Whether There Is Any Sorrow Contrary to the Pleasure of Contemplation?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is a sorrow that is contrary to
the pleasure of contemplation. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:10):
"The sorrow that is according to God, worketh penance steadfast unto
salvation." Now to look at God belongs to the higher reason, whose act
is to give itself to contemplation, according to Augustine (De Trin.
xii, 3, 4). Therefore there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation.
Obj. 2: Further, contrary things have contrary effects. If therefore
the contemplation of one contrary gives pleasure, the other contrary
will give sorrow: and so there will be a sorrow contrary to the
pleasure of contemplation.
Obj. 3: Further, as the object of pleasure is good, so the object of
sorrow is evil. But contemplation can be an evil: since the
Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, 9) that "it is unfitting to think of
certain things." Therefore sorrow can be contrary to the pleasure of
contemplation.
Obj. 4: Further, any work, so far as it is unhindered, can be a cause
of pleasure, as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 12, 13; x, 4. But the work of
contemplation can be hindered in many ways, either so as to destroy
it altogether, or as to make it difficult. Therefore in contemplation
there can be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure.
Obj. 5: Further, affliction of the flesh is a cause of sorrow. But,
as it is written (Eccles. 12:12) "much study is an affliction of the
flesh." Therefore contemplation admits of sorrow contrary to its
pleasure.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 8:16): "Her," i.e. wisdom's,
"conversation hath no bitterness nor her company any tediousness; but
joy and gladness." Now the conversation and company of wisdom are
found in contemplation. Therefore there is no sorrow contrary to the
pleasure of contemplation.
_I answer that,_ The pleasure of contemplation can be understood in
two ways. In one way, so that contemplation is the cause, but not the
object of pleasure: and then pleasure is taken not in contemplating
but in the thing contemplated. Now it is possible to contemplate
something harmful and sorrowful, just as to contemplate something
suitable and pleasant. Consequently if the pleasure of contemplation
be taken in this way, nothing hinders some sorrow being contrary to
the pleasure of contemplation.
In another way, the pleasure of contemplation is understood, so that
contemplation is its object and cause; as when one takes pleasure in
the very act of contemplating. And thus, according to Gregory of
Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.], "no sorrow is contrary to
that pleasure which is about contemplation": and the Philosopher says
the same (Topic. i, 13; Ethic. x, 3). This, however, is to be
understood as being the case properly speaking. The reason is because
sorrow is of itself contrary to pleasure in a contrary object: thus
pleasure in heat is contrary to sorrow caused by cold. But there is
no contrary to the object of contemplation: because contraries, as
apprehended by the mind, are not contrary, but one is the means of
knowing the other. Wherefore, properly speaking, there cannot be a
sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. Nor has it any
sorrow annexed to it, as bodily pleasures have, which are like
remedies against certain annoyances; thus a man takes pleasure in
drinking through being troubled with thirst, but when the thirst is
quite driven out, the pleasure of drinking ceases also. Because the
pleasure of contemplation is not caused by one's being quit of an
annoyance, but by the fact that contemplation is pleasant in itself:
for pleasure is not a "becoming" but a perfect operation, as stated
above (Q. 31, A. 1).
Accidentally, however, sorrow is mingled with the pleasure of
contemplation; and this in two ways: first, on the part of an organ,
secondly, through some impediment in the apprehension. On the part of
an organ, sorrow or pain is mingled with apprehension, directly, as
regards the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part, which have a
bodily organ; either from the sensible object disagreeing with the
normal condition of the organ, as the taste of something bitter, and
the smell of something foul; or from the sensible object, though
agreeable, being so continuous in its action on the sense, that it
exceeds the normal condition of the organ, as stated above (Q. 33, A.
2), the result being that an apprehension which at first was pleasant
becomes tedious. But these two things cannot occur directly in the
contemplation of the mind; because the mind has no corporeal organ:
wherefore it was said in the authority quoted above that intellectual
contemplation has neither "bitterness," nor "tediousness." Since,
however, the human mind, in contemplation, makes use of the sensitive
powers of apprehension, to whose acts weariness is incidental;
therefore some affliction or pain is indirectly mingled with
contemplation.
Nevertheless, in neither of these ways, is the pain thus accidentally
mingled with contemplation, contrary to the pleasure thereof. Because
pain caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not contrary to the
pleasure of contemplation, but rather is in affinity and in harmony
with it, as is evident from what has been said above (A. 4): while
pain or sorrow caused by bodily weariness, does not belong to the
same genus, wherefore it is altogether disparate. Accordingly it is
evident that no sorrow is contrary to pleasure taken in the very act
of contemplation; nor is any sorrow connected with it save
accidentally.
Reply Obj. 1: The "sorrow which is according to God," is not caused
by the very act of intellectual contemplation, but by something which
the mind contemplates: viz. by sin, which the mind considers as
contrary to the love of God.
Reply Obj. 2: Things which are contrary according to nature are not
contrary according as they exist in the mind: for things that are
contrary in reality are not contrary in the order of thought; indeed
rather is one contrary the reason for knowing the other. Hence one
and the same science considers contraries.
Reply Obj. 3: Contemplation, in itself, is never evil, since it is
nothing else than the consideration of truth, which is the good of
the intellect: it can, however, be evil accidentally, i.e. in so far
as the contemplation of a less noble object hinders the contemplation
of a more noble object; or on the part of the object contemplated, to
which the appetite is inordinately attached.
Reply Obj. 4: Sorrow caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not
contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but is in harmony with it,
as stated above.
Reply Obj. 5: Affliction of the flesh affects contemplation
accidentally and indirectly, as stated above.
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