Whether the Goodness of the Will Depends on Reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not
depend on reason. For what comes first does not depend on what
follows. But the good belongs to the will before it belongs to
reason, as is clear from what has been said above (Q. 9, A. 1).
Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on reason.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that the
goodness of the practical intellect is "a truth that is in conformity
with right desire." But right desire is a good will. Therefore the
goodness of the practical reason depends on the goodness of the will,
rather than conversely.
Obj. 3: Further, the mover does not depend on that which is moved,
but vice versa. But the will moves the reason and the other powers,
as stated above (Q. 9, A. 1). Therefore the goodness of the will
does not depend on reason.
_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. x): "It is an unruly will
that persists in its desires in opposition to reason." But the
goodness of the will consists in not being unruly. Therefore the
goodness of the will depends on its being subject to reason.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2), the goodness of the will
depends properly on the object. Now the will's object is proposed to
it by reason. Because the good understood is the proportionate object
of the will; while sensitive or imaginary good is proportionate not
to the will but to the sensitive appetite: since the will can tend to
the universal good, which reason apprehends; whereas the sensitive
appetite tends only to the particular good, apprehended by the
sensitive power. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on
reason, in the same way as it depends on the object.
Reply Obj. 1: The good considered as such, i.e. as appetible,
pertains to the will before pertaining to the reason. But considered
as true it pertains to the reason, before, under the aspect of
goodness, pertaining to the will: because the will cannot desire a
good that is not previously apprehended by reason.
Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher speaks here of the practical intellect,
in so far as it counsels and reasons about the means: for in this
respect it is perfected by prudence. Now in regard to the means, the
rectitude of the reason depends on its conformity with the desire of
a due end: nevertheless the very desire of the due end presupposes on
the part of reason a right apprehension of the end.
Reply Obj. 3: The will moves the reason in one way: the reason moves
the will in another, viz. on the part of the object, as stated above
(Q. 9, A. 1).
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