communication to be addressed to "General Emilio Aguinaldo" as
follows: "Sir: General Anderson wishes me to say that, the
second expedition having arrived, he expects to encamp in the
vicinity of Paranaque from 5,000 to 7,000 men. To do this,
supply this army and shelter, will require certain assistance
from the Filipinos in this neighborhood. We will want horses,
buffaloes, carts, etc., for transportation, bamboo for
shelter, wood to cook with, etc. For all this we are willing
to pay a fair price, but no more. We find so far that the
native population are not willing to give us this assistance
as promptly as required. But we must have it, and if it
becomes necessary we will be compelled to send out parties to
seize what we may need. We would regret very much to do this,
as we are here to befriend the Filipinos. Our nation has spent
millions of money to send forces here to expel the Spaniards
and to give good government to the whole people, and the
return we are asking is comparatively slight. General Anderson
wishes you to inform your people that we are here for their
good, and that they must supply us with labor and material at
the current market prices. We are prepared to purchase 500
horses at a fair price, but can not undertake to bargain for
horses with each individual owner. I regret very much that I
am unable to see you personally, as it is of the utmost
importance that these arrangements should be made as soon as
possible."
To this communication there seems to have been no written
reply until the 24th; and, on the 20th, the Chief
Quartermaster reported to General Anderson "that it is
impossible to procure transportation except upon Señor
Aguinaldo's order, in this section, who has an inventory of
everything. The natives have removed their wheels and hid
them." On the 23d General Anderson repeated his request, as
follows:
{615}
"General: When I came here three weeks ago I requested your
excellency to give what assistance you could to procure means
of transportation for the American Army, as it was to fight
the cause of your people. So far we have received no response.
As you represent your people, I now have the honor to make
requisition on you for 500 horses and 50 oxen and ox carts. If
you can not secure these, I will have to pass you and make
requisition directly on the people. I beg leave to request an
answer at your earliest convenience."
The next day Aguinaldo replied: "I have the honor to manifest
to your excellency that I am surprised beyond measure at that
which you say to me in it, lamenting the nonreceipt of any
response relative to the needs (or aids) that you have asked
of me in the way of horses, buffaloes, and carts, because I
replied in a precise manner, through the bearer, that I was
disposed to give convenient orders whenever you advised me of
the number of these with due anticipation (notice). I have
circulated orders in the provinces in the proximity that in
the shortest time possible horses be brought for sale, but I
cannot assure your excellency that we have the number of 500
that is needed, because horses are not abundant in these
vicinities, owing to deaths caused by epizootic diseases in
January and March last. Whenever we have them united (or
collected), I shall have the pleasure to advise your
excellency. I have also ordered to be placed at my disposal 50
carts that I shall place at your disposition whenever
necessary, always (premising) that you afford me a previous
advice of four days in anticipation."
Meantime, General Anderson had written to the War Department,
on the 18th: "Since reading the President's instructions to
General Merritt, I think I should state to you that the
establishment of a provisional government on our part will
probably bring us in conflict with insurgents, now in active
hostility to Spain. The insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, has
declared himself dictator and self-appointed president. He has
declared martial law and promulgated a minute method of rule and
administration under it. We have observed all official
military courtesies, and he and his followers express great
admiration and gratitude to the great American Republic of the
north, yet in many ways they obstruct our purposes and are
using every effort to take Manila without us. I suspect also
that Aguinaldo is secretly negotiating with the Spanish
authorities, as his confidential aid is in Manila. The city is
strongly fortified and hard to approach in the rainy season.
If a bombardment fails we should have the best engineering
ability here." And, again on the 21st, he had written: "Since
I wrote last, Aguinaldo has put in operation an elaborate
system of military government, under his assumed authority as
dictator, and has prohibited any supplies being given us,
except by his order. As to this last I have written to him
that our requisitions on the country for horses, ox carts,
fuel and bamboo (to make scaling ladders) must be filled, and
that he must aid in having them filled. His assumption of
civil authority I have ignored, and let him know verbally that
I could, and would, not recognize it, while I did not
recognize him as a military leader. It may seem strange that I
have made no formal protest against his proclamation as
dictator, his declaration of martial law, and publication and
execution of a despotic form of government. I wrote such a
protest, but did not publish it, at Admiral Dewey's request,
and also for fear of wounding the susceptibilities of
Major-General Merritt, but I have let it be known in every
other way that we do not recognize the dictatorship. These
people only respect force and firmness. I submit, with all
deference, that we have heretofore underrated the natives.
They are not ignorant, savage tribes, but have a civilization
of their own; and although insignificant in appearance, are
fierce fighters, and for a tropical people they are
industrious. A small detail of natives will do more work in a
given time than a regiment of volunteers."
On the 24th General Anderson received from the Philippine
leader a very clear and definite statement of his attitude
towards the "Expeditionary Forces of the United States," and
the intentions with which he and the people whom he
represented were acting. "I came," he wrote, "from Hongkong to
prevent my countrymen from making common cause with the
Spanish against the North Americans, pledging before my word
to Admiral Dewey to not give place [to allow] to any internal
discord, because, [being] a judge of their desires, I had the
strong convictions that I would succeed in both objects,
establishing a government according to their desires. Thus it
is that in the beginning I proclaimed the dictatorship, and
afterwards, when some of the provinces had already liberated
themselves from Spanish domination, I established a
revolutionary government that to-day exists, giving it a
democratic and popular character as far as the abnormal
circumstances of war permitted, in order that they [the
provinces] might be justly represented, and administered to
their satisfaction. It is true that my government has not been
acknowledged by any of the foreign powers, but we expected
that the great North American nation, which struggled first
for its independence, and afterwards for the abolition of
slavery, and is now actually struggling for the independence
of Cuba, would look upon it with greater benevolence than any
other nation. Because of this we have always acknowledged the
right of preference to our gratitude.
"Debtor to the generosity of the North Americans, and to the
favors we have received through Admiral Dewey, and [being]
more desirous than any other person of preventing any conflict
which would have as a result foreign intervention, which must be
extremely prejudicial, not alone to my nation but also to that
of your excellency, I consider it my duty to advise you of the
undesirability of disembarking North American troops in the
places conquered by the Filipinos from the Spanish, without
previous notice to this government, because as no formal
agreement yet exists between the two nations the Philippine
people might consider the occupation of its territories by
North American troops as a violation of its rights.
"I comprehend that without the destruction of the Spanish
squadron the Philippine revolution would not have advanced so
rapidly. Because of this I take the liberty of indicating to
your excellency the necessity that, before disembarking, you
should communicate in writing to this government the places
that are to be occupied and also the object of the occupation,
that the people may be advised in due form and [thus] prevent
the commission of any transgression against friendship.
{616}
I can answer for my people, because they have given me evident
proofs of their absolute confidence in my government, but I
can not answer for that which another nation whose friendship
is not well guaranteed might inspire in it [the people]; and
it is certain that I do this not as a menace, but as a further
proof of the true and sincere friendship which I have always
professed for the North American people, in the complete
security that it will find itself completely identified with
our cause of liberty."
In the same strain, on the 1st of August, Aguinaldo wrote to
United States Consul Williams, as to a "distinguished friend:"
"I have said always, and I now repeat, that we recognize the
right of the North Americans to our gratitude, for we do not
forget for a moment the favors which we have received and are
now receiving; but however great those favors may be, it is
not possible for me to remove the distrust of my compatriots.
These say that if the object of the United States is to annex
these islands, why not recognize the government established in
them, in order in that manner to join with it the same as by
annexation? Why do not the American generals operate in
conjunction with the Filipino generals and, uniting the
forces, render the end more decisive? Is it intended, indeed,
to carry out annexation against the wish of these people,
distorting the legal sense of that word? If the revolutionary
government is the genuine representative by right and deed of
the Filipino people, as we have proved when necessary, why is
it wished to oppress instead of gaining their confidence and
friendship?
"It is useless for me to represent to my compatriots the
favors received through Admiral Dewey, for they assert that up
to the present the American forces have shown not an active,
only a passive, co-operation, from which they suppose that the
intentions of these forces are not for the best. They assert,
besides, that it is possible to suppose that I was brought
from Hongkong to assure those forces by my presence that the
Filipinos would not make common cause with the Spaniards, and
that they have delivered to the Filipinos the arms abandoned
by the former in the Cavite Arsenal, in order to save
themselves much labor, fatigue, blood, and treasure that a war
with Spain would cost. But I do not believe these unworthy
suspicions. I have full confidence in the generosity and
philanthropy which shine in characters of gold in the history
of the privileged people of the United States, and for that
reason, invoking the friendship which you profess for me and
the love which you have for my people, I pray you earnestly,
as also the distinguished generals who represent your country
in these islands, that you entreat the Government at
Washington to recognize the revolutionary government of the
Filipinos, and I, for my part, will labor with all my power
with my people that the United States shall not repent their
sentiments of humanity in coming to the aid of an oppressed
people.
"Say to the Government at Washington that the Filipino people
abominate savagery; that in the midst of their past
misfortunes they have learned to love liberty, order, justice,
and civil life, and that they are not able to lay aside their
own wishes when their future lot and history are under
discussion. Say also that I and my leaders know what we owe to
our unfortunate country; that we know how to admire and are
ready to imitate the disinterestedness, the abnegation, and
the patriotism of the grand men of America, among whom stands
pre-eminent the immortal General Washington."
_United States, 56th Congress, 1st Session,
Senate Document Number 208._
In an article published in the "North American Review,"
February, 1900, General Anderson discussed his relations with
Aguinaldo very frankly, in part as follows: "On the 1st of
July, 1898, I called on Aguinaldo with Admiral Dewey. He asked
me at once whether 'the United States of the North' either had
recognized or would recognize his government—I am not quite
sure as to the form of his question, whether it was 'had' or
'would.' In either form it was embarrassing. My orders were,
in substance, to effect a landing, establish a base, not to go
beyond the zone of naval co-operation, to consult Admiral
Dewey and to wait for Merritt. Aguinaldo had proclaimed his
government only a few days before (June 28), and Admiral Dewey
had no instructions as to that assumption. The facts as to the
situation at that time I believe to be these: Consul Williams
states in one of his letters to the State Department that
several thousand Tagals were in open insurrection before our
declaration of war with Spain. I do not know as to the number,
yet I believe the statement has foundation in fact. Whether
Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman and Williams did or
did not give Aguinaldo assurances that a Filipino government
would be recognized, the Filipinos certainly thought so,
probably inferring this from their acts rather than from their
statements. If an incipient rebellion was already in progress,
what could be inferred from the fact that Aguinaldo and
thirteen other banished Tagals were brought down on a naval
vessel and landed in Cavite? Admiral Dewey gave them arms and
ammunition, as I did subsequently, at his request. They were
permitted to gather up a lot of arms which the Spaniards had
thrown into the bay; and, with the four thousand rifles taken
from Spanish prisoners and two thousand purchased in Hong
Kong, they proceeded to organize three brigades and also to
arm a small steamer they had captured. I was the first to tell
Admiral Dewey that there was any disposition on the part of
the American people to hold the Philippines, if they were
captured. The current of opinion was setting that way when the
first expeditionary force left San Francisco, but this the
Admiral had had no reason to surmise.
"But to return to our interview with Aguinaldo. I told him I
was acting only in a military capacity; that I had no
authority to recognize his government; that we had come to
whip the Spaniards, and that, if we were successful, the
indirect effect would be to free them from Spanish tyranny. I
added that, as we were fighting a common enemy, I hoped we
would get along amicably together. He did not seem pleased
with this answer. The fact is, he hoped and expected to take
Manila with Admiral Dewey's assistance, and he was bitterly
disappointed when our soldiers landed at Cavite. … A few days
thereafter, he made an official call, coming with cabinet and
staff and a band of music. On that occasion he handed me an
elaborate schedule for an autonomous government which he had
received from some Filipinos in Manila, with a statement that
they had reason to believe that Spain would grant them such a
form of government.
{617}
With this was an open letter addressed to the Filipino people
from Pedro Alexandre Paterno, advising them to put their trust
in Spain rather than America. The day before, two German
officers had called on Aguinaldo and I believed they had
brought him these papers. I asked him if the scheme was
agreeable to him. He did not answer, but asked if we, the
North Americans, as he called us, intended to hold the
Philippines as dependencies. I said I could not answer that,
but that in one hundred and twenty years we had established no
colonies. He then made this remarkable statement: 'I have studied
attentively the Constitution of the United States, and I find
in it no authority for colonies and I have no fear.' It may
seem that my answer was somewhat evasive, but I was at the
time trying to contract with the Filipinos for horses, carts,
fuel and forage. …
"The origin of our controversies and conflicts with the
Filipinos can … be traced back to our refusal to recognize the
political authority of Aguinaldo. Our first serious break with
them arose from our refusal to let them co-operate with us.
About nine o'clock on the evening of August 12, I received
from General Merritt an order to notify Aguinaldo to forbid
the Filipino insurgents under his command from entering
Manila. This notification was delivered to him at twenty
minutes past ten that night. The Filipinos had made every
preparation to assail the Spanish lines in their front.
Certainly, they would not have given up part of their line to
us unless they thought they were to fight with us. They,
therefore, received General Merritt's interdict with anger and
indignation. They considered the war as their war, and Manila
as their capital, and Luzon as their country. … At seven
o'clock I received an order from General Merritt to remove the
Filipinos from the city. … I therefore took the responsibility
of telegraphing Aguinaldo, who was at Bacoor, ten miles below,
requesting him to withdraw his troops and intimating that
serious consequences would follow if he did not do so. I
received his answer at eleven, saying that a Commission would
come to me the next morning with full powers. Accordingly the
next day Señors Buencomeno, Lagarde, Araneto and Sandeco came
to Division Headquarters in Manila and stated that they were
authorized to order the withdrawal of their troops, if we
would promise to reinstate them in their present positions on
our making peace with Spain. Thereupon I took them over to
General Merritt. Upon their repeating their demands, he told
them he could not give such a pledge, but that they could rely
on the honor of the American people. The General then read to
them the proclamation he intended to issue to the Filipino
people. …
"There is a great diversity of opinion as to whether a
conflict with the Filipinos could not have been avoided if a
more conciliatory course had been followed in dealing with
them. I believe we came to a parting of the ways when we
refused their request to leave their military force in a good
strategic position on the contingency of our making peace with
Spain without a guarantee of their independence."
_T. M. Anderson,
Our Rule in the Philippines
(North American Review, volume 170, page 275)._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July-August: Porto Rico).
Occupation of Porto Rico.
"With the fall of Santiago the occupation of Porto Rico became
the next strategic necessity. General Miles had previously been
assigned to organize an expedition for that purpose.
