Whether Some Good of the Soul Constitutes Man's Happiness?
Objection 1: It would seem that some good of the soul constitutes
man's happiness. For happiness is man's good. Now this is threefold:
external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But
happiness does not consist in external goods, nor in goods of the
body, as shown above (AA. 4, 5). Therefore it consists in goods
of the soul.
Obj. 2: Further, we love that for which we desire good, more than
the good that we desire for it: thus we love a friend for whom we
desire money, more than we love money. But whatever good a man
desires, he desires it for himself. Therefore he loves himself more
than all other goods. Now happiness is what is loved above all: which
is evident from the fact that for its sake all else is loved and
desired. Therefore happiness consists in some good of man himself:
not, however, in goods of the body; therefore, in goods of the soul.
Obj. 3: Further, perfection is something belonging to that which is
perfected. But happiness is a perfection of man. Therefore happiness
is something belonging to man. But it is not something belonging to
the body, as shown above (A. 5). Therefore it is something belonging
to the soul; and thus it consists in goods of the soul.
_On the contrary,_ As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22), "that
which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own
sake." But man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is
in man is to be loved for God's sake. Therefore happiness consists in
no good of the soul.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 1, A. 8), the end is twofold:
namely, the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use,
namely, the attainment or possession of that thing. If, then, we speak
of man's last end, it is impossible for man's last end to be the soul
itself or something belonging to it. Because the soul, considered in
itself, is as something existing in potentiality: for it becomes
knowing actually, from being potentially knowing; and actually
virtuous, from being potentially virtuous. Now since potentiality is
for the sake of act as for its fulfilment, that which in itself is in
potentiality cannot be the last end. Therefore the soul itself cannot
be its own last end.
In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power,
habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is the perfect
good fulfilling the desire. Now man's appetite, otherwise the will,
is for the universal good. And any good inherent to the soul is a
participated good, and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none
of them can be man's last end.
But if we speak of man's last end, as to the attainment or possession
thereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself desired as an
end, thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to his
last end: since man attains happiness through his soul. Therefore the
thing itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes
happiness, and makes man happy; but the attainment of this thing is
called happiness. Consequently we must say that happiness is something
belonging to the soul; but that which constitutes happiness is
something outside the soul.
Reply Obj. 1: Inasmuch as this division includes all goods that man
can desire, thus the good of the soul is not only power, habit, or
act, but also the object of these, which is something outside. And in
this way nothing hinders us from saying that what constitutes
happiness is a good of the soul.
Reply Obj. 2: As far as the proposed objection is concerned,
happiness is loved above all, as the good desired; whereas a friend
is loved as that for which good is desired; and thus, too, man loves
himself. Consequently it is not the same kind of love in both cases.
As to whether man loves anything more than himself with the love of
friendship there will be occasion to inquire when we treat of Charity.
Reply Obj. 3: Happiness, itself, since it is a perfection of the
soul, is an inherent good of the soul; but that which constitutes
happiness, viz. which makes man happy, is something outside his soul,
as stated above.
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