Whether Every Man Desires Happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that not all desire Happiness. For no man
can desire what he knows not; since the apprehended good is the object
of the appetite (De Anima iii, 10). But many know not what Happiness
is. This is evident from the fact that, as Augustine says (De Trin.
xiii, 4), "some thought that Happiness consists in pleasures of the
body; some, in a virtue of the soul; some in other things." Therefore
not all desire Happiness.
Obj. 2: Further, the essence of Happiness is the vision of the Divine
Essence, as stated above (Q. 3, A. 8). But some consider it
impossible for man to see the Divine Essence; wherefore they desire
it not. Therefore all men do not desire Happiness.
Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that "happy is he
who has all he desires, and desires nothing amiss." But all do not
desire this; for some desire certain things amiss, and yet they wish
to desire such things. Therefore all do not desire Happiness.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3): "If that actor
had said: 'You all wish to be happy; you do not wish to be unhappy,'
he would have said that which none would have failed to acknowledge
in his will." Therefore everyone desires to be happy.
_I answer that,_ Happiness can be considered in two ways. First
according to the general notion of happiness: and thus, of necessity,
every man desires happiness. For the general notion of happiness
consists in the perfect good, as stated above (AA. 3, 4). But since
good is the object of the will, the perfect good of a man is that
which entirely satisfies his will. Consequently to desire happiness
is nothing else than to desire that one's will be satisfied. And this
everyone desires. Secondly we may speak of Happiness according to its
specific notion, as to that in which it consists. And thus all do not
know Happiness; because they know not in what thing the general
notion of happiness is found. And consequently, in this respect, not
all desire it. Wherefore the reply to the first Objection is clear.
Reply Obj. 2: Since the will follows the apprehension of the
intellect or reason; just as it happens that where there is no real
distinction, there may be a distinction according to the
consideration of reason; so does it happen that one and the same
thing is desired in one way, and not desired in another. So that
happiness may be considered as the final and perfect good, which is
the general notion of happiness: and thus the will naturally and of
necessity tends thereto, as stated above. Again it can be considered
under other special aspects, either on the part of the operation
itself, or on the part of the operating power, or on the part of the
object; and thus the will does not tend thereto of necessity.
Reply Obj. 3: This definition of Happiness given by some--"Happy is
the man that has all he desires," or, "whose every wish is
fulfilled," is a good and adequate definition, if it be understood in
a certain way; but an inadequate definition if understood in another.
For if we understand it simply of all that man desires by his natural
appetite, thus it is true that he who has all that he desires, is
happy: since nothing satisfies man's natural desire, except the
perfect good which is Happiness. But if we understand it of those
things that man desires according to the apprehension of the reason,
thus it does not belong to Happiness, to have certain things that man
desires; rather does it belong to unhappiness, in so far as the
possession of such things hinders man from having all that he desires
naturally; thus it is that reason sometimes accepts as true things
that are a hindrance to the knowledge of truth. And it was through
taking this into consideration that Augustine added so as to include
perfect Happiness--that he "desires nothing amiss": although the
first part suffices if rightly understood, to wit, that "happy is he
who has all he desires."
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TREATISE ON HUMAN ACTS: ACTS PECULIAR TO MAN (QQ. 6-21)
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