CHAPTER LXXIV.

FROM THE BATTLE OF KNIDUS TO THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF

ATHENS.

Having in my last chapter carried the series of Asiatic events down

to the battle of Knidus, in the beginning of August, B.C. 394, at

which period war was already raging on the other side of the Ægean,

in Greece Proper,—I now take up the thread of events from a period

somewhat earlier, to show how this last-mentioned war, commonly

called the Corinthian war, began.

At the accession of Agesilaus to the throne, in 398 B.C., the power

of Sparta throughout all Greece from Laconia to Thessaly, was greater

than it had ever been, and greater than any Grecian state had ever

enjoyed before. The burden of the long war against Athens she had

borne in far less proportion than her allies; its fruits she had

reaped exclusively for herself. There prevailed consequently among

her allies a general discontent, which Thebes as well as Corinth

manifested by refusing to take part in the recent expeditions;

either of Pausanias against Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles in

Peiræus,—or of Agis against the Eleians,—or of Agesilaus against

the Persians in Asia Minor. The Eleians were completely humbled

by the invasions of Agis; all the other cities in Peloponnesus,

from apprehension, from ancient habit, and from being governed by

oligarchies who leaned on Sparta for support, were obedient to her

authority,—with the single exception of Argos, which remained, as

before, neutral and quiet, though in sentiment unfriendly. Athens

was a simple unit in the catalogue of Spartan allies, furnishing

her contingent, like the rest, to be commanded by the xenâgus,—or

officer sent from Sparta for the special purpose of commanding such

foreign contingents.

In the northern regions of Greece, the advance of Spartan power

is yet more remarkable. Looking back to the year 419 B.C. (about

two years after the peace of Nikias), Sparta had been so unable to

protect her colony of Herakleia, in Trachis on the Maliac Gulf,

near the strait of Thermopylæ, that the Bœotians were obliged

to send a garrison thither, in order to prevent it from falling

into the hands of Athens. They even went so far as to dismiss the

Lacedæmonian harmost.[530] In the winter of 409-408 B.C., another

disaster had happened at Herakleia, in which the Lacedæmonian harmost

was slain.[531] But about 399 B.C., we find Sparta exercising an

energetic ascendency at Herakleia, and even making that place a

central post for keeping down the people in the neighborhood of Mount

Œta and a portion of Thessaly. Herippidas, the Lacedæmonian, was sent

thither to repress some factious movements, with a force sufficient

to enable him to overawe the public assembly, to seize the obnoxious

party in the place, and to put them to death, five hundred in number,

outside of the gates.[532] Carrying his arms farther against the

Œtæans and Trachinians in the neighborhood, who had been long at

variance with the Laconian colonists at Herakleia, he expelled them

from their abodes, and forced them to migrate with their wives and

children into Thessaly.[533] Hence, the Lacedæmonians were enabled

to extend their influence into parts of Thessaly, and to place a

harmost with a garrison in Pharsalus, resting upon Herakleia as a

basis,—which thus became a position of extraordinary importance for

their dominion over the northern regions.

[530] Thucyd. v, 52.

[531] Xen. Hellen. i, 2, 18.

[532] Diodor. xiv, 38; Polyæn. ii, 21.

[533] Diodorus, _ut sup._; compare xiv, 81. τοὺς Τραχινίους

φεύγοντας ἐκ τῶν πατρίδων ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, etc.

With the real power of Sparta thus greatly augmented on land, in

addition to her vast empire at sea, bringing its ample influx of

tribute,—and among cities who had not merely long recognized her

as leader, but had never recognized any one else,—it required an

unusual stimulus to raise any formidable hostile combination against

her, notwithstanding a large spread of disaffection and antipathy.

The stimulus came from Persia, from whose treasures the means had

been before furnished to Sparta herself for subduing Athens. The

news that a formidable navy was fitting out in Phœnicia, which had

prompted the expedition of Agesilaus in the spring of 396 B.C., was

doubtless circulated and heard with satisfaction among the Grecian

cities unfriendly to Sparta; and the refusal of Thebes, Corinth, and

Athens, to take service under that prince,—aggravated in the case

of the Thebans by a positive offence given to him on the occasion of

his sacrifice at Aulis,—was enough to warn Sparta of the dangerous

sentiments and tendencies by which she was surrounded near home.

It was upon these tendencies that the positive instigation and

promises of Persia were brought to bear, in the course of the

following year; and not merely promises, but pecuniary supplies,

with news of revived naval warfare threatening the insular dominion

of Sparta. Tithraustes, the new satrap, who had put to death and

succeeded Tissaphernes, had no sooner concluded the armistice

mentioned above, and prevailed upon Agesilaus to remove his army

into the satrapy of Pharnabazus, than he employed active measures

for kindling war against Sparta in Greece, in order to create a

necessity for the recall of Agesilaus out of Asia. He sent a Rhodian

named Timokrates into Greece, as envoy to the cities most unfriendly

to the Lacedæmonians, with a sum of fifty talents;[534] directing

him to employ this money in gaining over the leading men in these

cities, and to exchange solemn oaths of alliance and aid with

Persia, for common hostility against Sparta. The island of Rhodes

having just revolted from the Spartan dominion, had admitted Konon

with the Persian fleet (as I have mentioned in the last chapter),

so that probably the Rhodian envoy was on a mission to Tithraustes

on behalf of his countrymen. He was an appropriate envoy on this

occasion, as having an animated interest in raising up new enemies

to Sparta, and as being hearty in stirring up among the Thebans and

Corinthians the same spirit which had led to the revolt of Rhodes.

The effect which that revolt produced in alarming and exasperating

the Spartans, has been already noticed; and we may fairly presume

that its effect on the other side, in encouraging their Grecian

enemies, was considerable. Timokrates visited Thebes, Corinth, and

Argos, distributing his funds. He concluded engagements on behalf

of the satrap, with various leading men in each, putting them into

communication with each other; Ismenias, Androkleidas, and others in

Thebes,—Timolaus and Polyanthes at Corinth,—Kylon and others at

Argos. It appears that he did not visit Athens; at least, Xenophon

expressly says that none of his money went there. The working of this

mission,—coupled, we must recollect, with the renewed naval warfare

on the coast of Asia, and the promise of a Persian fleet against

that of Sparta,—was soon felt in the more pronounced manifestation

of anti-Laconian sentiments in these various cities, and in the

commencement of attempts to establish alliance between them.[535]

[534] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 1. Πέμπει Τιμοκράτην Ῥόδιον εἰς τὴν

Ἑλλάδα, δοὺς χρυσίον ἐς πεντήκοντα τάλαντα ἀργυρίου, καὶ κελεύει

πειρᾶσθαι, πιστὰ τὰ μέγιστα λαμβάνοντα, διδόναι τοῖς προεστηκόσιν

ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ τε πόλεμον ἐξοίσειν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους.

Timokrates is ordered to give the money; yet not absolutely, but

only on a certain condition, in case he should find that such

condition could be realized; that is, if by giving it he could

procure from various leading Greeks sufficient assurances and

guarantees that they would raise war against Sparta. As this was

a matter more or less doubtful, Timokrates is ordered to _try

to give the money for this purpose_. Though the construction of

πειρᾶσθαι couples it with διδόναι, the sense of the word more

properly belongs to ἐξοίσειν—which designates the purpose to be

accomplished.

[535] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 2; Pausan. iii, 9, 4; Plutarch,

Artaxerxes, c. 20.

With that Laconian bias which pervades his Hellenica, Xenophon

represents the coming war against Sparta, as if it had been brought

about mainly by these bribes from Persia to the leading men in

these various cities. I have stated on more than one occasion, that

the average public morality of Grecian individual politicians in

Sparta, Athens, and other cities, was not such as to exclude personal

corruption; that it required a morality higher than the average, when

such temptation was resisted,—and a morality considerably higher

than the average, if it were systematically resisted, and for a long

life, as by Perikles and Nikias. There would be nothing therefore

surprising, if Ismenias and the rest had received bribes under the

circumstances here mentioned. But it appears highly improbable that

the money given by Timokrates could have been a bribe; that is,

given privately, and for the separate use of these leaders. It was

furnished for the promotion of a certain public object, which could

not be accomplished without heavy disbursements; it was analogous

to that sum of thirty talents which (as Xenophon himself tells us)

Tithraustes had just given to Agesilaus, as an inducement to carry

away his army into the satrapy of Pharnabazus (not as a present for

the private purse of the Spartan king, but as a contribution to

the wants of the army),[536] or to that which the satrap Tiribazus

gave to Antalkidas afterwards,[537] also for public objects.

Xenophon affirms, that Ismenias and the rest, having received these

presents from Timokrates, accused the Lacedæmonians and rendered

them odious,—each in his respective city.[538] But it is certain,

from his own showing, that the hatred towards them existed in these

cities, before the arrival of Timokrates. In Argos, such hatred was

of old standing; in Corinth and Thebes, though kindled only since the

close of the war, it was not the less pronounced. Moreover, Xenophon

himself informs us, that the Athenians, though they received none of

the money,[539] were quite as ready for war as the other cities. If

we therefore admit his statement as a matter of fact, that Timokrates

gave private presents to various leading politicians, which is by no

means improbable,—we must dissent from the explanatory use which he

makes of this fact by setting it out prominently as the cause of the

war. What these leading men would find it difficult to raise was,

not hatred to Sparta, but confidence and courage to brave the power

of Sparta. And for this purpose the mission of Timokrates would be

a valuable aid, by conveying assurances of Persian coöperation and

support against Sparta. He must have been produced publicly either

before the people, the senate, or at least the great body of the

anti-Laconian party in each city. And the money which he brought with

him, though a portion of it may have gone in private presents, would

serve to this party as the best warrant for the sincerity of the

satrap.

[536] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 26.

[537] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 16.

[538] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 2. Οἱ μὲν δὴ δεξάμενοι τὰ χρήματα ἐς

τὰς οἰκείας πόλεις διέβαλλον τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους· ἐπεὶ δὲ ταύτας

ἐς μῖσος αὐτῶν προήγαγον, συνίστασαν καὶ τὰς μεγίστας πόλεις πρὸς

ἀλλήλας.

[539] Xenophon, _ut sup._

Pausanias (iii, 9, 4) names some Athenians as having received

part of the money. So Plutarch also, in general terms (Agesil. c.

15).

Diodorus mentions nothing respecting either the mission or the

presents of Timokrates.

Whatever negotiations may have been in progress between the cities

visited by Timokrates, no union had been brought about between them

when the war, kindled by an accident, broke out as a “Bœotian

war,”[540] between Thebes and Sparta separately. Between the Opuntian

Lokrians and the Phokians, north of Bœotia, there was a strip of

disputed border land; respecting which the Phokians, imputing

wrongful encroachment to the Lokrians, invaded their territory. The

Lokrians, allied with Thebes, entreated her protection; upon which

a body of Bœotians invaded Phokis; while the Phokians on their

side threw themselves upon Lacedæmon, invoking her aid against

Thebes.[541] “The Lacedæmonians (says Xenophon) were delighted to

get a pretence for making war against the Thebans,—having been long

angry with them on several different grounds. They thought that the

present was an excellent time for marching against them, and putting

down their insolence; since Agesilaus was in full success in Asia,

and there was no other war to embarrass them in Greece.”[542] The

various grounds on which the Lacedæmonians rested their displeasure

against Thebes, begin from a time immediately succeeding the close of

the war against Athens, and the sentiment was now both established

and vehement. It was they who now began the Bœotian war; not the

Thebans, nor the bribes brought by Timokrates.

