"These are the words of the resolute and patriotic Jackson.

They are evidence that the United States, in addition to the

test imposed by public law as the condition of the recognition

of independence by a neutral state (to wit, that the revolted

state shall 'constitute in fact a body politic, having a

government in substance as well as in name, possessed of the

elements of stability,' and forming de facto, 'if left to

itself, a state among the nations, reasonably capable of

discharging the duties of a state'), has imposed for its own

governance in dealing with cases like these the further

condition that recognition of independent statehood is not due

to a revolted dependency until the danger of its being again

subjugated by the parent state has entirely passed away. This

extreme test was, in fact, applied in the case of Texas. The

Congress, to whom President Jackson referred the question as

one 'probably leading to war,' and therefore a proper subject

for 'a previous understanding with that body, by whom war can

alone be declared, and by whom all the provisions for

sustaining its perils must be furnished,' left the matter of

the recognition of Texas to the discretion of the Executive,

providing merely for the sending of a diplomatic agent when

the President should be satisfied that the Republic of Texas

had become 'an independent State.' It was so recognized by

President Van Buren, who commissioned a chargé d'affaires

March 7, 1837, after Mexico had abandoned an attempt to

reconquer the Texan territory, and when there was at the time

no bona fide contest going on between the insurgent province

and its former sovereign.

"I said in my message of December last, 'It is to be seriously

considered whether the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond

dispute the attributes of statehood which alone can demand the

recognition of belligerency in its favor.' The same

requirement must certainly be no less seriously considered

when the graver issue of recognizing independence is in

question, for no less positive test can be applied to the

greater act than to the lesser, while, on the other hand, the

influences and consequences of the struggle upon the internal

policy of the recognizing State, which form important factors

when the recognition of belligerency is concerned, are

secondary, if not rightly eliminable, factors when the real

question is whether the community claiming recognition is or

is not independent beyond peradventure.

"Nor from the standpoint of expediency do I think it would be

wise or prudent for this Government to recognize at the

present time the independence of the so-called Cuban republic.

Such recognition is not necessary in order to enable the United

States to intervene and pacify the island. To commit this

country now to the recognition of any particular government in

Cuba might subject us to embarrassing conditions of

international obligation toward the organization so

recognized. In case of intervention our conduct would be

subject to the approval or disapproval of such government. We

would be required to submit to its direction and to assume to

it the mere relation of a friendly ally. When it shall appear

hereafter that there is within the island a government capable

of performing the duties and discharging the functions of a

separate nation, and having, as a matter of fact, the proper

forms and attributes of nationality, such government can be

promptly and readily recognized and the relations and

interests of the United States with such nation adjusted.

"There remain the alternative forms of intervention to end the

war, either as an impartial neutral by imposing a rational

compromise between the contestants or as the active ally of

the one party or the other. As to the first, it is not to be

forgotten that during the last few months the relation of the

United States has virtually been one of friendly intervention

in many ways, each not of itself conclusive, but all tending

to the exertion of a potential influence toward an ultimate

pacific result just and honorable to all interests concerned.

The spirit of all our acts hitherto has been an earnest,

unselfish desire for peace and prosperity in Cuba untarnished

by differences between us and Spain and unstained by the blood

of American citizens. The forcible intervention of the United

States as a neutral to stop the war, according to the large

dictates of humanity and following many historical precedents

where neighboring states have interfered to check the hopeless

sacrifices of life by internecine conflicts beyond their

borders, is justifiable on rational grounds. It involves,

however, hostile constraint upon both the parties to the

contest, as well to enforce a truce as to guide the eventual

settlement.

{589}

"The grounds for such intervention may be briefly summarized

as follows:

First.

In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities,

bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there,

and which the parties to the conflict are either unable or

unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say this is

all in another country, belonging to another nation, and is

therefore none of our business. It is specially our duty, for

it is right at our door.

Second.

We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that

protection and indemnity for life and property which no

government there can or will afford, and to that end to

terminate the conditions that deprive them of legal

protection.

Third.

The right to intervene may be justified by the very serious

injury to the commerce, trade, and business of our people and

by the wanton destruction of property and devastation of the

island.

Fourth,

and which is of the utmost importance. The present condition

of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace, and

entails upon this Government an enormous expense.

With such a conflict waged for years in an island so near us

and with which our people have such trade and business

relations—when the lives and liberty of our citizens are in

constant danger and their property destroyed and themselves

ruined—where our trading vessels are liable to seizure and

are seized at our very door by warships of a foreign nation,

the expeditions of filibustering that we are powerless to

prevent altogether, and the irritating questions and

entanglements thus arising—all these and others that I need

not mention, with the resulting strained relations, are a

constant menace to our peace, and compel us to keep on a

semi-war footing with a nation with which we are at peace.

"These elements of danger and disorder already pointed out

have been strikingly illustrated by a tragic event which has

deeply and justly moved the American people. I have already

transmitted to Congress the report of the naval court of

inquiry on the destruction of the battleship 'Maine' in the

harbor of Habana during the night of the 15th of February. The

destruction of that noble vessel has filled the national heart

with inexpressible horror. Two hundred and fifty-eight brave

sailors and marines and two officers of our Navy, reposing in

the fancied security of a friendly harbor, have been hurled to

death, grief and want brought to their homes and sorrow to the

nation. The naval court of inquiry, which, it is needless to

say, commands the unqualified confidence of the Government,

was unanimous in its conclusion that the destruction of the

'Maine' was caused by an exterior explosion, that of a

submarine mine. It did not assume to place the responsibility:

that remains to be fixed. In any event the destruction of them

'Maine' by whatever exterior cause, is a patent and

impressive proof of a state of things in Cuba that is

intolerable. That condition is thus shown to be such that the

Spanish Government cannot assure safety and security to a

vessel of the American Navy in the harbor of Habana on a

mission of peace, and rightfully there.

"Further referring in this connection to recent diplomatic

correspondence, a dispatch from our minister to Spain, of the

26th ultimo, contained the statement that the Spanish minister

for foreign affairs assured him positively that Spain will do

all that the highest honor and justice require in the matter

of the 'Maine.' The reply above referred to of the 31st

ultimo, also contained an expression of the readiness of Spain

to submit to an arbitration all the differences which can

arise in this matter, which is subsequently explained by the

note of the Spanish minister at Washington of the 10th

instant, as follows: 'As to the question of fact which springs

from the diversity of views between the reports of the

American and Spanish boards, Spain proposes that the facts be

ascertained by an impartial investigation by experts, whose

decision Spain accepts in advance.' To this I have made no

reply.

"President Grant, in 1875, after discussing the phases of the

contest as it then appeared, and its hopeless and apparent

indefinite prolongation, said: 'In such an event, I am of

opinion that other nations will be compelled to assume the

responsibility which devolves upon them, and to seriously

consider the only remaining measures possible—mediation and

intervention. Owing, perhaps, to the large expanse of water

separating the island from the peninsula, … the contending

parties appear to have within themselves no depository of

common confidence, to suggest wisdom when passion and

excitement have their sway, and to assume the part of

peacemaker. In this view in the earlier days of the contest

the good offices of the United States as a mediator were

tendered in good faith, without any selfish purpose, in the

interest of humanity and in sincere friendship for both

parties, but were at the time declined by Spain, with the

declaration, nevertheless, that at a future time they would be

indispensable. No intimation has been received that in the

opinion of Spain that time has been reached. And yet the

strife continues with all its dread horrors and all its

injuries to the interests of the United States and of other

nations. Each party seems quite capable of working great

injury and damage to the other, as well as to all the

relations and interests dependent on the existence of peace in

the island; but they seem incapable of reaching any

adjustment, and both have thus far failed of achieving any

success whereby one party shall possess and control the island

to the exclusion of the other. Under these circumstances, the

agency of others, either by mediation or by intervention,

seems to be the only alternative which must sooner or later be

invoked for the termination of the strife.'

"In the last annual message of my immediate predecessor during

the pending struggle, it was said: 'When the inability of

Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection has become

manifest, and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is

extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence,

and when a hopeless struggle for its re-establishment has

degenerated into a strife which means nothing more than the

useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of

the very subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be

presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain

will be superseded by higher obligations, which we can hardly

hesitate to recognize and discharge.'

{590}

"In my annual message to Congress, December last, speaking to

this question, I said: 'The near future will demonstrate

whether the indispensable condition of a righteous peace, just

alike to the Cubans and to Spain, as well as equitable to all

our interests so intimately involved in the welfare of Cuba,

is likely to be attained. If not, the exigency of further and

other action by the United States will remain to be taken.

When that time comes that action will be determined in the

line of indisputable right and duty. It will be faced, without

misgiving or hesitancy, in the light of the obligation this

Government owes to itself, to the people who have confided to

it the protection of their interests and honor, and to

humanity. Sure of the right, keeping free from all offense

ourselves, actuated only by upright and patriotic

considerations, moved neither by passion nor selfishness, the

Government will continue its watchful care over the rights and

property of American citizens and will abate none of its efforts

to bring about by peaceful agencies a peace which shall be

honorable and enduring. If it shall hereafter appear to be a

duty imposed by our obligations to ourselves, to civilization,

and humanity to intervene with force, it shall be without fault

on our part, and only because the necessity for such action

will be so clear as to command the support and approval of the

civilized world.'

"The long trial has proved that the object for which Spain has

waged the war cannot be attained. The fire of insurrection may

flame or may smoulder with varying seasons, but it has not

been and it is plain that it cannot be extinguished by present

methods. The only hope of relief and repose from a condition

which can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification of

Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in

behalf of endangered American interests which give us the

right and the duty to speak and act, the War in Cuba must

stop.

"In view of these facts and of these considerations, I ask the

Congress to authorize and empower the President to take

measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities

between the Government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to

secure in the island the establishment of a stable government,

capable of maintaining order and observing its international

obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity and the security

of its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military

and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for

these purposes. And in the interest of humanity and to aid in

preserving the lives of the starving people of the island I

recommend that the distribution of food and supplies be

continued, and that an appropriation be made out of the public

Treasury to supplement the charity of our citizens.

"The issue is now with the Congress. It is a solemn

responsibility. I have exhausted every effort to relieve the

intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors.

Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the

Constitution and the law, I await your action.

"Yesterday, and since the preparation of the foregoing

message, official information was received by me that the

latest decree of the Queen Regent of Spain directs General

Blanco, in order to prepare and facilitate peace, to proclaim

a suspension of hostilities, the duration and details of which

have not yet been communicated to me. This fact with every

other pertinent consideration will, I am sure, have your just

and careful attention in the solemn deliberations upon which

you are about to enter. If this measure attains a successful

result, then our aspirations as a Christian, peace-loving

people will be realized. If it fails, it will be only another

justification for our contemplated action."

_Congressional Record,

April 11, 1898._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April).

Action of Congress empowering the President to expel

Spanish authority from the island of Cuba, and its result

in a state of war with Spain.

On the 13th of April, two days after receiving the President's

Message, as above, the House of Representatives adopted the

following resolution, by a vote of 324 against 19: "Resolved,

That the President is hereby authorized and directed to

intervene at once to stop the war in Cuba, to the end and with

the purpose of securing permanent peace and order there and

establishing by the free action of the people thereof a stable

and independent government of their own in the island of Cuba;

and the President is hereby authorized and empowered to use

the land and naval forces of the United States to execute the

purpose of this resolution."

_Congressional Record,

April 13, 1898, pages 4192-4196._

Three days later the Senate adopted the following, by 27 votes

against 21: "Resolved by the Senate and House of

Representatives of the United States of America in Congress

assembled,

First.

That the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought

to be, free and independent, and that the Government of the

United States hereby recognizes the Republic of Cuba as the

true and lawful Government of that island.

"Second.

That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the

Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the

Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and

government in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land and

naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

"Third.

That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is,

directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces

of the United States, and to call into the actual service of

the United States the militia of the several States, to such

extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into

effect.

"Fourth.

That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or

intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control

over said island except for the pacification thereof, and

asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave

the government and control of the island to its people."

_Congressional Record,

April 16, 1898, page 4386-4387._

The two Houses were in conflict, it will be seen, on the

question of the recognition of what claimed to be the

government of the Republic of Cuba, organized by the

insurgents. A majority of the House shared the doubts

expressed by the President in his message, as to the existence

of such a government in Cuba as could be recognized without

embarrassment; a majority of the Senate shut its eyes to that

doubt. After two days of heated controversy, the Senate gave

way, and the following resolution, recommended by conference

committees, was adopted in both Houses,—in the Senate by 42

yeas to 35 nays (12 not voting); in the House by 311 to 6 (39

not voting):

{591}

"Resolved, etc.

"First.

That the people of the Island of Cuba are and of right ought

to be free and independent.

"Second.

That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the

Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the

Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and

government in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land and

naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

"Third.

That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is,

directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces

of the United States, and to call into the actual service of

the United States the militia of the several States, to such

extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into

effect.

"Fourth.

That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or

intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control

over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and

asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave

the government and control of the island to its people."

_Congressional Record,

April 18, 1898, pages 4421-4422, and 4461-4462._

One week later, on the 25th of April, the President

communicated to Congress an account of his action in

accordance with this joint resolution, and its result in a

state of war between the United States and Spain as follows:

"Upon communicating to the Spanish minister in Washington the

demand which it became the duty of the Executive to address to

the Government of Spain in obedience to said resolution, the

minister asked for his passports and withdrew. The United

States minister at Madrid was in turn notified by the Spanish

minister for foreign affairs that the withdrawal of the

Spanish representative from the United States had terminated

diplomatic relations between the two countries, and that all

official communications between their respective

representatives ceased therewith.

"I commend to your special attention the note addressed to the

United States minister at Madrid by the Spanish minister for

foreign affairs on the 21st instant, whereby the foregoing

notification was conveyed. It will be perceived therefrom that

the Government of Spain, having cognizance of the joint

resolution of the United States Congress, and in view of the

things which the President is thereby required and authorized

to do, responds by treating the reasonable demands of this

Government as measures of hostility, following with that

instant and complete severance of relations by its action

which, by the usage of nations, accompanies an existent state

of war between sovereign powers.

"The position of Spain being thus made known and the demands

of the United States being denied with a complete rupture of

intercourse by the act of Spain, I have been constrained, in

exercise of the power and authority conferred upon me by the

joint resolution aforesaid, to proclaim under date of April

22, 1898, a blockade of certain ports of the north coast of

Cuba, lying between Cardenas and Bahia Honda and of the port

of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba; and further, in

exercise of my constitutional powers and using the authority

conferred upon me by the act of Congress approved April 22,

1898, to issue my proclamation dated April 23, 1898, calling

forth volunteers in order to carry into effect the said

resolution of April 20, 1898. …

"In view of the measures so taken, and with a view to the

adoption of such other measures as may be necessary to enable

me to carry out the expressed will of the Congress of the

United States in the premises, I now recommend to your

honorable body the adoption of a joint resolution declaring

that a state of war exists between the United States of

America and the Kingdom of Spain, and I urge speedy action

thereon, to the end that the definition of the international

status of the United States as a belligerent power may be made

known, and the assertion of all its rights and the maintenance

of all its duties in the conduct of a public war may be

assured."

_Congressional Record,

April 25, 1898, page 4671._

The recommendation of the President was carried out, on the

same day, by the passage in both Houses, unanimously, of an

enactment, "First. That war be, and the same is hereby,

declared to exist, and that war has existed since the 21st day

of April, A. D. 1898, including said day, between the United

States of America and the Kingdom of Spain. Second. That the

President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed

and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the

United States, and to call into the actual service of the

United States the militia of the several States, to such

extent as may be necessary to carry this act into effect."

_Congressional Record,

April 25, pages 4674 and 4693._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April).

Cabinet changes.

Two resignations from the President's cabinet occurred in

April, both occasioned by failing health. Honorable James A.

Gary was succeeded as Postmaster-General by Honorable Charles

Emory Smith, and Honorable John Sherman was followed in the

Secretaryship of State by his First Assistant in that office,

Judge William R. Day.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April-May).

War with Spain.

Military preparations.

Regular and Volunteer armies.

"The Rough Riders."

At the outbreak of the war, the Regular Army of the United

States numbered but 28,000 officers and men. Under authority

given by acts of Congress it was rapidly increased, and

returns for May, 1898, show 2,191 officers and nearly 42,000

men in the ranks. At the same time, a Volunteer Army was being

speedily raised and equipped. By proclamation of April 2-3d,

the President called for 125,000 volunteers, to be

apportioned, as far as practicable, among the states and

territories, according to population. On the 25th of May he

called for 75,000 more. Before the end of May, 118,580

enlisted volunteers, with 6,224 officers, were reported to

have been mustered in. These were assembled in various camps

and prepared for service in a more or less hurried way. At the

beginning, six army corps were constituted, embracing both the

Regular and Volunteer branches of the army. The First Corps,

under Major General John R. Brooke, and the Third under Major

General James F. Wade, were organized at Camp Thomas, Georgia.

