Sparta,—in an age of the world when diplomatic residents were as
yet unknown. A Syracusan merchant named Herodas, having visited
the Phœnician ports for trading purposes, brought back to Sparta
intelligence of the preparations which he had seen, sufficient to
excite much uneasiness. The Spartans were taking counsel among
themselves, and communicating with their neighboring allies, when
Agesilaus, at the instance of Lysander, stood forward as a volunteer
to solicit the command of a land-force for the purpose of attacking
the Persians in Asia. He proposed to take with him only thirty
full Spartan citizens or peers, as a sort of Board or Council of
Officers; two thousand Neodamodes or enfranchised Helots, whom the
ephors were probably glad to send away, and who would be selected
from the bravest and most formidable; and six thousand hoplites from
the land-allies, to whom the prospect of a rich service against
Asiatic enemies would be tempting. Of these thirty Spartans, Lysander
intended to be the leader; and thus, reckoning on his preëstablished
influence over Agesilaus, to exercise the real command himself,
without the name. He had no serious fear of the Persian arms, either
by land or sea. He looked upon the announcement of the Phœnician
fleet to be an empty threat, as it had so often proved in the mouth
of Tissaphernes during the late war; while the Cyreian expedition
had inspired him further with ardent hopes of another successful
Anabasis, or conquering invasion of Persia from the sea-coast
inwards. But he had still more at heart to employ his newly-acquired
ascendency in reëstablishing everywhere the dekarchies, which had
excited such intolerable hatred and exercised so much oppression,
that even the ephors had refused to lend positive aid in upholding
them, so that they had been in several places broken up or
modified.[470] If the ambition of Agesilaus was comparatively less
stained by personal and factious antipathies, and more Pan-hellenic
in its aim, than that of Lysander,—it was at the same time yet more
unmeasured in respect to victory over the Great King, whom he dreamed
of dethroning, or at least of expelling from Asia Minor and the
coast.[471] So powerful was the influence exercised by the Cyreian
expedition over the schemes and imagination of energetic Greeks: so
sudden was the outburst of ambition in the mind of Agesilaus, for
which no one before had given him credit.
[470] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 2.
[471] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 1. ἐλπίδας ἔχοντα μεγάλας αἱρήσειν
βασιλέα, etc. Compare iv, 2, 3.
Xen. Agesilaus, i, 36. ἐπινοῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων καταλύσειν τὴν ἐπὶ τὴν
Ἑλλάδα στρατεύσασαν πρότερον ἀρχήν, etc.
Though this plan was laid by two of the ablest men in Greece, it
turned out to be rash and improvident, so far as the stability of the
Lacedæmonian empire was concerned. That empire ought to have been
made sure by sea, where its real danger lay, before attempts were
made to extend it by new inland acquisitions. And except for purposes
of conquest, there was no need of farther reinforcements in Asia
Minor; since Derkyllidas was already there with a force competent
to make head against the satraps. Nevertheless, the Lacedæmonians
embraced the plan eagerly; the more so, as envoys were sent from many
of the subject cities, by the partisans of Lysander and in concert
with him, to entreat that Agesilaus might be placed at the head of
the expedition, with as large a force as he required.[472]
[472] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 5.
No difficulty probably was found in levying the proposed number
of men from the allies, since there was great promise of plunder
for the soldiers in Asia. But the altered position of Sparta with
respect to her most powerful allies was betrayed by the refusal of
Thebes, Corinth, and Athens to take any part in the expedition. The
refusal of Corinth, indeed, was excused professedly on the ground
of a recent inauspicious conflagration of one of the temples in the
city; and that of Athens, on the plea of weakness and exhaustion not
yet repaired. But the latter, at least, had already begun to conceive
some hope from the projects of Konon.[473]
[473] Xen. Hellen. iii, 5, 5; Pausan. iii, 9, 1.
The mere fact that a king of Sparta was about to take the command
and pass into Asia, lent peculiar importance to the enterprise. The
Spartan kings, in their function of leaders of Greece, conceived
themselves to have inherited the sceptre of Agamemnon and
Orestes;[474] and Agesilaus, especially, assimilated his expedition
to a new Trojan war,—an effort of united Greece, for the purpose of
taking vengeance on the common Asiatic enemy of the Hellenic name.
The sacrifices having been found favorable, Agesilaus took measures
for the transit of the troops from various ports to Ephesus. But
he himself, with one division, touched in his way at Geræstus, the
southern point of Eubœa; wishing to cross from thence and sacrifice
at Aulis, (the port of Bœotia nearly opposite to Geræstus on the
other side of the strait) where Agamemnon had offered his memorable
sacrifice immediately previous to departure for Troy. It appears
that he both went to the spot, and began the sacrifice, without
asking permission from the Thebans; moreover, he was accompanied
by his own prophet, who conducted the solemnities in a manner not
consistent with the habitual practice of the temple or chapel of
Artemis at Aulis. On both these grounds, the Thebans, resenting the
proceeding as an insult, sent a body of armed men, and compelled
him to desist from the sacrifice.[475] Not taking part themselves
in the expedition, they probably considered that the Spartan king
was presumptuous in assuming to himself the Pan-hellenic character
of a second Agamemnon; and they thus inflicted a humiliation which
Agesilaus never forgave.
[474] Herodot. i, 68; vii, 159; Pausan. iii, 16, 6.
[475] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 3, 4; iii, 5, 5; Plutarch, Agesilaus,
c. 6; Pausan. iii, 9, 2.
Agesilaus seems to have reached Asia about the time when Derkyllidas
had recently concluded his last armistice with Tissaphernes and
Pharnabazus; an armistice, intended to allow time for mutual
communication both with Sparta and the Persian court. On being asked
by the satrap what was his purpose in coming, Agesilaus merely
renewed the demand which had before been made by Derkyllidas—of
autonomy for the Asiatic Greeks. Tissaphernes replied by proposing a
continuation of the same armistice, until he could communicate with
the Persian court,—adding that he hoped to be empowered to grant the
demand. A fresh armistice was accordingly sworn to on both sides,
for three months; Derkyllidas (who with his army came now under the
command of Agesilaus) and Herippidas being sent to the satrap to
receive his oath, and take oaths to him in return.[476]
[476] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 5, 6; Xen. Agesilaus, i, 10.
The term of three months is specified only in the latter passage.
The former armistice of Derkyllidas had probably not expired when
Agesilaus first arrived.
While the army was thus condemned to temporary inaction at Ephesus,
the conduct and position of Lysander began to excite intolerable
jealousy in the superior officers; and most of all Agesilaus. So
great and established was the reputation of Lysander,—whose statue
had been erected at Ephesus itself in the temple of Artemis,[477] as
well as in many other cities,—that all the Asiatic Greeks looked
upon him as the real chief of the expedition. That he should be
real chief, under the nominal command of another, was nothing more
than what had happened before, in the year wherein he gained the
great victory of Ægospotami,—the Lacedæmonians having then also
sent him out in the ostensible capacity of secretary to the admiral
Arakus, in order to save the inviolability of their own rule, that
the same man should not serve twice as admiral.[478] It was through
the instigation of Lysander, and with a view to his presence,
that the decemvirs and other partisans in the subject cities had
sent to Sparta to petition for Agesilaus; a prince as yet untried
and unknown. So that Lysander,—taking credit, with truth, for
having ensured to Agesilaus first the crown, next this important
appointment,—intended for himself, and was expected by others, to
exercise a fresh turn of command, and to renovate in every town
the discomfited or enfeebled dekarchies. Numbers of his partisans
came to Ephesus to greet his arrival, and a crowd of petitioners
were seen following his steps everywhere; while Agesilaus himself
appeared comparatively neglected. Moreover, Lysander resumed all
that insolence of manner which he had contracted during his former
commands, and which on this occasion gave the greater offence, since
the manner of Agesilaus was both courteous and simple in a peculiar
degree.[479]
[477] Pausan. vi, 3, 6.
