At the time of the beginning of the Cuban insurrection the United States
was undergoing one of its quadrennial political campaigns, and March 4,
1869, saw General Ulysses S. Grant inducted to the Presidency--the man
who had led the nation to victory in the Civil War and had thus
maintained the union of the United States of America; a soldier of the
highest character, and one whose sympathies were keenly enlisted in
behalf of the Cuban revolution. When this news reached the Cuban leaders
they at once addressed to him an appeal for recognition, which ran as
follows:
* * * * *
"To his Excellency, the President of the United States:
"Sir:
"The people of Cuba, by their Grand Supreme Civil Junta, and through
their General-in-Chief, Senor Cespedes, desire to submit to your
Excellency, the following among other reasons, why your Excellency, as
President of the United States, should accord to them the belligerent
rights and a recognition of their independence.
"Because from the hearts of nineteen-twentieths of the inhabitants of
the island go up prayers for the success of the armies of the republic;
and from the sole and only want of arms and ammunition these patient
people are kept under the tyrannical yoke of Spain.
"Because the republic has armies numbering over 70,000 men, actually in
the field and doing duty. These men are organized and governed on the
principles of civilized warfare. The prisoners whom they take--and so
far they have taken three times as many as their enemies have taken from
them--are treated in every respect as the prisoners of war are used and
treated by the most civilized nations of the earth. In the hope of
recognition by the United States, they have never yet in a single
instance retaliated death for death, even in cases of the most provoking
nature.
"Because the Spanish authorities have almost invariably brutally
murdered the soldiers of the armies of the republic who have surrendered
to them, and have recently issued an official order requiring their
military forces hereafter instantly to kill and murder any prisoner of
the republic who surrenders. This is due, the order cheerfully tells us,
to save trouble and vexation to the Spanish civil authorities. This is
an outrage the civilized nations of the earth ought not to allow.
"Because the United States is the nearest civilized nation to Cuba,
whose political institutions strike a responsive chord in the hearts of
all Cubans. The commercial and financial interests of the two peoples
being largely identical and reciprocal in their natures, Cuba earnestly
appeals for the unquestionable right of recognition.
"Because the arms and authority of the Republic of Cuba now extend over
two-thirds of the entire geographical area of the island, embracing a
very great majority of the population in every part of the island.
"Because she has a navy in course of construction which will excel in
point of numbers and efficiency that heretofore maintained by the
Spanish authorities in these waters.
"Because these facts plainly show to the world that this is not a
movement of a few discontents, but the grand and sublime uprising of a
people thirsty for liberty and determined with this last effort to
secure to themselves and their posterity those unquestioned
rights--liberty of conscience and freedom of the individual.
"Finally, because she is following but in the footsteps of Spain herself
in endeavoring to banish tyrannical rulers, and in their stead place
rulers of her own choice, the people of Cuba having a tenfold more
absolute and potent right than Spain had, because Cuba's rulers are sent
without her voice or consent by a foreign country, accompanied by and
with swarms of officials to fill the various offices created only for
their individual comfort, drawing their maintenance and support from the
hard earnings of the natives of the soil.
"Allow us to add, with the greatest diffidence and sensitiveness, that
the difference between the rebellion in the United States and the
present revolution in Cuba is simply that in the former a small minority
rebelled against laws which they had a voice in making, and the
privilege of repealing; while in the case of Cuba, we are resisting a
foreign power in crushing us to the earth, as they have done for
centuries, with no appeal but that of arms open to us, and appointing
without knowledge, voice, advice or consent, tyrannical citizens of
their own country to rule us and eat our substance.
"Patria y Libertad!
"Approved by the Supreme Junta and ordered approved
By SENOR GENERAL CESPEDES,
Commander in Chief Republican Forces in Cuba.
Headquarters in the Field, March 1, 1869."
President Grant was strongly inclined to grant this petition, and in
this he was upheld by his most trusted friend and advisor, General
Rawlins. In consequence, he prepared on August 19, 1869, a proclamation
by which he recognized the insurgents as belligerents, the result of
which would have been to legalize the shipment of arms to them.
