"There is an easy, honest, honorable solution of the

Philippine question. It is set forth in the Democratic

platform, and it is submitted with confidence to the American

people. This plan I unreservedly indorse. If elected, I will

convene congress in extraordinary session as soon as

inaugurated and recommend an immediate declaration of the

nation's purpose, first, to establish a stable form of

government in the Philippine Islands, just as we are now

establishing a stable form of government in Cuba; second, to

give independence to the Cubans; third, to protect the

Filipinos from outside interference while they work out their

destiny, just as we have protected the republics of Central

and South America, and are, by the Monroe doctrine, pledged to

protect Cuba."

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900.

The Republican candidate on the same subject.

The answer of the party controlling the government to the

impeachment of its policy of colonial acquisition, and

especially of its conduct in the Philippine Islands, was given

by Mr. McKinley, in a letter of acceptance, addressed,

September 8, to the committee which gave him formal notice of

his renomination by the Republican convention. After

rehearsing at considerable length the events which preceded,

attended and followed the capture of Manila, he continued:

"Would not our adversaries have sent Dewey's fleet to Manila

to capture and destroy the Spanish sea power there, or,

dispatching it there, would they have withdrawn it after the

destruction of the Spanish fleet; and, if the latter, whither

would they have directed it to sail? Where could it have gone?

What port in the Orient was opened to it? Do our adversaries

condemn the expedition under the command of General Merritt to

strengthen Dewey in the distant ocean and assist in our

triumph over Spain, with which nation we were at war? Was it

not our highest duty to strike Spain at every vulnerable

point, that the war might be successfully concluded at the

earliest practicable moment? And was it not our duty to

protect the lives and property of those who came within our

control by the fortunes of war? Could we have come away at any

time between May 1, 1898, and the conclusion of peace without a

stain upon our good name? Could we have come away without

dishonor at any time after the ratification of the peace

treaty by the Senate of the United States? There has been no

time since the destruction of the enemy's fleet when we could

or should have left the Philippine Archipelago. After the

treaty of peace was ratified, no power but Congress could

surrender our sovereignty or alienate a foot of the territory

thus acquired. The Congress has not seen fit to do the one or

the other, and the President had no authority to do either, if

he had been so inclined, which he was not. So long as the

sovereignty remains in us it is the duty of the Executive,

whoever he may be, to uphold that sovereignty, and if it be

attacked to suppress its assailants. Would our political

adversaries do less?

"It has been asserted that there would have been no fighting

in the Philippines if Congress had declared its purpose to

give independence to the Tagal insurgents. The insurgents did

not wait for the action of Congress. They assumed the

offensive; they opened fire on our Army. Those who assert our

responsibility for the beginning of the conflict have

forgotten that, before the treaty was ratified in the Senate,

and while it was being debated in that body and while the

Bacon resolution was under discussion, on February 4, 1899,

the insurgents attacked the American Army, after being

previously advised that the American forces were under orders

not to fire upon them except in defense. The papers found in

the recently captured archives of the insurgents demonstrate

that this attack had been carefully planned for weeks before

it occurred. This unprovoked assault upon our soldiers at a

time when the Senate was deliberating upon the treaty shows

that no action on our part, except surrender and abandonment,

would have prevented the fighting, and leaves no doubt in any

fair mind of where the responsibility rests for the shedding

of American blood.

"With all the exaggerated phrase-making of this electoral

contest, we are in danger of being diverted from the real

contention. We are in agreement with all of those who

supported the war with Spain and also with those who counseled

the ratification of the treaty of peace. Upon these two great

essential steps there can be no issue and out of these came

all of our responsibilities. If others would shirk the

obligations imposed by the war and the treaty, we must decline

to act further with them, and here the issue was made. It is our

purpose to establish in the Philippines a government suitable

to the wants and conditions of the inhabitants and to prepare

them for self-government when they are ready for it and as

rapidly as they are ready for it. That I am aiming to do under

my Constitutional authority, and will continue to do until

Congress shall determine the political status of the

inhabitants of the archipelago.

"Are our opponents against the treaty? If so, they must be

reminded that it could not have been ratified in the Senate

but for their assistance. The Senate which ratified the treaty

and the Congress which added its sanction by a large

approbation comprised Senators and Representatives of the

people of all parties. Would our opponents surrender to the

insurgents, abandon our sovereignty or cede it to them? If

that be not their purpose, then it should be promptly

disclaimed, for only evil can result from the hopes raised by

our opponents in the minds of the Filipinos, that with their

success at the polls in November there will be a withdrawal of

our Army and of American sovereignty over the archipelago; the

complete independence of the Tagalog people recognized and the

powers of government over all the other people of the

archipelago conferred upon the Tagalog leaders. The effect of

a belief in the minds of the insurgents that this will be done

has already prolonged the rebellion and increases the

necessity for the continuance of a large army. It is now

delaying full peace in the archipelago and the establishment

of civil governments and has influenced many of the insurgents

against accepting the liberal terms of amnesty offered by

General MacArthur under my direction. But for these false

hopes, a considerable reduction could have been had in our

military establishment in the Philippines, and the realization

of a stable government would be already at hand.

{665}

"The American people are asked by our opponents to yield the

sovereignty of the United States in the Philippines to a small

fraction of the population, a single tribe out of 80 or more

inhabiting the archipelago, a faction which wantonly attacked

the American troops in Manila while in rightful possession

under the protocol with Spain, awaiting the ratification of

the treaty of peace by the Senate, and which has since been in

active, open rebellion against the United States. We are asked

to transfer our sovereignty to a small minority in the

islands, without consulting the majority, and to abandon the

largest portion of the population, which has been loyal to us,

to the cruelties of the guerrilla insurgent bands. More, than

this, we are asked to protect this minority in establishing a

government, and to this end repress all opposition of the

majority. We are required to set up a stable government in the

interest of those who have assailed our sovereignty and fired

upon our soldiers, and then maintain it at any cost or

sacrifice against its enemies within and against those having

ambitious designs from without. This would require an army and

navy far larger than is now maintained in the Philippines and

still more in excess of what will be necessary with the full

recognition of our sovereignty. A military support of

authority not our own, as thus proposed, is the very essence

of militarism, which our opponents in their platform oppose,

but which by their policy would of necessity be established in

its most offensive form.

"The American people will not make the murderers of our

soldiers the agents of the Republic to convey the blessings of

liberty and order to the Philippines. They will not make them

the builders of the new commonwealth. Such a course would be a

betrayal of our sacred obligations to the peaceful Filipinos

and would place at the mercy of dangerous adventurers the

lives and property of the natives and foreigners. It would

make possible and easy the commission of such atrocities as

were secretly planned to be executed on the 22d of February,

1899, in the city of Manila, when only the vigilance of our

Army prevented the attempt to assassinate our soldiers and all

foreigners and pillage and destroy the city and its

surroundings. In short, the proposition of those opposed to us

is to continue all the obligations in the Philippines which

now rest upon the Government, only changing the relation from

principal, which now exists, to that of surety. Our

responsibility is to remain, but our power is to be

diminished. Our obligation is to be no less, but our title is

to be surrendered to another power, which is without

experience or training or the ability to maintain a stable

government at home and absolutely helpless to perform its

international obligations with the rest of the world. To this

we are opposed. We should not yield our title while our

obligations last. In the language of our platform, 'Our

authority should not be less than our responsibility,' and our

present responsibility is to establish our authority in every

part of the islands.

"No government can so certainly preserve the peace, restore

public order, establish law, justice and stable conditions as

ours. Neither Congress nor the Executive can establish a

stable government in these islands except under our right of

sovereignty, our authority and our flag. And this we are

doing. We could not do it as a protectorate power so

completely or so successfully as we are doing it now. As the

sovereign power, we can initiate action and shape means to

ends and guide the Filipinos to self-development and

self-government. As a protectorate power we could not initiate

action, but would be compelled to follow and uphold a people

with no capacity yet to go alone. In the one case we can

protect both ourselves and the Filipinos from being involved

in dangerous complications; in the other we could not protect

even the Filipinos until after their trouble had come. Beside,

if we cannot establish any government of our own without the

consent of the governed, as our opponents contend, then we

could not establish a stable government for them or make ours

a protectorate without the like consent, and neither the

majority of the people or a minority of the people have

invited us to assume it. We could not maintain a protectorate

even with the consent of the governed without giving

provocation for conflicts and possibly costly wars. Our rights

in the Philippines are now free from outside interference and

will continue so in our present relation. They would not be

thus free in any other relation. We will not give up our own

to guarantee another sovereignty.

"Our title is good. Our peace commissioners believed they were

receiving a good title when they concluded the treaty. The

Executive believed it was a good title when he submitted it to

the Senate of the United States for its ratification. The Senate

believed it was a good title when they gave it their

Constitutional assent, and the Congress seems not to have

doubted its completeness when they appropriated $20,000,000

provided by the treaty. If any who favored its ratification

believed it gave us a bad title, they were not sincere. Our

title is practically identical with that under which we hold

our territory acquired since the beginning of the government,

and under which we have exercised full sovereignty and

established government for the inhabitants. It is worthy of

note that no one outside of the United States disputes the

fulness and integrity of the cession. What then is the real

issue on this subject? Whether it is paramount to any other or

not, it is whether we shall be responsible for the government

of the Philippines with the sovereignty and authority which

enable us to guide them to regulated liberty, law, safety and

progress, or whether we shall be responsible for the forcible

and arbitrary government of a minority without sovereignty and

authority on our part and with only the embarrassment of a

protectorate which draws us into their troubles without the

power of preventing them. There were those who two years ago

were rushing us on to war with Spain who are unwilling now to

accept its clear consequence, as there are those among us who

advocated the ratification of the treaty of pence, but now

protest against its obligations. Nations which go to war must

be prepared to accept its resultant obligations, and when they

make treaties must keep them.

{666}

"Those who profess to distrust the liberal and honorable

purposes of the Administration in its treatment of the

Philippines are not justified. Imperialism has no place in its

creed or conduct. Freedom is a rock upon which the Republican

party was builded and now rests. Liberty is the great

Republican doctrine for which the people went to war and for

which 1,000,000 lives were offered and billions of dollars

expended to make it a lawful legacy of all without the consent

of master or slave. There is a strain of ill-conceived

hypocrisy in the anxiety to extend the Constitutional

guarantees to the people of the Philippines while their

nullification is openly advocated at home. Our opponents may

distrust themselves, but they have no right to discredit the

good faith and patriotism of the majority of the people, who

are opposing them; they may fear the worst form of imperialism

with the helpless Filipinos in their hands, but if they do, it

is because they have parted with the spirit and faith of the

fathers and have lost the virility of the founders of the

party which they profess to represent.

"The Republican party does not have to assert its devotion to

the Declaration of Independence. That immortal instrument of

the fathers remained unexecuted until the people under the

lead of the Republican party in the awful clash of battle

turned its promises into fulfillment. It wrote into the

Constitution the amendments guaranteeing political equality to

American citizenship and it has never broken them or counseled

others in breaking them. It will not be guided in its conduct by

one set of principles at home and another set in the new

territory belonging to the United States. If our opponents

would only practice as well as preach the doctrines of Abraham

Lincoln there would be no fear for the safety of our

institutions at home or their rightful influence in any

territory over which our flag floats.

"Empire has been expelled from Porto Rico and the Philippines

by American freemen. The flag of the Republic now floats over

these islands as an emblem of rightful sovereignty. Will the

Republic stay and dispense to their inhabitants the blessings

of liberty, education and free institutions, or steal away,

leaving them to anarchy or imperialism? The American question

is between duty and desertion—the American verdict will be for

duty and against desertion, for the Republic against both

anarchy and imperialism."

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (June).

Revenues and expenditures of the government for the

fiscal year ended June 30, 1900.

The revenues of the Government from all sources (by

warrants) for the fiscal year ended June 30. 1900, were:

From internal revenue. $295.327,926.76

From customs. 233,164,871.16

From profits on coinage, bullion deposits, etc. 9,992,374.09

From District of Columbia. 4,008,722.77

From fees-consular, letters patents, and land. 3,291.716.68

From sales of public lands. 2,836.882.98

From tax on national banks. 1.998.554.00

From navy pension, navy hospital, clothing,

and deposit funds. 1,621.558.52

From sales of Indian lands. 1,384,663.49

From payment of interest by Pacific railways. 1,173,466.43

From miscellaneous. 997,375.68

From sales of Government property. 779,522.78

From customs fees, fines, penalties, etc. 675,706.95

From immigrant fund. 537,404.81

From deposits for surveying public lands. 273,247.19

From sales of ordnance material. 257,265.56

From Soldiers' Home, permanent fund. 247,926.62

From tax on seal skins, and rent of seal islands. 225,676.47

From license fees, Territory of Alaska. 157,234.94

From trust funds, Department of State. 152,794.56

From depredations on public lands. 76,307.58

From Spanish indemnity. 57,000.00

From sales of lands and buildings 3,842,737.68

From part payment Central Pacific

Railroad indebtedness. 3,338,016.49

From dividend received for account of

Kansas Pacific Railway. 821,891.70

From Postal Service. 102,354,579.29

Total receipts 669,595,431.18

The expenditures for the same period were:

For the civil establishment, including foreign

intercourse, public buildings, collecting

the revenues, District of Columbia,

and other miscellaneous expenses $98,542,411.37

For the military establishment, including

rivers and harbors, forts, arsenals, sea

coast defenses, and expenses of the war

with Spain and in the Philippines 134,174,761.18

For the naval establishment, including

construction of new vessels, machinery,

armament, equipment, improvement at

navy-yards, and expenses of the war

with Spain and in the Philippines 55,953,077.72

For Indian Service. 10,175,100.76

For pensions. 140,877,316.02

For interest on the public debt. 40,160,333.27

For deficiency in postal revenues. 7,230,778.79

For Postal Service. 102,354,579.29

Total expenditures. 590,068,371.00

Showing a surplus of 79,527,060.18

"As compared with the fiscal year 1899, the receipts for 1900

increased $58,613,426.83. … There was a decrease of

$117,358,388.14 in expenditures."

_United States Secretary of the Treasury,

Annual Report on the State of the Finances,

1900, pages 7-9._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (June).

Return of losses from all causes in the armies of the

United States since May 1, 1898.

In response to a resolution of the Senate, the following

return (56th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document 426) was

made by the Secretary of War, June 1, 1900, showing the losses

from all causes in the armies of the United States between May

1, 1898, and June 30, 1899; casualties in the Philippines

during the war with Spain, and after the close of the war with

Spain down to May 20, 1900; and other interesting details:

Statement showing losses, from all causes, in the armies of

the United States between May 1, 1898, and June 30, 1899.