[478] Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 7. This rule does not seem to have been
adhered to afterwards. Lysander was sent out again as commander
in 403 B.C. It is possible, indeed, that he may have been again
sent out as nominal secretary to some other person named as
commander.
[479] Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 7.
The thirty Spartan counsellors, over whom Lysander had been named
to preside, finding themselves neither consulted by him, nor
solicited by others, were deeply dissatisfied. Their complaints
helped to encourage Agesilaus, who was still more keenly wounded
in his own personal dignity, to put forth a resolute and imperious
strength of will, such as he had not before been known to possess.
He successively rejected every petition preferred to him by or
through Lysander; a systematic purpose which, though never formally
announced,[480] was presently discerned by the petitioners, by the
Thirty, and by Lysander himself. The latter thus found himself not
merely disappointed in all his calculations, but humiliated to
excess, though without any tangible ground of complaint. He was
forced to warn his partisans, that his intervention was an injury
and not a benefit to them; that they must desist from obsequious
attentions to him, and must address themselves directly to Agesilaus.
With that prince he also remonstrated on his own account,—“Truly,
Agesilaus, you know how to degrade your friends.”—“Ay, to be sure
(was the reply), those among them who want to appear greater than I
am; but such as seek to uphold me, I should be ashamed if I did not
know how to repay with due honor.”—Lysander was constrained to admit
the force of this reply, and to request, as the only means of escape
from present and palpable humiliation, that he might be sent on some
mission apart; engaging to serve faithfully in whatever duty he might
be employed.[481]
[480] The sarcastic remarks which Plutarch ascribes to Agesilaus,
calling Lysander “my meat-distributor” (κρεοδαίτην), are not
warranted by Xenophon, and seem not to be probable under the
circumstances (Plutarch, Lysand. c. 23; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 8).
[481] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 7-10; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 7-8;
Plutarch, Lysand. c. 23.
It is remarkable that in the Opusculum of Xenophon, a special
Panegyric called _Agesilaus_, not a word is said about this
highly characteristic proceeding between Agesilaus and Lysander
at Ephesus; nor indeed is the name of Lysander once mentioned.
This proposition, doubtless even more agreeable to Agesilaus than to
himself, being readily assented to, he was despatched on a mission
to the Hellespont. Faithful to his engagement of forgetting past
offences and serving with zeal, he found means to gain over a Persian
grandee named Spithridates, who had received some offence from
Pharnabazus. Spithridates revolted openly, carrying a regiment of
two hundred horse to join Agesilaus; who was thus enabled to inform
himself fully about the satrapy of Pharnabazus, comprising the
territory called Phrygia, in the neighborhood of the Propontis and
the Hellespont.[482]
[482] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 10.
The army under Tissaphernes had been already powerful at the moment
when his timidity induced him to conclude the first armistice with
Derkyllidas. But additional reinforcements, received since the
conclusion of the second and more recent armistice, had raised him
to such an excess of confidence, that even before the stipulated
three months had expired, he sent to insist on the immediate
departure of Agesilaus from Asia, and to proclaim war forthwith,
if such departure were delayed. While this message, accompanied by
formidable reports of the satrap’s force, filled the army at Ephesus
with mingled alarm and indignation, Agesilaus accepted the challenge
with cheerful readiness; sending word back that he thanked the satrap
for perjuring himself in so flagrant a manner, as to set the gods
against him and ensure their favor to the Greek side.[483] Orders
were forthwith given, and contingents summoned from the Asiatic
Greeks, for a forward movement southward, to cross the Mæander, and
attack Tissaphernes in Karia, where he usually resided. The cities on
the route were required to provide magazines, so that Tissaphernes,
fully anticipating attack in this direction, caused his infantry to
cross into Karia, for the purpose of acting on the defensive; while
he kept his numerous cavalry in the plain of the Mæander, with a
view to overwhelm Agesilaus, who had no cavalry, in his march over
that level territory towards the Karian hills and rugged ground. But
the Lacedæmonian king, having put the enemy on this false scent,
suddenly turned his march northward towards Phrygia and the satrapy
of Pharnabazus. Tissaphernes took no pains to aid his brother satrap,
who on his side had made few preparations for defence. Accordingly
Agesilaus, finding little or no resistance, took many towns and
villages, and collected abundance of provisions, plunder, and slaves.
Profiting by the guidance of the revolted Spithridates, and marching
as little as possible over the plains, he carried on lucrative
and unopposed incursions as far as the neighborhood of Daskylium,
the residence of the satrap himself, near the Propontis. Near the
satrapic residence, however, his small body of cavalry, ascending an
eminence, came suddenly upon an equal detachment of Persian cavalry,
under Rhathines and Bagæus; who attacked them vigorously, and drove
them back with some loss, until they were protected by Agesilaus
himself coming up with the hoplites. The effect of such a check (and
there were probably others of the same kind, though Xenophon does
not specify them) on the spirits of the army was discouraging. On
the next morning, the sacrifices being found unfavorable for farther
advance, Agesilaus gave orders for retreating towards the sea. He
reached Ephesus about the close of autumn; resolved to employ the
winter in organizing a more powerful cavalry, which experience proved
to be indispensable.[484]
[483] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 11, 12; Xen. Agesil. i, 12-14;
Plutarch, Agesil. c. 9.
[484] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 13-15; Xen. Agesil. i, 23. Ἐπεὶ μέντοι
οὐδὲ ἐν τῇ Φρυγίᾳ ἀνὰ τὰ πεδία ἐδύνατο στρατεύεσθαι, διὰ τὴν
Φαρναβάζου ἱππείαν, etc.
Plutarch, Agesil. c. 9.
These military operations of Agesilaus are loosely adverted to in
the early part of c. 79 of the fourteenth Book of Diodorus.
This autumnal march through Phrygia was more lucrative than glorious.
Yet it enables Xenophon to bring to view different merits of his
hero Agesilaus; in doing which he exhibits to us ancient warfare
and Asiatic habits on a very painful side. In common both with
Kallikratidas and Lysander, though not with the ordinary Spartan
commanders, Agesilaus was indifferent to the acquisition of money for
himself. But he was not the less anxious to enrich his friends, and
would sometimes connive at unwarrantable modes of acquisition for
their benefit. Deserters often came in to give information of rich
prizes or valuable prisoners; which advantages, if he had chosen,
he might have appropriated to himself. But he made it a practice
to throw both the booty and the honor in the way of some favorite
officer; just as we have seen (in a former chapter) that Xenophon
himself was allowed by the army to capture Asidates and enjoy a large
portion of his ransom.[485] Again, when the army in the course of
its march was at a considerable distance from the sea, and appeared
to be advancing farther inland, the authorized auctioneers, whose
province it was to sell the booty, found the buyers extremely slack.
It was difficult to keep or carry what was bought, and opportunity
for resale did not seem at hand. Agesilaus, while he instructed
the auctioneers to sell upon credit, without insisting on ready
money,—at the same time gave private hints to a few friends that he
was very shortly about to return to the sea. The friends thus warned,
bidding for the plunder on credit and purchasing at low prices, were
speedily enabled to dispose of it again at a seaport, with large
profits.[486]
[485] Xen. Agesil. i, 19; Xen. Anabas. vii, 8, 20-23; Plutarch,
Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p 809, B. See above, Chapter lxxii, of
this History.
[486] Xen. Agesil. i, 18. πάντες παμπλήθη χρήματα ἔλαβον.
We are not surprised to hear that such lucrative graces procured for
Agesilaus many warm admirers; though the eulogies of Xenophon ought
to have been confined to another point in his conduct, now to be
mentioned. Agesilaus, while securing for his army the plunder of the
country over which he carried his victorious arms, took great pains
to prevent both cruelty and destruction of property. When any town
surrendered to him on terms, his exactions were neither ruinous nor
grossly humiliating.[487] Amidst all the plunder realized, too, the
most valuable portion was the adult natives of both sexes, hunted
down and brought in by the predatory light troops of the army, to
be sold as slaves. Agesilaus was vigilant in protecting these poor
victims from ill-usage; inculcating upon his soldiers the duty, “not
of punishing them like wrong-doers, but simply of keeping them under
guard as men.[488]” It was the practice of the poorer part of the
native population often to sell their little children for exportation
to travelling slave-merchants, from inability to maintain them. The
children thus purchased, if they promised to be handsome, were often
mutilated, and fetched large prices as eunuchs, to supply the large
demand for the harems and religious worship of many Asiatic towns.