Unfortunately for the Cuban cause, though doubtless fortunately for the
United States, there was at the head of the State Department of the
United States a man of cooler judgment than General Grant, and one whose
emotions of pity were not so easily moved. This was the Secretary of
State, Hamilton Fish. Before Grant's proclamation could become
effective, it was necessary for the Secretary of State to sign, seal and
publish it, and this Mr. Fish refused to do. He felt that to do so would
constitute a grave error in diplomacy, and one which might have
far-reaching detrimental effects for the United States. It was his
judgment that the President had been betrayed by his sympathies, and he
felt it incumbent upon himself, as chief of the Department of State, to
restrain him from making a bad mistake. There was to be taken into
consideration the fact that the United States, in the war so recently
fought for the maintenance of the Union, had made vigorous protests
against the recognition of the Confederacy by foreign powers, and
Secretary Fish felt that the proclamation in favor of the Cuban
revolutionary government would stultify the course of the United States
government in that matter. Indeed, in sound judgment, it was impossible
to deny that the Confederates of the South were more justly entitled to
recognition, under all the circumstances of both cases, than were the
Cuban revolutionists. Fish felt that the condition in Cuba, at that
time, at any rate, did not merit the official recognition of the United
States government, and he was not backward in conveying his conviction
to General Grant. Then he simply pigeon-holed the proclamation and let
it die a natural death in musty obscurity. Upon second thought, General
Grant saw the soundness of Fish's conclusions, and not only did not
register a protest, but took occasion some months later to thank Fish
for his intervention, and the suppression of the proclamation.
[Illustration: MIGUEL DE ALDAMA]
MIGUEL DE ALDAMA
A man of letters and of great wealth and social leadership, Miguel
de Aldama was a native of Havana and one of the foremost citizens
of that capital when the Ten Years' War began. He at once placed
his fortune and himself at the disposal of his country, and was
appointed by President Cespedes to be Agent of the Cuban Republic
in New York. To that place he was reappointed by President Cisneros
Betancourt. He served in that capacity throughout the war, to the
great advantage of the patriot cause.
Meanwhile, reports of the cruelties of Spanish soldiers began to
penetrate the ears of American citizens. It was reported, and pretty
well authenticated, that disgusting atrocities were the order of the
day, when the Spanish troops found in their path anyone, male or female,
who was not in a position to resist them. There were stories of the
raping of little children before the eyes of their mothers, and of
mothers in the presence of their children, of the crucifixion, and
hanging by the thumbs of old men, and even of able bodied persons, who
happened to fall defenseless into the hands of the Spaniards. Tales of
barbarity to prisoners, even to the extent of roasting them alive, fired
the rage of justice-loving American citizens, and again touched the kind
heart of their President. To these reports were added others, less
revolting, but touching the commercial sense of the nation. American
property in Cuba was being destroyed, and American citizens were being
molested and restrained from the peaceful pursuit of their business.
American commerce was impeded and losses were suffered. It was recalled
that Spain had been prompt to recognize the Confederacy as a
belligerent power, and it seemed but the irony of justice, and a fair
sort of retaliation, that now the United States should give recognition
to those who were rebelling against Spain's misrule. But Fish was deaf
to all pleas in behalf of the Cubans, and resolutely blocked all
attempts to secure recognition for them. He argued and pleaded with the
President with such eloquence that presently he seemed to have him
convinced that the cause of freedom in Cuba was not yet worthy of the
recognition of the United States. In consequence, in his annual message,
in December, 1869, President Grant, less than four months after his
unpublished proclamation of recognition, declared that "the contest has
at no time assumed the conditions which amount to a war in the sense of
international war, or which would show the existence of a political
organization of the insurgents sufficient to justify a recognition of
belligerency." He added that "the principle is to be maintained,
however, that this nation is its own judge when to accord the rights of
belligerency either to a people struggling to free themselves from a
government they believed to be oppressive, or to independent nations at
war with each other."
It is needless to say that this position was a great disappointment to
the Cubans, and seemed to them utterly at variance with what they might
have expected from a nation so lately torn by Civil War, and which had
shown such keen individual sympathies with the cause of the freedom of
Cuba. However, from that time on, the United States, officially, at
least, showed the greatest patience--a patience which seemed almost
unbelievably enduring--toward the hardships which the Spanish
authorities put upon innocent Americans, and was indefatigably zealous
in its efforts to prevent violations of neutrality on the part of
sympathetic United States citizens. That there was some bitterness in
the hearts of the Cuban leaders, who felt they had a right to expect the
support of their sister republic, and a country which had against such
odds won her own independence, it is easy to believe, and there were
many who felt that this was a righteous indignation.