The Second was organized under Major General William M.

Graham, at Camp Alger, near Falls Church, Virginia. The

organization of the Fourth Corps, Major General John J.

Coppinger, commanding, was begun at Mobile, Alabama. The Fifth

Corps was organized at Tampa, Florid., under Major General

William R. Shafter.

{592}

A Sixth Corps, which had been provided for, was never

organized; but the Seventh was formed, at Tampa, Florida,

under Major General Fitzhugh Lee. Subsequently an Eighth Corps

was concentrated at San Francisco, and transported to the

Philippine Islands. Tampa, Florida, was the port chosen for

the shipment of troops to Cuba, and extensive preparations

were made for the transport service from that point. The

movement waited, first, for the preparation of newly levied

troops, and, secondly, for naval operations to make the voyage

of transports to Cuba safe from attack.

_Annual Report of the Adjutant-General to the

Major-General Commanding the Army, 1898._

Among the Volunteer regiments organized, one known as that of

"the Rough Riders" excited public interest in the greatest

degree. "The moment that the newspapers sent broadcast the

tale that such a regiment was contemplated, excitement began

in nearly every State in the Union, and did not end until the

announcement was made that the regiment was complete. As it

stood, finished, the troops which made it up, theoretically

came from the following sections, although men from the East

and from other States and Territories were scattered through

each troop. Troops A, B, and C, from Arizona. Troop D, from

Oklahoma. Troops E, F, G, H, and I, from New Mexico. Troop K,

from Eastern colleges and cities. Troops L and M, from Indian

Territory.

"Senator Warren, of Iowa, is responsible for the idea of the

Rough Riders. He introduced and carried through Congress,

aided by Senators Kyle, Carter, and others, a bill authorizing

the enrollment of three regiments, to be made up of expert

hunters, riflemen, cow-men, frontiersmen, and such other hardy

characters as might care to enlist from the Territories.

Captain Leonard Wood, of the Medical Corps, was the

President's chief medical adviser, and had had much experience

in Indian fighting in the West. Theodore Roosevelt was

Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and had had some knowledge of

men and things on the frontier, through his life on his Own

and other ranches. It was the President's intention to offer

to Wood the colonelcy of one regiment, to Roosevelt the

colonelcy of a second, and to Griggsby, of Montana, the

colonelcy of a third. Wood and Roosevelt received their offers

at about the same moment. Roosevelt promptly declined his, on

the theory that he had not had sufficient military experience

to warrant him in taking command of a regiment. He asked that

he might be given the second place in the regiment commanded

by Wood, which was done. Thus the Rough Riders began.

"Alexander Brodie, who afterwards became major of the

regiment, was probably the first man to systematically start

towards the organization of this particular regiment. … It was

on the 3d of May that the Arizona men started for San Antonio.

It was on the 8th of May that the very last men of all—those

of K Troop—left Washington for San Antonio. These were the

'dude warriors,' the 'dandy troopers,' the 'gilded gang.' When

their train pulled into San Antonio, and they started

stragglingly to march into camp, they encountered a contingent

of 340 cowboys from New Mexico. Oil and water are not farther

removed than were the everyday natures of these two groups of

men. Yet, instantly they fraternized, and from that

moment—through the hardships of it all—these men were

brothers. … Probably no military organization has ever been

made up of men selected from so large a number of applicants,

or of men so carefully selected. … A large delegation of men

from Harvard College called upon Roosevelt one day in

Washington and offered their services in a body. Indeed,

delegations of that kind from most of the Eastern Colleges

went to him, but went to him in vain. His secretary answered

more than five thousand individual applications for places in

the regiment, and answered ninety-nine per cent. of them with

declinations."

_E. Marshall,

The Story of the Rough Riders,

chapter 1

(Copyright, G. W. Dillingham & Co., New York)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April-May: Cuba)

War with Spain.

Blockade of Cuban ports.

On the 21st of April, the following instructions were

despatched by the Secretary of the Navy to Rear-Admiral

Sampson, appointed that day to the command of the naval force

on the Atlantic Station: "You will immediately institute a

blockade of the north coast of Cuba, extending from Cardenas

on the east to Bahia Honda on the west; also, if in your

opinion your force warrants, the port of Cienfuegos, on the

south side of the island. It is considered doubtful if the

present force at your command would warrant a more extensive

blockade. It should be borne in mind that whenever the Army is

ready to embark for Cuba the Navy will be required to furnish

the necessary convoy for its transports. For this reason it

does not seem desirable that you should undertake at present

to blockade any more of the island than has been indicated. It

is believed that this blockade will cut off Havana almost

entirely from receiving supplies from the outside. The Navy

Department is considering the question of occupying the port

of Matanzas by a military force large enough to hold it and to

open communications with the insurgents, and this may be done

at an early date, even before the main party of the Army is

ready to embark. If this operation is decided upon, you are

directed to co-operate with the Army and assist with such

vessels as are necessary to cover and protect such a

movement."

_Report of Secretary of Navy, 1898,

volume 2, page 175._

In previous confidential orders to the commander of the North

Atlantic squadron, issued April 6, in anticipation of

hostilities, the Department had directed as follows: "In the

event of hostilities with Spain, the Department wishes you to

do all in your power to capture or destroy the Spanish war

vessels in West Indian waters, including the small gunboats

which are stationed along the coast of Cuba.

"2. The Department does not wish the vessels of your squadron

to be exposed to the fire of the batteries at Havana, Santiago

de Cuba, or other strongly fortified ports in Cuba, unless the

more formidable Spanish vessels should take refuge within

those harbors. Even in this case the Department would suggest

that a rigid blockade and employment of our torpedo boats

might accomplish the desired object, viz, the destruction of

the enemy's vessels, without subjecting unnecessarily our own

men-of-war to the fire of the land batteries. There are two

reasons for this: First. There may be no United States troops

to occupy any captured stronghold, or to protect from riot and

arson, until after the dry season begins, about the first of

October. Second. The lack of docking facilities makes it

particularly desirable that our vessels should not be crippled

before the capture or destruction of Spain's most formidable

vessels.

{593}

"3. The Department further desires that, in case of war, you

will maintain a strict blockade of Cuba, particularly at the

ports of Havana, Matanzas, and, if possible, of Santiago de

Cuba, Manzanillo, and Cienfuegos. Such a blockade may cause

the Spaniards to yield before the rainy season is over."

_Report of Secretary of Navy, 1898,

volume 2, page 171._

The prudent policy here set forth restricted the action of the

fleet to blockading duty so closely, during the early weeks of

the war, that no serious demonstrations against the Spanish

land batteries were made. Admiral Sampson had been urgent for

permission to force the entrance to Havana harbor, before its

defenses were strengthened, expressing perfect confidence that

he could silence the western batteries, and reach a position

from which the city would be at the mercy of his guns; but he

was not allowed to make the attempt. The projected occupation

of Matanzas was not undertaken.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April-May: Philippines).

Statements of the circumstances in which Aguinaldo, the

head of the insurrectionary movement in the Philippines,

went to Manila, to co-operate with the American forces.

On the 4th of May, 1898, the following was published in the

"Singapore Free Press": "General Emilio Aguinaldo, accompanied

by his aide-de-camp, Colonel Marcelo H. del Pilar, and his

private secretary, Mr. J. Leyba, arrived incognito in

Singapore from Saigon on April 21, 1898. In Saigon, where

Aguinaldo had remained for one week, he had interviews with

one or two old Philippino friends now resident there. The

special purpose of Aguinaldo's visit to Singapore was to

consult other friends here, particularly Mr. Howard W. Bray,

an old and intimate English friend, for fifteen years resident

in the Philippines, about the state of affairs in the islands

generally—particularly as to the possibility of war between

the United States and Spain, and whether, in such an event,

the United States would eventually recognize the independence

of the Philippines, provided he lent his co-operation to the

Americans in the conquest of the country. The situation of the

moment was this, that the conditions of the honorable peace

concluded on December 14, 1897, between President Aguinaldo,

on behalf of the Philippine rebels, and H. E. Governor-General

Primo di Rivera, on behalf of Spain, had not been carried out,

although their immediate execution had been vouched for in

that agreement. These reforms would have provided protection

to the people against the organized oppression and rapacity of

the religious fraternities, would have secured improved civil

and criminal procedure in courts, and have guaranteed, in many

ways, improvements in the fiscal and social conditions of the

people. The repudiation by the Spanish Government of these

conditions, made by General Primo di Rivera, now left the

rebel leaders, who had for the most part gone to Hongkong,

free to act. And it was in pursuance of that freedom of action

that Aguinaldo again sought counsel of his friends in Saigon

and Singapore, with a view to the immediate resumption of

operations in the Philippines.

"Meantime Mr. Bray, whose assistance to this journal on

matters connected with the Philippines has been very

considerable, as our readers will have seen, was introduced by

the editor of the Singapore Free Press to Mr. Spencer Pratt,

consul-general of the United States, who was anxious, in view

of contingencies, to learn as much as possible about the real

condition of the Philippines. It was a few days after this

that Aguinaldo arrived incognito in Singapore, when he at once

met his friends, including Mr. Bray. Affairs now becoming more

warlike, Mr. Bray, after conversation with Mr. Spencer Pratt,

eventually arranged an interview between that gentleman and

General Aguinaldo, which took place late on the evening of

Sunday, the 24th April, at 'The Mansion,' River Valley road.

There were present on that occasion General Emilio Aguinaldo y

Fami, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, consul-general United States of

America; Mr. Howard W. Bray; Aguinaldo's private secretary,

Mr. J. Leyba; Colonel M. H. del Pilar, and Dr. Marcelino

Santos.

"During this conference, at which Mr. Bray acted as

interpreter, General Aguinaldo explained to the American

consul-general, Mr. Pratt, the incidents and objects of the

late rebellion, and described the present disturbed state of

the country. General Aguinaldo then proceeded to detail the

nature of the co-operation he could give, in which he, in the

event of the American forces from the squadron landing and

taking possession of Manila, would guarantee to maintain order

and discipline amongst the native troops and inhabitants in

the same humane way in which he had hitherto conducted the

war, and prevent them from committing outrages on defenceless

Spaniards beyond the inevitable in fair and honorable warfare.

He further declared his ability to establish a proper and

responsible government on liberal principles, and would be

willing to accept the same terms for the country as the United

States intend giving to Cuba.

"The consul-general of the United States, coinciding with the

general views expressed during the discussion, placed himself

at once in telegraphic communication with Admiral Dewey at

Hongkong, between whom and Mr. Pratt a frequent interchange of

telegrams consequently took place. As a result another private

interview was arranged at the American consular residence at

the Raffles Hotel between General Aguinaldo, Mr. Spencer

Pratt, Mr. Howard Bray, and Mr. Leyba, private secretary to

General Aguinaldo. As a sequel to this interview, and in

response to the urgent request of Admiral Dewey, General

Aguinaldo left Singapore for Hongkong by the first available

steamer, the Peninsular and Oriental 'Malacca,' on Tuesday,

the 26th April, at noon, accompanied by his aide-de-camp,

Captain del Pilar, and Mr. Leyba, his private secretary. …

"Throughout the whole stay of General Aguinaldo in Singapore

the editor was kept fully informed daily of the progress of

affairs. Naturally, however, all statement of what occurred

has been withheld by us until what has been deemed the fitting

moment has arrived. The substance of the whole incident in its

relations to the recent course of affairs in the Philippines

has been very fully telegraphed by the editor both to New York

and London."

{594}

Mr. Pratt, the U. S. Consul-General at Singapore, had already,

under date of April 28, given his own official report of the

interview with General Aguinaldo, to the Department at

Washington, as follows:

"I have the honor to report that I sent you on the 27th

instant, and confirmed in my dispatch Number 211 of that date,

a telegram which deciphered read as follows. … 'General

Aguinaldo gone my instance Hongkong arrange with Dewey

co-operation insurgents Manila.

PRATT.'

"The facts are these: On the evening of Saturday the 23d

instant, I was confidentially informed of the arrival here,

incognito, of the supreme leader of the Philippine insurgents,

General Emilio Aguinaldo, by Mr. H. W. Bray, an English gentleman

of high standing, who, after fifteen years' residence as a

merchant and planter in the Philippines, had been compelled by

the disturbed condition of things resulting from Spanish

misrule to abandon his property and leave there, and from whom

I had previously obtained much valuable information for

Commodore Dewey regarding fortifications, coal deposits, etc.,

at different points in the islands. Being aware of the great

prestige of General Aguinaldo with the insurgents, and that no

one, either at home or abroad, could exert over them the same

influence and control that he could, I determined at once to

see him, and, at my request, a secret interview was

accordingly arranged for the following morning, Sunday, the

24th, in which, besides General Aguinaldo, were only present

the General's trusted advisers and Mr. Bray, who acted as

interpreter.

"At this interview, after learning from General Aguinaldo the

state of and object sought to be obtained by the present

insurrectionary movement, which, though absent from the

Philippines, he was still directing, I took it upon myself,

whilst explaining that I had no authority to speak for the

Government, to point out the danger of continuing independent

action at this stage; and, having convinced him of the

expediency of co-operating with our fleet, then at Hongkong,

and obtained the assurance of his willingness to proceed

thither and confer with Commodore Dewey to that end, should

the latter so desire, I telegraphed the Commodore the same day

as follows, through our consul-general at Hongkong:

'Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hongkong arrange

with Commodore for general cooperation insurgents Manila if

desired. Telegraph.

PRATT.'

"The Commodore's reply reading thus:

'Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible.

DEWEY.'

"I received it late that night, and at once communicated to

General Aguinaldo, who, with his aide-de-camp and private

secretary, all under assumed names, I succeeded in getting off

by the British steamer 'Malacca,' which left here on Tuesday,

the 26th. Just previous to his departure, I had a second and

last interview with General Aguinaldo, the particulars of

which I shall give you by next mail. The general impressed me

as a man of intelligence, ability, and courage, and worthy the

confidence that had been placed in him.

"I think that in arranging for his direct cooperation with

the commander of our forces, I have prevented possible

conflict of action and facilitated the work of occupying and

administering the Philippines. If this course of mine meets

with the Government's approval, as I trust it may, I shall be

fully satisfied; to Mr. Bray, however, I consider there is due

some special recognition for most valuable services rendered.

How that recognition can best be made I leave to you to

decide."

Two days later (April 30), Mr. Pratt reported further, as

follows: "Referring to my dispatch No. 212, of the 28th

instant, I have the honor to report that in the second and

last interview I had with General Emilio Aguinaldo, on the eve

of his departure for Hongkong, I enjoined upon him the

necessity, under Commodore Dewey's direction, of exerting

absolute control over his forces in the Philippines, as no

excesses on their part would be tolerated by the American

Government, the President having declared that the present

hostilities with Spain were to be carried on in strict accord

with modern principles of civilized warfare. To this General

Aguinaldo fully assented, assuring me that he intended and was

perfectly able, once on the field, to hold his followers, the

insurgents, in check and lead them as our commander should

direct. The general further stated that he hoped the United

States would assume protection of the Philippines for at least

long enough to allow the inhabitants to establish a government

of their own, in the organization of which he would desire

American advise and assistance. These questions I told him I

had no authority to discuss."

Of the arrival of Aguinaldo at Hongkong and his conveyance

thence to Manila, the following account was given by Mr.

Wildman, the U. S. Consul at Hongkong, in a communication to

the State Department at Washington, which bears date July 18:

"On May 2 Aguinaldo arrived in Hongkong and immediately called

on me. It was May 16 before I could obtain permission from

Admiral Dewey to allow Aguinaldo to go by the United States

ship 'McCulloch,' and I put him aboard in the night so as to

save any complications with the local Government. Immediately

on the arrival of Aguinaldo at Cavite he issued a

proclamation, which I had outlined for him before he left,

forbidding pillage, and making it a criminal offense to

maltreat neutrals. He, of course, organized a government of

which he was dictator, an absolutely necessary step if he

hoped to maintain control over the natives, and from that date

until the present time he has been uninterruptedly successful

in the field and dignified and just as the head of his

government. According to his own statements to me by letter,

he has been approached by both the Spaniards and the Germans,

and has had tempting offers made him by the Catholic Church.

He has been watched very closely by Admiral Dewey, Consul

Williams, and his own junta here in Hongkong, and nothing of

moment has occurred which would lead anyone to believe that he

was not carrying out to the letter the promises made to me in

this consulate. The insurgents are fighting for freedom from

the Spanish rule, and rely upon the well-known sense of

justice that controls all the actions of our Government as to

their future."

{595}

In reply to Consul Pratt's report of his interviews with

General Aguinaldo, and of his proceedings in connection with

the departure of that personage from Singapore to Hongkong,

the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Day, wrote, June 16,

as follows: "The Department observes that you informed General

Aguinaldo that you had no authority to speak for the United

States; and, in the absence of the fuller report which you

promise, it is assumed that you did not attempt to commit this

Government to any alliance with the Philippine insurgents. To

obtain the unconditional personal assistance of General

Aguinaldo in the expedition to Manila was proper, if in so

doing he was not induced to form hopes which it might not be

practicable to gratify. This Government has known the

Philippine insurgents only as discontented and rebellious

subjects of Spain, and is not acquainted with their purposes.

