A revolution usually involves fighting as well as the organization of a
government. In the case of Cuba, this was especially inevitable. It was
realized by the patriots in advance that the redemption of Cuba from the
tyranny of Spain could only be accomplished by force of arms, and
consequently plans to that effect had been carefully perfected in
advance. It was highly creditable to the Cubans that they so promptly
organized a dignified and worthy government, and adopted a constitution
favorably comparable with that of any other republic in the world. It
was no less creditable to their judgment and their earnestness that they
had already prepared for extensive military operations, and that they at
once entered upon these in a vigorous and systematic manner. Plans for
the uprising had indeed been matured before the breaking out of the
revolution in Spain, but the latter event undoubtedly hastened the
execution of their designs.
At the outset, before complete organization was effected, the insurgents
at Bayamo were under the leadership of Francisco V. Aguilera, Manuel A.
Aguilera and Francisco M. Osorio; at Manzanillo the leader was Carlos
Manuel Cespedes; at Holguin, Belisario Alvarez was in command; at Las
Tunas, Vincente Garcia; at Jiguani, Donato Marmol; and at Santiago,
Manuel Fernandez.
When Cespedes issued his proclamation on October 10, the insurgents had
only 147 men in their ranks, armed with forty-five fowling pieces, four
rifles, and a few pistols and machetes--not enough arms to provide one
weapon apiece. But volunteers began to flock to their standards and in
two days the army had increased to over twenty-six times its original
strength, and numbered upwards of four thousand men, while at the end of
the month it had more than doubled, and had grown to nine thousand seven
hundred. By November 8, the revolutionary army contained twelve thousand
men, and at the end of 1868, it had grown to twenty-six thousand.
But even this growth did not give them anything like the strength of the
Spanish Army in Cuba. In October, 1868, Spain had in Cuba twelve
regiments of infantry, one corps of engineers, one regiment of
artillery, two regiments of cavalry, one section of civil guards, one
regiment of armed firemen, one regiment of prison guards, and five
regiments of infantry and cavalry militia, amounting to the following:
Regular troops of all kinds, including officers 14,300
Civil guards 640
Prison guards 120
Armed firemen 1,000
Infantry and cavalry militia 3,400
Soldiers who had served their time but had been
kept in service 300
------
19,760
These troops were distributed to the proportion of three-fifths of them
in the Western Department, and the remainder divided between the Central
and Eastern Departments. They were amply armed and munitioned, although
it must be admitted that not all of their armament was of the newest
pattern. It was, however, in excellent condition and they had six
thousand of the latest model Remington rifles.
At the end of the year, the Spanish troops had been augmented by large
reinforcements from the mother country, so that Spain had in the field a
thoroughly organized and abundantly equipped army of about 110,000 men,
which, of course, was capable of being greatly increased. She also had
in Cuban waters the following men of war, at the beginning of October,
1868:
2 Steam frigates 91 guns
2 2d class steamers 12 guns
5 3d class steamers 10 guns
5 screw steamers, schooner rigged 15 guns
--------
128 guns
Of course, she at once added to this navy, and it soon grew to
formidable proportions, while the revolutionists had no navy at all,
with which to repel Spanish attacks from the sea.
Despite the great preponderance of forces in its favor, the Spanish
government did not at first depend upon military prowess for the
suppression of the insurrection and the retention of Cuba as its colony.
This was perhaps, in a measure, because of the revolution in Spain,
which was keeping the Government well occupied with its internal
affairs, and also because of the desire of some of the liberal leaders
in Spain to avoid endless strife and bloodshed. Therefore at first,
pacific measures were contemplated. It had been thought that General
Dulce, as Captain-General of the Island for his third term, would be
able to effect a compromise with the Cubans, because of his kindly
disposition, and the good feeling which prevailed between him and the
Cubans. His good offices were greatly hampered and off-set by the
arrogance of the Volunteers, who did not hold him in high regard, since
they thought him much too gentle with the Cubans, and who were not in
sympathy with his mediations. Perhaps the flame of revolution had now
grown too hot to be quenched by soothing measures. At any rate, the hope
of the Spanish Government proved delusive. On the one hand, the patriot
leaders were outspoken in their unwillingness to accept Dulce's
proposals of an amicable settlement, based on compromise; and on the
other, the Volunteers frankly opposed making any concessions to the
Islanders, and directed all their influence against every measure which
Dulce offered as a solution. In this they had the ulterior motive of
driving Dulce from office, so that there might be placed in his position
a more arbitrary and ruthless man, one of their own kidney.
