Whether Happiness Is an Operation of the Speculative, or of the
Practical Intellect?
Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is an operation of the
practical intellect. For the end of every creature consists in
becoming like God. But man is like God, by his practical intellect,
which is the cause of things understood, rather than by his
speculative intellect, which derives its knowledge from things.
Therefore man's happiness consists in an operation of the practical
intellect rather than of the speculative.
Obj. 2: Further, happiness is man's perfect good. But the practical
intellect is ordained to the good rather than the speculative
intellect, which is ordained to the true. Hence we are said to be
good, in reference to the perfection of the practical intellect, but
not in reference to the perfection of the speculative intellect,
according to which we are said to be knowing or understanding.
Therefore man's happiness consists in an act of the practical
intellect rather than of the speculative.
Obj. 3: Further, happiness is a good of man himself. But the
speculative intellect is more concerned with things outside man;
whereas the practical intellect is concerned with things belonging to
man himself, viz. his operations and passions. Therefore man's
happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather
than of the speculative.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that "contemplation
is promised us, as being the goal of all our actions, and the
everlasting perfection of our joys."
_I answer that,_ Happiness consists in an operation of the
speculative rather than of the practical intellect. This is evident
for three reasons. First because if man's happiness is an operation,
it must needs be man's highest operation. Now man's highest operation
is that of his highest power in respect of its highest object: and
his highest power is the intellect, whose highest object is the
Divine Good, which is the object, not of the practical but of the
speculative intellect. Consequently happiness consists principally in
such an operation, viz. in the contemplation of Divine things. And
since that "seems to be each man's self, which is best in him,"
according to _Ethic._ ix, 8, and x, 7, therefore such an operation is
most proper to man and most delightful to him.
Secondly, it is evident from the fact that contemplation is sought
principally for its own sake. But the act of the practical intellect
is not sought for its own sake but for the sake of action: and these
very actions are ordained to some end. Consequently it is evident that
the last end cannot consist in the active life, which pertains to the
practical intellect.
Thirdly, it is again evident, from the fact that in the contemplative
life man has something in common with things above him, viz. with God
and the angels, to whom he is made like by happiness. But in things
pertaining to the active life, other animals also have something in
common with man, although imperfectly.
Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life
to come, consists entirely in contemplation. But imperfect happiness,
such as can be had here, consists first and principally, in an
operation of the practical intellect directing human actions and
passions, as stated in _Ethic._ x, 7, 8.
Reply Obj. 1: The asserted likeness of the practical intellect to God
is one of proportion; that is to say, by reason of its standing in
relation to what it knows, as God does to what He knows. But the
likeness of the speculative intellect to God is one of union and
"information"; which is a much greater likeness. And yet it may be
answered that, in regard to the principal thing known, which is His
Essence, God has not practical but merely speculative knowledge.
Reply Obj. 2: The practical intellect is ordained to good which is
outside of it: but the speculative intellect has good within it, viz.
the contemplation of truth. And if this good be perfect, the whole
man is perfected and made good thereby: such a good the practical
intellect has not; but it directs man thereto.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument would hold, if man himself were his own
last end; for then the consideration and direction of his actions and
passions would be his happiness. But since man's last end is
something outside of him, to wit, God, to Whom we reach out by an
operation of the speculative intellect; therefore, man's happiness
consists in an operation of the speculative intellect rather than of
the practical intellect.
________________________