Practically the discussion was ended by a despatch from the

British Colonial Secretary, September 22d, in which he said;

"Her Majesty's Government have on more than one occasion

repeated their assurances that they have no desire to

interfere in any way with independence of South African

Republic, provided that the conditions on which it was granted

are honourably observed in the spirit and in the letter, and

they have offered as part of a general settlement to give a

complete guarantee against any attack upon that independence,

either from within any part of the British dominions or from

the territory of a foreign State. They have not asserted any

rights of interference in the internal affairs of the Republic

other than those which are derived from the Conventions

between the two countries or which belong to every

neighbouring Government (and especially to one which has a

largely predominant interest in the adjacent territories) for

the protection of its subjects and of its adjoining

possessions." Referring to his despatch of September 8, the

Secretary concluded: "The refusal of the Government of the

South African Republic to entertain the offer thus made,

coming as it does at the end of nearly four months of

protracted negotiations, themselves the climax of an agitation

extending over a period of more than five years, makes it

useless to further pursue a discussion on the lines hitherto

followed, and Her Majesty's Government are now compelled to

consider the situation afresh, and to formulate their own

proposals for a final settlement of the issues which have been

created in South Africa by the policy constantly followed for

many years by the Government of the South African Republic.

They will communicate to you the result of their deliberations

in a later despatch."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command:

1899, C. 9518, 9521, 9530._

SOUTH AFRICA: Orange Free State: A. D. 1899 (September-October).

The Free State makes common cause with

the South African Republic.

On the 27th of September, President Steyn communicated to the

British High Commissioner a resolution adopted that day by the

Orange Free State Volksraad, instructing the government to

continue efforts for peaceful settlement of differences

between the South African Republic and Great Britain, but

concluding with the declaration that "if a war is now begun or

occasioned by Her Majesty's Government against South African

Republic, this would morally be a war against the whole of

white population of South Africa and would in its results be

calamitous and criminal, and further, that Orange Free State

will honestly and faithfully observe its obligations towards

South African Republic arising out of the political alliance

between the two Republics whatever may happen."

On the 11th of October, the High Commissioner communicated to

President Steyn the ultimatum that he received from the South

African Republic, and asked: "In view of Resolution of

Volksraad of Orange Free State communicated to me in Your

Honour's telegram of 27th September I have the honour to

request that I may be informed at Your Honour's earliest

possible convenience whether this action on the part of the

South African Republic has Your Honour's concurrence and

support." The reply of the Orange Free State President was as

follows:

"The high handed and unjustifiable policy and conduct of Her

Majesty's Government in interfering in and dictating in the

purely internal affairs of South African Republic,

constituting a flagrant breach of the Convention of London,

1884, accompanied at first by preparations, and latterly

followed by active commencement of hostilities against that

Republic, which no friendly and well-intentioned efforts on

our part could induce Her Majesty's Government to abandon,

constitute such an undoubted and unjust attack on the

independence of the South African Republic that no other

course is left to this State than honourably to abide by its

Conventional Agreements entered into with that Republic. On

behalf of this Government, therefore, I beg to notify that,

compelled thereto by the action of Her Majesty's Government,

they intend to carry out the instructions of the Volksraad as

set forth in the last part of the Resolution referred to by

Your Excellency."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command:

1899, C.—9530, pages 38 and 67._

{491}

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal and Orange Free State:

A. D. 1899 (September-October).

Preparations for war.

Troops massed on both sides of the frontiers.

Remonstrances of Orange Free State.

The Boer Ultimatum.

Before the controversy between Boer and Briton had reached the

stage represented above, both sides were facing the prospect

of war, both were bringing forces to the frontier, and each

was declaring that the other had been first to take that

threatening step. Which of them did first begin movements that

bore a look of menace seems difficult to learn from official

reports. On the 19th of September, the British High

Commissioner gave notice to the President of the Orange Free

State that "it has been deemed advisable by the Imperial

military authorities to send detachments of the troops

ordinarily stationed at Cape Town to assist in securing the

line of communication between the Colony and the British

territories lying to the north of it"; and "as this force, or

a portion of it, may be stationed near the borders of the

Orange Free State," he wished the burghers of that State to

understand that the movement was in no way directed against

them. Eight days later, President Steyn, of the Orange Free

State, addressed a long despatch to the High Commissioner,

remonstrating against the whole procedure of the British

government in its dealing with the South African Republic, and

alluding to the "enormous and ever increasing military

preparations of the British government." On the 2d of October

he announced to the Commissioner that he had "deemed it

advisable, in order to allay the intense excitement and unrest

amongst our burghers, arising from the totally undefended state

of our border, in the presence of a continued increase and

movement of troops on two sides of this State, to call up our

burghers, to satisfy them that due precaution had been taken."

The High Commissioner replied on the 3d: "Your Honour must be

perfectly well aware that all the movements of British troops

which have taken place in this country since the beginning of

present troubles, which have been necessitated by the natural

alarm of the inhabitants in exposed districts, are not

comparable in magnitude with the massing of armed forces by

government of South African Republic on the borders of Natal."

Some days previous to this, on the 29th of September,

Secretary Chamberlain had cabled from London to Sir Alfred

Milner: "Inform President of Orange Free State that what he

describes as the enormous and ever-increasing military

preparations of Great Britain have been forced upon Her

Majesty's Government by the policy of the South African

Republic, which has transformed the Transvaal into a permanent

armed camp, threatening the peace of the whole of South Africa

and the position of Great Britain as the paramount State."

On the 9th of October the High Commissioner received another

telegram from the President of the Orange Free State, of which

he cabled the substance to London as follows: "He demurs to

statement that military preparations of Her Majesty's

Government have been necessitated by conversion of South

African Republic into an armed camp. Her Majesty's Government

must be entirely misinformed and it would be regrettable if,

through such misunderstanding, present state of extreme

tension were allowed to continue. Though Her Majesty's

Government may regard precautions taken by South African

Republic after Jameson Raid as excessive, Government of South

African Republic cannot be blamed for adopting them, in view

of large Uitlander population constantly being stirred up,

through hostile press, to treason and rebellion by persons and

organizations financially or politically interested in

overthrowing the Government. Arming of Burghers not intended

for any purpose of aggression against Her Majesty's dominions.

People of South African Republic have, since shortly after

Jameson Raid, been practically as fully armed as now, yet have

never committed any act of aggression. It was not till Her

Majesty's Government, with evident intention of enforcing

their views on South African Republic in purely internal

matters, had greatly augmented their forces and moved them

nearer to borders that a single Burgher was called up for the

purpose, as be firmly believed, of defending country and

independence. If this natural assumption erroneous, not too

late to rectify misunderstanding by mutual agreement to

withdraw forces on both sides and undertaking by Her Majesty's

Government to stop further increase of troops."

But, in reality, it was already too late; for, on the same day

on which the above message was telegraphed from Bloemfontein,

the government of the South African Republic had presented to

the British Agent at Pretoria a note which ended the

possibility of peace. After reviewing the issue between the

two governments, the note concluded with a peremptory

ultimatum, as follows: "Her Majesty's unlawful intervention in

the internal affairs of this Republic in conflict with the

Convention of London, 1884, caused by the extraordinary

strengthening of troops in the neighbourhood of the borders of

this Republic, has thus caused an intolerable condition of

things to arise whereto this Government feels itself obliged,

in the interest not only of this Republic but also [?] of all

South Africa, to make an end as soon as possible, and feels

itself called upon and obliged to press earnestly and with

emphasis for an immediate termination of this state of things

and to request Her Majesty's Government to give it the

assurance

(a) That all points of mutual difference shall be regulated by

the friendly course of arbitration or by whatever amicable way

may be agreed upon by this Government with Her Majesty's

Government.

(b) That the troops on the borders of this Republic shall be

instantly withdrawn.

(c) That all reinforcements of troops which have arrived in

South Africa since the 1st June, 1899, shall be removed from

South Africa within a reasonable time, to be agreed upon with

this Government, and with a mutual assurance and guarantee on

the part of this Government that no attack upon or hostilities

against any portion of the possessions of the British Government

shall be made by the Republic during further negotiations

within a period of time to be subsequently agreed upon between

the Governments, and this Government will, on compliance

therewith, be prepared to withdraw the armed Burghers of this

Republic from the borders.

{492}

(d) That Her Majesty's troops which are now on the high seas

shall not be landed in any port of South Africa. This

Government must press for an immediate and affirmative answer

to these four questions, and earnestly requests Her Majesty's

Government to return such an answer before or upon Wednesday

the 11th October, 1899, not later than 5 o'clock p. m., and it

desires further to add that in the event of unexpectedly no

satisfactory answer being received by it within that interval

[it] will with great regret be compelled to regard the action

of Her Majesty's Government as a formal declaration of war,

and will not hold itself responsible for the consequences

thereof, and that in the event of any further movements of

troops taking place within the above-mentioned time in the

nearer directions of our borders this Government will be

compelled to regard that also as a formal declaration of war."

To this ultimatum the British government gave its reply, in a

despatch from Mr. Chamberlain to Sir Alfred Milner, October

10, as follows: "Her Majesty's Government have received with

great regret the peremptory demands of the Government of the

South African Republic conveyed in your telegram of 9th

October, Number 3. You will inform the Government of the South

African Republic, in reply, that the conditions demanded by

the Government of the South African Republic are such as Her

Majesty's Government deem it impossible to discuss."