In reviewing the state of affairs in Cuba at this early stage of the Ten
Years' War, and comparing the strength and composition of the contending
forces, it should be borne in mind that the Cuban army in the field was
a mere fragment of the potential strength of the Cuban people. There
were probably 150,000 Cubans, able bodied and of military age, who were
both willing and eager to enter the war, but who were restrained from so
doing for fear of what would befall their families if they identified
themselves openly with the patriot cause. If they left their homes to
take the field, their wives and children would be at the mercy of
Spanish troops or of the still more to be dreaded and pitiless
Volunteers. If we add to this the not unnatural doubt of the possibility
of succeeding in the revolt against the formidable power of Peninsular
Spain--a doubt fostered and confirmed by the failure of the former
attempts--we cannot blame the Cubans for not more generally
participating in active operations. Their absentation from so doing is
to be charged not, certainly, to cowardice or to lack of patriotism,
but to an excess of prudence.
In these circumstances, the numerical odds were at the beginning, and
remained all through the war, tremendously against the Cubans. Besides
this their army in a large measure, particularly at the beginning,
consisted of men who had had no experience in warlike manoeuvres, and
who lacked military drilling, for while preparations for uprisings had
been as constant as had been the uprisings themselves, naturally the
revolutionists, when their revolt was in an incipient stage, did not
wish to call attention to what they were planning by putting their
sympathizers through military tactics. The Cuban Army also lacked a
tremendous stabilizer of morale, in not being properly uniformed, but
rather presenting a motley appearance on the field. In fact there were
many times when they were so hard put that they were not only
inadequately clothed, but suffered for lack of food. The fact that they
were able so frequently to defeat the highly trained and well equipped
Spanish forces, and to hold their ground as successfully, as they did
year after year, is the highest possible tribute to their valor, their
intelligence in military matters, and their patriotic devotion.
The earliest engagements between the opposing forces occurred on October
13, 1868, at three places, not widely separated; Yara, Bairi and
Jiguani; in all of which the Cuban patriots were successful. The last of
the three named was considered by the patriots to be an extremely
important victory, and was accomplished by troops under the command of
General Donato Marmol. Heartened by this good fortune, the patriots on
October 15 laid siege to Bayamo, and three days later effected its
capture; whereupon that place was made the temporary seat of the Cuban
Government. These victories were all the more creditable and encouraging
because, we must remember, while the Spanish Army numbered many
thousands--scattered it is true in various parts of the Island--the
Cuban Army was only one-fourth as large and poorly armed and equipped.
At all times during the first engagements, the patriots were
outnumbered, but they made up in courage what they lacked in numbers,
and their enthusiasm and zeal for the cause for which they were fighting
carried them safely against tremendous odds.
Late in October--on the 26th to be exact--the patriots attacked the
Spanish troops at Las Tunas, and also at Villa del Cobre at the foot of
Monte Alta Garcia, between Puerto Principe and Nuevitas, and at Moran.
In all these engagements the Cubans were greatly hampered by the serious
lack of arms and munitions, but if they were not entirely successful
they were far from routed, they lost little ground, and maintained very
complete control over those portions of the Central and Eastern
Departments which were in sympathy with them.
By the early part of November, 1868, the Cubans had thoroughly beaten
the troops under the command of the Spanish Colonel Demetrio Quiros, and
forced him to retreat, and were thus enabled to advance into the very
suburbs of Santiago de Cuba, the ancient capital of the Island, and at
this time the capital of the Eastern Department. They promptly cut the
aqueduct which supplied that city with water, and thereby caused not
only great discomfort but something resembling panic among the
inhabitants. The patriots were naturally reluctant to resort to such
measures, because of the suffering which it caused to their own friends
and sympathizers; yet if the Spanish garrison in Santiago was to be
brought to terms, any strategic advantage which the Cubans could
acquire must be used to the utmost.
