FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 11, Art. 4]

Whether Enjoyment Is Only of the End Possessed?

Objection 1: It would seem that enjoyment is only of the end

possessed. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1) that "to enjoy is to

use joyfully, with the joy, not of hope, but of possession." But so

long as a thing is not had, there is joy, not of possession, but of

hope. Therefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed.

Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 3), enjoyment is not properly

otherwise than of the last end: because this alone gives rest to the

appetite. But the appetite has no rest save in the possession of the

end. Therefore enjoyment, properly speaking, is only of the end

possessed.

Obj. 3: Further, to enjoy is to lay hold of the fruit. But one does

not lay hold of the fruit until one is in possession of the end.

Therefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed.

_On the contrary,_ "to enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for

its own sake," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4). But this

is possible, even in regard to a thing which is not in our

possession. Therefore it is possible to enjoy the end even though it

be not possessed.

_I answer that,_ To enjoy implies a certain relation of the will to

the last end, according as the will has something by way of last end.

Now an end is possessed in two ways; perfectly and imperfectly.

Perfectly, when it is possessed not only in intention but also in

reality; imperfectly, when it is possessed in intention only. Perfect

enjoyment, therefore, is of the end already possessed: but imperfect

enjoyment is also of the end possessed not really, but only in

intention.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine speaks there of perfect enjoyment.

Reply Obj. 2: The will is hindered in two ways from being at rest.

First on the part of the object; by reason of its not being the last

end, but ordained to something else: secondly on the part of the one

who desires the end, by reason of his not being yet in possession of

it. Now it is the object that specifies an act: but on the agent

depends the manner of acting, so that the act be perfect or

imperfect, as compared with the actual circumstances of the agent.

Therefore enjoyment of anything but the last end is not enjoyment

properly speaking, as falling short of the nature of enjoyment. But

enjoyment of the last end, not yet possessed, is enjoyment properly

speaking, but imperfect, on account of the imperfect way in which it

is possessed.

Reply Obj. 3: One is said to lay hold of or to have an end, not only

in reality, but also in intention, as stated above.

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Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) From the Complete American Edition · 第 89 / 746 题