Fortunately, he was already at Santiago, where he had arrived
on the 11th of July with reinforcements for General Shafter's
army. With these troops, consisting of 3,415 infantry and
artillery, 2 companies of engineers and 1 company of the
signal corps, General Miles left Guantanamo on July 21st,
having 9 transports, convoyed by the fleet, under Captain
Higginson, with the 'Massachusetts' (flagship), 'Dixie,',
Gloucester,' 'Columbia' and 'Yale,' the two latter carrying
troops. The expedition landed at on July 25th, which port
was entered with little opposition. Here the fleet was joined
by the 'Annapolis' and the 'Wasp,' while the 'Puritan' and
'Amphitrite' went to San Juan and joined the 'New Orleans,'
which was engaged in blockading that port. The major general
commanding was subsequently reinforced by General Schwan's
brigade of the Third Army Corps, by General Wilson with a part
of his division and also by General Brooke with a part of his
corps, numbering in all 16,973 officers and men. On July 27th
he entered Ponce, one of the most important ports in the
island, from which he thereafter directed operations for the
capture of the island. With the exception of encounters with
the enemy at Guayama, Hormigueros [the Rio Prieto], Coamo, and
Yauco and an attack on a force landed at Cape San Juan, there
was no serious resistance. The campaign was prosecuted with
great vigor and by the 12th of August much of the island was
in our possession and the acquisition of the remainder was
only a matter of a short time. At most of the points in the
island our troops were enthusiastically welcomed.
Protestations of loyalty to the flag and gratitude for
delivery from Spanish rule met our commanders at every stage."
_Message of the President of the United States
to Congress, December 5, 1898._
"During the nineteen days of active campaign on the island of
Puerto Rico a large portion of the island was captured by the
United States forces and brought under our control. Our forces
were in such a position as to make the positions of the
Spanish forces, outside of the garrison at San Juan, utterly
untenable. The Spaniards had been defeated or captured in the
six different engagements which took place, and in every
position they had occupied up to that time. The volunteers had
deserted their colors, and many of them had surrendered to our
forces and taken the oath of allegiance. This had a
demoralizing effect upon the regular Spanish troops. … The
loss of the enemy in killed, wounded and captured was nearly
ten times our own, which was only 3 killed and 40 wounded."
_General Miles,
Report
(Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,
volume 1, part 2, page 36)._
{618}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July-September).
The War with Spain.
Capture of Manila.
Relations with the Filipino insurgents.
General Merritt's report.
Aguinaldo declared President of the Philippine Republic.
"Immediately after my arrival [July 25] I visited General
Greene's camp and made a reconnaissance of the position held
by the Spanish, and also the opposing lines of the insurgent
forces, hereafter to be described. I found General Greene's
command encamped on a strip of sandy land running parallel to
the shore of the bay and not far distant from the beach, but
owing to the great difficulties of landing supplies, the
greater portion of the force had shelter tents only, and were
suffering many discomforts, the camp being situated in a low,
flat place, without shelter from the heat of the tropical sun
or adequate protection during the terrific downpours of rain
so frequent at this season. I was at once struck by the
exemplary spirit of patient, even cheerful, endurance shown by
the officers and men under such circumstances, and this
feeling of admiration for the manner in which the American
soldier, volunteer and regular alike, accept the necessary
hardships of the work they have undertaken to do, has grown
and increased with every phase of the difficult and trying
campaign which the troops of the Philippine expedition have
brought to such a brilliant and successful conclusion.
"I discovered during my visit to General Greene that the left
or north flank of his brigade camp extended to a point on the
'Calle Real' about 3,200 yards from the outer line of Spanish
defenses of the city of Manila. This Spanish line began at the
powder magazine, or old Fort San Antonio, within a hundred
yards of the beach and just south of the Malate suburb of
Manila, and stretched away to the Spanish left in more or less
detached works, eastward, through swamps and rice fields,
covering all the avenues of approach to the town and
encircling the city completely. The Filipinos, or insurgent
forces at war with Spain, had, prior to the arrival of the
American land forces, been waging a desultory warfare with the
Spaniards for several months, and were at the time of my
arrival in considerable force, variously estimated and never
accurately ascertained, but probably not far from 12,000 men.
These troops, well supplied with small arms, with plenty of
ammunition and several field guns, had obtained positions of
investment opposite to the Spanish line of detached works
throughout their entire extent; and on the particular road
called the 'Calle Real,' passing along the front of General
Greene's brigade camp and running through Malate to Manila,
the insurgents had established an earthwork or trench within
800 yards of the powder-magazine fort. They also occupied as
well the road to the right, leading from the village of Pasay,
and the approach by the beach was also in their possession.
This anomalous state of affairs, namely, having a line of
quasi-hostile native troops between our forces and the Spanish
position, was, of course, very objectionable, but it was
difficult to deal with, owing to the peculiar condition of our
relations with the insurgents, which may be briefly stated as
follows:
"Shortly after the naval battle of Manila Bay, the principal
leader of the insurgents, General Emilio Aguinaldo, came to
Cavite from Hongkong, and, with the consent of our naval
authorities, began active work in raising troops and pushing
the Spaniards in the direction of the city of Manila. Having
met with some success, and the natives flocking to his
assistance, he proclaimed an independent government of
republican form, with himself as president, and at the time of
my arrival in the islands the entire edifice of executive and
legislative departments and subdivision of territory for
administrative purposes had been accomplished, at least on
paper, and the Filipinos held military possession of many
points in the islands other than those in the vicinity of
Manila. As General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival
nor offer his services as a subordinate military leader, and
as my instructions from the President fully contemplated the
occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and
stated that 'the powers of the military occupant are absolute
and supreme and immediately operate upon the political
condition of the inhabitants,' I did not consider it wise to
hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until
I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as
I would not until then be in a position to issue a
proclamation and enforce my authority, in the event that his
pretensions should clash with my designs.
"For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the city
were pressed and military operations conducted without
reference to the situation of the insurgent forces. The wisdom
of this course was subsequently fully established by the fact
that when the troops of my command carried the Spanish
intrenchments, extending from the sea to the Pasay road on the
extreme Spanish right, we were under no obligations, by
pre-arranged plans of mutual attack, to turn to the right and
clear the front still held against the insurgents, but were
able to move forward at once and occupy the city and suburbs.
"To return to the situation of General Greene's brigade as I
found it on my arrival, it will be seen that the difficulty in
gaining an avenue of approach to the Spanish line lay in the
fact of my disinclination to ask General Aguinaldo to withdraw
from the beach and the 'Calle Real,' so that Greene could move
forward. This was overcome by instructions to General Greene
to arrange, if possible, with the insurgent brigade commander
in his immediate vicinity to move to the right and allow the
American forces unobstructed control of the roads in their
immediate front. No objection was made, and accordingly
General Greene's brigade threw forward a heavy outpost line on
the 'Calle Real' and the beach and constructed a trench, in
which a portion of the guns of the Utah batteries was placed.
The Spanish, observing this activity on our part, made a very
sharp attack with infantry and artillery on the night of July
31. The behavior of our troops during this night attack was
all that could be desired, and I have, in cablegrams to the
War Department, taken occasion to commend by name those who
deserve special mention for good conduct in the affair. Our
position was extended and strengthened after this and resisted
successfully repeated night attacks, our forces suffering,
however, considerable loss in wounded and killed, while the
losses of the enemy, owing to the darkness, could not be
ascertained.
"The strain of the night fighting and the heavy details for
outpost duty made it imperative to re-enforce General Greene's
troops with General MacArthur's brigade, which had arrived in
transports on the 31st of July. The difficulties of this
operation can hardly be overestimated. The transports were at
anchor off Cavite, 5 miles from a point on the beach where it
was desired to disembark the men.
{619}
Several squalls, accompanied by floods of rain, raged day
after day, and the only way to get the troops and supplies
ashore was to load them from the ship's side into native
lighters (called 'cascos') or small steamboats, move them to a
point opposite the camp, and then disembark them through the
surf in small boats, or by running the lighters head on to the
beach. The landing was finally accomplished, after days of
hard work and hardship; and I desire here to express again my
admiration for the fortitude and cheerful willingness of the
men of all commands engaged in this operation. Upon the
assembly of MacArthur's brigade in support of Greene's, I had
about 8,500 men in position to attack, and I deemed the time
had come for final action. During the time of the night
attacks I had communicated my desire to Admiral Dewey that he
would allow his ships to open fire on the right of the Spanish
line of intrenchments, believing that such action would stop
the night firing and loss of life, but the admiral had
declined to order it unless we were in danger of losing our
position by the assaults of the Spanish, for the reason that,
in his opinion, it would precipitate a general engagement, for
which he was not ready. Now, however, the brigade of General
MacArthur was in position and the 'Monterey' had arrived, and
under date of August 6 Admiral Dewey agreed to my suggestion
that we should send a joint letter to the captain-general
notifying him that he should remove from the city all
non-combatants within forty-eight hours, and that operations
against the defenses of Manila might begin at any time after
the expiration of that period.
"This letter was sent August 7, and a reply was received the
same date, to the effect that the Spanish were without places
of refuge for the increased numbers of wounded, sick women,
and children now lodged within the walls. On the 9th a formal
joint demand for the surrender of the city was sent in. This
demand was based upon the hopelessness of the struggle on the
part of the Spaniards, and that every consideration of
humanity demanded that the city should not be subjected to
bombardment under such circumstances. The captain-general's
reply, of same date, stated that the council of defense had
declared that the demand could not be granted; but the
captain-general offered to consult his Government if we would
allow him the time strictly necessary for the communications
by way of Hongkong. This was declined on our part for the
reason that it could, in the opinion of the admiral and
myself, lead only to a continuance of the situation, with no
immediate result favorable to us, and the necessity was
apparent and very urgent that decisive action should be taken
at once to compel the enemy to give up the town, in order to
relieve our troops from the trenches and from the great
exposure to unhealthy conditions which were unavoidable in a
bivouac during the rainy season.
"The seacoast batteries in defense of Manila are so situated
that it is impossible for ships to engage them without firing
into the town, and as the bombardment of a city filled with
women and children, sick and wounded, and containing a large
amount of neutral property, could only be justified as a last
resort, it was agreed between Admiral Dewey and myself that an
attempt should be made to carry the extreme right of the
Spanish line of intrenchments in front of the positions at
that time occupied by our troops, which, with its flank on the
seashore, was entirely open to the fire of the navy. It was
not my intention to press the assault at this point, in case
the enemy should hold it in strong force, until after the navy
had made practicable breaches in the works and shaken the troops
holding them, which could not be done by the army alone, owing
to the absence of siege guns. … It was believed, however, as
most desirable, and in accordance with the principles of
civilized warfare, that the attempt should be made to drive
the enemy out of his intrenchments before resorting to the
bombardment of the city. …
"All the troops were in position on the 13th at an early hour
in the morning. About 9 a. m. on that day our fleet steamed
forward from Cavite and before 10 a. m. opened a hot and
accurate fire of heavy shells and rapid-fire projectiles on
the sea flank of the Spanish intrenchments at the powder
magazine fort, and at the same time the Utah batteries, in
position in our trenches near the 'Calle Real,' began firing
with great accuracy. At 10.25, on a prearranged signal from
our trenches that it was believed our troops could advance,
the navy ceased firing, and immediately a light line of
skirmishers from the Colorado regiment of Greene's brigade
passed over our trenches and deployed rapidly forward, another
line from the same regiment from the left flank of our
earthworks advancing swifty up the beach in open order. Both
these lines found the powder-magazine fort and the trenches
flanking it deserted, but as they passed over the Spanish
works they were met by a sharp fire from a second line
situated in the streets of Malate, by which a number of men
were killed and wounded, among others the soldier who pulled
down the Spanish colors still flying on the fort and raised
our own.
"The works of the second line soon gave way to the determined
advance of Greene's troops, and that officer pushed his
brigade rapidly through Malate and over the bridges to occupy
Binondo and San Miguel, as contemplated in his instructions.
In the meantime the brigade of General MacArthur, advancing
simultaneously on the Pasay road, encountered a very sharp
fire, coming from the blockhouses, trenches, and woods in his
front, positions which it was very difficult to carry, owing
to the swampy condition of the ground on both sides of the
roads and the heavy undergrowth concealing the enemy. With
much gallantry and excellent judgment on the part of the
brigade commander and the troops engaged these difficulties
were overcome with a minimum loss, and MacArthur advanced and
held the bridges and the town of Malate, as was contemplated
in his instructions.
"The city of Manila was now in our possession, excepting the
walled town, but shortly after the entry of our troops into
Malate a white flag was displayed on the walls, whereupon
Lieutenant Colonel C. A. Whittier, United States Volunteers,
of my staff, and Lieutenant Brumby, United States Navy,
representing Admiral Dewey, were sent ashore to communicate
with the Captain-General. I soon personally followed these
officers into the town, going at once to the palace of the
Governor-General, and there, after a conversation with the
Spanish authorities, a preliminary agreement of the terms of
capitulation was signed by the Captain-General and myself.
This agreement was subsequently incorporated into the formal
terms of capitulation, as arranged by the officers
representing the two forces, a copy of which is hereto
appended and marked.
{620}
Immediately after the surrender the Spanish colors on the sea
front were hauled down and the American flag displayed and
saluted by the guns of the navy. The Second Oregon Regiment,
which had proceeded by sea from Cavite, was disembarked and
entered the walled town as a provost guard, and the colonel
was directed to receive the Spanish arms and deposit them in
places of security. The town was filled with the troops of the
enemy driven in from the intrenchments, regiments formed and
standing in line in the streets, but the work of disarming
proceeded quietly and nothing unpleasant occurred.
"In leaving the subject of the operations of the 13th, I
desire here to record my appreciation of the admirable manner
in which the orders for attack and the plan for occupation of
the city were carried out by the troops exactly as
contemplated. I submit that for troops to enter under fire a
town covering a wide area, to rapidly deploy and guard all
principal points in the extensive suburbs, to keep out the
insurgent forces pressing for admission, to quietly disarm an
army of Spaniards more than equal in numbers to the American
troops, and finally by all this to prevent entirely all
rapine, pillage, and disorder, and gain entire and complete
possession of a city of 300,000 people, filled with natives
hostile to the European interests, and stirred up by the
knowledge that their own people were fighting in the outside
trenches, was an act which only the law-abiding, temperate,
resolute American soldier, well and skillfully handled by his
regimental and brigade commanders, could accomplish. …
"The amount of public funds and the numbers of the prisoners
of war and small arms taken have been reported in detail by
cable. It will be observed that the trophies of Manila were
nearly $900,000, 13,000 prisoners, and 22,000 arms.
Immediately after the surrender my headquarters were
established in the ayuntamiento, or city office of the
Governor-General, where steps were at once inaugurated to set
up the government of military occupancy. … On the 16th a
cablegram containing the text of the President's proclamation
directing a cessation of hostilities was received by me, and
at the same time an order to make the fact known to the
Spanish authorities, which was done at once. This resulted in
a formal protest from the Governor-General in regard to the
transfer of public funds then taking place, on the ground that
the proclamation was dated prior to the surrender. To this I
replied that the status quo in which we were left with the
cessation of hostilities was that existing at the time of the
receipt by me of the official notice, and that I must insist
upon the delivery of the funds. The delivery was made under
protest.