Average strength.

1898:

Regular Army, 55,853:

Volunteers, 163,103.

1899:

Regular Army, 63,370;

Volunteers, 45,457.

REGULAR ARMY.

CAUSES. Officers. Enlisted Men. Total.

Deaths:

Killed in action. 24 270 294

By Wounds. 7 114 121

Disease. 51 1,524 1,575

Accident. 1 72 73

Drowning. 2 48 50

Suicide. 1 32 33

Murder or homicide. 26 26

Total 86 2,086 2,172

Wounded. 109 1,586 1,695

{667}

VOLUNTEERS.

CAUSES.

Officers. Enlisted Men Total.

Deaths:

Killed in action. 17 188 205

By wounds. 3 78 81

Disease. 114 3,820 3,934

Accident. 5 137 142

Drowning. 1 40 41

Suicide. 1 20 21

Murder or homicide. 26 26

Total. 141 4,309 4,450

Wounded. 88 1,178 1,266

667

GRAND TOTAL.

CAUSES.

Officers. Enlisted Men

Deaths:

Killed In action 38 458

By wounds 10 192

Disease 165 5,344

Accident 6 209

Drowning 3 88

Suicide. 2 52

Murder or homicide. 52

Total 224 6,395

Wounded 197 2,764

Casualties in the Philippines during the war

with Spain, June 30, 1898, to August 13, 1898.

Average strength, 10,900.

Officers. Enlisted Men. Total.

Killed

(no deaths from wounds) 18 18

Wounded 10 99 109

Total 10 117 127

In the Philippines, from February 4, 1899, to May 20, 1900,

Average strength, 43,232.

Officers. Enlisted Men. Total.

Killed or died of wounds. 43 579 622

Deaths:

By disease 19 1,054 1,073

Accident 1 43 44

Drowning 2 94 96

Suicide 6 23 29

Murder or homicide 11 11

Total 71 1,804 1,875

Wounded. 132 1,897 2,029

Grand total 203 3,701 3,904

Casualties in the Fifth Corps in the operations against

Santiago, June 22 to July 17, 1898:

KILLED. WOUNDED.

ACTIONS.

Officers. Men. Officers. Men.

Las Guasimas, June 24 1 15 6 43

El Caney, July 1 4 77 25 335

San Juan, July 1-3 15 127 69 945

Aguadores, July l-2 2 10

Around Santiago,

July 10-12 1 1 1 11

Total. 21 222 101 1,344

Died of wounds received in the five battles named:

Officers, 5; men, 70.

Total killed and died of wounds:

Officers, 26; men, 292.

Statement of the number of insane soldiers admitted to the

Government Hospital for the Insane, Washington, D. C., from

the Philippine Islands, May 24, 1900, and the disposition made

of them:

Regulars. Volunteers.

Admitted 47 15

Discharged recovered 16 3

Discharged unimproved 1

On visit from hospital 1

Remaining in hospital 29 12

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (June).

Immigration for the year ended June 30.

"The Commissioner-General of Immigration, in the annual report

of the operations of his Bureau for the fiscal year ended June

30, 1900, submits tabulated statements showing the arrival in

this country during that period of 448,572 alien immigrants,

425,372 through ports of the United States and 23,200 through

Canada. Of these, 304,148 were males and 144,424 females;

54,624 were under 14 years of age, 370,382 were from 14 to 45

years old, and 23,566 were 45 and over. As to the literacy of

persons 14 years of age and over, there were 93,576 who could

neither read nor write, and 2,097 who could read but were

unable to write; 54,288 brought each $30 or over, and 271,821

showed sums less than $30, the total amounts displayed to

inspectors aggregating $6,657,530. There were returned to

their own countries within one year after landing 356, and

hospital relief was rendered during the year to 2,417. The

total debarred, or refused a landing at the ports, were 4,246,

as compared with 3,798 last year. Of these, 1 was excluded for

idiocy, 32 for insanity, 2,974 as paupers or persons likely to

become public charges, 393 on account of disease, 4 as

convicts, 2 as assisted immigrants, 833 as contract laborers,

and 7 women upon the ground that they had been imported for

immoral purposes. In addition to the foregoing, there were

excluded at the Mexican and Canadian borders a total of 1,616

aliens.

"It appears that the Croatian and Slovenian races sent an

increase of 99 per cent over those of the same races who came

last year; the Hebrew, an increase of 62 per cent; the South

Italian (including Sicilian), 28 per cent; the Japanese, 271

per cent; the Finnish, 106 per cent; the Magyar, 181 per cent;

the Polish, 64 per cent; the Scandinavian, 41 per cent.; the

Slovak, 84 per cent. These nine races, of the total of

forty-one races represented by immigration, furnished nearly

as many immigrants as the total arrivals for the last year, or

310,444, and their aggregate increase represented 85 per cent of

the total increase shown for the year.

{668}

The total immigration reported, 448,572, is in excess of that

for the preceding year, 311,715, by 136,857, or 43.9 per cent.

As to countries of origin, 424,700 came from European, 17,946

from Asiatic, 30 from African, and 5,896 from all other

sources. The Commissioner-General points out that in addition

to the 448,572 immigrants there arrived 65,635 other alien

passengers, who, he contends, should be included in conformity

to law with those classified as immigrants."

_United States, Secretary of the Treasury,

Annual Report, 1900, page 37._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (June).

Shipping, compared with that of other countries.

See (in this volume)

SHIPPING OF THE WORLD.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (June).

Alaska Act.

See (in this volume)

ALASKA: A. D. 1900.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (June).

Returns of Filipinos killed, wounded and captured from the

beginning of hostilities with them.

See (in this volume)

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1900 (MAY).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (June-December).

Co-operation with the Powers in China.

See (in this volume)

CHINA.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (July).

Appeal of citizens of Manila to the

Congress of the United States.

See (in this volume)

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1900 (JULY).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (July).

Forces sent to China under General Chaffee.

See (in this volume)

CHINA: A. D. 1900 (JULY).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (August).

Agreement with Russian proposal to withdraw troops

from Peking.

See (in this volume)

CHINA: A. D. 1900 (AUGUST-DECEMBER).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (September).

Opposition to German proposal for dealing with China.

See (in this volume)

CHINA: A. D. 1900 (AUGUST-DECEMBER).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (September-November).

Legislative measures of the Philippine Commission.

See (in this volume)

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1900 (SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (October).

Military forces in the Philippine Islands.

See (in this volume)

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1900 (OCTOBER).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (December).

Amendment and ratification of the Hay-Pauncefote Convention.

See (in this volume)

CANAL, INTEROCEANIC: A. D. 1900 (DECEMBER).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (December).

Celebration of the 100th anniversary of the removal of

the capital to Washington.

See (in this volume)

WASHINGTON.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (December).

Exports for the calendar year exceeding those

of any other nation.

A Press despatch from Washington, dated February 21, 1901,

announced the fact that the "complete figures for the calendar

year 1900, when compared with those of other nations, show

that American exports of domestic products are greater than

those of any other country. The total exports of domestic

merchandise from the United States in the calendar year 1900

were $1,453,013,659; those from the United Kingdom, which has

heretofore led in the race for this distinction were

$1,418,348,000, and those from Germany $1,050,611,000.

Additional interest is given to the first rank which the

United States now holds as an exporting nation by the fact

that a quarter of a century ago she stood fourth in that list.

In 1875 the domestic exports of the United States were

$497,263,737; those of Germany, $607,096,000; those of France,

$747,489,000, and those of the United Kingdom, $1,087,497,000.

To-day the United States stands at the head of the list, the

United Kingdom second, Germany third and France fourth, with

the figures as follows: United States, $1,453,013,659; United

Kingdom, $1,418,348,000; Germany, $1,050,611,000; France,

$787,060,000. All of these figures, it should be remembered,

relate to the exports of domestic products. Thus in the

quarter century the United States has increased her exports

from $497,263,737 to $1,453,013,659, or 192 per cent; Germany,

from $607,096,000 to $1,050,611,000, or 73 per cent; the

United Kingdom, from $1,087,497,000 to $1,418,348,000, or 34

per cent, and France, from $747,489,000 to $787,060,000, or 5

per cent.

"The following table, compiled from official reports, shows

the exports of domestic merchandise from the United States,

the United Kingdom and Germany in each calendar year from 1875

to 1900:

Year United States United Kingdom Germany

1875 $497,263,737 $1,087,497,000 $607,096,000

1876 575,735,804 976,410,000 619,919,000

1877 607,666,495 967,913,000 672,151,000

1878 723,286,821 938,500,000 702,513,000

1879 754,656,755 932,090,000 675,397,000

1880 875,564,075 1,085,521,000 741,202,000

1881 814,162,951 1,138,873,000 724,379,000

1882 749,911,309 1,175,099,000 776,228,000

18&1 777,523,718 1,166,982,000 796,208,000

1884 733,768,764 1,134,016,000 779,832,000

1885 673,593,506 1,037,124,000 695,892,000

1886 699,519,430 1,035,226,000 726,471,000

1887 703,319,692 1,079,944,000 762,897,000

1888 679,597,477 1,141,365,000 780,076,000

1889 814,154,864 1,211,442,000 770,537,000

1890 845,999,603 1,282,474,000 809,810,000

1891 907,333,551 1,203,169,000 772,679,000

1892 923,237,315 1,105,747,000 718,806,000

1893 854,729,454 1,062,162,000 753,301,000

1894 807,312,116 1,051,193,000 720,607,000

1895 807,742,415 1,100,452,000 807,328,000

1896 986,830,080 1,168,671,000 857,745,000

1897 1,079,834,296 1,139,882,000 884,486,000

1898 1,233,564,828 1,135,642,000 894,063,000

1899 1,203,460,000 1,287,971,039 1,001,278,000

1900 1,453,013,659 1,418,348,000 1,050,611,000

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900-1901.

Questions relating to the political status of the new

possessions of the nation submitted to the Supreme Court.

Questions of surpassing importance, touching the political

status of the new possessions which the nation had acquired

from Spain, the relations of their inhabitants to the

government and laws of the United States, the source and

nature of the authority to be exercised over them by the

Congress of the United States, whether exercised under the

constitution of the United States or independently of it, were

taken, in December and January (1900-1901), into the Supreme

Court for authoritative decision, by appeals to that tribunal

made in several suits which had arisen from disputed exactions

of duty on importations from Porto Rico and the Philippine

Islands. The questions had been burning ones in American

politics, from the moment that the treaty of peace with Spain

was signed, and the whole cast, character and consequence of

the new policy of over-sea expansion on which the American

Republic was then launched depended on the decision of the

Court.

{669}

Soon after the January argument and submission of these cases

to the Supreme Court, their extraordinary importance was

touched upon with impressive eloquence by the Honorable W.

Bourke Cockran, in an address upon "John Marshall," in which

he said:

"At this moment the [Supreme Court] is considering the gravest

question ever submitted to a judicial tribunal in the history

of mankind. Within a few days it must decide whether the

government of the United States, or rather whether two of its

departments can govern territory anywhere by the sword, or

whether authority exercised by officers of the United States

must be controlled and limited everywhere by the Constitution

of the United States.

"I do not mention this momentous question to express the

slightest opinion upon its merits, but merely that this

assemblage of judges and of lawyers may realize the part which

the judiciary is now required to play in determining the

influence which this country must exercise forevermore in the

family of nations. The power of Congress to acquire territory

is of course unquestioned, but the disposition to exercise

that power will always be controlled by the conditions under

which newly acquired territory must be held, and these

conditions the court must now prescribe. On the one hand it

may hold that wherever power is exercised under the

constitution there the limitations of the constitution must be

obeyed—that wherever the executive undertakes to administer, or

Congress to legislate, there the judiciary must enforce upon

both respect for the organic law to which they owe their

existence. If this doctrine be established it is clear that no

scheme of forcible conquest will ever be undertaken by this

government, for the simple reason that there can be no profit

in such an enterprise. On the other hand the Court may decide

that Congress can hold newly annexed territories on any terms

that it chooses—that it may govern them according to the

constitution or independently of it—that they may be

administered to establish justice among the governed or for

the glory and profit of the governors. If it be held that

government for profit can be maintained under the authority of

the United States, conceive the extent to which it may be

carried and the consequences which it may portend. If it be

possible to maintain two forms of government under our

constitution, it is possible to establish twenty in as many

different places. Territory may be annexed to the North, to

the South, to the East and to the West. The President of the

United States may be vested with imperial powers in one place,

with royal prerogatives in another and perhaps remain a

constitutional magistrate at home. He may be made a military

autocrat in some South American State, an anointed emperor in

some Northern clime, a turbaned sultan in some Eastern island.

Nay, more, Congress can move itself and the seat of government

from Washington to some newly annexed territory governed by

officers of its own creation, subject to its own unlimited

power, and thus take both outside the jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court.

"Has the world ever before seen—could the framers of this

constitution have conceived—a bench of judges exercising such

a power amid the universal submission and approval of the

whole people. And more extraordinary than all, this submission

remains unanimous though the decision of the court may

seriously affect its own position in the structure of our

government. For if it be held that the constitution does not

extend of itself over newly annexed territory, then clearly

the authority of the court cannot extend to it except by the

action of Congress and the executive. If the authority, that

is to say, the existence of the court in any part of the

territory of the United States, depends upon the other

departments, then it is idle to contend that it is an

independent and coordinate branch of the government. To decide

that the executive and legislative departments have the right

to govern territory outside the constitution the court must

deliberately renounce the importance which it has heretofore

enjoyed and accept for itself an inferior place in our

political system.

"To me this is the most sublime spectacle ever presented in

the history of the world. Think of it! A war has been waged

with signal success, vast territory has been exacted from a

conquered foe; a great political campaign has been fought and

won upon the policy of taking this territory and governing it

at the pleasure of Congress and the executive, yet if the

court should hold that what the executive has attempted, what

Congress has sanctioned, and what the people appear to have

approved at the polls is in contravention of the constitution,

not one voice would be raised to question the judgment or to

resist its enforcement. I have said the spectacle is sublime;

my friends, even a few weeks ago it was inconceivable. Before

the late election I confess I believed and said that the

success of the present administration would be interpreted as

a popular endorsement of its foreign policy and that the

popular verdict would very probably be made to exercise a

strong if not decisive influence on the court. I admit now

that I was mistaken. It is evident that this question will be

decided on its merits without the slightest attempt to coerce,

intimidate or influence the judges, and I say now with all

frankness that whatever may be the judgment it will be the

very best outcome for the people of this country, for the

peace of the world, for the welfare of the human race. I

cannot tell what this outcome may be, but I know that whenever

a crisis has arisen in the pathway of the republic, the

statesmanship of the common people has always met it with

justice and solved it with wisdom."

