FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 42, Art. 5]

Whether Sudden Things Are Especially Feared?

Objection 1: It would seem that unwonted and sudden things are not

especially feared. Because, as hope is about good things, so fear is

about evil things. But experience conduces to the increase of hope in

good things. Therefore it also adds to fear in evil things.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those are

feared most, not who are quick-tempered, but who are gentle and

cunning." Now it is clear that those who are quick-tempered are more

subject to sudden emotions. Therefore sudden things are less to be

feared.

Obj. 3: Further, we think less about things that happen suddenly. But

the more we think about a thing, the more we fear it; hence the

Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "some appear to be courageous

through ignorance, but as soon as they discover that the case is

different from what they expected, they run away." Therefore sudden

things are feared less.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): "Fear is startled

at things unwonted and sudden, which endanger things beloved, and

takes forethought for their safety."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3; Q. 41, A. 2), the object of

fear is an imminent evil, which can be repelled, but with difficulty.

Now this is due to one of two causes: to the greatness of the evil,

or to the weakness of him that fears; while unwontedness and

suddenness conduce to both of these causes. First, it helps an

imminent evil to seem greater. Because all material things, whether

good or evil, the more we consider them, the smaller they seem.

Consequently, just as sorrow for a present evil is mitigated in

course of time, as Cicero states (De Quaest. Tusc. iii, 30); so, too,

fear of a future evil is diminished by thinking about it beforehand.

Secondly, unwontedness and suddenness increase the weakness of him

that fears, in so far as they deprive him of the remedies with which

he might otherwise provide himself to forestall the coming evil, were

it not for the evil taking him by surprise.

Reply Obj. 1: The object of hope is a good that is possible to

obtain. Consequently whatever increases a man's power, is of a nature

to increase hope, and, for the same reason, to diminish fear, since

fear is about an evil which cannot be easily repelled. Since,

therefore, experience increases a man's power of action, therefore,

as it increases hope, so does it diminish fear.

Reply Obj. 2: Those who are quick-tempered do not hide their anger;

wherefore the harm they do others is not so sudden, as not to be

foreseen. On the other hand, those who are gentle or cunning hide

their anger; wherefore the harm which may be impending from them,

cannot be foreseen, but takes one by surprise. For this reason the

Philosopher says that such men are feared more than others.

Reply Obj. 3: Bodily good or evil, considered in itself, seems

greater at first. The reason for this is that a thing is more obvious

when seen in juxtaposition with its contrary. Hence, when a man

passes unexpectedly from penury to wealth, he thinks more of his

wealth on account of his previous poverty: while, on the other hand,

the rich man who suddenly becomes poor, finds poverty all the more

disagreeable. For this reason sudden evil is feared more, because it

seems more to be evil. However, it may happen through some accident

that the greatness of some evil is hidden; for instance if the foe

hides himself in ambush: and then it is true that evil inspires

greater fear through being much thought about.

________________________

Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) From the Complete American Edition · 第 292 / 746 题