While their contest with that power has been a matter of

public notoriety, they have neither asked nor received from

this Government any recognition. The United States, in

entering upon the occupation of the islands, as the result of

its military operations in that quarter, will do so in the

exercise of the rights which the state of war confers, and

will expect from the inhabitants, without regard to their

former attitude toward the Spanish Government, that obedience

which will be lawfully due from them. If, in the course of

your conferences with General Aguinaldo, you acted upon the

assumption that this government would cooperate with him for

the furtherance of any plan of his own, or that, in accepting

his cooperation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize

any political claims which he may put forward, your action was

unauthorized and cannot be approved."

_Treaty of Peace, and Accompanying Papers

(55th Congress, 3d Session, Senate Document Number 62,

part 2, pages 337-354)._

See, also (in this volume),

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1806-1808.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April-June).

The War with Spain.

Movements or the Spanish squadron under Admiral Cervera,

and the blockading of it in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba.

Lieutenant Hobson's exploit.

The sinking of the collier "Merrimac" in the channel.

The opening of hostilities found a Spanish squadron of four

armored cruisers (the "Cristobal Colon," the "Almirante

Oquendo," the "Vizcaya," and the "Infanta Maria Teresa,") with

three torpedo-boat destroyers (the "Pluton," "Furor" and

"Terror") and some lighter craft, assembled at the Cape Verde

islands, under Rear-Admiral Pascual Cervera. They were in

Portuguese waters, and Portugal, though friendly to Spain, was

forced to issue a proclamation of neutrality, on the 20th of

April, which required the Spanish fleet to depart. Some of the

vessels then returned to Spain; but the seven named above

sailed westward, and their destination became a mystery, very

exciting for some time to the American mind. They might

attempt to surprise some American coast city; they might

intercept the battle-ship "Oregon," then making her way from

the Pacific coast, by the long circuit around Cape Horn; they

might have some plan for breaking the Cuban blockade. Acting

on the latter conjecture, and surmising that Porto Rico would

be chosen for the Spanish naval base, Admiral Sampson moved in

that direction to seek them. He attacked the forts at San Juan

(May 12), and satisfied himself that no fleet was in the bay.

The truth was that Cervera was then just entering the

Caribbean Sea, considerably to the south of Sampson's search.

He touched at the French island of Martinique, and at the

Dutch island of Curaçoa, and then slipped across to Santiago

de Cuba, where he was to be overtaken by his fate. In the long

hill-sheltered bay, with a narrow entrance, which forms this

excellent Cuban harbor, the Spanish fleet was so hidden that

nearly a fortnight passed before its whereabouts could be

fully ascertained. It was not until May 20 that a blockade of

Santiago was established by a flying squadron of the American

fleet, under Commodore Schley, with certainty that the

squadron of Cervera was harbored there. On the 1st of June,

Admiral Sampson arrived on the scene, with a stronger naval

force, and took command. To attempt to force the narrow

entrance of the harbor, strongly fortified and thickly mined

as it was, and attack the Spanish fleet in the bay, was not

deemed practicable. The course resolved upon was to hold the

enemy fast in the shelter he had sought, until Santiago could

be taken, by a land attack. In pursuance of this plan, an

exploit of splendid daring was performed, in the early morning

of June 3, by a young officer, Lieutenant Richmond Pearson

Hobson, with a crew of seven volunteers, who placed and sank a

huge coaling ship, the "Merrimac," in the channel that leads

into Santiago Bay. The following is Admiral Sampson's report

of the undertaking and its achievement:

"Before coming here, I decided to make the harbor entrance

secure against the possibility of egress of the Spanish ships

by obstructing the narrow part of the entrance by sinking a

collier at that point. Upon calling upon Mr. Hobson for his

professional opinion as to a sure method of sinking the ship,

he manifested a most lively interest in the problem. After

several days' consideration he presented a solution which he

considered would insure the immediate sinking of the ship when

she had reached the desired point in the channel. This plan we

prepared for before we reached Santiago. This plan included

ten electric torpedoes on the outside of the ship, each of 78

pounds of gunpowder, sinking the ship partially before going

in, cutting the sea valves, and opening the cargo ports. The

plan contemplated a crew of only seven men and Mr. Hobson, who

begged that it might be intrusted to him. The anchor chains

were ranged upon deck for both the anchors, forward and aft,

the plan including the anchoring of the ship almost

automatically. As soon as I reached Santiago and had the

collier to work upon the details were commenced and diligently

prosecuted, hoping to complete them in one day, as the moon

and tide served best the first night after our arrival.

Notwithstanding every effort, the hour of 4 o'clock in the

morning arrived and the preparations were scarcely completed.

After a careful inspection of the final preparations I was

forced to relinquish the plan for that morning, as dawn was

breaking. Mr. Hobson begged to try it at all hazards.

"This morning proved more propitious, as a prompt start could

be made. Nothing could have been more gallantly executed. We

waited impatiently after the firing by the Spaniards had

ceased. When they did not reappear from the harbor at 6

o'clock I feared they had all perished. A steam launch, which

had been sent in charge of Naval Cadet Powell to rescue the

men, appeared at this time, coming out under a persistent fire

from the batteries, but brought none of the crew. A careful

inspection of the harbor from this ship showed that the

'Merrimac' had been sunk in the channel somewhat farther in

than had been intended.

{596}

This afternoon the chief of staff of Admiral Cervera came out

under a flag of truce with a letter from the Admiral extolling

the bravery of the crew in an unusual manner. I can not myself

too earnestly express my appreciation of the conduct of Mr.

Hobson and his gallant crew. I venture to say that a more

brave and daring thing has not been done since Cushing blew up

the 'Albemarle.'" The sunken ship did not actually block the

channel; but that fact takes nothing from the gallantry of the

exploit. Why the intended spot in the channel was missed was

explained by Lieutenant Hobson in a statement which he

afterwards made: "When the 'Merrimac' poked her nose into the

channel," says the Lieutenant, "our troubles commenced. The

deadly silence was broken by the swash of a small boat

approaching us from the shore. I made her out to be a picket

boat. She ran close up under the stern of the 'Merrimac' and

fired several shots from what seemed to be 3 pounder guns. The

'Merrimac's' rudder was carried away by this fire. That is why

the collier was not sunk across the channel. We did not discover

the loss of the rudder until Murphy [the volunteer assigned to

that duty] had cast anchor. We then found that the 'Merrimac'

would not answer to the helm and were compelled to make the

best of the situation. … Submarine mines and torpedoes were

exploded all around us, adding to the excitement. The mines

did no damage, although we could hear the rumbling and feel

the ship tremble. We were running without lights, and only the

darkness saved us from utter destruction. When the ship was in

the desired position and we found that the rudder was gone, I

called the men on deck. While they were launching the

catamaran I touched off the explosives. At the same time two

torpedoes, fired by the 'Reina Mercedes,' struck the

'Merrimac' amidships. I can not say whether our own explosives

or the Spanish torpedoes did the work, but the 'Merrimac' was

lifted out of the water, and almost rent asunder."

What followed, in the experience of the crew, when their

vessel went down, is described as follows by Lieutenant

Hobson, in a narrative of "The Sinking of the Merrimac," which

he published at a later day: "The stricken vessel now reeled

to port. Some one said: 'She is going to turn over on us,

sir,' to which I replied: 'No; she will right herself in

sinking, and we shall be the last spot to go under.' The

firing suddenly ceased. The vessel lowered her head like a

faithful animal, proudly aware of its sacrifice, bowed below

the surface, and plunged forward. The stern rose and heeled

heavily; it stood for a moment, shuddering, then started

downward, righting as it went. A great rush of water came up

the gangway, seething and gurgling out of the deck. The mass

was whirling from right to left 'against the sun'; it seized

us and threw us against the bulwarks, then over the rail. Two

were swept forward as if by a momentary recession, and one was

carried down into a coal-bunker—luckless Kelly. In a moment,

however, with increased force, the water shot him up out of

the same hole and swept him among us. The bulwarks

disappeared. A sweeping vortex whirled above. We charged about

with casks, cans, and spars, the incomplete stripping having

left quantities on the deck. The life-preservers stood us in

good stead, preventing chests from being crushed, as well as

buoying us on the surface; for spars came end on like

battering-rams, and the sharp corners of tin cans struck us

heavily. … When we looked for the life-boat we found that it

had been carried away. The catamaran was the largest piece of

floating debris; we assembled about it. The line suspending it

from the cargo-boom held and anchored us to the ship, though

barely long enough to reach the surface, causing the raft to

turn over and set us scrambling as the line came taut.

"The firing had ceased. It was evident the enemy had not seen

us in the general mass of moving objects; but soon the tide

began to drift these away, and we were being left alone with

the catamaran. The men were directed to cling close in, bodies

below and only heads out, close under the edges, and were

directed not to speak above a whisper, for the destroyer was

near at hand, and boats were passing near. We mustered; all

were present, and direction was given to remain as we were

till further orders, for I was sure that in due time after

daylight a responsible officer would come out to reconnoiter.

It was evident that we could not swim against the tide to

reach the entrance. Moreover, the shores were lined with

troops, and the small boats were looking for victims that

might escape from the vessel. The only chance lay in remaining

undiscovered until the coming of the reconnoitering boat, to

which, perhaps, we might surrender without being fired on. …

The air was chilly and the water positively cold. In less than

five minutes our teeth were chattering; so loud, indeed, did

they chatter that it seemed the destroyer or the boats would

hear. … We remained there probably an hour."

At daylight a steam launch approached, and was hailed by

Lieutenant Hobson, who judged that there must be officers on

board to whom it would be safe to surrender. He was more than

right. The commander of the launch was Admiral Cervera, in

person, who took the nearly exhausted men from the water and

treated them with great kindness, admiring the bravery of

their exploit, and sending a flag of truce to Admiral Sampson

to announce their safety. They were taken aboard the 'Reina

Mercedes,' and, as prisoners of war, were confined at first in

Morro Castle, and afterwards in the city. It so happened that

they were locked in the Morro during a bombardment of the

Spanish coast defences and fleet by ten of our vessels on June

6th, when about 1,500 projectiles were fired; and much anxiety

and indignation were expressed in this country in view of that

circumstance; but Mr. Ramsden, British consul at Santiago,

explained in a despatch that they were removed as soon as

lodgings could be prepared in the barracks—actually on June

7th. They were released on July 6th in exchange for prisoners

captured by our forces.

{597}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April-July).

War with Spain,

Destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay.

Despatches of Admiral Dewey.

His relations with Aguinaldo, the insurgent chief.

Arrival of American troops for the occupation of the city.

Commodore George Dewey, commanding the Asiatic Squadron, then

awaiting orders at Hongkong, received on the 25th of April the

following despatch by cable from the Secretary of the Navy: "War

has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at

once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once,

particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture

vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors." On the sixth day

after receiving these orders (namely on May 1st), he was able

to report from Manila, by a telegram sent from Hongkong on the

7th: "The squadron arrived at Manila at daybreak this morning.

Immediately engaged enemy and destroyed the following Spanish

vessels: 'Reina Christina,' 'Castillia,' 'Don Antonio de

Biloa,' 'Don Juan de Austria,' 'Isla de Luzon,' 'Isla de

Cuba,' 'General Lezo,' 'Marques del Duaro,' 'El Curreo,'

'Velasco,' one transport, 'Isla de Mandano,' water battery at

Cavite. I shall destroy Cavite arsenal dispensatory. The

squadron is uninjured. Few men were slightly wounded. I

request the Department will send immediately from San

Francisco fast steamer with ammunition. The only means of

telegraphing is to the American consul at Hongkong."

In due time the post brought particulars of the action, in the

following report from Commodore Dewey, dated May 4: "The

squadron left Mirs Bay, [China] on April 27, immediately on

the arrival of Mr. O. F. Williams, United States consul at

Manila, who brought important information and who accompanies

the squadron. Arrived off Bolinao on the morning of April 30

and, finding no vessels there, proceeded down the coast and

arrived off the entrance to Manila Bay on the same afternoon.

The 'Boston' and 'Concord' were sent to reconnoiter Port

Subic, I having been informed that the enemy intended to take

position there. A thorough search of the port was made by the

'Boston' and 'Concord,' but the Spanish fleet was not found,

although, from a letter afterwards found in the arsenal (

inclosed with translation), it appears that it had been their

intention to go there. Entered the Boca Grande, or south

channel, at 11.30 p. m., steaming in column at distance at 8

knots. After half the squadron had passed, a battery on the

south side of the channel opened fire, none of the shots

taking effect. The 'Boston' and 'McCulloch' returned the fire.

The squadron proceeded across the bay at slow speed, and

arrived off Manila at daybreak, and was fired upon at 5.15 a.

m. by three batteries at Manila and two at Cavite and by the

Spanish fleet anchored in an approximately east and west line

across the mouth of Bakor Bay, with their left in shoal water

in Canacao Bay. The squadron then proceeded to the attack, the

flagship 'Olympia,' under my personal direction, leading,

followed at distance by the 'Baltimore,' 'Raleigh,' 'Petrel,'

'Concord,' and 'Boston,' in the order named, which formation

was maintained throughout the action. The squadron opened fire

at 5.41 a. m. While advancing to the attack, two mines were

exploded ahead of the flagship, too far to be effective. The

squadron maintained a continuous and precise fire at ranges

varying from 5,000 to 2,000 yards, countermarching in a line

approximately parallel to that of the Spanish fleet. The

enemy's fire was vigorous, but generally ineffective.

"Early in the engagement two launches put out toward the

'Olympia' with the apparent intention of using torpedoes. One

was sunk and the other disabled by our fire and beached before

an opportunity occurred to fire torpedoes. At 7 a. m. the Spanish

flagship 'Reina Christina' made a desperate attempt to leave

the line and come out to engage at short range, but was

received with such galling fire, the entire battery of the

'Olympia' being concentrated upon her, that she was barely

able to return to the shelter of the point. The fires started

in her by our shell at this time were not extinguished until

she sank. At 7.35 a. m., it having been erroneously reported

to me that only 15 rounds per gun remained for the 5-inch

rapid-fire battery, I ceased firing and withdrew the squadron

for consultation and a redistribution of ammunition, if

necessary. The three batteries at Manila had kept up a

continuous fire from the beginning of the engagement, which

fire was not returned by this squadron. The first of these

batteries was situated on the south mole head at the entrance

to the Pasig River, the second on the south bastion of the

walled city of Manila, and the third at Malate, about one-ha]f

mile farther south. At this point I sent a message to the

Governor-General to the effect that if the batteries did not

cease firing the city would be shelled. This had the effect of

silencing them.

"At 11.16 a. m., finding that the report of scarcity of

ammunition was incorrect, I returned with the squadron to the

attack. By this time the flagship and almost the entire

Spanish fleet were in flames, and at 12.30 p. m. the squadron

ceased firing, the batteries being silenced and the ships

sunk, burnt, and deserted. At 12.40 p. m. the squadron

returned and anchored off Manila, the 'Petrel' being left

behind to complete the destruction of the smaller gunboats,

which were behind the point of Cavite. This duty was performed

by Commander E. P. Wood in the most expeditious and complete

manner possible. The Spanish lost the following vessels:

Sunk—'Reina Christina,' 'Castillia,' 'Don Antonio de Ulloa.'

Burnt—'Don Juan de Austria,' 'Isla de Luzon,' 'Isla de Cuba,'

'General Lezo,' 'Marques del Duaro,' 'El Correo,' 'Velasco,'

and 'Isla Mindanao,' (transport). Captured—'Rapido,' and

'Hercules' (tugs), and several small launches. I am unable to

obtain complete accounts of the enemy's killed and wounded,

but believe their loss to be very heavy. The 'Reina Christina'

alone had 150 killed, including the captain, and 90 wounded.

"I am happy to report that the damage done to the squadron

under my command was inconsiderable. There were none killed,

and only 7 men in the squadron very slightly wounded. As will

be seen by the reports of the commanding officers which are

herewith inclosed, several of the vessels were struck and even

penetrated, but the damage was of the slightest, and the

squadron is in as good condition now as before the battle. I

beg to state to the Department that I doubt if any commander

in chief, under similar circumstances, was ever served by more

loyal, efficient, and gallant captains than those of the

squadron now under my command. … On May 2, the day following

the engagement, the squadron again went to Cavite, where it

remains. A landing party was sent to destroy the guns and

magazines of the batteries there. … On the 3d the military

forces evacuated the Cavite Arsenal, which was taken

possession of by a landing party."