[540] Πόλεμος Βοιωτικός (Diodor. xiv, 81).

[541] Xenophon (Hellen. iii, 5, 3) says,—and Pausanias (iii, 9,

4) follows him,—That the Theban leaders, wishing to bring about

a war with Sparta, and knowing that Sparta would not begin it,

purposely incited the Lokrians to encroach upon this disputed

border, in order that the Phokians might resent it, and that thus

a war might be lighted up. I have little hesitation in rejecting

this version, which I conceive to have arisen from Xenophon’s

philo-Laconian and miso-Theban tendency, and in believing that

the fight between the Lokrians and Phokians, as well as that

between the Phokians and Thebans, arose without any design on the

part of the latter to provoke Sparta. So Diodorus recounts it, in

reference to the war between the Phokians and the Thebans; for

about the Lokrians he says nothing (xiv, 81).

The subsequent events, as recounted by Xenophon himself, show

that the Spartans were not only ready in point of force, but

eager in regard to will, to go to war with the Thebans; while the

latter were not at all ready to go to war with Sparta. They had

not a single ally; for their application to Athens, in itself

doubtful, was not made until after Sparta had declared war

against them.

[542] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 5. Οἱ μέντοι Λακεδαιμόνιοι ~ἄσμενοι

ἔλαβον πρόφασιν στρατεύειν ἐπὶ τοὺς Θηβαίους, πάλαι ὀργιζόμενοι~

αὐτοῖς, τῆς τε ἀντιλήψεως τῆς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος δεκάτης ἐν Δεκελείᾳ,

καὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ μὴ ἐθελῆσαι ἀκολουθῆσαι· ᾐτιῶντο δ᾽

αὐτοὺς, καὶ Κορινθίους πεῖσαι μὴ συστρατεύειν. Ἀνεμιμνήσκοντο δὲ

καὶ, ὡς θύοντ᾽ ἐν Αὐλίδι τὸν Ἀγησίλαον οὐκ εἴων, καὶ τὰ τεθυμένα

ἱερὰ ὡς ἔῤῥιψαν ἀπὸ τοῦ βωμοῦ· καὶ ὅτι οὐδ᾽ εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν

συνεστράτευον Ἀγησιλάῳ. Ἐλογίζοντο δὲ καὶ καλὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἐξάγειν

στρατιὰν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς, καὶ παῦσαι τῆς ἐς αὐτοὺς ὕβρεως· τά τε γὰρ

ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ καλῶς σφίσιν ἔχειν, κρατοῦντος Ἀγησιλάου, καὶ ἐν τῇ

Ἑλλάδι οὐδένα ἄλλον πόλεμον ἐμποδὼν σφίσιν εἶναι. Compare vii, 1,

34.

The description here given by Xenophon himself,—of the

past dealing and established sentiment between Sparta and

Thebes,—refutes his allegation, that it was the bribes brought

by Timokrates to the leading Thebans which first blew up the

hatred against Sparta; and shows farther, that Sparta did not

need any circuitous manœuvres of the Thebans, to furnish her with

a pretext for going to war.

The energetic and ambitious Lysander, who had before instigated the

expedition of Agesilaus across the Ægean, and who had long hated

the Thebans,—was among the foremost advisers of the expedition now

decreed by the ephors against Thebes,[543] as well as the chief

commander appointed to carry it into execution. He was despatched

with a small force to act on the north of Bœotia. He was directed

to start from Herakleia, the centre of Lacedæmonian influence in

those regions,—to muster the Herakleots, together with the various

dependent populations in the neighborhood of Œta, Œtæans, Malians,

Ænianes, etc.—to march towards Bœotia, taking up the Phokians

in his way,—and to attack Haliartus. Under the walls of this

town king Pausanias engaged to meet him on a given day, with the

native Lacedæmonian force and the Peloponnesian allies. For this

purpose, having obtained favorable border sacrifices, he marched

forth to Tegea, and there employed himself in collecting the allied

contingents from Peloponnesus.[544] But the allies generally were

tardy and reluctant in the cause; while the Corinthians withheld

all concurrence and support,[545]—though neither did they make any

manifestation in favor of Thebes.

[543] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 28.

[544] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 6, 7.

[545] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 23.

The conduct of the Corinthians here contributes again to refute

the assertion of Xenophon about the effect of the bribes of

Timokrates.

Finding themselves thus exposed to a formidable attack on two sides,

from Sparta at the height of her power, and from a Spartan officer

of known ability,—being, moreover, at the same time without a

single ally,—the Thebans resolved to entreat succor from Athens. A

Theban embassy to Athens for any purpose, and especially for this

purpose, was itself among the strongest marks of the revolution which

had taken place in Grecian politics. The antipathy between the

two cities had been so long and virulent, that the Thebans, at the

close of the war, had endeavored to induce Sparta to root out the

Athenian population. Their conduct subsequently had been favorable

and sympathizing towards Thrasybulus in his struggle against the

Thirty, and that leader had testified his gratitude by dedicating

statues in the Theban Herakleion.[546] But it was by no means clear

that Athens would feel herself called upon, either by policy or by

sentiment, to assist them in the present emergency; at a moment when

she had no Long Walls, no fortifications at Peiræus, no ships, nor

any protection against the Spartan maritime power.

[546] Pausanias, ix, 11, 4.

It was not until Pausanias and Lysander were both actually engaged in

mustering their forces, that the Thebans sent to address the Athenian

assembly. The speech of the Theban envoy sets forth strikingly the

case against Sparta as it then stood. Disclaiming all concurrence

with that former Theban deputy, who, without any instructions, had

taken on himself to propose, in the Spartan assembly of allies,

extreme severity towards the conquered Athenians,—he reminded the

Athenians that Thebes had by unanimous voice declined obeying the

summons of the Spartans, to aid in the march against Thrasybulus

and the Peiræus; and that this was the first cause of the anger

of the Spartans against her. On that ground, then, he appealed to

the gratitude of democratical Athens against the Lacedæmonians.

But he likewise invoked against them, with yet greater confidence,

the aid of oligarchical Athens,—or of those who at that time had

stood opposed to Thrasybulus and the Peiræus; for it was Sparta who,

having first set up the oligarchy at Athens, had afterwards refused

to sustain it, and left its partisans to the generosity of their

democratical opponents, by whom alone they were saved harmless.[547]

Of course Athens was eager, if possible (so he presumed), to regain

her lost empire; and in this enterprise he tendered the cordial

aid of Thebes as an ally. He pointed out that it was by no means

an impracticable enterprise; looking to the universal hatred which

Sparta had now drawn upon herself, not less on the part of ancient

allies than of prior enemies. The Athenians knew by experience that

Thebes could be formidable as a foe; she would now show that she

could be yet more effective as a friend, if the Athenians would

interfere to rescue her. Moreover, she was now about to fight, not

for Syracusans or Asiatics, but for her own preservation and dignity.

“We hesitate not to affirm, men of Athens (concluded the Theban

speaker), that what we are now invoking at your hands is a greater

benefit to you than it is to ourselves.”[548]

[547] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 9.

Πολὺ δ᾽ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦμεν, ὅσοι τῶν ἐν ἄστει ἐγένεσθε, προθύμως

ἐπὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἰέναι. Ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ, καταστήσαντες ὑμᾶς ἐς

ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ ἐς ἔχθραν τῷ δήμῳ, ἀφικόμενοι πολλῇ δυνάμει, ὡς

ὑμῖν σύμμαχοι, παρέδοσαν ὑμᾶς τῷ πλήθει· ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνοις

εἶναι, ἀπολώλατε, ὁ δὲ δῆμος οὑτοσὶ ὑμᾶς ἔσωσε.

[548] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 9, 16.

Eight years had now elapsed since the archonship of Eukleides and

the renovation of the democracy after the crushing visitation of

the Thirty. Yet we may see, from the important and well-turned

allusion of the Theban speaker to the oligarchical portion of the

assembly, that the two parties still stood in a certain measure

distinguished. Enfeebled as Athens had been left by the war, she

had never since been called upon to take any decisive and emphatic

vote on a question of foreign policy; and much now turned upon the

temper of the oligarchical minority, which might well be conceived

likely to play a party game and speculate upon Spartan countenance.

But the comprehensive amnesty decreed on the reëstablishment of the

democratical constitution,—and the wise and generous forbearance

with which it had been carried out, in spite of the most torturing

recollections,—were now found to have produced their fruits.

Majority and minority,—democrats and oligarchs,—were seen

confounded in one unanimous and hearty vote to lend assistance to

Thebes, in spite of all risk from hostility with Sparta. We cannot

indeed doubt that this vote was considerably influenced also by the

revolt of Rhodes, by the reappearance of Konon with a fleet in the

Asiatic seas, and by private communications from that commander

intimating his hope of acting triumphantly against the maritime power

of Sparta, through enlarged aid from Persia. The vote had thus a

double meaning. It proclaimed not merely the restored harmony between

democrats and oligarchs at Athens, but also their common resolution

to break the chain by which they were held as mere satellites and

units in the regiment of Spartan allies, and to work out anew the

old traditions of Athens as a self-acting and primary power, at

least,—if not once again an imperial power. The vote proclaimed

a renovated life in Athens, and its boldness under the existing

weakness of the city, is extolled two generations afterwards by

Demosthenes.[549]

[549] Demosthen. de Coronâ, c. 28, p. 258; also Philipp. i, c. 7,

p. 44. Compare also Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo, s. 15).

After having heard the Theban orator (we are told even by the

philo-Laconian Xenophon),[550] “very many Athenian citizens rose

and spoke in support of his prayer, and the whole assembly with one

accord voted to grant it.” Thrasybulus proposed the resolution, and

communicated it to the Theban envoys.

[550] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 16. Τῶν δ᾽ Ἀθηναίων παμπολλοὶ μὲν

ξυνηγόρευον, πάντες δ᾽ ἐψηφίσαντο βοηθεῖν αὐτοῖς.

He told them that Athens knew well the risk which she was incurring

while Peiræus was undefended; but nevertheless she was prepared to

show her gratitude by giving more in requital than she had received;

for she was prepared to give the Thebans positive aid, in case they

were attacked—while the Thebans had done nothing more for _her_ than

to refuse to join in an aggressive march against her.[551]

[551] Xen. Hellen. _ut sup._

Pausanias (iii, 9, 6) says that the Athenians sent envoys to the

Spartans to entreat them not to act aggressively against Thebes,

but to submit their complaint to equitable adjustment. This seems

to me improbable. Diodorus (xiv, 81) briefly states the general

fact in conformity with Xenophon.

Without such assurance of succor from Athens, it is highly probable

that the Thebans might have been afraid to face, single-handed,

Lysander and the full force of Sparta. But they now prepared for a

strenuous defence. The first approach of Lysander with his army of

Herakleots, Phokians, and others, from the north, was truly menacing;

the more so, as Orchomenus, the second city next to Thebes in the

Bœotian confederacy, broke off its allegiance and joined him. The

supremacy of Thebes over the cities composing the Bœotian confederacy

appears to have been often harsh and oppressive, though probably not

equally oppressive towards all, and certainly not equally odious to

all. To Platæa on the extreme south of Bœotia, it had been long

intolerable, and the unhappy fate of that little town has saddened

many pages of my preceding volumes; to Orchomenus, on the extreme

north, it was also unpalatable,—partly because that town stood next

in power and importance to Thebes,—partly because it had an imposing

legendary antiquity, and claimed to have been once the ascendant city

receiving tribute from Thebes. The Orchomenians now joined Lysander,

threw open to him the way into Bœotia, and conducted him with his

army, after first ravaging the fields of Lebadeia, into the district

belonging to Haliartus.[552]

[552] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 17; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 28.

