Whether Happiness Once Had Can Be Lost?
Objection 1: It would seem that Happiness can be lost. For Happiness
is a perfection. But every perfection is in the thing perfected
according to the mode of the latter. Since then man is, by his
nature, changeable, it seems that Happiness is participated by man in
a changeable manner. And consequently it seems that man can lose
Happiness.
Obj. 2: Further, Happiness consists in an act of the intellect; and
the intellect is subject to the will. But the will can be directed to
opposites. Therefore it seems that it can desist from the operation
whereby man is made happy: and thus man will cease to be happy.
Obj. 3: Further, the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's
Happiness has a beginning, since man was not always happy. Therefore
it seems that it has an end.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 25:46) of the righteous that
"they shall go . . . into life everlasting," which, as above stated
(A. 2), is the Happiness of the saints. Now what is eternal ceases
not. Therefore Happiness cannot be lost.
_I answer that,_ If we speak of imperfect happiness, such as can be
had in this life, in this sense it can be lost. This is clear of
contemplative happiness, which is lost either by forgetfulness, for
instance, when knowledge is lost through sickness; or again by
certain occupations, whereby a man is altogether withdrawn from
contemplation.
This is also clear of active happiness: since man's will can be
changed so as to fall to vice from the virtue, in whose act that
happiness principally consists. If, however, the virtue remain
unimpaired, outward changes can indeed disturb such like happiness,
in so far as they hinder many acts of virtue; but they cannot take it
away altogether because there still remains an act of virtue, whereby
man bears these trials in a praiseworthy manner. And since the
happiness of this life can be lost, a circumstance that appears to be
contrary to the nature of happiness, therefore did the Philosopher
state (Ethic. i, 10) that some are happy in this life, not simply,
but "as men," whose nature is subject to change.
But if we speak of that perfect Happiness which we await after this
life, it must be observed that Origen (Peri Archon. ii, 3), following
the error of certain Platonists, held that man can become unhappy
after the final Happiness.
This, however, is evidently false, for two reasons. First, from the
general notion of happiness. For since happiness is the "perfect and
sufficient good," it must needs set man's desire at rest and exclude
every evil. Now man naturally desires to hold to the good that he
has, and to have the surety of his holding: else he must of necessity
be troubled with the fear of losing it, or with the sorrow of knowing
that he will lose it. Therefore it is necessary for true Happiness
that man have the assured opinion of never losing the good that he
possesses. If this opinion be true, it follows that he never will
lose happiness: but if it be false, it is in itself an evil that he
should have a false opinion: because the false is the evil of the
intellect, just as the true is its good, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 2.
Consequently he will no longer be truly happy, if evil be in him.
Secondly, it is again evident if we consider the specific nature of
Happiness. For it has been shown above (Q. 3, A. 8) that man's
perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now
it is impossible for anyone seeing the Divine Essence, to wish not to
see It. Because every good that one possesses and yet wishes to be
without, is either insufficient, something more sufficing being
desired in its stead; or else has some inconvenience attached to it,
by reason of which it becomes wearisome. But the vision of the Divine
Essence fills the soul with all good things, since it unites it to
the source of all goodness; hence it is written (Ps. 16:15): "I shall
be satisfied when Thy glory shall appear"; and (Wis. 7:11): "All good
things came to me together with her," i.e. with the contemplation of
wisdom. In like manner neither has it any inconvenience attached to
it; because it is written of the contemplation of wisdom (Wis. 8:16):
"Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any
tediousness." It is thus evident that the happy man cannot forsake
Happiness of his own accord. Moreover, neither can he lose Happiness,
through God taking it away from him. Because, since the withdrawal of
Happiness is a punishment, it cannot be enforced by God, the just
Judge, except for some fault; and he that sees God cannot fall into a
fault, since rectitude of the will, of necessity, results from that
vision as was shown above (Q. 4, A. 4). Nor again can it be withdrawn
by any other agent. Because the mind that is united to God is raised
above all other things: and consequently no other agent can sever the
mind from that union. Therefore it seems unreasonable that as time
goes on, man should pass from happiness to misery, and vice versa;
because such like vicissitudes of time can only be for such things as
are subject to time and movement.
Reply Obj. 1: Happiness is consummate perfection, which excludes
every defect from the happy. And therefore whoever has happiness has
it altogether unchangeably: this is done by the Divine power, which
raises man to the participation of eternity which transcends all
change.
Reply Obj. 2: The will can be directed to opposites, in things which
are ordained to the end; but it is ordained, of natural necessity, to
the last end. This is evident from the fact that man is unable not to
wish to be happy.
Reply Obj. 3: Happiness has a beginning owing to the condition of the
participator: but it has no end by reason of the condition of the
good, the participation of which makes man happy. Hence the beginning
of happiness is from one cause, its endlessness is from another.
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