But during the months in which the Secretary of State and the somewhat
unwilling President of the United States were shaping this policy, the
war in Cuba was continuously waged. On March 7, 1869, a few days after
the Cubans addressed their petition to the United States government, the
Spanish attacked a strong Cuban position at Macaca, and were successful
in ousting the revolutionists. This disheartening occurrence was
followed by defeats for the Cubans, first at Mayari, where Spanish
forces under General Valcosta were victorious over a small army of which
General Cespedes was in command--General Cespedes, however, effecting a
withdrawal with safety to his own person and a part of his
supporters--and again at Jiguani, where it was the Cubans who made the
attack upon a Spanish force under General Valmaseda, only to meet defeat
at the hands of the Spaniards, and to be forced to flee in disorder to
their mountain fastnesses.
Meanwhile reinforcements came from Spain; this time as before, not a
large number, being only about twelve hundred men, but enough materially
to aid the governmental army, and to strengthen its morale. The
Captain-General also endeavored to win the hearts of the timid by
issuing a proclamation which declared important concessions in tax
regulations. A fifty per cent reduction was made in the direct taxation
on plantations, on cattle and on country real estate, as well as in
those taxes only recently levied on merchants and tradesmen. As a
crowning concession the taxes due for the last quarter of the year
1868-1869 were nullified. But it was apparently impossible for Spain to
make concessions without accompanying them with demands of some sort to
offset her seeming generosity. Therefore the Captain-General took
occasion to levy some new duties: On muscovado sugar, if shipped under
the flag of Spain, a tax of 16c a hundred weight, while shipment under a
foreign flag called for an additional 4c duty; on boxed sugar shipped
under the Spanish flag, a tax of 75c a box, while if under a foreign
flag, 12c additional; on every hogshead of sugar shipped under the flag
of Spain a tax of $1, and if under a foreign flag, 75c additional; a tax
on molasses of 50c a hogshead, and on rum of $1 for an equal quantity.
It will be recalled that the Cuban patriots had by their proclamation of
December 27, 1868, granted freedom to all slaves on the island. They now
began a campaign to enforce this decree by removing, from all
plantations of which their armies were able to take possession, the
slaves for service in the Cuban army, and to make their liberation
doubly sure, burning the buildings, and laying waste to the crops. In
the districts around Sagua and Remedios there were nine thousand
insurgents engaged in this work. This action it would be hard to excuse,
if there were not taken into consideration the fact that the Cubans had
endured such grievous wrongs at the hands of the Spaniards that they
would have been much less than human if they had not had some desire to
retaliate; and, after all, the retaliation which spoke most forcefully
to the Spaniard was that which attacked his worldly goods and his
pocketbook.
But to offset these actions, the Spanish at the same time proved
themselves victorious in several engagements. On March 18, at Alvarez,
they defeated the Cuban forces; at about the same time, at Guaracabuya,
they won another victory, with Cuban losses numbering one hundred and
thirty-six killed outright; and two thousand Cubans, under Generals
Morales and Villamil, were routed by the Spaniards at Potrerillo. In
this last affair the patriots suffered severe losses; three hundred
wounded, two hundred and five killed, and twenty-one taken prisoners,
together with many horses killed or captured. They were also obliged to
retreat in such haste that they had to abandon a considerable quantity
of ammunition, which was seized by the enemy. It is only necessary to
add that the Spanish lost but one officer, one private and one of their
number taken prisoner, to demonstrate the disheartening nature of the
encounter. But the Cubans were, as has been stated, drafting large
quantities of slaves into their army, and this victory for the Spaniards
was a signal proof that the slaves were not good material for soldiers.
Besides this, the patriots who took part in this engagement suffered
severely a lack of proper equipment.
The tide seemed to be turning against the Cubans, and in the days that
followed they were to face still further losses. The quality of the
recruits which were being added to the patriot army did not increase its
valor, skill or morale. They lacked guns, and those which they had were
of antiquated pattern; there was a woeful scarcity of larger arms and
ammunition, and the troops were weary and poorly fed. Against that
portion of the Cuban army stationed in the Villa Clara district the
Spanish now began to concentrate a large army, pouring troops into that
district until they were ten thousand strong. The Cubans were
outnumbered, and lacked the weapons of warfare, they had been
outmanoeuvred, and suffered tremendous losses, and yet another crushing
defeat lay before them, for on March 20, two thousand Cubans who were,
as they fondly believed, strongly entrenched at Placitas, were put to
flight by a small body of Spanish troops, highly skilled and well armed
it is true, but numbering only three hundred regulars and a small
company of the much feared Volunteers.