Before Lysander quitted Sparta, the plan of operations concerted

between him and Pausanias, was that they should meet on a given

day in the territory of Haliartus. And in execution of this plan

Pausanias had already advanced with his Peloponnesian army as far

as Platæa in Bœotia. Whether the day fixed between them had yet

arrived, when Lysander reached Haliartus, we cannot determine with

certainty. In the imperfection of the Grecian calendar, a mistake on

this point would be very conceivable,—as had happened between the

Athenian generals Hippokrates and Demosthenes in those measures which

preceded the battle of Delium in 424 B.C.[553] But the engagement

must have been taken by both parties, subject to obstructions in the

way,—since each would have to march through a hostile country to

reach the place of meeting. The words of Xenophon, however, rather

indicate that the day fixed had not arrived; nevertheless, Lysander

resolved at once to act against Haliartus, without waiting for

Pausanias. There were as yet only a few Thebans in the town, and he,

probably, had good reasons for judging that he would better succeed

by rapid measures, before any more Thebans could arrive, than by

delaying until the other Spartan army should join him; not to mention

anxiety that the conquest should belong to himself exclusively,

and confidence arising from his previous success at Orchomenus.

Accordingly, he sent in an invitation to the Haliartians to follow

the example of the Orchomenians, to revolt from Thebes, and to stand

upon their autonomy under Lacedæmonian protection. Perhaps there may

have been a party in the town disposed to comply. But the majority,

encouraged too by the Thebans within, refused the proposition; upon

which Lysander marched up to the walls and assaulted the town. He was

here engaged, close by the gates, in examining where he could best

effect an entrance, when a fresh division of Thebans, apprised of

his proceedings, was seen approaching from Thebes, at their fastest

pace,—cavalry, as well as hoplites. They were probably seen from

the watch-towers in the city earlier than they became visible to

the assailants without; so that the Haliartians, encouraged by the

sight, threw open their gates, and made a sudden sally. Lysander,

seemingly taken by surprise, was himself slain among the first, with

his prophet by his side, by a Haliartian hoplite named Neochôrus. His

troops stood some time, against both the Haliartians from the town,

and the fresh Thebans who now came up. But they were at length driven

back with considerable loss, and compelled to retreat to rugged and

difficult ground at some distance in their rear. Here, however, they

made good their position, repelling their assailants with the loss of

more than two hundred hoplites.[554]

[553] Thucyd. iv, 89. γενομένης διαμαρτίας τῶν ἡμερῶν, etc.

[554] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 18, 19, 20; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 28,

29; Pausan. iii, 5, 4.

The two last differ in various matters from Xenophon, whose

account, however, though brief, seems to me to deserve the

preference.

The success here gained, though highly valuable as an encouragement

to the Thebans, would have been counterbalanced by the speedy

arrival of Pausanias, had not Lysander himself been among the

slain. But the death of so eminent a man was an irreparable loss to

Sparta. His army, composed of heterogeneous masses, both collected

and held together by his personal ascendency, lost confidence and

dispersed in the ensuing night.[555] When Pausanias arrived soon

afterwards, he found no second army to join with him. Yet his own

force was more than sufficient to impress terror on the Thebans,

had not Thrasybulus, faithful to the recent promise, arrived with

an imposing body of Athenian hoplites, together with cavalry under

Orthobulus[556]—and imparted fresh courage as well as adequate

strength to the Theban cause.

[555] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 21. ἀπεληλυθότας ἐν νυκτὶ τούς τε

Φωκέας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας οἴκαδε ἑκάστους, etc.

[556] Lysias, Or. xvi, (pro Mantitheo) s. 15, 16.

Pausanias had first to consider what steps he would take to recover

the bodies of the slain,—that of Lysander among them; whether he

would fight a battle and thus take his chance of becoming master

of the field,—or send the usual petition for burial-truce, which

always implied confession of inferiority. On submitting the point

to a council of officers and Spartan elders, their decision as well

as his own was against fighting; not, however, without an indignant

protest from some of the Spartan elders. He considered that the whole

original plan of operations was broken up, since not only the great

name and genius of Lysander had perished, but his whole army had

spontaneously disbanded; that the Peloponnesian allies were generally

lukewarm and reluctant, not to be counted upon for energetic behavior

in case of pressing danger; that he had little or no cavalry,[557]

while the Theban cavalry was numerous and excellent; lastly, that

the dead body of Lysander himself lay so close to the walls of

Haliartus, that even if the Lacedæmonians were victorious, they could

not carry it off without serious loss from the armed defenders in

their towers.[558] Such were the reasons which determined Pausanias

and the major part of the council to send and solicit a truce. But

the Thebans refused to grant it except on condition that they should

immediately evacuate Bœotia. Though such a requisition was contrary

to the received practice of Greece,[559] which imposed on the victor

the duty of granting the burial-truce unconditionally, whenever it

was asked and inferiority thus publicly confessed,—nevertheless,

such was the reluctant temper of the army, that they heard not merely

with acquiescence, but with joy,[560] the proposition of departing.

The bodies were duly buried,—that of Lysander in the territory of

Panopê, immediately across the Phokian border, but not far from

Haliartus. And no sooner were these solemnities completed, than the

Lacedæmonian army was led back to Peloponnesus; their dejection

forming a mournful contrast to the triumphant insolence of the

Thebans, who watched their march and restrained them, not without

occasional blows, from straggling out of the road into the cultivated

fields.[561]

[557] Accordingly we learn from an oration of Lysias, that the

service of the Athenian horsemen in this expedition, who were

commanded by Orthobulus, was judged to be extremely safe and

easy; while that of the hoplites was dangerous (Lysias, Orat.

xvi, pro Mantith. s. 15).

[558] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 23. Κορίνθιοι μὲν παντάπασιν οὐκ

ἠκολούθουν αὐτοῖς, οἱ δὲ παρόντες οὐ προθύμως στρατεύοιντο, etc.

[559] See the conduct of the Thebans on this very point (of

giving up the slain at the solicitation of the conquered

Athenians for burial) after the battle of Delium, and the

discussion thereupon,—in this History, Vol. VI, ch. liii, p. 393

_seq._

[560] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 24. Οἱ δὲ ἄσμενοί τε ταῦτα ἤκουσαν,

etc.

[561] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 24.

The death of Lysander produced the most profound sorrow and

resentment at Sparta. On returning thither, Pausanias found himself

the subject of such virulent accusation, that he thought it prudent

to make his escape, and take sanctuary in the temple of Athênê Alea,

at Tegea. He was impeached, and put on trial during his absence, on

two counts; first, for having been behind the time covenanted, in

meeting Lysander at Haliartus; next for having submitted to ask a

truce from the Thebans, instead of fighting a battle for the purpose

of obtaining the bodies of the slain.

As far as there is evidence to form a judgment, it does not appear

that Pausanias was guilty upon either of the two counts. The first

is a question of fact; and it seems quite as likely that Lysander

was before his time, as that Pausanias was behind his time, in

arriving at Haliartus. Besides, Lysander, arriving there first,

would have been quite safe, had he not resolved to attack without

delay; in which the chances of war turned out against him; though

the resolution in itself may have been well conceived. Next, as to

the truce solicited for burying the dead bodies,—it does not appear

that Pausanias could with any prudence have braved the chances of a

battle. The facts of the case,—even as summed up by Xenophon, who

always exaggerates everything in favor of the Spartans,—lead us to

this conclusion. A few of the Spartan elders would doubtless prefer

perishing on the field of battle, to the humiliation of sending in

the herald to ask for a truce. But the mischief of fighting a battle

under the influence of such a point of honor, to the exclusion of

a rational estimate of consequences, will be seen when we come to

the battle of Leuktra, where Kleombrotus, son of Pausanias was thus

piqued into an imprudence (at least this is alleged as one of the

motives) to which his own life and the dominion of Sparta became

forfeit.[562] Moreover, the army of Pausanias, comprising very few

Spartans, consisted chiefly of allies who had no heart in the cause,

and who were glad to be required by the Thebans to depart. If he

had fought a battle and lost it, the detriment to Sparta would have

been most serious in every way; whereas, if he had gained a victory,

no result would have followed except the acquisition of the bodies

for burial; since the execution of the original plan had become

impracticable through the dispersion of the army of Lysander.

[562] Xen. Hellen. vi, 4, 5.

Though a careful examination of the facts leads us (and seems also

to have led Xenophon[563]) to the conclusion that Pausanias was

innocent, he was nevertheless found guilty in his absence. He was in

great part borne down by the grief felt at Sparta for the loss of

Lysander, with whom he had been before in political rivalry, and for

whose death he was made responsible. Moreover, the old accusation

was now revived against him,[564]—for which he had been tried,

and barely acquitted, eight years before,—of having tolerated the

reëstablishment of the Athenian democracy at a time when he might

have put it down. Without doubt this argument told prodigiously

against him at the present juncture, when the Athenians had just

now, for the first time since the surrender of their city, renounced

their subjection to Sparta and sent an army to assist the Thebans in

their defence. So violent was the sentiment against Pausanias, that

he was condemned to death in his absence, and passed the remainder of

his life as an exile in sanctuary at Tegea. His son, Agesipolis, was

invested with the sceptre in his place.

[563] The traveller Pausanias justifies the prudence of his regal

namesake in avoiding a battle, by saying that the Athenians

were in his rear, and the Thebans in his front; and that he was

afraid of being assailed on both sides at once, like Leonidas at

Thermopylæ and like the troops enclosed in Sphakteria (Paus. iii,

5, 5).

But the matter of fact, on which this justification rests,

is contradicted by Xenophon, who says that the Athenians had

actually joined the Thebans, and were in the same ranks—ἐλθόντες

ξυμπαρετάξαντο (Hellen. iii, 5, 22).

[564] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 25. Καὶ ὅτι τὸν δῆμον τῶν Ἀθηναίων

λαβὼν ἐν τῷ Πειραιεῖ ἀνῆκε, etc. Compare Pausanias, iii, 5, 3.

A brief remark will not be here misplaced. On no topic have Grecian

historians been more profuse in their reproaches, than upon the

violence and injustice of democracy, at Athens and elsewhere, in

condemning unsuccessful, but innocent generals. Out of the many cases

in which this reproach is advanced, there are very few wherein it

has been made good; but even if we grant it to be valid against

Athens and her democracy, the fate of Pausanias will show us that

the ephors and senate of anti-democratical Sparta were capable of

the like unjust misjudgment. Hardly a single instance of Athenian

condemnation occurs, which we can so clearly prove to be undeserved,

as this of a Spartan king.