The third week in November found them in possession of the towns of El
Caney and El Cobre; the latter famous as the site of the first copper
mines opened in Cuba, and the former as the scene of one of the sharpest
engagements of the United States war with Spain in 1898. The patriots
kept control of these two places for several weeks, and then deeming it
inexpedient to undertake any further operations against Santiago, which
was not only garrisoned by the Spanish Army but also protected by the
Spanish fleet, they withdrew their forces to the defense of Bayamo,
which was now being seriously threatened by the troops of Count
Valmaseda, reenforced by those under Colonel Lono, who had come thither
from Manati, under Colonel Campillo from Manzanillo, Colonel Mana from
Puerto Principe, and Colonel Quiro, who had hastened to Bayamo from
Santiago. With all these Spanish troops, well armed and abundantly
supplied with ammunition concentering upon the place, President Cespedes
realized that it would be impolitic to attempt to resist a siege. After
consultation with his associates, the result of which was a unanimous
decision, he set fire to the city and withdrew his troops. In
consequence, when Valmaseda arrived a little later, he found nothing
left of Bayamo but ruins.
This loss of their temporary capital did not perceptibly weaken the
Cuban position; indeed the patriot cause steadily grew in strength and
numbers. The entire jurisdiction of Holguin revolted against Spanish
authority, on October 28, and the inhabitants, in large numbers, rushed
to take up arms with the patriots. A week later Camaguey followed the
example of Holguin. The Spanish government both at home and in Cuba was
in the position of a man sitting on a couch under which had been stored
a quantity of bombs, all timed to go off at irregular intervals, and
from which position there was no escape. They did not know which way to
jump. The high officials in both countries lived in an uncertainty as to
events in Cuba which must have been nerve racking. Indeed--to mix our
metaphors--they never knew where the fever of revolutions was scheduled
to break out next. If they succeeded in getting it under control in one
place, and began to feel a bit secure against an epidemic, the next
morning they found what to them seemed a new eruption, and one which
they had not been able to anticipate. They conquered, or apparently
subdued, the patriots in one portion of the Island, and immediately
those in another burst forth into active opposition to what the Spanish
government would have termed law and order, but which the insurgents
called by the less pleasant terms of cruelty and unjust oppressions. And
occasionally, as we have seen, there glimmered in some Spanish
intelligence a faint doubt as to the efficacy of their usual methods,
and then for a very short time the authorities would try temporizing.
But the patriots had not suffered for generations from Spanish misrule
without having learned to mistrust the wiles of their oppressors, and
they viewed with more or less cynicism any surface indications of a less
tyrannous rule.
With the revolts of Camaguey and Holguin, the Spanish authorities came
to the conclusion that it was about time to try temporizing, and to
endeavor in some way to pacify the patriots. It may be that they would
have actually made concessions--we have it from one authority that they
were willing at this time to grant almost anything but the one thing
which was the single desire of the patriots. At any rate, on January 19,
1869, they made a formal proposal for a meeting between representatives
of the belligerents for the discussion of the issues between them, and
for a serious attempt to effect a compromise. President Cespedes felt
that the time for compromise had passed, long years before. The die had
been cast. The revolution had one aim, complete freedom, and that was
above all things the one concession which the Spaniards would not make.
But he was too clever not to realize that after all something might be
gained by compliance, if no more than a chance to feel out the mettle
and present designs of the Spaniards. It was possible that if he sent a
clever enough envoy he might learn much that would be to his advantage
in future negotiations. He was under no obligation to consent to or even
to consider seriously any terms which the Spaniards might offer, so that
he had nothing to lose by such a proceeding, and it was barely possible
that he might gain valuable information.
So he assented to the proposal, and sent his representative, Augustin
Arango, to Puerto Principe, under safe conduct issued by the Spanish
Government at Manzanillo. It is probable that the safe conduct would
have been respected by the Spanish authorities and Spanish troops. But
unfortunately, not only for the innocent envoy, and for the patriots,
but also for any hope that the Spaniards may have entertained--if indeed
their offer had been made in good faith, and there is always a measure
of doubt, in the face of their usual trickery--of an amicable
understanding, Arango fell into the hands of the Volunteers, who, in
quite characteristic manner, contemptuously disregarded the credentials
of their own government, and cruelly and brutally murdered General
Cespedes's messenger, immediately upon his entrance into Puerto
Principe.