_Great Britain,

Papers by Command: 1899, C.—9530._

Efforts which were being made at the time in Holland to assist

the Boer Republic in pacific negotiations with Great Britain

were suddenly frustrated by this action. A year later (in

November, 1900) it was stated in the States General at The

Hague that "in the autumn of 1899 the Netherlands Government

offered in London its good offices for the resumption of

negotiations with the Transvaal, but these efforts had no

result in consequence of the sudden ultimatum of the Transvaal

and the commencement of hostilities by the armies of the

Republics, actions which surprised the Netherlands Government.

When once the war had broken out any effort in the direction of

intervention would have been useless, as was shown by the

peremptory refusal given by Great Britain to the offer of the

United States."

An Englishman who was in the country at the time gives the

following account of the Boer preparation for war: "In the

towns the feeling was strongly against war; in the country

districts war was popular, as the farmers had not the

slightest doubt they would be able to carry out their threat

of 'driving the English into the sea.' … Skilled artillerymen

were finding their way into the country towards the end of

August last [1899]. The Boers themselves did not put much

faith in their artillery, but they were reassured by the

officers who told them that they would yet learn to respect

its usefulness and efficiency—a prophecy which to our cost has

been more than fulfilled. … General Joubert was always ready

and willing, at any time, to inspect and test new guns or

military necessaries, and no expense was spared to make the

Transvaal burgher army a first-class fighting-machine. …

Surprise has been expressed at the inaccurate statements made

by colonials as to the fighting strength of the Boers. They

had not allowed for the enormous increase of population. From

an absolutely reliable source the writer ascertained in

September last that they could put in the field between 50 and

60 thousand men, made up as follows: Transvaal burghers,

22,000; resident foreigners, etc., 10,000; Free Staters,

16,000; colonists who would cross the border and join, 6,000;

total, 54,000. … As soon as war seemed likely, no time was

lost in perfecting the military arrangements. Before Great

Britain had thought of mobilizing a soldier, the Boer

emissaries were again scouring the colonies of Natal and the

Cape, sounding the farmers as to what part they were prepared

to take in the coming conflict. … While people at home were

wondering what the next move would be, the Boers were ready to

answer the question. Towards the middle of September all

preparations were completed, the Government had laid in large

quantities of supplies (mainly of flour, Boer meal, and tinned

foods), which they anticipated would tide them over twelve to

eighteen months, and by that time, if they had not beaten the

British, they relied on foreign intervention. They had also

received large sums of money from Europe, and some additional

supplies of arms and ammunition. Ammunition was distributed in

large quantities throughout the country, each burgher

receiving a sealed packet in addition to his ordinary supply.

The last batch of the Mauser rides was distributed, and the

mobilization scheme finally arranged, by which, on a given

word being telegraphed to the different centres, the first

Republican army corps would be mobilized within twenty-four

hours. This actually took place. … The British Government

could hardly fail to be aware of the fact that the Transvaal

was in earnest this time. A visit to the country districts

towards the end of August, about the time when the Boer

Executive themselves sounded the country through their private

agencies, would have revealed the fact that the people were

not only perfectly willing to go to war, but that they

absolutely wished for it. As one Boer put it to the writer:

'We look on fighting the English as a picnic. In some of the

Kaffir wars we had a little trouble, but in the Vryheids

Oorlog (the Boer War of 1881) we simply potted the Rooineks as

they streamed across the veld in their red jackets, without

the slightest danger to ourselves.' They had the utmost

contempt for Tommy Atkins and his leaders, many of them

bragging that the only thing that deterred them from

advocating war instanter was the thought that they would have

to kill so many of the soldiers, with whom individually they

said there was no quarrel. With such a state of things, which

should have been perfectly clear to the Intelligence

Department (and through it to the War Office) in

London—because no resident with eyes to see could be deceived

in the matter—we allowed the present war to find us

unprepared!"

_J. Scoble and H. H. Abercrombie,

The Rise and Fall of Krugerism,

chapter 16 (New York: F. A. Stokes Co.)._

[Image: The Boer Republics and the Surroundings.]

{493}

SOUTH AFRICA: The Field of War: A. D. 1899 (October-November).

The Boer advance.

Invasion of Cape Colony and Natal.

The invaders joined by Dutch farmers of the colony.

The British unprepared.

Investment of Kimberley and Mafeking.

In a despatch dated January 16, 1900, Sir Alfred Milner gave

particulars of the first advance of the Boer forces from the

Orange Free State into Cape Colony, and of the extent to which

they were joined by Dutch farmers in districts south of Orange

River. He wrote: "The portion of the Colony with which I

propose to deal is that which lies south of the Orange River.

The districts north of that river have been so completely cut

off, and our accounts of what has been, and is, going on there

are so scanty and imperfect, that the history of their

defection cannot yet be written. I shall content myself with

quoting an extract from a report upon the state of affairs in

that region by a gentleman lately resident in Vryburg, which

undoubtedly fairly expresses the truth so far as he has been

in a position to observe it:—'All the farmers in the Vryburg,

Kuruman, and Taungs districts,' he says, 'have joined the

Boers, and I do not believe that you will find ten loyal

British subjects among the Dutch community in the whole of

Bechuanaland.' … The districts invaded by the enemy south of

the Orange River are:—Colesberg, Albert, Aliwal North,

Wodehouse, and Barkly East. It was on the 12th October that

the enemy committed the first act of war and of invasion near

Vryburg, on the western border, but it was not till more than

a month later, namely, the 14th November, that they occupied

Colesberg. Apparently they were waiting for reinforcements,

for when they actually did cross the frontier they were 1,100

strong. Whatever the cause of their delay, it was not due to

any discouragement from the people of Colesberg. The small

British garrison then in the country being engaged elsewhere,

and the district being entirely unguarded save by a few

policemen, people from there continually visited the river to

communicate with the enemy. The Chief Constable reports that

when he left the town 300 Colesberg farmers had already joined

the enemy, and that 400 more were expected from the adjoining

district of Philipstown. … On the 16th November General

Grobler, the Boer Commandant, addressed the following telegram

to Bloemfontein:—'Colesberg was occupied by me without

opposition. … I was very well pleased with the conduct of the

Afrikanders. We were everywhere welcomed.' … Eastwards along

the border the tide of insurrection ran strong. In the closing

days of October a Boer force assembled at Bethulie Bridge, which

was guarded only by a handful of police. As the days passed

and the alarm grew, the Cape police force was withdrawn from

Burghersdorp, which lies south of Bethulie, down the line to

Stormberg, while, in their turn, the Imperial forces abandoned

the important position of Stormberg, and retired on

Queenstown, thus leaving the district clear for the invaders.

That they did not immediately advance was certainly not owing

to any fear of resistance at Burghersdorp, the inhabitants of

which fraternised with the commando stationed on the river,

continually passing to and fro. Finally, on the 14th November,

the date of the occupation of Colesberg, the advance was made,

and on the following morning a body of 500 Boers occupied the

town. … According to the despatch of the Boer Commandant,

dated 16th November, Burghersdorp was occupied 'amidst cheers

from the Afrikanders,' and 'the Colonial burghers are very

glad to meet us.' Commandeering at once began throughout the

district of Albert, and a Burghersdorp resident estimated that

about 1,000 farmers were prepared to join at the date of his

leaving the place. …

"Within a space of less than three weeks from the occupation

of Colesberg, no less than five great districts—those of

Colesberg, Albert, Aliwal North, Barkly East, and

Wodehouse—had gone over without hesitation, and, so to speak,

bodily, to the enemy. Throughout that region the Landdrosts of

the Orange Free State had established their authority, and

everywhere, in the expressive words of a Magistrate, British

loyalists were 'being hunted out of town after town like

sheep.' In the invaded districts, as will be seen from the

above, the method of occupation has always been more or less

the same. The procedure is as follows:-A commando enters, the

Orange Free State flag is hoisted, a meeting is held in the

Court-house or market-place, and a Proclamation is read,

annexing the district. The Commandant then makes a speech, in

which he explains that the people must now obey the Free State

laws generally, though they are at present under martial law.

A local Landdrost is appointed, and loyal subjects are given a

few days or hours in which to quit, or be compelled to serve

against their country. … The number of rebels who have

actually taken up arms and joined the enemy during their

progress throughout the five annexed districts can for the

present only be matter of conjecture. I shall, however, be on

the safe side in reckoning that during November it was a

number not less than the total of the invading commandos, that

is, 2,000, while it is probable that of the invading commandos

themselves a certain proportion were colonists who had crossed

the border before the invasion took place. And the number,

whatever it was, which joined the enemy before and during

November has been increased since. A well-informed refugee

from the Albert district has estimated the total number of

Colonial Boers who have joined the enemy in the invaded

districts south of the Orange River at 3,000 to 4,000. In the

districts north of that river, to which I referred at the

beginning of this despatch, the number can hardly be less.

Adding to these the men who became burghers of the Transvaal

immediately before, or just after, the outbreak of war, with

the view of taking up arms in the struggle, I am forced to the

conclusion that, in round figures, not less than 10,000 of

those now fighting against us in South Africa, and probably

somewhat more, either are, or till quite recently were,

subjects of the Queen."-

_Great Britain, Papers by Command:

Cd. 264, 1900, pages 1-5._

The above relates to movements from the Orange Free State into

Cape Colony, where the most of reinforcement from Afrikander

inhabitants of British soil was to be got. From the Transvaal,

the movement of Boer forces across the frontiers, both

eastward and westward, was equally prompt. Early on the

morning of the 12th they were in Natal, advancing in three

strong columns, under General Joubert, upon Newcastle,

threatening the advance posts of the British at Dundee and

Glencoe (some 40 miles northeast of Ladysmith), where valuable

coal mines claimed defence. At the same time, another Boer

army, under General Cronje, had passed the western border and

was moving upon Mafeking, where Colonel (afterwards General)

Baden-Powell, with an irregular force of about 1,200 men, was

preparing for a siege.