Turning from the banished king to Lysander,—the Spartans had indeed

valid reasons for deploring the fall of the latter. He had procured

for them their greatest and most decisive victories, and the time was

coming when they needed his services to procure them more; for he

left behind him no man of equal warlike resource, cunning, and power

of command. But if he possessed those abilities which powerfully

helped Sparta to triumph over her enemies, he at the same time did

more than any man to bring her empire into dishonor, and to render

its tenure precarious. His decemviral governments or dekarchies,

diffused through the subject cities, and each sustained by a

Lacedæmonian harmost and garrison, were aggravations of local tyranny

such as the Grecian world had never before undergone. And though the

Spartan authorities presently saw that he was abusing the imperial

name of the city for unmeasured personal aggrandizement of his own,

and partially withdrew their countenance from his dekarchies,—yet

the general character of their empire still continued to retain the

impress of partisanship and subjugation which he had originally

stamped upon it. Instead of that autonomy which Sparta had so

repeatedly promised, it became subjection every way embittered. Such

an empire was pretty sure to be short-lived; but the loss to Sparta

herself, when her empire fell away, is not the only fault which the

historian of Greece has to impute to Lysander. His far deeper sin

consists in his having thrown away an opportunity,—such as never

occurred either before or afterwards,—for organizing some permanent,

honorable, self-maintaining, Pan-hellenic combination under the

headship of Sparta. This is (as I have before remarked) what a man

like Kallikratidas would have attempted, if not with far-sighted

wisdom, at least with generous sincerity, and by an appeal to the

best veins of political sentiment in the chief city as well as in

the subordinates. It is possible that with the best intentions even

he might have failed; so strong was the centrifugal instinct in the

Grecian political mind. But what we have to reproach in Lysander is,

that he never tried; that he abused the critical moment of cure for

the purpose of infusing new poison into the system; that he not only

sacrificed the interests of Greece to the narrow gains of Sparta,

but even the interests of Sparta to the still narrower monopoly of

dominion in his own hands. That his measures worked mischievously not

merely for Greece, but for Sparta herself, aggravating all her bad

tendencies,—has been already remarked in the preceding pages.

That Lysander, with unbounded opportunities of gain, both lived

and died poor, exhibits the honorable side of his character. Yet

his personal indifference to money seems only to have left the

greater space in his bosom for that thirst of power which made him

unscrupulous in satiating the rapacity, as well as in upholding

the oppressions, of coadjutors like the Thirty at Athens and the

decemvirs in other cities. In spite of his great success and ability

in closing the Peloponnesian war, we shall agree with Pausanias[565]

that he was more mischievous than profitable even to Sparta,—even

if we take no thought of Greece generally. What would have been the

effect produced by his projects in regard to the regal succession,

had he been able to bring them to bear, we have no means of

measuring. We are told that the discourse composed and addressed

to him by the Halicarnassian rhetor Kleon, was found after his

death among his papers by Agesilaus; who first learnt from it, with

astonishment and alarm, the point to which the ambition of Lysander

had tended, and was desirous of exposing his real character by

making the discourse public,—but was deterred by dissuasive counsel

of the ephor Lakratidas. But this story (attested by Ephorus[566])

looks more like an anecdote of the rhetorical schools than like a

reality. Agesilaus was not the man to set much value on sophists or

their compositions; nor is it easy to believe that he remained so

long ignorant of those projects which Lysander had once entertained

but subsequently dropped. Moreover the probability is, that Kleon

himself would make the discourse public as a sample of his own

talents, even in the lifetime of Lysander; not only without shame,

but as representing the feelings of a considerable section of readers

throughout the Grecian world.

[565] Pausanias, ix, 32, 6.

[566] Ephorus, Fr. 127, ed. Didot; Plutarch, Lysander, c. 30.

Most important were the consequences which ensued from the death of

Lysander and the retreat of Pausanias out of Bœotia. Fresh hope and

spirits were infused into all the enemies of Sparta. An alliance was

immediately concluded against her by Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and

Argos. Deputies from these four cities were appointed to meet at

Corinth, and to take active measures for inviting the coöperation of

fresh allies; so that the war which had begun as a Bœotian war, now

acquired the larger denomination of Corinthian war, under which it

lasted until the peace of Antalkidas. The alliance was immediately

strengthened by the junction of the Eubœans,—the Akarnanians,—the

Ozolian Lokrians,—Ambrakia and Leukas (both particularly attached to

Corinth),—and the Chalkidians of Thrace.[567]

[567] Diodor. xiv, 81, 82; Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 17.

We now enter upon the period when, for the first time, Thebes begins

to step out of the rank of secondary powers, and gradually raises

herself into a primary and ascendant city in Grecian politics.

Throughout the Peloponnesian war, the Thebans had shown themselves

excellent soldiers, both on horseback and on foot, as auxiliaries

to Sparta. But now the city begins to have a policy of its own, and

individual citizens of ability become conspicuous. While waiting

for Pelopidas and Epaminondas, with whom we shall presently become

acquainted, we have at the present moment Ismenias; a wealthy Theban,

a sympathizer with Thrasybulus and the Athenian exiles eight years

before, and one of the great organizers of the present anti-Spartan

movement; a man, too, honored by his political enemies,[568] when

they put him to death fourteen years afterwards, with the title of “a

great wicked man,”—the same combination of epithets which Clarendon

applies to Oliver Cromwell.

[568] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 36. Ὁ δ᾽ (Ismenias) ἀπελογεῖτο μὲν πρὸς

πάντα ταῦτα, οὐ μέντοι ἔπειθέ γε τὸ μὴ οὐ μεγαλοπράγμων τε καὶ

κακοπράγμων εἶναι.

It is difficult to make out anything from the two allusions

in Plato, except that Ismenias was a wealthy and powerful man

(Plato, Menon, p. 90 B; Republ. i. p. 336 A.).

It was Ismenias, who, at the head of a body of Bœotians and Argeians,

undertook an expedition to put down the Spartan influence in the

regions north of Bœotia. At Pharsalus in Thessaly, the Lacedæmonians

had an harmost and garrison; at Pheræ, Lykophron the despot was

their ally; while Larissa, with Medius the despot, was their

principal enemy. By the aid of the Bœotians, Medius was now enabled

to capture Pharsalus; Larissa, with Krannon and Skotusa, was received

into the Theban alliance,[569] and Ismenias obtained also the more

important advantage of expelling the Lacedæmonians from Herakleia.

Some malcontents, left after the violent interference of the Spartan

Herippidas two years before, opened the gates of Herakleia by

night to the Bœotians and Argeians. The Lacedæmonians in the town

were put to the sword, but the other Peloponnesian colonists were

permitted to retire in safety; while the old Trachinian inhabitants,

whom the Lacedæmonians had expelled to make room for their new

settlers, together with the Œtæans, whom they had driven out of the

districts in the neighborhood,—were now called back to repossess

their original homes.[570] The loss of Herakleia was a serious blow

to the Spartans in those regions,—protecting Eubœa in its recent

revolt from them, and enabling Ismenias to draw into his alliance the

neighboring Malians, Ænianes, and Athamanes,—tribes stretching along

the valley of the Spercheius westward to the vicinity of Pindus.

Assembling additional troops from these districts (which, only a

few months before, had supplied an army to Lysander[571]), Ismenias

marched against the Phokians, among whom the Spartan Lakisthenes had

been left as harmost in command. After a severe battle, this officer

with his Phokians was defeated near the Lokrian town of Naryx; and

Ismenias came back victorious to the synod at Corinth.[572]

[569] Diodor. xiv, 82; Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 3; Xen. Agesil. ii, 2.

[570] Diodor. xiv, 38-82.

[571] Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 5, 6.

[572] Diodor. xiv, 82.

By such important advantages, accomplished during the winter of

395-394 B.C., the prospects of Grecian affairs as they stood in the

ensuing spring became materially altered. The allies assembled at

Corinth, full of hope, and resolved to levy a large combined force

to act against Sparta; who on her side seemed to be threatened with

the loss of all her extra-Peloponnesian land-empire. Accordingly,

the ephors determined to recall without delay Agesilaus with his

army from Asia, and sent Epikydidas with orders to that effect.

But even before this reinforcement could arrive, they thought it

expedient to muster their full Peloponnesian force and to act

with vigor against the allies at Corinth, who were now assembling

in considerable numbers. Aristodemus,—guardian of the youthful

king Agesipolis son of Pausanias, and himself of the Eurystheneid

race,—marched at the head of a body of six thousand Lacedæmonian

hoplites;[573] the Spartan xenâgi (or officers sent on purpose to

conduct the contingents from the outlying allies), successively

brought in three thousand hoplites from Elis, Triphylia, Akroreia,

and Lasion,—fifteen hundred from Sikyon,—three thousand from

Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis. None were sent from Phlias,

on the plea (true or false[574]) that in that city the moment was one

of solemnity and holy truce. There were also hoplites from Tegea,

Mantineia, and the Achæan towns, but their number is not given; so

that we do not know the full muster-roll on the Lacedæmonian side.

The cavalry, six hundred in number, were all Lacedæmonian; there

were, moreover, three hundred Kretan bowmen,—and four hundred

slingers from different rural districts of Triphylia.[575]

[573] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 16. Xenophon gives this total of six

thousand as if it were of Lacedæmonians _alone_. But if we follow

his narrative, we shall see that there were unquestionably

in the army troops of Tegea, Mantineia, and the Achæan towns

(probably also some of other Arcadian towns,) present in the

battle (iv, 2, 13, 18, 20). Can we suppose that Xenophon meant

to include _these_ allies in the total of six thousand, along

with the Lacedæmonians,—which is doubtless a large total for

Lacedæmonians alone? Unless this supposition be admitted,

there is no resource except to assume an omission, either of

Xenophon himself, or of the copyist; which omission in fact Gail

and others do suppose. On the whole, I think they are right;

for the number of hoplites on both sides would otherwise be

prodigiously unequal; while Xenophon says nothing to imply that

the Lacedæmonian victory was gained in spite of great inferiority

of number, and something which even implies that it must have

been nearly equal (iv, 2, 13),—though he is always disposed to

compliment Sparta wherever he can.

[574] From a passage which occurs somewhat later (iv, 4, 15),

we may suspect that this was an excuse, and that the Phliasians

were not very well affected to Sparta. Compare a similar case of

excuse ascribed to the Mantineians (v, 2, 2).

[575] Diodorus (xiv, 83) gives a total of twenty-three thousand

foot and five hundred horse, on the Lacedæmonian side, but

without enumerating items. On the side of the confederacy he

states a total of more than fifteen thousand foot and five

hundred horse (c. 82).

The allied force of the enemy was already mustered near Corinth;

six thousand Athenian hoplites,—seven thousand Argeian,—five

thousand Bœotian, those from Orchomenus being absent,—three thousand

Corinthian,—three thousand from the different towns of Eubœa; making

twenty-four thousand in all. The total of cavalry was fifteen hundred

and fifty; composed of eight hundred Bœotian, six hundred Athenian,

one hundred from Chalkis in Eubœa, and fifty from the Lokrians. The

light troops also were numerous,—partly Corinthian, drawn probably

from the serf-population which tilled the fields,[576]—partly

Lokrians, Malians, and Akarnanians.

[576] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 17. Καὶ ψιλὸν δὲ, ξὺν τοῖς τῶν

Κορινθίων, πλέον ἦν, etc. Compare Hesychius, v, Κυνόφαλοι;

Welcker, Præfat. ad. Theognidem, p. xxxv; K. O. Müller, History

of the Dorians, iii, 4, 3.

