THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 39, Art. 3]

Whether Sorrow Can Be a Useful Good?

Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow cannot be a useful good. For

it is written (Ecclus. 30:25): "Sadness hath killed many, and there

is no profit in it."

Obj. 2: Further, choice is of that which is useful to an end. But

sorrow is not an object of choice; in fact, "a thing without sorrow

is to be chosen rather than the same thing with sorrow" (Topic. iii,

2). Therefore sorrow is not a useful good.

Obj. 3: Further, "Everything is for the sake of its own operation,"

as stated in _De Coelo_ ii, 3. But "sorrow hinders operation," as

stated in _Ethic._ x, 5. Therefore sorrow is not a useful good.

_On the contrary,_ The wise man seeks only that which is useful. But

according to Eccles. 7:5, "the heart of the wise is where there is

mourning, and the heart of fools where there is mirth." Therefore

sorrow is useful.

_I answer that,_ A twofold movement of the appetite ensues from a

present evil. One is that whereby the appetite is opposed to the

present evil; and, in this respect, sorrow is of no use; because that

which is present, cannot be not present. The other movement arises in

the appetite to the effect of avoiding or expelling the saddening

evil: and, in this respect, sorrow is of use, if it be for something

which ought to be avoided. Because there are two reasons for which it

may be right to avoid a thing. First, because it should be avoided in

itself, on account of its being contrary to good; for instance, sin.

Wherefore sorrow for sin is useful as inducing a man to avoid sin:

hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:9): "I am glad: not because you were

made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto penance."

Secondly, a thing is to be avoided, not as though it were evil in

itself, but because it is an occasion of evil; either through one's

being attached to it, and loving it too much, or through one's being

thrown headlong thereby into an evil, as is evident in the case of

temporal goods. And, in this respect, sorrow for temporal goods may

be useful; according to Eccles. 7:3: "It is better to go to the house

of mourning, than to the house of feasting: for in that we are put in

mind of the end of all."

Moreover, sorrow for that which ought to be avoided is always useful,

since it adds another motive for avoiding it. Because the very evil

is in itself a thing to be avoided: while everyone avoids sorrow for

its own sake, just as everyone seeks the good, and pleasure in the

good. Therefore just as pleasure in the good makes one seek the good

more earnestly, so sorrow for evil makes one avoid evil more eagerly.

Reply Obj. 1: This passage is to be taken as referring to excessive

sorrow, which consumes the soul: for such sorrow paralyzes the soul,

and hinders it from shunning evil, as stated above (Q. 37, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2: Just as any object of choice becomes less eligible by

reason of sorrow, so that which ought to be shunned is still more to

be shunned by reason of sorrow: and, in this respect, sorrow is

useful.

Reply Obj. 3: Sorrow caused by an action hinders that action: but

sorrow for the cessation of an action, makes one do it more earnestly.

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Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) From the Complete American Edition · 第 271 / 746 题