{494}

The inhabitants of the town, including refugees, numbered

about 2,000 whites and 7,000 blacks. A few days later Boer

forces were skirmishing with the defenders of the diamond

mines at Kimberley, where Colonel Kekewich commanded about

1,000 men, and where Cecil Rhodes was among the beleaguered

citizens. The population of Kimberley was 33,000, more than

half blacks. It is plain that the British were wholly

unprepared for so vigorous an opening of hostilities on the

part of the Boers. A military writer in the "London Times,"

discussing the "Lessons of the War," at the end of a year

after its beginning, made the following statements and

comment:—"There was no difficulty in obtaining the fullest

information as to the resources of the Transvaal and the Free

State, and we have been officially informed that 'the armed

strength of the Boers, the number of their guns, with their

character and calibre,' as laid down in the report of the

Director of Intelligence, 'corresponds exactly with our

recently-ascertained knowledge of what the enemy has put into

the field.' Whether or not these reports ever travel from

Queen Anne's gate to Pall-mall seems uncertain, since the

Commander-in-Chief publicly stated that 'We have found that

the enemy … are much more powerful and numerous than we

expected.' The report of the Intelligence Department seems,

therefore, to have been as valueless for practical purposes as

were those transmitted to Paris by Colonel Stoffel prior to

the outbreak of the Franco-German war, and Lord Wolseley was

apparently as little aware of the fighting resources of the

Boers as was Marshal Lebœuf of those of the Germans. When,

early in September, 1899, it became a pressing necessity to

reinforce the troops in South Africa, it was painfully

realized that not a single unit at home was ready to take the

field. One weak battalion and three field batteries, hastily

compounded by wholesale drafting from others, represented the

available contribution from a standing army at home whose

nominal effectives considerably exceeded 100,000. The

reinforcements, totally inadequate to meet the crisis, were

made up by drawing upon India and the colonial garrisons."

_London Times, November 22, 1900._

Another writer in "The Times," reviewing, at nearly the same

time, the previous year of the war, gave this account of its

opening circumstances:—"If the organization of the British

Army had permitted the despatch at short notice of 30,000

troops from Great Britain, the whole course of the war would

have been different. It was a prevailing illusion that Mr.

Kruger would yield to diplomatic pressure not backed by

available force, and political expediency, over-riding

military considerations, led to a compromise. It was tardily

decided to bring the forces in South Africa up to a total of

about 22,000 by drawing on India and the colonial garrisons;

mobilization was deferred till October 7. Thus the first

reinforcements arrived barely in time to prevent Natal from

being over-run by the Boers, and the expeditionary force did

not begin to reach Durban [the port of Natal] till after

Ladysmith had been closely invested. … There were advisers of

the Cabinet who held that the military strength of the Boers

was a bubble easily pricked. Thus it was widely believed that

a severe repulse in Northern Natal would suffice to break up

the Boer forces, and, knowing only that a body of 4,000

British troops was assembled at Dundee and another somewhat

larger at Ladysmith, we hastily assumed that these places were

naturally well suited and had been specially prepared for

defence. When, on the 26th, the concentration at Ladysmith was

accomplished, after a painful and a hazardous march, it was

imagined that our forces occupied an intrenched camp, which,

if necessary, could be held with ease. Later it became clear

that Ladysmith was exceedingly ill-adapted for defence, that

it was practically unfortified when invested, and finally

that, if the attacking force had been composed of trained

troops, it must have fallen, in spite of every effort on the

part of the garrison. The occupation of Dundee, it was

discovered, was maintained against the military judgment of

Sir G. White. …

"When at length the army corps and the cavalry division began,

early in November, to arrive in South Africa, we believed that

the bulk of this large force, which was apparently ready to

take the field, would invade the Orange Free State and strike

for Bloemfontein, clearing Cape Colony and inevitably drawing

Boer forces away from the investments of Kimberley and of

Ladysmith. This was another illusion. At least one-half of the

expeditionary force was despatched to Durban and the rest was

frittered away between three separate lines of advance. There

were thus four separate groupings of British troops, spread

over an immense front, and incapable of affording each other

mutual support. Moreover, the Commander-in-Chief being

involved in a difficult campaign in Natal, there was no

responsible head in Cape Colony, where partial chaos soon

supervened. … Faulty as was the strategy which substituted

scattered efforts with insufficient force for a primary

object, that of the Boers was happily even more ill-conceived.

In place of attempting to occupy our troops in Natal and throwing

their main strength into Cape Colony, where a Dutch rising on

a large scale would inevitably have occurred, they also

preferred to fritter away their strength, devoting their main

efforts against Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking, and

contenting themselves with the occupation of Colesberg and

Stormberg in small force, which, however, was quickly swelled

by local rebels."

_London Times,

November 5, 1900. _

SOUTH AFRICA: The Field of War: A. D. 1899 (October-December).

The early battles.

British reverses.

Siege of Ladysmith.

The serious fighting of the war began in Natal, as early as

the 20th of October, when three columns of the Boer forces

closed in on the British advance post at Glencoe. The first of

the Boer columns to arrive opened a precipitate attack, and in

the hard battle which ensued (at Talana Hill) the British

could claim the final advantage, though at very heavy cost.

Their commander, General Sir W. Penn Symons, received a mortal

wound and died three days afterwards, kindly cared for and

buried by the enemy, his successor in the command, General

Yule, having found it necessary to retreat from Glencoe and

Dundee to Ladysmith. The Boers were already striking at the

railroad between Glencoe and Ladysmith, and sharp fighting had

taken place on the 21st at Elandslaagte, a station on the line

only seventeen miles from the latter town.

{495}

The Boers, in that encounter, had been driven from the

neighboring hills, but the British had again suffered greatly,

and began to realize the quality of the foe with which they had

to deal. A graphic account of the battle at Elandslaagte was

written by the famous newspaper correspondent, G. W. Steevens,

who died shortly afterwards at Ladysmith. Two days after

Elandslaagte there was another engagement at Reitfontein,

still nearer to Ladysmith, fought for the purpose of keeping

the Boers from intercepting the retreat of General Yule. The

British forces defending Natal were now concentrated at

Ladysmith, which they had chosen for their main position, and

in which they had been collecting large quantities of military

stores. General Sir George White was there in general command.

The Boers, with General Joubert in chief command, were rapidly

closing in upon the town, and, on the 29th, they had a Creusot

(French) six-inch gun on a neighboring hill, within range,

ready to drop shells into its streets. That night General

White made an attempt to break their lines which ended in sore

disaster. One column, which marched far out, to a hill called

Nicholson's Nek, for a flanking attack on the enemy, lost most

of its ammunition and its battery, by a stampede of mules, and

then was caught in so helpless a position that it had to lay down

its arms. "The cursed white flag," wrote Mr. Steevens. "was up

again over a British force in South Africa. The best part of a

thousand British soldiers, with all their arms and equipment

and four mountain guns, were captured by the enemy. The Boers

had their revenge for Dundee and Elandslaagte in war; now they

took it full measure in kindness. As Atkins had tended their

wounded and succoured their prisoners there, so they tended

and succoured him here. One commandant wished to send the

wounded to Pretoria; the others, more prudent as well as more

humane, decided to send them back into Ladysmith. They gave

the whole men the water out of their own bottles; they gave

the wounded the blankets off their own saddles and slept

themselves on the naked veldt. They were short of transport,

and they were mostly armed with Martinis; yet they gave

captured mules for the hospital panniers and captured

Lee-Metfords for splints." It is consoling to come on a bit of

incident like this in the generally horrid story of war.

A few days later the communications of Ladysmith southward

were cut off, and the forces commanded by General White, about

10,000 in number, were hemmed in by superior numbers of the

Boers. British reinforcements were now beginning to arrive in

South Africa, and great numbers were at sea, not only imperial

troops, coming from England, India, Ceylon and elsewhere, but

colonial troops, offered by Canada, New Zealand and the

Australian colonies, and accepted by the imperial government.

The first operations of the British campaign were planned with

three objects, more or less distinct, namely, to rescue

General White's army, at Ladysmith, to relieve Kimberley, and

to expel the Boers from northern Cape Colony. They were

conducted on three lines, from the Natal port of Durban,

towards Ladysmith, under General Clery at the beginning; from

Cape Town towards Kimberley, under General Lord Methuen; from

Port Elizabeth and East London to Queenstown and the Cape

districts occupied by the Boers, under General Gatacre.

In the early battles of General Methuen's campaign, fought at

Belmont, November 23d, at Enslin, or Graspan, on the 25th, and

at Modder River, only 25 miles from Kimberley, on the 28th, he

carried his point, and kept up his advance, but at a heavy

sacrifice of men. The battle with Cronje's forces at Modder

River was a desperate struggle of ten hours duration, in which

the British lost nearly 500 men and gained little. The Boers

withdrew to an equally strong position, behind fortified lines

which extended, some six miles in length, on hills between two

points which bore the names of Spytfontein and Majesfontein.

There General Methuen attacked them again, December 11, and

met with a terrible repulse. His Highland Brigade, advancing

in the darkness, before daybreak, was in the midst of the

enemy's intrenchments before it knew them to be near, and was

horribly cut to pieces, losing 53 officers, including its

commander, General Wauchope, and 650 men. The British fell

back to Modder River, leaving not less than 1,000 men behind.

