There is a curious passage in his "A Small Boy and Others"-the

biography of the youth of William James and himself-telling how as

a child in the hotels and resorts of Europe he spent his time in

looking on at what was happening about him. He never got into the

game very far, because he preferred to think about it. That is

what Henry James did all his life long. He looked on, thought

about life with that wonderfully keen, and subtle, and humorous

mind of his, turned it into criticism; then fitted the results

with enough plot to make them move,--and there was a so-called

novel. Every one knows how in his last edition he rewrote some of

his early stories to make them more subtle. It would have been

amusing if he had seen fit to rewrite them altogether as critical

essays upon international life! I wonder how much they would have

suffered by the change.

This is why so many readers have been very proud of Henry James,

and yet unable to defend him successfully against critics who

pulled out handfuls of serpentine sentences from his latest novel,

asking, "Do you call this fiction?" It was not fiction, not

fiction at least as she used to be written; it was subtle,

graceful, cunning analysis of life. Fiction is synthesis--

building up, making a Becky Sharp, inventing a Meg Merrilies,

constructing a plot. Criticism is analysis--taking down, Henry

James was not so good at putting together as at taking to pieces.

He was able in one art, but in the other he was great.

The current tendency to make every new figure in world literature

conform to Greatness of a recognized variety or be dismissed, is

unfortunate and misleading. We are to be congratulated that the

greatness of Henry James was of a peculiar and irregular kind, a

keen, inventing greatness, American in this if in nothing else.

Unnumbered writers of the day, of whom Mr. Kipling is not the

least eminent, have profited by his influence, and learned from

him to give the final, subtle thought its final form. If that form

in his own case was tortuous, intricate, difficult, why so was the

thought. If it makes hard reading, his subject at least got hard

thinking. Before you condemn that curious style of his-so easy to

parody, so hard to imitate--ask whether such refinement of

thought as his could be much more simply expressed. Sometimes he

could have been simpler, undoubtedly; it was his fault that he did

not care to be; but that "plain American" would usually have

served his purpose, is certainly false.

Henry James must yield first honors as a novelist, it may be, to

others of his century if not of his generation. As a writer, above

all as a writer of fine, imaginative criticism of the intellect as

it moves through the complexities of modern civilization, he

yields to no one of our time. Whether he has earned his

distinction as an American writer I do not know, although I am

inclined to believe that he is more American than the critics

suspect; but as a master of English, and as a great figure in the

broad sweep of international English literature, his place is

secure.

Samuel Butler's "Erewhon" has passed safely into the earthly

paradise of the so-called classics. It has been recommended by

distinguished men of letters, reprinted and far more widely read

than on its first appearance; it has passed, by quotation and

reference, into contemporary literature, and been taught in

college classes. "Erewhon Revisited," written thirty years after

"Erewhon," is less well known.

Mr. Moreby Acklom (whose name, let me assure the suspicious

reader, is his own and not an Erewhonian inversion), in a most

informing preface to a new edition, makes two assertions which may

serve as my excuse for again endeavoring to explain the

fascination for our generation of the work of Samuel Butler.

College professors, he avers, have an antipathy for Samuel Butler;

the chief interest of Butler, he further states, was in theology.

Now I am a college professor without antipathy to Samuel Butler,

with, on the contrary, the warmest admiration for his sardonic

genius. And furthermore Butler's antipathy for college professors,

which is supposed to have drawn their fire in return, is based

upon a ruling passion far deeper than his accidental interest in

theology, a passion that gives the tone and also the key to the

best of his writings and which brought him into conflict with the

"vested interests" of his times. It is his passion for honest

thinking. If Butler's mark had been theology merely, his books

would have passed with the interest in his target. He would be as

difficult reading to-day as Swift in his "Tale of a Tub."

