Whether the Circumstances Are Properly Set Forth in the Third Book of
Ethics?
Objection 1: It would seem that the circumstances are not properly
set forth in _Ethic._ iii, 1. For a circumstance of an act is
described as something outside the act. Now time and place answer to
this description. Therefore there are only two circumstances, to wit,
"when" and "where."
Obj. 2: Further, we judge from the circumstances whether a thing is
well or ill done. But this belongs to the mode of an act. Therefore
all the circumstances are included under one, which is the "mode of
acting."
Obj. 3: Further, circumstances are not part of the substance of an
act. But the causes of an act seem to belong to its substance.
Therefore no circumstance should be taken from the cause of the act
itself. Accordingly, neither "who," nor "why," nor "about what," are
circumstances: since "who" refers to the efficient cause, "why" to
the final cause, and "about what" to the material cause.
On the contrary is the authority of the Philosopher in _Ethic._ iii,
1.
_I answer that,_ Tully, in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhetor. i), gives
seven circumstances, which are contained in this verse:
"Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando--
"Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, and when."
For in acts we must take note of "who" did it, "by what aids" or
"instruments" he did it, "what" he did, "where" he did it, "why" he
did it, "how" and "when" he did it. But Aristotle in _Ethic._ iii, 1
adds yet another, to wit, "about what," which Tully includes in the
circumstance "what."
The reason of this enumeration may be set down as follows. For a
circumstance is described as something outside the substance of the
act, and yet in a way touching it. Now this happens in three ways:
first, inasmuch as it touches the act itself; secondly, inasmuch as
it touches the cause of the act; thirdly, inasmuch as it touches the
effect. It touches the act itself, either by way of measure, as
"time" and "place"; or by qualifying the act as the "mode of acting."
It touches the effect when we consider "what" is done. It touches the
cause of the act, as to the final cause, by the circumstance "why";
as to the material cause, or object, in the circumstance "about
what"; as to the principal efficient cause, in the circumstance
"who"; and as to the instrumental efficient cause, in the
circumstance "by what aids."
Reply Obj. 1: Time and place surround (_circumstant_) the act by way of
measure; but the others surround the act by touching it in any other
way, while they are extrinsic to the substance of the act.
Reply Obj. 2: This mode "well" or "ill" is not a circumstance, but
results from all the circumstances. But the mode which refers to a
quality of the act is a special circumstance; for instance, that a
man walk fast or slowly; that he strike hard or gently, and so forth.
Reply Obj. 3: A condition of the cause, on which the substance of the
act depends, is not a circumstance; it must be an additional
condition. Thus, in regard to the object, it is not a circumstance of
theft that the object is another's property, for this belongs to the
substance of the act; but that it be great or small. And the same
applies to the other circumstances which are considered in reference
to the other causes. For the end that specifies the act is not a
circumstance, but some additional end. Thus, that a valiant man act
_valiantly for the sake of_ the good of the virtue o[f] fortitude, is
not a circumstance; but if he act valiantly for the sake of the
delivery of the state, or of Christendom, or some such purpose. The
same is to be said with regard to the circumstance "what"; for that a
man by pouring water on someone should happen to wash him, is not a
circumstance of the washing; but that in doing so he give him a
chill, or scald him; heal him or harm him, these are circumstances.
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