"After the issue of my proclamation and the establishment of
my office as military governor, I had direct written
communication with General Aguinaldo on several occasions. He
recognized my authority as military governor of the town of
Manila and suburbs, and made professions of his willingness to
withdraw his troops to a line which I might indicate, but at
the same time asking certain favors for himself. The matters
in this connection had not been settled at the date of my
departure. Doubtless much dissatisfaction is felt by the rank
and file of the insurgents that they have not been permitted
to enjoy the occupancy of Manila, and there is some ground for
trouble with them owing to that fact, but, notwithstanding
many rumors to the contrary, I am of the opinion that the
leaders will be able to prevent serious disturbances, as they
are sufficiently intelligent and educated to know that to
antagonize the United States would be to destroy their only
chance of future political improvement.
"On the 28th instant I received a cablegram directing me to
transfer my command to Major-General Otis, United States
Volunteers, and to proceed to Paris, France, for conference
with the peace commissioners. I embarked on the steamer
'China' on the 30th in obedience to these instructions."
_Report of General Wesley Merritt
(Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,
volume 1, pages 39-45)._
"Aguinaldo … retired to Malalos, about 25 miles to the
northward, leaving his troops entrenched round Manila, and
there with considerable pomp and ceremony on September 29th,
1898, he was declared First President of the Philippine
Republic, and the National Congress was opened with Pedro
Paterno as President of that assembly."
_G. J. Younghusband,
The Philippines and Round About,
page 27._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July-December).
War with Spain.
Suspension of hostilities.
Negotiation of Treaty of Peace.
Instructions to American Commissioners.
Relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty over Cuba and cession
of Porto Rico, the island of Guam and the Philippine Islands
to the United States.
In his message to Congress, December 5, 1898, President
McKinley gave the following account of his reception of
overtures from Spain, for the termination of the war, and of
the negotiations which resulted in a treaty of peace:
"The annihilation of Admiral Cervera's fleet, followed by the
capitulation of Santiago, having brought to the Spanish
Government a realizing sense of the hopelessness of continuing
a struggle now become wholly unequal, it made overtures of
peace through the French Ambassador, who, with the assent of
his Government, had acted as the friendly representative of
Spanish interests during the war. On the 26th of July M.
Cambon presented a communication signed by the Duke of
Almodovar, the Spanish Minister of State, inviting the United
States to state the terms upon which it would be willing to
make peace. On the 30th of July, by a communication addressed
to the Duke of Almodovar and handed to M. Cambon, the terms of
this Government were announced, substantially as in the
protocol afterwards signed. On the 10th of August the Spanish
reply, dated August 7th, was handed by M. Cambon to the
Secretary of State. It accepted unconditionally the terms
imposed as to Cuba, Porto Rico and an island of the Ladrone
group, but appeared to seek to introduce inadmissible
reservations in regard to our demand as to the Philippine
Islands. Conceiving that discussion on this point could
neither be practical nor profitable, I directed that, in order
to avoid misunderstanding, the matter should be forthwith
closed by proposing the embodiment in a formal protocol of the
terms upon which the negotiations for peace were to be
undertaken.
{621}
The vague and inexplicit suggestion of the Spanish note could
not be accepted, the only reply being to present as a virtual
ultimatum a draft of protocol embodying the precise terms
tendered to Spain in our note of July 30th, with added
stipulations of detail as to the appointment of commissioners
to arrange for the evacuation of the Spanish Antilles. On
August 12th M. Cambon announced his receipt of full powers to
sign the protocol submitted. Accordingly, on the afternoon of
August 12th M. Cambon, as the plenipotentiary of Spain, and
the Secretary of State, as the plenipotentiary of the United
States, signed a protocol providing:
Article I—
Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title
to Cuba.
Article II-
Spain will cede to the United States the island of Porto Rico
and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West
Indies and also an island in the Ladrones to be selected by
the United States.
Article III-
The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and
harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace,
which shall determine the control, disposition and government
of the Philippines.
The fourth article provided for the appointment of joint
commissions on the part of the United States and Spain, to
meet in Havana and San Juan, respectively, for the purpose of
arranging and carrying out the details of the stipulated
evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico and other Spanish islands in
the West Indies.
The fifth article provided for the appointment of not more
than five commissioners on each side, to meet at Paris not
later than October 1st, and proceed to the negotiation and
conclusion of a treaty of peace, subject to ratification
according to the respective constitutional forms of the two
countries.
The sixth and last article provided that upon the signature of
the protocol hostilities between the two countries should be
suspended and that notice to that effect should be given as
soon as possible by each government to the commanders of its
military and naval forces. Immediately upon the conclusion of
the protocol I issued a proclamation of August 12th,
suspending hostilities on the part of the United States. The
necessary orders to that end were at once given by telegraph.
The blockade of the ports of Cuba and San Juan de Porto Rico
was in like manner raised. On the 18th of August the
muster-out of 100,000 Volunteers, or as near that number as
was found to be practicable, was ordered. On the 1st of
December 101,165 officers and men had been mustered out and
discharged from the service and 9,002 more will be mustered
out by the 10th of this month. Also a corresponding number of
general staff officers have been honorably discharged from the
service. The military commissions to superintend the
evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico and the adjacent islands were
forthwith appointed: For Cuba, Major-General James F. Wade,
Rear-Admiral William T. Sampson, Major-General Matthew C.
Butler. For Porto Rico, Major-General John R. Brooke,
Rear-Admiral Winfield S. Schley and Brigadier-General William
W. Gordon, who soon afterwards met the Spanish commissioners
at Havana and San Juan respectively. … Pursuant to the fifth
article of the protocol, I appointed William H. Day, late
Secretary of State; Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye and
George Gray, Senators of the United States, and Whitelaw Reid,
to be the peace commissioners on the part of the United
States. Proceeding in due season to Paris they there met on
the first of October five commissioners, similarly appointed
on the part of Spain."
_Message of the President to Congress,
December 5, 1898._
The instructions given (September 16) by President McKinley to
the commissioners appointed to treat for peace with Spain, and
the correspondence between the commissioners at Paris and the
President and the Secretary of State at Washington during the
progress of the negotiations, were communicated confidentially
to the United States Senate on the 30th of January, 1899, but
not published until February, 1901, when the injunction of
secrecy was removed and the printing of the papers ordered by
vote of the Senate. The chief interest of these papers lies in
their disclosure of what passed between the American executive
and the peace commissioners on the subject of the Philippine
Islands which led to the demand for their entire surrender by
Spain.
In his instructions of September 16th to the commissioners, on
their departure for the meeting with Spanish commissioners at
Paris, the President wrote on this subject: "By article 6 of
the protocol it was agreed that hostilities between the two
countries should be suspended, and that notice to that effect
should be given as soon as possible by each Government to the
Commanders of its military and naval forces. Such notice was
given by the Government of the United States immediately after
the signature of the protocol, the forms of the necessary
orders having previously been prepared. But before notice
could reach the commanders of the military and naval forces of
the United States in the Philippines they captured and took
possession by conquest of the city of Manila and its suburbs,
which are therefore held by the United States by conquest as
well as by virtue of the protocol. In view of what has taken
place it is necessary now to determine what shall be our
future relations to the Philippines. …
"Our aim in the adjustment of peace should be directed to
lasting results and to the achievement of the common good
under the demands of civilization rather than to ambitious
designs. The terms of the protocol were framed upon this
consideration. The abandonment of the Western Hemisphere by
Spain was an imperative necessity. In presenting that
requirement we only fulfilled a duty universally acknowledged.
It involves no ungenerous reference to our recent foe, but
simply a recognition of the plain teachings of history, to say
that it was not compatible with the assurance of permanent
peace on and near our own territory that the Spanish flag
should remain on this side of the sea. This lesson of events
and of reason left no alternative as to Cuba, Porto Rico, and
the other islands belonging to Spain in this hemisphere. The
Philippines stand upon a different basis. It is none the less
true, however, that, without any original thought of complete
or even partial acquisition, the presence and success of our
arms at Manila imposes upon us obligations which we can not
disregard. The march of events rules and overrules human
action. A vowing unreservedly the purpose which has animated
all our effort, and still solicitous to adhere to it, we can
not be unmindful that without any desire or design on our part
the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which
we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose
growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has
plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization.
{622}
"Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial
opportunity to which American statesmanship can not be
indifferent. It is just to use every legitimate means for the
enlargement of American trade; but we seek no advantages in
the Orient which are not common to all. Asking only the open
door for ourselves, we are ready to accord the open door to
others. The commercial opportunity which is naturally and
inevitably associated with this new opening depends less on
large territorial possessions than upon an adequate commercial
basis and upon broad and equal privileges. It is believed that
in the practical application of these guiding principles the
present interests of our country and the proper measure of its
duty, its welfare in the future, and the consideration of its
exemption from unknown perils will be found in full accord
with the just, moral, and humane purpose which was invoked as
our justification in accepting the war.
"In view of what has been stated, the United States can not
accept less than the cession in full right and sovereignty of
the island of Luzon. It is desirable, however, that the United
States shall acquire the right of entry for vessels and
merchandise belonging to citizens of the United States into
such ports of the Philippines as are not ceded to the United
States upon terms of equal favor with Spanish ships and
merchandise, both in relation to port and customs charges and
rates of trade and commerce, together with other rights of
protection and trade accorded to citizens of one country
within the territory of another. You are therefore instructed
to demand such concession, agreeing on your part that Spain
shall have similar rights as to her subjects and vessels in
the ports of any territory in the Philippines ceded to the
United States."
On the 7th of October, Mr. Day, on behalf of the American
commissioners, cabled a long communication from Paris to Mr.
Hay, his successor in the United States Department of State,
summarizing testimony given before the Commission by General
Merritt, lately commanding in the Philippines, and statements
brought by General Merritt from Admiral Dewey, General Greene,
and others. In part, the telegram was as follows:
"General Anderson, in correspondence with Aguinaldo in June
and July, seemed to treat him and his forces as allies and
native authorities, but subsequently changed his tone. General
Merritt reports that Admiral Dewey did not approve this
correspondence and advised against it. Merritt and Dewey both
kept clear of any compromising communications. Merritt
expresses opinion we are in no way committed to any insurgent
programme. Answering questions of Judge Day, General Merritt
said insurrection practically confined to Luzon. Tribal and
religious differences between the inhabitants of various
islands. United States has helped rather than injured
insurrection. Under no obligation other than moral to help
natives. Natives of Luzon would not accept Spanish rule, even
with amnesty. Insurgents would be victorious unless Spaniards
did better in future than in past. Insurgents would fight
among themselves if they had no common enemy. Think it
feasible for United States to take Luzon and perhaps some
adjacent islands and hold them as England does her colonies.
Natives could not resist 5,000 troops. … General Merritt
thinks that if United States attempted to take possession of
Luzon, or all the group as a colony, Aguinaldo and his
immediate followers would resist it, but his forces are
divided and his opposition would not amount to anything. If
the islands were divided, filibustering expeditions might go
from one island to another, thus exposing us to constant
danger of conflict with Spain. In answer to questions of
Senator Frye, Merritt said insurgents would murder Spaniards
and priests in Luzon and destroy their property if the United
States withdrew. United States under moral obligation to stay
there. He did not know whether the effect of setting up a
government by the United States in Luzon would be to produce
revolutions in other islands. It might cause reforms in their
government. … Answering questions of Mr. Gray, Merritt said
consequences in case of either insurgent or Spanish triumph
made it doubtful whether United States would be morally
justified in withdrawing. Our acts were ordinary acts of war,
as if we had attacked Barcelona, but present conditions in
Philippine Islands were partly brought about by us. Insurgents
not in worse condition by our coming. Spaniards hardly able to
defend themselves. If we restored them to their position and
trenches, they might maintain themselves with the help of a
navy when we withdrew. Did not know that he could make out a
responsibility by argument, but he felt it. It might be
sentimental. He thought it would be an advantage if the United
States would change its policy and keep the islands. (He)
thought our interests in the East would be helped by the cheap
labor in the Philippines, costing only from 20 to 80 cents a
day, according to skill. … Answering questions of Mr. Reid,
Merritt said he considered capture of Manila practically
capture of group. Nothing left of Spanish sovereignty that was
not at mercy of the United States. Did not think our humanity
bounded by geographical lines. After Dewey's victory we armed
insurgents to some extent, but Dewey says it was
over-estimated. Insurgents bought arms from Hongkong merchants
with Dewey's cognizance, but Dewey was not in favor of allowing
this to continue. Spaniards would destroy Aguinaldo and his
principal followers, if allowed to do so."
October 25, Judge Day cabled a message to Washington, saying:
"Differences of opinion among commissioners concerning
Philippine Islands are set forth in statements transmitted
herewith. On these we request early consideration and explicit
instructions. Liable now to be confronted with this question
in joint commission almost immediately." The differing
statements then transmitted were three in number, the first of
them signed by Messrs. Davis, Frye, and Reid, who said:
"Information gained by commission in Paris leads to conviction
that it would be naval, political, and commercial mistake to
divide the archipelago. Nearly all expert testimony taken
tends to this effect. As instructions provide for retention at
least of Luzon, we do not consider question of remaining in
Philippine Islands at all as now properly before us. We
therefore ask for extension of instructions. Spain governed
and defended these islands from Manila, and with destruction
of her fleet and the surrender of her army we became as
complete masters of the whole group as she had been, with
nothing needed to complete the conquest save to proceed with
the ample forces we had at hand to take unopposed possession.
{623}
The Ladrones and Carolines were also governed from the same
capital by the same governor-general. National boundaries
ought to follow natural divisions, but there is no natural
place for dividing Philippine Islands. … If we do not want the
islands ourselves, better to control their disposition; that
is, to hold the option on them rather than to abandon it.
Could then at least try to protect ourselves by ample treaty
stipulations with the acquiring powers. Commercially, division
of archipelago would not only needlessly establish dangerous
rivals at our door, but would impair value of part we kept."
Disagreeing with this view, Judge Day said:
"I am unable to agree that we should peremptorily demand the
entire Philippine island group. In the spirit of our
instructions, and bearing in mind the often declared
disinterestedness of purpose and freedom from designs of
conquest with which the war was undertaken, we should be
consistent in our demands in making peace. Territory
permanently held must be taken as war indemnity and with due
regard to our responsibility because of the conduct of our
military and naval authorities in dealing with the insurgents.