{598}

Promptly in response to this report of his victory, a joint

resolution of thanks to Commodore Dewey and his officers and

men, by the two Houses of Congress, was despatched to them,

with announcement to the former of his promotion to the rank

of rear-admiral. The admiral replied, on the 13th, from

Cavite, making due acknowledgments, and adding: "I am

maintaining strict blockade of Manila by sea, and believe

rebels are hemming in by land, although they are inactive and

making no demonstrations. Great scarcity of provisions in the

city. I believe the Spanish Governor-General will be obliged

to surrender soon. I can take Manila at any moment. To retain

possession and thus control Philippine Islands would require,

in my best judgment, a well equipped force of 5,000 men."

On the 20th he reported, further: "Aguinaldo, the rebel

commander in chief, was brought down by the 'McCulloch' [from

Hongkong]. Organizing forces near Cavite and may render

assistance that will be valuable." On the 27th of June, in

reply to inquiries from the Navy Department, he explained his

relations with Aguinaldo, as follows: "Aguinaldo, insurgent

leader, with thirteen of his staff, arrived May 19, by

permission, on 'Nanshan.' Established self Cavite, outside

arsenal, under the protection of our guns, and organized his

army. I have had several conferences with him, generally of a

personal nature. Consistently I have refrained from assisting

him in any way with the force under my command, and on several

occasions I have declined requests that I should do so,

telling him the squadron could not act until the arrival of

the United States troops. At the same time I have given him to

understand that I consider insurgents as friends, being

opposed to a common enemy. He has gone to attend a meeting of

insurgent leaders for the purpose of forming a civil

government. Aguinaldo has acted independently of the squadron,

but has kept me advised of his progress, which has been

wonderful. I have allowed to pass by water recruits, arms, and

ammunition, and to take such Spanish arms and ammunition from

the arsenal as he needed. Have advised frequently to conduct

the war humanely, which he has done invariably. My relations

with him are cordial, but I am not in his confidence. The

United States has not been bound in any way to assist

insurgents by any act or promises, and he is not, to my

knowledge, committed to assist us. I believe he expects to

capture Manila without my assistance, but doubt ability, they

not yet having many guns. In my opinion these people are far

superior in their intelligence and more capable of

self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar

with both races."

_Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1898,

volume 2, pages 67-72 and 103._

On the 30th of June, troops sent from San Francisco, to the

number of 2,500 officers and men, commanded by General T. M.

Anderson, arrived in Manila Bay, to co-operate with the navy

in taking Manila and occupying the city, when taken. They were

followed by a second expeditionary force, under General F. V.

Greene, which arrived July 17, and by a third, July 25 and 31,

with which came General Merritt, commanding the corps and the

Department of the Pacific. General Merritt's army then

numbered nearly 11,000 men, and it was increased during the

next few weeks to more than 15,000.

_Reports of the War Department, 1898,

volume 1, part 2, page 499._

An English officer, Major Younghusband, who visited Manila at

this time, remarked: "It may, perhaps, with some confidence be

prophesied that when the cold fit, which will in due course

follow the warmth of the present enthusiasm, falls on the

nation, America will discover that the true parting of the

ways was … in having allowed Admiral Dewey to do more than

defeat the Spanish fleet and exact a heavy indemnity from the

city of Manila before sailing away." It would seem to be more

true, however, to say that the parting of the ways was when a

military expedition was sent from San Francisco to Manila, to

be landed, for the capture of the city and for the occupation

of the islands. It is claimed with reason that Admiral Dewey

could not "sail away," after the destruction of the Spanish

ships, because he needed the harbor he had seized, his fleet

having lost most of the privileges it had formerly been using

in neutral ports, when it became the fleet of a belligerent

power. To retain possession of Manila Bay while it was needed

by the American fleet was clearly a measure connected

legitimately with the general conduct of the war against

Spain. But it is difficult to see that the landing of soldiers

on the island of Luzon and the capture of the city of Manila

added anything to the security with which the Bay was held for

the purposes of Admiral Dewey's fleet, or that it contributed

at all to the weakening of Spain in the war, and to the rescue

of Cuba from Spanish misrule. For two months, from the first

day of May until the last day of June, before a soldier

arrived, and for six weeks longer, before Manila surrendered,

Admiral Dewey appears to have been as fully and as

conveniently in possession of all the advantages that

harborage there could give him, as he was after the Spanish

flag had been lowered in the city and on the island.

Therefore, the American conquest of the Philippines does not

readily connect itself with the war for the liberation of

Cuba, as a necessary part of it, but presents itself to the

mind as a somewhat supplementary enterprise, undertaken with

objects of its own.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (May-August).

Conduct of English and German naval officers at Manila.

While Admiral Dewey was holding Manila Bay, before the taking

of the city, there were many rumors and exciting stories

afloat, of offensive behavior towards the American fleet by

commanders of German war ships that were sent to the scene. As

far as possible, the facts were officially suppressed, in

order to avoid a quarrel between the two countries, and no

authoritative account of what occurred can be found. But some

incidents obtained publicity which are probably true in the

main. The first unpleasant happening appears to have been the

arrival in Manila Bay of a German naval vessel, which steamed

in with entire disregard of the blockading fleet, as though

the port was its own. Thereupon Admiral Dewey sent a forcible

reminder to the captain that he was intruding upon a blockade,

by firing a shot across his bow, and ordering him to heave to.

The German captain, in a rage, is said to have called on the

commanding officer of a British squadron that was in the Bay,

for advice as to what he should do, and was told that he owed

the American Admiral an apology for his violation of naval

etiquette, well settled for such circumstances as those

existing in Manila Bay. According to the story, the British

commander, Captain Sir Edward Chichester, himself on the best

of terms with Admiral Dewey, visited the latter, on behalf of

the German officer, and made the matter smooth.

{599}

But, either through indiscretion of his own, or because he had

instructions to interfere as much as possible with the

proceedings of the Americans, the German commander continued

to pursue an offensive course. According to report, be went so

far as to stop a movement which Aguinaldo (then a recognized

ally of the United States) was making, to take possession of a

certain island, and to capture some Spaniards who were on it.

This provoked Admiral Dewey to a demonstration against him so

threatening that he drew back in haste, and the island was

occupied.

According to all accounts, Admiral Dewey showed unsurpassed

wisdom and dignity in meeting and checking these offensive

proceedings without allowing them to become a cause of

international quarrel; and he was happily aided in doing so by

the hearty support of the British naval commander. According

to still another report of the time, a German admiral, who had

come upon the scene, meditated an interference to forbid the

bombarding of Manila, when the city was about to be attacked,

and, calling upon Sir Edward Chichester to ascertain what

action the latter would take, was significantly told, "That is

only known to Admiral Dewey and myself,"—which convinced him

that his project was not wise. An English writer has related,

with much satisfaction, that when Sir Edward's ship, the

"Immortalité," finally steamed out of Manila Bay, returning to

Hong Kong, "every ship in the American fleet manned her yards

and gave the British man-of-war three cheers as she passed

along; and she with the answering signal, 'thank you,' flying

at her mast-head, went on her way."

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (June).

Act creating the United States Industrial Commission.

An Act "authorizing the appointment of a non-partisan

Commission to collate information and to consider and

recommend legislation to meet the problems presented by labor,

agriculture, and capital," was passed by Congress and approved

by the President June 18, 1898. It provided:

"That a commission is hereby created, to be called the

'Industrial Commission,' to be composed as follows. Five

members of the Senate, to be appointed by the presiding

officer thereof; five members of the House of Representatives,

to be appointed by the Speaker, and nine other persons, who shall

fairly represent the different industries and employments, to

be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and

consent of the Senate. … That it shall be the duty of this

commission to investigate questions pertaining to immigration,

to labor, to agriculture, to manufacturing, and to business,

and to report to Congress and to suggest such legislation as

it may deem best upon these subjects. … That it shall furnish

such information and suggest such laws as may be made a basis

for uniform legislation by the various States of the Union, in

order to harmonize conflicting interests and to be equitable

to the laborer, the employer, the producer, and the consumer.

… That the commission shall give reasonable time for hearings,

if deemed necessary, and if necessary it may appoint a

subcommission or subcommissions of its own members to make

investigation in any part of the United States, and it shall

be allowed actual necessary expenses for the same. It shall

have the authority to send for persons and papers and to

administer oaths and affirmations. … That it may report from

time to time to the Congress of the United States, and shall

at the conclusion of its labors submit a final report."

The Commission thus contemplated was duly appointed by the

President, and organized by the election of Senator Kyle for

its chairman. For the scope and plan of its investigations a

committee on procedure made the following recommendations,

which were adopted by the Commission and which have been

followed in what it has done:

"The main work of the Commission may … be said to be to study

and compare existing laws bearing upon industrial conditions,

here and elsewhere, to ascertain by competent testimony

wherein they are deficient, defective, inoperative, or

oppressive, and to recommend such remedial statutes as will

tend not only to make the conditions of industry more uniform

as between the several States, but to remove such existing

sources or causes of discontent, inequality, and injustice as

can be reached and regulated through legislation. … In order

to secure satisfactory results, it appears to your committee

imperatively necessary that the work shall be confined

strictly to the main purpose, viz, of ascertaining the nature

and effects of existing legislation, and the nature of

remedial legislation which may be necessary or desirable to

equalize conditions in industry and to remove any just grounds

of complaint on the part of either labor or capital or of the

people at large.

"To facilitate the progress of the work we recommend the

division of the Commission into four subcommissions of five

members each, to be severally charged with the investigation

of present conditions and the formulation of remedial

suggestions in the following branches of industry:

1. On agriculture and agricultural labor.

2. On the conditions of labor and capital employed in

manufacturing and general business.

3. On the conditions of labor and capital employed in mining.

4. On transportation.

In addition, we recommend a fifth subcommission, to be known

as the subcommission on statistics, in the membership of which

there shall be one representative of each of the above

subcommissions. …

"The committee also suggests that there are certain subjects

of inquiry which appertain equally to all the groups into

which it has recommended that the Commission be segregated.

The subjects of immigration, of education, of combinations and

trusts, and of taxation at once suggest themselves as

belonging in this category. It is therefore recommended that

these subjects, one or more of them, be examined into by the

full Commission pending the organization of the several

subcommissions."

The subject to which the Commission gave earliest attention

was that of "Trusts and Industrial Combinations," on which it

submitted a preliminary report on the 1st of March, 1900.

See (in this volume)

TRUSTS.

{600}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (June).

Act providing for the arbitration of disputes between

employers and employees in inter-state commerce.

The following are the main sections of a very important Act of

Congress, approved June 1, 1898, which provides for the

arbitration of disputes between railway and other employees

engaged in interstate commerce and the companies or

individuals employing them:

"That the provisions of this Act shall apply to any common

carrier or carriers and their officers, agents, and employees,

except masters of vessels and seamen, … engaged in the

transportation of passengers or property wholly by railroad,

or partly by railroad and partly by water, for a continuous

carriage or shipment, from one State or Territory of the

United States or the District of Columbia, to any other State

or Territory of the United States, or the District of

Columbia, or from any place in the United States to an

adjacent foreign country, or from any place in the United

States through a foreign country to any other place in the

United States. …

"Section 2. That whenever a controversy concerning wages,

hours of labor, or conditions of employment shall arise

between a carrier subject to this Act and the employees of

such carrier, seriously interrupting or threatening to

interrupt the business of said carrier, the chairman of the

Interstate Commerce Commission and the Commissioner of Labor

shall, upon the request of either party to the controversy,

with all practicable expedition, put themselves in

communication with the parties to such controversy, and shall

use their best efforts, by mediation and conciliation, to

amicably settle the same; and if such efforts shall be

unsuccessful, shall at once endeavor to bring about an

arbitration of said controversy in accordance with the

provisions of this Act.

"Section 3. That whenever a controversy shall arise between a

carrier subject to this Act and the employees of such carrier

which can not be settled by mediation and conciliation in the

manner provided in the preceding section, said controversy may

be submitted to the arbitration of a board of three persons,

who shall be chosen in the manner following: One shall be

named by the carrier or employer directly interested; the

other shall be named by the labor organization to which the

employees directly interested belong, or, if they belong to

more than one, by that one of them which specially represents

employees of the same grade and class and engaged in services

of the same nature as said employees so directly interested:

Provided, however, That when a controversy involves and

affects the interests of two or more classes and grades of

employees belonging to different labor organizations, such

arbitrator shall be agreed upon and designated by the

concurrent action of all such labor organizations; and in

cases where the majority of such employees are not members of

any labor organization, said employees may by a majority vote

select a committee of their own number, which committee shall

have the right to select the arbitrator on behalf of said

employees. The two thus chosen shall select the third

commissioner of arbitration; but, in the event of their

failure to name such arbitrator within five days after their

first meeting, the third arbitrator shall be named by the

commissioners named in the preceding section. A majority of

said arbitrators shall be competent to make a valid and

binding award under the provisions hereof. The submission

shall be in writing, shall be signed by the employer and by

the labor organization representing the employees, shall

specify the time and place of meeting of said board of

arbitration, shall state the questions to be decided, and

shall contain appropriate provisions by which the respective

parties shall stipulate, as follows:

"First. That the board of arbitration shall commence their

hearings within ten days from the date of the appointment of

the third arbitrator, and shall find and file their award, as

provided in this section, within thirty days from the date of

the appointment of the third arbitrator; and that pending the

arbitration the status existing immediately prior to the

dispute shall not be changed: Provided, That no employee shall

be compelled to render personal service without his consent.

"Second. That the award and the papers and proceedings,

including the testimony relating thereto certified under the

hands of the arbitrators and which shall have the force and

effect of a bill of exceptions, shall be filed in the clerk's

office of the circuit court of the United States for the

district wherein the controversy arises or the arbitration is

entered into, and shall be final and conclusive upon both

parties, unless set aside for error of law apparent on the

record.

"Third. That the respective parties to the award will each

faithfully execute the same, and that the same may be

specifically enforced in equity so far as the powers of a

court of equity permit: Provided, That no injunction or other

legal process shall be issued which shall compel the

performance by any laborer against his will of a contract for

personal labor or service.

"Fourth. That employees dissatisfied with the award shall not

by reason of such dissatisfaction quit the service of the

employer before the expiration of three months from and after

the making of such award without giving thirty days' notice in

writing of their intention so to quit. Nor shall the employer

dissatisfied with such award dismiss any employee or employees

on account of such dissatisfaction before the expiration of three

months from and after the making of such award without giving

thirty days' notice in writing of his intention so to

discharge.

"Fifth. That said award shall continue in force as between the

parties thereto for the period of one year after the same

shall go into practical operation, and no new arbitration upon

the same subject between the same employer and the same class

of employees shall be had until the expiration of said one

year if the award is not set aside as provided in section

four. That as to individual employees not belonging to the

labor organization or organizations which shall enter into the

arbitration, the said arbitration and the award made therein

shall not be binding, unless the said individual employees

shall give assent in writing to become parties to said

arbitration. …

"Section 7. That during the pendency of arbitration under this

Act it shall not be lawful for the employer, party to such

arbitration, to discharge the employees, parties thereto,

except for inefficiency, violation of law, or neglect of duty;

nor for the organization representing such employees to order,

nor for the employees to unite in, aid, or abet, strikes

against said employer; nor, during a period of three months

after an award under such an arbitration, for such an employer

to discharge any such employees, except for the causes

aforesaid, without giving thirty days' written notice of an

intent so to discharge; nor for any of such employees, during

a like period, to quit the service of said employer without

just cause, without giving to said employer thirty days'

written notice of an intent so to do; nor for such

organization representing such employees to order, counsel, or

advise otherwise.

{601}

Any violation of this section shall subject the offending

party to liability for damages; Provided, that nothing herein

contained shall be construed to prevent any employer, party to

such arbitration, from reducing the number of its or his

employees whenever in its or his judgment business necessities

require such reduction. …

"Section 10. That any employer subject to the provisions of

this Act and any officer, agent, or receiver of such employer

who shall require any employee, or any person seeking

employment, as a condition of such employment, to enter into

an agreement, either written or verbal, not to become or

remain a member of any labor corporation, association, or

organization; or shall threaten any employee with loss of

employment, or shall unjustly discriminate against any

employee because of his membership in such a labor

corporation, association, or organization; or who shall

require any employee or any person seeking employment, as a

condition of such employment, to enter into a contract whereby

such employee or applicant for employment shall agree to

contribute to any fund for charitable, social or beneficial

purposes; to release such employer from legal liability for

any personal injury by reason of any benefit received from

such fund beyond the proportion of the benefit arising from

the employer's contribution to such fund; or who shall, after

having discharged an employee, attempt or conspire to prevent

such employee from obtaining employment, or who shall, after

the quitting of an employee, attempt or conspire to prevent

such employee from obtaining employment, is hereby declared to

be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof in

any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction in

the district in which such offense was committed, shall be

punished for each offense by a fine of not less than one

hundred dollars and not more than one thousand dollars."

_United States Statutes at Large,

volume 30, page 424._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (June).

The War with Spain.

Seizure of the island of Guam.