Emboldened by these successes, the Captain-General again shifted his
position, and issued an order, to be made the excuse for an outrage
against American shipping, which was severely to tax the friendliness of
international relations. The Spanish government was ever haunted by the
bugbear of American intervention, and doubtless the decree in question
was issued as a preventive against such action, for the Spanish well
knew that should such intervention once take place their cause would be
irrevocably lost, and with it their dominion over Cuba. The decree
provided for the confiscation on the high seas of any and all vessels
carrying either men, arms or ammunition or all three, or indeed anything
which might be construed as intended for material aid to the
revolutionists, and further provided that "all persons captured on such
vessels without regard to their number will be immediately executed."
Viewed in the calm light of history this decree would seem bound, if
enforced, to be almost suicidal to the Spanish interests, being in
opposition to law and justice, and in express violation of existing
treaty obligations between Spain and the United States, and thus bound
to bring a storm of protest from the United States government.
As if this were not enough, Dulce followed this action by another
decree, promulgated on April 1, which prohibited the transfer of
property, except by the direct consent of the government, and this
prohibition included the sale of produce of all sorts, stocks, shares in
mercantile projects, and real estate, together with many minor
provisions; while by a third decree, which shortly followed, he ordered
the confiscation of the estates of American citizens who were suspected
of sympathy or complicity with the revolutionists. Naturally, the United
States government made a strong protest against such summary action,
rightly declaring it to be in violation of the provisions of the treaty
of 1795.
The Cuban troops now began a more or less concentrated attack on
Trinidad, and to relieve the pressure at this point, the Spanish sent a
large force toward Puerto Principe, hoping to weaken the Cuban army at
the former place, because of the necessity of withdrawing men to combat
the Spanish army at the latter. The Spanish government also sought to
offset the damage and destruction done by the insurgents to property of
loyalists by issuing a decree proclaiming their intention to confiscate
the property of all individuals who were absent from home without a
governmental excuse--which would of course include all landowners who
were fighting in the Cuban army--and providing for a detail of men to
protect against the revolutionists every estate thus taken.
On April 17 battle was again joined by the Cubans under Colonel
Francisco Rubalcava and a Spanish force under the combined leadership of
Generals Letona, Escalante and Lesca. The fighting which ensued taxed
the Cuban resources to the utmost. All day long the battle raged, and
when both sides were worn out with combat, the result was not decisive
for either army, while one hundred and eighty Spanish troops and two
hundred Cubans lay dead under the stars.
For nearly two weeks thereafter there was a period of quiet and
recuperation on the part of the Cubans, with the exception of a number
of minor skirmishes, but on May 3 the belligerents again met in battle
at Las Minas, when twelve hundred Spaniards, under the command of
General Lesca, and a large Cuban force under General Quesada, fought in
the most violent of hand to hand conflicts. Frightful butchery ensued,
for this time victory again returned to the Cuban standards, and the
Spanish were forced to retreat in disorder, leaving behind them one
hundred and sixty killed and three hundred wounded, while the Cuban
losses were two hundred killed and an equal number wounded.
To add to the rejoicing over this victory, small as it was, a few days
previous the Cubans had had a practical demonstration of the sympathy of
United States citizens for their cause, and of the ability of those
citizens to evade the drastic provisions of the government against any
display of that feeling. On May 1 there arrived at Mayari a body of
three hundred Americans, under the leadership of General Thomas Jordan,
a tried veteran of the Civil War, in which he had been an officer in the
Confederate Army. He was an experienced soldier, who had had a fine
military training and had been graduated from West Point. This in itself
might have been quite enough to put new heart into the Cuban leaders,
but General Jordan had brought with him not only reinforcements but
arms, ammunition, clothing, medical supplies and food. A detailed list
of this material included four thousand long range rifles, three hundred
new pattern Remington rifles, five hundred revolvers, twelve pieces of
artillery of various sizes including twelve, twenty-four and thirty-two
pound cannon, and a large supply of ammunition for these arms. And the
relief did not stop here, for there were a thousand pairs of shoes, and
clothing for one thousand persons, two printing-presses, medical
supplies, and quantities of rice, tinned biscuits, salt meat, flour and
salt. This meant food and arms for at least six thousand men, and there
is no wonder that there seemed to be occasion for the wildest rejoicing
on the part of those who were so manfully and against such great odds
engaged in upholding the cause of freedom in Cuba. Now the patriots
might oppose the Spanish with at least six thousand well equipped men,
and they had also acquired in the person of General Jordan an officer
whose aid in drilling raw recruits could not be overestimated.