Whether this conduct was wise or unwise is not now important. We
cannot leave the insurgents to mere treaty stipulations or to
their unaided resources, either to form a government or to
battle against a foe which (although) unequal to us, might
readily overcome them. On all hands it is agreed that the
inhabitants of the islands are unfit for self-government. This
is particularly true of Mindanao and the Sulu group. Only
experience can determine the success of colonial expansion
upon which the United States is entering. It may prove
expensive in proportion to the scale upon which it is tried
with ignorant and semibarbarous people at the other side of
the world. It should therefore be kept within bounds." Judge
Day, accordingly, suggested a division of the archipelago that
would give to the United States Luzon, Mindoro, and Palawan,
and control the entrance to the China Sea. Senator Gray, in a
third statement, dissented from both these views, saying: "The
undersigned can not agree that it is wise to take Philippine
Islands in whole or in part. To do so would be to reverse
accepted continental policy of the country, declared and acted
upon throughout our history. Propinquity governs the case of
Cuba and Porto Rico. Policy proposed introduces us into
European politics and the entangling alliances against which
Washington and all American statesmen have protested. It will
make necessary a navy equal to largest of powers; a greatly
increased military establishment; immense sums for
fortifications and harbors; multiply occasions for dangerous
complications with foreign nations, and increase burdens of
taxation. Will receive in compensation no outlet for American
labor in labor market already overcrowded and cheap; no area
for homes for American citizens; climate and social conditions
demoralizing to character of American youth; new and disturbing
questions introduced into our politics; church question
menacing. On whole, instead of indemnity—injury. The
undersigned can not agree that any obligation incurred to
insurgents is paramount to our own manifest interests. … No
place for colonial administration or government of subject
people in American system. So much from standpoint of
interest; but even conceding all benefits claimed for
annexation, we thereby abandon the infinitely greater benefit
to accrue from acting the part of a great, powerful, and
Christian nation; we exchange the moral grandeur and strength
to be gained by keeping our word to nations of the world and
by exhibiting a magnanimity and moderation in the hour of
victory that becomes the advanced civilization we claim, for
doubtful material advantages and shameful stepping down from
high moral position boastfully assumed. We should set example
in these respects, not follow in the selfish and vulgar greed
for territory which Europe has inherited from medieval times.
Our declaration of war upon Spain was accompanied by a solemn
and deliberate definition of our purpose. Now that we have
achieved all and more than our object, let us simply keep our
word. … At the very least let us adhere to the President's
instructions and if conditions require the keeping of Luzon
forego the material advantages claimed in annexing other
islands. Above all let us not make a mockery of the injunction
contained in those instructions, where, after stating that we
took up arms only in obedience to the dictates of humanity and
in the fulfillment of high public and moral obligations, and
that we had no design of aggrandizement and no ambition of
conquest, the President among other things eloquently says:
'It is my earnest wish that the United States in making peace
should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it in
facing war. It should be as scrupulous and magnanimous in the
concluding settlement as it was just and humane in its
original action.' This and more, of which I earnestly ask a
re-perusal, binds my conscience and governs my actions."
But the President had now arrived at a different state of
mind, and directed Secretary Hay to make the following reply,
on the 26th: "The information which has come to the President
since your departure convinces him that the acceptance of the
cession of Luzon alone, leaving the rest of the islands
subject to Spanish rule, or to be the subject of future
contention, can not be justified on political, commercial, or
humanitarian grounds. The cession must be of the whole
archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible and the
former must therefore be required. The President reaches this
conclusion after most thorough consideration of the whole
subject, and is deeply sensible of the grave responsibilities
it will impose, believing that this course will entail less
trouble than any other and besides will best subserve the
interests of the people involved, for whose welfare we can not
escape responsibility."
Two days later, the moral and political reflections of the
President on the subject were expressed still further to the
commissioners by Secretary Hay, in the following telegram:
"While the Philippines can be justly claimed by conquest,
which position must not be yielded, yet their disposition,
control, and government the President prefers should be the
subject of negotiation as provided in the protocol. It is
imperative upon us that as victors we should be governed only
by motives which will exalt our nation. Territorial expansion
should be our least concern; that we shall not shirk the moral
obligations of our victory is of the greatest.
{624}
It is undisputed that Spain's authority is permanently
destroyed in every part of the Philippines. To leave any part
in her feeble control now would increase our difficulties and
be opposed to the interests of humanity. The sentiment in the
United States is almost universal that the people of the
Philippines, whatever else is done, must be liberated from
Spanish domination. In this sentiment the President fully
concurs. Nor can we permit Spain to transfer any of the
islands to another power. Nor can we invite another power or
powers to join the United States in sovereignty over them. We
must either hold them or turn them back to Spain.
Consequently, grave as are the responsibilities and unforeseen
as are the difficulties which are before us, the President can
see but one plain path of duty—the acceptance of the archipelago.
Greater difficulties and more serious
complications—administrative and international—would follow
any other course. The President has given to the views of the
commissioners the fullest consideration, and in reaching the
conclusion above announced in the light of information
communicated to the commission and to the President since your
departure, he has been influenced by the single consideration
of duty and humanity. The President is not unmindful of the
distressed financial condition of Spain, and whatever
consideration the United States may show must come from its
sense of generosity and benevolence, rather than from any real
or technical obligation. The terms upon which the full cession
of the Philippines shall be made must be left largely with the
commission."
On the 3d of November, Judge Day cabled: "After a careful
examination of the authorities, the majority of the commission
are clearly of opinion that our demand for the Philippine
Islands can not be based on conquest. When the protocol was
signed Manila was not captured, siege was in progress and
capture made after the execution of the protocol. Captures
made after agreement for armistice must be disregarded and
status quo restored as far as practicable. We can require
cession of Philippine Islands only as indemnity for losses and
expenses of the war. Have in view, also, condition of islands,
the broken power of Spain, anarchy in which our withdrawal would
leave the islands, etc. These are legitimate factors."
On the 4th, Senator Davis added a personal telegram as
follows: "I think we can demand cession of entire archipelago
on other and more valid grounds than a perfected territorial
conquest of the Philippine Islands, such as indemnity or as
conditions of peace imposed by our general military success
and in view of our future security and general welfare,
commercial and otherwise. I think the protocol admits all
these grounds, and that the ground alone of perfected
territorial conquest of the Philippine Islands is too narrow
and untenable under protocol."
Secretary Hay replied, for the President, on the 5th: "The
President has no purpose to question the commission's judgment
as to the grounds upon which the cession of the archipelago is
to be claimed. His only wish in that respect is to hold all
the ground upon which we can fairly and justly make the claim.
He recognizes fully the soundness of putting forward indemnity
as the chief ground, but conquest is a consideration which
ought not to be ignored. How our demand shall be presented,
and the grounds upon which you will rest it, he confidently
leaves with the commissioners. His great concern is that a
treaty shall be effected in terms which will not only satisfy
the present generation but, what is more important, be
justified in the judgment of posterity."
Discussion followed, in which Judge Day and Senator Gray
repeated the views they had formerly expressed, in dissent
from the policy determined upon by the President and his
cabinet, the latter saying: "Believing that the result of a
failure to obtain a treaty would be the forcible seizure of
the whole Philippine Islands group, an event greatly to be
deprecated as inconsistent with the traditions and
civilization of the United States, I would be willing to take
the islands by the cession of a treaty of peace, and I would,
to that end, make such reasonable concessions as would comport
with the magnanimity of a great nation dealing with a weak and
prostrate foe. I mean that I would prefer the latter
alternative to the former, not that I have changed my mind as
to the policy of taking the Philippine Islands at all."
So far as concerned the demands of the United States (which
Spain was powerless to resist), the question was settled, on
the 13th of November, by a telegram from Secretary Hay to Mr.
Day, in which he said: "We are clearly entitled to indemnity
for the cost of the war. We can not hope to be fully
indemnified. We do not expect to be. It would probably be
difficult for Spain to pay money. All she has are the
archipelagoes of the Philippines and the Carolines. She surely
can not expect us to turn the Philippines back and bear the cost
of the war and all claims of our citizens for damages to life
and property in Cuba without any indemnity but Porto Rico,
which we have and which is wholly inadequate. … You are
therefore instructed to insist upon the cession of the whole
of the Philippines, and, if necessary, pay to Spain ten to
twenty millions of dollars, and if you can get cession of a
naval and telegraph station in the Carolines, and the several
concessions and privileges and guaranties, so far as
applicable, enumerated in the views of Commissioners Frye and
Reid, you can offer more."
_United States, 56th Congress, 2d Session,
Senate Document Number 148
(Papers relating to the Treaty with Spain)._
Discussion between the Spanish and American commissioners at
Paris was prolonged until the 10th of December, when the
former yielded to what they protested against as hard terms,
and the following Treaty of Peace was signed:
Treaty of Peace.
ARTICLE I.
Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to
Cuba. And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to
be occupied by the United States, the United States will, so
long as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the
obligations that may under international law result from the
fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and
property.
ARTICLE II.
Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico and
other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West
Indies, and the island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones.
{625}
ARTICLE III.
Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the
Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within
the following line: A line running from west to east along or
near the twentieth parallel of north latitude, and through the
middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, from the one hundred
and eighteenth (118th) to the one hundred and twenty seventh
(127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence
along the one hundred and twenty seventh (127th) degree
meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the parallel of
four degrees and forty five minutes (4° 45') north latitude,
thence along the parallel of four degrees and forty five
minutes (4° 45') north latitude to its intersection with the
meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and
thirty five minutes (119° 35') east of Greenwich, thence along
the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and
thirty five minutes (119° 35') east of Greenwich to the
parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7° 40')
north, thence along the parallel of latitude of seven degrees
and forty minutes (7° 40') north to its intersection with the
one hundred and sixteenth (116th) degree meridian of longitude
east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the intersection
of the tenth (10th) degree parallel of north latitude with the
one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of
longitude east of Greenwich, and thence along the one hundred
and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of
Greenwich to the point of beginning. The United States will
pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars ($20,000,000)
within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of
the present treaty.
ARTICLE IV.
The United States will, for the term of ten years from the
date of the exchange of the ratifications of the present
treaty, admit Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of
the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships and
merchandise of the United States.
ARTICLE V.
The United States will, upon the signature of the present
treaty, send back to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish
soldiers taken as prisoners of war on the capture of Manila by
the American forces. The arms of the soldiers in question
shall be restored to them. Spain will, upon the exchange of
the ratifications of the present treaty, proceed to evacuate
the Philippines, as well as the island of Guam, on terms
similar to those agreed upon by the Commissioners appointed to
arrange for the evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands in
the West Indies, under the Protocol of August 12, 1898, which
is to continue in force till its provisions are completely
executed. The time within which the evacuation of the
Philippine Islands and Guam shall be completed shall be fixed
by the two Governments. Stands of colors, uncaptured war
vessels, small arms, guns of all calibres, with their
carriages and accessories, powder, ammunition, livestock, and
materials and supplies of all kinds, belonging to the land and
naval forces of Spain in the Philippines and Guam, remain the
property of Spain. Pieces of heavy ordnance, exclusive of
field artillery, in the fortifications and coast defences,
shall remain in their emplacements for the term of six months,
to be reckoned from the exchange of ratifications of the
treaty; and the United States may, in the meantime, purchase
such material from Spain, if a satisfactory agreement between
the two Governments on the subject shall be reached.
ARTICLE VI.
Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release
all prisoners of war, and all persons detained or imprisoned
for political offences, in connection with the insurrections
in Cuba and the Philippines and the war with the United
States. Reciprocally the United States will release all
persons made prisoners of war by the American forces, and will
undertake to obtain the release of all Spanish prisoners in
the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines. The
Government of the United States will at its own cost return to
Spain and the Government of Spain will at its own cost return
to the United States, Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines,
according to the situation of their respective homes,
prisoners released or caused to be released by them,
respectively, under this article.
ARTICLE VII.
The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims for
indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of either
Government, or of its citizens or subjects, against the other
Government, that may have arisen since the beginning of the
late insurrection in Cuba and prior to the exchange of
ratifications of the present treaty, including all claims for
indemnity for the cost of the war. The United States will
adjudicate and settle the claims of its citizens against Spain
relinquished in this article.
ARTICLE VIII.
In conformity with the provisions of Articles I, II, and III
of this treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto
Rico and other islands in the West Indies, in the island of
Guam, and in the Philippine Archipelago, all the buildings,
wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways and
other immovable property which, in conformity with law, belong
to the public domain, and as such belong to the Crown of
Spain. And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or
cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding paragraph
refers, cannot in any respect impair the property or rights
which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of
all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or private
establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other
associations having legal capacity to acquire and possess
property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or
of private individuals, of whatsoever nationality such
individuals may be. The aforesaid relinquishment or cession,
as the case may be, includes all documents exclusively
referring to the sovereignty relinquished or ceded that may
exist in the archives of the Peninsula. Where any document in
such archives only in part relates to said sovereignty, a copy
of such part will be furnished whenever it shall be requested.
Like rules shall be reciprocally observed in favor of Spain in
respect of documents in the archives of the islands above
referred to. In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as
the case may be, are also included such rights as the Crown of
Spain and its authorities possess in respect of the official
archives and records, executive as well as judicial, in the
islands above referred to, which relate to said islands or the
rights and property of their inhabitants. Such archives and
records shall be carefully preserved, and private persons
shall without distinction have the right to require, in
accordance with law, authenticated copies of the contracts,
wills and other instruments forming part of notarial protocols
or files, or which may be contained in the executive or
judicial archives, be the latter in Spain or in the islands
aforesaid.
{626}
ARTICLE IX.
Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the
territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes
or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may
remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights
of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such
property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the
right to carry on their industry, commerce and professions,
being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are
applicable to other foreigners. In case they remain in the
territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of
Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from
the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a
declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in
default of which declaration they shall be held to have
renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the
territory in which they may reside. The civil rights and
political status of the native inhabitants of the territories
hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the
Congress.
ARTICLE X.
The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain
relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the
free exercise of their religion.
ARTICLE XI.
The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by
this treaty cedes or relinquishes her sovereignty shall be
subject in matters civil as well as criminal to the
jurisdiction of the courts of the country wherein they reside,
pursuant to the ordinary laws governing the same; and they
shall have the right to appear before such courts, and to
pursue the same course as citizens of the country to which the
courts belong.
ARTICLE XII.
Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the exchange of
ratifications of this treaty in the territories over which
Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be
determined according to the following rules:
1. Judgments rendered either in civil suits between private
individuals, or in criminal matters, before the date
mentioned, and with respect to which there is no recourse or
right of review under the Spanish law, shall be deemed to be
final, and shall be executed in due form by competent
authority in the territory within which such judgments should
be carried out.
2. Civil suits between private individuals which may on the
date mentioned be undetermined shall be prosecuted to judgment
before the court in which they may then be pending or in the
court that may be substituted therefor.
3. Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned before the
Supreme Court of Spain against citizens of the territory which
by this treaty ceases to be Spanish shall continue under its
jurisdiction until final judgment; but, such judgment having
been rendered, the execution thereof shall be committed to the
competent authority of the place in which the case arose.
ARTICLE XIII.
The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents
acquired by Spaniards in the Island of Cuba and in Porto Rico,
the Philippines and other ceded territories, at the time of
the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, shall
continue to be respected. Spanish scientific, literary and
artistic works, not subversive of public order in the
territories in question, shall continue to be admitted free of
duty into such territories, for the period of ten years, to be
reckoned from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of
this treaty.
ARTICLE XIV.
Spain will have the power to establish consular officers in
the ports and places of the territories, the sovereignty over
which has been either relinquished or ceded by the present
treaty.
ARTICLE XV.