_W. Bourke Cockran,

John Marshall: an address before the Erie County Bar

Association, February 4, 1901, at Buffalo._

Argument before the Supreme Court was begun on the 17th of

December, 1900, on two cases thus stated in the brief

submitted for the government: "On June 6, 1899, Goetze

imported from Porto Rico into the port of New York a quantity

of leaf or filler tobacco, upon which duty was assessed at 35

cents per pound as filler tobacco not specially provided for,

in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 213 of the

tariff act of 1897, commonly known as the 'Dingley Act.' The

importer protested, claiming that the merchandise was not

subject to duty, because Porto Rico at the time of the

importation was not a foreign country and because, therefore,

the imposition of duties on goods brought from a place within

the territory of the United States into a port of the United

States is not lawful and valid under the Constitution.

{670}

The Board of General Appraisers sustained the assessment of

duty imposed by the collector upon the merchandise in

question, and thereupon the importer appealed to the United

States circuit court for the southern district of New York, by

which court the decision of the Board of General Appraisers

was affirmed in an opinion rendered by District Judge

Townsend. From the judgment of the circuit court this appeal

was taken.

"Porto Rico was partially occupied by the war forces of the

United States during the months of July and August, 1898. By

the protocol of August 12, 1898, between the United States and

Spain, Spain agreed to cede Porto Rico to the United States

and immediately evacuate. The evacuation was effected and full

possession of the island assumed by the United States prior to

January 1, 1899. From that date until the 1st of May, 1900,

Porto Rico was occupied and governed by the military forces of

the United States, under the command of the President, as

conquered territory, under the law of belligerent right. The

treaty of Paris, made in pursuance of the protocol, was signed

December 10, 1898, ratified by the Senate February 6, 1899,

and ratifications exchanged April 11, 1899. So that the

importation in this case was subsequent to the ratification of

the treaty, but prior to the establishment of a civil

government in the island under act of Congress. It does not

appear that the importers are citizens of the United States or

of Porto Rico, nor whether or not the imported tobacco was the

product of Porto Rico.

"In the case of Fourteen Diamond Rings, it appears that the

claimant, Pepke, is a citizen of the United States and served

as a United States soldier in the Island of Luzon; that while

there he purchased or acquired the rings in question and

brought them into the United States without paying duty

thereon some time in the year 1899, between July 31 and

September 25. The rings were seized, on May 18, 1900, at

Chicago, by a United States customs officer as merchandise

liable to duty which should have been invoiced, and was

fraudulently imported and brought into the United States

contrary to law. An information for the forfeiture of the

rings was filed on behalf of the Government, June 1, 1900, to

which the claimant pleaded. Setting up that at the time he

acquired said property Luzon was a part of the territory of

the United States and that the seizure of said goods was

contrary to the claimant's right as a citizen of the United

States under the Constitution, and particularly under section

2, Article IV, thereof, and he insisted that under Article I,

section 8, Congress is required in laying and collecting taxes

to see to it that all taxes and duties shall be uniform

throughout the United States. To this plea the United States

demurred, and upon hearing of the demurrer, the district court

gave judgment of forfeiture for the Government. This judgment

the claimant has removed into this court by a writ of error."

The contention of the government as set forth in the same

brief, and the main contention of the appellants in the case,

against which the argument for the government was directed,

were partly as follows:

"The Tariff Act of 1897 declares that 'there shall be levied,

collected and paid upon all articles imported from foreign

countries and mentioned in the schedules herein contained, the

rates of duty which are by the schedules and paragraphs

respectively prescribed.' (30 Stat., 151.)

"The Government contends, and the circuit court so held, that

this act applied to merchandise imported from Porto Rico and

the Philippine Islands after their cession to the United

States exactly as it did before; that within the meaning of

the act these countries are to be regarded as foreign,

belonging to but not forming in a domestic sense a part of the

United States.

"That it is within the constitutional province of the

treaty-making power to accept the cession of foreign territory

upon such terms, conditions, and limitations as to its

internal status as may best subserve the interests of the

United States, and it is not necessary to invest such

territory with the full status of an integral part of the

Union.

"That this is one of the ordinary and necessary sovereign

powers of an independent nation, and nothing in the Federal

Constitution or in the fundamental principles that underlie

our Republic denies to the nation a right to the full exercise

of this usual and common sovereign right.

"That the treaty-making power—the President and the Senate—as

evidenced by the language of the treaty of Paris, did not

intend to make Porto Rico and the Philippine Islands integral

parts of the United States, but intended, in several

particulars, to reserve their final status for adjustment by

Congress, at the same time making peculiar and special

differential provisions for variations and exceptions in

customs and port regulations as to Spain and Spanish goods and

subjects, which are inconsistent with the intention that the

ceded countries became upon the ratification of the treaty a

part of the United States in all respects and in the fullest

sense.

"The Government contends that the term 'foreign countries' in

the act of 1897 is to be regarded as having been understood by

Congress to be subject to the rule of interpretation of the

phrase given by the Supreme Court in the case of Fleming v.

Page, where it was held that under our revenue laws every port

is regarded as a foreign one until expressly established as

domestic under the authority and control of the statutes of

the United States.

"That the clause of the Constitution which declares that

duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the

United States does not apply to nor govern these cases,

because the term 'United States,' as there used, means only

the territory comprised within the several States of the

Union, and was intended only for their benefit and protection,

and not for the benefit or protection of outside territory

belonging to the nation; that in the latter sense duties on

imports from these islands are uniform throughout the United

States, because they are uniformly imposed at every port in

the United States, so that there is no preference given to the

ports of one State over those of another, nor is any

inequality between the several States created.

{671}

"That the right to bring merchandise into the United States is

a right entirely within the regulation of Congress; such right

in no wise differs as to either citizens or aliens.

Citizenship carries with it no special or peculiar privileges

at the custom-house. The American, the Spaniard, the Porto

Rican, are treated alike. The basis of the customs laws is not

ownership, but (1) the geographical origin of the shipment,

and (2) the nature of the goods. The duty is imposed against

merchandise, not upon the importer. "The Government contends,

therefore, that in view of the fact that tariff laws are 'in

rem,' there is no principle of justice, much less of

constitutional restriction, which forbids Congress from taxing

in this way the merchandise of outlying possessions of the

United States when brought into the ports of the Union. That

the limitations of the Constitution as to customs, etc., were

intended to secure equality between the States in the

geographical sense, and not to forbid Congress from exercising

the ordinary sovereign power of taxation as to the products of

other sections of country not included within the geographical

boundaries of the States; for which we rely upon the opinion

of this court in Knowlton v. Moore as decisive and conclusive.

"If the foregoing propositions are sound, then it is

established (1) that the tariff act of 1897 was intended by

Congress to classify as foreign all countries not a part of or

belonging to the United States at the time of its passage, and

the subsequent cession of the Spanish islands to the United

States did not operate to admit imports from those islands

free of duty, under that law; (2) that the tariff act so

construed and enforced violates no constitutional rule of

uniformity.

"And the case of the plaintiffs in error would seem on these

grounds to have no legal foundation.

"The Government might well be content to rest its argument

upon these propositions. But counsel for the plaintiffs in

error, in the court below as well us in this court, have gone

far beyond these limits, and have challenged and denied the

constitutionality of certain provisions of the treaty of

Paris, contending that the cession of Porto Rico and the

Philippine Archipelago effected a complete incorporation of

those countries with the United States, so that they have

become a part of the United States in the fullest and largest

sense, not only internationally, but organically, so

completely, indeed, that no difference or distinction can be

made by law between imports from those countries and imports

from one of the States of the Union.

"They insist that there can be no limited or qualified

acquisition of territory by this nation; that when Porto Rico

was ceded to the United States it came at once under the

obligations of the Constitution and became entitled to the

privileges of the Constitution, its inhabitants citizens of

the United States, and its territory a part of the United

States. They argue, therefore, that the clause of the treaty

which says that 'the civil rights and political status of the

inhabitants shall be determined by the Congress,' in so far as

it is intended to defer the full enjoyment of the rights and

privileges of citizenship under the Constitution until

Congress shall bestow them hereafter upon the inhabitants, is

'ultra vires' and void, or at least superfluous and

ineffective, because the Constitution 'ex proprio vigore'

extends at once, as an automatic operation, to all territory

ceded to this Government, and no treaty or treaty-making power

can hinder or even suspend it. …

"Counsel have been at great pains to prove that the Government

of the United States is one of delegated powers, and that its

powers are not absolute and untrammeled, but subject to

certain limits never and nowhere to be transcended; that the

vague political entity known as The People stands behind the

constituted agencies of government, holding in reserve the

sources of supreme power, capable and ready to alter or

destroy at its pleasure the machinery heretofore set up in its

behalf. They call these doctrines truisms, and so they are.

They do not help us in this case.

"The Government of the United States has been vested not with

all powers but only with certain particular powers. These

particular delegated powers are in some respects limited and

confined in scope and operation, but in other respects they

are entirely unlimited. So that the real and practical

question is whether there is any limitation preventing the

particular thing here complained of.

"It is worth while, in passing, to allude to the undeniable

fact that 'The People' referred to are not the people of the

Territories or of the outlying possessions of the United

States, but the people of the several States, who ordained and

established for themselves and their posterity the Federal

Constitution.

"Counsel confuse ideas when they argue that the contention of

the Government in these cases implies the possession by

Congress of all unlimited and despotic powers in the

government of territory. We mean no more than this court meant

when it said:

"'The power of Congress over the Territories is general and

plenary.

"'Its sovereignty over them is complete.

"'It has full and complete legislative authority over the

people of the Territories and all departments of the

Territorial governments.

"'The people of the United States, as sovereign owners of the

National Territories, have supreme power over them and their

inhabitants.

"'In legislating for the Territories Congress would doubtless

be subject to those fundamental limitations in favor of

personal rights which are formulated in the Constitution and

its amendments, but these limitations would exist rather by

inference and the general spirit of the Constitution than by

any express and direct application of its provisions.'"

_In the Supreme Court of the United States,

October Term, 1900, John H. Goetze, Appellant, &c.;

Brief for the United States._

On the 8th of January, 1901, four other causes, involving

substantially the same questions, came before the Supreme

Court, and, by order of the Court, were consolidated, to be

dealt with virtually as one case. The titles of the cases were

respectively as follows:

Elias S. A. Dc Lima et al., plaintiffs in error,

agt. George R. Bidwell;

Samuel B. Downes et al., plaintiffs in error,

agt. George R. Bidwell;

Henry W. Dooley et al., plaintiffs in error,

agt. the United States;

Carlos Armstrong, appellant,

agt. the United States, and George W. Crossmon et al.,

appellants, agt. the United States.

{672}

For the plaintiffs, in the case of Henry W. Dooley et al., the

Honorable John G. Carlisle made an oral argument, in which he

said: "What is the Constitution? In the first place it is not

only the supreme law of the States composing the union, but

the supreme law of the land; supreme over every branch and

department of the Government; supreme over every one

exercising authority under the Government; supreme over every

other law or order or regulation, and supreme over all the

people, wherever they may be, within its jurisdiction, and

what we claim is, that so long as this Constitution exists

absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberties, or

property of the people can be exercised nowhere in this

Republic. It is now argued that it is supreme only within the

boundaries of the several States, unless Congress extends it

to the Territories; that it limits the powers of Congress only

when legislating for the geographical area embraced in the

States; that the inhabitants of the States are the only people

who can, as a matter of right, claim the benefit of its

guarantees and prohibitions for the protection even of those

personal and property rights which have for ages been secured

by the common law of England, and that all other people within

the jurisdiction of the United States are dependent for the

protection of their civil rights substantially upon the will

of Congress. The question whether the Constitution should be

declared to be the supreme law of the whole land, or only the

supreme law of the respective States and their inhabitants or

citizens, was presented in the Federal Convention of 1787, and

was finally disposed of by the adoption of the clause as it

now stands in the Constitution, which declares it to be "the

supreme law of the land.

"In the plan proposed by Mr. Charles Pinckney, of South

Carolina, it was provided that 'all acts made by the

legislature of the United States pursuant to this

Constitution, and all treaties made under the authority of the

United States, shall be the supreme law of the land,' etc. (1

Elliot, page 46). Mr. Patterson's plan proposed 'that all acts

of the United States in Congress assembled made by virtue and

in pursuance of the powers hereby vested in them, and by the

Articles of Confederation and all treaties made and ratified

under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme

law of the respective States, so far as those acts or treaties

shall relate to such States or their citizens,' etc. (pages

71, 72). These plans and others were referred to the Committee

of the Whole House and were reported back without any

provision upon this subject. Afterwards the Convention

unanimously agreed to the following resolution:

'That the Legislative acts made by virtue and in pursuance of

the Articles of Union and all treaties made and ratified under

the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law

of the respective States, so far as those acts or treaties

shall relate to the said States or their citizens or

inhabitants' (page 100). Thus it stood when referred to the

committee of five, of which Mr. Rutledge was chairman, and on

the 6th of August, 1787, that committee reported back to the

Convention a draft of the proposed Constitution, the eighth

article of which was the same as the resolution last quoted,

except that in the place of the words 'Articles of Union' it

contained the words 'this Constitution' (page 120). This

report was considered in the Committee of the Whole, and on

the 23d of August the eighth article was unanimously amended

so as to read: 'This Constitution and all laws of the United

States made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made under

the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of

the several States and of their citizens and inhabitants,'

etc. (page 151).