But in their haste to get out of the way of a plundering army, these
slave-merchants were forced often to leave by the way-side the little
children whom they had purchased, exposed to the wolves, the dogs, or
starvation. In this wretched condition, they were found by Agesilaus
on his march. His humane disposition prompted him to see them carried
to a place of safety, where he gave them in charge of those old
natives whom age and feebleness had caused to be left behind as
not worth carrying off. By such active kindness, rare, indeed, in a
Grecian general, towards the conquered, he earned the gratitude of
the captives, and the sympathies of every one around.[489]
[487] Xen. Agesil. i, 20-22.
[488] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 19; Xen. Agesil. i, 28. τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν
λῃστῶν ἁλισκομένους βαρβάρους.
So the word λῃστὴς, used in reference to the fleet, means the
commander of a predatory vessel or privateer (Xen. Hellen. ii, 1,
30).
[489] Xen. Agesil. i, 21. Καὶ πολλάκις μὲν προηγόρευε τοῖς
στρατιώταις ~τοὺς ἁλισκομένους μὴ ὡς ἀδίκους τιμωρεῖσθαι,
ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἀνθρώπους ὄντας φυλάσσειν~. Πολλάκις δὲ, ὅποτε
μεταστρατοπεδεύοιτο, ~εἰ αἴσθοιτο καταλελειμμένα παιδάρια μικρὰ
ἐμπόρων, (ἃ πολλοὶ ἐπώλουν, διὰ τὸ νομίζειν μὴ δύνασθαι ἂν φέρειν
αὐτὰ καὶ τρέφειν)~ ἐπεμέλετο καὶ τούτων, ὅπως συγκομίζοιτό ποι·
τοῖς δ᾽ αὖ διὰ γῆρας καταλελειμμένοις αἰχμαλώτοις προσέταττεν
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι αὐτῶν, ὡς μήτε ὑπὸ κυνῶν, μήθ᾽ ὑπὸ λύκων,
διαφθείροιντο. Ὥστε οὐ μόνον οἱ πυνθανόμενοι ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ
αὐτοὶ οἱ ἁλισκόμενοι εὐμενεῖς αὐτῷ ἐγίγνοντο.
Herodotus affirms that the Thracians also sold their children for
exportation,—πωλεῦσι τὰ τέχνα ἐπ᾽ ἐξαγωγῇ (Herod. v, 6): compare
Philostratus, Vit. Apollon. viii, 7-12, p. 346; and Ch. xvi, Vol.
III, p. 216 of this History.
Herodotus mentions the Chian merchant Panionius (like the
“_Mitylenæus mango_” in Martial,—“Sed Mitylenæi roseus mangonis
ephebus” Martial, vii, 79)—as having conducted on a large scale
the trade of purchasing boys, looking out for such as were
handsome, to supply the great demand in the East for eunuchs,
who were supposed to make better and more attached servants.
Herodot. viii, 105. ὅκως γὰρ κτήσαιτο (Panionius) παῖδας εἴδεος
ἐπαμμένους, ἐκτάμνων ἀγινέων ἐπώλεε ἐς Σάρδις τε καὶ Ἔφεσον
χρημάτων μεγάλων· παρὰ γὰρ τοῖσι βαρβάροισι τιμιώτεροί εἰσι οἱ
εὐνοῦχοι, πίστιος εἵνεκα τῆς πάσης, τῶν ἐνορχίων. Boys were
necessary, as the operation was performed in childhood or
youth,—παῖδες ἐκτομίαι (Herodot. vi, 6-32: compare iii, 48).
The Babylonians, in addition to their large pecuniary tribute,
had to furnish to the Persian court annually five hundred παῖδας
ἐκτομίας (Herodot. iii, 92). For some farther remarks on the
preference of the Persians both for the persons and the services
of εὐνοῦχοι, see Dio Chrysostom, Orat. xxi, p. 270; Xenoph.
Cyropæd. vii, 5, 61-65. Hellanikus (Fr. 169, ed. Didot) affirmed
that the Persians had derived both the persons so employed, and
the habit of employing them, from the Babylonians.
When Mr. Hanway was travelling near the Caspian, among the
Kalmucks, little children of two or three vears of age, were
often tendered to him for sale, at two rubles per head (Hanway’s
Travels, ch. xvi, pp. 65, 66).
This interesting anecdote, imparting a glimpse of the ancient world
in reference to details which Grecian historians rarely condescend
to unveil, demonstrates the compassionate disposition of Agesilaus.
We find in conjunction with it another anecdote, illustrating the
Spartan side of his character. The prisoners who had been captured
during the expedition were brought to Ephesus, and sold during
the winter as slaves for the profit of the army. Agesilaus,—being
then busily employed in training his troops to military
efficiency, especially for the cavalry service during the ensuing
campaign,—thought it advisable to impress them with contempt for the
bodily capacity and prowess of the natives. He therefore directed the
heralds who conducted the auction, to put the prisoners up to sale
in a state of perfect nudity. To have the body thus exposed, was a
thing never done, and even held disgraceful by the native Asiatics;
while among the Greeks the practice was universal for purposes of
exercise,—or at least, had become universal during the last two or
three centuries,—for we are told that originally the Asiatic feeling
on this point had prevailed throughout Greece. It was one of the
obvious differences between Grecian and Asiatic customs,[490]—that
in the former, both the exercises of the palæstra, as well as the
matches in the solemn games, required competitors of every rank
to contend naked. Agesilaus himself stripped thus habitually;
Alexander, prince of Macedon, had done so, when he ran at the Olympic
stadium,[491]—also the combatants out of the great family of the
Diagorids of Rhodes, when they gained their victories in the Olympic
pankratium,—and all those other noble pugilists, wrestlers, and
runners, descended from gods and heroes, upon whom Pindar pours forth
his complimentary odes.
[490] Herodot. i, 10. παρὰ γὰρ τοῖσι Λυδοῖσι, σχεδὸν δὲ παρὰ
τοῖσι ἄλλοισι βαρβάροισι, καὶ ἄνδρα ὀφθῆναι γυμνόν, ἐς αἰσχύνην
μεγάλην φέρει. Compare Thucyd. i, 6; Plato, Republic, v, 3, p.
452, D.
[491] Herodot. v, 22.
On this occasion at Ephesus, Agesilaus gave special orders to put up
the Asiatic prisoners to auction naked; not at all by way of insult,
but in order to exhibit to the eye of the Greek soldier, as he
contemplated them, how much he gained by his own bodily training and
frequent exposure, and how inferior was the condition of men whose
bodies never felt the sun or wind. They displayed a white skin, plump
and soft limbs, weak and undeveloped muscles, like men accustomed to
be borne in carriages instead of walking or running; from whence we
indirectly learn that many of them were men in wealthy circumstances.
And the purpose of Agesilaus was completely answered; since his
soldiers, when they witnessed such evidences of bodily incompetence,
thought that “the enemies against whom they had to contend were not
more formidable than women.”[492] Such a method of illustrating the
difference between good and bad physical training, would hardly have
occurred to any one except a Spartan, brought up under the Lykurgean
rules.
[492] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 19. Ἡγούμενος δὲ, καὶ τὸ καταφρονεῖν
τῶν πολεμίων ῥώμην τινὰ ἐμβάλλειν πρὸς τὸ μάχεσθαι, προεῖπε
τοῖς κήρυξι, τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν λῃστῶν ἁλισκομένους βαρβάρους γυμνοὺς
πωλεῖν. Ὁρῶντες οὖν οἱ στρατιῶται λευκοὺς μὲν, ~διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε
ἐκδύεσθαι~, μαλακοὺς δὲ καὶ ἀπόνους, διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ ἐπ᾽ ὀχημάτων
εἶναι, ἐνόμισαν, οὐδὲν διοίσειν τὸν πόλεμον ἢ εἰ γυναιξὶ δέοι
μάχεσθαι.