Like most of the great satirists of the world, Butler's saeva

indignatio was aroused by the daily conflicts between reason and

stupidity, between candor and disingenuousness, with all their

mutations of hypocrisy, guile, deceit, and sham. In "Erewhon" it

was human unreason, as a clever youth sees it, that he was

attacking. We remember vividly the beautiful Erewhonians, who knew

disease to be sin, but believed vice to be only disease. We

remember the "straighteners" who gave moral medicine to the

ethically unwell, the musical banks, the hypothetical language,

the machines that threatened to master men, as in the war of 1914-

1918 and in the industrial system of to-day they have mastered men

and made them their slaves. There was a youthful vigor in

"Erewhon," a joyous negligence as to where the blow should fall, a

sense of not being responsible for the world the author flicked

with his lash, which saved the book from the condemnation that

would have been its fate had the Victorians taken it seriously. It

was an uneven book, beginning with vivid narrative in the best

tradition of Defoe, losing itself finally in difficult argument,

and cut short in mid-career.

"Erewhon Revisited" is much better constructed. The old craftsman

has profited by his years of labor in the British Museum. He has a

story to tell, and tells it, weighting it with satire judiciously,

as a fisherman weights his set line. If his tale becomes unreal it

is only when he knows the author is ready to hear the author in

person. If the Erewhon of his first visit does not fit his new

conception he ruthlessly changes it. One misses the satiric _tours de

force_ of the first "Erewhon." There is nothing so brilliant as the

chapters on disease and machines which for fifty years since life has

been illustrating. But "Erewhon Revisited" is a finished book; it has

artistic unity.

And why does Butler revisit Erewhon? Not because he was trained as

a priest and must have an excuse to rediscuss theology, although

the story of the book suggests this explanation. Higgs, the

mysterious stranger of "Erewhon," who escaped by a balloon, has

become a subject for myth. In Erewhon he is declared the child of

the sun. Miracles gather about the supreme miracle of his air-born

departure. His "Sayings," a mixture of Biblical quotation and

homely philosophy, strained through Erewhonian intellects, become

a new ethics and a new theology. His clothes are adopted for

national wear (although through uncertainty as to how to put them

on one part of the kingdom goes with buttons and pockets behind).

Sunchildism becomes the state religion. The musical banks, which

had been trading in stale idealism, take it over and get new life;

and the professors of Bridgeford, the intellectuals of the

kingdom, capitalize it, as we say to-day, and thus tighten their

grip on the public's mind and purse.

Butler's purpose is transparent. It is not, as Longmans, who

refused the work, believed, to attack Christianity. It is rather

to expose the ease with which a good man and his message (Higgs

brought with him to Erewhon evangelical Christianity) can become

miraculous, can become an instrument for politics and a cause of

sham. Indeed, Butler says in so many words to the Anglicans of his

day: "Hold fast to your Christianity, for false as it is it is better

than what its enemies would substitute; but go easy with

the miraculous, the mythical, the ritualistic. These 'tamper with

the one sure and everlasting word of God revealed to us by human

experience.'"

All this is permanent enough, but I cannot believe, as most

commentators do, that it is the heart of the book; or if it is the

heart of the book, it is not its fire. The satiric rage of Butler,

who in the person of Higgs returns to Erewhon to find himself

deified, does not fall upon the fanatic worshipers of the

sunchild, nor even upon the musical banks who have grown strong

through his cult. It kindles for the ridiculous Hanky and Panky,

professors respectively of worldly wisdom and worldly unwisdom at

Bridgeford, and hence, according to Mr. Acklom, the antipathy

toward Butler of all college professors.

But it is not because they are professors that Butler hates Hanky

and Panky; it is because they represent that guaranteed authority

which in every civilization can and does exploit the passions and

the weaknesses of human nature for its own material welfare.

Butler had been conducting a lifelong warfare against scholars who

defended the _status quo_ of the church and against scientists who

were consolidating a strategic (and remunerative) position for

themselves in the universities. He saw, or thought he saw, English

religion milked for the benefit of Oxford and Cambridge graduates

needful of "livings"; and Darwinism and the new sciences generally

being swept into the maw of the same professionally intellectual

class. A free lance himself, with a table in the British Museum, some

books and a deficit instead of an income from his intellectual labors,

he attacked the vested interests of his world.

