Whether Every Passion of the Soul Is Evil Morally?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the passions of the soul are
morally evil. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "some call
the soul's passions diseases or disturbances of the soul" [*Cf. Q.
22, A. 2, footnote]. But every disease or disturbance of the soul is
morally evil. Therefore every passion of the soul is evil morally.
Obj. 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "movement
in accord with nature is an action, but movement contrary to nature
is passion." But in movements of the soul, what is against nature is
sinful and morally evil: hence he says elsewhere (De Fide Orth. ii,
4) that "the devil turned from that which is in accord with nature to
that which is against nature." Therefore these passions are morally
evil.
Obj. 3: Further, whatever leads to sin, has an aspect of evil. But
these passions lead to sin: wherefore they are called "the passions
of sins" (Rom. 7:5). Therefore it seems that they are morally evil.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "all
these emotions are right in those whose love is rightly placed . . .
For they fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve for sin,
they rejoice in good works."
_I answer that,_ On this question the opinion of the Stoics differed
from that of the Peripatetics: for the Stoics held that all passions
are evil, while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate passions
are good. This difference, although it appears great in words, is
nevertheless, in reality, none at all, or but little, if we consider
the intent of either school. For the Stoics did not discern between
sense and intellect; and consequently neither between the
intellectual and sensitive appetite. Hence they did not discriminate
the passions of the soul from the movements of the will, in so far as
the passions of the soul are in the sensitive appetite, while the
simple movements of the will are in the intellectual appetite: but
every rational movement of the appetitive part they call will, while
they called passion, a movement that exceeds the limits of reason.
Wherefore Cicero, following their opinion (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4)
calls all passions "diseases of the soul": whence he argues that
"those who are diseased are unsound; and those who are unsound are
wanting in sense." Hence we speak of those who are wanting in sense
of being "unsound."
On the other hand, the Peripatetics give the name of "passions" to
all the movements of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore they esteem
them good, when they are controlled by reason; and evil when they are
not controlled by reason. Hence it is evident that Cicero was wrong
in disapproving (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) of the Peripatetic theory
of a mean in the passions, when he says that "every evil, though
moderate, should be shunned; for, just as a body, though it be
moderately ailing, is not sound; so, this mean in the diseases or
passions of the soul, is not sound." For passions are not called
"diseases" or "disturbances" of the soul, save when they are not
controlled by reason.
Hence the reply to the First Objection is evident.
Reply Obj. 2: In every passion there is an increase or decrease in
the natural movement of the heart, according as the heart is moved
more or less intensely by contraction and dilatation; and hence it
derives the character of passion. But there is no need for passion to
deviate always from the order of natural reason.
Reply Obj. 3: The passions of the soul, in so far as they are
contrary to the order of reason, incline us to sin: but in so far as
they are controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue.
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