SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 6]

Whether Sorrow Is to Be Shunned More Than Pleasure Is to Be Sought?

Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is to be shunned more than

pleasure is to be sought. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 63): "There

is nobody that does not shun sorrow more than he seeks pleasure." Now

that which all agree in doing, seems to be natural. Therefore it is

natural and right for sorrow to be shunned more than pleasure is

sought.

Obj. 2: Further, the action of a contrary conduces to rapidity and

intensity of movement: for "hot water freezes quicker and harder," as

the Philosopher says (Meteor. i, 12). But the shunning of sorrow is

due to the contrariety of the cause of sorrow; whereas the desire for

pleasure does not arise from any contrariety, but rather from the

suitableness of the pleasant object. Therefore sorrow is shunned more

eagerly than pleasure is sought.

Obj. 3: Further, the stronger the passion which a man resists

according to reason, the more worthy is he of praise, and the more

virtuous: since "virtue is concerned with the difficult and the good"

(Ethic. ii, 3). But the brave man who resists the movement of

shunning sorrow, is more virtuous than the temperate man, who resists

the movement of desire for pleasure: since the Philosopher says

(Rhet. ii, 4) that "the brave and the just are chiefly praised."

Therefore the movement of shunning sorrow is more eager than the

movement of seeking pleasure.

_On the contrary,_ Good is stronger than evil, as Dionysius declares

(Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure is desirable for the sake of the good

which is its object; whereas the shunning of sorrow is on account of

evil. Therefore the desire for pleasure is more eager than the

shunning of sorrow.

_I answer that,_ The desire for pleasure is of itself more eager than

the shunning of sorrow. The reason of this is that the cause of

pleasure is a suitable good; while the cause of pain or sorrow is an

unsuitable evil. Now it happens that a certain good is suitable

without any repugnance at all: but it is not possible for any evil to

be so unsuitable as not to be suitable in some way. Wherefore

pleasure can be entire and perfect: whereas sorrow is always partial.

Therefore desire for pleasure is naturally greater than the shunning

of sorrow. Another reason is because the good, which is the object of

pleasure, is sought for its own sake: whereas the evil, which is the

object of sorrow, is to be shunned as being a privation of good: and

that which is by reason of itself is stronger than that which is by

reason of something else. Moreover we find a confirmation of this in

natural movements. For every natural movement is more intense in the

end, when a thing approaches the term that is suitable to its nature,

than at the beginning, when it leaves the term that is unsuitable to

its nature: as though nature were more eager in tending to what is

suitable to it, than in shunning what is unsuitable. Therefore the

inclination of the appetitive power is, of itself, more eager in

tending to pleasure than in shunning sorrow.

But it happens accidentally that a man shuns sorrow more eagerly than

he seeks pleasure: and this for three reasons. First, on the part of

the apprehension. Because, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "love

is felt more keenly, when we lack that which we love." Now from the

lack of what we love, sorrow results, which is caused either by the

loss of some loved good, or by the presence of some contrary evil.

But pleasure suffers no lack of the good loved, for it rests in

possession of it. Since then love is the cause of pleasure and

sorrow, the latter is the more shunned, according as love is the more

keenly felt on account of that which is contrary to it. Secondly, on

the part of the cause of sorrow or pain, which cause is repugnant to

a good that is more loved than the good in which we take pleasure.

For we love the natural well-being of the body more than the pleasure

of eating: and consequently we would leave the pleasure of eating and

the like, from fear of the pain occasioned by blows or other such

causes, which are contrary to the well-being of the body. Thirdly, on

the part of the effect: namely, in so far as sorrow hinders not only

one pleasure, but all.

Reply Obj. 1: The saying of Augustine that "sorrow is shunned more

than pleasure is sought" is true accidentally but not simply. And

this is clear from what he says after: "Since we see that the most

savage animals are deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear of

pain," which pain is contrary to life which is loved above all.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not the same with movement from within and

movement from without. For movement from within tends to what is

suitable more than it recedes from that which is unsuitable; as we

remarked above in regard to natural movement. But movement from

without is intensified by the very opposition: because each thing

strives in its own way to resist anything contrary to it, as aiming

at its own preservation. Hence violent movement is intense at first,

and slackens towards the end. Now the movement of the appetitive

faculty is from within: since it tends from the soul to the object.

Consequently pleasure is, of itself, more to be sought than sorrow is

to be shunned. But the movement of the sensitive faculty is from

without, as it were from the object of the soul. Consequently the

more contrary a thing is the more it is felt. And then too,

accidentally, in so far as the senses are requisite for pleasure and

pain, pain is shunned more than pleasure is sought.

Reply Obj. 3: A brave man is not praised because, in accordance with

reason, he is not overcome by any kind of sorrow or pain whatever,

but because he is not overcome by that which is concerned with the

dangers of death. And this kind of sorrow is more shunned, than

pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse are sought, which

latter pleasures are the object of temperance: thus life is loved

more than food and sexual pleasure. But the temperate man is praised

for refraining from pleasures of touch, more than for not shunning

the pains which are contrary to them, as is stated in _Ethic._ iii,

11.

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Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) From the Complete American Edition · 第 249 / 746 题