He exposed the dangers which wait upon all miraculous religions,

the shams which they give birth to. But not because he was

obsessed with theology. If he had lived in the nineteen hundreds

he would have studied, I think, sociology and economics instead of

theology and biology. He would have attacked, in England, the

House of Lords instead of Oxford, and had an eye for the

intellectuals who are beginning to sway the mighty power of the

labor unions. He would have been a Radical-Conservative and voted

against both the British Labor party and the Coalition. In America

he would have lashed the trusts, execrated the Anti-Saloon League,

admired and been exasperated by Mr. Wilson, hated the Republican

party, and probably have voted for it lest worse follow its

defeat. He would have been, in short, a liberal of a species very

much needed just now in America, a bad party man, destructive

rather than constructive, no leader, but a satirist when, God

knows, we need one for the clearing of our mental atmosphere.

And unless I am wrong throughout this brief analysis, Samuel

Butler, who mentally and spiritually is essentially our

contemporary, would not, if he were writing now, concern himself

with theology at all, but with the shams and unreasons which are

the vested tyrannies set over us to-day. Erewhon, when we last

hear of it, is about to become a modern colonial state. Its

concern is with an army and with economics. Chow-Bok, the savage,

now become a missionary bishop, is about to administer its

ecclesiastical system. Its spiritual problems no longer center

upon the validity of miraculous tradition and the logic of a

theological code. But the vested interests (represented by Pocus,

the son of Hanky) remain. These Butler would attack in the needed

fashion. These remain the enemy.

VII

CONCLUSION

DEFINING THE INDEFINABLE

I am well aware that literature or even such an inconsiderable

part of literature as this gay book on my desk or the poem on the

printed page, as a whole is indefinable. Every critic of

literature from Aristotle down has let some of it slip between his

fingers. If he describes the cunning form of a play or a story,

then the passion in it, or the mood behind it, eludes him. If he

defines the personality of the writer, the art which makes all the

difference between feeling and expression escapes definition. No

ten philosophers yet agree as to whether beauty is an absolute

quality, or simply an attribute of form, whether a poem is

beautiful because it suggests and approaches an archetype, or

whether it is beautiful because it perfectly expresses its

subject.

And yet when the ambition to explain and describe and define

everything is humbly set aside there remains a good honest job for

the maker of definitions, and it is a job that can be done. I may

not be able to tell what art is, but I can tell what it isn't. I

may fail to make a formula for literature, but I can try at least

to tell what Thomas Hardy has chiefly accomplished, define

Conrad's essential quality, point out the nature of romantic

naturalism, and distinguish between sentiment and sentimentality.

And if such things were ever worth doing they are worth doing now.

Only a prophet dares say that we are at the beginning of a great

creative period in the United States, but any open-eyed observer

can see that an era of American literary criticism is well under

way. The war, which confused and afterward dulled our thinking,

stirred innumerable critical impulses, which are coming to the

surface, some like bubbles and others like boils, but some as new

creations of the American intellect. The new generation has shown

itself acrimoniously critical. It slaps tradition and names its

novels and poetry as Adam named the animals in the garden, out of

its own imagination. The war shook it loose from convention, and

like a boy sent away to college, its first impulse is to disown

the Main Street that bore it. Youth of the 90's admired its elders

and imitated them unsuccessfully. Youth of the nineteen twenties

imitates France and Russia of the 70's, and contemporary England.

It may eventually do more than the 90's did with America; in the

meantime, while it flounders in the attempt to create, it is at

least highly critical. Furthermore, the social unrest, beginning

before the war and likely to outlast our time, has made us all

more critical of literature. Mark Twain's "Yankee in King Arthur's

Court" turned the milk of Tennyson's aristocratic "Idylls" sour.