The following order, dated May 10, 1898, was addressed by the

Secretary of the Navy to the Commander of the U. S. S.

'Charleston':

"Upon the receipt of this order, which is forwarded by the

steamship 'City of Pekin' to you at Honolulu, you will proceed

with the 'Charleston' and 'City of Pekin' in company, to

Manila, Philippine Islands. On your way, you are hereby

directed to stop at the Spanish Island of Guam. You will use

such force as may be necessary to capture the port of Guam,

making prisoners of the governor and other officials and any

armed force that may be there. You will also destroy any

fortifications on said island and any Spanish naval vessels

that may be there, or in the immediate vicinity. These

operations at the Island of Guam should be very brief, and

should not occupy more than one or two days. Should you find

any coal at the Island of Guam, you will make such use of it

as you consider desirable. It is left to your discretion

whether or not you destroy it. From the Island of Guam,

proceed to Manila and report to Rear-Admiral George Dewey, U.

S. N., for duty in the squadron under his command."

In a despatch dated June 24, Captain Glass, of the

"Charleston," reported the execution of these orders as

follows: "I have the honor to report that in obedience to the

Department's telegraphic order of May 24, 1898, this ship

sailed from Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, on the 4th instant for

Manila with the transports 'City of Pekin,' 'Australia,' and

'City of Sydney' under convoy. When clear of land, I opened

the confidential order of May 10, 1898, and changed course for

the Island of Guam, next day informing Commander Gibson, in

charge of transports, and Brigadier-General Anderson,

commanding expeditionary force, of the change in my orders and

that the transports would accompany the 'Charleston.' Arriving

off the north end of the island at daylight, June 20, I first

visited the port of Agana, the capital of Guam, and of the

Mariana group, and finding no vessels there of any kind,

proceeded to San Luis D'Apra, where it was expected that a

Spanish gunboat and a military force would be found, a rumor

to that effect having reached me while at Honolulu. Arriving

off the port at 8.30 a. m., it was found that Fort Santiago,

on Oroté Point, was abandoned and in ruins, and I steamed

directly into the harbor, having ordered the transports to

take a safe position outside and await instructions. A few

shots were fired from the secondary battery at Fort Santa Cruz

to get the range and ascertain if it was occupied. Getting no

response, ceased firing and came to anchor in a position to

control the harbor, and it was then found that this fort also

was abandoned. The only vessel in port was a small Japanese

trading vessel from Yokohama. An officer had just shoved off

from the ship to board the Japanese vessel, and obtain

information as to the condition of affairs on shore, when a

boat was seen approaching the ship, through the reefs at the

head of the harbor, flying the Spanish flag and bringing two

officers, the captain of the port, a lieutenant-commander in

the Spanish navy, and the health officer, a surgeon of the

Spanish army. These officers came on board, and, in answer to

my questions, told me they did not know that war had been

declared between the United States and Spain, their last news

having been from Manila, under date of April 14. I informed

them that war existed and that they must consider themselves

as prisoners. As they stated that no resistance could be made

by the force on the island, I released them on parole for the

day, to proceed to Agana and inform the governor that I

desired him to come on board ship at once, they assuring me

that he would do so as soon as he could reach the port. While

awaiting the return of these officers, an examination was made

of the harbor, the only dangers to navigation were buoyed, and

the transports came in during the afternoon.

"At 5 p. m. the governor's secretary, a captain in the Spanish

army, came on board, bringing me a letter from the governor,

in which he stated that he was not allowed by law to go on

board a foreign vessel and requested me to meet him on shore

for a conference. This letter is appended, marked A. As it was

then too late to land a party, from the state of the tide on

the reef between the ship and the landing place, I directed

the secretary to return and say to the governor that I would

send an officer ashore with a communication for him early next

day.

{602}

… At 8.30 a. m. on June 21 Lieutenant William Braunersreuther

was sent ashore, under flag of truce, with a written demand

for the immediate surrender of the defenses of the Island of

Guam and all officials and persons in the military service of

Spain. Mr. Braunersreuther was directed to wait half an hour

only for a reply, to bring the governor and other officials on

board as prisoners of war in case of surrender, or in case of

refusal or delay beyond the time given, to return and take

command of the landing force, which he would find in

readiness, and proceed to Agaña. At 12.15 p. m. Mr.

Braunersreuther returned to the ship, bringing off the

governor and three other officers, his staff, and handed me a

letter from the governor acceding fully to my demand. Having

received the surrender of the Island of Guam, I took formal

possession at 2.45 p. m., hoisting the American flag on Fort

Santa Cruz and saluting it with 21 guns from the 'Charleston.'

From a personal examination of Fort Santa Cruz, I decided that

it was entirely useless as a defensive work, with no guns and

in a partly ruinous condition, and that it was not necessary

to expend any mines in blowing it up. The forts at Agaña, San

Luis D'Apra, and Umata are of no value and no guns remain in

the island except four small cast-iron guns of obsolete

pattern at Agaña, formerly used for saluting, but now

condemned as unsafe even for that purpose. No Spanish vessel

of war has visited Guam during the last eighteen months. No

coal was found on the island."

_Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1898,

volume 2, pages 151-3._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (June-July).

War with Spain.

Expedition of the army under General Shafter

against Santiago de Cuba.

Battles of El Caney and San Juan Hill.

To co-operate with the navy in operations for the capture of

Santiago de Cuba, and of the Spanish fleet blockaded in the

harbor of that town, orders were issued from Washington on the

31st of May, by Major-General Miles, Commanding the Army,

"with the approval of the Secretary of War," which directed

General Shafter, commanding the forces assembled at Tampa,

Florida, to place them on transports and proceed with them,

under convoy of the navy, to Santiago. Owing to an extreme

lack of both railway and harbor facilities at Tampa, an entire

week was consumed in the embarkation of the troops and

supplies. When on shipboard, the expedition was delayed

another week by false reports of the appearance of Spanish

cruisers on the Cuban coast, which seemed to the Washington

authorities to call for a stronger naval convoy to guard the

transport fleet. It was not until the 14th of June that the

fleet was permitted to sail, with 16,000 men. It arrived off

Guantanamo, near Santiago, on the morning of the 20th.

Meantime, the blockading fleet had bombarded the forts at

Santiago twice, on the 6th and on the 16th, and had silenced

them, for the time being, on both occasions, but apparently

with no permanent effect. With more success, two vessels from

the fleet had entered the harbor of Guantanamo on the 7th and

taken possession of the lower bay, where a marine battalion

was landed on the 10th and established in camp, to hold ground

until the army arrived. Meantime, also, communication with

General Garcia, commanding Cuban forces, had been opened, and

arrangements made, the results of which were subsequently

acknowledged by General Miles, in his annual report, as

follows:

"General Garcia regarded my requests as his orders, and

promptly took steps to execute the plan of operations. He sent

3,000 men to check any movement of the 12,000 Spaniards

stationed at Holguín. A portion of this latter force started

to the relief of the garrison at Santiago, but was

successfully checked and turned back by the Cuban forces under

General Feria. General Garcia also sent 2,000 men, under

Perez, to oppose the 6,000 Spaniards at Guantánamo, and they

were successful in their object. He also sent 1,000 men, under

General Ríos, against the 6,000 men at Manzanillo. Of this

garrison, 3,500 started to reenforce the garrison at Santiago,

and were engaged in no less than thirty combats with the

Cubans on their way before reaching Santiago. … With an

additional force of 5,000 men General Garcia besieged the

garrison of Santiago, taking up a strong position on the west

side and in close proximity to the harbor, and he afterwards

received General Shafter and Admiral Sampson at his camp near

that place. He had troops in the rear, as well as on both

sides of the garrison at Santiago before the arrival of our

troops."

_Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,

volume 1, part 2, page 16._

The troops from Tampa, under General Shafter, arriving on the

20th, were disembarked on the 22d, 23d and 24th, at Daiquiri,

and advanced to Siboney. The first resistance encountered was

at La Guasima, three miles from Siboney, on the Santiago road,

where the Spaniards were driven from strong entrenchments by a

part of Young's brigade of General Wheeler's cavalry division

(dismounted). The brigade thus first in the fighting was

composed of the 1st and 10th regiments of regular cavalry and

the 1st United States Volunteer cavalry, commonly called the

"Rough Riders." After the engagement at La Guasima, six days

were occupied in concentrating the army (including the Cuban

auxiliaries of General Garcia), mostly at Sevilla, a short

distance beyond La Guasima, on the same road, and in

overcoming great difficulties of transportation for supplies.

On June 30, General Shafter reconnoitered the country around

Santiago and made his plan of attack. "From a high hill," says

his subsequent report, "from which the city was in plain view,

I could see the San Juan Hill and the country about El Caney. The

roads were very poor, and, indeed, little better than

bridlepaths, until the San Juan River and El Caney were

reached. The position of El Caney, to the northeast of

Santiago, was of great importance to the enemy as holding the

Guantanamo road, as well as furnishing shelter for a strong

outpost that might be used to assail the right flank and rear

of any force operating against San Juan Hill. In view of this

I decided to begin the attack next day at El Caney with one

division, while sending two divisions on the direct road to

Santiago, passing by El Poso House, and, as a diversion, to

direct a small force against Aguadores from Siboney along the

railroad by the sea, with a view of attracting the attention

of the Spaniards in the latter direction and of preventing

them from attacking our left flank.

"During the afternoon I assembled the division commanders and

explained to them my general plan of battle. Lawton's division

[composed of Chaffee's, Miles' and Ludlow's brigades],

assisted by Capron's light battery, was ordered to move out

during the afternoon toward El Caney, to begin the attack

there early the next morning.

{603}

[Image: Map Illustrating the Santiago Campaign …]

{604}

After carrying El Caney, Lawton was to move by the Caney road

toward Santiago and take position on the right of the line.

Wheeler's division of dismounted cavalry [embracing Sumner's

brigade—3d, 6th and 9th regular cavalry, and Young's brigade

mentioned above] and Kent's division of infantry [Wikoft's,

Hawkins's and Pearson's brigades] were directed on the

Santiago road, the head of the column resting near El Poso,

toward which heights Grimes's battery moved on the afternoon

of the 30th, with orders to take position thereon early the

next morning and at the proper time prepare the way for the

advance of Wheeler and Kent on San Juan Hill. The attack at

this point was to be delayed until Lawton's guns were heard

at El Caney and his infantry fire showed he had become well

engaged.

"The remainder of the afternoon and night was devoted to

cutting out and repairing the roads and to other necessary

preparations for battle. These preparations were far from what

I desired them to be; but we were in a sickly climate; our

supplies had to be brought forward by a narrow wagon road,

which the rains might at any time render impassable; fear was

entertained that a storm might drive the vessels containing

our stores to sea, thus separating us from our base of

supplies; and lastly, it was reported that General Pando, with

8,000 reenforcements for the enemy, was en route from

Manzanillo and might be expected in a few days. Under those

conditions I determined to give battle without delay.

"Early on the morning of July 1, Lawton was in position around

El Caney, Chaffee's brigade [7th, 12th, and 13th U. S.

Infantry] on the right, across the Guantanamo road; Miles's

brigade [1st, 4th, and 25th U. S. Infantry] in the center, and

Ludlow's [8th and 22d U. S. Infantry and 2d Microcassettes

Volunteers] on the left. The duty of cutting off the enemy's

retreat along the Santiago road was assigned to the latter

brigade. The artillery opened on the town at 6.15 A. M. The

battle here soon became general and was hotly contested. The

enemy's position was naturally strong and was rendered more so

by blockhouses, a stone fort, and entrenchments cut in solid

rock, and the loopholing of a solidly built stone church. The

opposition offered by the enemy was greater than had been

anticipated, and prevented Lawton from joining the right of

the main line during the day, as had been intended.

"After the battle had continued for some time Bates's brigade

of two regiments (3d and 20th United States Infantry] reached

my headquarters from Siboney. I directed him to move near El

Caney, to give assistance, if necessary. He did so and was put

in position between Miles and Chaffee. The battle continued

with varying intensity during most of the day and until the

place was carried by assault, about 4.30 p. m. As the

Spaniards endeavored to retreat along the Santiago road,

Ludlow's position enabled him to do very effective work and to

practically cut off all retreat in that direction.

"After the battle at El Caney was well opened and the sound of

the small-arms fire caused us to believe that Lawton was

driving the enemy before him, I directed Grimes's battery to

open fire from the heights of El Poso on the San Juan'

blockhouse, which could be seen situated in the enemy's

entrenchments extending along the crest of San Juan Hill. This

fire was effective and the enemy could be seen running away

from the vicinity of the blockhouse. The artillery fire from

El Poso was soon returned by the enemy's artillery. They

evidently had the range of this hill, and their first shells

killed and wounded several men. As the Spaniards used

smokeless powder it was very difficult to locate the positions

of their pieces, while, on the contrary, the smoke caused by our

black powder plainly indicated the position of our battery.

"At this time the cavalry division [of General Wheeler] under

General Sumner (commanding temporarily in consequence of the

illness of General Wheeler, who returned to duty that day],

which was lying concealed in the general vicinity of the El

Poso House, was ordered forward, with directions to cross the

San Juan River and deploy to the right on the Santiago side,

while Kent's division was to follow closely in its rear and

deploy to the left. These troops moved forward in compliance

with orders, but the road was so narrow as to render it

impracticable to retain the column of fours formation at all

points, while the undergrowth on either side was so dense as

to preclude the possibility of deploying skirmishers. It

naturally resulted that the progress made was slow, and the

long range rifles of the enemy's infantry killed and wounded a

number of our men while marching along this road and before

there was any opportunity to return this fire. At this time

Generals Kent and Sumner were ordered to push forward with all

possible haste and place their troops in position to engage the

enemy. General Kent, with this end in view, forced the head of

his column alongside of the cavalry column as far as the

narrow trail permitted, and thus hurried his arrival at the

San Juan and the formation beyond that stream. A few hundred

yards before reaching the San Juan the road forks, a fact that

was discovered by Lieutenant-Colonel Derby, of my staff, who

had approached well to the front in a war balloon. This

information he furnished to the troops, resulting in Sumner

moving on the right-hand road, while Kent was enabled to

utilize the road to the left. … After crossing the stream, the

cavalry moved to the right with a view of connecting with

Lawton's left when he should come up, and with their left

resting near the Santiago road. In the meanwhile Kent's

division, with the exception of two regiments of Hawkins's

brigade, being thus uncovered, moved rapidly to the front from

the forks previously mentioned in the road, utilizing both

trails, but more especially the one to the left, and crossing

the creek formed for attack in the front of San Juan Hill."

_Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,

volume 1, part 2, page 147._

"The particulars of this gallant attack, which won the hill

and decided the fate of Santiago, are given with more

clearness in the report of General Kent, who commanded the

division which had most of the fighting to do, than in that of

General Shafter. Wikoff's 'heroic brigade,' writes General

Kent, 'consisting of the 13th, 9th, and 24th United States

Infantry, speedily crossed the stream and were quickly

deployed to the left of the lower ford.

{605}

While personally superintending this movement Colonel Wikoff

was killed, the command of the brigade then devolving upon

Lieutenant-Colonel Worth, 13th Infantry, who immediately fell

severely wounded, and then upon Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum,

24th Infantry, who, five minutes later, also fell under the

withering fire of the enemy. The command of the brigade then

devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel E. P. Ewers, 9th Infantry.

Meanwhile I had again sent a staff officer to hurry forward

the second brigade [Pearson's] which was bringing up the rear.

The 10th and 2d Infantry, soon arriving at the forks, were

deflected to the left to follow the Third Brigade [Wikoff's],

while the 21st was directed along the main road to support

Hawkins [whose brigade was composed of the 6th and 16th U. S.

Infantry and the 71st New York Volunteers].

"Crossing the lower ford a few minutes later, the 10th and 2d

moved forward in column in good order toward the green knoll …

on the left. Approaching the knoll the regiments deployed,

passed over the knoll, and ascended the high ridge beyond,

driving back the enemy in the direction of his trenches. I

observed this movement from the Fort San Juan Hill. … Prior to

this advance of the second brigade, the third, connecting with

Hawkins's gallant troops on the right, had moved toward Fort

San Juan, sweeping through a zone of most destructive fire,

scaling a steep and difficult hill, and assisting in capturing

the enemy's strong position (Fort San Juan) at 1.30 p. m. This

crest was about 125 feet above the general level and was

defended by deep trenches and a loopholed brick fort

surrounded by barbed-wire entanglements. General Hawkins, some

time after I reached the crest, reported that the 6th and 16th

Infantry had captured the hill, which I now consider

incorrect. Credit is almost equally due the 6th, 9th, 13th,

16th, and 24th regiments of infantry. … The Thirteenth

Infantry captured the enemy's colors waving over the fort, but

unfortunately destroyed them. …

"The greatest credit is due to the officers of my command,

whether company, battalion, regimental, or brigade commanders,

who so admirably directed the formation of their troops,

unavoidably intermixed in the dense thicket, and made the

desperate rush for the distant and strongly defended crest, I

have already mentioned the circumstances of my third brigade's

advance across the ford, where, in the brief space of ten

minutes, it lost its brave commander (killed) and the next two

ranking officers by disabling wounds; yet in spite of these

confusing conditions the formations were effected without

hesitation, although under a stinging fire, companies acting

singly in some instances and by battalions and regiments in

others, rushing through the jungle, across the stream, waist

deep, and over the wide bottom thickly set with barbed-wire

entanglements. …

"The enemy having retired to a second line of rifle pits, I

directed my line to hold their positions and intrench. At ten

minutes past 3 p. m. I received almost simultaneously two

requests—one from Colonel Wood, commanding a cavalry brigade,

and one from General Sumner—asking for assistance for the

cavalry on my right, 'as they were hard pressed.' I

immediately sent to their aid the 13th Infantry, who promptly

went on this further mission, despite the heavy losses they

had already sustained. Great credit is due to the gallant

officer and gentleman, Brigadier General H. S. Hawkins, who,

placing himself between the two regiments, leading his

brigade, the 6th and 16th Infantry, urged and led them by

voice and bugle calls to the attack so successfully

accomplished."

_Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,

volume 1, part 2, page 164._

The part borne by the dismounted cavalry division in the

capture of the Spanish intrenchments on San Juan Hill is

described as follows in the report of General Sumner,

temporarily in command:

"After crossing the creek with sufficient strength to hold it

and protect the crossing, I received verbal orders to move by

the right flank to connect with Lawton's left. During the

execution of this movement a balloon, under command of Colonel

Derby, came up the road, forcing open Wood's Brigade and

cutting it in two, thereby delaying the movement. The

artillery fire of the enemy opened upon the balloon and

continued for more than an hour, thereby subjecting part of my

command massed and the rest moving by the flank to long

shrapnel fire. Many officers and men were wounded here by

exploding shells and small arms' firing of the enemy. After

completing the deployment the command was so much committed to

battle that it became necessary either to advance or else

retreat under fire.

"Lieutenant Miley, representing General Shafter, authorized an

advance, which was ordered, Carroll's brigade taking the

advance, reinforced on the right by Roosevelt's regiment and

supported by the 1st and 10th Cavalry of Wood's Brigade. The

advance was made under heavy infantry fire through open flat

ground, cut up by wire fences, to the creek, dIstant about 600

yards. The advance was made in good order, the enemy's fire

being returned only under favorable opportunities. In crossing

the flat one officer (Captain O'Neil) and several men were

killed and several officers and men wounded. Both sides of the

creek are heavily wooded for about 200 yards. The creek was

swollen, and the crossing through this space and the creek was

made with great difficulty. After passing through the thick

woods the ground was entirely open and fenced by wire. From

this line it was necessary to storm the hill, upon the top of

which is a house loopholed, etc., for defense. The slope of

the hill is very difficult, but the assault was made with

great gallantry and with much loss to the enemy. In this

assault Colonel Hamilton, Lieutenants Smith and Shipp were

killed; Colonel Carroll, Lieutenants Thayer and Myer were

wounded. A number of casualties occurred among the enlisted

men. After taking this hill the front line advanced to take

the Fort San Juan Hill under fire from strong force of the

enemy in trenches and house known as 'Blockhouse.' … The

assault was successful, the line storming the trenches and

blockhouse with conspicuous gallantry and coolness, capturing

three prisoners, wounding and killing many of the enemy. …

Connected with my left, Hawkins's brigade of Kent's division

carried everything in front of it and captured the house and

hill known as 'Fort San Juan' proper."

_Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,

volume 1, part 2. page 370._

{606}

Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt, who commanded the Rough Riders

regiment that day, while Colonel Wood commanded the brigade,

tells the story of the fight, and what followed, very tersely,

in his report: "After crossing the river at the ford," says

the Lieutenant-Colonel, "we were moved along and up its light

bank under fire, and were held in reserve at a sunken road.

Here we lost a good many men, including Captain O'Neil,

killed, and Lieutenant Haskell, wounded. We then received your

order to advance and support the regular cavalry in the attack

on the intrenchments and blockhouses on the hills to the left.

The regiment was deployed on both sides of the road, and moved

forward until we came to the rearmost lines of the regulars.

We continued to move forward until I ordered a charge, and the

men rushed the blockhouse and rifle pits on the hill to the

right of our advance. They did the work in fine shape, though

suffering severely. The guidons of Troops E and G were first

planted on the summit, though the first men up were some A and

B troopers who were with me.

"We then opened fire on the intrenchments on a hill to our

left which some of the other regiments were assailing and

which they carried a few minutes later. Meanwhile we were

under a heavy rifle fire from the intrenchments along the

hills to our front, from whence they also shelled us with a

piece of field artillery until some of our marksmen silenced

it. When the men got their wind we charged again and carried

the second line of intrenchments with a rush. Swinging to the

left, we then drove the Spaniards over the brow of the chain

of hills fronting Santiago. By this time the regiments were

much mixed, and we were under a very heavy fire, both of

shrapnel and from rifles from the batteries, intrenchments,

and forts immediately in front of the city. On the extreme

front I now found myself in command with fragments of the six

cavalry regiments of the two brigades under me. The Spaniards

made one or two efforts to retake the line, but were promptly

driven back.

"Both General Sumner and you sent me word to hold the line at

all hazards, and that night we dug a line of intrenchments

across our front, using the captured Spaniards' intrenching

tools. We had nothing to eat except what we captured from the

Spaniards; but their dinners had fortunately been cooked, and

we ate them with relish, having been fighting all day. We had

no blankets and coats, and lay by the trenches all night. The

Spaniards attacked us once in the night, and at dawn they

opened a heavy artillery and rifle fire. Very great assistance

was rendered us by Lieutenant Parker's Gatling battery at

critical moments; he fought his guns at the extreme front of

the firing line in a way that repeatedly called forth the

cheers of my men. One of the Spanish batteries which was used

against us was directly in front of the hospital so that the

red cross flag flew over the battery, saving it from our fire

for a considerable period. The Spanish Mauser bullets made

clean wounds; but they also used a copper-jacketed or

brass-jacketed bullet which exploded, making very bad wounds

indeed.

"Since then we have continued to hold the ground; the food has

been short; and until today [July 4] we could not get our

blankets, coats, or shelter tents, while the men lay all day

under the fire from the Spanish batteries, intrenchments, and

guerrillas in trees, and worked all night in the trenches,

never even taking off their shoes. But they are in excellent

spirits, and ready and anxious to carry out any orders they

receive. At the end of the first day the eight troops were

commanded, two by captains, three by first lieutenants, two by

second lieutenants, and one by the sergeant whom you made

acting lieutenant. We went into the fight about 490 strong; 86

were killed or wounded, and there are about half a dozen

missing. The great heat prostrated nearly 40 men, some of them

among the best in the regiment."

_Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,

volume 1, part 2, page 684._

There have been much contradiction and controversy concerning

some of the orders by which the battle of San Juan was

directed. The following are the conclusions on that subject of

a civilian observer who seems to have seen and investigated

with impartiality:

"The orders under which the battle of San Juan was fought were

given by Adjutant-General McClernand to General Kent, commanding

the Infantry Division—consisting, in addition to the

organizations already mentioned (Wikoff's and Pearson's

brigades), of the First Brigade, including the Sixth and

Sixteenth United States Infantry and the Seventy-first New

York, under General Hawkins—at about nine o'clock in the

morning. There is no question fortunately as to the exact

wording of the orders. A little green knoll to the left of the

Santiago road and half a mile short of the San Juan Heights was

pointed out as the point which was to be the extreme limit of

the forward movement of the Infantry Division. Once there,

further orders would be given. The orders under which General

Sumner advanced from El Pozo would appear to have been more

specific, and certainly more clear than the orders which

General Kent received for the Infantry Division a few minutes

later. At the same time, it is true that these orders were

also based upon a complete misconception of the situation and

a total ignorance of the Spanish position and the lay of the

country beyond El Pozo. General Sumner's orders were to

advance along that branch of the Aguadores Creek which runs

parallel with the Santiago road from El Pozo, until it joins

the main stream of the Aguadores at the angle subsequently

known as the 'bloody angle,' where the creek makes a sharp

turn to the left, and then runs a general southerly course

toward the town of Aguadores and the sea. This creek General

Sumner was instructed to hold until the result of Lawton's

attack upon Caney became known, and he received further

orders. Once the creek was reached, Sumner, under the most

unfavorable circumstances of a heavy fire, and the thick and

pathless jungles which his men had to penetrate, deployed his

whole division, and then sent back word to McClernand, the

adjutant-general of the corps, acquainting him with the actual

conditions by which he was confronted, and asking whether his

orders contemplated an attack upon the enemy's intrenched

position, setting forth at the same time the utter

impossibility of keeping his men inactive for a long time

under such a heavy fire as was being poured in upon them.

{607}

"Had it been proposed to carry out the plan, as discussed and

agreed upon at General Shafter's headquarters the night

before, to advance along the right flank of the Spanish

position, keeping in touch with Lawton, obviously these two

divisions, or a large part of them, should have been directed

to take the direct road which ran north from El Pozo to

Marianaje and thence to El Caney, leaving in front of San Juan

only force sufficient to retain the Spaniards in their

position. But the divisions were ordered to proceed along the

Santiago road, and in a very few minutes came under fire. The

original plan may have been changed at the last moment, of

course; but as every movement that was subsequently made was

in the line of carrying this plan out, until finally, on the

12th, General Lawton succeeded in completely investing the

town on the north and west, this does not seem likely. The

more probable explanation of the movement and of what

followed, and the one accepted by general officers, is as

follows: That it was still intended to follow Lawton's advance

on the right, but that owing to our failure to develop the

Spanish position in our front, and our complete ignorance of

the lay of the land, the flank movement was not begun until

too late—not until the troops had been led into a position

from which they could be extricated only by wresting from the

Spaniards the block-houses and the trenches from which,

unexposed and unseen, they were delivering such a galling fire

upon our men, engaged in wandering aimlessly about in an

almost trackless tropical jungle. At this moment of great

confusion and uncertainty, when the road was choked with the

regiments of both the cavalry and infantry divisions, mutually

hindering one another in their struggles to advance, and

having to sustain a heavy and destructive fire which could not

be answered, an ordeal even for the veteran soldier; at this

moment, when something might still have been done to mislead

the enemy and cover our advance, the war balloon was sent up

directly behind our columns. This mistake betrayed the exact

location of our advance, and the Spanish fire became heavier

and better directed, and our losses more severe."

_S. Bonsal,

The Fight for Santiago,

chapter 6 (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company)._

The same writer gives a sickening account of the sufferings of

the wounded after the battle and the miserable failure of

provision for any kind of succor or care of them. "Of course:"

he says, "in view of the perilous situation which the two

divisions now occupied upon the crest of the hill, and the

great anxiety which was felt at headquarters for the safety of

the whole army, and the preparations which had to be made

against the expected night attack of the Spaniards to drive

our men back and retake their lost position, the search for

the dead and wounded this evening had to be confined to a very

limited area, and was only as thorough as the shortness of the

time for which men could be spared from the colors permitted.

The jungle and the great fields of long grass were not

searched, and thus many of the wounded were not discovered

until the following day; and quite a number, indeed, not until

the armistice was declared, on the third day after the battle,

when the men had time to ransack the hill-side and the valley

for the missing. And there were some—those who had the

strength when they fell to crawl through the cactus, the

Spanish bayonet, and all manner of prickly and trailing plants

into the deeper and more protected recesses of the jungle—who

were never discovered at all until days, many days, had

passed; and the gathering of the vultures told where some poor

fellow had died without care and without food, of his wounds

or from starvation. Of such an one, when his place of hiding

was discovered, there was, as a rule, only left a whitened

skeleton and pieces of the uniform he had worn. The last

resting place of not a few was never discovered at all.

"I believe I am giving a moderate estimate when I say that at

least one-third of the men wounded on July 1st received no

attention, and were not brought back to the division hospital

until the afternoon of Ju]y 3d. This night we knew nothing,

and had not even the slightest suspicion, of how numerous the

undiscovered wounded were. … Only about half of the wounded

men who were discovered this evening and been brought back to

the dressing station when the moon rose above the dark forest

line, and lit up the battlefield and the heights of San Juan

as clearly, and, indeed, more clearly than day, for there was

now not the dazzling force and the confusing mirage of the

pitiless sunlight to blind the sight. The majority of these

men had had their wounds dressed where they fell, or soon

after falling, with the first-aid bandages. There were very

few indeed to whom it had been possible to give any further

attention than this, as the regimental surgeons, for want of

transportation, had been unable to bring their medical chests,

and those who were best provided carried with them only small

pocket cases. …

"When the first-aid bandages were applied, the wounded man and

those who helped him were, as a rule, under fire, which made

any but the most summary methods of wound-dressing quite

impossible. Fortunately these bandages, so simple and

practical, lent themselves excellently well to this procedure.

The first thing the soldiers or the hospital attendants would

do when they came upon a wounded man was, in the case of a

wound in the body, to tear off his shirt, or in the case of a

wound in the leg, tear off his trousers, and then wrap around

the wound the first-aid bandage. The wound-dressers were

generally in such haste, and the wounded men usually so

helpless to assist in any way, and their shirts and trousers

so rotten from the drenching rains in which they had been worn

without change day or night, that the taking off of the clothing

was literally what I call it—tearing, and the garment came off

so rent as to be quite useless for further wear. Consequently

the soldiers were carried half-naked, or, if they had been

wounded in both the body and the lower limbs, as was so

frequently the case, entirely naked, to the army wagons and so

down to the hospital, where there was not a scrap of clothing

or bedding forthcoming to cover them with. These who were

stripped in this way during the daytime were baked and

blistered by the fierce sunlight, only to shiver with the

penetrating cold and dampness after the rain had ceased to

fall and when the chill night came on.

"Knowing that he was totally unprepared to clothe or cover the

wounded that would probably be brought in, the chief surgeon

of the corps issued an order, the evening before the battle,

that all wounded men should be brought in with their blankets,

halves of shelter-tents, and ponchos when possible. This was

certainly a step in the right direction, even if it was but a

frank confession by the authorities that no preparation had

been made by them for the emergency which it cannot be said

was suddenly thrust upon them, but which they might have

foreseen and should have been preparing against for many weeks

previous.

{608}

While the attending soldiers, realizing how serious for their

wounded comrades it would be to have to lie in the hospitals

uncovered to wind and weather, made great efforts to find

their packs, these efforts were not often successful, and a

great majority of the wounded reached the hospital half

naked, and had thereafter only the covering and the bedding

which their comrades and the hospital attendants were able to

'rustle' for them, and this was little enough and not seldom

nothing at all.

"Had this expedition been provided with a greater number of

surgeons and hospital attendants, had the ambulances been at

hand which we left in Tampa or upon the transports, ambulances

without which it is reasonable to suppose—at least we had

supposed—no civilized power would enter upon an aggressive

war, much less upon a campaign in which we had the advantage

of choosing both our own time and the field of operations, the

outrageous treatment which our wounded suffered, and the

barbarous scenes which we were called upon to witness upon

this and the following days would never have occurred."

_S. Bonsai,

The Fight for Santiago,

chapter 8 (New York: Doubleday, Page & Company)._

The troops which had carried San Juan Hill were intrenched,

that night, in the positions they had gained, and those which

had taken El Caney were brought into connection with them,

Lawton's division on their right and Bates's brigade on the

left. The battle was renewed by the Spaniards soon after

daylight on the morning of the 2d, and raged with more or less

fury throughout the day. That evening, about 10 o'clock, a

fierce attempt was made to break through the American lines,

but without success. Again, on the morning of the third, the

Spaniards reopened battle, but with less vigor than before.

General Shafter then sent the following letter to General

Toral, the Spanish commander: "I shall be obliged, unless you

surrender, to shell Santiago de Cuba. Please inform the

citizens of foreign countries, and all women and children,

that they should leave the city before 10 o'clock to-morrow

morning." In reply, General Toral wrote; "It is my duty to say

to you that this city will not surrender, and that I will

inform the foreign consuls and inhabitants of the contents of

your message." Several of the foreign consuls at Santiago then

came into the American lines and persuaded General Shafter to

delay the shelling of the town until noon of the 5th, provided

that the Spanish forces made no demonstration meantime against

his own. This established a truce which was renewed, in a

series of negotiations until the 10th. "I was of the opinion,"

reported General Shafter, "that the Spaniards would surrender

if given a little time, and I thought this result would be

hastened if the men of their army could be made to understand

they would be well treated as prisoners of war. Acting upon

this presumption I determined to offer to return all the

wounded Spanish officers at El Caney who were able to bear

transportation, and who were willing to give their paroles not

to serve against the forces of the United States until

regularly exchanged. This offer was made and accepted. These

officers, as well as several of the wounded Spanish privates,

27 in all, were sent to their lines under the escort of some

of our mounted cavalry. Our troops were received with honors,

and I have every reason to believe the return of the Spanish

prisoners produced a good impression on their comrades. The

cessation of firing about noon on the 3d practically

terminated the battle of Santiago." General Shafter goes on to

say that when the battle was fiercest, on July 1st, he probably

had no more than 12,000 men on the firing line, not counting a

few Cubans who assisted in the attack on El Caney, and who

fought with valor. They were confronted by about equal numbers

of the enemy, in strong and intrenched positions. "Our losses

in these battles were 22 officers and 208 men killed, and 81

officers and 1,203 men wounded; missing 79. The missing, with

few exceptions, reported later." Up to this time, General

Shafter had been unable to complete the investment of the town

with his own men, and had depended upon General Garcia with

his Cubans, placed on the extreme right of the American lines,

to watch for and intercept reinforcements. They failed to do

so, and 2,800 Spaniards, under General Escario, entered the

city on the night of the 2d. The American commander now

extended his own lines as rapidly as possible and completed

the investment of the town.

_Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,

volume 1, part 2, pages 155-157._

As stated above, permission was given on the 3d for

non-combatants to leave the city. "They did leave in the

following days to the number of perhaps 20,000, filling the

neighboring villages and roads with destitute people, mostly

women and children. It then seemed to fall to our lot to see

that these people did not starve in a desolate country, and to

be as much our duty to take care of these people, whom our

policy had driven from their homes, as it was for Spain to

feed the reconcentrados, whom they drove from their homes

under their war policy. The task was not insignificant."

_Report of Inspector-General

(Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,

volume 1, part 2, page 596)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July).

Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands.

See (in this volume)

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS: A. D. 1898.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July 1).

National Bankrupt Law.

After years of effort on the part of its advocates, a national

bankrupt law was enacted by both Houses of Congress and

received the President's signature on the 1st of July, 1898.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July 3).

Destruction of the Spanish squadron at Santiago.

On the morning of July 3, Admiral Cervera, convinced that

Santiago would be taken by the American forces, and acting

under orders from the Captain-General at Havana, made a

desperate attempt to save his squadron by escaping to sea. The

result was a total destruction of the Spanish ships, in an

engagement with the blockading fleet, of which Admiral Sampson

gave the following account in his official report:

"The enemy's vessels came out of the harbor between 9.35 and

10 a. m., the head of the column appearing around Cay Smith at

9.31 and emerging from the channel five or six minutes later.

The positions of the vessels of my command off Santiago at

that moment were as follows: The flagship 'New York' was 4

miles east of her blockading station and about 7 miles from

the harbor entrance. She had started for Siboney, where I

intended to land, accompanied by several of my staff, and go

to the front to consult with General Shafter.

{609}

A discussion of the situation and a more definite

understanding between us of the operations proposed had been

rendered necessary by the unexpectedly strong resistance of

the Spanish garrison of Santiago. I had sent my chief of staff

on shore the day before to arrange an interview with General

Shafter, who had been suffering from heat prostration. I made

arrangements to go to his headquarters, and my flagship was in

the position mentioned above when the Spanish squadron

appeared in the channel. The remaining vessels were in or near

their usual blockading positions, distributed in a semicircle

about the harbor entrance, counting from the eastward to the

westward, in the following order: The 'Indiana' about a mile

and a half from shore, the 'Oregon'—the 'New York's' place

being between these two—the 'Iowa,' 'Texas,' and 'Brooklyn,'

the latter two miles from the shore west of Santiago. The

distance of the vessels from the harbor entrance was from 2½

to 4 miles, the latter being the limit of day blockading

distance. The length of the arc formed by the ships was about

8 miles. The 'Massachusetts' had left at 4 a. m., for

Guantanamo for coal. Her station was between the 'Iowa' and

'Texas.' The auxiliaries 'Gloucester' and 'Vixen' lay close to

the land and nearer the harbor entrance than the large

vessels, the 'Gloucester' to the eastward and the 'Vixen' to

the westward. The torpedo boat 'Ericsson' was in company with

the flagship and remained with her during the chase until

ordered to discontinue, when she rendered very efficient

service in rescuing prisoners from the burning' Vizcaya.' …

"The Spanish vessels came rapidly out of the harbor, at a

speed estimated at from 8 to 10 knots, and in the following

order: 'Infanta Maria Teresa' (flagship), 'Vizcaya,'

'Cristobal Colon,' and the 'Almirante Oquendo.' The distance

between these ships was about 800 yards, which means that from

the time the first one became visible in the upper reach of

the channel until the last one was out of the harbor an

interval of only about 12 minutes elapsed. Following the

'Oquendo,' at a distance of about 1,200 yards, came the

torpedo-boat destroyer 'Pluton,' and after her the 'Furor.'

The armored cruisers, as rapidly as they could bring their

guns to bear, opened a vigorous fire upon the blockading

vessels, and emerged from the channel shrouded in the smoke

from their guns. The men of our ships in front of the port

were at Sunday 'quarters for inspection.' The signal was made

simultaneously from several vessels, 'Enemy ships escaping,'

and general quarters was sounded. The men cheered as they

sprang to their guns, and fire was opened probably within 8

minutes by the vessels whose guns commanded the entrance. The

'New York' turned about and steamed for the escaping fleet,

flying the signal, 'Close in towards harbor entrance and

attack vessels,' and gradually increasing speed, until toward

the end of the chase she was making 16½ knots, and was rapidly

closing on the 'Cristobal Colon.' She was not, at any time,

within the range of the heavy Spanish ships, and her only part

in the firing was to receive the undivided fire from the forts

in passing the harbor entrance, and to fire a few shots at one

of the destroyers, thought at the moment to be attempting to

escape from the 'Gloucester.'

"The Spanish vessels, upon clearing the harbor, turned to the

westward in column, increasing their speed to the full power

of their engines. The heavy blockading vessels, which had

closed in towards the Morro at the instant of the enemy's

appearance, and at their best speed, delivered a rapid fire,

well sustained and destructive, which speedily overwhelmed and

silenced the Spanish fire. The initial speed of the Spaniards

carried them rapidly past the blockading vessels, and the

battle developed into a chase in which the 'Brooklyn' and

'Texas' had, at the start, the advantage of position. The

'Brooklyn' maintained this lead. The 'Oregon,' steaming with

amazing speed from the commencement of the action, took first

place. The 'Iowa' and the 'Indiana' having done good work, and

not having the speed of the other ships, were directed by me,

in succession, at about the time the 'Vizcaya' was beached, to

drop out of the chase and resume blockading stations. These

vessels rescued many prisoners. The 'Vixen,' finding that the

rush of the Spanish ships would put her between two fires, ran

outside of our own column and remained there during the battle

and chase.

"The skillful handling and gallant fighting of the

'Gloucester' excited the admiration of everyone who witnessed

it, and merits the commendation of the Navy Department. She is

a fast and entirely unprotected auxiliary vessel—the yacht

'Corsair'—and has a good battery of light rapid-fire guns. She

was lying about 2 miles from the harbor entrance, to the

southward and eastward, and immediately steamed in, opening

fire upon the large ships. Anticipating the appearance of the

'Pluton' and 'Furor,' the 'Gloucester' was slowed, thereby

gaining more rapidly a high pressure of steam, and when the

destroyers came out she steamed for them at full speed, and

was able to close to short range, while her fire was accurate,

deadly, and of great volume. During this fight the

'Gloucester' was under the fire of the Socapa Battery. Within

twenty minutes from the time they emerged from Santiago Harbor

the careers of the 'Furor' and the 'Pluton' were ended, and

two-thirds of their people killed. The 'Furor' was beached and

sunk in the surf; the 'Pluton' sank in deep water a few

minutes later. The destroyers probably suffered much injury

from the fire of the secondary batteries of the battle ships

'Iowa,' 'Indiana,' and the 'Texas,' yet I think a very

considerable factor in their speedy destruction was the fire,

at close range, of the 'Gloucester's' battery. After rescuing

the survivors of the destroyers, the 'Gloucester' did

excellent service in landing and securing the crew of the

'Infanta Maria Teresa.'

"The method of escape attempted by the Spaniards, all steering

in the same direction, and in formation, removed all tactical

doubts or difficulties, and made plain the duty of every

United States vessel to close in, immediately engage, and

pursue. This was promptly and effectively done. As already

stated, the first rush of the Spanish squadron carried it past

a number of the blockading ships which could not immediately

work up to their best speed; but they suffered heavily in

passing, and the 'Infanta Maria Teresa' and the 'Oquendo' were

probably set on fire by shells fired during the first fifteen

minutes of the engagement. It was afterwards learned that the

'Infanta Maria Teresa's' fire main had been cut by one of our

first shots, and that she was unable to extinguish fire. With

large volumes of smoke rising from their lower decks aft,

these vessels gave up both fight and flight and ran in on the

beach—the 'Infanta Maria Teresa' at about 10.15 a. m. at Nima

Nima, 6½ miles from Santiago Harbor entrance, and the

'Almirante Oquendo' at about 10.30 a. m. at Juan Gonzales, 7

miles from the port.

{610}

"The 'Vizcaya' was still under the fire of the leading

vessels; the 'Cristobal Colon' had drawn ahead, leading the

chase, and soon passed beyond the range of the guns of the

leading American ships. The 'Vizcaya' was soon set on fire,

and, at 11.15, she turned inshore, and was beached at

Aserraderos, 15 miles from Santiago, burning fiercely, and

with her reserves of ammunition on deck already beginning to

explode. When about 10 miles west of Santiago the 'Indiana'

had been signaled to go back to the harbor entrance, and at

Aserraderos the 'Iowa' was signaled to 'Resume blockading

station.' The 'Iowa' assisted by the 'Ericsson' and the

'Hist,' took off the crew of the 'Vizcaya,' while the

'Harvard' and the 'Gloucester' rescued those of the 'Infanta

Maria Teresa' and the 'Almirante Oquendo.' This rescue of

prisoners, including the wounded, from the burning Spanish

vessels, was the occasion of some of the most daring and

gallant conduct of the day. The ships were burning fore and

aft, their guns and reserve ammunition were exploding, and it

was not known at what moment the fire would reach the main

magazines. In addition to this a heavy surf was running just

inside of the Spanish ships. But no risk deterred our officers

and men until their work of humanity was complete.

"There remained now of the Spanish ships only the 'Cristobal

Colon'—but she was their best and fastest vessel. Forced by

the situation to hug the Cuban coast, her only chance of

escape was by superior and sustained speed. When the 'Vizcaya'

went ashore, the 'Colon' was about 6 miles ahead of the

'Brooklyn' and the 'Oregon'; but her spurt was finished, and

the American ships were now gaining upon her. Behind the

'Brooklyn' and the 'Oregon' came the 'Texas,' 'Vixen,' and

'New York.' It was evident from the bridge of the 'New York'

that all the American ships were gradually overhauling the

chase, and that she had no chance of escape. At 12.50 the

'Brooklyn' and the 'Oregon' opened fire and got her range—the

'Oregon's' heavy shell striking beyond her—and at 1.20 she

gave up without firing another shot, hauled down her colors,

and ran ashore at Rio Torquino, 48 miles from Santiago.

Captain Cook, of the 'Brooklyn,' went on board to receive the

surrender. While his boat was alongside I came up in the 'New

York,' received his report, and placed the 'Oregon' in charge

of the wreck to save her, if possible, and directed the

prisoners to be transferred to the 'Resolute,' which had

followed the chase. Commodore Schley, whose chief of staff had

gone on board to receive the surrender, had directed that all

their personal effects should be retained by the officers.

This order I did not modify. The 'Cristobal Colon' was not

injured by our firing, and probably is not much injured by

beaching, though she ran ashore at high speed. The beach was

so steep that she came off by the working of the sea. But her

sea valves were opened and broken, treacherously, I am sure,

after her surrender, and despite all efforts she sank. When it

became evident that she could not be kept afloat, she was

pushed by the 'New York' bodily up on the beach, the 'New

York's' stem being placed against her for this purpose—the

ship being handled by Captain Chadwick with admirable

judgment—and sank in shoal water and may be saved. Had this

not been done she would have gone down in deep water and would

have been, to a certainty, a total loss.

"I regard this complete and important victory over the Spanish

forces as the successful finish of several weeks of arduous

and close blockade, so stringent and effective during the

night that the enemy was deterred from making the attempt to

escape at night, and deliberately elected to make the attempt

in daylight. The object of the blockade of Cervera's squadron

was fully accomplished, and each individual bore well his part

in it—the commodore in command on the second division, the

captains of ships, their officers, and men. The fire of the

battle ships was powerful and destructive, and the resistance

of the Spanish squadron was, in great part, broken almost

before they had got beyond the range of their own forts. …

Several of the [American] ships were struck—the 'Brooklyn'

more often than the others—but very slight material injury was

done, the greatest being aboard the 'Iowa.' Our loss was 1 man

killed and 1 wounded, both on the 'Brooklyn.' It is difficult to

explain this immunity from loss of life or injury to ships in

a combat with modern vessels of the best type, but Spanish

gunnery is poor at the best, and the superior weight and

accuracy of our fire speedily drove the men from their guns

and silenced their fire. This is borne out by the statements

of prisoners and by observation."

_Annual Report of Secretary of the Navy, 1898,

volume 2, pages 506-511._

Some particulars of the destruction of the "Furor," the

"Pluton," and the "Infanta Maria Teresa," and of the rescue of

surviving Spaniards, including Admiral Cervera, are given in a

report by Lieutenant Huse, executive officer of the "Gloucester,"

as follows: "The 'Pluton' was run on the rocks about 4 miles

west of Morro and blew up. Our crew cheered at the sight of

the explosion. The 'Furor' soon commenced to describe circles

with a starboard helm, her fire ceased, and it became apparent

that she was disabled. A white rag was waved from forward and

we stopped firing. Lieutenants Wood and Norman and Assistant

Engineer Proctor were sent to rescue the crews and to see if

the prizes could be saved. These found a horrible state of

affairs on the 'Furor.' The vessel was a perfect shambles. As

she was on fire and burning rapidly, they took off the living

and then rescued all they could find in the water and on the

beach. The 'Pluton' was among the rocks in the surf and could

not be boarded, but her crew had made their way ashore or were

adrift on life buoys and wreckage. These were all taken on board.

I have since learned that the 'New York' passed a number of

men in the water who had doubtless jumped overboard from the

destroyers to escape our fire. All these were probably

drowned. While this work was going on several explosions took

place on the 'Furor,' and presently—at about 11.30—she threw

her bows in the air, and turning to port slowly sank in deep

water. …

{611}

"While one of our boats was still ashore, seeing heavy clouds

of smoke behind the next point the ship was moved in that

direction, the men being at quarters and everything in

readiness for further action. On rounding the point two

men-of-war were found on the beach burning fiercely aft, the

majority of the crew being crowded on the forecastle and

unable apparently to reach land, only 200 yards away. Our

boats, under Lieutenant Norman and Ensign Edson, put off to

the nearer vessel, which proved to be the flagship 'Infanta

Maria Teresa,' and rescued all on board by landing them on the

beach through the surf. Lieutenant Norman formally received

the surrender of the commander in chief and all his officers

and men present, and as soon as all hands had been transferred

ashore, brought on board this ship all the higher officers,

including the admiral. Lieutenant Wood meanwhile rescued the

remaining survivors on board the 'Oquendo,' the second of the

burning vessels. The Spanish officers not feeling that the

prisoners on shore were secure from attack by Cuban partisans,

by your orders I directed Lieutenant Norman to land with a

small force, establish a camp on shore, and hoist the United

States flag over it. He took with him all the rations that

could be spared from the stores aboard."

_Annual Report of Secretary of the Navy, 1898,

volume 2, page 542._

The following is a translation, from Admiral Cervera's report,

as partly published in newspapers at Madrid, giving his

description of the destruction of his flagship and his own

rescue from death: "The enemy's fire produced terrible damages

on board the 'Infanta Maria Teresa,' destroying the elements

of defence—among others, the net for protection against fire.

In this critical moment the captain of the ship, Señor Concas,

fell wounded, and it was necessary to withdraw him, I taking

command of the vessel, because it was impossible to find the

second commandant of the 'Maria Teresa.' Immediately

afterwards they reported to me that my cabin was burning in

consequence of an explosion. The fire soon became very great

and ignited other parts of the ship. I gave orders to my aid

to flood the after magazines, but it was impossible. Dense

clouds of smoke impeded walking in the passages and practicing

any kind of operations. In this situation I could only think

of beaching the ship, and did so, running aground on Punta

Cabrera. The contest was impossible on our side, and there was

nothing more to be done but to save as much as possible. I

thought to lower the flag, but that was not possible on

account of the fire, which prevented all operations. In these

anxious moments two boats came to the aid of the 'Maria

Teresa,' into which a number of us jumped. Those that were not

dying were saved with nothing. The 'Teresa' lowered a small boat,

which sank before it could be of any service. Subsequently

they succeeded in launching a steam launch, but this also sank

after making one voyage to the beach. I succeeded in saving

myself with nothing, two sailors helping me, one named Andres

Sequeros and the officer D. Angel Cervera, all of us arriving

on board the American ship 'Gloucester' naked. At this time we

were all naked."

