Whether the Goodness of the Will, As Regards the Means, Depends on
the Intention of the End?
Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not
depend on the intention of the end. For it has been stated above (A.
2) that the goodness of the will depends on the object alone. But as
regards the means, the object of the will is one thing, and the end
intended is another. Therefore in such matters the goodness of the
will does not depend on the intention of the end.
Obj. 2: Further, to wish to keep God's commandment, belongs to a good
will. But this can be referred to an evil end, for instance, to
vainglory or covetousness, by willing to obey God for the sake of
temporal gain. Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on
the intention of the end.
Obj. 3: Further, just as good and evil diversify the will, so do they
diversify the end. But malice of the will does not depend on the
malice of the end intended; since a man who wills to steal in order
to give alms, has an evil will, although he intends a good end.
Therefore neither does the goodness of the will depend on the
goodness of the end intended.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. ix, 3) that God rewards
the intention. But God rewards a thing because it is good. Therefore
the goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end.
_I answer that,_ The intention may stand in a twofold relation to the
act of the will; first, as preceding it, secondly as following
[*Leonine edn.: 'accompanying'] it. The intention precedes the act of
the will causally, when we will something because we intend a certain
end. And then the order to the end is considered as the reason of the
goodness of the thing willed: for instance, when a man wills to fast
for God's sake; because the act of fasting is specifically good from
the very fact that it is done for God's sake. Wherefore, since the
goodness of the will depends on the goodness of the thing willed, as
stated above (AA. 1, 2), it must, of necessity, depend on the
intention of the end.
On the other hand, intention follows the act of the will, when it is
added to a preceding act of the will; for instance, a man may will to
do something, and may afterwards refer it to God. And then the
goodness of the previous act of the will does not depend on the
subsequent intention, except in so far as that act is repeated with
the subsequent intention.
Reply Obj. 1: When the intention is the cause of the act of willing,
the order to the end is considered as the reason of the goodness of
the object, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: The act of the will cannot be said to be good, if an
evil intention is the cause of willing. For when a man wills to give
an alms for the sake of vainglory, he wills that which is good in
itself, under a species of evil; and therefore, as willed by him, it
is evil. Wherefore his will is evil. If, however, the intention is
subsequent to the act of the will, then the latter may be good: and
the intention does not spoil that act of the will which preceded, but
that which is repeated.
Reply Obj. 3: As we have already stated (A. 6, ad 1), "evil results
from each particular defect, but good from the whole and entire
cause." Hence, whether the will tend to what is evil in itself, even
under the species of good; or to the good under the species of evil,
it will be evil in either case. But in order for the will to be good,
it must tend to the good under the species of good; in other words,
it must will the good for the sake of the good.
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