Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object alone?
Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not
depend on the object alone. For the end has a closer relationship to
the will than to any other power. But the acts of the other powers
derive goodness not only from the object but also from the end, as
we have shown above (Q. 18, A. 4). Therefore the act also of the
will derives goodness not only from the object but also from the end.
Obj. 2: Further, the goodness of an action is derived not only from
the object but also from the circumstances, as stated above (Q. 18,
A. 3). But according to the diversity of circumstances there may be
diversity of goodness and malice in the act of the will: for
instance, if a man will, when he ought, where he ought, as much as he
ought, and how he ought, or if he will as he ought not. Therefore the
goodness of the will depends not only on the object, but also on the
circumstances.
Obj. 3: Further, ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the
will, as stated above (Q. 6, A. 8). But it would not be so, unless
the goodness or malice of the will depended on the circumstances.
Therefore the goodness and malice of the will depend on the
circumstances, and not only on the object.
_On the contrary,_ An action does not take its species from the
circumstances as such, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 10, ad 2). But good
and evil are specific differences of the act of the will, as stated
above (A. 1). Therefore the goodness and malice of the will depend,
not on the circumstances, but on the object alone.
_I answer that,_ In every genus, the more a thing is first, the more
simple it is, and the fewer the principles of which it consists: thus
primary bodies are simple. Hence it is to be observed that the first
things in every genus, are, in some way, simple and consist of one
principle. Now the principle of the goodness and malice of human
actions is taken from the act of the will. Consequently the goodness
and malice of the act of the will depend on some one thing; while the
goodness and malice of other acts may depend on several things.
Now that one thing which is the principle in each genus, is not
something accidental to that genus, but something essential thereto:
because whatever is accidental is reduced to something essential, as
to its principle. Therefore the goodness of the will's act depends on
that one thing alone, which of itself causes goodness in the act; and
that one thing is the object, and not the circumstances, which are
accidents, as it were, of the act.
Reply Obj. 1: The end is the object of the will, but not of the other
powers. Hence, in regard to the act of the will, the goodness derived
from the object, does not differ from that which is derived from the
end, as they differ in the acts of the other powers; except perhaps
accidentally, in so far as one end depends on another, and one act of
the will on another.
Reply Obj. 2: Given that the act of the will is fixed on some good,
no circumstances can make that act bad. Consequently when it is said
that a man wills a good when he ought not, or where he ought not,
this can be understood in two ways. First, so that this circumstance
is referred to the thing willed. And thus the act of the will is not
fixed on something good: since to will to do something when it ought
not to be done, is not to will something good. Secondly, so that the
circumstance is referred to the act of willing. And thus, it is
impossible to will something good when one ought not to, because one
ought always to will what is good: except, perhaps, accidentally, in
so far as a man by willing some particular good, is prevented from
willing at the same time another good which he ought to will at that
time. And then evil results, not from his willing that particular
good, but from his not willing the other. The same applies to the
other circumstances.
Reply Obj. 3: Ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the will,
in so far as the circumstance affects the thing willed: that is to
say, in so far as a man ignores the circumstances of the act which
he wills.
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