It is not difficult to picture the rage and disgust of the patriots at
this new example of Spanish perfidy, which so clearly demonstrated the
futility of attempting any negotiations of any kind whatever with an
enemy capable of such lack of honor. The death of Arango, therefore, put
an end to the farce of Spanish pretended repentance. And this
circumstance did not pass without the news being spread all over the
island. Patriots who had been timidly balancing themselves in outward
neutrality, were so aroused with indignation that they began boldly to
plunge into the maelstrom of civil war. On February 9, 1869, the entire
district of Las Tunas revolted and cast its lot with the insurgents.
Each new act of injustice emanating from the Spaniards was like removing
the supports of a dam behind which had been restrained the waters of
patriotism. The Spaniards had killed one Cuban patriot in cold blood;
the cause of revolutions had gained thousands, each fired with
enthusiasm.
Thus far General Quesada had been waging an almost exclusively irregular
or guerrilla warfare. This was because of the smallness of his army, the
lack of arms and equipment, and the unfamiliarity of his men with
military tactics. Indeed, such methods of warfare were in a large
measure continued throughout the entire Ten Years' War. But by the time
of which we now write he was able on some occasions and at some places
to array his troops in orderly fashion and to conduct his campaign in
much the same manner as the Spaniards themselves. Thus, he was able to
carry on regular siege operations against Colonel Mena, and his garrison
of three thousand Spaniards, at Puerto Principe. Colonel Prieto with
several thousand Cubans busied himself with cutting the railroad lines
which the Spanish authorities had constructed for strategic purposes,
and destroying communications between Villa Clara and Cienfuegos. A
strong Spanish force was sent against him, and a serious engagement
occurred at San Cristobal, where the patriots were entirely successful.
The Spanish troops retreated to Guanajay, a short distance from Havana,
closely pursued by the patriots, and when forced to give battle, the
Spaniards were once more put to rout, with heavy losses.
Havana was now practically in a state of siege, with a patriot army in
possession of Guanajay, and small bands constantly harassing the Spanish
troops at different points in the vicinity of the city. The Spanish
Captain-General, Dulce, was still nursing the idea that some sort of an
agreement might be reached, and at least a truce declared, and he
therefore refused to officially declare the besieged condition of the
city, and endeavored to placate the patriots by leniency toward the
sympathizers in the city, and a conciliatory attitude toward the
revolutionists. However, his efforts had little effect on the Cubans.
Their forces pressed forward against Santiago de Cuba, and disaster for
the Spanish garrison at that city was only averted by the timely arrival
of Count Valmaseda with reinforcements. Las Tunas was still in the hands
of the revolutionists, who were divided into small parties and were
conducting a guerrilla warfare throughout practically the entire Island,
attacking whenever it seemed to be to their advantage, and dispersing
when the forces sent against them were sufficiently large to give the
odds to the Government. Trinidad was practically segregated from the
outside world so far as communications by land were concerned. The
patriots had stopped the mail service, and had cut the telegraph wires.
The city was in a turmoil of fear and apprehension, sending requests
for aid whenever they could get word through, which was not frequently,
since the patriots took a cynical delight in having so far turned the
tables on their oppressors, and in detaining and making prisoners the
couriers who tried to reach the Spanish lines with news of Trinidad's
predicament.
The patriots did not confine their efforts to any part of the Island,
although the major part of them were east of Havana, and only that small
stretch of territory embracing the province of Pinar del Rio was
comparatively free from trouble. The insurgents were insufficiently
provisioned, and so they resorted to pillage. This was particularly true
of the bands in the vicinity of Nuevitas, where attacks were constantly
being made on the plantations, and the farmers lived in a state of
alarm, never knowing when a patriot band might descend upon them
demanding food for the present and for the future, and proceeding to
take it by force, if necessary. Frequently those who were not in favor
of the cause of liberty extended a frightened hospitality, rather than
to excite the wrath of their hungry visitors, and resorted to treachery
to carry the news of the marauders to some nearby Spanish camp, only to
have the rescuing forces chagrined to find, when they arrived, that the
birds were not "in the hand," but had been fed, and had fled with their
booty. Nuevitas was well garrisoned, and therefore the patriots confined
their operations to a region sufficiently remote from the outskirts of
the town, so that reprisals would be slow and difficult.