"This was the form in which the article stood when the whole

draft was referred to the committee of eleven, but when

reported back September 12, it constituted the second clause

of the sixth article and declared that the Constitution and

laws and the treaties made and to be made should be 'the

supreme law of the land,' and so it now stands as part of the

Constitution. If the clause had been adopted in the form

agreed to in the committee and inserted in the first draft,

there would have been at least a certain degree of

plausibility in the argument made here for the Government, but

even in that case we think the powers of Congress would have

been limited whenever and wherever it might attempt to

exercise them. But it is argued here that the history of the

Constitution and the language employed in the preamble, and in

some other places, show that it was intended to establish a

government only for such of the States then existing as might

ratify it, and such other States as might thereafter be

admitted into the Union, and that, therefore, while it confers

power upon Congress to govern Territories, it does not require

that body to govern them in accordance with the supreme law of

the land; that is, in accordance with the instrument from

which the power to govern is derived. Even if the premises

were true, the conclusion would not follow; but is it true

that the Constitution was ordained and established for the

government of the States only? If so, how did it happen that

the great men who framed that instrument made it confer the

power to govern Territories as well as States? It is true that

the Constitution was ordained and established by the people of

the States, but it created a National Government for national

purposes, not a mere league or compact between the States, and

jurisdiction was conferred upon that Government over the whole

national domain, whatever its boundaries might be. It is not

true that the Government was established only for the States,

their inhabitants or citizens, but if it were true, then it

could exercise no power outside of the States, and this court

would have to put a new construction upon that provision which

authorizes Congress to dispose of and make all needful rules

and regulations respecting the territory, or other property,

belonging to the United States. The necessary construction of

that clause would be that it conferred power only to dispose

of land or other property, and to make necessary rules and

regulations respecting land or other property belonging to the

United States; that is, belonging to the several States

composing the Union. It would confer no power whatever to

govern the people outside of the States."

_Supreme Court of the United States,

October Term, 1900,

Henry W. Dooley [et al.] vs. the United States:

Argument of J. G. Carlisle._

{673}

On one point the argument of Mr. Charles H. Aldrich, attorney

for the plaintiff in the case of the "Fourteen Diamond Rings,"

was as follows: In "the relations of the United States to other

nations, our government is a sovereign state, and has the

right, and as such 'free and independent State has full power,

to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish

commerce, and to do all other acts and things which

independent States may of right do.' In this relation it is

correct, as I conceive, to speak of the United States of

America as a unit and use a singular verb. It is such unit and

has this power because there was created a government upon

which the people conferred these powers. If war is declared it

must be under the constitution; if peace is concluded it is in

the exercise of a constitutional power; if commerce is

established it is because Congress under the constitution was

given power to regulate commerce; if alliances are contracted

it can only be done under the constitution. In short, the

sovereign nation exists through the adoption of the

constitution, and its powers are derived from that instrument

and must be found, as this court has often declared, in the

language thereof or by necessary implication therefrom. We are

in the Philippines and Porto Rico and can be rightfully there

only in the exercise of some of these enumerated powers, as in

the language of the tenth amendment, 'the powers not delegated

to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it

to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to

the people.' This amendment designates the constitution as the

source of the power of the United States and excludes the idea

of power free from constitutional restraint derived by

implication from powers delegated by the constitution.

"Nor is it true that at the time this declaration was made all

independent states or nations claimed and exercised the right

to acquire, hold and govern foreign dependencies, and no state

or nation then recognized its obligation to confer on the

people of such acquired territory the privileges and

immunities enjoyed by the people of the home government,

except at its own will and discretion. It is true that all

independent states claimed and exercised the right to acquire

territory, but if it were important in this case I think the

arguments of Pitt, Camden and Barre could be used to establish

the proposition that under the British Constitution as it

then was, that nation had, from the time of King John and the

Great Charter until King George, recognized that its subjects

had essential rights not dependent upon the 'will and

discretion' of the home government. It is unnecessary to

follow that subject here. It is sufficient that the

Declaration of Independence was brought about by the assertion

on the part of King George and his ministers of precisely the

present doctrine of this administration and its

representatives in this court. If value is to be attached to

contemporary history that fact cannot be lost sight of. The

speeches of Grenville and Townshend in favor of unlimited

power on the part of Parliament over the American colonists

and their affairs have been substantially parodied in Congress

by the advocates of unrestrained power over our 'colonies,' as

it is now unfortunately fashionable to denominate them. The

signers of the Declaration of Independence held that as

subjects of the British Constitution there was no right to

impose taxes upon them without their consent, to deprive them

of trial by jury, to deprive them of their legislatures, and

to declare Parliament in vested with power to legislate for

them 'in all cases whatsoever.' These and other grievances

were held denials of rights belonging to every British subject

as such and to justify rebellion and war. It seems impossible

that a people who rebelled for such reasons established a

State invested with the very power which they had denied to

the British government and the assertions of which made

rebellion necessary.

"This argument that the power to declare war and conclude

peace carries with it, as an auxiliary, power to do whatever

other nations are accustomed to do with the people and

territory acquired through the exercise of these powers, has a

remarkable likeness to the arguments put forward at the

beginning of the century with reference to the Alien and

Sedition Acts. The supporters of the constitutionality of

these acts claimed that the common law had been introduced and

become a part of the constitution of the United States, and

therefore the powers usually exercisable under the common law

could be exercised by the Congress of the United States in the

respects involved in those acts. Mr. Madison's letter

discussing this contention was answered, so far as it asserted

the right of a state to nullify an act of Congress, but was

never answered, so far as it denied the existence of the

common law as a part of the constitution of the United States.

His objections to that contention, succinctly stated, were,

that if the common law was a part of the constitution, then

there were no constitutional limitations. Congress, like

Parliament, could legislate in all cases whatsoever; that the

President would be possessed of the royal prerogatives (as is

now claimed in this case by the Attorney-General); that the

judiciary would have a discretion little short of legislative

power; that these powers in the different branches of the

government would not be alterable, because, being in the

constitution, they could only be repealed by amendment of that

instrument; and, lastly, that the constitution would have a

different meaning in different States, inasmuch as the common

law was different in such States, and that it would lack the

certainty which a constitution should have, as the common law

was an ever-growing or varying body of law, and, therefore,

with reference to the proper action of the government in each

instance, the question would be important as to what portion

of the common law was in the constitution and what not so

embodied.

"Nearly every sentence of Mr. Madison's able argument with

reference to the common law as a part of the constitution is

applicable to the contention that sovereign powers, so-called,

as derived from or defined by international law, became a part

of the constitution of the United States through the

delegation of the powers to make war, conclude peace, and make

all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and

other property belonging to the United States. This court has

adopted the view of Mr. Madison. It is hoped that the child of

the old error by which again the executive and legislative

power is sought to be enlarged through the incorporation into

the constitution of 'the sovereign power of other nations'

will receive the same answer.

"In fact, we submit that this court has already held that

sovereign power in the sense that the words are used in the

law of nations as prerogative rights of the King or Emperor,

not only is not vested in the United States or in any branch

of its government, but cannot be so vested. The sovereign

power is with the people. In leaving it with the people our

government marked a departure from all that had previously

existed."

_Supreme Court of the United States,

October Term, 1900, Number 419:

C. H. Aldrich, Argument in reply._

{674}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1901.

Military and naval expenditure,

compared with that of other Powers.

See (in this volume)

WAR BUDGETS.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1901 (January).

Apportionment of Representatives under the Twelfth Census.

The question of obedience to the Fourteenth Amendment.

Restrictions of the elective franchise in the States.

Section 3 of Article 1 of the Constitution requires that

"Representatives … shall be apportioned among the several

States which may be included within this Union according to

their respective numbers. … The actual enumeration shall be

made within three years after the first meeting of the

Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent

term of ten years. … The number of Representatives shall not

exceed one for every 30,000; but each State shall have at

least one." The first meeting of Congress was in 1789; the

required first census of the United States was taken in 1790,

and, in obedience to the constitutional requirement, the

enumeration has been repeated within the closing year of every

decade since, to supply the basis for a new apportionment of

representatives among the States. The twelfth census, taken in

1900, called for such new distribution, and action upon it was

taken in Congress in January, 1901.

As the section quoted above stood in the Constitution until

1868, it contained a further clause, inserted as one of the

original compromises made between the slaveholding and the

free States, requiring that the determination of numbers to be

represented in the several States should be made "by adding to

the whole number of free persons, including those bound to

service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed,

three-fifths of all other persons." This original clause of

the Constitution was superseded by the Fourteenth Amendment,

adopted in 1868, which introduced this new provision, in its

second section: "Representatives shall be apportioned among

the several States according to their respective numbers,

counting the whole number of persons in each State, except

Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election

for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of

the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive

and judicial officers of a State, or the members of the

Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants

of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of

the United States, or in any way abridged, except for

participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of

representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion

which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole

number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such

State." To many persons it seemed to be very clear that this

provision of the amended Constitution required account to be

taken of the qualifications by which a number of States have

abridged the suffrage, especially where done for the

understood purpose of disfranchising colored citizens and that

Congress was left with no discretion to do otherwise.

See, (in this volume),

LOUISIANA, NORTH CAROLINA, SOUTH CAROLINA,

MISSISSIPPI, and MARYLAND.

Those holding this view in the House of Representatives gave

support to the following resolution, introduced by Mr.

Olmsted, of Pennsylvania:

"Whereas the continued enjoyment of full representation in

this House by any State which has, for reasons other than

participation in rebellion or other crime, denied to any of

the male inhabitants thereof, being 21 years of age and

citizens of the United States, the right to vote for

Representatives in Congress, Presidential electors, and other

specified officers, is in direct violation of the fourteenth

amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which

declares that in such case 'the basis of representation

therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of

such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male

citizens 21 years of age in such State,' and is an invasion of

the rights and dignity of this House and of its members, and

an infringement upon the rights and privileges in this House

of other States and their representatives; and

"Whereas the States of Massachusetts, Maine, Connecticut,

Delaware, California, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina,

South Carolina, Wyoming, Oregon, and other States do, by the

provisions of the constitutions and statutes of said States,

and for reasons other than participation in rebellion or other

crime, deny the right to vote for members of Congress and

Presidential electors, as well as the executive and judicial

officers of such States and members of the legislatures

thereof, to male inhabitants 21 years of age and over and

citizens of the United States; and such denial in certain of

the said States extends to more than one-half of those who

prior to the last apportionment of representation were

entitled to vote in such States; and

"Whereas in order that the apportionment of membership of the

House of Representatives may be determined in a constitutional

manner: Therefore, be it

"Resolved by the House of Representatives, That the Director

of the Census is hereby directed to furnish this House, at the

earliest possible moment, the following information;

"First. The total number of male citizens of the United States

over 21 years of age in each of the several States of the

Union.

"Second. The total number of male citizens of the United

States over 21 years of age who, by reason of State

constitutional limitations or State legislation, are denied

the right of suffrage, whether such denial exists on account

of illiteracy, on account of pauperism, on account of

polygamy, or on account of property qualifications, or for any

other reason.

"Resolved further, That the Speaker of the House of

Representatives is hereby authorized and directed to appoint a

select committee of five members from the membership of the

Census Committee of the House of Representatives, who shall

investigate the question of the alleged abridgment of the

elective franchise for any of the causes mentioned in all the

States of the Union in which constitutional or legislative

restrictions on the right of suffrage are claimed to exist,

and that such committee report its findings within twenty days

from the date of the adoption of this resolution to the said

Census Committee, and that within one week after the said

report shall have been received by the Census Committee the

Census Committee shall return a bill to the House of

Representatives providing for the apportionment of the

membership of the House of Representatives based on the

provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of

the United States."

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Republicans, hardly less than Democrats, in Congress and

outside, were averse to raising what could not fail to be a

burning sectional issue, and grounds for ignoring the

constitutional mandate were sought with considerable eagerness

on both sides. Strict obedience to the requirement of the

Constitutional provision was claimed to be impracticable, at

least within the time available for proceedings connected with

the present apportionment of representatives. Said one

speaker, opposing the resolutions in the House: "There is not

a State in this Union that has not added to or subtracted from

the Federal constitutional requirements—not one. … If there is

any addition, whether as a matter of police regulation or

otherwise, to the constitutional amendments regulating the

franchise and the resultant representation in this House—if

there is addition or subtraction of one iota—then those who

desire to live up to this Constitution, no matter whether they

ruin their neighbors, no matter whether they again kindle the

fires of sectional strife, those who in their love for the

Constitution are so mentally rigid that they would demand its

enforcement though they set the Union aflame, must include

every State in this Union."

Said another: "How would anybody find out how many people in

the State of Mississippi were disfranchised for the reasons

stated in this resolution? There is there an educational

qualification. How are you to determine how many of the men in

the State of Mississippi who did not vote, did not vote

because they were disfranchised under the educational

qualification? Then there is a qualification in extension and

not in limitation of the suffrage, saying that even those who

can not read and write may still vote, provided they can give

an understanding interpretation of the Constitution or any

part of it. How are you going to determine how many are

disqualified by that? And then there is a qualification which

says that those can not vote who shall not by a certain time

have paid their poll tax. Out of the number of people who did

not vote, how are you going to determine which of them have

not voted because of the educational qualification? Which

because of the understanding qualification? Which because of

the poll-tax qualification? Which because of the registration

qualification? How many because of the pure Australian ballot

which exists in the State of Mississippi? … There is not a

State in the Union which has the Australian ballot which by

the very fact and the necessity of voting according to that

Australian ballot does not prevent the citizen who can not

read and write from voting if he votes a split ticket of any

sort."

A third speaker remarked: "To live up to that amendment, 'that

no male inhabitant shall be deprived of suffrage except for

participation in the rebellion or other crimes,' the male

inhabitant, I take it, is he who has acquired domicile in that

State, and the moment that he acquires domicile, and is a

male, he is a 'male inhabitant' of that State, and entitled

at once to suffrage; and yet every State in the Union, I

believe without exception, has requirements as to residence

not only in the State, but in the city, in the county, in the

precinct and ward and the voting place; and everyone of those

requirements, as every gentleman on that side must admit, are

in direct conflict with and contravention of the fourteenth

amendment to the Constitution of the United States literally

construed."

But the advocates of obedience to the Constitution, supporting

the resolutions of Mr. Olmsted, planted their argument on the

very facts brought against it, as demonstrating the need of

measures to check a growing tendency in the country to

restrict the elective franchise. Said Mr. Shattuck, of Ohio:

"We find that in 1870 there were three States that had

abridged their electorates—California, Connecticut, and

Massachusetts. In these three States there was a

constitutional provision for an educational qualification,

which disfranchised a certain percentage of the

electorate—namely, the illiterates. But, in those States, the

percentage of illiteracy is very light, averaging about 6 per

cent. The basis of representation would hardly have been

affected in those States had the fourteenth amendment been

conformed with.

"An examination into the election laws of the various States

reveals an astonishing tendency at this time to abridge their

electorates. When the Congress which adopted the existing

apportionment discussed the matter ten years ago but three

States had abridged their electorate by action of the State,

and in these the percentage of disfranchised males was but 6

per cent. But since that time similar policies have been

adopted by other States, and to-day we face the fact that ten

of the forty-five States of this Union have abridged their

electorates, and that in these the percentage of males 21

years of age and over, disfranchised, averages over 20 per

cent. The constitutions of several other States permit such an

abridgment. Besides, there are other States preparing to adopt

these policies and to disfranchise thousands of men who to-day

hold the right of franchise. In view of this remarkable

tendency it is inconceivable that Congress can longer permit

the fourteenth amendment to remain a dead letter, and to pass

a bill making an apportionment based solely upon the

population and neglecting the proviso which applies to all

States which have abridged their electorate.

