At the beginning of the year 1874 a _coup d'etat_ placed Serrano again
at the head of the government in Spain, but in Cuba there was no change.
The struggle was still continued. The first battle of the year was on a
larger scale than the majority of those which had preceded it. At
Naranjo, on January 4, two thousand Cubans under General Gomez were
victorious over four thousand Spaniards, and the Cuban losses were
slight in comparison with those of the enemy. Again, at Corralillo, on
January 8, the Cubans scored a triumph, and on the next day a third
victory was achieved at Los Melones by the forces of General Garcia.
Don Joachim Jovellar, the Captain-General, declared the island to be in
a state of siege, and in a bold but hardly successful attempt to swell
the Spanish forces proclaimed a conscription of all men from twenty to
forty years old, and exacted the payment of a thousand dollars in gold
in lieu of compliance with this decree. He antagonized the Volunteers,
who considered themselves of much finer quality than the Spanish common
soldiers, by demanding that one-tenth of their number be allotted to and
placed under the command of the regular army. The Volunteers resisted
this order, and made an attempt to secure Jovellar's removal from
office, but were unsuccessful, and he continued to take the most
extraordinary measures, stating that he would summarily put down the
rebellion; and yet the fighting steadily continued.
General Portillo was considered one of the most able of the Spanish
officers, and it was expected that he would be able to inflict great
losses on the insurgents, hence the Spanish leaders were greatly
chagrined when he went down in defeat at the hands of General Gomez, who
then proceeded to administer a like chastisement to the forces under
General Arminan, who had taken up his position at Guasimas, and who was
forced to make his escape to Puerto Principe, abandoning his command,
all of whom were killed, wounded or taken prisoner. In all the history
of the war no such victory had ever before been won. The battle had
raged for three days and nights, and at its inception General Arminan
had been at the head of an army of three thousand men. When the
Spaniards had heard how Arminan was faring, they had sent General
Bascones to the rescue, but he never got through to aid Arminan, for he
was routed by the Cubans while on his way.
Jovellar was a little less confident, after these occurrences, that it
would be a simple matter to put down the rebellion. He seems to have
lacked the quality of resolute perseverance, and when matters were
against him he resigned his office, and again Don Jose de la Concha
returned to take charge of Spanish affairs in Cuba. Now Concha had been
_persona non grata_ with the Volunteers and he was not received by them
with great enthusiasm. He began at once upon assuming office to take the
force out of the decrees promulgated by Jovellar, by greatly modifying
their terms, and promising freedom to all blacks who would serve in the
army for a period of five years.
In April, 1874, Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State, made public
announcement in Washington that during the five years of the war the
Spanish losses had totaled more than eighty thousand men and officers, a
large number of these casualties being due to sickness caused by
unsanitary conditions, while Spain had spent over one hundred million
dollars in her ineffective efforts to put down the revolution. He
further stated that it did not appear that she was likely to accomplish
this speedily, since the revolutionary government seemed quite as
powerful and as active as in the beginning.
The history of the year 1875 was one of unimportant engagements, small
skirmishes and guerrilla warfare, no important battle being fought until
the year had about reached its close, when Gomez suffered a severe
defeat at Puerto Principe, which is believed to have been the turning of
the tide against the Cubans. Meanwhile the United States began to
display a strong interest in Cuban affairs.
On November 5, 1875, a letter was sent by the State Department to Caleb
Cushing, then United States minister to Madrid, containing the following
information, intended, of course, as admonition to the Spanish
government:
"In the absence of any prospect of a termination of the war, or of any
change in the manner in which it has been conducted on either side, the
President feels that the time is at hand when it may be the duty of
other governments to intervene, solely with a view of bringing to an end
a disastrous and destructive conflict, and of restoring peace in the
island of Cuba. No government is more deeply interested in the order and
peaceful administration of this island than is the United States, and
none has suffered as the United States from the condition which has
obtained there during the past six or seven years. He will, therefore,
feel it his duty at an early day to submit the subject in this light,
and accompanied by an expression of the views above presented, for the
consideration of Congress."
For some strange reason, Mr. Fish seemed to have lost his usual cool
wisdom; for he went perilously near to ignoring the Monroe Doctrine, so
sacred to all the traditions of American diplomacy, when he directed
that a copy of this letter be forwarded to General Robert C. Schenck,
the United States Minister at London, directing him to ask for the
support of Great Britain in his position.
