Whether Sorrow Can Be a Virtuous Good?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not a virtuous good. For
that which leads to hell is not a virtuous good. But, as Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 33), "Jacob seems to have feared lest he
should be troubled overmuch by sorrow, and so, instead of entering
into the rest of the blessed, be consigned to the hell of sinners."
Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good.
Obj. 2: Further, the virtuous good is praiseworthy and meritorious.
But sorrow lessens praise or merit: for the Apostle says (2 Cor.
9:7): "Everyone, as he hath determined in his heart, not with
sadness, or of necessity." Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good.
Obj. 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15), "sorrow is
concerned about those things which happen against our will." But not
to will those things which are actually taking place, is to have a
will opposed to the decree of God, to Whose providence whatever is
done is subject. Since, then, conformity of the human to the Divine
will is a condition of the rectitude of the will, as stated above (Q.
19, A. 9), it seems that sorrow is incompatible with rectitude of the
will, and that consequently it is not virtuous.
_On the contrary,_ Whatever merits the reward of eternal life is
virtuous. But such is sorrow; as is evident from Matt. 5:5: "Blessed
are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore sorrow
is a virtuous good.
_I answer that,_ In so far as sorrow is good, it can be a virtuous
good. For it has been said above (A. 1) that sorrow is a good
inasmuch as it denotes perception and rejection of evil. These two
things, as regards bodily pain, are a proof of the goodness of
nature, to which it is due that the senses perceive, and that nature
shuns, the harmful thing that causes pain. As regards interior
sorrow, perception of the evil is sometimes due to a right judgment
of reason; while the rejection of the evil is the act of the will,
well disposed and detesting that evil. Now every virtuous good
results from these two things, the rectitude of the reason and the
will. Wherefore it is evident that sorrow may be a virtuous good.
Reply Obj. 1: All the passions of the soul should be regulated
according to the rule of reason, which is the root of the virtuous
good; but excessive sorrow, of which Augustine is speaking, oversteps
this rule, and therefore it fails to be a virtuous good.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as sorrow for an evil arises from a right will and
reason, which detest the evil, so sorrow for a good is due to a
perverse reason and will, which detest the good. Consequently such
sorrow is an obstacle to the praise and merit of the virtuous good;
for instance, when a man gives an alms sorrowfully.
Reply Obj. 3: Some things do actually happen, not because God wills,
but because He permits them to happen--such as sins. Consequently a
will that is opposed to sin, whether in oneself or in another, is not
discordant from the Divine will. Penal evils happen actually, even by
God's will. But it is not necessary for the rectitude of his will,
that man should will them in themselves: but only that he should not
revolt against the order of Divine justice, as stated above (Q. 19,
A. 10).
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