"We will not review the past by any discussion of the question

as to whether the provisions of the fourteenth amendment

should have been made effective when the last apportionment

was made ten years ago. We find to-day conditions existing

which make its enforcement imperative. I do not propose to

discuss at this time whether the reasons given for these

abridgments by the people of the various States are valid or

not. … I am simply pointing out the conditions as they exist;

I am simply pointing out that the time has come when the

tendency of the States to abridge their electorates has grown

to such proportions as to demand that this Congress shall

proceed in a constitutional manner in making the new

apportionment. I do not say that States have not the right to

establish educational qualifications for their electors, but I

do maintain that when they have done so they must pay the penalty

prescribed in the Constitution, and have their representation

abridged proportionately.

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I do not say that we shall punish only Louisiana;

I do not say that we shall punish only Massachusetts;

I do not say that we shall punish only California;

but I do say and insist, as the representative of a State in

which every male member 21 years of age and over is guaranteed

the sacred right of franchise, that there is a constitutional

remedy prescribed for their acts, and I do demand that that

remedy be applied."

The following interesting table, showing the restrictions of

the electorate in the various States of the Union, was

appended to the remarks of Mr. Shattuck:

STATES.

REQUIREMENTS AS TO CITIZENSHIP. [First paragraph]

PERSONS EXCLUDED FROM SUFFRAGE. [Second paragraph]

ALABAMA.

Citizen of United States, or alien who has declared intention.

Convicted of treason or other crime punishable by

imprisonment, idiots, or insane.

ARKANSAS.

Citizen of United States, or alien who has declared intention.

Idiots, insane, convicted of felony until pardoned, failure

to pay poll tax, United States soldiers on duty in State.

CALIFORNIA.

Citizen by nativity, naturalization, or treaty of Queretaro.

Chinese, insane, embezzlers of public moneys, convicted

of infamous crime, person unable to read Constitution

in English, and to write his name.

COLORADO.

Citizen or alien, male or female, who has declared intention 4

months prior to election.

Under guardianship, insane, idiots, or imprisoned.

CONNECTICUT.

Citizen of United States.

Convicted of felony or theft, unless pardoned.

Person unable to read Constitution or statutes.

DELAWARE.

Citizen who has paid registration fee of $1.

Idiots, insane, paupers, felons. Person who can not

read the English language and write his name.

FLORIDA.

Citizen of United States.

Insane, under guardianship, convicted of felony or any

infamous crime.

GEORGIA.

Citizen of the United States who has paid all

his taxes since 1877.

Idiots, insane, convicted of crime punishable by imprisonment

until pardoned, failure to pay taxes.

IDAHO.

Citizen of the United States, male or female.

Under guardianship, idiots, insane, convicted of felony,

treason, or embezzlement of public funds, polygamist or

bigamist.

ILLINOIS.

Citizen of the United States.

Convicted of felony.

INDIANA.

Citizen of United States, or alien who has declared intention

and resided 1 year in United States and 6 months in State.

Convicted of crime and disfranchised by judgment of the court,

United States soldiers, sailors, and marines.

IOWA.

Citizen of the United States.

Idiots, insane, convicted of infamous crime.

KANSAS.

Citizen of United States, alien who has declared intention, or

[under] treaties with Mexico.

Felons, insane, duelists, rebels, not restored to

citizenship, under guardianship, public embezzlers,

offering or accepting a bribe.

KENTUCKY.

Citizen of the United States.

Treason, felony, bribery at election.

LOUISIANA.

Citizen of United States or alien who has declared intention.

Idiots, insane, convicted of treason, embezzlement of public

funds, all crime punishable by imprisonment in penitentiary,

persons unable to read and write, and not owning property in

the State assessed at $300, or not the son or grandson of a

citizen of the United States prior to January 1, 1867, person

who has not paid pool tax.

MAINE.

Citizen of the United States.

Paupers, persons under guardianship, Indians not taxed, and in

1893 all new voters who can not read the Constitution or write

their own names in English.

MARYLAND.

Citizen of the United States.

Convicted of larceny or other infamous crime, unless pardoned,

persons convicted of bribery.

MASSACHUSETTS.

Citizen of the United States.

Paupers and persons under guardianship, person who can not

read Constitution in English and write his name.

MICHIGAN.

Citizen or inhabitant who has declared intention under United

States laws 6 months before election and lived in State

2½ years.

Indians, duelists, and accessories.

MINNESOTA.

Citizen of United States or alien who has declared intention,

and civilized Indians.

Convicted of treason or felony, unless pardoned, persons

under guardianship or insane.

MISSISSIPPI.

Citizen of the United States.

Insane, idiots, Indians not taxed, felons, persons who have

not paid taxes, persons who can not read or understand

Constitution.

Missouri.

Citizen of United States or alien who has declared intention

not less than 1 year or more than 5 before offering to vote.

United States soldiers and marines, paupers, criminals

convicted once until pardoned, felons and violators of

suffrage laws convicted a second time.

MONTANA.

Citizen of the United States.

Felons, unless pardoned, idiots, insane, United States

soldiers, seamen, and marines, Indians.

NEBRASKA.

Citizen of United States or alien who has declared intention.

Convicts.

NEVADA.

Citizen of the United States.

Idiots, insane, unpardoned convicts, Indians, Chinese.

NEW HAMPSHIRE.

Citizen of United States.

Paupers (except honorably discharged United States soldiers

and sailors), persons excused from paying taxes at their own

request,

NEW JERSEY.

Citizen of the United States or alien who has declared

intention 30 days prior to election.

Idiots, insane paupers, persons convicted of crimes (unless

pardoned) which exclude them from being witnesses.

NEW YORK.

Citizen who shall have been a citizen for 90 days.

Convicted of bribery or any infamous crime, Indians under

tribal relations.

NORTH CAROLINA.

Citizen of the United States.

Convicted of felony or other infamous crime, idiots,

lunatics, persons unable to read or write, unless lineal

descendant of citizen of United States prior to January 1,

1867, nonpayment of poll tax.

NORTH DAKOTA.

Citizen of the United States, alien who has declared

intention 1 year, and civilized Indian.

Under guardianship, persons non compos mentis, or convicted

of felony and treason, unless restored to civil rights.

OHIO.

Citizen of the United States.

Felony until pardoned, idiots, insane, United States

soldiers and sailors.

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OREGON.

Citizen of Unite States or alien who

has declared intention 1 year preceding election.

Idiots, insane, convicted of felony, United States soldiers

and sailors, Chinese.

PENNSYLVANIA.

Citizen of the United States at least 1 month, and if 22 years

old or more, must have paid tax within 2 years.

Convicted of some offense whereby right of suffrage is

forfeited, non taxpayers.

RHODE ISLAND.

Citizen of the United States.

Paupers, lunatics, persons non compos mentis, convicted

of bribery or infamous crime until restored to right to

vote under guardianship.

SOUTH CAROLINA.

Citizen of the United States.

Convicted of treason, murder, or other infamous crime,

dueling, paupers, insane, idiots, person who has not

paid poll tax, who can not read an write any section of

the State constitution, or can show that he has paid all

taxes on property within the State assessed at $300.

SOUTH DAKOTA.

Citizen of the United States or alien

who has declared intention.

Under guardianship, idiots, insane, convicted of treason

or felony, unless pardoned.

TENNESSEE.

Citizen of the United States who has paid poll tax of

preceding year.

Convicted of bribery or other infamous offense.

TEXAS.

Citizen of the United States or alien who has declared

intention.

Idiots, lunatics, paupers, convicted of felony, United

States soldiers and seamen.

UTAH.

Citizen, male and female.

Idiots, insane, convicted of treason or violation of

election laws.

VERMONT.

Citizen of the United States.

Those who have not obtained the approbation of the board of

civil authority of the town in which they reside.

VIRGINIA.

Citizen of the United States.

Idiots, lunatics, convicted of bribery at election,

embezzlement of public funds, treason, felony and petty

larceny, duelists and abettors unless pardoned by legislature.

WASHINGTON.

Citizen of the United States.

Indians not taxed, idiots, insane, persons convicted of

infamous crimes.

WEST VIRGINIA.

Citizen of the State.

Paupers, idiots, lunatics, convicted of treason, felony, or

bribery at elections.

WISCONSIN.

Citizen of the United States or alien who has declared

intention.

Insane, under guardianship, convicted of treason or felony,

unless pardoned, Indians having tribal relations.

WYOMING.

Citizen of the United States, male and female.

Idiots, insane, persons convicted of infamous crimes unless

restored to civil rights, unable to read State constitution.

_Congressional Record, January 4-5, 1901,

pages 618-20, and 662-5._

The resolutions of Mr. Olmsted were not adopted. The

reapportionment was made on the basis of the totals of the

census returns, with no reckoning of any denials of the right

to vote. The following is the text of the Act, as passed and

approved January 16:

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled, That after

the third day of March, nineteen hundred and three, the House

of Representatives shall be composed of three hundred and

eighty-six members [the existing number being 357] to be

apportioned among the several States as follows:

Alabama, nine;

Arkansas, seven;

California, eight;

Colorado, three;

Connecticut, five;

Delaware, one;

Florida, three;

Georgia, eleven;

Idaho, one;

Illinois, twenty-five;

Indiana, thirteen;

Iowa, eleven;

Kansas, eight;

Kentucky, eleven;

Louisiana, seven;

Maine, four;

Maryland, six;

Massachusetts, fourteen;

Michigan, twelve;

Minnesota, nine;

Mississippi, eight;

Missouri, sixteen:

Montana, one;

Nebraska, six;

Nevada, one;

New Hampshire, two;

New Jersey, ten;

New York, thirty-seven;

North Carolina, ten;

North Dakota, two;

Ohio, twenty-one:

Oregon, two;

Pennsylvania, thirty-two;

Rhode Island, two;

South Carolina, seven;

South Dakota, two;

Tennessee, ten:

Texas, sixteen:

Utah, one;

Vermont, two;

Virginia, ten;

Washington, three;

West Virginia, five;

Wisconsin, eleven; and

Wyoming, one.

"SECTION 2.

That whenever a new State is admitted to the Union the

Representative or Representatives assigned to it shall be in

addition to the number three hundred and eighty-six.

"SECTION 3.

That in each State entitled under this apportionment, the

number to which such State may be entitled in the Fifty-eighth

and each subsequent Congress shall be elected by districts

composed of contiguous and compact territory and containing as

nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants. The said

districts shall be equal to the number of the Representatives

to which such State may be entitled in Congress, no one

district electing more than one Representative.

"SECTION 4.

That in case of an increase in the number of Representatives

which may be given to any State under this apportionment such

additional Representative or Representatives shall be elected

by the State at large, and the other Representatives by the

districts now prescribed by law until the legislature of such

State in the manner herein prescribed, shall redistrict such

State; and if there be no increase in the number of

Representatives from a State the Representatives thereof shall

be elected from the districts now prescribed by law until such

State be redistricted as herein prescribed by the legislature

of said State; and if the number hereby provided for shall in

any State be less than it was before the change hereby made,

then the whole number to such State hereby provided for shall

be elected at large, unless the legislatures of said States

have provided or shall otherwise provide before the time fixed

by law for the next election of Representatives therein.

"SECTION 5.

That all Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent with this Act are

hereby repealed."

No existing State quota was reduced by the new apportionment,

and the gains were as follows:

Illinois, New York and Texas, 3;

Minnesota, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 2;

Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,

Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, North

Carolina, North Dakota, Washington, West Virginia and

Wisconsin, 1.

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That clause of the third section which requires districts to

be "composed of contiguous and compact territory" is intended

to be a bar to the partisan trick called "gerrymandering." The

vote on the bill in the House (165 against 102) was singularly

non-partisan. The minority was said to be composed of exactly

the same number of Republicans and Democrats, 51 of each, and

in the majority vote there were included 84 Republicans and 81

Democrats. The vote was also non-sectional, except that New

England voted almost solidly for the measure. East, South and

West the State delegations were almost equally divided.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1901 (February).

Act to increase the standing army of the nation to 100,000 men.

In his annual Message to Congress, December 3, 1900, the

President set forth the military needs of the country, created

by its new policy of imperial expansion, and recommended that

the permanent army be raised to 100,000 in number, from 45,000

to 60,000 of which would be required in the Philippine Islands

until their people were made submissive to the authority of

the United States. In accord with the executive

recommendation, Congress passed "an Act to increase the

efficiency of the permanent military establishment of the

United States," which became law by the President's signature

on the 2d of February, 1901. Its first section provides that

"from and after the approval of this Act the Army of the

United States, including the existing organizations, shall

consist of fifteen regiments of cavalry, a corps of artillery,

thirty regiments of infantry, one Lieutenant-General, six

major-generals, fifteen brigadier-generals, an

Adjutant-General's Department, an Inspector-General's

Department, a Judge-Advocate-General's Department, a

Quartermaster's Department, a Subsistence Department, a

Medical Department, a Pay Department, a Corps of Engineers, an

Ordnance Department, a Signal Corps, the officers of the

Record and Pension Office, the chaplains, the officers and

enlisted men of the Army on the retired list, the professors,

corps of cadets, the army detachments and band at the United

States Military Academy, Indian scouts as now authorized by

law, and such other officers and enlisted men as may

hereinafter be provided for." A subsequent section enacts that

the total enlisted force of the line of the army shall not exceed

at any one time 100,000.

Section 2 provides that "each regiment of cavalry shall

consist of one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, three majors,

fifteen captains, fifteen first lieutenants, and fifteen

second lieutenants; two veterinarians, one sergeant-major, one

quartermaster-sergeant, one commissary-sergeant, three

squadron sergeants-major, two color-sergeants with rank, pay,

and allowances of squadron sergeant-major, one band, and

twelve troops organized into three squadrons of four troops

each. … Each troop of cavalry shall consist of one captain,

one first lieutenant, one second lieutenant, one first

sergeant, one quartermaster-sergeant, six sergeants, six

corporals, two cooks, two farriers and blacksmiths, one

saddler, one wagoner, two trumpeters, and forty-three

privates; the commissioned officers to be assigned from among

those hereinbefore authorized."