Following this action of his Secretary of State, President Grant, in his
message to Congress in December, 1875, said: "The past year has
furnished no evidence of an approaching termination of the ruinous
conflict which has been raging for seven years in the neighboring island
of Cuba. While conscious that the insurrection has shown a strength and
endurance which made it at least doubtful whether it be in the power of
Spain to subdue it, it seems unquestionable that no such civil
organization exists which may be recognized as an independent government
capable of performing its international obligations and entitled to be
treated as one of the powers of the earth."
The Spanish government was very wrathful when these facts became known
to it and at once sent a note to Great Britain claiming that the United
States had no reason to bewail the Cuban situation, for on account of it
her commerce had increased; that Spanish had had under the most jealous
and watchful care, as regards the safety of their person and property,
all American citizens who were engaged in business ventures on the
island, and that most of them were making huge fortunes. A complaint was
made that the United States gave refuge to Cuban outlaws, and it was
alleged that all past claims of the United States growing out of the
Cuban difficulty had been or were about to be settled.
However, Great Britain refused to have anything to do with an attempt,
in conjunction with the United States, to end the Cuban war, stating
that it was doubtful whether Spain would accept any terms that could be
offered, and that if she refused, Great Britain did not feel willing to
bring pressure to bear.
Spain, in a note dated February 3, 1876, intimated that the reason why a
settlement of the insurrection in Cuba had not been effected was because
the insurgents would not come out into the open and fight, but preferred
to wage a guerrilla warfare from mountain fastnesses; that could they be
lured into the open, Spain had a sufficient force in the field promptly
to defeat them. It was further intimated that the Creoles were tiring of
the insurrection and that it was now being supported mainly by negroes,
mulattoes, Chinese laborers, adventurers, and deserters from the Spanish
army. Finally the assertion was made that when Spain was finally
victorious, as it was assumed that she would be, she would at once
abolish slavery, and put into effect the most liberal of administrative
reforms.
In strange contradictions of these pretensions, Spain presently looked
to the United States Government to mediate in the affairs of Cuba, and
early in the year 1876 asked that it attempt to bring about an
understanding with the insurgents. Hamilton Fish, who was still
Secretary of State, replied, stating plainly the points which the United
States considered essential for the establishment of peace, law and
order in distressed Cuba:
"1--The mutual and reciprocal observance of treaty obligations, and a
full, friendly and liberal understanding and interpretation of all
doubtful treaty provisions, wherever doubt or question may exist.
"2--Peace, order, and good government in Cuba which involves prompt and
effective measures to restore peace, and the establishment of a
government suited to the spirit and necessities of the age, liberal in
its provisions, wherein justice can be meted out to all alike, according
to defined and well-established provisions.
"3--Gradual but effectual emancipation of slaves.
"4--Improvement of commercial facilities and the removal of the
obstructions now existing in the way of trade and commerce."
The Spanish government replied on April 16, making a specific answer to
each point made by the United States:
"1--The government of his majesty is in entire conformity as regards
complying for its part with all the stipulations of the existing
treaties, and giving to them a perfect, friendly and liberal
interpretation in all that which may be the subject of doubt or
question.
"2--The government of the king likewise proposes, because it believes it
necessary, to change in a liberal sense the regime hitherto followed in
the island of Cuba, not only in its administration but also in its
political part.
"3--Not merely gradual and genuine, but rapid emancipation of the
slaves, because the government of his majesty recognizes and
unreservedly proclaims that slavery neither can nor ought to be
maintained in any of its dominions, by reason of its being an
anti-Christian institution and opposed to present civilization.
"4--The government of the king finds itself in complete accord not only
as to increasing but as to extending to the furthest possible limit all
commercial facilities, and causing the disappearance of all the
obstacles which today exist, and which hinder the rapid and free course
of commercial negotiations."
The United States made no further attempts at intervention, and for the
time being the matter was dropped.
During the year which followed, 1877, more and more the Cuban methods of
warfare merited the description which Spain had given of them. It became
a war of extermination, rather than battle for independence. Cespedes,
Quesada, Agramonte, and many other of the original leaders had died in
battle, or had been captured and murdered by the enemy. Foreigners, who
knew nothing of early ideals, and indeed little of early struggles, had
largely replaced the great Cuban patriots, and their idea was not so
much separation from Spain and conquest of the enemy as plunder.
