Whether Delight Is in Time?
Objection 1: It would seem that delight is in time. For "delight is
a kind of movement," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But all
movement is in time. Therefore delight is in time.
Obj. 2: Further, a thing is said to last long and to be morose in
respect of time. But some pleasures are called morose. Therefore
pleasure is in time.
Obj. 3: Further, the passions of the soul are of one same genus. But
some passions of the soul are in time. Therefore delight is too.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "no one
takes pleasure according to time."
_I answer that,_ A thing may be in time in two ways: first, by
itself; secondly, by reason of something else, and accidentally as
it were. For since time is the measure of successive things, those
things are of themselves said to be in time, to which succession or
something pertaining to succession is essential: such are movement,
repose, speech and such like. On the other hand, those things are
said to be in time, by reason of something else and not of
themselves, to which succession is not essential, but which are
subject to something successive. Thus the fact of being a man is not
essentially something successive; since it is not a movement, but the
term of a movement or change, viz. of this being begotten: yet,
because human being is subject to changeable causes, in this respect,
to be a man is in time.
Accordingly, we must say that delight, of itself indeed, is not in
time: for it regards good already gained, which is, as it were, the
term of the movement. But if this good gained be subject to change,
the delight therein will be in time accidentally: whereas if it be
altogether unchangeable, the delight therein will not be in time,
either by reason of itself or accidentally.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated in _De Anima_ iii, 7, movement is twofold.
One is "the act of something imperfect, i.e. of something existing in
potentiality, as such": this movement is successive and is in time.
Another movement is "the act of something perfect, i.e. of something
existing in act," e.g. to understand, to feel, and to will and such
like, also to have delight. This movement is not successive, nor is
it of itself in time.
Reply Obj. 2: Delight is said to be long lasting or morose, according
as it is accidentally in time.
Reply Obj. 3: Other passions have not for their object a good
obtained, as delight has. Wherefore there is more of the movement of
the imperfect in them than in delight. And consequently it belongs
more to delight not to be in time.
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