Whether Anything Can Be an Object of Universal Hatred?
Objection 1: It would seem that a thing cannot be an object of
universal hatred. Because hatred is a passion of the sensitive
appetite, which is moved by an apprehension in the senses. But the
senses cannot apprehend the universal. Therefore a thing cannot be an
object of universal hatred.
Obj. 2: Further, hatred is caused by disagreement; and where there is
disagreement, there is nothing in common. But the notion of
universality implies something in common. Therefore nothing can be
the object of universal hatred.
Obj. 3: Further, the object of hatred is evil. But "evil is in
things, and not in the mind" (Metaph. vi, 4). Since therefore the
universal is in the mind only, which abstracts the universal from the
particular, it would seem that hatred cannot have a universal object.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is
directed to something singular, whereas hatred is also directed to a
thing in general; for everybody hates the thief and the backbiter."
_I answer that,_ There are two ways of speaking of the universal:
first, as considered under the aspect of universality; secondly, as
considered in the nature to which it is ascribed: for it is one thing
to consider the universal man, and another to consider a man as man.
If, therefore, we take the universal, in the first way, no sensitive
power, whether of apprehension or of appetite, can attain the
universal: because the universal is obtained by abstraction from
individual matter, on which every sensitive power is based.
Nevertheless the sensitive powers, both of apprehension and of
appetite, can tend to something universally. Thus we say that the
object of sight is color considered generically; not that the sight
is cognizant of universal color, but because the fact that color is
cognizant by the sight, is attributed to color, not as being this
particular color, but simply because it is color. Accordingly hatred
in the sensitive faculty can regard something universally: because
this thing, by reason of its common nature, and not merely as an
individual, is hostile to the animal--for instance, a wolf in regard
to a sheep. Hence a sheep hates the wolf universally. On the other
hand, anger is always caused by something in particular: because it
is caused by some action of the one that hurts us; and actions
proceed from individuals. For this reason the Philosopher says (Rhet.
ii, 4) that "anger is always directed to something singular, whereas
hatred can be directed to a thing in general."
But according as hatred is in the intellectual part, since it arises
from the universal apprehension of the intellect, it can regard the
universal in both ways.
Reply Obj. 1: The senses do not apprehend the universal, as such: but
they apprehend something to which the character of universality is
given by abstraction.
Reply Obj. 2: That which is common to all cannot be a reason of
hatred. But nothing hinders a thing from being common to many, and at
variance with others, so as to be hateful to them.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the universal under the aspect
of universality: and thus it does not come under the sensitive
apprehension or appetite.
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