The Cubans were strongly entrenched at San Miguel, where, on February 7,
they were attacked by the Spaniards. When other means failed, the
Spanish forces tried to "smoke out" the insurgents by burning the city,
but while this dislodged them from the city itself, it failed to drive
them from the vicinity, where they took up an advantageous position and
held it against assault.
Puerto Principe was surrounded; the aqueduct was cut, and food was
scarce and growing scarcer. The inhabitants clamored for succor, when
starvation seemed imminent. Their cries for aid became too insistent to
be disregarded, and therefore a body of troops was dispatched from
Santiago de Cuba toward Jiguani, whither the main body of the Spanish
troops under Count Valmaseda, had retired. The patriots were apprised of
this manoeuvre, and the Spanish troops were constantly harassed by bands
of Cubans, and it was only after several severe engagements, and
considerable losses, that they succeeded in joining Valmaseda at
Jiguani.
In the sort of warfare which they were now waging, the advantages were
all with the revolutionists. They were thoroughly acquainted with the
country, and knew well how to take advantage of its natural defenses,
while the Spanish forces, especially those imported from Spain for the
purpose of putting down the rebellion, lacked such knowledge, and in
strategy were always at a disadvantage. The Cuban leaders were not only
exceedingly clever in their manoeuvres, but they seemed to have a sense
of humor, and to take a grim delight in fooling the Spanish commanders,
and luring them on a fool's errand. The patriots, whenever the tide of
battle went against them, retreated to fastnesses in the interior, well
known to them, and uncharted by the enemy, from whence they would sally
forth, when opportunity presented, harass the Spaniards, and again
retire to their lair, whither the enemy feared to follow them, lest they
might fall into a trap.
The Cubans had a particularly annoying practice of spreading reports
that a large revolutionary force had assembled in a certain place, and
enticing the Spaniards to that location, when the latter would only
discover, to their chagrin, that the report had been "grossly
exaggerated," and that in reality there was only a handful of men
instead of the large number which they expected; and to this would be
added the further annoyance of having the little body of Cubans melt as
if by magic in retreat to some position unknown to the Spanish or
practically impenetrable by them, with their lack of information as to
its potentialities, and their fear that it might prove their undoing. If
this were not sufficiently annoying, the Cubans had a habit of sending
out anonymous and misleading information, to the effect that an attack
on the Cubans at a particular point would have felicitous results for
the Spaniards, since it was believed that that position was inadequately
defended, and upon acting on this information, the Spaniards would be
baffled by discovering that the supposed forces, if indeed there had
been any previously present, had long since departed, leaving the place
deserted. Again and again the Spaniards were thus decoyed and beguiled,
and yet they continued to act on the misleading advices, because failure
to do so might lose them a real victory, should one message out of the
many really prove reliable.
Thus were the patriots learning to match Spanish cunning with a new,
peculiar and ironic brand of their own, and were turning the tables on
the tormentors who had for so many years mistreated them and laughed at
their protests. It will be recalled that Bayamo had been burned by the
revolutionists, when it seemed apparent that their capital city was
about to fall in to the hands of the Spaniards, or at least, when it
seemed the part of prudence to surrender it. In spite of the fact that
this meant that the inhabitants would be rendered homeless, so strong
was the patriotic feeling in that city, that the destruction was done
with the consent of the populace. A thousand of these people now fell
into the hands of the Spaniards, and on February 14 were taken to
Manzanillo. The next day long expected reinforcements arrived from
Spain. They were small in number, it is true, only a thousand strong,
but conditions in Spain made it difficult for her to spare large numbers
of troops, and this was most fortunate for the cause of freedom, for
thus Spain was unable to send to Cuba a sufficient number of drilled
soldiers to offset the advantage which the little Cuban army had in its
acquaintance with the geography of the Island, and the physical
possibilities which it afforded for scattered and sporadic attacks in
unexpected quarters.