The Cubans did not get their booty to headquarters without some
opposition from the Spaniards. That was hardly to be hoped, since their
every movement was reported to the government by Spanish spies, and it
would have been impossible for an expedition like the one in question to
land without detection. But they were able to resist all attempts to
wrest their supplies from them.
Around Trinidad and Cienfuegos fighting was constant. Each day saw its
skirmishes, and there were some violent engagements, all of which left
matters pretty much as they had been so far as any victory of a decisive
character for either side was concerned. The Cubans were, however, able
to disperse a body of Spanish troops which were advancing toward Las
Tunas in the hope of relieving the citizens of that place, which was
also in a state of siege. The Spaniards were bearing a quantity of
provisions for the city, and in their flight these were abandoned and
fell into the hands of the Cubans.
When matters were succeeding in a manner more or less favorable to the
Spanish cause, the Volunteers were quiet and inclined to discontinue
temporarily their opposition to Dulce, but when things took a turn for
the worse he was always made the scapegoat. Hence the Volunteers were
renewing their attacks on his policies, although for the time being he
had been suffering one of his periodic reversions to severity. This
time, the Volunteers were successful in obtaining the recall of Dulce as
Captain-General. They simply drove him out by mob force, on June 4, and
put into his place one Senor Espinar. This appointment was an arbitrary
act, which the Spanish government refused to confirm, and therefore
Espinar's political life was cut short almost at its inception, and
General Caballero de Rodas became Captain-General of the island. Now
Rodas should have been a man entirely to the liking of the Volunteers.
He had won for himself a reputation for cruelty toward the republican
insurgents in Spain while he was stationed at Cadiz, which had caused
him to be called "the butcher of Cadiz." He evidently felt it incumbent
to live up to his title, for now the Spanish troops were incited to
unspeakable cruelties.
Promptly on taking office, Rodas began his career with the decree of
July 7, 1869, which he fondly hoped would prevent further aid from
reaching the revolutionists from the United States or from any other
country. The proclamation was as follows:
"The custody and guardianship of the coasts of this island, of the keys
adjacent, and the waters appertaining to the territory, being of the
greatest importance, in order to suppress the insurgent bands that have
hitherto maintained themselves by outside assistance, and determined as
I am to give a vigorous impulse to the pursuit of them, and with a view
of settling the doubts entertained by our own cruisers as to the proper
interpretation of the decree promulgated by this superior political
government under dates of November 9, 1868, and February 18 and 26 and
March 24 last, I have decided to amplify and unite the aforesaid orders
and substitute for them the following, which, by virtue of the authority
vested in me by the nation, I decree:
"Article I.--All parts situated between Cayo Bahia de Cadiz and Point
Maysi on the north side, and from Point Maysi to Cienfuegos on the
south, with the exception of Sagua La Grande, Caibarien, Nuevitas,
Gibara, Baracoa, Guantanamo, Santiago de Cuba, Manzanillo, Santa Cruz,
Zaza, Trinidad and Cienfuegos, where there are custom houses, will
continue closed to the import and export trade, both by foreign and
coasting vessels. Those who may attempt the entry of any closed ports,
or to open communications with their coasts, will be pursued, and, on
being captured, are to be tried as violators of the law.
"Article II.--Vessels carrying gunpowder, arms and warlike stores, will
likewise be judged in accordance with the law.
"Article III.--The transportation of individuals in the service of the
insurrection is by far more serious than that of contraband of war, and
will be deemed an act of decided hostility, and the vessel and crew
regarded as enemies to the state.
"Article IV.--Should the individuals referred to in the foregoing
article come armed, this will be regarded, _de facto_, as proof of their
intentions, and they will be regarded as pirates, as will also be the
case with the crew of the vessel.
"Article V.--In accordance with the law, vessels captured under an
unknown flag, whether armed or unarmed, will also be regarded as
pirates.
"Article VI.--In free seas adjacent to those of this island, the
cruisers will limit themselves to their treatment of denounced vessels,
or those who render themselves suspicious, to the rights given in the
treaties between Spain and the United States in 1795, Great Britain in
1835, and with other nations subsequently; and if, in the exercise of
these rights, they should encounter any vessels recognized as enemies of
the integrity of the territory, they will carry them into port for legal
investigation and judgment accordingly.