Sections 3-9, relating to the Artillery, are, in part, as

follows:

"That the regimental organization of the artillery arm of the

United States Army is hereby discontinued, and that arm is

constituted and designated as the Artillery Corps. It shall be

organized as hereinafter specified and shall belong to the

line of the Army. That the Artillery Corps shall comprise two

branches—the coast artillery and the field artillery. The

coast artillery is defined as that portion charged with the

care and use of the fixed and movable elements of land and

coast fortifications, including the submarine mine and torpedo

defenses; and the field artillery as that portion accompanying

an army in the field, and including field and light artillery

proper, horse artillery, siege artillery, mountain artillery,

and also machine-gun batteries: Provided, That this shall not

be construed to limit the authority of the Secretary of War to

order coast artillery to any duty which the public service

demands or to prevent the use of machine or other field guns

by any other arm of the service under the direction of the

Secretary of War. … That the Artillery Corps shall consist of

a Chief of Artillery, who shall be selected and detailed by

the President from the colonels of artillery, to serve on the

staff of the general officer commanding the Army, and whose

duties shall be prescribed by the Secretary of War: fourteen

colonels, one of whom shall be the Chief of Artillery;

thirteen lieutenant-colonels, thirty-nine majors, one hundred

and ninety-five captains, one hundred and ninety-five first

lieutenants, one hundred and ninety-five second lieutenants;

and the captains and lieutenants provided for in this section

not required for duty with batteries or companies shall be

available for duty as staff officers of the various artillery

garrisons and such other details as may be authorized by law

and regulations; twenty-one sergeants-major, with the rank,

pay, and allowances of regimental sergeants-major of infantry;

twenty-seven sergeants-major, with the rank, pay, and

allowances of battalion sergeants-major of infantry; one

electrician sergeant to each coast artillery post having

electrical appliances; thirty batteries of field artillery,

one hundred and twenty-six batteries of coast artillery, and

ten bands organized as now authorized by law for artillery

regiments: Provided, That the aggregate number of enlisted men

for the artillery, as provided under this Act, shall not

exceed eighteen thousand nine hundred and twenty, exclusive of

electrician sergeants." Concerning the Infantry it is

provided, in Section 10, that "each regiment of infantry shall

consist of one colonel, one lieutenant colonel, three majors,

fifteen captains, fifteen first lieutenants, and fifteen

second lieutenants; one sergeant-major, one

quartermaster-sergeant, one commissary-sergeant, three

battalion sergeants-major, two color sergeants, with rank,

pay, and allowances of battalion sergeants-major, one band,

and twelve companies, organized into three battalions of four

companies each. Of the officers herein provided, the captains

and lieutenants not required for duty with the companies shall

be available for detail as regimental and battalion staff

officers and such other details as may be authorized by law or

regulations. … Each infantry company shall consist of one

captain, one first lieutenant, one second lieutenant, one

first sergeant, one quartermaster-sergeant, four sergeants,

six corporals, two cooks, two musicians, one artificer, and

forty-eight privates, the commissioned officers to be assigned

from those hereinbefore authorized."

{679}

Section 11 provides that "the enlisted force of the Corps of

Engineers shall consist of one band and three battalions of

engineers. … Each battalion of engineers shall consist of one

sergeant-major, one quartermaster-sergeant, and four

companies. Each company of engineers shall consist of one

first sergeant, one quartermaster-sergeant, with the rank,

pay, and allowances of sergeant, eight sergeants, ten

corporals, two musicians, two cooks, thirty-eight first-class

and thirty-eight second-class privates."

Section 12 relates to the appointment of army chaplains—one

for each regiment of cavalry and infantry, and twelve for the

corps of artillery—no person to be appointed who has passed

the age of forty years. The office of post chaplain is

abolished. Sections 13 to 27 relate mainly to the organization

of the several Departments, of the Adjutant-General,

Inspector-General, Judge-Advocate-General,

Quartermaster-General, Commissary-General, Surgeon-General,

Paymaster-General, Chief of Engineers, Chief of Ordnance, etc.

Section 28, prescribing the rules of promotion and

appointment, is as follows: "That vacancies in the grade of

field officers and captain, created by this Act, in the

cavalry, artillery, and infantry shall be filled by promotion

according to seniority in each branch, respectively. Vacancies

existing after the promotions have been made shall be provided

for as follows: A sufficient number shall be reserved in the

grade of second lieutenant for the next graduating class at

the United States Military Academy. Persons not over forty

years of age who shall have at any time served as volunteers

subsequent to April twenty-first, eighteen hundred and

ninety-eight, may be ordered before boards of officers for

such examination as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War,

and those who establish their fitness before these examining

boards may be appointed to the grades of first or second

lieutenant in the Regular Army, taking rank in the respective

grades according to seniority as determined by length of prior

commissioned service; but no person appointed under the

provisions of this section shall be placed above another in

the same grade with longer commissioned service, and nothing

herein contained shall change the relative rank of officers

heretofore commissioned in the Regular Army. Enlisted men of

the Regular Army or volunteers may be appointed second

lieutenants in the Regular Army to vacancies created by this

Act, provided that they shall have served one year, under the

same conditions now authorized by law for enlisted men of the

Regular Army."

Important provisions are embodied in Sections 35 and 36, as

follows:

"SECTION 35. That the Secretary of War be, and he is hereby,

authorized and directed to cause preliminary examinations and

surveys to be made for the purpose of selecting four sites

with a view to the establishment of permanent camp grounds for

instruction of troops of the Regular Army and National Guard,

with estimates of the cost of the sites and their equipment

with all modern appliances, and for this purpose is authorized

to detail such officers of the Army as may be necessary to

carry on the preliminary work; and the sum of ten thousand

dollars is hereby appropriated for the necessary expense of

such work, to be disbursed under the direction of the

Secretary of War: Provided, That the Secretary of War shall

report to Congress the result of such examination and surveys,

and no contract for said sites shall be made nor any

obligation incurred until Congress shall approve such

selections and appropriate the money therefor.

"SECTION 36. That when in his opinion the conditions in the

Philippine Islands justify such action the President is

authorized to enlist natives of those islands for service in

the Army, to be organized as scouts, with such officers as he

shall deem necessary for their proper control, or as troops or

companies, as authorized by this Act, for the Regular Army.

The President is further authorized, in his discretion, to

form companies, organized as are companies of the Regular

Army, in squadron's or battalions, with officers and

non-commissioned officers corresponding to similar

organizations in the cavalry and infantry arms. The total

number of enlisted men in said native organizations shall not

exceed twelve thousand, and the total enlisted force of the

line of the Army, together with such native force, shall not

exceed at any one time one hundred thousand. … When, in the

opinion of the President, natives of the Philippine Islands

shall, by their services and character, show fitness for

command, the President is authorized to make provisional

appointments to the grades of second and first lieutenants

from such natives, who, when so appointed, shall have the pay

and allowances to be fixed by the Secretary of War, not

exceeding those of corresponding grades of the Regular Army."

Section 38 abolishes the so-called "Army Canteen," in

compliance with strenuous demands from temperance

organizations in the country, notwithstanding much testimony

favorable to the canteen system from well-informed and

conscientious witnesses. The language of the section is as

follows: "The sale of or dealing in beer, wine, or any

intoxicating liquors, by any person in any post exchange or

canteen or army transport, or upon any premises used for

military purposes by the United States, is hereby prohibited.

The Secretary of War is hereby directed to carry the

provisions of this section into full force and effect." Prompt

obedience to this command of law was given by the War

Department, which issued the required general order February

4th.

The following amendment, proposed by Senator Hoar for addition

to the Act, was voted down: "Provided, That no further

military force shall be used in the Philippine Islands, except

such as may be necessary to keep order in places there now

actually under the peaceable control of the United States and

to protect persons or property to whom, in the judgment of the

President, protection may be due from the United States, until

the President shall have first proclaimed an amnesty for all

political offenses committed against the United States in the

Philippine Islands, and shall have, if in his power, agreed

upon an armistice with persons now in hostility to the United

States, and shall have invited such number, not less than 10,

as he shall think desirable of the leaders or representatives

of the persons now hostile to the United States there to come

to the United States and state their wishes and the condition,

character, and wishes of the people of the Philippine Islands

to the Executive and Congress, and shall have offered to

secure to them safe conduct to come, abide, and return, and

shall have provided at the public charge for the expenses of

their transportation both ways and their stay in this country

for a reasonable and sufficient time for such purpose."

{680}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1910 (February).

The Russian sugar question.

United States countervailing duty and Russian retaliation.

See (in this volume)

SUGAR BOUNTIES.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1901 (February-March).

Adoption of the so-called "Spooner Amendment" to

the Army Appropriation Bill empowering the President to

establish a civil government in the Philippines.

See (in this volume)

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1901 (FEBRUARY-MARCH).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1901 (February-March).

Adoption of the "Platt Amendment," prescribing conditions on

which the President is authorized to "leave the government and

control of the island of Cuba to its people."

See (in this volume)

CUBA: A. D. 1901 (FEBRUARY-MARCH).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1901 (March).

Reinauguration of President McKinley for a second term in the

executive office. His inaugural address.

The reinauguration of President McKinley, for the second term

of office to which he had been elected, was performed with the

customary ceremonies, at the capitol, in Washington, on the

4th of March, 1001. His inaugural address upon the occasion is

especially interesting, for the reason that it indicates the

understanding with which the President received his

re-election, and the interpretation which he has put upon it

as an expression of the national will on questions of

extraordinary moment. He spoke as follows:

"My Fellow Citizens: When we assembled here on March 4, 1897,

there was great anxiety with regard to our currency and

credit. None exists now. Then our treasury receipts were

inadequate to meet the current obligations of the government.

Now they are sufficient for all public needs, and we have a

surplus instead of a deficit. Then I felt constrained to

convene the Congress in extraordinary session to devise

revenues to pay the ordinary expenses of the government. Now I

have the satisfaction to announce that the Congress just

closed has reduced taxation in the sum of $41,000,000. Then

there was deep solicitude because of the long depression in

our manufacturing, mining, agricultural and mercantile

industries, and the consequent distress of our laboring

population. Now every avenue of production is crowded with

activity, labor is well employed and American products find

good markets at home and abroad. Our diversified productions,

however, are increasing in such unprecedented volume as to

admonish us of the necessity of still further enlarging our

foreign markets by broader commercial relations. For this

purpose reciprocal trade arrangements with other nations

should in liberal spirit be carefully cultivated and promoted.

"The national verdict of 1896 has for the most part been

executed. Whatever remains unfulfilled is a continuing

obligation resting with undiminished force upon the Executive

and the Congress. But fortunate as our condition is, its

permanence can only be assured by sound business methods and

strict economy in national administration and legislation. We

should not permit our great prosperity to lead us to reckless

ventures in business or profligacy in public expenditures.

While the Congress determines the objects and the sum of

appropriations, the officials of the executive departments are

responsible for honest and faithful disbursement, and it

should be their constant care to avoid waste and extravagance.

Honesty, capacity and industry are nowhere more indispensable

than in public employment. These should be fundamental

requisites to original appointment and the surest guarantees

against removal.

"Four years ago we stood on the brink of war without the

people knowing it and without any preparation or effort at

preparation for the impending peril. I did all that in honor

could be done to avert the war, but without avail. It became

inevitable, and the Congress at its first regular session,

without party division, provided money in anticipation of the

crisis and in preparation to meet it. It came. The result was

signally favorable to American arms and in the highest degree

honorable to the government. It imposed upon us obligations

from which we cannot escape, and from which it would be

dishonorable to seek to escape. We are now at peace with the

world, and it is my fervent prayer that if differences arise

between us and other powers they may be settled by peaceful

arbitration, and that hereafter we may be spared the horrors

of war.

"Intrusted by the people for a second time with the office of

President, I enter upon its administration appreciating the

great responsibilities which attach to this renewed honor and

commission, promising unreserved devotion on my part to their

faithful discharge and reverently invoking for my guidance the

direction and favor of Almighty God. I should shrink from the

duties this day assumed if I did not feel that in their

performance I should have the cooperation of the wise and

patriotic men of all parties. It encourages me for the great

task which I now undertake to believe that those who

voluntarily committed to me the trust imposed upon the chief

executive of the republic will give to me generous support in

my duties to 'preserve, protect and defend the constitution of

the United States,' and to 'care that the laws be faithfully

executed.' The national purpose is indicated through a

national election. It is the constitutional method of

ascertaining the public will. When once it is registered it is

a law to us all, and faithful observance should follow its

decrees.

"Strong hearts and helpful hands are needed, and fortunately

we have them in every part of our beloved country. We are

reunited. Sectionalism has disappeared. Division on public

questions can no longer be traced by the war maps of 1861.

These old differences less and less disturb the judgment.

Existing problems demand the thought and quicken the

conscience of the country, and the responsibility for their

presence as well as for their righteous settlement rests upon

us all, no more upon me than upon you. There are some national

questions in the solution of which patriotism should exclude

partisanship. Magnifying their difficulties will not take them

off our hands nor facilitate their adjustment. Distrust of the

capacity, integrity and high purpose of the American people

will not be an inspiring theme for future political contests.

Dark pictures and gloomy forebodings are worse than useless.

These only becloud, they do not help to point the way of

safety and honor. 'Hope maketh not ashamed.'

{681}

"The prophets of evil were not the builders of the republic,

nor in its crises have they saved or served it. The faith of

the fathers was a mighty force in its creation, and the faith

of their descendants has wrought its progress and furnished

its defenders. They are obstructionists who despair and who

would destroy confidence in the ability of our people to solve

wisely and for civilization the mighty problems resting upon

them. The American people, intrenched in freedom at home, take

their love for it with them wherever they go, and they reject

as mistaken and unworthy the doctrine that we lose our own

liberties by securing the enduring foundations of liberty to

others. Our institutions will not deteriorate by extension,

and our sense of justice will not abate under tropic suns in

distant seas.

"As heretofore so hereafter will the nation demonstrate its

fitness to administer any new estate which events devolve upon

it, and in the fear of God will 'take occasion by the hand and

make the bounds of freedom wider yet.' If there are those

among us who would make our way more difficult we must not be

disheartened, but the more earnestly dedicate ourselves to the

task upon which we have rightly entered. The path of progress

is seldom smooth. New things are often found hard to do. Our

fathers found them so. We find them so. They are inconvenient.

They cost us something. But are we not made better for the

effort and sacrifice, and are not those we serve lifted up and

blessed?