Just one day before this catastrophe, on the 10th, another of

like nature, but little less serious, was sustained by General

Gatacre's column, moving from Queenstown. He, too, attempted a

night march and an early morning attack on the Boers in a

fortified position at Stormberg, was misled by guides,

miscalculated the distance, neglected to send scouts ahead,

and so took his men to the very muzzles of waiting guns. From

the storm which then opened on them there were more than 500

who did not escape. Besides the dead and wounded, many went as

prisoners to Pretoria. Before the week of these defeats

reached its end, another, far worse, had been added in the

Natal campaign. General Sir Redvers Buller, appointed to the

chief command in South Africa, had arrived at Cape Town on the

last day of October, and, after some general study of the

field at large, had taken personal direction of the operations

in Natal, for the relief of Ladysmith. His movements were

undoubtedly hurried by urgent appeals from General White. On

the 15th of December he felt prepared to attempt the passage

of the Tugela River, near Colenso, and did so with his full

force, at two drifts, or fords, some two miles apart. Like

Methuen and Gatacre, he seems to have been strangely

misinformed as to the location and strength of the

intrenchments of the Boers. The latter had succeeded again and

again in concealing lines of deadly rifle-pits and batteries

until their assailants fairly stumbled against them, within

fatally close range. This happened at Colenso, as at Stormberg

and Majesfontein and the ill-managed attempt to begin an

advance upon Ladysmith cost 165 men and officers killed, 670

wounded, 337 prisoners and missing, besides 11 guns.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Field of War: A. D. 1900.

Fighting qualities of the Boers.

"Take a community of Dutchmen of the type of those who

defended themselves for fifty years against all the power of

Spain at a time when Spain was the greatest power in the

world. Intermix with them a strain of those inflexible French

Huguenots who gave up home and fortune and left their country

forever at the time of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes.

The product must obviously be one of the most rugged, virile,

unconquerable races ever seen upon earth.

{496}

Take this formidable people and train them for seven

generations in constant warfare against savage men and

ferocious beasts, in circumstances under which no weakling

could survive, place them so that they acquire exceptional

skill with weapons and in horsemanship, give them a country

which is eminently suited to the tactics of the huntsman, the

marksman, and the rider. Then, finally, put a finer temper

upon their military qualities by a dour fatalistic Old

Testament religion and an ardent and consuming patriotism.

Combine all these qualities and all these impulses in one

individual, and you have the modern Boer—the most formidable

antagonist who ever crossed the path of Imperial Britain."

_A. C. Doyle,

The Great Boer War,

chapter 1._

Count Adalbert von Sternberg, a German officer who served with

the Boers, and who has since related his experiences in a

book, writes to the same effect. "The Boers," he remarks,

"were mounted, whilst the English were on foot, a matter of

considerable importance in these hot countries. Given the same

or even slightly superior forces, no Continental army would

have played its part better than the English, and I even doubt

whether, in regard to practical equipment and technical smartness

and efficiency the Continent would have done as well. The fact

is the Boer is an enemy of quite exceptional a character, such

as never has been met before, or is likely to be met again.

Mounted sharpshooters, armed with the very best of weapons,

acclimatized, fanatical, and accustomed to habits of war, are

terrible opponents, and cannot be dealt with off hand as if

they were hordes of savages. One must not forget that the

Boers have the keenest eyes imaginable, and that they

understand better than anyone else how to get the fullest

advantage of cover. All these are advantages which go far

towards compensating defective leading and the weakening of

moral due to being always on the defensive. … The Boers would

have had much greater successes if they had not abandoned all

idea of taking the offensive. They could not be brought to

that, for that they lacked courage, and to that lack of

courage they owe their destruction."

SOUTH AFRICA: The Field of War: A. D. 1900 (January-February).

Continued British disasters on the Tugela.

Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener in the field.

Invasion of Orange Free State.

Capture of General Cronje and army.

Relief of Kimberley and Ladysmith.

The dark and heavy clouds of disaster which overhung the

British in South Africa at the close of the year shadowed

England with anxiety and gloom. For the first time, the

seriousness of the task of war in which the country had become

engaged was understood, and energies corresponding to it were

roused. Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, of Indian and Afghan

renown, was sent out to take supreme command, with the equally

famous Lord Kitchener, subjugator of the Egyptian Sudan, for

his chief of staff. Immense reinforcements of troops were

provided for with haste. On the 1st of January it was

estimated that 30,000 fresh troops were afloat or on the point

of embarkation, and that Lord Roberts would have 200,000 men

at command when all then assigned to South Africa should have

reached Natal and the Cape. Lord Roberts landed at the Cape on

the 10th of January, and was occupied for a month in

organizing and preparing for new movements in the field.

Meantime, General Buller had made a second attempt to turn the

strongly fortified position of his opponent on the Tugela,

between his own army and the beleaguered force at Ladysmith,

and had failed more discouragingly than before. Crossing the

Tugela, some miles west of Colenso, on the 17th, he pressed a

hard-fought, uphill advance, from one to another of the rocky

hills (called kopjes) of the region, for several days. On the

23d his troops stormed the fortifications of the Boers on

Spion Kop, a spur of the Drakenberg mountains, and carried

them with heavy loss, only to find that they were commanded

from other heights and could not be held. Again he drew back

to the southern bank of the Tugela, on the 29th; but only for

a few days. On the 5th of February his army was once more

pushed beyond the river, and entrenched in a position among

the hills, which it held until the 9th, and was then, for the

third time, withdrawn. This third movement is supposed to

have been a feint, intended to detain the Boer forces in his

front, either from some assault feared at Ladysmith or from

interference with the campaign which Lord Roberts was about to

open. The besieged at Ladysmith were holding out with grim

resolution, but they were known to be in sore straits.

Occasional messages by the heliograph told of much sickness

and fast approaching starvation in the town. Fever was killing

more than the shells from the bombarding guns; and the chances

of relief seemed to have almost disappeared.

But a sudden change in the whole military situation was about

to be made. Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener had organized

arrangements of transportation and supplies for handling the

immense force now at their command, and were ready to execute

their plans. The former arrived at Modder River on the 9th of

February; two days later his columns were set in motion, and

the Boer forces, under General Cronje, were too greatly

outnumbered to withstand the avalanche which fell upon them.

General French led a cavalry expedition to Kimberley, reaching

the town on the 15th and raising the siege. The next day

General Cronje was in retreat towards Bloemfontein, the Free

State capital, harassed by British cavalry, and with the main

army of Lord Roberts straining every nerve to strike him

before he reached it. On the 18th he was brought to bay, at a

point on the Madder River, near Paardeberg, where he defended

himself for nine days, in a situation that was impregnable to

assault, but terribly exposed to artillery fire from

surrounding heights. He was expecting help from the forces in

Natal and elsewhere, and several attempts were made by his

associates to reach him; but the British were too strong to be

driven from their prey. After suffering to such a degree that

his men would endure no more, the brave and stubborn Boer

surrendered on the 27th, his army, reduced to about 4,000,

laying down their arms. Some 500 had been taken in the

previous fighting, and considerable numbers in the last days

of the siege, are said to have deserted and found means to

slip through the enemy's lines. The prisoners were sent, for

convenience of custody, to the island of St. Helena, the

general being accompanied by his whole family, and treated

with much respect.

{497}

While these operations were being carried to success by Lord

Roberts, General Buller was again attacking the formidable

fortifications of the enemy in his front. From the 14th of

February until the 23d he sacrificed great numbers of men in

assaults which failed to break a passage through the kopjes

defended by Boer guns. But Lord Roberts's invasion of the Free

State had, by this time, caused large withdrawals of Boers

from the line of the Tugela, and they were preparing to raise

the siege of Ladysmith. Consequently, when the British attack

was renewed, on the 27th, it achieved success, at last. The

Boers were driven from their main position and abandoned their

whole line. Ladysmith was reached by a swift advance of

cavalry the next day, and the half-starved garrison and

citizens were soon receiving supplies.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Field of War: A. D. 1900 (March).

Overtures of peace from Presidents Kruger and Steyn.

The reply of Lord Salisbury.

Death of General Joubert.

On the 5th of March, the Presidents of the South African

Republic and the Orange Free State addressed the following

telegram, jointly, to Lord Salisbury: "The blood and tears of

the thousands who have suffered by this war, and the prospect

of all the moral and economic ruin with which South Africa is

now threatened, make it necessary for both belligerents to ask

themselves dispassionately, and as in the sight of the Triune

God, for what they are fighting, and whether the aim of each

justifies all this devouring misery and devastation. With this

object, and in view of the assertions of various members of

the British Parliament to the effect that this war was begun

and is being carried on with the set purpose of undermining

Her Majesty's authority in South Africa, and of setting up an

Administration over all South Africa independent of Her

Majesty's Government, we consider it our duty solemnly to

declare that this war was undertaken solely as a defensive

measure for securing the threatened independence of the South

African Republic, and is only continued in order to secure the

incontestable independence of both Republics as sovereign

international States, and to ensure that those of Her

Majesty's subjects who have taken part with us in this war

shall suffer no harm whatever in person or property. On these

conditions, but on these conditions alone, are we now, as in

the past, desirous of seeing peace reëstablished in South

Africa, and of putting an end to the evil now reigning over

South Africa; while, if Her Majesty's Government is determined

to destroy the independence of the Republics, there is nothing

left to us and our people but to persevere to the end in the

course already begun, in spite of the overwhelming

pre-eminence of the British Empire, confident that the God who

lighted the unextinguishable fire of the love of freedom in

the hearts of our fathers will not forsake us, but will

accomplish His work in us and in our descendants. We hesitated

to make this declaration earlier to Your Excellency, as we

feared that as long as the advantage was always on our side,

and as long as our forces held defensive positions far in Her

Majesty's Colonies, such a declaration might hurt the feelings

of honour of the British people; but now that the prestige of the

British Empire may be considered to be assured by the capture

of one of our forces by Her Majesty's troops, and that we are

thereby forced to evacuate other positions which our forces

had occupied, that difficulty is over, and we no longer

hesitate clearly to inform your Government and people in the

sight of the whole civilised world why we are fighting, and on

what conditions we are ready to restore peace."

