Whether an Action Has the Species of Good or Evil from Its End?
Objection 1: It would seem that the good and evil which are from the
end do not diversify the species of actions. For actions derive their
species from the object. But the end is altogether apart from the
object. Therefore the good and evil which are from the end do not
diversify the species of an action.
Obj. 2: Further, that which is accidental does not constitute the
species, as stated above (A. 5). But it is accidental to an action to
be ordained to some particular end; for instance, to give alms from
vainglory. Therefore actions are not diversified as to species,
according to the good and evil which are from the end.
Obj. 3: Further, acts that differ in species, can be ordained to the
same end: thus to the end of vainglory, actions of various virtues
and vices can be ordained. Therefore the good and evil which are
taken from the end, do not diversify the species of action.
_On the contrary,_ It has been shown above (Q. 1, A. 3) that human
actions derive their species from the end. Therefore good and evil in
respect of the end diversify the species of actions.
_I answer that,_ Certain actions are called human, inasmuch as they
are voluntary, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1). Now, in a voluntary
action, there is a twofold action, viz. the interior action of the
will, and the external action: and each of these actions has its
object. The end is properly the object of the interior act of the
will: while the object of the external action, is that on which the
action is brought to bear. Therefore just as the external action
takes its species from the object on which it bears; so the interior
act of the will takes its species from the end, as from its own
proper object.
Now that which is on the part of the will is formal in regard to that
which is on the part of the external action: because the will uses
the limbs to act as instruments; nor have external actions any
measure of morality, save in so far as they are voluntary.
Consequently the species of a human act is considered formally with
regard to the end, but materially with regard to the object of the
external action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he
who steals that he may commit adultery, is strictly speaking, more
adulterer than thief."
Reply Obj. 1: The end also has the character of an object, as stated
above.
Reply Obj. 2: Although it is accidental to the external action to be
ordained to some particular end, it is not accidental to the interior
act of the will, which act is compared to the external act, as form
to matter.
Reply Obj. 3: When many actions, differing in species, are ordained
to the same end, there is indeed a diversity of species on the part
of the external actions; but unity of species on the part of the
internal action.
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