The Government of each country will, for the term of ten
years, accord to the merchant vessels of the other country the
same treatment in respect of all port charges, including
entrance and clearance dues, light dues, and tonnage duties,
as it accords to its own merchant vessels, not engaged in the
coastwise trade. This article may at any time be terminated on
six months notice given by either Government to the other.
ARTICLE XVI.
It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty
by the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the
time of its occupancy thereof; but it will upon the
termination of such occupancy, advise any Government
established in the island to assume the same obligations.
ARTICLE XVII.
The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the
United States, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate thereof, and by Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain;
and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington within
six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible. In
faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have
signed this treaty and have hereunto affixed our seals. Done
in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of December, in the year
of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight.
[Signed]
William R. Day,
Cushman K. Davis,
William P. Frye,
Geo. Gray,
Whitelaw Reid,
Eugenio Montero Ríos,
B. de Abarzuza,
J. de Garnica,
W. R. de Villa Urrutia,
Rafael Cerero.
That the treaty would be ratified by the Senate of the United
States was by no means certain when it was signed, and
remained questionable for two months.
See below:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (JANUARY-FEBRUARY).
Some time after the conclusion of the treaty, it was
discovered that the boundaries defined in it for the cession
of the Philippine Islands failed to include the islands of
Cagayan, or Kagayan, and Sibutu, in the southern part of the
archipelago. Still later, it was found that several small
islands (the Bachi or Bashee group, and others) belonging to
the Spanish possessions in the East were left lying outside of
the northern Philippine boundary, as laid down in the treaty
of cession. It is said that the Japanese government called
attention to this latter error, desiring to have the islands
in question, which are near to Formosa, controlled by the
United States, rather than by Spain. By a new treaty with
Spain, negotiated in 1900, all these outlying islands were
acquired by the United States, for the sum of $100,000.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (August).
Losses of the armies at Santiago and in the Philippines.
See below:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (JUNE).
{627}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (August 21).
The War with Spain.
Letter from departing Spanish soldiers to the soldiers
of the American army.
The following letter, addressed, on the eve of their departure
for Spain, by the Spanish soldiers at Santiago, to the
soldiers of the American army, "is surely," says
Lieutenant-Colonel Miley, who quotes it in his book entitled
"In Cuba with Shafter"—"is surely the most remarkable letter
ever addressed by vanquished soldiers to their conquerors:
'Soldiers of the American Army: We would not be fulfilling our
duty as well-born men in whose breasts there lives gratitude
and courtesy, should we embark for our beloved Spain without
sending you our most cordial and sincere good wishes and
farewell. We fought you with ardor and with all our strength,
endeavoring to gain the victory, but without the slightest
rancor or hate toward the American nation. We have been
vanquished by you, so our generals and chiefs judged in
signing the capitulation, but our surrender and the
blood-battles preceding it have left in our souls no place for
resentment against the men who fought us nobly and valiantly.
You fought and acted in compliance with the same call of duty
as we, for we all but represent the power of our respective
States. You fought us as men, face to face, and with great
courage, as before stated—a quality we had not met with during
the three years we have carried on this war against a people
without a religion, without morals, without conscience, and of
doubtful origin, who could not confront the enemy, but shot
their noble victims from ambush and then immediately fled.
This was the kind of warfare we had to sustain in this
unfortunate land. You have complied exactly with all the laws
and usages of war as recognized by the armies of the most
civilized nations of the world; have given honorable burial to
the dead of the vanquished; have cured their wounded with
great humanity; have respected and cared for your prisoners
and their comfort; and lastly, to us, whose condition was
terrible, you have given freely of food and of your stock of
medicines, and have honored us with distinction and courtesy,
for after the fighting the two armies mingled with the utmost
harmony. With this high sentiment of appreciation from us all,
there remains but to express our farewell, and with the
greatest sincerity we wish you all happiness and health in
this land, which will no longer belong to our dear Spain, but
will be yours. You have conquered it by force and watered it
with your blood, as your conscience called for under the
demands of civilization and humanity; but the descendants of
the Congos and Guineas, mingled with the blood of unscrupulous
Spaniards and of traitors and adventurers—these people are
not able to exercise or enjoy their liberty, for they will
find it a burden to comply with the laws which govern
civilized humanity. From eleven thousand Spanish soldiers.
(Signed) Pedro Lopez De Castillo, Soldier of Infantry.
Santiago de Cuba, August 21, 1898.'"
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (August-December).
Situation in the Philippines following the occupation
of Manila by American forces.
Growing distrust and unfriendliness of the Tagalos.
Report of General Otis.
See (in this volume)
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1898 (AUGUST-DECEMBER).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (December).
Organization of military government in Cuba.
See (in this volume)
CUBA: A. D. 1898-1899 (DECEMBER-OCTOBER).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898-1899.
Statistics of the Spanish-American War.
The following military and naval statistics of the war with
Spain, compiled from official sources, were submitted to the
House of Representatives, during its debate on the Army Bill,
in December, 1900, as part of an appendix to a speech made in
support of the Bill by Honorable Charles Dick, of Ohio:
ORGANIZATION AND STRENGTH OF THE ARMY
DURING AND AFTER THE WAR.
By an Act of Congress approved April 22, 1898, providing for
the temporary increase of the military establishment of the
United States, "the organized and active land forces were
declared to consist of the Regular Army and of the militia of
the several States when called into service, constituting two
branches, designated, respectively, as be Regular Army and the
Volunteer Army of the United States. And the President was
authorized to organize the regular and volunteer troops into
divisions of three brigades, each brigade to be composed of
three or more regiments, and when three or more divisions are
present in the same army, to organize them into army corps,
each corps to consist of not more than three divisions. Under
the authority conferred upon him by the joint resolution of
April 20 and the act of April 22, 1898, the President issued a
proclamation, dated April 23, 1898, calling for volunteers to the
number of 125,000 men, to be apportioned as far as practicable
among the several States, Territories, and the District of
Columbia, according to population, to serve for two years
unless sooner discharged. Among the several arms of the
service the troops were apportioned as follows: Five regiments
and 17 troops of cavalry, 16 batteries of light artillery, 1
regiment and 7 batteries of heavy artillery, 119 regiments and
10 battalions of infantry. May 25, 1898, the President issued
a proclamation calling for an additional force of 75,000 men.
For controlling military reasons, it was determined to utilize
so much of this additional force as was necessary to bring up
the several State organizations in service to the full legal
strength, the remainder to be apportioned among the several
States and Territories according to their respective quotas as
nearly as possible. The apportionment to the several arms of
service under this second call was for 16 batteries of light
artillery, 3 battalions of heavy artillery, and 22 regiments,
ten battalions, and 46 companies of infantry."
The strength of the Regular Army on the 1st of April, 1898,
just before the breaking out of the war, was as follows:
Officers. Enlisted Men.
General officers and staff corps. 532 2,026
Cavalry. 437 6,047
Artillery. 288 4,486
Infantry. 886 12,828
Miscellaneous. 653
Total. 2,143 26,040
The Regular Army was authorized to be increased to 65,000 men
as a war footing. The total strength of the armies, Regular
and Volunteer, at several later dates, was as follows:
{628}
DATE. Regulars. Volunteers. Total.
April 15, 1898 28,183 28,183
May 31, 1898 38,816 124,776 162,592
August 31, 1898 56,362 216,256 272,618
January 31, 1899 65,531 90,241 155,772
June 30, 1899 63,535 16,550 80,085
Maximum force at any one time during Spanish-American war,
274,717 officers and men. On the 29th of November, 1898, the
Army of the United States consisted of 2,324 officers and
61,444 enlisted men of the regular force, and of 5,216
officers and 110,202 enlisted men of the volunteer force,
making an aggregate of 7,540 officers and 171,646 enlisted
men.
PAY OF ARMY.
Payments made to Regular and Volunteer armies engaged during
Spanish-American war, from April 21, 1898, to April 11, 1899,
$67,065,629.56.
CASUALTIES IN ACTION.
In Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines between May 1, 1898,
and June 30, 1899.
Killed Cuba Porto Rico Philippines
Officers 21 16
Enlisted men 223 4 219
Wounded:
Officers 101 92
Enlisted men 1,344 36 1,349
Died of Wounds:
Officers 10 10
Enlisted men 64 8 82
Died of Disease:
Officers 34 4 11
Enlisted men. 888 251 369
Grand total, 5,136.
Casualties in Fifth Army Corps in campaign against Santiago,
June 22, 1898, to July 17, 1898.
Officers. Enlisted Men.
Killed. 21 222
Wounded 101 1,344
At battle of Las Guasimas, June 24, 1898.
Officers. Enlisted Men.
Killed. 1 15
Wounded 6 43
At battle of El Caney, July 1, 1898.
Officers. Enlisted Men.
Killed. 4 77
Wounded 25 335
At Aguadores, July 1-2, 1898.
Officers. Enlisted Men.
Killed. 2
Wounded 10
At battle of San Juan, July 1-3, 1898.
Officers. Enlisted Men.
Killed. 15 127
Wounded 69 945
Casualties around Santiago, July 10-12, 1898.
Officers. Enlisted Men.
Killed. 1 1
Wounded 1 11
Grand total of casualties in killed and wounded
during the war with Spain.
WHERE. KILLED. WOUNDED.
Officers. Enlisted Men. Officers. Enlisted Men.
Cuba 23 237 99 1,332
Porto Rico. 3 4 36
Manila 17 10 96
Total 23 257 113 1,464
The deaths from all causes (including casualties in action) in
the whole Army, regulars and volunteers, for the fourteen
months from May, 1898, to June, 1899, inclusive, were 6,619.
This is equivalent to an annual rate of 33.03 per thousand of
strength. The deaths from disease during the whole period were
at an annual rate of hut 25.68 per thousand. These were as
follows:
STATIONS. Number of Deaths Rate per 1,000.
United States 3,577 23.81
Cuba 928 45.14
Porto Rico 238 38.15
Philippines 402 17.20
{629}
Deaths in the armies of the United States, by countries,
between May 1, 1898, and June 30, 1899.
[Off. = Officer; Enl. = Enlisted Men.]
COUNTRY KILLED. DIED OF DISEASE. ACCIDENT.
WOUNDS
Off. Enl. Off. Enl. Off. Enl. Off. Enl.
REGULARS.
United States 1 5 10 32 874 1 51
Cuba 19 184 5 60 8 381 7
Porto Rico 3 73 3
Hawaiian Islands 10 1
Philippine Islands 4 81 1 33 4 109 10
At sea 1 11 4 77
Total 24 270 7 114 51 1,524 1 72
VOLUNTEERS.
United States 1 87 2,836 3 111
Cuba 3 39 10 16 457 2 12
Porto Rico 3 1 157 5
Hawaiian Islands 33 1
Philippine Islands 14 146 3 67 5 215 6
At sea 5 122 2
Total 17 188 3 78 114 3,820 5 137
Aggregate 38 458 10 192 165 5,344 6 209
COUNTRY. DROWNED. SUICIDE. MURDER TOTAL.
HOMICIDE
Off. Enl. Off. Enl. Off. Enl. Off. Enl.
REGULARS.
United States 1 16 19 18 35 993
Cuba 7 5 6 32 650
Porto Rico 1 3 1 3 81
Hawaiian Islands 1 12
Philippine Islands 19 1 3 1 10 256
At sea 1 4 2 6 94
Total 2 48 1 32 26 86 2,086
VOLUNTEERS.
United States 23 1 15 22 91 3,008
Cuba 4 3 21 525
Porto Rico 2 1 1 1 169
Hawaiian Islands 34
Philippine Islands 1 9 3 23 446
At sea 2 1 5 127
Total 1 40 1 20 26 141 4,309
Aggregate 3 88 2 52 52 224 6,395
{630}
Recapitulation of casualties in action in the armies of the
United States between May 1, 1898, and June 30, 1899.
[Off. = Officer; Enl. = Enlisted Men.]
COUNTRY. KILLED. WOUNDED. TOTAL. AGGREGATE
Off. Enl. Off. Enl. Off. Enl.
REGULARS.
Cuba 18 183 86 1,126 104 1,309 1,413
Porto Rico 1 2 15 2 16 18
United States 1 5 10 1 15 16
Philippines, to
August 13, 1898 7 1 25 1 32 33
Philippines since
February 4, 1899 2 74 20 410 22 484 506
Total 21 270 109 1,586 130 1,856 1,986
VOLUNTEERS.
Cuba 3 39 15 218 18 257 275
Porto Rico 3 2 21 2 24 26
Philippines,
to Aug. 13, 1898 11 9 74 9 85 94
Philippines, since
February 4, 1899 14 135 62 865 76 1,000 1,076
Total 17 188 88 1,178 105 1,366 1,471
Grand total 38 458 197 2,764 235 3,222 3,457
HOSPITALS.
From the declaration of war with Spain to September 20, 1899,
there have been established:
Beds.
20 field division hospitals, averaging 250 beds each 5,000
31 general hospitals with a total capacity of about 13,800
Railroad ambulance train 270
4 hospital ships 1,000
Total 20,070
In addition to these over 5,000 cases were treated in civil
hospitals. It is difficult even to approximate the number of
men treated in these hospitals. During that period somewhat
over 100,000 cases were admitted on sick report, a number
equal to 2,147 per 1,000 of strength during the year, or to
179 per 1,000 per month—the ratio of admissions to hospital
cases being 13 to 8. Using these data as a basis, and assuming
the mean strength of the Army (Regulars and Volunteers) to have
been 154,000, it would appear that from May 1, 1898, to
September 20, 1899, about 275,000 cases have been treated in
these hospitals.
TRANSPORTATION OF SPANISH PRISONERS OF WAR TO SPAIN.
The following is a statement showing the dates of embarkation,
names of vessels, and number of officers, enlisted men, and
others who took passage:
[Date = Date of Embarkation,
Off. = Officers
Men = Enlisted men,
Women = Women and children over 5 years of age,
Priests = Priests and Sisters of Charity.]
Date Name of Vessel. Off. Men Women Priests Total
August 9 Alicante 38 1,069 6 11 1,124
August 14 Isla de Luzon 137 2,056 40 4 2,237
August 16 Covadonga 109 2,148 79 2,336
August 19 Villaverde 52 565 34 651
August 19 Isla de Panay 99 1,599 26 5 1,729
August 22 P. de Satrustegui 128 2,359 68 2,555
August 25 Montevideo 136 2,108 122 2 2,368
August 27 Cherihon 18 905 37 960
August 28 Colón 100 1,316 59 1,475
August 30 do 23 726 5 754
September 1 Leon XIII 113 2,209 108 2,430
September 3 San Ignacio 59 1,408 20 12 1,499
September 6 Leonora 15 1,118 1,333
September 12 Cindad de Cadiz 53 19 14 86
September 17 San Augustin 65 800 45 910
September 17 San Francisco 18 588 11 617
Total 1,163 20,974 679 48 22,864
ARMS AND AMMUNITION CAPTURED AT SANTIAGO.