Property was no longer respected, the once prosperous island was fast
becoming desolate, and on every hand deserted and ruined plantations
were covered with weeds, where once had been wide cultivated fields. The
insurgents were a motley array of men, of many races, and of varied
color, yellow Chinese, and all shades of mulattoes, with only a small
proportion of Creoles. The bands were now composed principally of
marauders, who destroyed everything that they could not steal. Their
victory no longer meant a triumph for democracy, and the establishment
of a liberal government where there was now an oppressive one, but
rather it would be a menace to civilization, hostile to all ideals of
law and order.
The constitution of Spain's army at this period is reported to have been
two hundred and seventy-three superior officers; three thousand and
fifty-four subalterns; sixty-eight thousand one hundred and fifteen
privates, with an equipment of eight thousand four hundred and
seventy-eight horses; four hundred and sixty-two mules; forty-two field
guns, and plenty of small arms and ammunition. The men were properly
clothed, and well fed. Notwithstanding the confusion of the Carlist
uprising, Spain had been able to send over, during the first year of
King Alfonso's reign, twenty-four thousand, four hundred and forty-five
soldiers, while her naval force included forty-five vessels, equipped
with one hundred and thirty-two guns, and manned by two thousand four
hundred and twenty-six men. Besides this, over ten thousand men were on
the high seas to reinforce the Spanish army. The disorganized, ragged,
weary, badly fed Cuban forces, with the lawless element which now
unhappily predominated among them had small chance of victory against
such overwhelming odds. Nothing but the natural topography of the
country, so favorable to guerrilla warfare, and the knowledge which the
natives had of its mountain strongholds, had enabled the Cuban army to
prolong thus far the war. The only thing which had saved the island from
entire economic destruction was the fact that the belligerents had not
invaded the western provinces, and their inhabitants had been free to
plant and reap and conduct their lives in an orderly fashion.
The expenses of the war had made heavy inroads on the Spanish treasury,
and in August of this year, the Spanish capitalists had contributed
nearly twenty-five thousand pesetas toward the expenses of the army in
Cuba. As the season advanced, troop ships arrived at regular intervals.
In October, General Martinez Campos--one of the ablest soldiers and
statesmen in Spain--was appointed Captain-General of Cuba and commander
of the army, and he sailed from Spain to take over his command,
accompanied by fourteen thousand men. Determined that the revolution
should once for all be terminated, and not content with the sum which
Spain's bankers had placed at her disposal, the Spanish Cortes passed a
bill providing for a foreign loan, which would be devoted to the
suppression of the insurrection.
The beginning of the year 1877 thus saw the cause of liberty in a
precarious condition. The Cuban army had been so greatly weakened that
in the encounters which took place the Spaniards were constantly
victorious, and they were soon able to regain the major portion of the
territory which had previously been occupied by the revolutionists. The
time seemed favorable for a settlement of the difficulties in a manner
which, while offering a few concessions to the Cubans, might still be
greatly to the advantage of Spain. To the Captain-General this seemed
the proper occasion for some nice diplomacy, for coaxing with fair words
instead of coercing with violence. He therefore on May 5 issued a
proclamation which he felt would be effective in inducing the
revolutionists to abandon the struggle and to return to the doubtful
protection of allegiance to Spanish rule. His proclamation read as
follows:
"Article I--From the date of this decree, all orders of banishment
decreed gubernatively by this Government for political motives are
hereby rescinded, and all proceedings now under way regarding the same
are hereby overruled.
"Article II--The embargoes imposed gubernatively on insurgents who have
presented or may present themselves for pardon before the termination of
the war shall also be raised. There will, however, be excepted from the
favor of disembargo the property of backsliding insurgents and that of
the leaders of the insurrection, in respect to which this General
Government will adopt the measure it deems most convenient, according to
the special circumstances of each case.
"Article III--The property, embargoed gubernatively, of the disloyal
('infidentes') who have since died, shall also be released from embargo,
and delivered unto their lawful heirs, if these remain faithful to the
Spanish nation.
"Article IV--The property referred to in the two preceding articles once
returned, its owners or holders shall not sell, assign, transfer or
burden it in any manner until two years after the official publication
of the complete pacification of the island.
"Article V--The proceeds of property before its return shall be
considered as applied toward the expenses of the war, unless otherwise
provided for, and its owners without any right to make reclamation of
any nature whatsoever.