Captain-General Dulce, alarmed at the conditions which existed, and at
the failure of the Spanish army to subdue the revolution, and
undoubtedly spurred on by the Volunteers, who had no patience with his
conciliatory methods, changed his policy, and issued a proclamation,
thoroughly muzzling the press, to avoid the spreading of the news of the
extent of the revolution and the success of the revolutionists, and thus
endeavored to stem the influx of recruits into the Cuban Army. He also
established a military court martial, which planned to deal summarily
with the leaders of the revolution should any fall into their hands.
Next he proclaimed the expiration of the amnesty previously granted,
while he--true to type--softened this decree, probably as a bit of
insidious strategy, by offering to pardon all insurgents who would
surrender themselves, excluding the leaders, and those who had been
convicted--unrepresented at the trials, of course--of the crimes of
murder, arson and robbery. The underlying thought of this proclamation
probably was that the rank and file of the insurgents might surrender
and deliver their leaders into his hands for punishment. This was
accompanied by a demand upon the citizens of Havana for the sum of
$25,000,000 to support the government, and to aid it in carrying on its
campaign against the revolutionists.
He only too well knew that the sympathy of the people of the United
States, if not the secret sympathy of the government at Washington, was
with the Cubans, and not only Dulce himself but indeed all the leaders
of the Spanish cause lived in constant fear of private aid to the
insurgents from the United States, if not of possible governmental
intervention in their behalf. They well knew also that the Americans who
had made their homes on the Island, and who were deeply interested in
its commercial salvation, were all sympathizers in the cause of the
revolution, and felt that only through freedom from Spanish rule and a
resumption of peace could they hope to retrieve the fortunes which they
had invested, and now apparently sunk, in Cuban business ventures. That
these Americans, despite the censorship, were in communication with
their friends in their own country Dulce did not doubt, and that they
would urge the sending of relief to Cuba he felt certain. He therefore
applied to the United States Consul at Havana for the names of all
American residents of Cuba, that he might keep them under surveillance,
check up their movements, and act, if necessary, to prevent them from
either personally, or through their influence in the United States,
lending any material aid to the revolutionists.
In spite of the Captain-General's precautions, his fears were realized.
Aid did reach the revolutionists from the United States, in the shape of
guns and ammunition, accompanied by American sympathizers, who in some
fashion ran the gauntlet of the Spanish navy in Cuban waters. The Cuban
Army advanced against La Guanaja, wrested it from the Spaniards, and
proceeded to fortify it with American guns, manned by American gunners.
The town was believed by both of the belligerents to be impervious to
attack from the land, and the Spanish commanders therefore dispatched a
naval force to conquer it from the sea. The bombardment which ensued
dashed the hopes of the revolutionists, so far as the effectiveness of
their fortifications were concerned, as against a naval attack. The
Spanish shells wrought great damage, and when they had reduced the
defenses, a landing was made and the town was retaken by assault. The
Cubans were therefore forced to beat a hurried retreat to the
surrounding country, and the Spaniards were left in complete control of
the city. Now they had a decided advantage, for from this vantage-point
they were able to send aid to Puerto Principe, and, on February 23, two
battalions were hurried thither. Meanwhile, General Lesca, who had been
stationed at La Guanaja, set out to attack the Cuban Army at Colonia de
Santo Domingo and in this expedition he was reinforced by the troops
under General Puello. The Spanish army in this encounter greatly
outnumbered the patriots but the latter fought with the courage of
desperation; a wholesale slaughter ensued in which both sides suffered
enormous losses; and when, worn out, the Cubans withdrew, the result
might well be termed a draw, for neither side could justly claim
victory.
During the month of February, the revolutionists harassed the Spaniards
in the vicinity of Santa Cruz, but not with their usual success, the
odds being largely in favor of the latter. On February 25, a band of
revolutionists surprised the town of La Lujas, situated only a short
distance from Cienfuegos. Before opposition could be mustered, they took
possession of the town, and with it the uniforms of the city guards, and
all the arms, ammunition and horses which they could find, and they also
burned the police archives, thus destroying any records at that place
which might later be used against individual revolutionists, in the
event of an ultimate Spanish victory.