Mauser carbines, Spanish, 7 mm 16,902
Mauser rifles, Argentine, 7½ mm 872
Remington rifles, 7 mm 6,118
Total rifles 23,892
Mauser carbines, Spanish 833
Mauser carbines, Argentine 7½ mm 84
Remington carbines, 7½ mm 330
Total carbines 1,247
Revolvers 75
{631}
Mauser-Spanish—cartridges, 7 mm. 1,500,000
Mauser-Argentine—cartridges, 7½ mm. 1,471,200
Remington cartridges, 7½ mm 1,680,000
Total. 4,651,200
Nine hundred and seventy-three thousand Remington
cartridges, 7½ mm., worthless.
STRENGTH OF THE NAVY, REGULAR AND AUXILIARY.
The number of enlisted men allowed by law prior to the
outbreak of hostilities was 12,500. On August 15, when the
enlisted force reached its maximum, there were 24,123 men in
the service. This great increase was made necessary by the
addition of 128 ships to the Navy. The maximum fighting force
of the Navy, separated into classes, was as follows:
Battle ships (first class). 4
Battle ships (second class). 1
Armored cruisers. 2
Coast defense monitors. 6
Armored ram. 1
Protected cruisers. 12
Unprotected cruisers. 3
Gunboats. 18
Dynamite cruiser. 1
Torpedo boats. 11
Vessels of old Navy,
Including monitors. 14
Auxiliary Navy:
Auxiliary cruisers. 11
Converted yachts. 28
Revenue cutters. 15
Light-house tenders. 4
Converted tugs. 27
Converted colliers. 19
Miscellaneous. 19
NAVAL, PRISONERS OF WAR CAPTURED OFF SANTIAGO, JULY 3, 1898.
Officers. 99
Enlisted men. 1,675
CASUALTIES IN ACTION.
ENGAGEMENT. Casualties Killed Wounded Died later
from wounds
Action at Manila Bay,
May 1 9 9
Action off Cienfuegos,
May 11 12 1 11 1
Action off Cardenas,
May 11. 8 5 3
Action off San Juan,
Porto Rico, May 12 8 1 7
Engagements at Guantanamo,
Cuba, June 11 to 20 22 *6 16
Engagement off Santiago:
June 22 10 1 9
July 3 11 1 10
Miscellaneous:
Yankee, June 13. 1 1
Eagle, July 12 1 1
Bancroft, August 2 1 1
Amphitrite, August 7 1 1 †l
Total 84 16 68 2
* One accidentally killed.
† Accidentally shot.
_Congressional Record,
February 1, 1901, pages 1941-1962._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898-1899.
Investigation of the conduct of the War Department
in the war with Spain.
Severe criticism of the conduct of the War Department during
the war with Spain, including many charges of inefficiency in
its service, produced by improper appointments made for
political reasons, and other charges of misdoing in the
purchase of supplies, under influences either political or
otherwise corrupt, led to the appointment by the President, in
September, 1898, of an investigating commission, composed of
nine soldier and civilian members, as follows:
General Grenville M. Dodge, President.
Colonel James A. Sexton.
Colonel Charles Denby,
Captain Evan P. Howell,
Honorable Urban A. Woodbury,
Brigadier-General John M. Wilson, U. S. A.,
General James A. Beaver,
Major-General Alexander McD. Cook, U. S. A.,
Dr. Phineas S. Conner.
The report of the Commission, made in the following February,
cannot be said to have been a convincing and satisfactory one
to the country at large. It was indignantly described as a
"whitewashing report," even by many journals and writers of
the party in power. Its inquiries did not appear to have been
keenly and impartially searching; its conclusions were not
thought to be drawn with a rigorous and fearless hand.
The charges against the War Department which excited most
feeling and drew most public attention related to the quality
of the fresh beef supplied to the army, which was in two
forms, refrigerated and canned. Major-General Miles,
commanding the Army, had declared that much of the
refrigerated beef furnished to the soldiers should be called
"embalmed beef," maintaining that it had been "apparently
preserved with secret chemicals, which destroy its natural
flavor" and which were believed to be "detrimental to the
health of the troops." He intimated that hundreds of tons of
such beef had been contracted for by the Commissary-General
"under pretense of experiment." In repelling this serious
accusation, Commissary-General Charles P. Eagan read a
statement before the Commission, so violent and unmeasured in
its vituperation of the commanding general that it was
returned to him for correction; many newspapers declined to
publish it, and he was subsequently tried by court-martial in
consequence—as related below. The conclusion of the
Commission on the subject of the charges relating to
refrigerated beef was stated in its report as follows:
"The Commission is of the opinion that no refrigerated beef
furnished by contractors and issued to the troops during the
war with Spain was subjected to or treated with any chemicals
by the contractors or those in their employ."
Concerning the canned beef, which had caused much disgust in
the army, the Commission reported:
"The result of our own testing and of all the analyses made at
our instance … is that the canned meat which has been brought
to our attention is pure, sound, and nutritive. It has not
been found to contain any acids or any deleterious substance,
but to be unadulterated meat. The testimony before us is that
the canned meat is not, in general, intended to be issued to
troops except as an emergency ration. The preponderance of the
proof is that meat on the hoof and the refrigerated beef are
more acceptable. A number of officers and others have
testified that the meat is unpalatable. Its palatability
greatly depends upon the mode in which it is cooked. In a
tropical climate, carried on the march, exposed to heat, the
meat so changes in appearance as to become repulsive. In the
Navy, where the meat is properly cared for, there has been no
complaint, so far as has appeared in evidence before us. After
careful consideration we find that canned meat, as issued to
the troops, was generally of good quality, was properly
prepared, and contained no deleterious substance.
{632}
At times probably material of poor quality is issued; in one
of the cans sent to us and examined by the chemist a large
amount of gristle was found. That it was not issued 'under
pretense of an experiment' is indicated by the fact that it
has been in use in the Army for more than 20 years."
On the general management of the Quarter-master's Department,
with which much fault had been found, the Commission reported:
"The conclusions drawn … are as follows:
"1. The Quartermaster's Department, a month before war was
declared, was neither physically nor financially prepared for
the tremendous labor of suddenly equipping and transporting an
army over ten times the size of the Regular Army of the United
States.
"2. That the department devoted the ability, zeal, and
industry of its officers to accomplish the herculean task
before it so soon as funds were made available and war was
declared.
"3. That it deserves credit for the great work accomplished,
for the immense quantity of materials obtained and issued
within so short a period, and for its earnest efforts in
reference to railroad transportation and in protecting the
great interests of the General Government committed to its
charge. Its officers, especially those at the head-quarters of
the department and at its depots, worked earnestly and
laboriously day and night, sparing themselves in no possible
way.
"4. There appears to have been a lack of system, whereby, even
as late as October, troops in camps and in the field were
lacking in some articles of clothing, camp and garrison
equipage; and hospitals, at least at two important localities
in the South—Fort Monroe, Virginia, and Huntsville,
Alabama—lacked stoves, while at Huntsville fuel was wanting.
"5. There appears to have been lack of executive or
administrative ability, either on the part of the
Quartermaster's Department or the railroad officials, in
preventing the great congestion of cars at Tampa and
Chickamauga when these camps were first established, which
congestion caused delay, annoyance, and discomfort to the
large bodies of troops concentrating at those places.
"6. There appears to have been a lack of foresight in
preparing and promptly having available at some central
locality on the seacoast the necessary fleet of transports
which it seemed evident would be required for the movement of
troops to a foreign shore, and, finally, when the call came
suddenly and the emergency was supreme, the department appears
not to have fully comprehended the capacity of the fleet under
its command; not to have supplied it with a complete outfit of
lighters for the immediate disembarkation of troops and
supplies; to have accepted without full investigation the
statement that the vessels were capable of transporting 25,000
men, while really they could not and did not transport more
than 17,000 with their artillery, equipments, ammunition, and
supplies, and lacked sufficient storage room for the necessary
amount of wagon transportation—that very important element
in the movement of an army in the face of an enemy.
"7. The Quartermaster's Department should maintain on hand at
all times a complete supply for at least four months for an
army of 100,000 men of all articles of clothing, camp and
garrison equipage, and other quartermaster's supplies which
will not deteriorate by storage or which cannot at once be
obtained in open market.
"Finally. In the opinion of this commission, there should be a
division of the labor now devolving upon the Quartermaster's
Department."
In another part of its report, dealing especially with the
Santiago campaign, the Commission makes a statement which
seems to reflect some additional light on the sixth paragraph
of the finding quoted above, relative to the unpreparedness of
the quartermaster's department for the landing of the Santiago
expedition. It says:
"The Navy Department, on the 31st of May, 1898, sent the
following communication to the honorable the Secretary of War:
'This Department begs leave to inquire what means are to be
employed by the War Department for landing the troops,
artillery, horses, siege guns, mortars, and other heavy
objects when the pending military expedition arrives on the
Cuban coast near Santiago. While the Navy will be prepared to
furnish all the assistance that may be in its power, it is
obvious that the crews of the armored ships and of such others
as will be called upon to remove the Spanish mines and to meet
the Spanish fleet in action can not be spared for other purposes,
and ought not to be fatigued by the work incident to landing
of the troops and stores, etc.' This information, so far as
can be ascertained, was never communicated to either General
Miles or General Shafter; the expedition therefore left Tampa
with no facilities for landing other than were afforded by the
boats of the several transports conveying the expedition, with
the exception of several lighters and steam tugs of light draft,
such as could be hastily secured."
On the conduct of the Medical Department, which was another
matter of investigation, the Commission reported: "To sum up,
in brief, the evidence submitted shows:
" 1. That at the outbreak of the war the Medical Department
was, in men and materials, altogether unprepared to meet the
necessities of the army called out.
"2. That as a result of the action through a generation of
contracted and contracting methods of administration, it was
impossible for the Department to operate largely, freely, and
without undue regard to cost.
"3. That in the absence of a special corps of inspectors, and
the apparent infrequency of inspections by chief surgeons, and
of official reports of the state of things in camps and
hospitals, there was not such investigation of the sanitary
conditions of the army as is the first duty imposed upon the
Department by the regulations.
"4. That the nursing force during the months of My, June, and
July was neither ample nor efficient, reasons for which may be
found in the lack of a proper volunteer hospital corps, due to
the failure of Congress to authorize its establishment, and to
the nonrecognition in the beginning of the value of women
nurses and the extent to which their services could be
secured.
"5. That the demand made upon the resources of the Department
in the care of sick and wounded was very much greater than had
been anticipated, and consequently, in like proportion, these
demands were imperfectly met.
{633}
"6. That powerless as the Department was to have supplies
transferred from point to point, except through the
intermediation of the Quartermaster's Department, it was
seriously crippled in its efforts to fulfil the regulation
duty of 'furnishing all medical and hospital supplies.'
"7. That the shortcomings in administration and operation may
justly be attributed, in large measure, to the hurry and
confusion incident to the assembling of an army of untrained
officers and men, ten times larger than before, for which no
preparations in advance had been or could be made because of
existing rules and regulations.
"8. That notwithstanding all the manifest errors, of omission
rather than of commission, a vast deal of good work was done
by medical officers, high and low, regular and volunteer, and
there were unusually few deaths among the wounded and the
sick.
"What is needed by the medical department in the future is—
"1. A larger force of commissioned medical officers.
"2. Authority to establish in time of war a proper volunteer
hospital corps.
"3. A reserve corps of selected trained women nurses, ready to
serve when necessity shall arise, but under ordinary
circumstances, owing no duty to the War Department, except to
report residence at determined intervals.
"4. A year's supply for an army of at least four times the
actual strength, of all such medicines, hospital furniture,
and stores as are not materially damaged by keeping, to be
held constantly on hand in the medical supply depots.
"5. The charge of transportation to such extent as will secure
prompt shipment and ready delivery of all medical supplies.
"6. The simplification of administrative 'paper work,' so that
medical officers may be able to more thoroughly discharge
their sanitary and strictly medical duties.
"7. The securing of such legislation as will authorize all
surgeons in medical charge of troops, hospitals, transports,
trains, and independent commands to draw from the Subsistence
Department funds for the purchase of such articles of diet as
may be necessary to the proper treatment of soldiers too sick
to use the army ration. This to take the place of all
commutation of rations of the sick now authorized.
"Convalescent soldiers traveling on furlough should be
furnished transportation, sleeping berths or staterooms, and
$1.50 per diem for subsistence in lieu of rations, the soldier
not to be held accountable or chargeable for this amount."
_Report of the Commission, volume 1._
Public opinion of the report, when divested of partisan
prejudice, was probably expressed very fairly in the following
comments of "The Nation," of New York:
"The two leading conclusions of the court of inquiry as to the
quality of the beef supplied to our troops during the war with
Spain, are in accordance with the evidence and will be
accepted as fairly just by the country. The court finds that
so far as the canned roast beef was concerned, the charges
which General Miles made against it as an unsuitable ration
are sustained, but that as regards the use of chemicals in the
treatment of refrigerated beef his charges were not
established. If instead of saying 'not established,' the court
had said 'not fully sustained,' its verdict would have been
above criticism on these two points. There was evidence of the
use of chemicals, but it was not conclusive and was flatly
contradicted. There is no doubt whatever that the use of the
refrigerated beef was a blunder, but there was very little
evidence to sustain a more serious charge than that against
it.
"But while the court has found justly on these points, it is
difficult to read its report without feeling that its members
did so reluctantly, and that, if left to follow their
inclinations, they would have censured General Miles and
allowed everybody else concerned to go free. General Miles is
the one person involved whom they allow no extenuating
circumstances to benefit in their report. At every opportunity
they take the worst possible view of his conduct, while almost
invariably taking the most lenient view possible of nearly
everybody else. … So far as the findings of the court apply to
Eagan's conduct, they are condemnatory in general terms, but
they do not seek to go behind him for the reasons for his
conduct. … No attention whatever is paid to the evidence of
several reputable witnesses that Eagan had told them that he
had to buy of certain contractors; none is paid, either, to
the evidence of Eagan's subordinates that he himself so
altered the refrigerated beef contracts that no one could say
whether they called for preservation for seventy-two hours or
twenty-four. Leniency of this kind is never shown toward
General Miles."
_The Nation,
May 11, 1899._
Perhaps a weightier criticism is represented by the following,
which we quote from an article contributed to "The
Independent" by General Wingate, President of the National
Guard Association of the United States: "So far as the
refrigerated beef was concerned, the truth probably is that
there was little, if any, 'embalming' about it. Soldiers
generally agree that the beef itself was almost universally
good. … General Miles, on the other hand, was clearly right in
asking that the troops might be furnished with beef cattle on the
hoof, which could follow the army over any road and which
would keep in good condition on the luxuriant grasses of Cuba
and Porto Rico. This was the system pursued in our Civil War.
No one has yet explained why it was abandoned for the
experiment of furnishing this kind of beef to places in the
tropics where it had to be hauled in wagons for many hours
over muddy roads, and when most of the wagons required to move
it promptly had to be left behind for want of water
transportation.