The allied leaders, holding a council of war to arrange their plans,

came to a resolution that the hoplites should not be drawn up in

deeper files than sixteen men,[577] in order that there might be no

chance of their being surrounded; and that the right wing, carrying

with it command for the time, should be alternated from day to day

between the different cities. The confidence which the events of the

last few months had infused into these leaders, now for the first

time acting against their old leader Sparta, is surprising. “There

is nothing like marching to Sparta (said the Corinthian Timolaus)

and fighting the Lacedæmonians at or near their own home. We must

burn out the wasps in their nest, without letting them come forth

to sting us. The Lacedæmonian force is like that of a river; small

at its source, and becoming formidable only by the affluents which

it receives, in proportion to the length of its course.”[578] The

wisdom of this advice was remarkable; but its boldness was yet more

remarkable, when viewed in conjunction with the established feeling

of awe towards Sparta. It was adopted by the general council of the

allies; but unfortunately the time for executing it had already

passed; for the Lacedæmonians were already in march and had crossed

their own border. They took the line of road by Tegea and Mantineia

(whose troops joined the march), and advanced as far as Sikyon,

where probably all the Arcadian and Achæan contingents were ordered

to rendezvous.

[577] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 13; compare iv, 2, 18,—where he says

of the Thebans—~ἀμελήσαντες~ τοῦ ἐς ἑκκαίδεκα, βαθεῖαν παντελῶς

ἐποιήσαντο τὴν φάλαγγα, etc., which implies and alludes to the

resolution previously taken.

[578] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 11, 12.

The troops of the confederacy had advanced as far as Nemea when

they learnt that the Lacedæmonian army was at Sikyon; but they then

altered their plan, and confined themselves to the defensive. The

Lacedæmonians on their side crossed over the mountainous post called

Epieikia, under considerable annoyance from the enemy’s light troops,

who poured missiles upon them from the high ground. But when they

had reached the level country, on the other side, along the shore

of the Saronic Gulf, where they probably received the contingents

from Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, and Halieis,—the whole army thus

reinforced marched forward without resistance, burning and ravaging

the cultivated lands. The confederates retreated before them, and at

length took up a position close to Corinth, amidst some rough ground

with a ravine in their front.[579] The Lacedæmonians advanced forward

until they were little more than a mile distant from this position,

and there encamped.

[579] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 14, 15.

In the passage,—καὶ οἱ ἕτεροι μέντοι ~ἐλθόντες~

κατεστρατοπεδεύσαντο, ἔμπροσθεν ποιησάμενοι τὴν χαράδραν,—I

apprehend that ἀπελθόντες (which is sanctioned by four MSS.,

and preferred by Leunclavius) is the proper reading, in place

of ~ἐλθόντες~. For it seems certain that the march of the

confederates was one of retreat, and that the battle was fought

very near to the walls of Corinth; since the defeated troops

sought shelter within the town, and the Lacedæmonian pursuers

were so close upon them, that the Corinthians within were afraid

to keep open the gates. Hence we must reject the statement of

Diodorus,—that the battle was fought on the banks of the river

Nemea (xiv, 83) as erroneous.

There are some difficulties and obscurities in the description

which Xenophon gives of the Lacedæmonian march. His words

run—ἐν τούτῳ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ δὴ Τεγεάτας παρειληφότες

καὶ Μαντινέας, ~ἐξῄεσαν τὴν ἀμφίαλον~. These last three words

are not satisfactorily explained. Weiske and Schneider construe

τὴν ἀμφίαλον (very justly) as indicating the region lying

immediately on the Peloponnesian side of the isthmus of Corinth

and having the Saronic Gulf on one side, and the Corinthian Gulf

on the other; in which was included Sikyon. But then it would

not be correct to say, that “the Lacedæmonians had gone out by

the bimarine way.” On the contrary, the truth is, that “they

had gone out into the bimarine road or region,—which meaning

however would require a preposition—ἐξῄεσαν ~εἰς~ τὴν ἀμφίαλον.

Sturz in his Lexicon (v. ἐξιέναι) renders τὴν ἀμφίαλον—_viam ad

mare_—which seems an extraordinary sense of the word, unless

instances were produced to support it; and even if instances were

produced, we do not see why the way from Sparta to Sikyon should

be called by that name; which would more properly belong to the

road from Sparta down the Eurotas to Helos.

Again, we do not know distinctly the situation of the point or

district called τὴν Ἐπιεικίαν (mentioned again, iv, 4, 13). But

it is certain from the map, that when the confederates were

at Nemea, and the Lacedæmonians at Sikyon,—the former must

have been exactly placed so as to intercept the junction of

the contingents from Epidaurus, Trœzen, and Hermionê, with the

Lacedæmonian army. To secure this junction, the Lacedæmonians

were obliged to force their way across that mountainous region

which lies near Kleônæ and Nemea, and to march in a line

pointing from Sikyon down to the Saronic Gulf. Having reached

the other side of these mountains near the sea, they would be in

communication with Epidaurus and the other towns of the Argolic

peninsula.

The line of march which the Lacedæmonians would naturally

take from Sparta to Sikyon and Lechæum, by Tegea, Mantineia,

Orchomenus, etc., is described two years afterwards in the case

of Agesilaus (iv, 5, 19).

After an interval seemingly of a few days, the Bœotians, on the day

when their turn came to occupy the right wing and to take the lead,

gave the signal for battle.[580] The Lacedæmonians, prevented by

the wooded ground from seeing clearly, were only made aware of the

coming attack by hearing the hostile pæan. Taking order of battle

immediately, they advanced forward to meet the assailants when within

a furlong of their line. In each army, the right division took the

lead,—slanting to the right, or keeping the left shoulder forward,

according to the tendency habitual with Grecian hoplites, through

anxiety to keep the right or unshielded side from being exposed

to the enemy, and at the same time to be protected by the shield

of a right-hand neighbor.[581] The Lacedæmonians in the one army,

and the Thebans in the other, each inclined themselves, and caused

their respective armies to incline also, in a direction slanting

to the right, so that the Lacedæmonians on their side considerably

outflanked the Athenians on the opposite left. Out of the ten tribes

of Athenian hoplites, it was only the six on the extreme left who

came into conflict with the Lacedæmonians; while the remaining four

contended with the Tegeans who stood next to the Lacedæmonians on

their own line. But the six extreme Athenian tribes were completely

beaten, and severely handled, being taken in flank as well as in

front by the Lacedæmonians. On the other hand, the remaining four

Athenian tribes vanquished and drove before them the Tegeans; and

generally, along all the rest of the line, the Thebans, Argeians, and

Corinthians were victorious,—except where the troops of the Achæan

Pellênê stood opposed to those of the Bœotian Thespiæ, where the

battle was equal and the loss severe on both sides. The victorious

confederates, however, were so ardent and incautious in pursuit, as

to advance a considerable distance and return with disordered ranks;

while the Lacedæmonians, who were habitually self-restraining in

this particular, kept their order perfectly, attacking the Thebans,

Argeians, and Corinthians to great advantage when returning to their

camp. Several of the Athenian fugitives obtained shelter within the

walls of Corinth; in spite of the opposition of the philo-Laconian

Corinthians, who insisted upon shutting the gates against them, and

opening negotiations with Sparta. The Lacedæmonians however came so

near that it was at last thought impossible to keep the gates open

longer. Many of the remaining confederates were therefore obliged to

be satisfied with the protection of their ancient camp;[582] which

seems, however, to have been situated in such defensible ground,[583]

that the Lacedæmonians did not molest them in it.

[580] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 18. The coloring which Xenophon puts

upon this step is hardly fair to the Thebans, as is so constantly

the case throughout his history. He says that “they were in no

hurry to fight” (οὐδέν τι κατήπειγον τὴν μάχην ξυνάπτειν) so

long as they were on the left, opposed to the Lacedæmonians on

the opposite right; but that as soon as they were on the right

(opposed to the Achæans on the opposite left), they forthwith

gave the word. Now it does not appear that the Thebans had

any greater privilege on the day when they were on the right,

than the Argeians or Athenians had when each were on the right

respectively. The command had been determined to reside in the

right division, which post alternated from one to the other; why

the Athenians or Argeians did not make use of this post to order

the attack, we cannot explain.

So again, Xenophon says, that in spite of the resolution taken by

the Council of War to have files sixteen deep, and no more,—the

Thebans made their files much deeper. Yet it is plain, from his

own account, that no mischievous consequences turned upon this

greater depth.

[581] See the instructive description of the battle of

Mantineia—in Thucyd. v, 71.

[582] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 20-23.

The allusion to this incident in Demosthenes (adv. Leptinem, c.

13, p. 472) is interesting, though indistinct.

[583] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 19. καὶ γὰρ ἦν λάσιον τὸ χωρίον—which

illustrates the expression in Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo)

s. 20. ἐν Κορίνθῳ χωρίων ἰσχυρῶν κατειλημμένων.

So far as the Lacedæmonians separately were concerned, the battle

of Corinth was an important victory, gained (as they affirmed) with

the loss of only eight men, and inflicting heavy loss upon the

Athenians in the battle, as well as upon the remaining confederates

in their return from pursuit. Though the Athenian hoplites suffered

thus severely, yet Thrasybulus their commander,[584] who kept the

field until the last, with strenuous efforts to rally them, was

not satisfied with their behavior. But on the other hand, all the

allies of Sparta were worsted, and a considerable number of them

slain. According to Diodorus, the total loss on the Lacedæmonian side

was eleven hundred; on the side of the confederates twenty-eight

hundred.[585] On the whole, the victory of the Lacedæmonians was

not sufficiently decisive to lead to important results, though it

completely secured their ascendency within Peloponnesus. We observe

here, as we shall have occasion to observe elsewhere, that the

Peloponnesian allies do not fight heartily in the cause of Sparta.

They seem bound to her more by fear than by affection.

[584] Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo) s. 19.

Plato in his panegyrical discourse (Menexenus, c. 17, p. 245

E.) ascribes the defeat and loss of the Athenians to “bad

ground”—χρησαμένων δυσχωρίᾳ.

[585] Diodor. xiv, 83.

The statement in Xenophon (Agesil. vii, 5) that near ten thousand

men were slain on the side of the confederates, is a manifest

exaggeration; if indeed the reading be correct.

The battle of Corinth took place about July 394 B.C., seemingly

about the same time as the naval battle near Knidus (or perhaps a

little earlier), and while Agesilaus was on his homeward march after

being recalled from Asia. Had the Lacedæmonians been able to defer

the battle until Agesilaus had come up so as to threaten Bœotia on

the northern side, their campaign would probably have been much more

successful. As it is, their defeated allies doubtless went home in

disgust from the field of Corinth, so that the confederates were now

enabled to turn their whole attention to Agesilaus.

That prince had received in Asia his summons of recall from the

ephors with profound vexation and disappointment, yet at the same

time with patriotic submission. He had augmented his army, and

was contemplating more extensive schemes of operations against the

Persian satrapies in Asia Minor. He had established such a reputation

for military force and skill, that numerous messages reached him

from different inland districts, expressing their anxiety to be

emancipated from Persian dominion; and inviting him to come to their

aid. His ascendency was also established over the Grecian cities

on the coast, whom he still kept under the government of partisan

oligarchies and Spartan harmosts,—yet seemingly with greater

practical moderation, and less license of oppression, than had marked

the conduct of these men when they could count upon so unprincipled

a chief as Lysander. He was thus just now not only at a high pitch

of actual glory and ascendency, but nourishing yet brighter hopes of

farther conquests for the future. And what filled up the measure of

his aspirations,—all the conquests were to be made at the expense,

not of Greeks, but of the Persians. He was treading in the footsteps

of Agamemnon, as Pan-hellenic leader against a Pan-hellenic enemy.