But, with it all, neither army was making any particular progress toward
a decisive victory. The balance of advantage swung first one way and
then the other. The Spanish found their well drilled troops unable to
match themselves with any degree of effectiveness against the
resourcefulness of the revolutionists, and their methods of warfare. The
attempts at mediation had failed; indeed had been thwarted by the
treacherous action within their own body--by the murder which was staged
by the Volunteers' faction. On the other hand, as yet Cuba had been able
to secure but little aid from the one country on the sympathy of the
citizens of which she might count. The United States had far from come
up to expectations in the assistance she had thus far unofficially
rendered. Perhaps this was because the authorities in that country had
no desire to embroil themselves with Spain, and kept a close watch on
the movements of suspected Cuban partisans. The Cubans were able to make
life exceedingly uncomfortable for the Spanish forces, and for Spaniard
sympathizers throughout the country, but with their present numbers and
equipment they had little hope of gaining a decision of the hostilities
in their favor. The best they could do was to keep the country in a
state of uproar, gaining what little advantage they could, and meanwhile
the inhabitants were facing starvation, the destruction of their
holdings, the burning of their buildings, and the devastation of a
fruitful country. The constant operations of marauders, who took
advantage of the Cuban method of warfare, to pillage and steal and lay
in ruin various portions of the country, as well as the fear of attack
from the guerrillas, were driving the farmers and their families to the
protection of the cities, and thus farms were standing idle and
uncultivated, and there was bound to be an even greater food shortage.
The Government was being aided by the church, and the neutrals,
despairing of any change in conditions for the better, were, whenever
the opportunity presented itself, emigrating from the Island to regions
less tumultuous, where living conditions were not so uncertain and
dangerous.
The Government was finding conditions intolerable, and decided to make a
strenuous effort to dislodge the revolutionists from their inland
strongholds and thus to compel them to abandon their badgering methods,
and to come forth into the open and give battle, well knowing that, if
this could be accomplished, the odds would all be in favor of the
Spaniards. Therefore, a special company of Volunteers was assembled,
with fresh reinforcements direct from Spain, and they were sent into the
fastnesses of the interior, in a strong endeavor to drive out the
Cubans. Simultaneously General Letona conducted a vigorous campaign in
relief of Cienfuegos, and General Puello organized small parties which
were sent out on marauding expeditions. But the principal result of
these efforts was to throw the Island into a still greater state of
excitement, and to encourage robbers and bandits, who, taking advantage
of the consequent uproar, seized the favorable opportunity for pillage.
Thus their devastation was added to the troubles of the already much
tried farmers in Cuba. The country around Holguin and Gibara was in a
state beyond description, and the life of every citizen, no matter what
his sympathies, was in constant danger.
Then a very serious battle took place between the forces under General
Lesca, and an army of four thousand Cubans. The Spaniards were advancing
from La Guanaja to the succor of Puerto Principe, when the two forces
met. The Cubans were well entrenched on the Sierra de Cubitas. They were
principally infantry, and they had the Spanish at a disadvantage. The
engagement might have ended in an utter defeat for that portion of the
Government Army, had it not been that they were well supplied with
artillery, which did effective work against the Cubans, and therefore
the Spaniards were able to escape, though with heavy losses.
Early in the next month, March, 1869, the Cubans obtained--from what
source is not disclosed, but it may be that their American sympathizers
were responsible--large accessions of artillery, with a goodly supply of
ammunition, which a small body of not over a hundred men, under
Cisneros, were able to convey to Mayari, where General Quesada was
stationed with seven thousand Cubans. When we consider that heretofore
the revolutionists had been much more blessed with enthusiasm and belief
in the ultimate triumph of their just cause than they had with the
material means for accomplishing that end, it is not difficult to
picture with what new hope and confidence this much needed assistance
was received. Now more than ever they began to feel the certainty of
final success, and to be imbued with a steadfast purpose to fight to the
last ditch for the cause of freedom.