"CABALLERO DE RODAS."
Of course this action was incited and backed by the Volunteers, and met
with their heartiest approval, but if either they or their mouthpiece,
Rodas, had any real idea that such a decree would act as a deterrent
against aid being sent to the Cubans, they misjudged the temper of the
friends of the revolution in America. It simply made them aware of the
necessity of increased secrecy and caution, but did not one whit curtail
their enterprises.
To reinforce his action, Rodas promptly issued another decree against
the insurgents in the following contemptuous terms:
"The insurrection, in its impotency, being reduced to detached bands,
perverted to the watchword of desolation and daily perpetrating crimes
that have no precedent in civilized countries, personal security and the
rights of justice, the foremost guarantees of person and property,
imperiously demand that said insurrection be hastened to its end, and
without consideration toward those who have placed themselves beyond the
pale of the law. The culprit will not be deprived of the guarantee of
just impartiality in the evidence of his crime, but without delay
admissible in normal periods, which would procrastinate or paralyze the
verdict of the law and its inexorable fulfilment.
"As the guardians of the national integrity, the protection of the
upright and pacific citizen, fulfilling the duties of my office, and in
virtue of the authority conceded to me by the Government of the nation,
I hereby decree:
"Article I.--The decrees promulgated by this superior political
government under date of the 12th and 13th of February last shall be
carried out with vigor.
"Article II.--The crimes of premeditated incendiarism, assassination and
robbery, by armed force and contraband, shall be tried by a council of
war.
"Article III.--The courts of justice will continue in the exercise of
their attributes, without prejudice, however, of having submitted to me
such cases as special circumstances may require.
"CABALLERO DE RODAS."
Thus, in high-sounding phrases and treacherous hypocrisy, did the
"butcher of Cadiz" proclaim himself the guardian of persons and
property. If his pronouncements had not had too grim a significance,
they might have filled the Cuban patriots with the spirit of ironical
laughter, such a divergence was there between his character and his past
record, and the new role which he now announced himself as about to
play.
Naturally this action did not pass unnoticed by the United States
government. On July 16, the Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, informed
the Spanish minister at Washington that Rodas's decree of July 7
interfered with the commerce of the United States in a manner which
could only be tolerated in times of war; that the United States would
maintain her right to carry contraband in times of peace, and would
permit no interference with her vessels on the high seas, except in time
of war; that if Spain was in a state of war with Cuba it was incumbent
on her to proclaim the fact; and further adding that the United States
would regard any attempt to enforce Rodas's decree as a recognition by
Spain of the existence of a state of war in Cuba, and would govern
itself accordingly. Spain was in no position and had no desire to
declare Cuba in a state of war. Such action would wrest from her certain
advantages which in her present ambiguous position she was prepared to
enjoy to the utmost. She at once recognized that Rodas's action was
entirely too arbitrary, and might be productive of a most embarrassing
situation, and therefore acting under instructions from the Spanish
government, he at once receded from his arrogant position and his decree
was materially modified.
American commerce with Cuba had been exceedingly profitable to those
engaged in it, and, under the disturbed condition of affairs in the
island, not only did it suffer, but the commercial interests of American
residents in Cuba were badly jeopardized. General Grant still nursed his
secret good will toward the cause of the revolutionists, although the
advice of his Secretary of State had put a temporary restraint on it. It
may be that this new indignity which Spain had sought to impose not only
on the insurgents but also on American interests spurred him to action.
However, that may be, when Daniel E. Sickles was appointed United States
Minister to Spain, on June 29th, 1869, he was instructed at once on his
arrival in Madrid to offer to the Spanish government the good offices of
the United States in an effort to bring about an understanding and
adjustment between the revolutionists and the governmental party and to
effect a cessation of the hostilities which were rapidly ruining both
the Creoles and the Spanish landowners alike. Sickles received the most
careful instructions to proceed in a conciliatory fashion, and in no
manner to imply any recognition by the United States of the belligerency
of Cuba. To guide him in his work, terms were drafted as a basis for the
negotiations and they embodied the following points:
1. The acknowledgment by Spain of the independence of Cuba.
2. Cuba to pay Spain an indemnity under conditions to be thereafter
agreed upon. In case such sum could not immediately be paid in full, the
unpaid portion to be secured by the pledge of export and import duties,
in a manner to be agreed upon.