"Article VI--None of those whose property has been released from embargo
shall either have the right to make reclamation for any loss or injury
that may have been suffered by the property or object returned them.
"Article VII--To assist as far as possible in the return of said
property, this Government will authorize the Governors and
Lieutenant-Governors of the island to effect the same in each case, to
those comprised in this decree, whose property is situated within their
respective jurisdictions, with the due precautions which shall be
communicated to them from the office of the Secretary of the General
Government.
"Article VIII--The judicial proceedings actually under way against
_infidentes_ shall be forwarded until overruled, or judged, as may
result in law.
"Article IX--Concerning the property adjudged to the State, by sentence
of competent tribunals, his Majesty's Government will decide in due time
whatever it may deem most convenient.
"Article X--The requisite orders shall be issued through the office of
the Secretary of this General Government, that the foregoing articles
shall be duly complied with by whom it may concern."
Seven months later, on November 3, he promulgated a second decree
providing "that all estates ruined during the war, and in the way of
reconstruction, shall be free from contributions for five years, from
the date of the decree. Every new state and all new property acquired in
cities or villages of the central and oriental departments will have the
same privilege. All industries and commerce in said departments newly
established will be exempt for three years from contributions. All
female cattle, either Spanish or foreign, imported into Cuba with the
exclusive object of raising stock, will be duty free for two years."
The first decree had the desired effect. A number of the Cuban leaders
surrendered in October, 1877. It is true that when some of these men
attempted to return to the Cuban lines and persuade the other officers
to join them in submission to Spanish authority, they were tried by
court-martial and sentenced. But the tide had turned, and was now
steadily flowing favorably for the Spaniards. The war was over. Cuban
independence had once more been postponed.
Negotiations were entered into at Zanjon, in which General Maximo Gomez
represented the Cubans, and Captain-General Campos the Spanish
government. On February 15, 1878, the so-called Treaty of Zanjon was
signed; its terms being in brief as follows:
"Article I--The political, organic and administrative laws enjoyed by
Porto Rico shall be established in Cuba.
"Art. II--Free pardon for all political offenses committed from 1868 to
date, and freedom for those who are under indictment or are serving
sentences within or without the island. Amnesty to all deserters from
the Spanish army, regardless of nationality, this clause being extended
to include all those who have taken part directly or indirectly in the
revolutionary movement.
"Art. III--Freedom for the Asiatic coolies and for the slaves who may be
in the insurgent ranks.
"Art. IV--No individual who by virtue of this capitulation shall submit
to and remain under the authority of the Spanish government shall be
compelled to render any military service before peace be established
over the whole territory.
"Art. V--Every individual who by virtue of this capitulation may wish to
depart from the island shall be permitted to do so, and the Spanish
government shall provide him with the means therefor, without passing
through any town or settlement, if he so desire.
"Art. VI--The capitulation of each force shall take place in uninhabited
spots, where beforehand the arms and ammunition of war shall be
deposited.
"Art. VII--In order to further the acceptance, by the insurgents of the
other departments of these articles of capitulation, the
commander-in-chief of the Spanish army shall furnish them free
transportation, by land and sea, over all the lines within his control
of the Central Department.
"Art. VIII--This pact with the Committee of the Central Department shall
be deemed to have been made with all the departments of the island which
may accept the conditions."
In addition to this, there were reported to have been secret agreements,
which provided for "a civil governor with duties distinct from those of
a military governor; a provincial parliament in each of the three
departments; popular elections for municipal officers; the inclusion of
the war debt in the public estimates of the island; the dissolution of
the Volunteer Corps of Havana, and the organization of a new militia to
be composed alike of Cubans and Spaniards; a representation of the
island in the Cortes; a recognition of the military rank of the
insurgent chiefs and officers, and those accredited with foreign
commissions, their rank 'to be effective only in the list of the Spanish
army in Cuba,' and the complete abolition of slavery in five years, with
indemnity."
Both parties disregarded the terms of the treaty. Doubtless the Cubans
would have played with entire fairness, had it not been for the fact
that the Spaniards at once demonstrated that they did not intend to keep
their promises. General Garcia retained the title of "President of the
Republic," and the House of Representatives continued, until 1869, to
meet somewhere in the wilderness. General Campos made a bid for popular
favor, and went on record as advocating a peace which would be lasting.