All these glorious dreams were dissipated by Epikydidas, with his

sad message, and peremptory summons, from the ephors. In the chagrin

and disappointment of Agesilaus we can sincerely sympathize; but

the panegyric which Xenophon and others pronounce upon him for his

ready obedience is altogether unreasonable.[586] There was no merit

in renouncing his projects of conquest at the bidding of the ephors;

because, if any serious misfortune had befallen Sparta at home, none

of those projects could have been executed. Nor is it out of place to

remark, that even if Agesilaus had not been recalled, the extinction

of the Lacedæmonian naval superiority by the defeat of Knidus, would

have rendered all large plans of inland conquest impracticable. On

receiving his orders of recall, he convened an assembly both of his

allies and of his army, to make known the painful necessity of his

departure; which was heard with open and sincere manifestations of

sorrow. He assured them that as soon as he had dissipated the clouds

which hung over Sparta at home, he should come back to Asia without

delay, and resume his efforts against the Persian satraps; in the

interim he left Euxenus, with a force of four thousand men for their

protection. Such was the sympathy excited by his communication,

combined with esteem for his character, that the cities passed a

general vote to furnish him with contingents of troops for his march

to Sparta. But this first burst of zeal abated, when they came to

reflect that it was a service against Greeks; not merely unpopular

in itself, but presenting a certainty of hard fighting with little

plunder. Agesilaus tried every means to keep up their spirits, by

proclaiming prizes both to the civic soldiers and to the mercenaries,

to be distributed at Sestus in the Chersonesus, as soon as they

should have crossed into Europe,—prizes for the best equipment, and

best disciplined soldiers in every different arm.[587] By these means

he prevailed upon the bravest and most effective soldiers in his

army to undertake the march along with him; among them many of the

Cyreians, with Xenophon himself at their head.

[586] Xen. Agesil. i, 37; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 15. Cornelius

Nepos (Agesilaus, c. 4) almost translates the Agesilaus of

Xenophon; but we can better feel the force of _his_ panegyric,

when we recollect that he had had personal cognizance of the

disobedience of Julius Cæsar in his province to the orders of the

Senate, and that the omnipotence of Sylla and Pompey in their

provinces were then matter of recent history. “Cujus exemplum

(says Cornelius Nepos about Agesilaus) utinam imperatores nostri

sequi voluissent!”

[587] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 2-5; Xen. Agesil. i, 38; Plutarch,

Agesil. c. 16.

Though Agesilaus, in leaving Greece, had prided himself on hoisting

the flag of Agamemnon, he was now destined against his will to tread

in the footsteps of the Persian Xerxes in his march from the Thracian

Chersonese through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, to Thermopylæ

and Bœotia. Never, since the time of Xerxes, had any army undertaken

this march; which now bore an Oriental impress, from the fact that

Agesilaus brought with him some camels, taken in the battle of

Sardis.[588] Overawing or defeating the various Thracian tribes, he

reached Amphipolis on the Strymon where he was met by Derkyllidas,

who had come fresh from the battle of Corinth and informed him of

the victory. Full as his heart was of Pan-hellenic projects against

Persia, he burst into exclamations of regret on hearing of the death

of so many Greeks in battle, who could have sufficed, if united,

to emancipate Asia Minor.[589] Sending Derkyllidas forward to Asia

to make known the victory to the Grecian cities in his alliance,

he pursued his march through Macedonia and Thessaly. In the latter

country, Larissa, Krannon, and other cities in alliance with Thebes,

raised opposition to bar his passage. But in the disunited condition

of this country, no systematic resistance could be organized against

him. Nothing more appeared than detached bodies of cavalry, whom he

beat and dispersed, with the death of Polycharmus, their leader. As

the Thessalian cavalry, however, was the best in Greece, he took

great pride in having defeated them with cavalry disciplined by

himself in Asia; backed, however, it must be observed, by skilful and

effective support from his hoplites.[590] After having passed the

Achæan mountains or the line of Mount Othrys, he marched the rest of

the way without opposition, through the strait of Thermopylæ to the

frontier of Phokis and Bœotia.

[588] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 24.

[589] Xenoph. Agesil. vii, 5; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 16.

[590] Xen. Hellen. iv, 2, 4-9; Diodor. xiv, 83.

In this latter part of his march, Agesilaus was met by the ephor

Diphridas in person, who urged him to hasten his march as much

as possible, and attack the Bœotians. He was further joined by

two Lacedæmonian regiments[591] from Corinth, and by fifty young

Spartan volunteers as a body-guard, who crossed by sea from Sikyon.

He was reinforced also by the Phokians and the Orchomenians,—in

addition to the Peloponnesian troops who had accompanied him to

Asia, the Asiatic hoplites, the Cyreians, the peltasts, and the

cavalry, whom he had brought with him from the Hellespont, and some

fresh troops collected in the march. His army was thus in imposing

force when he reached the neighborhood of Chæroneia on the Bœotian

border. It was here that they were alarmed by an eclipse of the

sun, on the fourteenth of August, 394 B.C.; a fatal presage, the

meaning of which was soon interpreted for them by the arrival of a

messenger bearing news of the naval defeat of Knidus, with the death

of Peisander, brother-in-law of Agesilaus. Deeply was the latter

affected by this irreparable blow. He foresaw that, when known, it

would spread dismay and dejection among his soldiers, most of whom

would remain attached to him only so long as they believed the cause

of Sparta to be ascendant and profitable.[592] Accordingly, he

resolved, being now within a day’s march of his enemies, to hasten

on a battle without making known the bad news. Proclaiming that

intelligence had been received of a sea-fight having taken place, in

which the Lacedæmonians had been victorious, though Peisander himself

was slain,—he offered a sacrifice of thanksgiving and sent round

presents of congratulation,—which produced an encouraging effect,

and made the skirmishers especially both forward and victorious.

[591] Plutarch (Agesil. c. 17; compare also Plutarch, Apophth.

p. 795, as corrected by Morus ad Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 15) states

two moræ or regiments as having joined Agesilaus from Corinth;

Xenophon alludes only to one, besides that mora which was in

garrison at Orchomenus (Hellen. iv, 3, 15; Agesil. ii, 6).

[592] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 13.

Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀγησίλαος πυθόμενος ταῦτα, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον χαλεπῶς

ἔφερεν· ἐπεὶ μέντοι ἐνεθυμήθη, ὅτι τοῦ στρατεύματος τὸ πλεῖστον

εἴη αὐτῷ, οἷον ἀγαθῶν μὲν γιγνομένων ἡδέως μετέχειν, εἰ δέ τι

χαλεπὸν ὁρῷεν, οὐκ ἀνάγκην εἶναι κοινωνεῖν αὐτοῖς, etc.

These indirect intimations of the real temper even of the

philo-Spartan allies towards Sparta are very valuable when coming

from Xenophon, as they contradict all his partialities, and are

dropped here almost reluctantly, from the necessity of justifying

the conduct of Agesilaus in publishing a false proclamation to

his army.

To his enemies, now assembled in force on the plain of Korôneia,

the real issue of the battle of Knidus was doubtless made known,

spreading hope and cheerfulness through their ranks; though we are

not informed what interpretation they put upon the solar eclipse.

The army was composed of nearly the same contingents as those who

had recently fought at Corinth, except that we hear of the Ænianes

in place of the Malians; but probably each contingent was less

numerous, since there was still a necessity for occupying and

defending the camp near Corinth. Among the Athenian hoplites, who had

just been so roughly handled in the preceding battle, and who were

now drafted off by lot to march into Bœotia, against both a general

and an army of high reputation,—there prevailed much apprehension

and some reluctance; as we learn from one of them, Mantitheus, who

stood forward to volunteer his services, and who afterwards makes

just boast of it before an Athenian dikastery.[593] The Thebans and

Bœotians were probably in full force, and more numerous than at

Corinth, since it was their own country which was to be defended.

The camp was established in the territory of Korôneia, not far from

the great temple of Itonian Athênê, where the Pambœotia, or general

Bœotian assemblies were held, and where there also stood the trophy

erected for the great victory over Tolmides and the Athenians, about

fifty years before.[594] Between the two armies there was no great

difference of numbers, except as to the peltasts, who were more

numerous in the army of Agesilaus, though they do not seem to have

taken much part in the battle.

[593] Lysias, Orat. xvi, (pro Mantitheo) s. 20. φοβουμένων

ἁπάντων εἰκότως, etc.

[594] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19.

Having marched from Chæroneia, Agesilaus approached the plain of

Korôneia from the river Kephissus, while the Thebans met him from

the direction of Mount Helikon. He occupied the right wing of his

army, the Orchomenians being on the left, and the Cyreians with the

Asiatic allies in the centre. In the opposite line, the Thebans were

on the right, and the Argeians on the left. Both armies approached

slowly and in silence until they were separated only by an interval

of a furlong, at which moment the Thebans on the right began the

war-shout, and accelerated their march to a run,—the rest of the

line following their example. When they got within half a furlong

of the Lacedæmonians, the centre division of the latter, under

the command of Herippidas (comprising the Cyreians, with Xenophon

himself, and the Asiatic allies) started forward on their side, and

advanced at a run to meet them; seemingly, getting beyond their

own line,[595] and coming first to cross spears with the enemy’s

centre. After a sharp struggle, the division of Herippidas was

here victorious, and drove back its opponents. Agesilaus, on his

right, was yet more victorious, for the Argeians opposed to him,

fled without even crossing spears. These fugitives found safety

on the high ground of Mount Helikon. But on the other hand, the

Thebans on their own right completely beat back the Orchomenians,

and pursued them so far as to get to the baggage in the rear of the

army. Agesilaus, while his friends around were congratulating him

as conqueror, immediately wheeled round to complete his victory by

attacking the Thebans; who, on their side also faced about, and

prepared to fight their way, in close and deep order, to rejoin their

comrades on Helikon. Though Agesilaus might have let them pass, and

assailed them in the rear with greater safety and equal effect, he

preferred the more honorable victory of a conflict face to face.

Such is the coloring which his panegyrist, Xenophon,[596] puts upon

his manœuvre. Yet we may remark that if he had let the Thebans pass,

he could not have pursued them far, seeing that their own comrades

were at hand to sustain them,—and also that having never yet fought

against the Thebans, he had probably no adequate appreciation of

their prowess.

[595] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 17. ἀντεξέδραμον ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀγησιλάου

φάλαγγος, etc.

[596] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 19; Xen. Agesil. ii, 12.

The crash which now took place was something terrific beyond all

Grecian military experience,[597] leaving an indelible impression

upon Xenophon, who was personally engaged in it. The hoplites on

both sides came to the fiercest and closest bodily struggle, pushing

shields against each other, with all the weight of the incumbent mass

behind impelling forward the foremost ranks,—especially in the deep

order of the Thebans. The shields of the foremost combatants were

thus stove in, their spears broken, and each man was engaged in such

close embrace with his enemy, that the dagger was the only weapon

which he could use. There was no systematic shout, such as usually

marked the charge of a Grecian army; the silence was only broken by a

medley of furious exclamations and murmurs.[598] Agesilaus himself,

who was among the front ranks, and whose size and strength were by

no means on a level with his personal courage, had his body covered

with wounds from different weapons,[599]—was trodden down,—and only

escaped by the devoted courage of those fifty Spartan volunteers

who formed his body-guard. Partly from his wounds, partly from the

irresistible courage and stronger pressure of the Thebans, the

Spartans were at length compelled to give way, so far as to afford a

free passage to the former, who were thus enabled to march onward

and rejoin their comrades; not without sustaining some loss by

attacks on their rear.[600]

[597] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 16; Xen. Agesil. ii, 9.

