Whether Theologians Should Take Note of the Circumstances of Human
Acts?
Objection 1: It would seem that theologians should not take note of
the circumstances of human acts. Because theologians do not consider
human acts otherwise than according to their quality of good or evil.
But it seems that circumstances cannot give quality to human acts; for
a thing is never qualified, formally speaking, by that which is
outside it; but by that which is in it. Therefore theologians should
not take note of the circumstances of acts.
Obj. 2: Further, circumstances are the accidents of acts. But one
thing may be subject to an infinity of accidents; hence the
Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 2) that "no art or science considers
accidental being, except only the art of sophistry." Therefore the
theologian has not to consider circumstances.
Obj. 3: Further, the consideration of circumstances belongs to the
orator. But oratory is not a part of theology. Therefore it is not
a theologian's business to consider circumstances.
_On the contrary,_ Ignorance of circumstances causes an act to be
involuntary, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and
Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi.]. But involuntariness
excuses from sin, the consideration of which belongs to the
theologian. Therefore circumstances also should be considered by the
theologian.
_I answer that,_ Circumstances come under the consideration of the
theologian, for a threefold reason. First, because the theologian
considers human acts, inasmuch as man is thereby directed to
Happiness. Now, everything that is directed to an end should be
proportionate to that end. But acts are made proportionate to an end
by means of a certain commensurateness, which results from the due
circumstances. Hence the theologian has to consider the
circumstances. Secondly, because the theologian considers human acts
according as they are found to be good or evil, better or worse: and
this diversity depends on circumstances, as we shall see further on
(Q. 18, AA. 10, 11; Q. 73, A. 7). Thirdly, because the theologian
considers human acts under the aspect of merit and demerit, which is
proper to human acts; and for this it is requisite that they be
voluntary. Now a human act is deemed to be voluntary or involuntary,
according to knowledge or ignorance of circumstances, as stated above
(Q. 6, A. 8). Therefore the theologian has to consider circumstances.
Reply Obj. 1: Good directed to the end is said to be useful; and this
implies some kind of relation: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic.
i, 6) that "the good in the genus 'relation' is the useful." Now, in
the genus "relation" a thing is denominated not only according to
that which is inherent in the thing, but also according to that which
is extrinsic to it: as may be seen in the expressions "right" and
"left," "equal" and "unequal," and such like. Accordingly, since the
goodness of acts consists in their utility to the end, nothing
hinders their being called good or bad according to their proportion
to extrinsic things that are adjacent to them.
Reply Obj. 2: Accidents which are altogether accidental are neglected
by every art, by reason of their uncertainty and infinity. But such
like accidents are not what we call circumstances; because
circumstances although, as stated above (A. 1), they are extrinsic to
the act, nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it, by being
related to it. Proper accidents, however, come under the
consideration of art.
Reply Obj. 3: The consideration of circumstances belongs to the
moralist, the politician, and the orator. To the moralist, in so far
as with respect to circumstances we find or lose the mean of virtue
in human acts and passions. To the politician and to the orator, in
so far as circumstances make acts to be worthy of praise or blame, of
excuse or indictment. In different ways, however: because where the
orator persuades, the politician judges. To the theologian this
consideration belongs, in all the aforesaid ways: since to him all
the other arts are subservient: for he has to consider virtuous and
vicious acts, just as the moralist does; and with the orator and
politician he considers acts according as they are deserving of
reward or punishment.
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