Whether Man Wills All, Whatsoever He Wills, for the Last End?
Objection 1: It would seem that man does not will all, whatsoever he
wills, for the last end. For things ordained to the last end are said
to be serious matter, as being useful. But jests are foreign to
serious matter. Therefore what man does in jest, he ordains not to
the last end.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says at the beginning of his
Metaphysics (i. 2) that speculative science is sought for its own sake.
Now it cannot be said that each speculative science is the last end.
Therefore man does not desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last
end.
Obj. 3: Further, whosoever ordains something to an end, thinks of
that end. But man does not always think of the last end in all that
he desires or does. Therefore man neither desires nor does all for
the last end.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "That is the
end of our good, for the sake of which we love other things, whereas
we love it for its own sake."
_I answer that,_ Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he
desires, for the last end. This is evident for two reasons. First,
because whatever man desires, he desires it under the aspect of good.
And if he desire it, not as his perfect good, which is the last end,
he must, of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good,
because the beginning of anything is always ordained to its
completion; as is clearly the case in effects both of nature and of
art. Wherefore every beginning of perfection is ordained to complete
perfection which is achieved through the last end. Secondly, because
the last end stands in the same relation in moving the appetite, as
the first mover in other movements. Now it is clear that secondary
moving causes do not move save inasmuch as they are moved by the first
mover. Therefore secondary objects of the appetite do not move the
appetite, except as ordained to the first object of the appetite,
which is the last end.
Reply Obj. 1: Actions done jestingly are not directed to any external
end; but merely to the good of the jester, in so far as they afford
him pleasure or relaxation. But man's consummate good is his last end.
Reply Obj. 2: The same applies to speculative science; which is
desired as the scientist's good, included in complete and perfect
good, which is the ultimate end.
Reply Obj. 3: One need not always be thinking of the last end,
whenever one desires or does something: but the virtue of the first
intention, which was in respect of the last end, remains in every
desire directed to any object whatever, even though one's thoughts be
not actually directed to the last end. Thus while walking along the
road one needs not to be thinking of the end at every step.
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