Διηγήσομαι δὲ καὶ τὴν μάχην· καὶ γὰρ ἐγένετο οἵα οὐκ ἄλλη τῶν γ᾽

ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν.

[598] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 19; Xen. Agesil. ii, 12.

Καὶ συμβαλόντες τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐωθοῦντο, ἐμάχοντο, ἀπέκτεινον,

ἀπέθνησκον. Καὶ κραυγὴ μὲν οὐδεμία παρῆν, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ σιγή· φωνὴ

δέ τις ἦν τοιαύτη, οἵαν ὀργή τε καὶ μάχη παράσχοιτ᾽ ἄν.

[599] Xen. Agesil. ii, 13. Ὁ δὲ, καίπερ πολλὰ τραύματα ἔχων

πάντοσε καὶ παντοίοις ὅπλοις, etc.

Plutarch, Agesil. c. 18.

[600] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 19; Xen. Agesil. ii, 12.

Agesilaus thus remained master of the field of battle, having gained

a victory over his opponents taken collectively. But so far as

concerns the Thebans separately, he had not only gained no victory,

but had failed in his purpose of stopping their progress, and had

had the worst of the combat. His wounds having been dressed, he was

brought back on men’s shoulders to give his final orders, and was

then informed that a detachment of eighty Theban hoplites, left

behind by the rest, had taken refuge in the temple of Itonian Athênê

as suppliants. From generosity mingled with respect to the sanctity

of the spot, he commanded that they should be dismissed unhurt, and

then proceeded to give directions for the night-watch, as it was

already late. The field of battle presented a terrible spectacle;

Spartan and Theban dead lying intermingled, some yet grasping their

naked daggers, others pierced with the daggers of their enemies;

around, on the blood-stained ground, were seen broken spears, smashed

shields, swords and daggers scattered apart from their owners.[601]

He directed the Spartan and Theban dead to be collected in separate

heaps, and placed in safe custody for the night, in the interior

of his phalanx; the troops then took their supper, and rested for

the night. On the next morning, Gylis the Polemarch was ordered to

draw up the army in battle-array, to erect a trophy, and to offer

sacrifices of cheerfulness and thanksgiving, with the pipers solemnly

playing, according to Spartan fashion. Agesilaus was anxious to make

these demonstrations of victory as ostentatious as possible, because

he really doubted whether he had gained a victory. It was very

possible that the Thebans might feel confidence enough to renew the

attack, and try to recover the field of battle, with their own dead

upon it; which Agesilaus had, for that reason, caused to be collected

in a separate heap and placed within the Lacedæmonian line.[602] He

was, however, soon relieved from doubt by a herald coming from the

Thebans to solicit the customary truce for the burial of their dead;

the understood confession of defeat. The request was immediately

granted; each party paid the last solemnities to its own dead, and

the Spartan force was then withdrawn from Bœotia. Xenophon does not

state the loss on either side, but Diodorus gives it at six hundred

on the side of the confederates, three hundred and fifty on that of

the Lacedæmonians.[603]

[601] Xen. Agesil. ii, 14. Ἐπεί γε μὴν ἔληξεν ἡ μάχη, παρῆν δὴ

θεάσασθαι ἔνθα συνέπεσον ἀλλήλοις, τὴν μὲν γῆν αἵματι πεφυρμένην,

νεκροὺς δὲ κειμένους φιλίους καὶ πολεμίους μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων, ἀσπίδας

δὲ διατεθρυμμένας, δόρατα συντεθραυσμένα, ἐγχειρίδια γυμνὰ κουλεῶν

τὰ μὲν χαμαί, τὰ δ᾽ ἐν σώμασι, τὰ δ᾽ ἔτι μετὰ χειρός.

[602] Xen. Agesil. ii, 15. Τότε μὲν οὖν (καὶ γὰρ ἦν ἤδη ὀψέ)

συνελκύσαντες ~τοὺς τῶν πολεμίων νεκροὺς~ εἴσω φάλαγγος,

ἐδειπνοποιήσαντο καὶ ἐκοιμήθησαν.

Schneider in his note on this passage, as well as ad. Xen.

Hellen. iv, 3, 21—condemns the expression τῶν πολεμίων as

spurious and unintelligible. But in my judgment, these words hear

a plain and appropriate meaning, which I have endeavored to give

in the text. Compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19.

[603] Diodor. xiv, 84.

Disqualified as he was by his wounds for immediate action, Agesilaus

caused himself to be carried to Delphi, where the Pythian games were

at that moment going on. He here offered to Apollo the tithe of the

booty acquired during his two years’ campaigns in Asia; a tithe

equal to one hundred talents.[604] Meanwhile the polemarch Gylis

conducted the army first into Phokis, next on a predatory excursion

into the Lokrian territory, where the nimble attack of the Lokrian

light troops, amidst hilly ground, inflicted upon his troops a severe

check, and cost him his life. After this the contingents in the army

were dismissed to their respective homes, and Agesilaus himself, when

tolerably recovered, sailed with the Peloponnesians homeward from

Delphi across the Corinthian Gulf.[605] He was received at Sparta

with every demonstration of esteem and gratitude, which was still

farther strengthened by his exemplary simplicity and exact observance

of the public discipline; an exactness not diminished either by long

absence or enjoyment of uncontrolled ascendency. From this time

forward he was the effective leader of Spartan policy, enjoying an

influence greater than had ever fallen to the lot of any king before.

His colleague, Agesipolis, both young and of feeble character, was

won over by his judicious and conciliatory behavior, into the most

respectful deference.[606]

[604] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 21; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 19. The latter

says—εἰς Δελφοὺς ἀπεκομίσθη ~Πυθίων ἀγομένων~, etc. Manso, Dr.

Arnold, and others, contest the accuracy of Plutarch in this

assertion respecting the time of year at which the Pythian games

were celebrated, upon grounds which seem to me very insufficient.

[605] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 22, 23; iv. 4, 1.

[606] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 17, 20; Xen. Hellen. v, 3, 20.

Three great battles had thus been fought in the space of little

more than a month (July and August)—those of Corinth, Knidus,

and Korôneia; the first and third on land, the second at sea, as

described in my last chapter. In each of the two land-battles the

Lacedæmonians had gained a victory; they remained masters of the

field, and were solicited by the enemy to grant the burial-truce.

But if we inquire what results these victories had produced, the

answer must be that both were totally barren. The position of Sparta

in Greece as against her enemies had undergone no improvement. In

the battle of Corinth, her soldiers had indeed manifested signal

superiority, and acquired much honor. But at the field of Korôneia,

the honor of the day was rather on the side of the Thebans, who broke

through the most strenuous opposition, and carried their point of

joining their allies. And the purpose of Agesilaus (ordered by the

ephor Diphridas) to invade Bœotia, completely failed.[607] Instead of

advancing, he withdrew from Korôneia, and returned to Peloponnesus

across the gulf from Delphi; which he might have done just as well

without fighting this murderous and hardly contested battle. Even the

narrative of Xenophon, deeply colored as it is both by his sympathies

and his antipathies, indicates to us that the predominant impression

carried off by every one from the field of Korôneia was that of the

tremendous force and obstinacy of the Theban hoplites,—a foretaste

of what was to come at Leuktra!

[607] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 17. Cornelius Nepos, Agesil. c. 4.

“Obsistere ei conati sunt Athenienses et Bœoti,” etc. They

_succeeded_ in barring his way, and compelling him to retreat.

If the two land-victories of Sparta were barren of results, the case

was far otherwise with her naval defeat at Knidus. That defeat was

pregnant with consequences following in rapid succession, and of

the most disastrous character. As with Athens at Ægospotami,—the

loss of her fleet, serious as that was, served only as the

signal for countless following losses. Pharnabazus and Konon,

with their victorious fleet, sailed from island to island, and

from one continental seaport to another, in the Ægean, to expel

the Lacedæmonian harmosts, and terminate the empire of Sparta. So

universal was the odium which it had inspired, that the task was

found easy beyond expectation. Conscious of their unpopularity, the

harmosts in almost all the towns, on both sides of the Hellespont,

deserted their posts and fled, on the mere news of the battle of

Knidus.[608] Everywhere Pharnabazus and Konon found themselves

received as liberators, and welcomed with presents of hospitality.

They pledged themselves not to introduce any foreign force or

governor, nor to fortify any separate citadel, but to guarantee

to each city its own genuine autonomy. This policy was adopted

by Pharnabazus at the urgent representation of Konon, who warned

him that if he manifested any design of reducing the cities to

subjection, he would find them all his enemies; that each of them

severally would cost him a long siege; and that a combination would

ultimately be formed against him. Such liberal and judicious ideas,

when seen to be sincerely acted upon, produced a strong feeling of

friendship and even of gratitude, so that the Lacedæmonian maritime

empire was dissolved without a blow, by the almost spontaneous

movements of the cities themselves. Though the victorious fleet

presented itself in many different places, it was nowhere called

upon to put down resistance, or to undertake a single siege.

Kos, Nisyra, Teos, Chios, Erythræ, Ephesus, Mitylênê, Samos, all

declared themselves independent, under the protection of the new

conquerors.[609] Pharnabazus presently disembarked at Ephesus and

marched by land northward to his own satrapy; leaving a fleet of

forty triremes under the command of Konon.

[608] Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 1-5.

[609] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 1-3; Diodor. xiv, 84. About Samos, xiv,

97.

Compare also the speech of Derkyllidas to the Abydenes (Xen.

Hellen. iv, 8, 4)—Ὅσῳ δὲ μᾶλλον αἱ ἄλλαι πόλεις ξὺν τῇ τύχῃ

ἀπεστράφησαν ἡμῶν, τοσούτῳ ὄντως ἡ ὑμετέρα πιστότης μείζων φανείη

ἄν, etc.

To this general burst of anti-Spartan feeling, Abydos, on the Asiatic

side of the Hellespont, formed the solitary exception. That town,

steady in hostility to Athens,[610] had been the great military

station of Sparta for her northern Asiatic warfare, during the last

twenty years. It was in the satrapy of Pharnabazus, and had been

made the chief place of arms by Derkyllidas and Agesilaus, for

their warfare against that satrap as well as for the command of the

strait. Accordingly, while it was a main object with Pharnabazus to

acquire possession of Abydos,—there was nothing which the Abydenes

dreaded so much as to become subject to him. In this view they

were decidedly disposed to cling to Lacedæmonian protection; and

it happened by a fortunate accident for Sparta, that the able and

experienced Derkyllidas was harmost in the town at the moment of

the battle of Knidus. Having fought in the battle of Corinth, he

had been sent to announce the news to Agesilaus, whom he had met on

his march at Amphipolis, and who had sent him forward into Asia to

communicate the victory to the allied cities;[611] neither of them at

that moment anticipating the great maritime defeat then impending.

The presence in Abydos of such an officer, who had already acquired

a high military reputation in that region, and was at marked enmity

with Pharnabazus,—combined with the standing apprehensions of the

Abydenes,—was now the means of saving a remnant at least of maritime

ascendency to Sparta. During the general alarm which succeeded the

battle of Knidus, when the harmosts were everywhere taking flight,

and when anti-Spartan manifestations often combined with internal

revolutions to overthrow the dekarchs or their substitutes, were

spreading from city to city,—Derkyllidas assembled the Abydenes,

heartened them up against the reigning contagion, and exhorted them

to earn the gratitude of Sparta by remaining faithful to her while

others were falling off; assuring them that she would still be found

capable of giving them protection. His exhortations were listened

to with favor. Abydos remained attached to Sparta, was put in a

good state of defence, and became the only harbor of safety for the

fugitive harmosts out of the other cities, Asiatic and European.

