Whether Delight Is a Passion?
Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not a passion. For
Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes operation from
passion, and says that "operation is a movement in accord with
nature, while passion is a movement contrary to nature." But delight
is an operation, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 5).
Therefore delight is not a passion.
Obj. 2: Further, "To be passive is to be moved," as stated in _Phys._
iii, 3. But delight does not consist in being moved, but in having
been moved; for it arises from good already gained. Therefore delight
is not a passion.
Obj. 3: Further, delight is a kind of a perfection of the one who is
delighted; since it "perfects operation," as stated in _Ethic._ x, 4,
5. But to be perfected does not consist in being passive or in being
altered, as stated in _Phys._ vii, 3 and _De Anima_ ii, 5. Therefore
delight is not a passion.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 2; xiv, 5 seqq) reckons
delight, joy, or gladness among the other passions of the soul.
_I answer that,_ The movements of the sensitive appetite, are
properly called passions, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3). Now every
emotion arising from a sensitive apprehension, is a movement of the
sensitive appetite: and this must needs be said of delight, since,
according to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11) "delight is a certain
movement of the soul and a sensible establishing thereof all at once,
in keeping with the nature of the thing."
In order to understand this, we must observe that just as in natural
things some happen to attain to their natural perfections, so does
this happen in animals. And though movement towards perfection does
not occur all at once, yet the attainment of natural perfection does
occur all at once. Now there is this difference between animals and
other natural things, that when these latter are established in the
state becoming their nature, they do not perceive it, whereas animals
do. And from this perception there arises a certain movement of the
soul in the sensitive appetite; which movement is called delight.
Accordingly by saying that delight is "a movement of the soul," we
designate its genus. By saying that it is "an establishing in keeping
with the thing's nature," i.e. with that which exists in the thing, we
assign the cause of delight, viz. the presence of a becoming good. By
saying that this establishing is "all at once," we mean that this
establishing is to be understood not as in the process of
establishment, but as in the fact of complete establishment, in the
term of the movement, as it were: for delight is not a "becoming" as
Plato [*Phileb. 32, 33] maintained, but a "complete fact," as stated
in _Ethic._ vii, 12. Lastly, by saying that this establishing is
"sensible," we exclude the perfections of insensible things wherein
there is no delight. It is therefore evident that, since delight is a
movement of the animal appetite arising from an apprehension of sense,
it is a passion of the soul.
Reply Obj. 1: Connatural operation, which is unhindered, is a second
perfection, as stated in _De Anima_ ii, 1: and therefore when a thing
is established in its proper connatural and unhindered operation,
delight follows, which consists in a state of completion, as observed
above. Accordingly when we say that delight is an operation, we
designate, not its essence, but its cause.
Reply Obj. 2: A twofold movement is to be observed in an animal: one,
according to the intention of the end, and this belongs to the
appetite; the other, according to the execution, and this belongs to
the external operation. And so, although in him who has already
gained the good in which he delights, the movement of execution
ceases, by which he tends to the end; yet the movement of the
appetitive faculty does not cease, since, just as before it desired
that which it had not, so afterwards does it delight in that which is
possesses. For though delight is a certain repose of the appetite, if
we consider the presence of the pleasurable good that satisfies the
appetite, nevertheless there remains the impression made on the
appetite by its object, by reason of which delight is a kind of
movement.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the name of passion is more appropriate to
those passions which have a corruptive and evil tendency, such as
bodily ailments, as also sadness and fear in the soul; yet some
passions have a tendency to something good, as stated above (Q. 23,
AA. 1, 4): and in this sense delight is called a passion.
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