The deep drawn undercurrent of socialistic thinking urges us

toward a new consideration of all earlier writing, to see what may

be its social significance. The "churl," the "hind," the

"peasant," the "first servant" and "second countryman," who were

the mere transitions of earlier stories now are central in

literature. They come with a challenge, and when we read

Galsworthy, Wells, Sinclair, Dreiser, Hardy's "The Dynasts,"

Bennett--we are conscious of criticizing life as we read. The pale

cast of thought has sicklied modern pages. The more serious works

of art are also literary criticism. Again, there is the mingling

of the peoples, greatest of course in America. Our aliens used to

be subservient to the national tradition. They went about becoming

rich Americans and regarded the Anglo-American culture as a

natural phenomenon, like the climate, to which after a while they

would accustom themselves. Their children were born in it. But now

it is different. The Jews particularly, who keep an Oriental

insistence upon logic even longer than a racial appearance, have

passed the acquisitive stage and begin to throw off numerous

intellectuals, as much at home in English as their fellow

Americans, but critical of the American emotions, and the American

way of thinking, as only a brain formed by different traditions

can be. Soon the Mediterranean races domiciled here will pass into

literary expressiveness. It is as impossible that we should not

have criticism of the national tradition expressed in our

literature as that an international congress should agree upon

questions of ethics or religion.

And of course the new internationalism, which is far more vigorous

than appears on the surface, favors such criticism. The war

brought America and Europe two thousand miles closer, and the

habit of interest in what Europeans are thinking, once acquired,

is not likely to be lost. No American writer of promise can hope

now to escape comparison with the literatures of Western Europe,

and comparison means a new impulse to criticism.

Fundamental, creative criticism--like Sainte-Beuve's, Matthew

Arnold's, Walter Pater's, like Dryden's, Brunetiere's, De

Gourmont's, or Croce's--will presumably come. The conditions, both

of publication and of audience, are ripe for it now in the United

States. But there is a good deal of spade work in the study of

literature to be done first, and still more education of the

reading American mind. One reason why Lowell was not a great

critic was because his scholarship was defective, or, to put it

more fairly, because the scholarship of his contemporaries, with

whose knowledge he might have buttressed his own, was incomplete.

And if a twentieth century Sainte-Beuve should begin to write for

general American readers, it is doubtful whether they would accept

his premises. Says the intellectual, why _should_ he write for the

general public? I answer that if he writes for coteries only, if he is

disdainful of the intelligent multitude, he will never understand

_them,_ and so will not comprehend the national literature which it is

his function to stimulate, interpret, and guide.

The spade work of criticism is research, investigation into the

facts of literature and into its social background. The scholar is

sometimes, but not often, a critic. He finds out what happened,

and often why it happened. He analyzes, but he does not usually

make a synthesis. He writes history, but he cannot prophesy, and

criticism is prophecy implied or direct. Few outside the

universities realize the magnitude of American research into

literature, even into American literature, which has been

relatively neglected. A thousand spades have been at work for a

generation. We are getting the facts, or we are learning how to

get them.

But before we may expect great criticism we must educate our

public, and ourselves, in that clear vision of what is and what is

not, which from Aristotle down has been the preliminary to

criticism. A humble, but a useful, way to begin is by definition.

I use definition in no pedantic sense. I mean, in general, logical

definition where the class or _genus_ of the thing to be

described--whether best-selling novel or sentimental tendency--is

first made clear, and then its _differentia,_ its differences

from the type analyzed out and assorted. But this process in

literature cannot be as formal as logic. Good literature cannot be

bound by formulas. Yet when a poem charged with hot emotion, or a

story that strays into new margins of experience, is caught and

held until one can compare it with others, see the curve on which

it is moving, guess its origin and its aim, forever after it

becomes easier to understand, more capable of being thought about

and appreciated. And when the current of taste of some new

generation that overflows conventions and washes forward, or

backward, into regions long unlaved, is viewed as a current, its

direction plotted, its force estimated, its quality compared, why

that is definition, and some good will come of it.