Xen. Agesil. i, 28—where he has it—πίονας δὲ καὶ ἀπόνους, διὰ
τὸ ἀεὶ ἐπ᾽ ὀχημάτων εἶναι (Polyænus, ii, 1, 5; Plutarch, Agesil.
c. 9).
Frontinus (i, 18) recounts a proceeding somewhat similar on the
part of Gelon, after his great victory over the Carthaginians
at Himera in Sicily:—“Gelo Syracusarum tyrannus, bello adversus
Pœnos suscepto, cum multos cepisset, infirmissimum quemque
præcipue ex auxiliaribus, qui nigerrimi erant, nudatum in
conspectu suorum produxit, ut persuaderet contemnendos.”
While Agesilaus thus brought home to the vision of his soldiers the
inefficiency of untrained bodies, he kept them throughout the winter
under hard work and drill, as well in the palæstra as in arms. A
force of cavalry was still wanting. To procure it, he enrolled all
the richest Greeks in the various Asiatic towns, as conscripts to
serve on horseback; giving each of them leave to exempt himself,
however, by providing a competent substitute and equipment,—man,
horse, and arms.[493] Before the commencement of spring, an adequate
force of cavalry was thus assembled at Ephesus, and put into
tolerable exercise. Throughout the whole winter, that city became a
place of arms, consecrated to drilling and gymnastic exercises. On
parade as well as in the palæstra, Agesilaus himself was foremost in
setting the example of obedience and hard work. Prizes were given
to the diligent and improving among hoplites, horsemen, and light
troops; while the armorers, braziers, leather-cutters, etc.,—all
the various artisans, whose trade lay in muniments of war, were in
the fullest employment. “It was a sight full of encouragement (says
Xenophon, who was doubtless present and took part in it), to see
Agesilaus and the soldiers leaving the gymnasium, all with wreaths on
their heads, and marching to the temple of Artemis to dedicate their
wreaths to the goddess.”[494]
[493] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 15; Xen. Agesil. i, 23. Compare what
is related about Scipio Africanus—Livy, xxix, 1.
[494] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 17, 18; Xen. Agesil. i, 26, 27.
Before Agesilaus was in condition to begin his military operations
for the spring, the first year of his command had passed over.
Thirty fresh counsellors reached Ephesus from Sparta, superseding
the first thirty under Lysander, who forthwith returned home. The
army was now not only more numerous, but better trained, and more
systematically arranged than in the preceding campaign. Agesilaus
distributed the various divisions under the command of different
members of the new Thirty; the cavalry being assigned to Xenoklês,
the Neodamode hoplites to Skythês, the Cyreians to Herippidas, the
Asiatic contingents to Migdon. He then gave out that he should march
straight against Sardis. Nevertheless, Tissaphernes, who was in
that place, construing this proclamation as a feint, and believing
that the real march would be directed against Karia, disposed his
cavalry in the plain of the Mæander as he had done in the preceding
campaign; while his infantry were sent still farther southward within
the Karian frontier. On this occasion, however, Agesilaus marched
as he had announced, in the direction of Sardis. For three days he
plundered the country without seeing an enemy; nor was it until the
fourth day that the cavalry of Tissaphernes could be summoned back to
oppose him; the infantry being even yet at a distance. On reaching
the banks of the river Paktôlus, this Persian cavalry found the Greek
light troops dispersed for the purpose of plunder, attacked them
by surprise, and drove them in with considerable loss. Presently,
however, Agesilaus came up, and ordered his cavalry to charge,
anxious to bring on a battle before the Persian infantry could arrive
in the field. In efficiency, it appears, the Persian cavalry was a
full match for his cavalry, and in number apparently superior. But
when he brought up his infantry, and caused his peltasts and younger
hoplites to join the cavalry in a vigorous attack,—victory soon
declared on his side. The Persians were put to flight and many of
them drowned in the Paktôlus. Their camp, too, was taken, with a
valuable booty; including several camels, which Agesilaus afterwards
took with him into Greece. This success ensured to him the unopposed
mastery of all the territory around Sardis. He carried his ravages
to the very gates of that city, plundering the gardens and ornamented
ground, proclaiming liberty to those within, and defying Tissaphernes
to come out and fight.[495]
[495] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 21-24; Xen. Agesil. i, 32, 33;
Plutarch, Agesil. c. 10.
Diodorus (xiv, 80) professes to describe this battle; but his
description is hardly to be reconciled with that of Xenophon,
which is better authority. Among other points of difference,
Diodorus affirms that the Persians had fifty thousand infantry;
and Pausanias also states (iii, 9, 3) that the number of Persian
infantry in this battle was greater than had ever been got
together since the times of Darius and Xerxes Whereas, Xenophon
expressly states that the Persian infantry had not come up, and
took no part in the battle.
The career of that timid and treacherous satrap now approached its
close. The Persians in or near Sardis loudly complained of him as
leaving them undefended, from cowardice and anxiety for his own
residence in Karia; while the court of Susa was now aware that
the powerful reinforcement which had been sent to him last year,
intended to drive Agesilaus out of Asia, had been made to achieve
absolutely nothing. To these grounds of just dissatisfaction was
added a court intrigue; to which, and to the agency of a person yet
more worthless and cruel than himself, Tissaphernes fell a victim.
The queen mother, Parysatis, had never forgiven him for having been
one of the principal agents in the defeat and death of her son Cyrus.
Her influence being now reëstablished over the mind of Artaxerxes,
she took advantage of the existing discredit of the satrap to get an
order sent down for his deposition and death. Tithraustes, the bearer
of this order, seized him by stratagem at Kolossæ in Phrygia, while
he was in the bath, and caused him to be beheaded.[496]
[496] Plutarch. Artaxerx. c. 23; Diodor. xiv, 80; Xen. Hellen.
iii, 4, 25.
The mission of Tithraustes to Asia Minor was accompanied by increased
efforts on the part of Persia for prosecuting the war against Sparta
with vigor, by sea as well as by land; and also for fomenting
the anti-Spartan movement which burst out into hostilities this
year in Greece. At first, however, immediately after the death of
Tissaphernes, Tithraustes endeavored to open negotiations with
Agesilaus, who was in military possession of the country around
Sardis, while that city itself appears to have been occupied by
Ariæus, probably the same Persian who had formerly been general
under Cyrus, and who had now again revolted from Artaxerxes.[497]
Tithraustes took credit to the justice of the king for having
punished the late satrap; out of whose perfidy (he affirmed) the
war had arisen. He then summoned Agesilaus, in the king’s name, to
evacuate Asia, leaving the Asiatic Greeks to pay their original
tribute to Persia, but to enjoy complete autonomy, subject to that
one condition. Had this proposition been accepted and executed,
it would have secured these Greeks against Persian occupation or
governors; a much milder fate for them than that to which the
Lacedæmonians had consented in their conventions with Tissaphernes
sixteen years before,[498] and analogous to the position in which
the Chalkidians of Thrace had been placed with regard to Athens,
under the peace of Nikias;[499] subject to a fixed tribute, yet
autonomous,—with no other obligation or interference. Agesilaus
replied that he had no power to entertain such a proposition without
the authorities at home, whom he accordingly sent to consult. But
in the interim he was prevailed upon by Tithraustes to conclude an
armistice for six months, and to move out of his satrapy into that
of Pharnabazus; receiving a contribution of thirty talents towards
the temporary maintenance of the army.[500] These satraps generally
acted more like independent or even hostile princes, than coöperating
colleagues; one of the many causes of the weakness of the Persian
empire.
[497] Xen. Hellen. iii, 14, 25; iv, 1, 27.
