Whether Man's Happiness Consists in the Vision of the Divine Essence?
Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness does not consist in
the vision of the Divine Essence. For Dionysius says (Myst. Theol. i)
that by that which is highest in his intellect, man is united to God
as to something altogether unknown. But that which is seen in its
essence is not altogether unknown. Therefore the final perfection of
the intellect, namely, happiness, does not consist in God being seen
in His Essence.
Obj. 2: Further, the higher the perfection belongs to the higher
nature. But to see His own Essence is the perfection proper to the
Divine intellect. Therefore the final perfection of the human
intellect does not reach to this, but consists in something less.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 3:2): "When He shall appear,
we shall be like to Him; and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall see Him as
He is."
_I answer that,_ Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing
else than the vision of the Divine Essence. To make this clear, two
points must be observed. First, that man is not perfectly happy, so
long as something remains for him to desire and seek: secondly, that
the perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its
object. Now the object of the intellect is "what a thing is," i.e.
the essence of a thing, according to _De Anima_ iii, 6. Wherefore the
intellect attains perfection, in so far as it knows the essence of a
thing. If therefore an intellect knows the essence of some effect,
whereby it is not possible to know the essence of the cause, i.e. to
know of the cause "what it is"; that intellect cannot be said to
reach that cause simply, although it may be able to gather from the
effect the knowledge that the cause is. Consequently, when man knows
an effect, and knows that it has a cause, there naturally remains in
the man the desire to know about the cause, "what it is." And this
desire is one of wonder, and causes inquiry, as is stated in the
beginning of the _Metaphysics_ (i, 2). For instance, if a man,
knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider that it must be due to some
cause, and know not what that cause is, he wonders about it, and from
wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry cease until he
arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the cause.
If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created
effect, knows no more of God than "that He is"; the perfection of
that intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there
remains in it the natural desire to seek the cause. Wherefore it is
not yet perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the
intellect needs to reach the very Essence of the First Cause. And
thus it will have its perfection through union with God as with that
object, in which alone man's happiness consists, as stated above (AA.
1, 7; Q. 2, A. 8).
Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius speaks of the knowledge of wayfarers
journeying towards happiness.
Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 1, A. 8), the end has a twofold
acceptation. First, as to the thing itself which is desired: and in
this way, the same thing is the end of the higher and of the lower
nature, and indeed of all things, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 8).
Secondly, as to the attainment of this thing; and thus the end of the
higher nature is different from that of the lower, according to their
respective habitudes to that thing. So then in the happiness of God,
Who, in understanding his Essence, comprehends It, is higher than
that of a man or angel who sees It indeed, but comprehends It not.
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