3. The abolition of slavery in the island of Cuba.
4. The declaration of an armistice pending negotiations for a final
settlement.
And, furthermore, Sickles was empowered, if necessary, to suggest that
the United States would guarantee the payment by Cuba of the indemnity.
Sickles took up the negotiations with the Spanish government at Madrid
in accordance with his instructions, and after much consideration the
Spanish government agreed to accept the good offices of the United
States government, provided it was not required to treat with the
revolutionists on a basis of equality--that would be too galling to the
sensitive Spanish dignity--but that it would be allowed to take the
position of making concessions to a rebellious people, such concessions
of course to be couched in legal terms, and carried out in accordance
with constitutional forms and with all due solemnity. Above all, the
result of the negotiations was not to be regarded as a treaty between
armed powers on an equal footing. In support of her position, Spain made
the following demands, as constituting the basis of settlement to which
she would agree:
1. The revolutionists to lay down their arms and return to their homes.
2. Whereupon, Spain would grant a full and complete amnesty.
3. The question of the independence of Cuba to be submitted to vote by
their own vote whether they desired independence or not.
4. Provided a majority vote was cast for independence Spain would grant
it, the Cortes consenting, upon the payment of a satisfactory sum by
Cuba, or the partial payment and guarantee by the United States of the
remainder.
When Sickles submitted the result of his efforts to the government of
his own country, that government, well knowing that the Cubans would
never consent to the first two stipulations laid down by Spain, promptly
rejected them. Sickles again took up the matter with the Spanish
government, but they stood firm, and since there seemed no hope of an
agreement on any terms which would be acceptable to the revolutionists,
the matter was finally dropped.
Meanwhile Spain had been sending considerable reinforcements to Cuba,
and commenced an active campaign against the force under the command of
the American General Jordan. These were probably the best equipped and
best trained troops which the Cuban army had at its command, and they
were well fitted to administer a rebuff to the Spaniards, which they
did. The attacks of the Spaniards were all unsuccessful, and the Cubans
were elated by the certainty that in bravery and resources they were
more than a match for the Spanish army, and that, when they were
properly equipped they seemed to have the advantage. In these different
battles--none of them of very large scope--the Spanish lost four hundred
killed, wounded and taken prisoners. Meanwhile the Cubans attacked the
Spanish forces near Baja, a small town on the bay in the vicinity of
Nuevitas, and defeated three hundred marines under General Puello,
killing eighty of the enemy.
But the rainy season was approaching and soon caused a halt in
hostilities, while both armies were strengthening their positions
looking forward to the time when weather would permit a resumption of
the warfare. If the Spanish were obtaining reinforcements, the Cubans
also were, in spite of the Spanish blockade and the decrees of the
Captain-General, as well as the activities of the United States
officials, constantly receiving aid from the United States. This mainly
took the form of small expeditions from the southern states. However, at
the close of July there arrived a company of two hundred and
seventy-five recruits from the states of Ohio, Indiana and Kentucky,
bringing with them large stores of food, clothing, arms and ammunitions.
So it appeared that faith in the righteousness of the Cuban cause was
not confined to what were known as the southern states.
These men were placed under the direct command of General Quesada, and
thus reinforced he decided to make an effort to subdue and capture the
besieged Las Tunas. He set out to go thither with twelve hundred men.
All night long the fight raged on the outskirts of the town, and just as
the morning was breaking the Cubans made a triumphal entry. By two
o'clock the next afternoon the town was completely under their control.
When news of this victory reached the Spanish headquarters, a large
force was immediately dispatched to dislodge the Cubans, and spies
reporting to General Quesada that the Spanish troops sent against him
not only largely outnumbered his own, but also were bringing large
quantities of heavy artillery with them, he decided that to hold the
town would not be of sufficient importance--if indeed he could do so
against such odds--to risk an engagement. He, therefore, again retired.
He had been welcomed as a deliverer by the inhabitants of Las Tunas,
for they had suffered gross indignities under Spanish occupation, and
now many of them enlisted in the Cuban army, and accompanied General
Quesada on his retreat.
It may have been that the attempted intervention of the United States
government at Madrid led the Spanish government to believe that the time
had again arrived to temporize; at any rate, several concessions were
made in an attempt to pacify the insurgents, but without any perceptible
effect.
