Whether the Degree of Goodness or Malice in the Will Depends on the
Degree of Good or Evil in the Intention?
Objection 1: It would seem that the degree of goodness in the will
depends on the degree of good in the intention. Because on Matt.
12:35, "A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth
forth that which is good," a gloss says: "A man does as much good as
he intends." But the intention gives goodness not only to the
external action, but also to the act of the will, as stated above (A.
7). Therefore the goodness of a man's will is according to the
goodness of his intention.
Obj. 2: Further, if you add to the cause, you add to the effect. But
the goodness of the intention is the cause of the good will.
Therefore a man's will is good, according as his intention is good.
Obj. 3: Further, in evil actions, a man sins in proportion to his
intention: for if a man were to throw a stone with a murderous
intention, he would be guilty of murder. Therefore, for the same
reason, in good actions, the will is good in proportion to the good
intended.
_On the contrary,_ The intention can be good, while the will is evil.
Therefore, for the same reason, the intention can be better, and the
will less good.
_I answer that,_ In regard to both the act, and the intention of the
end, we may consider a twofold quantity: one, on the part of the
object, by reason of a man willing or doing a good that is greater;
the other, taken from the intensity of the act, according as a man
wills or acts intensely; and this is more on the part of the agent.
If then we speak of these respective quantities from the point of
view of the object, it is evident that the quantity in the act does
not depend on the quantity in the intention. With regard to the
external act this may happen in two ways. First, through the object
that is ordained to the intended end not being proportionate to that
end; for instance, if a man were to give ten pounds, he could not
realize his intention, if he intended to buy a thing worth a hundred
pounds. Secondly, on account of the obstacles that may supervene in
regard to the exterior action, which obstacles we are unable to
remove: for instance, a man intends to go to Rome, and encounters
obstacles, which prevent him from going. On the other hand, with
regard to the interior act of the will, this happens in only one way:
because the interior acts of the will are in our power, whereas the
external actions are not. But the will can will an object that is not
proportionate to the intended end: and thus the will that tends to
that object considered absolutely, is not so good as the intention.
Yet because the intention also belongs, in a way, to the act of the
will, inasmuch, to wit, as it is the reason thereof; it comes to pass
that the quantity of goodness in the intention redounds upon the act
of the will; that is to say, in so far as the will wills some great
good for an end, although that by which it wills to gain so great a
good, is not proportionate to that good.
But if we consider the quantity in the intention and in the act,
according to their respective intensity, then the intensity of the
intention redounds upon the interior act and the exterior act of the
will: since the intention stands in relation to them as a kind of
form, as is clear from what has been said above (Q. 12, A. 4; Q. 18,
A. 6). And yet considered materially, while the intention is intense,
the interior or exterior act may be not so intense, materially
speaking: for instance, when a man does not will with as much
intensity to take medicine as he wills to regain health. Nevertheless
the very fact of intending health intensely, redounds, as a formal
principle, upon the intense volition of medicine.
We must observe, however, that the intensity of the interior or
exterior act, may be referred to the intention as its object: as when
a man intends to will intensely, or to do something intensely. And
yet it does not follow that he wills or acts intensely; because the
quantity of goodness in the interior or exterior act does not depend
on the quantity of the good intended, as is shown above. And hence it
is that a man does not merit as much as he intends to merit: because
the quantity of merit is measured by the intensity of the act, as we
shall show later on (Q. 20, A. 4; Q. 114, A. 4).
Reply Obj. 1: This gloss speaks of good as in the estimation of God,
Who considers principally the intention of the end. Wherefore another
gloss says on the same passage that "the treasure of the heart is the
intention, according to which God judges our works." For the goodness
of the intention, as stated above, redounds, so to speak, upon the
goodness of the will, which makes even the external act to be
meritorious in God's sight.
Reply Obj. 2: The goodness of the intention is not the whole cause of
a good will. Hence the argument does not prove.
Reply Obj. 3: The mere malice of the intention suffices to make the
will evil: and therefore too, the will is as evil as the intention is
evil. But the same reasoning does not apply to goodness, as stated
above (ad 2).
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