_Annual Report of Secretary of the Navy, 1898,

volume 2, pages 558-559._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 July (4-17).

The surrender of Santiago and of all the Spanish forces

in eastern Cuba.

The following is a continuation of the report made by General

Shafter of his operations at Santiago de Cuba, resulting in

the surrender of the entire forces of Spain in eastern Cuba:

"The information of our naval victory was transmitted under

flag of truce to the Spanish commander in Santiago on July 4,

and the suggestion again made that he surrender to save

needless effusion of blood. On the same date I informed

Admiral Sampson that if he would force his way into the harbor

the city would surrender without any further sacrifice of

life. Commodore Watson replied that Admiral Sampson was

temporarily absent, but that in his (Watson's) opinion the

navy should not enter the harbor. In the meanwhile letters

passing between General Toral and myself caused the cessation

of hostilities to continue; each army, however, continued to

strengthen its intrenchments. I was still of the opinion the

Spaniards would surrender without much more fighting, and on

July 6 called General Toral's attention to the changed

conditions and at his request gave him time to consult his

home Government. This he did, asking that the British consul,

with the employees of the cable company, be permitted to

return from El Caney to the city. This I granted. The strength

of the enemy's position was such I did not wish to assault if

it could be avoided. An examination of the enemy's works, made

after the surrender, fully justified the wisdom of the course

adopted. The intrenchments could only have been carried with

very great loss of life, probably with not less than 3,000

killed and wounded.

"On July 8 General Toral offered to march out of the city with

arms and baggage, provided he would not be molested before

reaching Holguin, and to surrender to the American forces the

territory then occupied by him. I replied that while I would

submit his proposition to my home Government, I did not think

it would be accepted. In the meanwhile arrangements were made

with Admiral Sampson that when the army again engaged the

enemy the navy would assist by shelling the city from ships

stationed off Aguadores, dropping a shell every few minutes.

On July 10 the 1st Illinois and the 1st District of Columbia

arrived, and were placed on the line to the right of the

cavalry division. This enabled me to push Lawton further to

the right and to practically command the Cobra road. On the

afternoon of the date last mentioned the truce was broken off

at 4 p. m., and I determined to open with four batteries of

artillery, and went forward in person to the trenches to give

the necessary orders; but the enemy anticipated us by opening

fire with his artillery a few minutes after the hour stated.

His batteries were apparently silenced before night, while

ours continued playing upon his trenches until dark. During

this firing the navy fired from Aguadores, most of the shells

falling in the city. There was also some small-arms firing. On

this afternoon and the next morning we lost Captain Charles W.

Rowell, 2d Infantry, and 1 man killed, and Lieutenant Lutz, 2d

Infantry, and 10 men wounded. On the morning of July 11 the

bombardment by the Navy and my field guns was renewed and

continued until nearly noon, and on the same day I reported to

the Adjutant-General of the Army that the right of Ludlow's

brigade of Lawton's division rested on the bay. Thus our hold

upon the enemy was complete.

{612}

"At 2 p. m. on this date, the 11th, the surrender of the city

was again demanded. The firing ceased and was not again

renewed. By this date the sickness in the army was increasing

very rapidly as a result of exposure in the trenches to the

intense heat of the sun and the heavy rains. Moreover, the

dews in Cuba are almost equal to rains. The weakness of the

troops was becoming so apparent I was anxious to bring the

siege to an end, but in common with most of the officers of

the army I did not think an assault would be justifiable,

especially as the enemy seemed to be acting in good faith in

their preliminary propositions to surrender. On July 11 I

wrote General Toral as follows: 'With the largely increased

forces which have come to me, and the fact that I have your

line of retreat securely in my hands, the time seems fitting

that I should again demand of your excellency the surrender of

Santiago and of your excellency's army. I am authorized to

state that should your excellency so desire the Government of

the United States will transport the entire command of your

excellency to Spain.' General Toral replied that he had

communicated my proposition to his general-in-chief, General

Blanco.

"July 12 I informed the Spanish commander that Major-General

Miles, commander-in-chief of the American Army, had just

arrived in my camp, and requested him to grant us a personal

interview on the following day. He replied he would be pleased

to meet us. The interview took place on the 13th, and I

informed him his surrender only could be considered, and that

as he was without hope of escape he had no right to continue

the fight. On the 14th another interview took place, during

which General Toral agreed to surrender, upon the basis of his

army, the Fourth Army Corps, being returned to Spain, the

capitulation embracing all of eastern Cuba east of a line

passing from Acerraderos on the south to Sagua de Tanamo on

the north, via Palma Soriano. It was agreed commissioners

should meet during the afternoon to definitely arrange the

terms. … The terms of surrender finally agreed upon included

about 12,000 Spanish troops in the city and as many more in

the surrendered district. It was arranged the formal surrender

should take place between the lines on the morning of July 17,

each army being represented by 100 armed men. At the time

appointed, I appeared at the place agreed upon with my general

officers, staff, and 100 troopers of the Second Cavalry under

Captain Brett. General Toral also arrived with a number of his

officers and 100 infantry. We met midway between the

representatives of our two armies, and the Spanish commander

formally consummated the surrender of the city and the 24,000

troops in Santiago and the surrendered district. After this

ceremony I entered the city with my staff and escort, and at

12 o'clock noon the American flag was raised over the

governor's palace with appropriate ceremonies."

_Annual Reports of the War Department, 1898,

volume 2, pages 157-159._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898

(July-August: Army administration).

Red-tape and politics.

Their working in the campaign.

"The Cuban campaign had been foreseen by intelligent officers

for more than a year, but the department which clothes the

army had taken no steps toward providing a suitable uniform

for campaigning in the tropics until war was declared. The

Fifth Army Corps, a comparatively small body of 17,000 men,

was concentrated at Tampa on the railroad within reach of all

the appliances for expediting business. Between April 26, when

war was declared, and, June 6, when the corps embarked for

Cuba, sufficient time elapsed to have clothed 1,000,000 men if

the matter had been handled in the same manner a wholesale

clothing firm would handle similar business. Yet the corps

went to Cuba wearing the winter clothing it had brought on its

backs from Montana, Wyoming, and Michigan. It endured the heat

of the tropics clad in this, and was furnished with light

summer clothing by the department to wear for its return to

Montauk, where the breezes were so bracing that the teeth

chattered even when the men were clad in winter clothing. The

only reason for this absolute failure to properly clothe the

army was that the methods of the department are too slow and

antiquated for the proper performance of business. There was

no lack of money. It was a simple case of red-tape delays.

There can be no doubt that the intention was that the summer

clothing should be worn in Cuba and that there should be warm

clothing issued at Montauk. It was issued after the troops had

shivered for days in their light clothes. The delays

unavoidably connected with an obsolete method caused great

suffering that should not have been inflicted upon men

expected to do arduous duty. A sensible man would not put a

heavy blanket on a horse to do draught work on a hot day; but

the red tape of an antiquated way of doing business caused our

soldiers to wear heavy woolen clothes in torrid heat, when every

nerve was to be strained to the breaking point in athletic

exertion. This is not pointed out in a fault-finding spirit.

The men are proud to have been in the Fifth Corps and to have

endured these things for the country and the flag; but these

unnecessary sufferings impaired the fighting strength of the

army, caused much of the sickness that visited the Fifth

Corps, and might have caused the failure of the whole

expedition. …

"The difficulty here depicted was one which beset the

department at every turn in the whole campaign. It is a

typical case. Transports, tentage, transportation—it was the

same in everything. With the most heroic exertions the

department was able to meet emergencies only after they had

passed. This was caused partly by lack of ready material, but

mainly by an inelastic system of doing business which broke

down in emergencies. This, in turn, was caused mainly by the

illiberal treatment accorded to this, as well as to every

other department of the army by Congress. It uniformly cuts

mercilessly all estimates of this, as of every other

department, and leaves no margin of expenditure or chance of

improvement. It dabbles in matters which are purely technical

and require the handling of expert executive talent. …

"Plans for war should be prepared in advance. This was

especially true of the last war, which had been foreseen for

years and considered a probability for several months. All

details should have been previously worked out, all

contingencies foreseen before hostilities began. Such plans

would require some modifications, of course, but would form a

working basis.

{613}

Neither Santiago nor Manila Bay would have been foreseen; but

any plans for war would have involved the consideration and

solution of the following problems: How to raise, arm, equip,

organize, mobilize, clothe, feed, shelter, and transport large

bodies of soldiers. The point where the battle might occur

would be a mere tactical detail to be worked out at the proper

time. The above problems could all be solved in time of peace and

should have been solved. The general staff performs this

function in foreign armies, but we had no such body in our

service and nothing to imperfectly take its place. …

"The most urgently needed reform is the absolute divorcement

of the army in all of its departments from politics. … No

department of the army should be more exempt from political

influence than the staff. This points at once to the most

urgent reform, viz., make the commanding general the real

working head of the army, instead of the Secretary of War. No

good results have come to the service by the extension of the

Secretary's powers in Grant's first administration. Most of

the evils of the service can be traced to the fact that the

general commanding has since that time been practically

deprived of his proper functions, and the real head of the

army has been a politician."

_Lieutenant J. H. Parker,

Our Army Supply Department and the need of a General Staff

(Review of Reviews, December, 1898)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July-August: Cuba).

The War with Spain.

Sickness in the American army at Santiago.

Its alarming state.

Hurried removal of troops to Montauk Point, Long Island.

"After the surrender of General Toral's army General Shafter

urged the War Department from time to time to hasten the

shipment of the Spanish prisoners to their homes, in order

that the American Army, whose condition was now deplorable,

might be transported to the United States. At this time about

half the command had been attacked by malarial fever, with a

few cases of yellow fever, dysentery, and typhoid fever. The

yellow-fever cases were mainly confined to the troops at

Siboney, and the few cases found among the troops at the front

were at once transferred to that place. … There was great

fear, and excellent grounds for it, that the yellow fever, now

sporadic throughout the command, would become epidemic. With

the command weakened by malarial fevers, and its general tone

and vitality much reduced by all the circumstances incident to

the campaign, the effects of such an epidemic would

practically mean its annihilation. The first step taken to

check the spread of disease was the removal of all the troops

to new camping grounds. … It was directed that the command be

moved in this way every few days, isolating the cases of

yellow fever as they arose, and it was expected that in a

short time the yellow fever would be stamped out. … But the

effect produced on the command by the work necessary to set up

the tents and in the removal of the camps increased the number

on the sick report to an alarming degree. Convalescents from

malarial fever were taken again with the fever, and yellow

fever, dysentery, and typhoid increased. It was useless now to

attempt to confine the yellow-fever cases to Siboney, and

isolation hospitals were established around Santiago. It was

apparent that to keep moving the command every few days simply

weakened the troops and increased the fever cases. Any exertion

in this heat caused a return of the fever, and it must be

remembered that the convalescents now included about 75 per

cent. of the command. The Commanding General was now directed

to move the entire command into the mountains to the end of

the San Luis railroad, where the troops would be above the

yellow fever limit; but this was a physical impossibility. …

"The situation was desperate; the yellow-fever cases were

increasing in number, and the month of August, the period in

which it is epidemic, was at hand. It was with these

conditions staring them in the face, that the officers

commanding divisions and brigades and the Chief Surgeon were

invited by General Shafter to discuss the situation. As a

result of this conference the General sent the following

telegram giving his views [and those of the General Officers

and Medical Officers]. … 'In reply to telegram of this date

[August 3], stating that it is deemed best that my command be

moved to end of railroad, where yellow fever is impossible, I

have to say that under the circumstances this move is

practically impossible. The railroad is not yet repaired,

although it will be in about a week. Its capacity is not to

exceed 1,000 men a day, at the best, and it will take until

the end of August to make this move, even if the sick-list

should not increase. An officer of my staff, Lieutenant Miley,

who has looked over the ground, says it is not a good camping

ground. … In my opinion there is but one course to take, and

that is to immediately transport the Fifth Corps and the

detached regiments that came with it, and were sent

immediately after it, with the least delay possible, to the

United States. If this is not done I believe the death-rate

will be appalling. I am sustained in this view by every

medical officer present. I called together to-day the General

Officers and the senior Medical Officers and telegraph you

their views.' …

"On August 4th instructions were received from the War

Department to begin the removal of the command to Montauk

Point, Long Island. Some of the immune regiments were on the

way to Santiago, and other regiments were at once ordered

there to garrison the district as General Shafter's command

was withdrawn. The first of the fleet of vessels to return the

Spanish troops arrived in time to be loaded and leave August

9th, and by the end of the month nearly all were transported.

"After the surrender the relations between the American and

Spanish troops were very cordial. There could be little or no

conversation between individuals, but in many ways the respect

each had for the other was shown, and there seemed to be no

hatred on either side. Most of the Spanish officers remained

in their quarters in town, and they shared in the feeling

displayed by their men. Salutations were generally exchanged

between the officers, and American ways and manners became

very popular among the Spaniards. …

{614}

"By the 25th of the month General Shafter's entire command,

with the exception of a few organizations just ready to

embark, had departed, and, turning over the command to General

Lawton, he sailed that day with his staff on the 'Mexico,' one

of the captured transports, and at noon September 1st went

ashore at Montauk Point, Long Island."

_J. D. Miley, In Cuba with Shafter,

chapter 12 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons)._

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (July-August: Philippines).

Correspondence between the General commanding

United States forces at Cavite and Manila,

and Aguinaldo, the Filipino leader.

On the 4th of July, General Thomas M. Anderson, then

commanding the "United States Expeditionary Forces" at Cavite

Arsenal, addressed the following communication to "Señor Don

Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, Commanding Philippine Forces":

"General: I have the honor to inform you that the United

States of America, whose land forces I have the honor to

command in this vicinity, being at war with the Kingdom of

Spain, has entire sympathy and most friendly sentiments for

the native people of the Philippine Islands. For these reasons

I desire to have the most amicable relations with you, and to

have you and your people co-operate with us in military

operations against the Spanish forces. In our operations it

has become necessary for us to occupy the town of Cavite as a

base of operations. In doing this I do not wish to interfere

with your residence here and the exercise by yourself and

other native citizens of all functions and privileges not

inconsistent with military rule. I would be pleased to be

informed at once of any misconduct of soldiers under my

command, as it is the intention of my Government to maintain

order and to treat all citizens with justice, courtesy, and

kindness. I have therefore the honor to ask your excellency to

instruct your officials not to interfere with my officers in

the performance of their duties and not to assume that they

can not visit Cavite without permission."

On the following day Aguinaldo replied:

"General: Interpreting the sentiments of the Philippine

people, I have the honor to express to your excellency my most

profound gratefulness for the sympathy and amicable sentiments

with which the natives of these islands inspire the great North

American nation and your excellency. I also thank most

profoundly your desire of having friendly relations with us,

and of treating us with justice, courtesy, and kindness, which

is also our constant wish to prove the same, and special

satisfaction whenever occasion represents. I have already

ordered my people not to interfere in the least with your

officers and men, orders which I shall reiterate to prevent

their being unfulfilled; hoping that you will inform me of

whatever misconduct that may be done by those in my command,

so as to reprimand them and correspond with your wishes." …

To this communication General Anderson returned the following

on the 6th: "General: I am encouraged by the friendly

sentiment expressed by your excellency in your welcome letter

received on the 5th instant to endeavor to come to a definite

understanding, which I hope will be advantageous to both. Very

soon we expect a large addition to our forces, and it must be

apparent to you as a military officer that we will require

much more room to camp our soldiers, and also storeroom for

our supplies. For this I would like to have your excellency's

advice and co-operation, as you are best acquainted with the

resources of this country. It must be apparent to you that we

do not intend to remain here inactive, but to move promptly

against our common enemy. But for a short time we must

organize and land supplies, and also retain a place for

storing them near our fleet and transports. I am solicitous to

avoid any conflict of authority which may result from having

two sets of military officers exercising command in the same

place. I am also anxious to avoid sickness by taking sanitary

precaution. Your own medical officers have been making

voluntary inspections with mine, and fear epidemic diseases if

the vicinity is not made clean. Would it not be well to have

prisoners work to this end under the advice of the surgeons?"

…

On the 9th of July General Anderson reported to the War

Department at Washington: "General Aguinaldo tells me he has

about 15,000 fighting men, but only 11,000 armed with guns,

which mostly were taken from the Spaniards. He claims to have

in all 4,000 prisoners. When we first landed he seemed very

suspicious, and not at all friendly, but I have now come to a

better understanding with him and he is much more friendly and

seems willing to co-operate. But he has declared himself

dictator and president, and is trying to take Manila without

our assistance. This is not probable, but if he can effect his

purpose he will, I apprehend, antagonize any attempt on our

part to establish a provisional government."