"We will be consoled, too, with the fact that opposition has

confronted every onward movement of the republic from its

opening hour until now, but without success. The republic has

marched on and on, and its every step has exalted freedom and

humanity. We are undergoing the same ordeal as did our

predecessors nearly a century ago. We are following the course

they blazed. They triumphed. Will their successors falter and

plead organic impotency in the nation? Surely after one

hundred and twenty-five years of achievement for mankind we

will not now surrender our equality with other Powers on

matters fundamental and essential to nationality. With no such

purpose was the nation created. In no such spirit has it

developed its full and independent sovereignty. We adhere to

the principle of equality among ourselves, and by no act of

ours will we assign to ourselves a subordinate rank in the

family of nations.

"My fellow citizens, the public events of the last four years

have gone into history. They are too near to justify recital.

Some of them were unforeseen; many of them momentous and far

reaching in their consequences to ourselves and our relations

with the rest of the world. The part which the United States

bore so honorably in the thrilling scenes in China, while new

to American life, has been in harmony with its true spirit and

best traditions, and in dealing with the results its policy

will be that of moderation and fairness.

"We face at this moment a most important question—that of the

future relations of the United States and Cuba. With our near

neighbors we must remain close friends. The declaration of the

purposes of this government in the resolution of April 20,

1898, must be made good. Ever since the evacuation of the

island by the army of Spain the Executive with all practicable

speed has been assisting its people in the successive steps

necessary to the establishment of a free and independent

government prepared to assume and perform the obligations of

international law, which now rest upon the United States under

the Treaty of Paris. The convention elected by the people to

frame a constitution is approaching the completion of its

labors. The transfer of American control to the new government

is of such great importance, involving an obligation resulting

from our intervention and the treaty of peace, that I am glad

to be advised by the recent act of Congress of the policy

which the legislative branch of the government deems essential

to the best interests of Cuba and the United States. The

principles which led to our intervention require that the

fundamental law upon which the new government rests should be

adapted to secure a government capable of performing the

duties and discharging the functions of a separate nation, of

observing its international obligations, of protecting life

and property, insuring order, safety and liberty, and

conforming to the established and historical policy of the

United States in its relation to Cuba.

"The peace which we are pledged to leave to the Cuban people

must carry with it the guarantees of permanence. We became

sponsors for the pacification of the island, and we remain

accountable to the Cubans no less than to our own country and

people for the reconstruction of Cuba as a free commonwealth,

on abiding foundations of right, justice, liberty and assured

order. Our enfranchisement of the people will not be completed

until free Cuba shall 'be a reality, not a name—a perfect

entity, not a hasty experiment, bearing within itself the

elements of failure.'

"While the treaty of peace with Spain was ratified on February

6, 1899, and ratifications were exchanged nearly two years

ago, the Congress has indicated no form of government for the

Philippine Islands. It has, however, provided an army to

enable the Executive to suppress insurrection, restore peace,

give security to the inhabitants and establish the authority

of the United States throughout the archipelago. It has

authorized the organization of native troops as auxiliary to

the regular force. It has been advised from time to time of

the acts of the military and naval officers in the islands, of

my action in appointing civil commissions, of the instructions

with which they were charged, of their duties and powers, of

their recommendations and of their several acts under

Executive commission, together with the very complete general

information they have submitted.

"These reports fully set forth the conditions, past and

present, in the islands, and the instructions clearly show the

principles which will guide the Executive until the Congress

shall, as it is required to do by the treaty, determine 'the

civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants.'

The Congress having added the sanction of its authority to the

powers already possessed and exercised by the Executive under

the constitution, thereby leaving with the Executive the

responsibility for the government of the Philippines, I shall

continue the efforts already begun until order shall be

restored throughout the islands, and as fast as conditions

permit will establish local governments, in the formation of

which the full co-operation of the people has been already

invited, and when established will encourage the people to

administer them.

{682}

"The settled purpose, long ago proclaimed, to afford the

inhabitants of the islands self-government as fast as they

were ready for it will be pursued with earnestness and

fidelity. Already something has been accomplished in this

direction. The government's representatives, civil and

military, are doing faithful and noble work in their mission

of emancipation, and merit the approval and support of their

countrymen. The most liberal terms of amnesty have already

been communicated to the insurgents, and the way is still open

for those who have raised their arms against the government

for honorable submission to its authority.

"Our countrymen should not be deceived. We are not waging war

against the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands. A portion

of them are making war against the United States. By far the

greater part of the inhabitants recognize American

sovereignty, and welcome it as n guarantee of order and

security for life, property, liberty, freedom of conscience

and the pursuit of happiness. To them full protection will be

given. They shall not be abandoned. We will not leave the

destiny of the loyal millions in the islands to the disloyal

thousands who are in rebellion against the United States.

Order under civil institutions will come as soon as those who

now break the peace shall keep it. Force will not be needed or

used when those who make war against us shall make it no more.

May it end without further bloodshed, and there be ushered in

the reign of peace, to be made permanent by a government of

liberty under law."

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1901 (March).

Rejection by the British government of the Interoceanic Canal

Treaty as amended by the Senate.

See (in this volume)

CANAL, INTEROCEANIC: A. D. 1901 (MARCH).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1901 (March).

Death of Ex-President Harrison.

Benjamin Harrison, President of the United States 1889-1893,

died at his home in Indianapolis, on the afternoon of March

13, 1901, after an illness of a few days.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1901 (March-April).

Capture of Aguinaldo, the Filipino leader.

His oath of allegiance to the United States.

See (in this volume)

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1901 (MARCH-APRIL).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1901 (April).

Organization of the enlarged regular army.

Its strength, 76,000 men.

A Press despatch from Washington, April 24, announced that the

Secretary of War had approved recommendations of

Lieutenant-General Miles for the organization of the army, not

raising it to the full strength of 100,000 men authorized by

Congress, but providing for a force of 76,787 enlisted men,

distributed as follows:

"Line of the army, 74,504;

ordnance department, 700;

signal corps, 760;

post quartermaster sergeants, 150;

post commissary sergeants, 200;

electrician sergeants, 100;

Military Academy detachment and band, 298;

Indian scouts, 75.

The cavalry is to be organized into fifteen regiments,

consisting of 12 troops of 85 enlisted men, which, with the

bands, will make a cavalry force of 15,840 men. The infantry

is to consist of 38,520 men, divided into 30 regiments of 12

companies each. The artillery corps will have a total of

18,862 men, of which the coast artillery will have 13, 734,

organized into 126 companies of 109 men each; and the field

artillery, 4,800 men, organized into 30 batteries of 150 men

each. The engineer battalions will consist of 12 companies

amounting to 1,282 men. This plan makes no provision for the

employment of Filipino natives, but this is explained by the

fact that the 12,000 authorized for the native military force

was made a distinctive feature of the Army bill by Congress

and separated from the Regular Army."

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1901 (April).

Petition from the workingmen of Porto Rico.

See (in this volume)

PORTO RICO: A. D. 1901 (APRIL).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1901 (May).

Decision of the Supreme Court in the cases involving

questions touching the status of the new territorial

possessions of the nation.

The opinions of the Supreme Court in the cases before it known

as "the insular cases," involving questions touching the

relations of the government of the United States to the

insular possessions lately acquired (see above: A. D.

1900-1901), were announced on the 27th of May, as these sheets

of the present volume were about to go to press.

In the case of Elias S. A. De Lima et al. the opinion of the

majority of the Court, delivered by Justice Brown, was against

the claim of the government to duties on goods imported into

the United States from Porto Rico after the ratification of

the treaty of peace with Spain and before the passage of the

Porto Rican act of April 12, 1900.

See, (in this volume),

PORTO RICO: A. D. 1899-1900; and 1900, APRIL).

It was held in this decisive opinion that Porto Rico, at the

time the duties in question were collected, was not a foreign

country, but a territory of the United States. Said Justice

Brown: "If an Act of Congress be necessary to convert a

foreign country into domestic territory, the question at once

suggests itself, What is the character of the legislation

demanded for this purpose? Will an act appropriating money for

its purchase be sufficient? Apparently not. Will an act

appropriating the duties collected upon imports to and from

such country for the benefit of its government be sufficient?

Apparently not. Will acts making appropriations for its postal

service, for the establishment of lighthouses, for the

maintenance of quarantine stations, for erecting public

buildings, have that effect? Will an act establishing a

complete local government, but with the reservation of a right

to collect duties upon commerce, be adequate for that purpose?

None of these, nor all together, will be sufficient, if the

contention of the government be sound, since acts embracing

all these provisions have been passed in connection with Porto

Rico, and it is insisted that it is still a foreign country

within the meaning of the tariff laws. We are unable to

acquiesce in this assumption that a territory may be at the

same time both foreign and domestic. We are, therefore, of the

opinion that at the time these duties were levied Porto Rico

was not a foreign country within the meaning of the tariff

laws, but a territory of the United States; that the duties

were illegally exacted, and that the plaintiffs are entitled

to recover them back."

But in the case of Samuel B. Downes et al. a different set of

circumstances was dealt with, since the duties in question

were on goods imported from Porto Rico after the passage of

the Act of April 12 (called "the Foraker Act"). On the

question thus presented the majority of the Court sustained

the contention of the government, saying, in an opinion

delivered by Justice Brown:

{683}

"We are of opinion that the island of Porto Rico is a

territory appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but

not a part of the United States within the revenue clause of

the Constitution; that the Foraker act is constitutional so

far as it imposes duties upon imports from such island and

that the plaintiff cannot recover the duties exacted in this

case." The following general conclusions were held by Justice

Brown to be established:

"First—That the District of Columbia and the Territories are

not States, within the judicial clause of the Constitution

giving jurisdiction in cases between citizens of different

States.

"Second—That Territories are not States, within the meaning of

revised statutes, section 709, permitting writs of error from

this court in cases where the validity of a State's statute is

drawn in question.

"Third—That the District of Columbia and the Territories are

States as that word is used in treaties with foreign powers,

with respect to the ownership, disposition and inheritance of

property.

"Fourth—That the Territories are not within the clause of the

Constitution providing for the creation of a Supreme Court and

such inferior courts as Congress may see fit to establish.

"Fifth—That the Constitution does not apply to foreign

countries or trials therein conducted, and that Congress may

lawfully provide for such trials before consular tribunals,

without the intervention of a grand or petit jury.

"Sixth—That where the Constitution has been once formally

extended by Congress to Territories, neither Congress nor the

Territorial Legislature can enact laws inconsistent

therewith."

Five of the nine justices of the Court concurred in the decree

announced by Justice Brown; but three of them, viz., Justices

White, Shims and McKenna, placed their concurrence on

different and quite opposed grounds, in an opinion prepared by

Justice White. In their view of the case before the court,

"the sole and only issue is, had Porto Rico, at the time of

the passage of the Act in question, been incorporated into and

become an integral part of the United States?" and their

conclusion is reported to have been, that "the question when

Porto Rico was to be incorporated was a political question, to

be determined by the American people, speaking through

Congress, and was not for the courts to determine."

The minority of the Court, consisting of Chief Justice Fuller,

Justices Harlan, Brewer and Peckham dissented from the decree

rendered by the majority, and from the varying grounds on

which the two sections of that majority had rested it. As

summarized in press despatches of the day, their opinion,

delivered by the Chief Justice, "absolutely rejected the

contention that the rule of uniformity [that is, the

constitutional provision that 'all duties, imposts and excises

shall be uniform throughout the United States'] was not

applicable to Porto Rico because it had not been incorporated

into and become an integral part of the United States; the

word incorporation had no occult meaning, and whatever its

situation before, the Foraker act made Porto Rico an organized

Territory of the United States." "The concurring opinion of

the majority," said the Chief Justice, "recognized that

Congress, in dealing with the people of new territories or

possessions, is bound to respect the fundamental guarantees of

life, liberty and property, but assumes that Congress is not

bound in those territories or possessions to follow the rules

of taxation prescribed by the Constitution. And yet the power

to tax involves the power to destroy and the levy of duty

touches all our people in all places under the jurisdiction of

the Government. The logical result is that Congress may

prohibit commerce altogether between the States and

Territories, and may prescribe one rule of taxation in one

Territory, and a different rule in another. That theory

assumes that the Constitution created a government empowered

to acquire countries throughout the world, to be governed by

different rules than those obtaining in the original States

and Territories, and substitutes for the present system of

republican government, a system of domination over distant

provinces in the exercise of unrestricted power. In our

judgment, so much of the Porto Rican act as authorized the

imposition of these duties is invalid and plaintiffs were

entitled to recover."

Justice Harlan announced his concurrence with the dissenting

opinion delivered by the Chief Justice. He regarded the

Foraker act as unconstitutional in its revenue provisions, and

believed that Porto Rico, after the ratification of the treaty

with Spain, became a part of the United States. In conclusion,

Justice Harlan said: "The addition of Porto Rico to the

territory of the United States has been recognized by direct

action upon the part of Congress. It has legislated in

recognition of the treaty with Spain. If Porto Rico did not by

such action become a part of the United States it did become

such, at least, when Congress passed the Foraker act. I can

not believe that Congress may impose any duty, impost or

excise with respect to that territory and its people which is

not consistent with the constitutional requirement that all

duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the

United States."

No decision was rendered in the case of the Fourteen Diamond

Rings, which involved questions relative to the status of the

Philippine Islands in their relations to the government of the

United States.

----------UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: End--------

UNITED STATES OF CENTRAL AMERICA.

Its formation and dissolution.

See (in this volume)

CENTRAL AMERICA: A. D. 1821-1898.

UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION.

See (in this volume)

TRUSTS: UNITED STATES: THE CLIMAX, &c.

UNIVERSITIES.

See (in this volume)

EDUCATION.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA:

Expeditions to explore the ruins of Nippur.

See (in this volume)

ARCHÆOLOGICAL, RESEARCH: BABYLONIA: AMERICAN EXPLORATION.

UNYORO:

British regulation of the kingdom.

See (in this volume)

UGANDA: A. D. 1897-1898.

UR.

See (in volume 1)

BABYLONIA, PRIMITIVE;

See (in volume 4)

SEMITES;

and (in this volume)

ARCHÆOLOGICAL RESEARCH: BABYLONIA.

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URUGUAY: A. D. 1896-1899.

Revolutionary movement.

Assassination of President Borda.

Blancos and Colorados.

Restoration of tranquil government by the

Vice President, Cuestas.

In November, 1896, a movement for the overthrow of President

Borda was begun, with strong assistance from the neighboring

Brazilian State of Rio Grande do Sul. Months of civil war

followed, with varying fortunes, but the summer of 1897 found

the President parleying with the insurgents, endeavoring to

make terms. His original opponents had been the party called

that of the Blancos, or Whites; the Colorados, or Reds, had

supported him; but he seemed to be making enemies among them.