On the 11th Lord Salisbury replied as follows: "I have the

honour to acknowledge Your Honours' telegram, dated the 5th of

March, from Bloemfontein, of which the purport is principally

to demand that Her Majesty's Government shall recognise the

'incontestable independence' of the South African Republic and

Orange Free State 'as sovereign international States,' and to

offer, on those terms, to bring the war to a conclusion. In

the beginning of October last peace existed between Her

Majesty and the two Republics under the Conventions which then

were in existence. A discussion had been proceeding for some

months between Her Majesty's Government and the South African

Republic, of which the object was to obtain redress for

certain very serious grievances under which British residents

in the South African Republic were suffering. In the course of

those negotiations, the South African Republic had, to the

knowledge of Her Majesty's Government, made considerable

armaments, and the latter had, consequently, taken steps to

provide corresponding reinforcements to the British garrisons

of Cape Town and Natal. No infringement of the rights

guaranteed by the Conventions had, up to that point, taken

place on the British side. Suddenly, at two days' notice, the

South African Republic, after issuing an insulting ultimatum,

declared war upon Her Majesty; and the Orange Free State, with

whom there had not even been any discussion, took a similar

step. Her Majesty's dominions were immediately invaded by the

two Republics, siege was laid to three towns within the

British frontier, a large portion of the two Colonies was

overrun, with great destruction to property and life, and the

Republics claimed to treat the inhabitants of extensive

portions of Her Majesty's dominions as if those dominions had

been annexed to one or other of them. In anticipation of these

operations the South African Republic had been accumulating

for many years past military stores on an enormous scale,

which by their character could only have been intended for use

against Great Britain. Your Honours make some observations of a

negative character upon the object with which these

preparations were made. I do not think it necessary to discuss

the questions you have raised. But the result of these

preparations, carried on with great secrecy, has been that the

British Empire has been compelled to confront an invasion

which has entailed upon the Empire a costly war and the loss

of thousands of precious lives. This great calamity has been

the penalty which Great Britain has suffered for having in

recent years acquiesced in the existence of the two Republics.

In view of the use to which the two Republics have put the

position which was given to them, and the calamities which

their unprovoked attack has inflicted upon Her Majesty's

dominions, Her Majesty's Government can only answer Your

Honours' telegram by saying that they are not prepared to

assent to the independence either of the South African

Republic or of the Orange Free State."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command:

Africa, Number 2, 1900._

{498}

On the 27th of March, the Boer cause experienced a great loss,

in the sudden death, from peritonitis, of General Joubert, the

Commandant-General and Vice President of the South African

Republic.

SOUTH AFRICA: Orange Free State: A. D. 1900 (March).

Proclamation to the burghers by the British commander.

Soon after entering the Orange Free State, Lord Roberts issued

a proclamation addressed to the burghers, assuring them that

the British government did not believe them to be responsible

for the aggressive act of war committed by the government of

the Orange Free State, and bore them no ill-will. "I,

therefore," his proclamation continued, "warn all Burghers to

desist from any further hostility towards Her Majesty's

Government and the troops under my command, and I undertake

that any of them, who may so desist and who are found staying

in their homes and quietly pursuing their ordinary

occupations, will not be made to suffer in their persons or

property on account of their having taken up arms in obedience

to the order of their Government. Those, however, who oppose

the forces under my command, or furnish the enemy with

supplies or information, will be dealt with according to the

customs of war. Requisitions for food, forage, fuel, or

shelter, made on the authority of the officers in command of

Her Majesty's troops, must be at once complied with; but

everything will be paid for on the spot, prices being

regulated by the local market rates. If the inhabitants of any

district refuse to comply with the demands made on them, the

supplies will be taken by force, a full receipt being given.

Should any inhabitant of the country consider that he or any

member of his household has been unjustly treated by any

officer, soldier or civilian attached to the British Army, he

should submit his complaint, either personally or in writing,

to my Headquarters or to the Headquarters of the nearest

General Officer. Should the complaint on enquiry be

substantiated, redress will be given. Orders have been issued

by me, prohibiting soldiers from entering private houses, or

molesting the civil population on any pretext whatever, and

every precaution has been taken against injury to property on

the part of any person belonging to, or connected with, the

Army."

After the occupation of Bloemfontein, Lord Roberts issued a

second proclamation, announcing that he had received authority

from his government to offer the following terms to those "who

have been engaged in the present war": "All Burghers who have

not taken a prominent part in the policy which has led to the

war between Her Majesty and the Orange Free State, or

commanded any forces of the Republic, or commandeered or used

violence to any British subjects, and who are willing to lay

down their arms at once, and to bind themselves by an oath to

abstain from further participation in the war, will be given

passes to allow them to return to their homes and will not be

made prisoners of war, nor will their property be taken from

them."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command:

Cd. 261, 1900, pages 62-63._

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal and the Free State:

A. D. 1900 (March).

Boer Peace Commissioners to Europe and America.

In March, three commissioners, Messrs. Fischer, Wolmeraans and

Wessels were sent to Europe and America by the two Boer

governments to solicit intervention in their behalf. They

visited several European countries and proceeded thence to the

United States, in May. There were many demonstrations of

popular sympathy in their reception, on both sides of the

ocean, but they failed to obtain official recognition.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Field of War: A. D. 1900 (March-May).

The British in Bloemfontein and Kroonstad.

The relief of Mafeking.

From the scene of the surrender of General Cronje Lord Roberts

moved quickly on the Free State capital. His advance was

resisted by considerable forces of the Boers, but he was able

to turn most of their positions, and fought only one severe

battle, at Driefontein, on the 10th of March. On the 12th his

cavalry was in possession of Bloemfontein, and the

Field-Marshal entered the city on the following day, receiving

from the municipal officers a formal surrender of the keys of the

public buildings, and being welcomed by some part of the

population with demonstrations of joy. President Steyn and

most of the members of the government of the Republic had

retired to Kroonstad and established the seat of authority

there. The lighting and the forced marches of a single month,

since he began his advance, had now exhausted the mobility of

Lord Roberts's army, worn out the means of transportation

which Lord Kitchener had hastily organized for it,—while his

troops were being stricken with fever,—and he was compelled to

suspend his campaign for some weeks. The situation at that

time was probably described with accuracy by a military

contributor to "Blackwood's Magazine" for June, 1900, who

wrote: "Lord Roberts found himself at Bloemfontein with the

wreck of an army and a single narrow-gauge line of railway

between himself and his base, upwards of 700 miles distant. It

was very soon known in Boer headquarters at Kroonstad that he

could not move beyond Bloemfontein for some weeks. The

triumphal march of Generals Gatacre and Clements through the

recently captured territory, accepting submissions, hoisting

union-jacks and picking up rifles of antique date, afforded

much amusement to the Boers, who saw their opportunity and

streamed down in large numbers on the small British posts

which were scattered east and south of the railway."

There was a good deal of raiding and fighting on a minor

scale, with a number of mortifying mishaps to the British

arms; but little of importance occurred in the military field

until near the end of April, when Lord Roberts had reinforced

and mobilized his army sufficiently to move forward again,

towards Pretoria. On the 12th of May he entered Kroonstad, and

the Free State government was again in flight. He paused at

Kroonstad for some days, and while he paused there came news

of the relief of Mafeking, which caused a wilder joy in

England than any other event of the war. There had been

painful anxiety on account of the besieged in that remote

town, in the far corner of Bechuanaland, on the border of the

Transvaal,—so far from help, and so stoutly defended for seven

weary months by a very small force. From a point near

Kimberley, a flying column of mounted men, mostly colonial

troops, commanded by Colonel Mahon, had been started northward

on the 4th of May, taking a route east of the railway, to avoid,

as much as possible, the Boers.

{499}

On the 15th they were 20 miles west of Mafeking, and there

they were joined by another detachment, under Colonel Plumer,

which had been operating in the northern region for some weeks

without being able to break up the siege. The two advanced on

the works of the besiegers, drove them out by hard fighting,

and entered the town on the 18th of May. Meantime, another

column, under General Hunter, had been securing and opening

the railway, to bring up the sorely needed supplies for the

famished and worn-out garrison and people of the town. The

defense of Mafeking was one of the finest performances of the

war, and gave distinction to Colonel Baden-Powell.

SOUTH AFRICA: Cape Colony: A. D. 1900 (April-June).

The question of the treatment of Cape Colonists who had taken

part with the Boers in the war.

Resignation of Premier Schreiner.

On the 28th of April, the Ministers of Cape Colony addressed

to the Governor, Sir Alfred Milner, a Minute upon the subject

of the treatment of those inhabitants of the Colony who had

joined or given aid to the Boers in the war, and who had thus

made themselves liable to the pains and penalties of high

treason. "Ministers submit," they said, "that the ends of

justice would be served by the selection of a certain limited

number of the principal offenders, whose trials would mark the

magnitude of their offence, and whose punishment, if found

guilty, would act as a deterrent. For the remainder, Ministers

believe that the interests both of sound policy and of public

morality would be served if Her Gracious Majesty were moved to

issue, as an act of grace, a Proclamation of amnesty under

which, upon giving proper security for their good behaviour,

all persons chargeable with high treason, except those held

for trial, might be enlarged and allowed to return to their

avocations. Ministers urge such a course not only on the

ground of that natural desire for clemency towards her erring

subjects which they feel sure would spring from Her Gracious

Majesty, but from a deep sense of the importance of such a

step upon the future well-being of this country."