"The matter of the refrigerated or so-called 'embalmed' beef
is, however, of very slight consequence compared with that of
the canned roast beef. The use of that beef as an army ration
in this country, at least, was new. Officer after officer has
testified before the court of inquiry that they never saw it
so issued before the Cuban campaign. It is true that the navy
uses it, but the facilities on shipboard for caring for and
cooking food are so different and so superior to those of an
army in the field that no comparison can justly be made
between them. Moreover, as was recently stated in the 'Army
and Navy Journal,' the belief is general in the navy that the
canned beef it had rejected on inspection was afterward sold
to the army and accepted by it without inspection.
{634}
Be this as it may, the evidence is overwhelming that the
canned roast beef which was issued to the army was repulsive
in appearance and disagreeable in smell. … Governor Roosevelt
says in his testimony that 'from generals to privates he never
heard any one who did not condemn it as an army ration.' Its
defects appeared on the voyage to Santiago, if not before. It
was then so bad that the men would not touch it, and as
Governor Roosevelt says in his article in 'Scribner's,' his
Rough Riders, who certainly were not particular, could not eat
it, and as it constituted one-third of the rations, his men
had to go hungry. And yet, in spite of these facts, a million
pounds of that beef was purchased from Armour & Co. alone, and
its issue was continued not only in Cuba but in Porto Rico.
What is worse than all, after its defects were fully known it
was issued as a traveling ration to the fever-racked men on
their homeward voyage to this country; men who needed and were
entitled to receive the most nourishing food and to whom this
indigestible stuff was poison. This should never be forgotten
or forgiven by the plain people of the country. …
"No one in authority has been willing to admit that there was
the slightest thing wrong, or the least need for improvement
in his department. … This is another of the hundreds of
examples which have occurred in our past war, and which will
continue to take place in the future until the whole staff
system of the army has been rectified, of the reign of that
hide bound bureaucratic spirit which induces the head of a
department in Washington to decide in his office what should
be used by the troops in the field without practical
experience on the subject, and to stubbornly close his eyes
and ears to everything which will tend to show that it is
possible that his department has made a mistake. …
"It is noticeable that so far not an official in any of the
supply or medical departments is known to have been court
martialed or even censured. Yet I do not hesitate to say that
the summary dismissal from the service, in the beginning, of
two or three quartermasters and commissaries, including the
gentlemen who were the cause of sending thousands of cars to
Tampa without invoices or anything on the outside of them to
indicate their contents, would have saved the lives of
hundreds of our soldiers. Under these circumstances it is most
lamentable to find that the awful experiences which have made
so many homes desolate, and so many of our best young men
invalids, have borne no practical fruit. Both the army
officials and Congress are like the Bourbons, they 'have
learned nothing and forgotten nothing.'"
_G. W. Wingate,
What the Beef Scandal Teaches
(Independent, April 6, 1899)._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898-1899.
Joint High Commission for settlement of
pending questions with Canada.
See (in this volume)
CANADA: A. D. 1898-1899.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898-1899 (October-October).
Military government of Porto Rico.
See (in this volume)
PORTO RICO: A. D. 1898-1899 (OCTOBER-OCTOBER).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898-1899 (December-January).
Instructions by the President to General Otis,
Military Governor of the Philippines.
Their proclamation by the latter in a modified form.
The effect.
See (in this volume)
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1898-1899 (DECEMBER-JANUARY).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (January).
The case of Commissary-General Eagan.
A court-martial, sitting in January, 1899, for the trial of
Commissary-General Eagan, on the charge that he had been
guilty of "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and
conduct to the prejudice of good order and military
discipline," in the abusive language that he had applied to
the commanding general of the army, in the course of his
testimony before the Commission to investigate the conduct of
the War Department found the accused officer guilty, and
imposed the inevitable penalty of dismissal from the service,
but recommended executive clemency in his case.
See:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898-1899.
The sentence was commuted by the President to suspension from
rank and duty for six years. This involved no loss of pay,
and, at the end of six years, General Eagan will go on the
retired list.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (January).
Appointment of the First Commission to the Philippines.
The President's instructions to the Commissioners.
See (in this volume)
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1899 (JANUARY).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (January-February).
The Treaty of Peace in the Senate.
Its ratification.
The Treaty of Peace with Spain, signed at Paris December 10,
1898, was sent by the President to the Senate on the 4th of
January, 1899, and held under debate in that body until the
6th of February following. The opposition to it was very
strong, being especially directed against the acquisition of
the Philippine Islands, involving, as that acquisition did,
the embarkation of the Republic in a colonial or imperial
policy, of conquest and of government without the consent of
the governed, which seemed to a great number of thoughtful
people, not only incongruous with its constitution, but a
dangerous violation of the principles on which its republican
polity is founded. But even those most opposed to the
acquisition of the Philippine Islands were reluctant to reopen
the state of war by rejection of the treaty, and directed
their efforts mainly towards the securing of a definite
declaration from Congress of the intention of the government
of the United States to establish independence in the islands.
"Even before the signing of the treaty at Paris, on the 6th of
December, when the demand of the American commissioners for
cession of the Philippines was known, the opposition expressed
itself in the following resolution, introduced by Senator
Vest, of Missouri:
"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled. That under the
Constitution of the United States no power is given to the
Federal Government to acquire territory to be held and
governed permanently as colonies. The colonial system of
European nations can not be established under our present
Constitution, but all territory acquired by the Government,
except such small amount as may be necessary for coaling
stations, correction of boundaries, and similar governmental
purposes, must be acquired and governed with the purpose of
ultimately organizing such territory into States suitable for
admission into the Union."
This resolution became the ground of much senatorial debate
during the following weeks. The arguments opposed to it, and
supporting the policy of the administration, are represented
fairly by the following passage from a speech made by Senator
Platt, of Connecticut, on December 16:
{635}
"I propose to maintain that the United States is a nation;
that as a nation it possesses every sovereign power not
reserved in its Constitution to the States or the people; that
the right to acquire territory was not reserved, and is
therefore an inherent sovereign right; that is a right upon
which there is no limitation, and with regard to which there
is no qualification; that in certain instances the right may
be inferred from specific clauses in the Constitution, but
that it exists independent of these clauses; that in the right
to acquire territory is found the right to govern it; and as
the right to acquire is a sovereign and inherent right, the
right to govern is a sovereign right not limited in the
Constitution, and that these propositions are in accordance
with the views of the framers of the Constitution, the
decisions of the Supreme Court, and the legislation of
Congress.
"Mr. President, this is a nation. It has been called by
various names. It has been called a Confederated Republic, a
Federal Union, the Union of States, a league of States, a rope
of sand; but during all the time these names have been applied
to it it has been a nation. It was so understood by the
framers of the Constitution. It was so decided by the great
judges of the Supreme Court in the early days of the
Constitution. It is too late to deny it, and, Mr. President,
it is also too late to admit it, and not have faith in it.
Intellectual assent to the doctrines of Christianity does not
make a man a Christian. It is saving faith that makes the
Christian. And a mere intellectual assent to the doctrine that
we are a nation does not make the true patriot. It is high
time that we come to believe without qualification, to believe
in our hearts, in the exercise of patriotic faith, that the
United States is a nation. When we come to believe that, Mr.
President, many of the doubts and uncertainties which have
troubled men will disappear.
"It is time to be heroic in our faith and to assert all the
power that belongs to the nation as a nation. … The attempt to
shear the United States of a portion of its sovereign power is
an attempt which may well be thoroughly and fully discussed.
In the right to acquire territory is found the right to
govern, and as the right to acquire is sovereign and
unlimited, the right to govern is a sovereign right, and I
maintain is not limited in the Constitution. If I am right in
holding that the power to acquire is the sovereign power
without limitation, I think it must be admitted that the right
to govern is also sovereign and unlimited. But if it is sought
to rest the right to govern upon that clause of the
Constitution which gives Congress the power to dispose of or
make 'all needful rules and regulations' for the government of
the territory of the United States, I submit there is no
limitation there. There is no qualification there."
On the 4th of January the Senate received the treaty from the
President. On the 7th, Senator Mason, of Illinois, introduced
the following resolution, and, subsequently, spoke with
earnestness in its support:
"Whereas all just powers of government are derived from the
consent of the governed: Therefore, be it
"Resolved by the Senate of the United States, That the
Government of the United States of America will not attempt to
govern the people of any other country in the world without
the consent of the people themselves, or subject them by force
to our dominion against their will."
On the 9th an impressive speech was made by Senator Hoar, of
Massachusetts, mainly in reply to Senator Platt. He spoke
partly as follows:
"Mr. President, I am quite sure that no man who will hear or
who will read what I say today will doubt that nothing could
induce me to say it but a commanding sense of public duty. I
think I dislike more than most men to differ from men with
whom I have so long and so constantly agreed. I dislike to
differ from the President, whose election I hailed with such
personal satisfaction and such exulting anticipations for the
Republic. I dislike to differ from so many of my party
associates in this Chamber, with whom I have for so many years
trod the same path and sought the same goal. I am one of those
men who believe that little that is great or good or permanent
for a free people can be accomplished without the
instrumentality of party. And I have believed religiously, and
from my soul, for half a century, in the great doctrines and
principles of the Republican party. I stood in a humble
capacity by its cradle. I do not mean, if I can help it, to
follow its hearse. I am sure I render it a service; I am sure
I help to protect and to prolong the life of that great
organization, if I can say or can do anything to keep it from
forsaking the great principles and doctrines in which alone it
must live or bear no life. I must, in this great crisis,
discharge the trust my beloved Commonwealth has committed to
me according to my sense of duty as I see it. However
unpleasant may be that duty, as Martin Luther said, 'God help
me. I can do no otherwise.'
"I am to speak for my country, for its whole past and for its
whole future. I am to speak to a people whose fate is bound up
in the preservation of our great doctrine of constitutional
liberty. I am to speak for the dead soldier who gave his life
for liberty that his death might set a seal upon his country's
historic glory. I am to speak for the Republican party, all of
whose great traditions are at stake, and all of whose great
achievements are in peril. …
"The question with which we now have to deal is whether
Congress may conquer and may govern, without their consent and
against their will, a foreign nation, a separate, distinct,
and numerous people, a territory not hereafter to be populated
by Americans, to be formed into American States and to take its
part in fulfilling and executing the purposes for which the
Constitution was framed, whether it may conquer, control, and
govern this people, not for the general welfare, common
defense, more perfect union, more blessed liberty of the
people of the United States, but for some real or fancied
benefit to be conferred against their desire upon the people
so governed or in discharge of some fancied obligation to
them, and not to the people of the United States.
"Now, Mr. President, the question is whether the men who
framed the Constitution, or the people who adopted it, meant
to confer that power among the limited and restrained powers
of the sovereign nation that they were creating. Upon that
question I take issue with my honorable friend from
Connecticut.
{636}
I declare not only that this is not among the express powers
conferred upon the sovereignty they created, that it is not
among the powers necessarily or reasonably or conveniently
implied for the sake of carrying into effect the purposes of
that instrument, but that it is a power which it can be
demonstrated by the whole contemporaneous history and by our
whole history since until within six months they did not mean
should exist—a power that our fathers and their descendants
have ever loathed and abhorred—and that they believed that no
sovereign on earth could rightfully exercise it, and that no
people on earth could rightfully confer it. They not only did
not mean to confer it, but they would have cut off their right
hands, everyone of them, sooner than set them to an instrument
which should confer it. …
"The great contemporaneous exposition of the Constitution is
to be found in the Declaration of Independence. Over every
clause, syllable, and letter of the Constitution the
Declaration of Independence pours its blazing torch-light. The
same men framed it. The same States confirmed it. The same
people pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred
honor to support it. The great characters in the
Constitutional Convention were the great characters of the
Continental Congress. There are undoubtedly, among its burning
and shining truths, one or two which the convention that
adopted it were not prepared themselves at once to put into
practice. But they placed them before their countrymen as an
ideal moral law to which the liberty of the people was to
aspire and to ascend as soon as the nature of existing
conditions would admit. Doubtless slavery was inconsistent
with it, as Jefferson, its great author, has in more than one
place left on record. But at last in the strife of a great
civil war the truth of the Declaration prevailed and the
falsehood of slavery went down, and at last the Constitution
of the United States conformed to the Declaration and it has
become the law of the land, and its great doctrines of liberty
are written upon the American flag wherever the American flag
floats. Who shall haul them down?"
Two days later (January 11) the following resolutions were
introduced by Senator Bacon, of Georgia:
"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
First, That the Government and people of the United States
have not waged the recent war with Spain for conquest and for
the acquisition of foreign territory, but solely for the
purposes set forth in the resolution of Congress making the
declaration of said war, the acquisition of such small tracts
of land or harbors as may be necessary for governmental
purposes being not deemed inconsistent with the same.
"Second. That in demanding and in receiving the cession of the
Philippine Islands it is not the purpose of the Government of
the United States to secure and maintain dominion over the
same as a part of the territory of the United States, or to
incorporate the inhabitants thereof as citizens of the United
States, or to hold said inhabitants as vassals or subjects of
this Government.
"Third. That whereas at the time of the declaration of war by
the United States against Spain, and prior thereto, the
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands were actively engaged in
a war with Spain to achieve their independence, and whereas
said purpose and the military operations thereunder have not
been abandoned, but are still being actively prosecuted
thereunder, therefore, in recognition of and in obedience to
the vital principle announced in the great declaration that
governments derive 'their just powers from the consent of the
governed,' the Government of the United States recognizes that
the people of the Philippine Islands of a right ought to be
free and independent; that, with this view and to give effect
to the same, the Government of the United States has required
the Government of Spain to relinquish its authority and
government in the Philippine Islands and to withdraw its land
and naval forces from the Philippine Islands and from the
waters thereof.
"Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaim any
disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty,
jurisdiction, or control over said islands, and assert their
determination when an independent government shall have been
duly erected therein entitled to recognition as such, to
transfer to said government, upon terms which shall be
reasonable and just, all rights secured under the cession by
Spain, and to thereupon leave the government and control of
the islands to their people."
On the 13th, Senator McLaurin, of South Carolina, returned to
the question of constitutional power in the government of the
United States to hold territory in a permanently subject
state, and spoke against the view maintained by Senator Platt,
of Connecticut: "To hold," he said, "that there is an inherent
power of sovereignty in the nation, outside of the
Constitution, to do something not authorized by that
instrument is to place this 'inherent sovereignty' above the
Constitution and thus destroy the very foundation upon which
constitutional government rests. Judge Gray in the
Chinese-exclusion case, said: 'The United States are a
sovereign and independent nation, and are invested by the
Constitution with the entire control of international
relations and with all the powers of government necessary to
maintain that control and make it effective.' While holding
that the United States are a sovereign and independent nation,
it will be seen that he also holds that the sovereignty of the
nation is vested by the Constitution; and if so, it can only
be exercised in the mode pointed out in the Constitution and
is controlled by the words of the grant of this sovereignty.
There was no nation of the United States until the adoption of
the Federal Constitution; hence before that time there could
be no sovereignty of the nation. What conferred this
sovereignty? Clearly the States, by and through the Federal
Constitution. If so, then there can be no inherent right of
sovereignty except that conferred by the Constitution.