[498] Thucyd. viii, 18, 37, 58.
[499] Thucyd. v, 18, 5.
[500] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 26; Diodor. xiv, 80. ἑξαμηνιαίους
ἀνοχάς.
When Agesilaus had reached the neighborhood of Kymê, on his march
northward to the Hellespontine Phrygia, he received a despatch from
home, placing the Spartan naval force in the Asiatic seas under
his command, as well as the land-force, and empowering him to name
whomsoever he chose as acting admiral.[501] For the first time
since the battle of Ægospotami, the maritime empire of Sparta was
beginning to be threatened, and increased efforts on her part were
becoming requisite. Pharnabazus, going up in person to the court
of Artaxerxes, had by pressing representations obtained a large
subsidy for fitting out a fleet in Cyprus and Phœnicia, to act under
the Athenian admiral Konon against the Lacedæmonians.[502] That
officer,—with a fleet of forty triremes, before the equipment of
the remainder was yet complete,—had advanced along the southern
coast of Asia Minor to Kaunus, at the south-western corner of the
peninsula, on the frontier of Karia and Lykia. In this port he was
besieged by the Lacedæmonian fleet of one hundred and twenty triremes
under Pharax. But a Persian reinforcement strengthened the fleet
of Konon to eighty sail, and put the place out of danger; so that
Pharax, desisting from the siege, retired to Rhodes.
[501] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 27.
[502] Diodor. xiv, 39, Justin, vi, 1.
The neighborhood of Konon, however, who was now with his fleet of
eighty sail near the Chersonesus of Knidus, emboldened the Rhodians
to revolt from Sparta. It was at Rhodes that the general detestation
of the Lacedæmonian empire, disgraced in so many different cities by
the local dekarchies and by the Spartan harmosts, first manifested
itself. And such was the ardor of the Rhodian population, that their
revolt took place while the fleet of Pharax was (in part at least)
actually in the harbor, and they drove him out of it.[503] Konon,
whose secret encouragements had helped to excite this insurrection,
presently sailed to Rhodes with his fleet, and made the island his
main station. It threw into his hands an unexpected advantage;
for a numerous fleet of vessels arrived there shortly afterwards,
sent by Nephareus, the native king of Egypt (which was in revolt
against the Persians), with marine stores and grain to the aid of
the Lacedæmonians. Not having been apprized of the recent revolt,
these vessels entered the harbor of Rhodes as if it were still a
Lacedæmonian island; and their cargoes were thus appropriated by
Konon and the Rhodians.[504]
[503] Diodor. xiv, 79. Ῥόδιοι δὲ ἐκβαλόντες τὸν τῶν Πελοποννησίων
στόλον, ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, καὶ τὸν Κόνωνα προσεδέξαντο
μετὰ τοῦ στόλου παντὸς εἰς τὴν πόλιν.
Compare Androtion apud Pausaniam, vi, 7, 2.
[504] Diodor. xiv, 79; Justin (vi, 2) calls this native Egyptian
king _Hercynion_.
It seems to have been the uniform practice, for the corn-ships
coming from Egypt to Greece to halt at Rhodes (Demosthen. cont.
Dionysodor p. 1285: compare Herodot. ii, 182).
In recounting the various revolts of the dependencies of Athens
which took place during the Peloponnesian war, I had occasion to
point out more than once that all of them took place not merely in
the absence of any Athenian force, but even at the instigation (in
most cases) of a present hostile force,—by the contrivance of a
local party,—and without privity or previous consent of the bulk
of the citizens. The present revolt of Rhodes, forming a remarkable
contrast on all these points, occasioned the utmost surprise and
indignation among the Lacedæmonians. They saw themselves about to
enter upon a renewed maritime war, without that aid which they had
reckoned on receiving from Egypt, and with aggravated uncertainty
in respect to their dependencies and tribute. It was under this
prospective anxiety that they took the step of nominating Agesilaus
to the command of the fleet as well as of the army, in order to
ensure unity of operations;[505] though a distinction of functions,
which they had hitherto set great value upon maintaining, was thus
broken down,—and, though the two commands had never been united in
any king before Agesilaus.[506] Pharax, the previous admiral, was
recalled.[507]
[505] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 27.
[506] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 10; Aristotel. Politic. ii, 6, 22.
[507] The Lacedæmonian named Pharax, mentioned by Theopompus
(Fragm. 218, ed. Didot: compare Athenæus, xii, p. 536) as a
profligate and extravagant person, is more probably an officer
who served under Dionysius in Sicily and Italy, about forty years
after the revolt of Rhodes. The difference of time appears so
great, that we must probably suppose two different men bearing
the same name.
But the violent displeasure of the Lacedæmonians against the revolted
Rhodians was still better attested by another proceeding. Among
all the great families at Rhodes, none were more distinguished
than the Diagoridæ. Its members were not only generals and high
political functionaries in their native island, but had attained
even Pan-hellenic celebrity by an unparalleled series of victories
at the Olympic and other great solemnities. Dorieus, a member of
this family, had gained the victory in the pankration at Olympia
on three successive solemnities. He had obtained seven prizes in
the Nemean, and eight in the Isthmian games. He had carried off the
prize at one Pythian solemnity without a contest,—no one daring
to stand up against him in the fearful struggle of the pankration.
As a Rhodian, while Rhodes was a subject ally of Athens during the
Peloponnesian war, he had been so pronounced in his attachment to
Sparta as to draw on himself a sentence of banishment; upon which he
had retired to Thurii, and had been active in hostility to Athens
after the Syracusan catastrophe. Serving against her in ships
fitted out at his own cost, he had been captured in 407 B.C. by the
Athenians, and brought in as prisoner to Athens. By the received
practice of war in that day, his life was forfeited; and over and
above such practice, the name of Dorieus was peculiarly odious to the
Athenians. But when they saw before the public assembly a captive
enemy, of heroic lineage, as well as of unrivalled athletic majesty
and renown, their previous hatred was so overpowered by sympathy and
admiration, that they liberated him by public vote, and dismissed him
unconditionally.[508]
[508] Xen. Hellen. i, 5, 19.
Compare a similar instance of merciful dealing, on the part
of the Syracusan assembly, towards the Sikel prince Duketius
(Diodor. xi, 92).
This interesting anecdote, which has already been related in
my eighth volume,[509] is here again noticed as a contrast to
the treatment which the same Dorieus now underwent from the
Lacedæmonians. What he had been doing since, we do not know; but
at the time when Rhodes now revolted from Sparta, he was not only
absent from the island, but actually in or near Peloponnesus.
Such, however, was the wrath of the Lacedæmonians against Rhodians
generally, that Dorieus was seized by their order, brought to Sparta,
and there condemned and executed.[510] It seems hardly possible that
he can have had any personal concern in the revolt. Had such been
the fact, he would have been in the island,—or would at least have
taken care not to be within the reach of the Lacedæmonians when the
revolt happened. Perhaps, however, other members of the Diagoridæ,
his family, once so much attached to Sparta, may have taken part in
it; for we know, by the example of the Thirty at Athens, that the
Lysandrian dekarchies and Spartan harmosts made themselves quite
as formidable to oligarchical as to democratical politicians, and
it is very conceivable that the Diagoridæ may have become less
philo-Laconian in their politics.
[509] Hist. of Greece, Vol. VIII, Ch. lxiv, p. 159.
[510] Pausanias, vi, 7, 2.
This extreme difference in the treatment of the same man by Athens
and by Sparta raises instructive reflections. It exhibits the
difference both between Athenian and Spartan sentiment, and between
the sentiment of a multitude and that of a few. The grand and
sacred personality of the Hieronike Dorieus, when exhibited to
the senses of the Athenian multitude,—the spectacle of a man in
chains before them, who had been proclaimed victor and crowned on
so many solemn occasions before the largest assemblages of Greeks
ever brought together,—produced an overwhelming effect upon their
emotions; sufficient not only to efface a strong preëstablished
antipathy founded on active past hostility, but to countervail
a just cause of revenge, speaking in the language of that day.