The substance of the Minute was transmitted by cable to Mr.

Chamberlain, and he replied to it on the 5th of May, objecting

to the proposed proclamation of a broad amnesty, saying:

"Clemency to rebels is a policy which has the hearty sympathy

of Her Majesty's Government, but justice to loyalists is an

obligation of duty and honour. The question is how can these

two policies be harmonized. It is clear that in the interest

of future peace it is necessary to show that rebellion cannot

be indulged in with impunity, and above all that if

unsuccessful it is not a profitable business for the rebel.

Otherwise the State would be offering a premium to rebellion.

The present moment, therefore, while the war is still

proceeding, and while efforts may still be made to tempt

British subjects into rebellious courses, is in any case not

appropriate for announcing that such action may be indulged in

with absolute impunity. And if, as has been suggested, a great

many of the Queen's rebellious subjects are the mere tools of

those who have deceived them, it is important that these

should be made aware individually that whatever their leaders

may tell them rebellion is a punishable offence." This

attitude of the Imperial Government on the subject of amnesty

occasioned differences in the Ministry of Cape Colony which

led to the resignation of the Premier, Mr. W. P. Schreiner, on

the 13th of June, and the appointment of a new Ministry, under

Sir Gordon Sprigg.

_Great Britain, Papers by Command:

July, 1900, Cape Colony, Cd. 264._

SOUTH AFRICA: The Field of War: A. D. 1900 (May).

The British army stricken with fever.

The losses of the British army in battle during this campaign

of Lord Roberts had not been severe; but it had encountered a

worse enemy than the Boers, and was being terribly thinned and

shattered by the ravages of enteric or typhoid fever. The

sanitary condition of the army in May, and the lack of due

provision for dealing with the dreadful epidemic, have been

graphically described by the writer already quoted, in

"Blackwood's Magazine." Referring to the outset of the

campaign, in February, he wrote:

"The movement of men and cattle depends on flesh and muscle—it

cannot go on for ever; the strain of incessant marching on

insufficient food and forage will find out the weak spot even

in the most willing. General French started on his memorable

ride with 4,800 horses, of which 990 dropped by the way,

though the loss in the ranks, exclusive of Paardeberg, was

only fifty men,—the brunt of the battle for life lay with the

horses. But not for long. The men with worn-out boots,

tattered clothes, hurrying through scorching days and frosty

nights, with half a biscuit and water tainted with dead Boers,

to satisfy an appetite and thirst compelled by hard work at an

altitude of 4,000 feet, who marched in as soldiers, proud of the

victory they had won, staggered and fell out, victims to the

curse that creeps in, unnoticed, wherever camps are

crowded—enteric. … Of all things on which we prided ourselves

was the care and the money we had lavished to provide comforts

for our sick soldiers. The foremost surgeons of the day had

volunteered; military hospitals had been arranged on the

latest plan; private benevolence had provided as many more;

ladies of every rank in life had gone out to nurse: the

soldiers, at all events, would be looked after. Letters from

the front had come from patients to say how well they had been

treated. Mr. Treves at the Reform Club made a speech eulogizing

the perfection of the hospitals in Natal, and Sir W. MacCormac

spoke of the medical arrangements as admirable—our minds

rested content. All this was so long ago as the 10th March,

but what happened in March, for all we knew, was happening in

May. Then Mr. Burdett-Coutts told us that hundreds of men were

lying in the worst stages of typhoid, with only a blanket to

cover them, a thin water-proof sheet (not even that for many)

between them and the ground; no milk and hardly any medicines;

without beds, stretchers, or mattresses; without pillows, without

linen of any kind, without a single nurse amongst them, with a

few private soldiers as orderlies, and only three doctors to

attend on 350 patients; their faces covered with flies in

black clusters, the men too weak to brush them off, trying in

vain to dislodge them by painful twitching of the

features—there was no one to do it for them. And this a mile

from Bloemfontein, where the army had been for six weeks. It

is true that a terrible epidemic had followed it from

Paardeberg, to break out when it halted. Lord Roberts tells us

that before he left on May 3rd the sick gradually increased to

2,000, reaching on June 4th the appalling number, in

Bloemfontein, of over 5,000 suffering from typhoid alone.

{500}

Such were the bare facts as stated on either side—a sudden and

devastating epidemic with totally inadequate hospital

arrangements to meet it. … Yet typhoid has always been the

scourge of armies in the field,—in South Africa the

water-supply, invariably surface drainage fouled by dead

animals, is proverbial—that at least was known. The medical

authorities on the spot were repeatedly warned by local

medical men that from February onwards ten men would be down

with typhoid for one with wounds. Ladysmith is in evidence of

the persistent presence of typhoid—every one who has visited

South Africa bears witness to the same—it can hardly be urged

that an outbreak was unreasonable to expect; yet when it did

occur it seems to have been taken by the medical

administration at the base as an unwarrantable intrusion."

_The War Operations in South Africa

(Blackwood's Magazine, August, 1900)._

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1900 (May).

Speech of President Kruger to the Volksraads.

The following translation of a speech addressed to both

Volksraads by President Kruger, in May, 1900, was published in

England some months later: "It is known to you," said the

President, "how, before the war started, pressure was brought

to bear to obtain the franchise. It is known to you that the

Government conceded, after the Rand had consented, although

this body saw the difficulty in the matter, till even the

burghers made petitions to the effect that we had parted with

all our rights. The Government had in view the prevention of

shedding blood. The Raad then consented to a seven years'

franchise, and also to grant immediately the franchise to

people resident here longer than seven years. There were then

nearly 30,000 who would obtain the franchise immediately, and

so much was conceded that when these had obtained the

franchise they would have been able to out-vote the old

burghers. We consented to this solely to prevent the shedding

of blood. Yet they were not satisfied and they wanted the

franchise after five years' residence. Our burghers were

against this, and there were also members of the Raad who

would not agree to this, yet, nevertheless, the Government

made a proposition about it, because they had discovered that

it was not about the franchise, but that it was a pretence

full of Pharisaic hypocrisy, because documents had been found

that in 1896 it was decided that the two independent Republics

should not be allowed to exist any more. I cannot express

myself otherwise than to call it a devilish fraud. Peace was

spoken of while a resolution had already been passed to

annihilate us. Even if we had conceded more, yea, even if we

had said that the franchise could be obtained after one year,

then that would not have been accepted. It was proved by

documents that, as this nation could not be allowed to be a

free nation, as was pointed out in the address, the

Government, to prevent the further shedding of blood, made a

proposition to Chamberlain and Salisbury about this matter,

and what was the reply? You have, doubtless, read the paper,

and, although I cannot verbally repeat the contents of the

said document, it amounts to this. That they were annoyed ever

to have acknowledged us as an independent nation, and that,

notwithstanding all conventions made, they would never

acknowledge this nation as self-supporting. Honourable

gentlemen, I had to express that which was in my mind. Psalm

83 speaks of the assault of the evil one on the Kingdom of

Christ. That must not exist. The self-same words of Salisbury

also appear, because he says 'this nation must not exist,' and

God says, 'this nation shall exist.' Who will be victorious?

Certainly the Lord. You see therein the deceit which they then

already practised, even they, for though our nation did not

wish to part with any rights, the Executive Council conceded

so far that we nearly lost the country. The intention was not

to obtain these rights. They wanted our country not to be

independent any longer. Every other proposition was

unsatisfactory to them.

"Let us look this matter in the face and see the cunning

deceit enveloped therein. They wrote to the Orange Free State

that they had nothing against them, but that they had some

grievance against this Republic. Their intention was to tear

the two Republics asunder, and it has been proved by

documentary evidence that neither of them would be allowed to

remain. You see the deception which lies therein. The

documents prove that this was already decided in 1896, from

the time of Jameson's invasion, and yet they maintain that if

the Orange Free State had laid down their weapons that that

country would remain in existence. The Orange Free State

decided not to lay down their arms, and we started together.

We were 40,000 men, but everywhere we had to watch the

Kaffirs, and even the commander of Mafeking informed us that

certain Kaffir chiefs would assist him. We know that these

numbered 30,000 able-bodied men. The number of Kaffirs nearly

equalled the number of our forces. Besides them, more than

200,000 English troops arrived, and against these we have to

fight. Now, gentlemen, look on God's government. Is it not

wonderful that 40,000 men having to fight these thousands,

besides the coloured people, still live? Acknowledge therein

the hand of God. The matter I wish to impress is this. It is

remarkable that when we meet the enemy we stand in the

proportion of 10 to 100. Yet the Lord hath spared us thus far.

I do not wish to prophesy, but I wish to point out that our

guidance is in the word of God. It is extraordinary, but this

war is a sign of the times. What it amounts to is this. That

the power of the Beast is an obstinate power to persecute the

Church and will continue this until the Lord says, 'Thus far

and no further: and why? Because the Church must be tried and

purified as there is so much iniquity among us. That is why

the war is extraordinary and is a sign of the times. Every one

will be convinced that the word of God can be plainly traced

in this matter. They say that the people 'shall not exist,'

but God says, 'it shall exist and be purified.' In my mind it

lies clear and discernable that the day of grace is not far

off. The Lord will prove to be ruler, and nothing shall take

place without His will. When He allows chastisement to come

upon us we must bend ourselves and humble ourselves, confess

our sins and turn again to the Lord. When the whole nation has

been humbled, and it is seen that we can do nothing ourselves,

the Lord will help us and we shall have peace immediately.