[610] Ἐκ γὰρ Ἀβύδου, τῆς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ὑμῖν ἔχθρας—says

Demosthenes in the Athenian assembly (cont. Aristokrat. c. 39, p.

672; compare c. 52, p. 688).

[611] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 2.

Having secured his hold upon Abydos, Derkyllidas crossed the strait

to make sure also of the strong place of Sestos, on the European

side, in the Thracian Chersonese.[612] In that fertile peninsula

there had been many new settlers, who had come in and acquired land

under the Lacedæmonian supremacy, especially since the building of

the cross-wall by Derkyllidas to defend the isthmus against Thracian

invasion. By means of these settlers, dependent on Sparta for the

security of their tenures,—and of the refugees from various cities

all concentrated under his protection,—Derkyllidas maintained his

position effectively both at Abydos and at Sestos; defying the

requisition of Pharnabazus that he should forthwith evacuate them.

The satrap threatened war, and actually ravaged the lands around

Abydos,—but without any result. His wrath against the Lacedæmonians,

already considerable, was so aggravated by disappointment when he

found that he could not yet expel them from his satrapy, that he

resolved to act against them with increased energy, and even to

strike a blow at them near their own home. For this purpose he

transmitted orders to Konon to prepare a commanding naval force for

the ensuing spring, and in the mean time to keep both Abydos and

Sestos under blockade.[613]

[612] Lysander, after the victory of Ægospotami and the expulsion

of the Athenians from Sestos, had assigned the town and district

as a settlement for the pilots and Keleustæ aboard his fleet. But

the ephors are said to have reversed the assignment, and restored

the town to the Sestians (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14). Probably,

however, the new settlers would remain in part upon the lands

vacated by the expelled Athenians.

[613] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 4-6.

As soon as spring arrived, Pharnabazus embarked on board a powerful

fleet equipped by Konon; directing his course to Melos, to various

islands among the Cyclades, and lastly to the coast of Peloponnesus.

They here spent some time on the coast of Laconia and Messenia,

disembarking at several points to ravage the country. They next

landed on the island of Kythêra, which they captured, granting

safe retirement to the Lacedæmonian garrison, and leaving in the

island a garrison under the Athenian Nikophêmus. Quitting then the

harborless, dangerous, and ill-provided coast of Laconia, they sailed

up the Saronic gulf to the isthmus of Corinth. Here they found the

confederates,—Corinthian, Bœotian, Athenian, etc., carrying on war

with Corinth as their central post, against the Lacedæmonians at

Sikyon. The line across the isthmus from Lechæum to Kenchreæ (the

two ports of Corinth) was now made good by a defensive system of

operations, so as to confine the Lacedæmonians within Peloponnesus;

just as Athens, prior to her great losses in 446 B.C., while

possessing both Megara and Pegæ, had been able to maintain the inland

road midway between them, where it crosses the high and difficult

crest of Mount Geraneia, thus occupying the only three roads by which

a Lacedæmonian army could march from the isthmus of Corinth into

Attica or Bœotia.[614] Pharnabazus communicated in the most friendly

manner with the allies, assured them of his strenuous support against

Sparta, and left with them a considerable sum of money.[615]

[614] See Sir William Gell’s Itinerary of Greece, p. 4. Ernst

Curtius—Peloponnesos—p. 25, 26, and Thucyd. i, 108.

[615] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 7, 8; Diodor. xiv, 84.

The appearance of a Persian satrap with a Persian fleet, as master

of the Peloponnesian sea and the Saronic Gulf, was a phenomenon

astounding to Grecian eyes. And if it was not equally offensive to

Grecian sentiment, this was in itself a melancholy proof of the

degree to which Pan-hellenic patriotism had been stifled by the

Peloponnesian war and the Spartan empire. No Persian tiara had been

seen near the Saronic Gulf since the battle of Salamis; nor could

anything short of the intense personal wrath of Pharnabazus against

the Lacedæmonians, and his desire to revenge upon them the damage

inflicted by Derkyllidas and Agesilaus, have brought him now so far

away from his own satrapy. It was this wrathful feeling of which

Konon took advantage to procure from him a still more important boon.

Since 404 B.C., a space of eleven years, Athens had continued

without any walls around her seaport town Peiræus, and without any

Long Walls to connect her city with Peiræus. To this state she had

been condemned by the sentence of her enemies, in the full knowledge

that she could have little trade,—few ships either armed or

mercantile,—poor defence even against pirates, and no defence at all

against aggression from the mistress of the sea. Konon now entreated

Pharnabazus, who was about to go home, to leave the fleet under his

command, and to permit him to use it in rebuilding the fortifications

of Peiræus as well as the Long Walls of Athens. While he engaged to

maintain the fleet by contributions from the islands, he assured the

satrap that no blow could be inflicted upon Sparta so destructive

or so mortifying, as the renovation of Athens and Peiræus with their

complete and connected fortifications. Sparta would thus be deprived

of the most important harvest which she had reaped from the long

struggle of the Peloponnesian war. Indignant as he now was against

the Lacedæmonians, Pharnabazus sympathized cordially with these

plans, and on departing not only left the fleet under the command

of Konon, but also furnished him with a considerable sum of money

towards the expense of the fortifications.[616]

[616] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 9, 10.

Konon betook himself to the work energetically and without delay.

He had quitted Athens in 407 B.C., as one of the joint admirals

nominated after the disgrace of Alkibiades. He had parted with his

countrymen finally at the catastrophe of Ægospotami in 405 B.C.,

preserving the miserable fraction of eight or nine ships out of that

noble fleet which otherwise would have passed entire into the hands

of Lysander. He now returned, in 393 B.C., as a second Themistokles,

the deliverer of his country, and the restorer of her lost strength

and independence. All hands were set to work; carpenters and masons

being hired with the funds furnished by Pharnabazus, to complete

the fortifications as quickly as possible. The Bœotians and other

neighbors lent their aid zealously as volunteers,[617]—the same who

eleven years before had danced to the sound of joyful music when

the former walls were demolished; so completely had the feelings

of Greece altered since that period. By such hearty coöperation

the work was finished during the course of the present summer and

autumn without any opposition; and Athens enjoyed again her fortified

Peiræus and harbor, with a pair of Long Walls, straight and parallel,

joining it securely to the city. The third, or Phalêric Wall (a

single wall stretching from Athens to Phalêrum), which had existed

down to the capture of the city by Lysander, was not restored; nor

was it indeed by any means necessary to the security either of the

city or of the port. Having thus given renewed life and security

to Peiræus, Konon commemorated his great naval victory by a golden

wreath in the acropolis, as well as by the erection of a temple in

Peiræus to the honor of the Knidian Aphroditê, who was worshipped

at Knidus with peculiar devotion by the local population.[618]

He farther celebrated the completion of the walls by a splendid

sacrifice and festival banquet. And the Athenian people not only

inscribed on a pillar a public vote gratefully recording the exploits

of Konon, but also erected a statue to his honor.[619]

[617] Xen. Hellen. iv. 8, 10; Diodor. xiv. 85.

Cornelius Nepos (Conon, c. 4) mentions fifty talents as a sum

received by Konon from Pharnabazus as a present, and devoted by

him to this public work. This is not improbable; but the total

sum contributed by the satrap towards the fortifications must,

probably, have been much greater.

[618] Demosthen. cont. Androtion. p. 616. c. 21. Pausanias (i, 1,

3) still saw this temple in Peiræus—very near to the sea; five

hundred and fifty years afterwards.

[619] Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 16. p. 477, 478; Athenæus, i,

3; Cornelius Nepos, Conon, c. 4.

The importance of this event in reference to the future history of

Athens was unspeakable. Though it did not restore to her either

her former navy, or her former empire, it reconstituted her as a

city, not only self-determining, but even partially ascendant. It

reanimated her, if not into the Athens of Perikles, at least into

that of Isokrates and Demosthenes; it imparted to her a second

fill of strength, dignity, and commercial importance, during the

half century destined to elapse before she was finally overwhelmed

by the superior military force of Macedon. Those who recollect

the extraordinary stratagem whereby Themistokles had contrived

(eighty-five years before) to accomplish the fortification of Athens,

in spite of the base but formidable jealousy of Sparta and her

Peloponnesian allies, will be aware how much the consummation of the

Themistoklean project had depended upon accident. Now, also, Konon

in his restoration was favored by unusual combinations, such as no

one could have predicted. That Pharnabazus should conceive the idea

of coming over himself to Peloponnesus with a fleet of the largest

force, was a most unexpected contingency. He was influenced neither

by attachment to Athens, nor seemingly by considerations of policy,

though the proceeding was one really conducive to the interests

of Persian power,—but simply by his own violent personal wrath

against the Lacedæmonians. And this wrath probably would have been

satisfied, if, after the battle of Knidus, he could have cleared his

own satrapy of them completely. It was his vehement impatience, when

he found himself unable to expel his old enemy, Derkyllidas, from the

important position of Abydos, which chiefly spurred him on to take

revenge on Sparta in her own waters. Nothing less than the satrap’s

personal presence would have placed at the disposal of Konon either

a sufficient naval force, or sufficient funds for the erection of

the new walls, and the defiance of all impediment from Sparta. So

strangely did events thus run, that the energy, by which Derkyllidas

preserved Abydos, brought upon Sparta, indirectly, the greater

mischief of the new Kononian walls. It would have been better for

Sparta that Pharnabazus should at once have recovered Abydos as well

as the rest of his satrapy; in which case he would have had no wrongs

remaining unavenged to incense him, and would have kept on his own

side of the Ægean; feeding Konon with a modest squadron sufficient

to keep the Lacedæmonian navy from again becoming formidable on the

Asiatic side, but leaving the walls of Peiræus (if we may borrow

an expression of Plato) “to continue asleep in the bosom of the

earth.”[620]

[620] Plato, Legg. vi, p. 778; καθεύδειν ἐᾷν ἐν τῇ γῇ κατακείμενα

τὰ τείχη, etc.

But the presence of Konon with his powerful fleet was not the only

condition indispensable to the accomplishment of this work. It

was requisite further, that the interposition of Sparta should be

kept off, not merely by sea, but by land, and that, too, during

all the number of months that the walls were in progress. Now the

barrier against her on land was constituted by the fact, that the

confederate force held the cross line within the isthmus from Lechæum

to Kenchreæ, with Corinth as a centre.[621] But they were unable

to sustain this line even through the ensuing year,—during which

Sparta, aided by dissensions at Corinth, broke through it, as will

appear in the next chapter. Had she been able to break through it

while the fortifications of Athens were yet incomplete, she would

have deemed no effort too great to effect an entrance into Attica and

interrupt the work, in which she might very probably have succeeded.

Here, then, was the second condition, which was realized during

the summer and autumn of 393 B.C., but which did not continue to

be realized longer. So fortunate was it for Athens, that the two

conditions were fulfilled both together during this particular year!

[621] The importance of maintaining these lines, as a protection

to Athens against invasion from Sparta, is illustrated in Xen.

Hellen. v, 4, 19, and Andokides, Or. iii, De Pace, s. 26.