But the same appearance produced no effect at all on the Spartan
ephors and senate; not sufficient even to hinder them from putting
Dorieus to death, though he had given them no cause for antipathy
or revenge, simply as a sort of retribution for the revolt of the
island. Now this difference depended partly upon the difference
between the sentiment of Athenians and Spartans, but partly also
upon the difference between the sentiment of a multitude and that of
a few. Had Dorieus been brought before a select judicial tribunal
at Athens, instead of before the Athenian public assembly,—or, had
the case been discussed before the assembly in his absence,—he
would have been probably condemned, conformably to usage, under the
circumstances; but the vehement emotion worked by his presence upon
the multitudinous spectators of the assembly, rendered such a course
intolerable to them. It has been common with historians of Athens
to dwell upon the passions of the public assembly as if it were
susceptible of excitement only in an angry or vindictive direction;
whereas, the truth is, and the example before us illustrates, that
they were open-minded in one direction as well as in another,
and that the present emotion, whatever it might be, merciful or
sympathetic as well as resentful, was intensified by the mere fact of
multitude. And thus, where the established rule of procedure happened
to be cruel, there was some chance of moving an Athenian assembly to
mitigate it in a particular case, though the Spartan ephors or senate
would be inexorable in carrying it out,—if, indeed, they did not, as
seems probable in the case of Dorieus, actually go beyond it in rigor.
While Konon and the Rhodians were thus raising hostilities against
Sparta by sea, Agesilaus, on receiving at Kymê the news of his
nomination to the double command, immediately despatched orders
to the dependent maritime cities and islands, requiring the
construction and equipment of new triremes. Such was the influence
of Sparta, and so much did the local governments rest upon its
continuance, that these requisitions were zealously obeyed. Many
leading men incurred considerable expense, from desire to acquire
his favor; so that a fleet of one hundred and twenty new triremes
was ready by the ensuing year. Agesilaus, naming his brother-in-law,
Peisander, to act as admiral, sent him to superintend the
preparations; a brave young man, but destitute both of skill and
experience.[511]
[511] Xen. Hellen. iii, 4, 28, 29; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 10.
Meanwhile, he himself pursued his march (about the beginning of
autumn) towards the satrapy of Pharnabazus,—Phrygia south and
south-east of the Propontis. Under the active guidance of his new
auxiliary, Spithridates, he plundered the country, capturing some
towns, and reducing others to capitulate; with considerable advantage
to his soldiers. Pharnabazus, having no sufficient army to hazard a
battle in defence of his satrapy, concentrated all his force near
his own residence at Daskylium, offering no opposition to the march
of Agesilaus; who was induced by Spithridates to traverse Phrygia
and enter Paphlagonia, in hopes of concluding an alliance with the
Paphlagonian prince Otys. That prince, in nominal dependence on
Persia, could muster the best cavalry in the Persian empire. But
he had recently refused to obey an invitation from the court at
Susa, and he now not only welcomed the appearance of Agesilaus, but
concluded an alliance with him, strengthening him with an auxiliary
body of cavalry and peltasts. Anxious to requite Spithridates for
his services, and vehemently attached to his son, the beautiful
youth Megabates,—Agesilaus persuaded Otys to marry the daughter
of Spithridates. He even caused her to be conveyed by sea in a
Lacedæmonian trireme,—probably from Abydos to Sinôpê.[512]
[512] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 1-15.
The negotiation of this marriage by Agesilaus is detailed in a
curious and interesting manner by Xenophon. His conversation
with Otys took place in the presence of the thirty Spartan
counsellors, and probably in the presence of Xenophon himself.
The attachment of Agesilaus to the youth Megabazus or Megabates,
is marked in the Hellenica (iv, 1, 6-28)—but is more strongly
brought out in the Agesilaus of Xenophon (v, 6), and in Plutarch,
Agesil. c. 11.
In the retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks (five years before)
along the southern coast of the Euxine, a Paphlagonian prince
named Korylas is mentioned (Xen. Anab. v, 5, 22; v, 6, 8).
Whether there was more than one Paphlagonian prince—or whether
Otys was successor of Korylas—we cannot tell.
Reinforced by the Paphlagonian auxiliaries, Agesilaus prosecuted
the war with augmented vigor against the satrapy of Pharnabazus. He
now approached the neighborhood of Daskylium, the residence of the
satrap himself, inherited from his father Pharnakês, who had been
satrap before him. This was a well-supplied country, full of rich
villages, embellished with parks and gardens for the satrap’s hunting
and gratification: the sporting tastes of Xenophon lead him also to
remark that there were plenty of birds for the fowler, with rivers
full of fish.[513] In this agreeable region Agesilaus passed the
winter. His soldiers, abundantly supplied with provisions, became so
careless, and straggled with so much contempt of their enemy, that
Pharnabazus, with a body of four hundred cavalry and two scythed
chariots, found an opportunity of attacking seven hundred of them by
surprise; driving them back with considerable loss, until Agesilaus
came up to protect them with the hoplites.
[513] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 16-33.
This partial misfortune, however, was speedily avenged. Fearful of
being surrounded and captured, Pharnabazus refrained from occupying
any fixed position. He hovered about the country, carrying his
valuable property along with him, and keeping his place of encampment
as secret as he could. The watchful Spithridates, nevertheless,
having obtained information that he was encamped for the night in
the village of Kanê, about eighteen miles distant, Herippidas (one
of the thirty Spartans) undertook a night-march with a detachment
to surprise him. Two thousand Grecian hoplites, the like number of
light-armed peltasts, and Spithridates with the Paphlagonian horse,
were appointed to accompany him. Though many of these soldiers
took advantage of the darkness to evade attendance, the enterprise
proved completely successful. The camp of Pharnabazus was surprised
at break of day; his Mysian advanced guards were put to the sword,
and he himself, with all his troops, was compelled to take flight
with scarcely any resistance. All his stores, plate, and personal
furniture, together with a large baggage-train and abundance of
prisoners, fell into the hands of the victors. As the Paphlagonians
under Spithridates formed the cavalry of the victorious detachment,
they naturally took more spoil and more prisoners than the infantry.
They were proceeding to carry off their acquisitions, when Herippidas
interfered and took everything away from them; placing the entire
spoil of every description, under the charge of Grecian officers, to
be sold by formal auction in a Grecian city; after which the proceeds
were to be distributed or applied by public authority. The orders of
Herippidas were conformable to the regular and systematic proceeding
of Grecian officers; but Spithridates and the Paphlagonians were
probably justified by Asiatic practice in appropriating that which
they had themselves captured. Moreover, the order, disagreeable
in itself, was enforced against them with Lacedæmonian harshness
of manner,[514] unaccompanied by any guarantee that they would be
allowed, even at last, a fair share of the proceeds. Resenting the
conduct of Herippidas as combining injury with insult, they deserted
in the night and fled to Sardis, where the Persian Ariæus was in
actual revolt against the court of Susa. This was a serious loss, and
still more serious chagrin, to Agesilaus. He was not only deprived of
valuable auxiliary cavalry, and of an enterprizing Asiatic informant;
but the report would be spread that he defrauded his Asiatic allies
of their legitimate plunder, and others would thus be deterred from
joining him. His personal sorrow too was aggravated by the departure
of the youth Megabazus, who accompanied his father Spithridates to
Sardis.[515]
[514] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 11. πικρὸς ὢν ἐξεταστὴς τῶν κλαπέντων,
etc.
[515] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 27; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 11.
Since the flight of Spithridates took place secretly by night,
the scene which Plutarch asserts to have taken place between
Agesilaus and Megabazus cannot have occurred on the departure of
the latter, but must belong to some other occasion; as, indeed,
it seems to be represented by Xenophon (Agesil. v, 4).
It was towards the close of this winter that a personal conference
took place between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus, managed by the
intervention of a Greek of Kyzikus named Apollophanês; who was
connected by ties of hospitality with both, and served to each as
guarantee for the good faith of the other. We have from Xenophon,
himself probably present, an interesting detail of this interview.