The Spaniards had good cause not to desire resumption of warfare, and
the Cubans were too worn out to start any serious trouble. Campos wrote
a report to the Spanish government, couched in florid language and
breathing benevolence:
"I do not wish to make a momentary peace. I desire that this peace be
the beginning of a bond of common interests between Spain and her Cuban
provinces, and that this bond be drawn continually closer by the
identity of aspirations and the good faith of both.
"Let not the Cubans be considered as pariahs or minors, but put on an
equality with other Spaniards in everything not inconsistent with their
present condition.
"It was on the other hand impossible, according to my judgment and
conscience, not to grant the first condition; not to do it was to
postpone indefinitely the fulfilment of a promise made in our present
constitution. It was not possible that this island, richer, more
populous, and more advanced morally and materially than her sister,
Porto Rico, should remain without the advantages and liberties long ago
planted in the latter with good results; and the spirit of the age, and
the decision of the country gradually to assimilate the colonies to the
Peninsula, made it necessary to grant the promised reforms, which would
have been already established, and surely more amply, if the abnormal
state of things had not concentrated all the attention of government on
the extirpation of the evil which was devouring this rich province.
"I did not make the last constitution; I had no part in the discussion
of it. It is now the law, and as such I respect it, and as such endeavor
to apply it. But there was in it something conditional, which I think a
danger, a motive of distrust, and I have wished that it might disappear.
Nothing assures me that the present ministry will continue in power, and
I do not know whether that which replaces it would believe the fit
moment to have arrived for fulfilling the precept of the constitution.
"I desire the peace of Spain, and this will not be firm while there is
war or disturbance in the richest jewel of her crown. Perhaps the
insurgents would have accepted promises less liberal and more vague than
those set forth in this condition; but even had this been done it would
have been but a brief postponement, because those liberties are destined
to come for the reasons already given, with the difference that Spain
now shows herself generous and magnanimous, satisfying just aspirations
which she might deny, and a little later, probably very soon, would have
been obliged to grant them, compelled by the force of ideas and of the
age.
"Moreover, she has promised over and over again to enter on the path of
assimilation, and if the promises were more vague, even though the
fulfillment of this promise were begun, these people would have the
right to doubt our good faith and to show a distrust unfortunately
warranted by the failings of human nature itself.
"The not adding another one hundred thousand to the one hundred thousand
families that mourn their sons slain in this pitiless war, and the cry
of peace that will resound in the hearts of the eighty thousand mothers
who have sons in Cuba who are liable to conscription, would be a full
equivalent for the payment of a debt of justice."
February 21, 1878, saw the Cuban insurrection officially at an end. The
Cubans laid down their arms and surrendered to the Spanish forces. On
March 1, telegrams announcing this fact were received by the Cortes in
Spain with the greatest rejoicing. On the next day a royal decree was
published at Havana announcing that Cuba was to be accorded the same
treatment which had been granted to Porto Rico; and many concessions
were nominally made to the former insurgents. Cuba was to be allowed to
have her own municipal government and city councils, and was to be
granted representation in the Cortes, while a second decree was
promulgated at Puerto Principe declaring the freedom of all slaves who
had been born since the enactment of the measure of February 10, 1869,
on the condition that within a month they presented themselves to the
authorities for the proper legal procedure. Spain had so frequently gone
on record, particularly in her efforts to enlist the sympathy of the
United States Government, that she would, immediately on a determination
of the war in her favor, declare the abolition of slavery, that she
could not now very well give the lie to her assurances. The
proclamation at Puerto Principe, however, contained the extremely
unjust provision that all patriots who had taken part in the revolution
would not receive compensation for the financial loss suffered in the
freeing of their slaves, but that the loyal Spaniards would be
indemnified. It is not difficult to picture how this provision must have
impressed those patriots who had sacrificed everything in an effort to
free themselves from that very rule which was now imposing such an
unfair enactment upon them.
Official Spanish reports give the following table of their losses yearly
during the Ten Years' War:
_Year_ _Force in Field_ _Deaths_
1869 35,570 5,504
1870 47,242 9,395
1871 55,357 6,574
1872 58,708 7,780
1873 52,500 5,902
1874 62,578 5,923
1875 63,212 6,361
1876 78,099 8,482
1877 90,245 17,677
1878 81,700 7,500
------
Total 81,098