{501}

This humility has not grasped our hearts sufficiently at

present, and we must perform our earnest duty as Peter says in

1 Peter, chapter v., v. 7 and 8:—'Casting all your care upon

Him; for He careth for you'; but in the eighth verse it

states:—'Be sober, be vigilant; because your adversary the

Devil, as a roaring lion, walketh about, seeking whom he may

devour.' That is the point on which we must be careful. If we

fall into disbelief then we lower ourselves.

"I ask you, brothers, what is their behaviour? In an open

letter Kaffirs are called up by them as at Derdepoort, and

women and children are murdered. The English assert that no

Kaffirs were utilized against us but only coloured people, but

it is a fact that Montsioa with his Kaffirs are in Mafeking,

and are employed to fight against us. Now, gentlemen, you must

not come to the conclusion that everyone who fights against us

belongs to the Beast (vide Revelations, chapter 13). There are

certainly hundreds of God's children with them who, however,

through fear are the Beast's, and are forced to act with them,

but God knows all hearts. We did not seek to spill the blood

which lies strewn upon the earth, as we conceded nearly all

our rights; but when they wanted to murder us, we could not

give way any more. How did it fare with Ahab? The mighty foe

came on to the walls of the city, and they lost heart. Then

the prophet of God came and said, Fear nothing. Then God

arose, and in that God we must put our trust, because He is

the same God. Let us not, therefore, live as if no God

existed; He reigns. In the beginning was the Word, and the

Word was God, and the Word became flesh and lived amongst us.

Look at history, it must be an example to us. He is still the

same God who led out Israel and hardened the heart of Pharaoh

to the end, until finally all the first-born of the Egyptians

died, whereupon Pharaoh allowed the Israelites to go. He is

still the same God who calmed the winds and storms on the sea,

and His arm is not shortened. Some ask, 'Does not this only

have reference to the Church in the two Republics?' No. See

the three youths in the burning oven. Did these rejoice alone?

No; but God's people of the whole earth. Was it solitary for

Daniel in the lions' den? No, but all Christians on the whole

earth rejoiced. So the Lord often chooses a small body to whom

He shows His miracles as an example for the whole Christian

world. Look upon the blood which has been spilt upon this

earth. Who is the cause of it? We have wanted peace and our

freedom since 1836, and the Lord has given it us, and will the

Lord ever give anything and then withdraw? No. But let us

humble ourselves before the Lord. There is no doubt about it

that eventually the Lord will lead us to victory. The day of

grace is not far from His people. Do not let us doubt but

remain true to God's word and fight in His name. When the cup

of humiliation is brought to our lips and we earnestly humble

ourselves before the Lord, then the day of grace has arrived.

Let each one then acknowledge that it is the hand of God which

makes us free and nothing else, then we shall not boast. Yet He

uses man as His instrument.

"I have laid my address before you, and I hope that the Raad

will not sit over it longer than to-morrow morning. There are

several members of the Raad who are burghers or military

officers in the field, so there will be no time to treat

ordinary subjects. I trust that you will only treat such

subjects as I lay before you. I have appointed an acting

Commandant General since I have lost my right-hand man,

although I do not infer that I have not more such men. The

late most noble Commandant General, Messrs. Kock and

Wolmarans, members of the executive council, are lost to me.

The State Secretary is a newly appointed one, and I am the

only one remaining of the old members of the executive

council, yet I have experienced much assistance and support

from the present members, and God will also support us. The

Lord is still our Commander-in-Chief; He gives orders and He

knows when to say, 'Thus far and no further.' It is surprising

how other Powers are unanimously with us and how the whole of

Europe prays for us, and will the Lord lend a deaf ear to

these prayers? Oh, no! Trust in the Lord and let us stand by

Him, and He will perform miracles. Even if I have to go to St.

Helena, the Lord will bring His people back and make them free,

and the same judgment will fall on the present Babylon, the

cause of all the spilt blood. We fight for the freedom which

God granted to us. I say again, should any brothers from this

Raad and private persons fall by the sword, they fought in the

name of the Lord and believed, and they, so says the word of

the Lord, are sacrificed on the altar for the glorification of

His name and of the glorious Church, which, at this time, is to

be revealed. The Church must be tried and purified, and that

is why I cannot see that this extraordinary war will be

allowed to destroy us. This war will be continued until the

Lord says, 'Thus far and no further,' remain at that, abide by

that, and fight with me. I give myself in the hands of the

Lord, whatever He has destined for me, I shall kiss His rod

with which He chastizes me because I am also guilty. Let

everyone humble himself before the Lord, I have said."

SOUTH AFRICA: Orange Free State: A. D. 1900 (May).

Annexation by proclamation of Lord Roberts to the

Dominions of the Queen.

"In view of Lord Robert's opinion that early annexation would

tend towards the pacification of the country, by removing a

feeling of uncertainty as to the return of President Steyn's

government," the following commission by the Queen to Lord

Roberts was issued on the 21st of May:

"Victoria R. I., by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom of

Great Britain and Ireland Queen, Defender of the Faith,

Empress of India: To Our Right Trusty and Well-beloved

Councillor Frederick Sleigh, Baron Roberts of Kandahar, Field

Marshal of Our Forces, Knight of Our Most Illustrious Order of

Saint Patrick, Knight Grand Cross of Our Most Honourable Order

of the Bath, Knight Grand Commander of Our Most Exalted Order

of the Star of India, Knight Grand Commander of Our Most

Eminent Order of the Indian Empire, upon whom We have

conferred the Decoration of the Victoria Cross. Greeting:

Whereas the territories in South Africa heretofore known as

the Orange Free State have been conquered by Our forces, And

whereas it is expedient that such territories should be

annexed to and should henceforth form part of Our Dominions:

Now know you that We, reposing especial trust and confidence

in you the said Frederick Sleigh, Baron Roberts of Kandahar,

do hereby authorize and empower you in Our name to annex the

said territories and to declare that the said territories

shall henceforth form part of Our Dominions.

{502}

And We do hereby constitute and appoint you to be thereupon

Administrator of the said territories provisionally and until

Our pleasure is more fully known. And We do authorize and

empower you as such Administrator to take all such measures,

and to make and enforce such laws as you may deem necessary

for the peace, order, and good government of the said

territories. And we do strictly charge and command all Our

officers, civil and military, and all other Our faithful

subjects, that in their several places, and according to their

respective opportunities, they do aid and assist you in the

execution of this Our Commission, and for so doing this shall

be your Warrant. Given at Our Court at St. James's, this 21st

day of May, One thousand nine hundred, in the Sixty-third Year

of Our Reign." The commission was executed by a public reading

of the proclamation of Lord Roberts at Bloemfontein on the

24th of May.

_Great Britain, Papers by Command: 1900,

Cd. 261, pages 136, 144._

A counter-proclamation, referring to that of the British

commander, was issued by President Steyn, from Reitz, on the

11th of June, declaring: "Whereas an unjust war was forced on

the people of the Orange Free State and of the South African

Republic by Great Britain in the month of October 1899, and

whereas these two small Republics have maintained the unequal

struggle with the powerful British Empire for more than eight

months and still maintain it; … Whereas the forces of the

Orange Free State are still in the field and the Orange Free

State has not been conquered and whereas the aforesaid

proclamation is thus in contradiction with International Law;

Whereas the independence of the Orange Free State has been

acknowledged by nearly all the civilised Powers; Whereas it is

notorious that the British authorities have lately recognised

that the Orange Free State is governed in an exemplary manner,

and that it is both a violation of the laws of civilization

and a denial of the fundamental rights of such people to rob

it on what a pretence soever, of its freedom, and whereas I

consider it desirable to make known to all whom it may concern

that the aforesaid Proclamation is not recognised by the

Government and the people of the Orange Free State; So,

therefore, I, M. T. Steyn, State President of the Orange Free

State, in consultation with the Executive Council, and in the

name of the independent people of the Orange Free State, do

hereby proclaim that the aforesaid annexation is not

recognised and is hereby declared to be null and of no avail.

The people of the Orange Free State is and remains a free and

independent people, and refuses to submit to British rule."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command:

Cd. 261, 1900, page 155._

SOUTH AFRICA: Cape Colony: A. D. 1900 (May).

Opposition of Cape Colony Afrikanders to the annexation

of the Republics.

A "People's Congress" of the Afrikanders, or Bondmen, of Cape

Colony, was held at Graaff-Reinet, on the 30th of May, to

protest against the annexation of the Boer Republics. The

following resolution was adopted by acclamation: "Whereas,

were the Republics to be annexed the majority of Cape

Colonists would feel themselves bound morally to work

unceasingly by every right and lawful means for the

restoration of independence to the Republics, and to make that

end their first political object; And whereas from our

knowledge of the history and character of the Republics we are

convinced they would never become the willing subjects of the

Empire, but would seize any and every opportunity which might

offer itself to recover their independence, possibly by force

of arms, once they were to be deprived of it; And whereas

instead of the annexation of the Republics tending to promote

the welfare of their people, as has been claimed, it would, if

successfully maintained for any long period, tend to degrade

those people and their offsprings, seeing that the servitude

of a self-governing State is as demoralising to its people as

the more direct form of personal slavery; And whereas, as the

annexation of the Republics by Great Britain would be as great

a wrong morally as the theft by a rich man of a poor man's

hard-earned savings; On that general ground alone it is not

believable that permanent good could result from such a

policy. Therefore be it resolved now that we, on behalf of the

majority of Cape Colonists, do hereby declare our solemn and

profound conviction that the annexation of the two South

African Republics would be disastrous to the peace and welfare

of South Africa and of the Empire as a whole." Also the

following: "Be it resolved that it is the opinion of the

people in Congress here assembled that a settlement of the

South African question on the following basis would prove a

blessing to South Africa and the Empire, namely, that the two

Republics should have their unqualified independence; that the

Colonies should have the right to enter into treaties of

obligatory arbitration with the Republics for the settlement

of all disputes affecting the internal affairs of the South

African Continent, and that this colony, and any other colony

so deserving it, should have a voice in the selection of its

Governors. Be it further resolved that a settlement on the

above basis would make the majority of the people who have

made South Africa their home the warm friends and staunch

allies of the British Empire, and that in no other way known

to us can that end now be attained."