Not every attempt to bring aid from the United States to Cuba was
productive of results, and during the summer there had been a number of
efforts which were abortive, or which failed of execution. But just as
hope of a successful relief expedition was dying in the hearts of the
Cubans, a party of six hundred men with a quantity of rifles and a large
amount of ammunition arrived from that stronghold of Cuban sympathizers,
New Orleans. Meanwhile General Jordan communicated a request for aid to
his compatriots who composed the Cuban Junta in the City of New York. He
reported that the Cuban army was composed of twenty six thousand eight
hundred men, besides whom there were at least forty thousand freed
slaves, who were armed merely with machetes. He requested that seventy
five thousand stands of arms be in some manner dispatched to the Cubans,
and expressed the opinion that if this could be accomplished, in ninety
days the war would be determined in favor of the patriots.
Small bodies of Cubans were still carrying on guerrilla warfare wherever
it seemed most effective, and the plantations belonging to Spanish
sympathizers were suffering in consequence. The idea of this action was
not wanton destruction. The Cubans argued that it was from such sources
as the rich Spanish planters that Spain, by taxation, obtained revenues
which were enabling her to continue the war, and thus their own country
was being used to supply funds for her own destruction; and therefore
when they destroyed Spanish holdings, they were not only wreaking
vengeance on their tormentors, but they were also reducing the resources
which made the prosecution of the war possible. To offset these actions,
the Spanish commanders were countenancing the most scandalous
conditions, and allowing most wholesale torture and butchery of such
luckless patriots as fell into their hands, in which they could have had
no motive except to terrorize the Cubans, and to enjoy that peculiar
pleasure which they seemed to take in cruelty and murder. However, in
the month of November alone, the patriots were able to burn the
buildings on and destroy the productiveness of over a hundred and fifty
sugar plantations, which the Spanish government had confiscated under
the order which Dulce had promulgated. These were plantations which
belonged to soldiers in the Cuban army, and which had been seized by the
Spaniards in the absence of their owners, and the revenues of which had
been flowing into the Spanish treasury.
This work of destruction had the approval of General Cespedes, for he
felt that it was necessary to cut off every possible source of revenue
for Spain from the island, and so, in December, he issued a proclamation
calling on all loyal patriots to see that it was made impossible for
Spain to collect revenue from sugar and tobacco plantations on the
island, when by any action of patriots this could be avoided.
The revolutionists had been encouraged, not only by their friends in the
United States, but also by the sympathetic expressions of former Spanish
colonies in South America, who were now enjoying their own freedom. As
early as May 15, 1869, the President of the Republic of Peru expressed
to General Cespedes his good wishes, in a letter couched in the
following terms:
"The President of Peru sympathizes deeply with the noble cause of which
your Excellency constitutes himself the worthy champion, and he will do
his utmost to mark the interest that island, so worthy of taking its
place with the civilized nations of the world, inspires him with. The
Peruvian Government recognizes as belligerents the party which is
fighting for the independence of Cuba, and will strive its utmost to
secure their recognition as such by other nations; and likewise that the
war should be properly regulated in conformity with international usages
and laws."
This action on the part of Peru was followed by recognition of the
revolutionists on the part of other South American states of Spanish
origin. Action was taken on this subject in Colombia, in June, 1870,
when a bill was introduced into the House of Representatives proposing
that all the Spanish-American republics form a combination for the
active promotion of aid to Cuba, material and political, in her struggle
for independence. This bill was reported out of Committee, with the
following comments:
"1. The cause for which Cuban patriots fight is the same for which
Colombia fought incessantly from 1810 to 1824.
"2. The interests of self-preservation, and our duty as a civilized and
Christian nation, justify in the most complete manner Colombian
intervention.
"3. The aggressions of monarchial Europe against the liberty and
independence of America always have had and will have for a base Spanish
dominion in Cuba.
"4. The policy of the United States cannot serve as a guide to Colombia
on this occasion.
"5. The resources we may need for this war are not beyond our means.
"6. The time has arrived when Colombia should assume in the politics of
South America the position to which she is called by her topographical
situation, her historical traditions, her population, and her political
conquests."
In spite of this favorable report, and the fact that the bill passed the
House, the Senate rejected it.
Thus the struggle went on, the patriots fighting almost with the courage
of desperation, gaining a little here, and losing there, but always
holding before them the justice of their cause, and resolutely refusing
to admit the possibility of failure.