By an assassin of his own party he was shot, on the 25th of

August, as he came from a service in the cathedral at

Montevideo which commemorated the anniversary of Uruguayan

independence. Senor Juan Luis Cuestas, the President of the

Senate and ex-officio Vice President of the Republic, assumed

the administration of the government, made peace with the

insurgents, and prepared to deal with a faction in the

Chambers which is said to have made good government

impossible. "The Representatives had made themselves hated by

violence, corruption, and attacks on property. Senor Cuestas

accordingly removed all officials devoted to the Chambers,

called out a thousand National Guards, and being thus master

of the situation, on February 10th dissolved the Chambers and

declared himself provisional President. He then appointed a

'Council' of eighty prominent citizens of all parties,

invested them with the legislative power, and directed them to

elect a new President, and to settle the method and time of

the next elections. … According to the 'Times',

correspondent, the citizens of Monte Video of all parties

approved his action, not a stroke was struck for the Chambers,

and public securities rose at once by from eight to fourteen

points. Senor Cuestas, in fact, is trusted and competent."

_The Spectator (London),

March 26, 1898._

In due time, the Provisional President had to deal with a

military revolt, which he effectually suppressed. Then, on the

1st of March, 1899, he was constitutionally elected President,

after resigning his dictatorial powers for a fortnight, in

order that the election might be freely held.

UTAH: A. D. 1895-1896.

Prohibition of polygamous marriages.

Proclamation of admission to the Union.

On the 4th of January, 1896, a proclamation by the President

of the United States, after reciting the provisions of the Act

of Congress approved July 16, 1894, and the action taken by a

convention of the people of Utah, held in accordance with the

said act, in March, 1895, which convention "did, by ordinance

irrevocable without the consent of the United States and the

people of said State, as required by said act, provide that

perfect toleration of religious sentiment shall be secured and

that no inhabitant of said State shall ever be molested in person

or property on account of his or her mode of religious

worship, but that polygamous or plural marriages are forever

prohibited," thereupon declared and proclaimed the creation of

the State of Utah and its admission into the Union to be

accomplished. The constitution of the new State has some

radical features, providing for an eight-hours labor-day, and

giving to women equal rights with men in suffrage and in

eligibility to public office.

V.

VASSOS, Colonel, in Crete.

See (in this volume)

TURKEY: A. D. 1897 (FEBRUARY-MARCH).

"VEGETARIANS," The.

See (in this volume)

CHINA: A. D. 1895 (AUGUST).

VENEZUELA: A. D. 1895.

Revolt suppressed.

An attempted rising, in the interest of Dr. Rojas Paul,

against the government of President Crespo, in the autumn of

1895, was quickly suppressed.

VENEZUELA: A. D. 1895 (July).

The question of the boundary of British Guiana taken up by the

government of the United States.

Despatch of Secretary Olney to Ambassador Bayard.

For a number of years the government of the United States had

been exerting itself to bring about the settlement of a long

standing dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela

concerning the line of boundary between the territory of

Venezuela and that of British Guiana. In 1895 the effort

became more resolute, as appeared in a lengthy despatch

addressed, on the 20th of July, by the American Secretary of

State, Mr. Olney, to the American Ambassador in London, Mr.

Bayard. In this despatch Mr. Olney reviewed the long

controversy which had been in progress, and recalled the

communications on the subject which had passed between the

governments of the United States and Great Britain since 1886.

He then summarised "the important features of the existing

situation" as represented in his recital, by the following

statement:

"1. The title to territory of indefinite but confessedly very

large extent is in dispute between Great Britain on the one

hand, and the South American Republic of Venezuela on the

other.

2. The disparity in the strength of the claimants is such that

Venezuela can hope to establish her claim only through

peaceful methods—through an agreement with her adversary

either upon the subject itself or upon an arbitration.

3. The controversy with varying claims on the part of Great

Britain has existed for more than half-a-century, during which

period many earnest and persistent efforts of Venezuela to

establish a boundary by agreement have proved unsuccessful.

4. The futility of the endeavour to obtain a conventional line

being recognized, Venezuela, for a quarter of a century, has

asked and striven for arbitration.

5. Great Britain, however, has always and continuously

refused, and still refuses, to arbitrate except upon the

condition of a renunciation of a large part of the Venezuelan

claim, and of a concession to herself of a large share of the

territory in controversy.

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6. By the frequent interposition of its good offices at the

instance of Venezuela, by constantly urging and promoting the

restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries,

by pressing for arbitration of the disputed boundary, by offering

to act as Arbitrator, by expressing its grave concern whenever

new alleged instances of British aggression upon Venezuelan

territory have been brought to its notice, the Government of

the United States has made it clear to Great Britain and to

the world that the controversy is one in which both its honour

and its interests are involved, and the continuance of which

it cannot regard with indifference."

Mr. Olney proceeds next to consider the rights, the interests

and the duty of the United States in the matter, and to what

extent, if any, it "may and should intervene in a controversy

between and primarily concerning only Great Britain and

Venezuela," and his conclusions on these points are founded on

the doctrine set forth by President Monroe, of resistance to

European intervention in American affairs. Quoting President

Monroe's celebrated Message on the subject, in 1823, Mr. Olney

remarks:

"The Message just quoted declared that the American continents

were fully occupied, and were not the subjects for future

colonization by European Powers. To this spirit and this

purpose, also, are to be attributed the passages of the same

Message which treat any infringement of the rule against

interference in American affairs on the part of the Powers of

Europe as an act of unfriendliness to the United States. It

was realized that it was futile to lay down such a rule unless

its observance could be enforced. It was manifest that the

United States was the only Power in this hemisphere capable of

enforcing it. It was therefore courageously declared, not

merely that Europe ought not to interfere in American affairs,

but that any European Power doing so would be regarded as

antagonizing the interests and inviting the opposition of the

United States.

"That America is in no part open to colonization, though the

proposition was not universally admitted at the time of its

first enunciation, has long been universally conceded. We are

now concerned, therefore, only with that other practical

application of the Monroe doctrine the disregard of which by

an European Power is to be deemed an act of unfriendliness

towards the United States. The precise scope and limitations

of this rule cannot be too clearly apprehended. It does not

establish any general Protectorate by the United States over

other American States. It does not relieve any American State

from its obligations as fixed by international law, nor

prevent any European Power directly interested from enforcing

such obligations or from inflicting merited punishment for the

breach of them. It does not contemplate any interference in

the internal affairs of any American State, or in the

relations between it and other American States. It does not

justify any attempt on our part to change the established form

of Government of any American State, or to prevent the people

of such State from altering that form according to their own

will and pleasure. The rule in question has but a single

purpose and object. It is that no European Power or

combination of European Powers shall forcibly deprive an

American State of the right and power of self-government, and

of shaping for itself its own political fortunes and

destinies. That the rule thus defined has been the accepted

public law of this country ever since its promulgation cannot

fairly be denied. …

"It is manifest that, if a rule has been openly and uniformly

declared and acted upon by the Executive Branch of the

Government for more than seventy years without express

repudiation by Congress, it must be conclusively presumed to

have its sanction. Yet it is certainly no more than the exact

truth to say that every Administration since President

Monroe's has had occasion, and sometimes more occasions than

one, to examine and consider the Monroe doctrine, and has in

each instance given it emphatic indorsement. … A doctrine of

American public law thus long and firmly established and

supported could not easily be ignored in a proper case for its

application, even were the considerations upon which it is

founded obscure or questionable. No such objection can be

made, however, to the Monroe doctrine understood and defined

in the manner already stated. It rests, on the contrary, upon

facts and principles that are both intelligible and

incontrovertible. That distance and 3,000 miles of intervening

ocean make any permanent political union between an European

and an American State unnatural and inexpedient will hardly be

denied. But physical and geographical considerations are the

least of the objections to such a union. Europe, as Washington

observed, has a set of primary interests which are peculiar to

herself. America is not interested in them, and ought not to

be vexed or complicated with them. …

"If, … for the reasons stated, the forcible intrusion of

European Powers into American politics is to be deprecated—if,

as it is to be deprecated, it should be resisted and

prevented—such resistance and prevention must come from the

United States. They would come from it, of course, were it

made the point of attack. But, if they come at all, they must

also come from it when any other American State is attacked,

since only the United States has the strength adequate to the

exigency. Is it true, then, that the safety and welfare of the

United States are so concerned with the maintenance of the

independence of every American State as against any European

Power as to justify and require the interposition of the

United States whenever that independence is endangered? The

question can be candidly answered in but one way. The States

of America, South as well as North, by geographical proximity,

by natural sympathy, by similarity of Governmental

Constitutions, are friends and allies, commercially and

politically, of the United States. To allow the subjugation of

any of them by an European Power is, of course, to completely

reverse that situation, and signifies the loss of all the

advantages incident to their natural relations to us. But that

is not all. The people of the United States have a vital

interest in the cause of popular self-government. … To-day the

United States is practically Sovereign on this continent, and

its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its

interposition. Why? It is not because of the pure friendship

or good-will felt for it. It is not simply by reason of its

high character as a civilised State, nor because wisdom and

justice and equity are the invariable characteristics of the

dealings of the United States. It is because, in addition to

all other grounds, its infinite resources, combined with its

isolated position, render it master of the situation, and

practically invulnerable as against any or all other Powers.

{686}

All the advantages of this superiority are at once imperilled

if the principle be admitted that European Powers may convert

American States into Colonies or provinces of their own. The

principle would be eagerly availed of, and every Power doing

so would immediately acquire a base of military operations

against us. What one Power was permitted to do could not be

denied to another, and it is not inconceivable that the

struggle now going on for the acquisition of Africa might be

transferred to South America. If it were, the weaker countries

would unquestionably be soon absorbed, while the ultimate result

might be the partition of all South America between the

various European Powers. …

"The people of the United States have learned in the school of

experience to what extent the relations of States to each

other depend not upon sentiment nor principle, but upon

selfish interest. They will not soon forget that, in their

hour of distress, all their anxieties and burdens were

aggravated by the possibility of demonstrations against their

national life on the part of Powers with whom they had long

maintained the most harmonious relations. They have yet in

mind that France seized upon the apparent opportunity of our

Civil War to set up a Monarchy in the adjoining State of

Mexico. They realize that, had France and Great Britain held

important South American possessions to work from and to

benefit, the temptation to destroy the predominance of the

Great Republic in this hemisphere by furthering its

dismemberment might have been irresistible. From that grave

peril they have been saved in the past, and may be saved again

in the future, through the operation of the sure but silent

force of the doctrine proclaimed by President Monroe. …

"There is, then, a doctrine of American public law, well

founded in principle and abundantly sanctioned by precedent,

which entitles and requires the United States to treat as an

injury to itself the forcible assumption by an European Power

of political control over an American State. The application

of the doctrine to the boundary dispute between Great Britain

and Venezuela remains to be made, and presents no real

difficulty. Though the dispute relates to a boundary-line,

yet, as it is between States, it necessarily imports political

control to be lost by one party and gained by the other. The

political control at stake, too, is of no mean importance, but

concerns a domain of great extent—the British claim, it will

be remembered, apparently expanding in two years some 33,000

square miles—and, if it also directly involves the command of

the mouth of the Orinoco, is of immense consequence in

connection with the whole river navigation of the interior of

South America. It has been intimated, indeed, that in respect

of these South American possessions, Great Britain is herself

an American State like any other, so that a controversy

between her and Venezuela is to be settled between themselves

as if it were between Venezuela and Brazil, or between

Venezuela and Colombia, and does not call for or justify

United States intervention. If this view be tenable at all,

the logical sequence is plain. Great Britain as a South

American State is to be entirely differentiated from Great

Britain generally; and if the boundary question cannot be

settled otherwise than by force, British Guiana with her own

independent resources, and not those of the British Empire,

should be left to settle the matter with Venezuela—an

arrangement which very possibly Venezuela might not object to.

But the proposition that an European Power with an American

dependency is for the purposes of the Monroe doctrine to be

classed not as an European but as an American State will not

admit of serious discussion. If it were to be adopted, the

Monroe doctrine would be too valueless to be worth asserting.

…

"The declaration of the Monroe Message—that existing Colonies

or dependencies of an European Power would not be interfered

with by the United States—means Colonies or dependencies then

existing with their limits as then existing. So it has been

invariably construed, and so it must continue to be construed,

unless it is to be deprived of all vital force. Great Britain

cannot be deemed a South American State within the purview of

the Monroe doctrine, nor, if she is appropriating Venezuelan

territory, is it material that she does so by advancing the

frontier of an old Colony instead of by the planting of a new

Colony. The difference is matter of form, and not of

substance, and the doctrine if pertinent in the one case must

be in the other also. It is not admitted, however, and

therefore cannot be assumed, that Great Britain is in fact

usurping dominion over Venezuelan territory. While Venezuela

charges such usurpation Great Britain denies it, and the

United States, until the merits are authoritatively

ascertained, can take sides with neither. But while this is

so—while the United States may not, under existing

circumstances at least, take upon itself to say which of the

two parties is right and which wrong—it is certainly within

its right to demand that the truth shall be ascertained. …

"It being clear, therefore, that the United States may

legitimately insist upon the merits of the boundary question

being determined, it is equally clear that there is but one

feasible mode of determining them, viz., peaceful arbitration.

The impracticability of any conventional adjustment has been

often and thoroughly demonstrated. Even more impossible of

consideration is an appeal to arms—a mode of settling national

pretensions unhappily not yet wholly obsolete. If, however, it

were not condemnable as a relic of barbarism and a crime in

itself, so one-sided a contest could not be invited nor even

accepted by Great Britain without distinct disparagement to

her character as a civilized State. Great Britain, however,

assumes no such attitude. On the contrary, she both admits

that there is a controversy, and that arbitration should be

resorted to for its adjustment. But, while up to that point

her attitude leaves nothing to be desired, its practical

effect is completely nullified by her insistence that the

submission shall cover but a part of the controversy—that, as

a condition of arbitrating her right to a part of the disputed

territory, the remainder shall be turned over to her. If it

were possible to point to a boundary which both parties had

ever agreed or assumed to be such either expressly or tacitly,

the demand that territory conceded by such line to British Guiana

should be held not to be in dispute might rest upon a

reasonable basis. But there is no such line. The territory

which Great Britain insists shall be ceded to her as a

condition of arbitrating her claim to other territory has

never been admitted to belong to her.

{687}

It has always and consistently been claimed by Venezuela. Upon

what principle—except her feebleness as a nation—is she to be

denied the right of having the claim heard and passed upon by

an impartial Tribunal? No reason or shadow of reason appears

in all the voluminous literature of the subject. …