"The Senator further contends that we are a sovereign nation,
and as such have the same inherent right to acquire territory
as England, France, Germany, and Mexico. I controvert that
proposition. The sovereignty of the nation of Great Britain
and the others is vested in the people, and has never been
delegated and limited as in our country. These Governments
enjoy sovereignty in its elementary form.
{637}
What the government wills it may do without considering the
act or its consequences in the light of an organic law of
binding obligation. Our Government is in a very different
position. The Federal Constitution is the embodiment of the
sovereignty of the United States as a nation, and this
sovereignty can only be exercised in accordance with the
powers contained in its provisions. Great Britain can do
anything as a nation in the way of the exercise of
governmental functions. There is nothing to prohibit or
restrict the fullest exercise of her sovereignty as a nation.
Hence there is no analogy, and the sovereignty of the United
States as a nation differs widely from that of Great Britain.
"It is further contended that a sovereign right can not be
limited and that all our Constitution can do is to prescribe
the manner in which it can be exercised. If, as already shown,
the sovereignty of the United States was conferred by the
States through the Federal Constitution, it is clear that, in
conferring the power and prescribing the manner of its
exercise, they did set a limit in the very terms of the
instrument itself. I deny, therefore, that the United States
as a nation has a sovereign, inherent right and control
outside of the grant of such power in the Constitution. This
is not an essential element of nationality so far as our
nation is concerned, although it may be in England or Russia,
where the nationality and sovereignty incident to it are not
created and limited by a written constitution."
On the 14th of January, Mr. Hoar submitted the following:
"Resolved, That the people of the Philippine islands of right
ought to be free and independent; that they are absolved from
all allegiance to the Spanish Crown, and that all political
connection between them and Spain is and ought to be totally
dissolved, and that they have, therefore, full power to do all
acts and things which independent states may of right do; that
it is their right to institute a new government for
themselves, laying its foundation on such principles and
organizing its powers in such form as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their safety and happiness; and that with
these rights the people of the United States do not propose to
interfere."
On the 18th, Mr. Bacon amended his resolutions, given above,
by changing the phrase "an independent government" to "a
stable and independent government," and then spoke upon them
with force, saying, among other things: "The simple fact that
we went to war with Spain did not devolve upon us any
obligation with reference to the Philippine Islands. We went
to war with Spain not for the purpose of correcting all the
evils with which her people were afflicted; we went to war
with Spain not to break the chains of tyranny with which she
might be binding her different colonies: we did not undertake
to be the great universal benefactor and to right all the
wrongs of all the world, or even all the wrongs that Spain
might be inflicting upon any of her people. "We went to war
because a particular colony which she was afflicting lay at
our doors; we went to war because the disorders of that
Government affected the peace of our community and were
injurious to our material interest. We said there was a
condition of affairs which was unbearable and that we would
put an end to it.
"To that extent and to that alone we claimed and avowed the
reason for the declaration of war. So it follows that the mere
declaration of war did not affect in any manner our relations
with the Philippine Islands except to put us in a state of war
with them as a part of the Spanish domain, and in no manner
laid any obligations upon us as to those islands. We were not
charged with the duty of preserving order in Asia. We were not
charged with the obligations of seeing that they had a stable
and orderly government in any part of that hemisphere. No such
duty rested upon us. None such was assumed by us. Therefore
the simple declaration of war did not lay any obligation upon
us as to the Philippine Islands, and I desire that any Senator
will put his finger upon the act which laid us under any
obligations to the Philippine Islands outside of the fact that
in the war which ensued we took those who were the insurgents
in those islands to be our allies and made a common cause with
them.
"Now, Mr. President, all that grows out of that—all that grows
out of the fact of that cooperation and that alliance—is to
impose upon us a single obligation which we must not ignore.
How far does that obligation go? Does it require that we shall
for all time undertake to be the guardians of the Philippine
Islands? Does that particular obligation lay upon us the duty
hereafter, not only now but for years to come, to maintain an
expensive military establishment, to burden our people with
debt, to run the risk of becoming involved in wars in order
that we may keep our hands upon the Philippine Islands and
keep them in proper condition hereafter? I am unable to see
how the obligation growing out of the fact that they were our
allies can possibly be extended to that degree. No Senator has
yet shown any reason why such an obligation rests upon us, and
I venture to say that none which is logical will or can be
shown."
The practical considerations, of circumstance and expediency,
which probably had more influence than those of law or
principle, were strongly urged by Senator Lodge, of
Massachusetts, who said, on the 24th:
"Suppose we ratify the treaty. The islands pass from the
possession of Spain into our possession without committing us
to any policy. I believe we can be trusted as a people to deal
honestly and justly with the islands and their inhabitants
thus given to our care. What our precise policy shall be I do
not know, because I for one am not sufficiently informed as to
the conditions there to be able to say what it will be best to
do, nor, I may add, do I think anyone is. But I believe that
we shall have the wisdom not to attempt to incorporate those
islands with our body politic, or make their inhabitants part
of our citizenship, or set their labor alongside of ours and
within our tariff to compete in any industry with American
workmen. I believe that we shall have the courage not to
depart from those islands fearfully, timidly, and unworthily
and leave them to anarchy among themselves, to the brief and
bloody domination of some self-constituted dictator, and to
the quick conquest of other powers, who will have no such
hesitation as we should feel in crushing them into subjection
by harsh and repressive methods. It is for us to decide the
destiny of the Philippines, not for Europe, and we can do it
alone and without assistance. …
{638}
"During the campaign of last autumn I said in many speeches to
the people of my State that I could never assent to hand those
islands back to Spain; that I wanted no subject races and no
vassal States; but that we had by the fortunes of war assumed
a great responsibility in the Philippines; that we ought to
meet it, and that we ought to give to those people an
opportunity for freedom, for peace, and for self-government;
that we ought to protect them from the rapacity of other
nations and seek to uplift those whom we had freed. From those
views I have never swerved, and I believed then, as I believe
now, that they met with the approbation of an overwhelming
majority of the people of Massachusetts. …
"Take now the other alternative. Suppose we reject the treaty
or strike out the clause relating to the Philippines. That
will hand the islands back to Spain; and I cannot conceive
that any American should be willing to do that. Suppose we
reject the treaty: what follows? Let us look at it
practically. We continue the state of war, and every sensible
man in the country, every business interest, desires the
re-establishment of peace in law as well as in fact. At the
same time we repudiate the President and his action before the
whole world, and the repudiation of the President in such a
matter as this is, to my mind, the humiliation of the United
States in the eyes of civilized mankind and brands us a people
incapable of great affairs or of taking rank where we belong,
as one of the greatest of the great world powers.
"The President cannot be sent back across the Atlantic in the
person of his commissioners, hat in hand, to say to Spain,
with bated breath, 'I am here in obedience to the mandate of a
minority of one-third of the Senate to tell you that we have
been too victorious, and that you have yielded us too much,
and that I am very sorry that I took the Philippines from
you.' I do not think that any American President would do
that, or that any American would wish him to."
Senator Harris, of Kansas, submitted the following on the 3d
of February:
"Resolved by the Senate of the United States of America, That
the United States hereby disclaim any disposition or intention
to exercise permanent sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control
over the Philippine Islands, and assert their determination,
when a stable and independent government shall have been
erected therein entitled to recognition as such, to transfer
to said government, upon terms which shall be reasonable and
just, all rights secured under the cession by Spain, and to
thereupon leave the government and control of the islands to
their people."
The following was offered on the 27th of January by Senator
Sullivan, of Mississippi:
"Resolved, That the ratification of the pending treaty of
peace with Spain shall in no wise determine the policy to be
pursued by the United States in regard to the Philippines, nor
shall it commit this Government to a colonial policy; nor is
it intended to embarrass the establishment of a stable,
independent government by the people of those islands whenever
conditions make such a proceeding hopeful of successful and
desirable results."
On the same day a joint resolution was proposed by Senator
Lindsay, of Kentucky:
"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the
acquisition by the United States, through conquest, treaty, or
otherwise, of territory, carries with it no constitutional
obligation to admit said territory, or any portion thereof,
into the Federal Union as a State or States.
"Section 2.
That it is against the policy, traditions, and interests of
the American people to admit states erected out of other than
North American territory into our union of American States.
"Section 3.
That the United States accept from Spain the cession of the
Philippine Islands with the hope that the people of those
islands will demonstrate their capacity to establish and
maintain a stable government, capable of enforcing law and
order at home and of discharging the international obligations
resting on separate and independent States, and with no
expectation of permanently holding those islands as colonies
or provinces after they shall demonstrate their capacity for
self-government, the United States to be the judge of such
capacity."
None of the resolutions given above obtained favorable
consideration in the Senate. On the 6th of February the treaty
was ratified, by one vote in excess of the two-thirds which
the constitution requires. It received 57 votes against 27, or
61 against 29 if account be taken of senators absent and
paired. Of the supporters of the treaty, 42 were Republicans;
of its opponents, 24 were Democrats. It was signed by
President McKinley on the 10th of February, and by the Queen
of Spain on the 17th of March.
After the ratification of the treaty, the Senate, by 26 votes
against 22, adopted the following resolution, offered by Mr.
McEnery of Louisiana:
"Resolved, That by the ratification of the treaty of peace
with Spain it is not intended to incorporate the inhabitants
of the Philippine islands into citizenship of the United
States, nor is it intended to permanently annex said islands
as an integral part of the territory of the United States. But
it is the intention of the United States to establish on said
islands a government suitable to the wants and conditions of
the inhabitants of said islands, to prepare them for local
self-government, and in due time to make such disposition of
said islands as will best promote the interests of the
citizens of the United States and the inhabitants of said
islands."
_Congressional Record,
December 6, 1898—February 6, 1899._
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (January-November).
Attack on Americans at Manila by Aguinaldo's forces.
Continued hostilities.
Progress of American conquest.
See (in this volume)
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1899 (JANUARY-NOVEMBER).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (March).
Appointment of the Isthmian Canal Commission.
See (in this volume)
CANAL, INTEROCEANIC: A. D. 1889-1899.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (May).
Modification of Civil Service Rules by President McKinley.
See (in this volume)
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: A. D. 1899.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (May-July).
Representation in the Peace Conference at The Hague.
See (in this volume)
PEACE CONFERENCE.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (June-October).
Arbitration and settlement of the Venezuela boundary question.
See (in this volume)
VENEZUELA: A. D. 1896-1899.
{639}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (July).
Cabinet change.
General Russel A. Alger resigned his place in the President's
Cabinet as Secretary of War, in July, and was succeeded by the
Honorable Elihu Root, of New York.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (July).
Provisional government established in the island of Negros.
See (in this volume)
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1899 (MARCH-JULY).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (October).
Report of conditions in Cuba by the Military Governor.
See (in this volume)
CUBA: A. D. 1898-1899 (DECEMBER-OCTOBER).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (October).
Modus Vivendi fixing provisional boundary line between Alaska
and Canada.
See (in this volume)
ALASKA BOUNDARY QUESTION.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (November).
Death of Vice-President Hobart.
Honorable Garret A. Hobart, Vice-President of the United
States, died November 21. Under the Act provided for this
contingency, the Secretary of State then became the successor
to the President, in the event of the death of the latter
before the expiration of his term.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899 (November).
Re-arrangement of affairs in the Samoan Islands.
Acquisition of the eastern group, with Pago Pago harbor.
See (in this volume)
SAMOAN ISLANDS.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899-1900 (September-February).
Arrangement with European Powers of the commercial policy
of the "open-door" in China.
See (in this volume)
CHINA: A. D. 1899-1900 (SEPTEMBER-FEBRUARY).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899-1900 (November-November).
Continued military operations in the Philippines.
See (in this volume)
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1899-1900.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1899-1901.
Reciprocity arrangements under the Dingley Tariff Act,
not ratified by the Senate.
The Dingley Tariff Act, which became law on the 24th of July,
1897, authorized the making of tariff concessions to other
countries on terms of reciprocity, if negotiated within two
years from the above date. At the expiration of two years,
such conventions of reciprocity had been arranged with France
and Portugal, and with Great Britain for her West Indian
colonies of Jamaica, Barbadoes, Trinidad, Bermuda, and British
Guiana. With France, a preliminary treaty signed in May, 1898,
was superseded in July, 1899, by one of broader scope, which
opens the French markets to an extensive list of American
commodities at the minimum rates of the French tariff, and
cuts the American tariff from 5 to 20 per cent. on many French
products, not inclusive of sparkling wines. In the treaty with
Portugal, the reduction of American duties on wines is more
general. The reciprocal reduction on American products extends
to many agricultural and mineral products. The reciprocal
agreement with the British West Indies covers sugar, fruits,
garden products, coffee and asphalt, on one side, and flour,
meat, cotton goods, agricultural machinery, oils, etc., on the
other.
None of these treaties was acted upon by the United States
Senate during the session of 1899-1900, and it became
necessary to extend the time for their ratification, which was
done. Some additional reciprocity agreements were then
negotiated, of which the following statement was made by the
President in his Message to Congress, December 3, 1900:
"Since my last communication to the Congress on this subject
special commercial agreements under the third section of the
tariff act have been proclaimed with Portugal, with Italy and
with Germany. Commercial conventions under the general
limitations of the fourth section of the same act have been
concluded with Nicaragua, with Ecuador, with the Dominican
Republic, with Great Britain on behalf of the island of
Trinidad and with Denmark on behalf of the island of St.
Croix. These will be early communicated to the Senate.
Negotiations with other governments are in progress for the
improvement and security of our commercial relations."
The question of the ratification of all these treaties was
pending in the Senate when the term of the 56th Congress
expired, March 4, 1901. Opposing interests in the United
States seemed likely then to defeat their ratification. On the
last day of the special session of the Senate, March 5-9, an
agreement extending the time for the ratification of the
French reciprocity treaty was received and referred to the
committee on foreign relations. On the 15th of March,
Secretary Hay and Lord Pauncefote signed protocols extending
for one year the time of ratification for four of the British
West Indian reciprocity treaties, namely, Jamaica, Bermuda,
Guiana and Turks and Caicos islands.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900.
Naval strength.
See (in this volume)
NAVIES OF THE SEA POWERS.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900.
State of Indian schools.
Recent Indian policy.
Indian population.
See (in this volume)
INDIANS, AMERICAN: A. D. 1899-1900.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (January).
Report of the First Philippine Commission.
See (in this volume)
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1900 (JANUARY).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (January-March).
The outbreak of the "Boxers" in northern China.
See (in this volume)
CHINA: A. D. 1900 (JANUARY-MARCH).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (February).
Negotiation of the Hay-Pauncefote Convention relative
to the Nicaragua Canal.
See (in this volume)
CANAL, INTEROCEANIC: A. D. 1900 (DECEMBER).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1900 (March-December).
Passage of the Financial Bill.
Settlement of the question of the monetary standard.
The working of the act.
Legislation in the direction sought by the advocates of the
gold standard and of a reformed monetary system for the
country, whose agitations are referred to above, was attained
in the spring of 1900, by the passage of an important
"Financial Bill" which became law on the 14th of March.