Some general definition of that intellectual emotion which we call

good reading is especially needed in America. Most of us, if we

are native born, have been educated by a set of literary

conventions arranged in convenient categories. That is more or

less true of all literary education, but it is particularly true

in the United States, where the formal teaching of English

literature _per se_ began, where, as nowhere else in the

world, there was a great and growing population eager to become

literate and with no literary traditions behind it. The student

from a bookless home learned to think of his literature as

primarily something to be studied; the teacher who had to teach

thousands like him was forced to reduce living literature to dead

categories in order that a little of it at least should be taught.

Thousands of Americans, therefore, of our generation emerged from

their training with a set of literary definitions which they

assumed to be true and supposed to be culture. Only true

definitions of what literature really is can break up such

fossilized defining.

On the other hand, that large proportion of our best reading

population which is not native in its traditions offers a

different but equally important problem. How can the son of a

Russian Jew, whose father lived in a Russian town, who himself has

been brought up in clamorous New York, understand Thoreau, let us

say, or John Muir, or Burroughs, or Willa Cather, without some

defining of the nature of the American environment and the

relation between thought and the soil? How is an intelligent

German-American, whose cultural tradition has been thoroughly

Teutonic, to make himself at home in a literature whose general

character, like its language, is English, without some defining of

the Anglo-American tradition? Lincoln must be defined for him;

Milton must be defined for him; most of all perhaps Franklin must

be defined for him. I have chosen elementary examples, but my

meaning should be sufficiently clear.

And the American critic--by which I mean you, O discriminating

reader, as well as the professional who puts pen to paper--is

equally in need of the art of definition. The books we read and

write are on different planes of absolute excellence or

unworthiness. There is--to take the novel--the story well

calculated to pass a pleasant hour but able to pass nothing else;

there is the story with a good idea in it and worth reading for

the idea only; there is the story worthless as art but usefully

catching some current phase of experience; and there is the fine

novel which will stand any test for insight, skill, and truth. Now

it is folly to apply a single standard to all these types of

story. It can be done, naturally, but it accomplishes nothing

except to eliminate all but the shining best. That is a task for

history. In the year in which we live--and it is sometimes

necessary to remind the austerer critic that we always live in the

present--there are a hundred books, of poetry, of essays, of

biography, of fiction, which are by no means of the first rank and

yet are highly important, if only as news of what the world, in

our present, is thinking and feeling. They cannot be judged, all

of them, on the top plane of perfect excellence; and if we judge

them all on any other plane, good, better, best get inextricably

mixed.

For example, consider once more a novel which at the moment of

this writing is a best-seller, and which with reference to its

popularity I have discussed in an earlier essay. I mean Mr.

Hutchinson's "If Winter Comes." This book is essentially the

tragedy of a good and honest soul thrown by harsh circumstance

into an environment which is bound to crush him. He has the wrong

wife, he has the wrong business associates, the girl he loves

is separated from him by moral barriers. If he breaks through these

he injures irreparably his own sense of what is due to his God and

his fellow man. His instincts of charity, humor, and love rebound

upon him. He is too Christian for England, and too guileless for

life. This is a worthy theme, and yet if we judge this novel on

the highest plane it fails miserably. For Mr. Hutchinson stacks

the cards. He gives his hero his way and his salvation, after much

suffering, by a series of lucky accidents. He destroys the problem

he creates, by forging an answer.

But this novel should not be finally judged on the highest plane.

It is not a tragedy, it is a romance. It belongs on the plane

below, the plane of stories told to meet the secret desires of

humanity, which have little to do with reality, and are quite

oblivious to fact. On this plane "If Winter Comes" ranks highly,

for it is poignantly told, there is life in its characters, and

truth in the best of its scenes. Definition saves us from calling

a good novel great; it spares us the unnecessary error of calling

a good and readable story bad because it is not a triumph of

consistent art.

Definitions: Essays in Contemporary Criticism [First Series] · 第 16 / 17 段