Agesilaus, accompanied by his thirty Spartan counsellors, being the
first to arrive at the place of appointment, all of them sat down
upon the grass to wait. Presently came Pharnabazus, with splendid
clothing and retinue. His attendants were beginning to spread fine
carpets for him, when the satrap, observing how the Spartans were
seated, felt ashamed of such a luxury for himself, and sat down
on the grass by the side of Agesilaus. Having exchanged salutes,
they next shook hands; after which Pharnabazus, who as the older
of the two had been the first to tender his right hand, was also
the first to open the conversation. Whether he spoke Greek well
enough to dispense with the necessity of an interpreter, we are not
informed. “Agesilaus (said he), I was the friend and ally of you
Lacedæmonians while you were at war with Athens; I furnished you with
money to strengthen your fleet, and fought with you myself ashore on
horseback, chasing your enemies into the sea. You cannot charge me
with having ever played you false, like Tissaphernes, either by word
or deed. Yet, after this behavior, I am now reduced by you to such a
condition, that I have not a dinner in my own territory, except by
picking up your leavings, like the beasts of the field. I see the
fine residences, parks, and hunting-grounds, bequeathed to me by my
father, which formed the charm of my life, cut up or burnt down by
you. Is this the conduct of men mindful of favors received, and eager
to requite them? Pray answer me this question; for, perhaps, I have
yet to learn what is holy and just.”
The thirty Spartan counsellors were covered with shame by this
emphatic appeal. They all held their peace; while Agesilaus, after
a long pause, at length replied,—“You are aware, Pharnabazus, that
in Grecian cities, individuals become private friends and guests of
each other. Such guests, if the cities to which they belong go to
war, fight with each other, and sometimes by accident even kill each
other, each in behalf of his respective city. So then it is that we,
being at war with your king, are compelled to hold all his dominions
as enemy’s land. But in regard to you, we would pay any price to
become your friends. I do not invite you to accept us as masters,
in place of your present master; I ask you to become our ally, and
to enjoy your own property as a freeman—bowing before no man and
acknowledging no master. Now freedom is in itself a possession of the
highest value. But this is not all. We do not call upon you to be a
freeman, and yet poor. We offer you our alliance, to acquire fresh
territory, not for the king, but for yourself; by reducing those who
are now your fellow-slaves to become your subjects. Now tell me,—if
you thus continue a freeman and become rich, what can you want
farther to make you a thoroughly prosperous man?”
“I will speak frankly to you in reply (said Pharnabazus). If the king
shall send any other general, and put me under him, I shall willingly
become your friend and ally. But if he imposes the duty of command on
me, so strong is the point of honor, that I shall continue to make
war upon you to the best of my power. Expect nothing else.”[516]
[516] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 38. Ἐὰν μέντοι μοι τὴν ἀρχὴν προστάττῃ,
τοιοῦτόν τι, ὡς ἔοικε, φιλοτιμία ἐστὶ, εὖ χρὴ εἰδέναι, ὅτι
πολεμήσω ὑμῖν ὡς ἂν δύνωμαι ἄριστα.
Compare about φιλοτιμία, Herodot. iii, 53.
Agesilaus, struck with this answer, took his hand and said,—“Would
that with such high-minded sentiments you _could_ become our friend!
At any rate, let me assure you of this,—that I will immediately quit
your territory; and for the future, even should the war continue, I
will respect both you and all your property, as long as I can turn my
arms against any other Persians.”
Here the conversation closed; Pharnabazus mounted his horse, and
rode away. His son by Parapita, however,—at that time still
a handsome youth,—lingered behind, ran up to Agesilaus, and
exclaimed,—“Agesilaus, I make you my guest.”—“I accept it with all
my heart,”—was the answer. “Remember me by this,”—rejoined the
young Persian,—putting into the hands of Agesilaus the fine javelin
which he carried. The latter immediately took off the ornamental
trappings from the horse of his secretary Idæus, and gave them as a
return present; upon which the young man rode away with them, and
rejoined his father.[517]
[517] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 29-41; Plutarch, Agesil. c. 13, 14;
Xen. Agesil. iii, 5.
There is a touching interest and emphasis in this interview as
described by Xenophon, who here breathes into his tame Hellenic
chronicle something of the romantic spirit of the Cyropædia. The
pledges exchanged between Agesilaus and the son of Pharnabazus
were not forgotten by either. The latter,—being in after days
impoverished and driven into exile by his brother, during the
absence of Pharnabazus in Egypt,—was compelled to take refuge in
Greece; where Agesilaus provided him with protection and a home,
and even went so far as to employ influence in favor of an Athenian
youth, to whom the son of Pharnabazus was attached. This Athenian
youth had outgrown the age and size of the boy-runners in the Olympic
stadium; nevertheless Agesilaus, by strenuous personal interference,
overruled the reluctance of the Eleian judges, and prevailed upon
them to admit him as a competitor with the other boys.[518] The
stress laid by Xenophon upon this favor illustrates the tone of
Grecian sentiment, and shows us the variety of objects which personal
ascendency was used to compass. Disinterested in regard to himself,
Agesilaus was unscrupulous both in promoting the encroachments, and
screening the injustices, of his friends.[519] The unfair privilege
which he procured for this youth, though a small thing in itself,
could hardly fail to offend a crowd of spectators familiar with the
established conditions of the stadium, and to expose the judges to
severe censure.
[518] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 40. πάντ᾽ ἐποίησεν, ὅπως ἂν δι᾽ ἐκεῖνον
ἐγκριθείη εἰς τὸ στάδιον ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ, μέγιστος ὢν παίδων.
[519] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 5-13.
Quitting the satrapy of Pharnabazus,—which was now pretty well
exhausted, while the armistice concluded with Tithraustes must have
expired,—Agesilaus took up his camp near the temple of Artemis, at
Astyra in the plain of Thêbê (in the region commonly known as Æolis),
near the Gulf of Elæus. He here employed himself in bringing together
an increased number of troops, with a view to penetrate farther
into the interior of Asia Minor during the summer. Recent events
had greatly increased the belief entertained by the Asiatics in his
superior strength; so that he received propositions from various
districts in the interior, inviting his presence, and expressing
anxiety to throw off the Persian yoke. He sought also to compose
the dissensions and misrule which had arisen out of the Lysandrian
dekarchies in the Greco-Asiatic cities, avoiding as much as possible
sharp inflictions of death or exile. How much he achieved in this
direction, we cannot tell,[520] nor can it have been possible,
indeed, to achieve much, without dismissing the Spartan harmosts and
lessening the political power of his own partisans; neither of which
he did.
[520] Xen. Hellen. iv, 1, 41; Xen. Agesil. i, 35-38; Plutarch,
Agesil. c. 14, 15; Isokrates, Or. v, (Philipp.) s. 100.
His plans were now all laid for penetrating farther than ever into
the interior, and for permanent conquest, if possible, of the western
portion of Persian Asia. What he would have permanently accomplished
towards this scheme, cannot be determined; for his aggressive march
was suspended by a summons home, the reason of which will appear in
the next chapter.
Meanwhile, Pharnabazus had been called from his satrapy to go and
take the command of the Persian fleet in Kilikia and the south of
Asia Minor, in conjunction with Konon. Since the revolt of Rhodes
from the Lacedæmonians, (in the summer of the preceding year,
395 B.C.) that active Athenian had achieved nothing. The burst
of activity, produced by the first visit of Pharnabazus at the
Persian court, had been paralyzed by the jealousies of the Persian
commanders, reluctant to serve under a Greek,—by peculation of
officers who embezzled the pay destined for the troops,—by mutiny
in the fleet from absence of pay,—and by the many delays arising
while the satraps, unwilling to spend their own revenues in the war,
waited for orders and remittances from court.[521] Hence Konon had
been unable to make any efficient use of his fleet, during those
months when the Lacedæmonian fleet was increased to nearly double its
former number. At length he resolved,—seemingly at the instigation
of his countrymen at home[522] as well as of Euagoras prince of
Salamis in Cyprus, and through the encouragement of Ktesias, one
of the Grecian physicians resident at the Persian court,—on going
himself into the interior to communicate personally with Artaxerxes.
