Whether Any Passion Is Good or Evil in Its Species?
Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is good or
evil morally according to its species. Because moral good and evil
depend on reason. But the passions are in the sensitive appetite; so
that accordance with reason is accidental to them. Since, therefore,
nothing accidental belongs to a thing's species, it seems that no
passion is good or evil according to its species.
Obj. 2: Further, acts and passions take their species from their
object. If, therefore, any passion were good or evil, according to
its species, it would follow that those passions the object of which
is good, are specifically good, such as love, desire and joy: and
that those passions, the object of which is evil, are specifically
evil, as hatred, fear and sadness. But this is clearly false.
Therefore no passion is good or evil according to its species.
Obj. 3: Further, there is no species of passion that is not to be
found in other animals. But moral good is in man alone. Therefore no
passion of the soul is good or evil according to its species.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "pity is a
kind of virtue." Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that
modesty is a praiseworthy passion. Therefore some passions are good
or evil according to their species.
_I answer that,_ We ought, seemingly, to apply to passions what has
been said in regard to acts (Q. 18, AA. 5, 6; Q. 20, A. 1)--viz. that
the species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be considered
from two points of view. First, according to its natural genus; and
thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species of an
act or passion. Secondly, according to its moral genus, inasmuch as
it is voluntary and controlled by reason. In this way moral good and
evil can belong to the species of a passion, in so far as the object
to which a passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord
with reason: as is clear in the case of _shame_ which is base fear;
and of _envy_ which is sorrow for another's good: for thus passions
belong to the same species as the external act.
Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the passions in their natural
species, in so far as the sensitive appetite is considered in itself.
But in so far as the sensitive appetite obeys reason, good and evil
of reason are no longer accidentally in the passions of the appetite,
but essentially.
Reply Obj. 2: Passions having a tendency to good, are themselves
good, if they tend to that which is truly good, and in like manner,
if they turn away from that which is truly evil. On the other hand,
those passions which consist in aversion from good, and a tendency to
evil, are themselves evil.
Reply Obj. 3: In irrational animals the sensitive appetite does not
obey reason. Nevertheless, in so far as they are led by a kind of
estimative power, which is subject to a higher, i.e. the Divine
reason, there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard
to the soul's passions.
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