Landing on the Kilikian coast, he crossed by land to Thapsakus on
the Euphrates (as the Cyreian army had marched), from whence he
sailed down the river in a boat to Babylon. It appears that he did
not see Artaxerxes, from repugnance to that ceremony of prostration
which was required from all who approached the royal person. But his
messages, transmitted through Ktesias and others,—with his confident
engagement to put down the maritime empire of Sparta and counteract
the projects of Agesilaus, if the Persian forces and money were put
into efficient action,—produced a powerful effect on the mind of
the monarch; who doubtless was not merely alarmed at the formidable
position of Agesilaus in Asia Minor, but also hated the Lacedæmonians
as main agents in the aggressive enterprise of Cyrus. Artaxerxes not
only approved his views, but made to him a large grant of money, and
transmitted peremptory orders to the coast that his officers should
be active in prosecuting the maritime war.
[521] Compare Diodor. xv, 41 _ad fin._; and Thucyd. viii, 45.
[522] Isokrates (Or. viii, De Pace, s. 82) alludes to “many
embassies” as having been sent by Athens to the king of Persia,
to protest against the Lacedæmonian dominion. But this mission of
Konon is the only one which we can verify, prior to the battle of
Knidus.
Probably Dennis, the son of Pyrilampês, an eminent citizen and
trierarch of Athens, must have been one of the companions of
Konon in this mission. He is mentioned in an oration of Lysias
as having received from the Great King a present of a golden
drinking-bowl or φιάλη; and I do not know on what other occasion
he can have received it, except in this embassy (Lysias, Or. xix,
De Bonis Aristoph. s. 27).
What was of still greater moment, Konon was permitted to name any
person whom he chose, as admiral jointly with himself. It was by his
choice that Pharnabazus was called from his satrapy, and ordered to
act jointly as commander of the fleet. This satrap, the bravest and
most straightforward among all the Persian grandees, and just now
smarting with resentment at the devastation of his satrapy[523] by
Agesilaus, coöperated heartily with Konon. A powerful fleet, partly
Phœnician, partly Athenian or Grecian, was soon equipped, superior
in number even to the newly-organized Lacedæmonian fleet under
Peisander.[524] Euagoras, prince of Salamis in Cyprus,[525] not only
provided many triremes, but served himself, personally, on board.
[523] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 6.
[524] The measures of Konon and the transactions preceding the
battle of Knidus, are very imperfectly known to us; but we may
gather them generally from Diodorus, xiv, 81; Justin, vi, 3, 4;
Cornelius Nepos, Vit. Conon. c. 2, 3; Ktesiæ Fragment, c. 62, 63,
ed. Bähr.
Isokrates (Orat. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 165; compare Orat. ix,
(Euagor.) s. 77) speaks loosely as to the duration of time that
the Persian fleet remained blocked up by the Lacedæmonians before
Konon obtained his final and vigorous orders from Artaxerxes,
unless we are to understand his _three years_ as referring to
the first news of outfit of ships of war in Phœnicia, brought to
Sparta by Herodas, as Schneider understands them; and even then
the statement that the Persian fleet remained πολιορκούμενον
for all this time, would be much exaggerated. Allowing for
exaggeration, however, Isokrates coincides generally with the
authorities above noticed.
It would appear that Ktesias the physician obtained about this
time permission to quit the court of Persia and come back to
Greece. Perhaps he may have been induced (like Demokêdes of
Kroton, one hundred and twenty years before) to promote the views
of Konon in order to get for himself this permission.
In the meagre abstract of Ktesias given by Photius (c. 63)
mention is made of some Lacedæmonian envoys who were now going up
to the Persian court, and were watched or detained on the way.
This mission can hardly have taken place before the battle of
Knidus; for then Agesilaus was in the full tide of success, and
contemplating the largest plans of aggression against Persia. It
must have taken place, I presume, after the battle.
[525] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Euagoras) s. 67. Εὐαγόρου δὲ ~αὑτόν
τε παρασχόντος~, καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως τὴν πλείστην παρασκευάσαντος.
Compare s. 83 of the same oration. Compare Pausanias, i, 3, 1.
It was about the month of July, 394 B.C., that Pharnabazus and
Konon brought their united fleet to the south-western corner of Asia
Minor; first, probably, to the friendly island of Rhodes, next,
off Loryma[526] and the mountain called Dorion on the peninsula of
Knidus.[527] Peisander, with the fleet of Sparta and her allies,
sailed out from Knidus to meet them, and both parties prepared for
a battle. The numbers of the Lacedæmonians are reported by Diodorus
at eighty-five triremes; those of Konon and Pharnabazus at above
ninety. But Xenophon, without particularizing the number on either
side, seems to intimate the disparity as far greater; stating that
the entire fleet of Peisander was considerably inferior even to the
Grecian division under Konon, without reckoning the Phœnician ships
under Pharnabazus.[528] In spite of such inferiority, Peisander did
not shrink from the encounter. Though a young man without military
skill, he possessed a full measure of Spartan courage and pride;
moreover,—since the Spartan maritime empire was only maintained by
the assumed superiority of his fleet,—had he confessed himself
too weak to fight, his enemies would have gone unopposed around
the islands to excite revolt. Accordingly, he sailed forth from
the harbor of Knidus. But when the two fleets were ranged opposite
to each other, and the battle was about to commence,—so manifest
and alarming was the superiority of the Athenians and Persians,
that his Asiatic allies on the left division, noway hearty in the
cause, fled almost without striking a blow. Under such discouraging
circumstances, he nevertheless led his fleet into action with the
greatest valor. But his trireme was overwhelmed by numbers, broken
in various places by the beaks of the enemy’s ships, and forced back
upon the land, together with a large portion of his fleet. Many of
the crews jumped out and got to land, abandoning their triremes to
the conquerors. Peisander, too, might have escaped in the same way;
but disdaining either to survive his defeat or to quit his ship, fell
gallantly fighting aboard. The victory of Konon and Pharnabazus was
complete. More than half of the Spartan ships were either captured
or destroyed, though the neighborhood of the land enabled a large
proportion of the crews to escape to Knidus, so that no great number
of prisoners were taken.[529] Among the allies of Sparta, the chief
loss of course fell upon those who were most attached to her cause;
the disaffected or lukewarm were those who escaped by flight at the
beginning.
[526] Diodor. xiv, 83. διέτριβον περὶ Λώρυμα τῆς Χερσονήσου.
It is hardly necessary to remark, that the word _Chersonesus_
here (and in xiv, 89) does not mean the peninsula of Thrace
commonly known by that name, forming the European side of the
Hellespont,—but the peninsula on which Knidus is situated.
[527] Pausan. vi, 3, 6. περὶ Κνίδον καὶ ὄρος τὸ Δώριον
ὀνομαζόμενον.
[528] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 12. Φαρνάβαζον, ναύαρχον ὄντα, ξὺν
ταῖς Φοινίσσαις εἶναι. Κόνωνα δὲ, τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἔχοντα, τετάχθαι
ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ. Ἀντιπαραταξαμένου δὲ τοῦ Πεισάνδρου, καὶ ~πολὺ
ἐλαττόνων αὐτῷ τῶν νεῶν φανεισῶν τῶν αὑτοῦ τοῦ μετὰ Κόνωνος
Ἑλληνικοῦ~, etc.
[529] Xen. Hellen. iv, 3, 10-14; Diodor. xiv, 83; Cornelius
Nepos, Conon, c. 4; Justin, vi, 3.
Such was the memorable triumph of Konon at Knidus; the reversal of
that of Lysander at Ægospotami eleven years before. Its important
effects will be recounted in the coming chapter.