In transmitting a report of this meeting to Secretary

Chamberlain, the High Commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner, wrote:

"I do not myself take a very gloomy view of the prospect of

racial relations in the Colony, much less in South Africa

generally. If it is true, as the conciliators are never tired

of threatening us, that race hatred will be eternal, why

should they make such furious efforts to keep it up at the

present moment? The very vehemence of their declarations that

the Africanders will never forgive, nor forget, nor acquiesce,

seems to me to indicate a considerable and well-justified

anxiety on their part lest these terrible things should after

all happen."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command:

July, 1900, South Africa, Cd. 261, pages 182-188._

{503}

SOUTH AFRICA: The Field of War: A. D. 1900 (May-June).

The British invasion of the Transvaal.

Occupation of Johannesburg and Pretoria.

Expulsion of the Boers from Natal.

Discussion of terms of surrender.

On the 22d of May, Lord Roberts resumed his forward movement

from Kroonstad, with a strong column of cavalry, under General

French, in advance on the west, and another, of mounted

infantry, under General Ian Hamilton, on the east. The Boers,

under General Botha, had prepared defensive works on the

Rhenoster River, but were too much endangered by the flanking

column of General Hamilton to make a stand there, and fell

back. Again at the Vaal River, their fortifications were

untenable, as against an invasion of such numbers, with so

large a mounted force. With little resistance the British army

crossed the Vaal on the 26th and 27th and entered the

territory of the South African Republic. On the 30th it was

before Johannesburg, and the town was surrendered on the

following day. Thence the invading force moved upon Pretoria,

meeting some opposition, but evidently none that was hopefully

made, and the capital was surrendered unconditionally to Lord

Roberts on the 5th of June. President Kruger and the officials

of his government had left the town, with their archives and

their treasure, and movable offices had been prepared for them

in railway cars, which were transferred for the time being to

Machadodorp, at some distance eastward. Most of the armed

burghers had escaped from the town, and they had been able to

remove about 900 of their British prisoners; but a large

number of the latter were set free. General Botha gathered up

his broken and discouraged forces and intrenched them in a

strong position on the Lorenzo Marquez railway, only 15 miles

eastward from Pretoria. Lord Roberts moved against him on the

11th and compelled him to retreat, after hard fighting for

five hours. This ended important operations in that part of

the field.

In Natal, General Buller, since early in May, had been pushing

his army northward, in a movement co-operative with that of

Lord Roberts. He had turned the flank of the Boer forces in

the positions they had fortified against his advance, regained

Glencoe and Dundee, and moved on to Newcastle. Then, with more

serious fighting, he forced Botha's Pass through the

mountains, compelled the Boers to evacuate their strongholds

on Laing's Nek and Majuba Hill, and was substantially in

possession of Natal.

On the 30th of May, General Buller sent word to General Chris

Botha that Lord Roberts had crossed the Vaal, and suggested

surrender, further resistance appearing useless. This led to a

meeting of the opposed commanders, at which Botha asked what

terms Lord Roberts would offer. Buller immediately referred

the question to Lord Roberts, saying: "Can you let me know

your terms of peace for individual and separate commandos? … I

think they are inclined to give in, and that I have in front

of me about half the Transvaal forces now in the field. If you

think it worth while please let me know if I may mention any

terms of peace to them. I think, even if assisted from the

Orange Free State, it will cost me about 500 men killed and

wounded to get out of Natal." The reply of Lord Roberts, dated

June 3, 1900, was as follows: "Your telegram of yesterday. My

terms with the Transvaal Government are unconditional

surrender. With regard to troops, those who deliver up their

arms and riding animals are allowed to go to their homes on

signing pledge that they will not fight again during present

war. The exceptions to this rule are those who have commanded

portions of the Republican forces, or who have taken an active

part in the policy which brought about the war, or who have

been guilty of or been parties to wanton destruction of

property, or guilty of acts contrary to the usages of

civilized warfare. Principal officers should remain with you

on parole until you receive instructions regarding their

disposal." General Botha declined the terms.

Nine days later (June 12) Lord Roberts opened correspondence

on the same subject with General Louis Botha, Acting

Commandant-General of the Boer forces, endeavoring to persuade

him, "in the cause of humanity, to refrain from further

resistance." The Commandant-General wrote in return: "For the

purpose of arriving at a decision, it is not only absolutely

necessary for me to call a General Council of War of my

Officers and to consult them, but above all it is necessary

for me to consider the subject with my Government. I trust

that for the sake of humanity your Excellency will give me the

opportunity for such consideration and consultation. As some

of my Officers are near the Natal Border, and I am also a long

way separate from my Government, this will require some time.

I ask your Excellency kindly, therefore, for an armistice for

six days, beginning from to-morrow morning at sunrise, during

which time no forward movement will be made on either side

within the territory of the South African Republic."

Lord Roberts replied: "I am anxious to meet your wishes and to

enable your Honour to communicate with the Government of the

South African Republic, but as the movement of my troops in

that Republic are intimately connected with operations in

progress in other parts of South Africa, it is impossible for

me to accede to your Honour's request that there should be an

armistice for 6 days, during which time no forward movement

will be made on either side within the territory of the South

African Republic. I am willing, however, to refrain from

making further movements in the district to the east of the

Elands River Railway Station, our present most advanced post

in that direction, and also in the district north of the

Volksrust and Johannesburg Railway, for a period of five (5)

days, commencing at dawn on the 15th June, on the condition

that no movement westward or southward is made by the Army of

the South African Republic during that same period. This will,

I trust, give your Honour the opportunity you desire of

consulting your Officers and conferring with your Government,

and I sincerely hope that the result will be of such a

satisfactory nature as to prevent further unnecessary loss of

life."

The proposal was declined by General Botha, in the following

note (June 15): "In answer to your letter, dated 14th June,

just received by me, wherein your Excellency consents to an

armistice for five days, but with the reservation of the right

to your Excellency to move your Army in all directions within

the South African Republic, except cast of Elands River

Station and north of the Volksrust-Johannesburg Railway line,

I must, to my great regret, inform your Excellency that this

reservation makes it impossible for me to accept this

armistice, which I have so much desired."

{504}

SOUTH AFRICA: The Field of War: A. D. 1900 (June-December).

Continued resistance of the Boers in guerilla warfare.

An outline of the events of seven months.

A British view of the later situation.

"After the occupation of Pretoria, exhaustion of the mounted

forces and of the transport again supervened and Lord Roberts

was preoccupied with the double task of bringing up large

numbers of horses and masses of stores by a railway exposed to

attack along a distance of 290 miles, and at the same time of

dealing, as best he could, with scattered bodies of the enemy,

nowhere formidable in a military sense, but capable of much

mischief. The period beginning with the occupation of

Bloemfontein, during which the Boers developed and maintained

warfare of guerilla type, imposed highly responsible duties

upon British officers in charge of scattered posts and

convoys. In some cases those duties were not adequately

discharged, and for a time the defences of the important line

of communications appeared to be somewhat imperfectly

organized and supervised. There were signs of the tendency to

relax precautions after a conspicuous success, which has been

shown by British armies on other occasions. It was clear that

the main centre of Boer activity was in the Bethlehem

district, and at the end of June Lord Roberts despatched a

strong column south under Lieutenant-General Hunter to

co-operate with Major-Generals MacDonald, Clements, and Paget

from the west. Bethlehem was captured on July 7, and by the

end of the month Commandant Prinsloo, caught in the Brandwater

Basin between the forces of Lieutenant-Generals Hunter and

Rundle, surrendered with more than 4,000 men and a large

number of horses and wagons. … Meanwhile, Lord Roberts, who

had driven back the Boers along the Lorenzo Marques line, in

two actions near Eerste Fabrieken, on June 11 and 12, began an

advance eastward on July 23, and on August 7 Sir R. Buller

moved northwards from Paarde Kop. On August 25 the

Commander-in-Chief met Sir R. Buller and Generals French and

Pole-Carew at Belfast, and after the fighting of the 27th the

resistance of the Boers in this district practically

collapsed. Starting from Machadodorp on September 1, Sir R.

Buller moved slowly towards Spitzkop, driving the enemy before

him through a difficult mountainous region, and General French

pressed on to Barberton, which was occupied on the 13th

without opposition. On the 24th the Guards reached Komati

Poort. The rugged hill country east of Belfast offered great

opportunities for the tactics in which the Boers appeared to

excel; but the 'natural fortress surrounded by a glacis of

about 1,500 yards absolutely without cover' near Bergendal

Farm was not defended with the tenacity shown on previous

occasions, and the subsequent British advance led to a

wholesale destruction of artillery material and to the

surrender of some 3,000 men to the Portuguese. This, the third

great disaster which has befallen the Boers, left them without

any centre of resistance or any considerable gathering of

fighting men.

"Before the outbreak of war we estimated their available

strength at about 45,000, to which must be added some 10,000

colonial rebels and perhaps 5,000 mercenaries. It is doubtful

whether the force actually in the field at any one time

reached 45,000, and the total loss in killed, wounded and

prisoners, cannot be much less than 30,000. … Exhaustion of

supplies and of ammunition must soon begin to tell heavily

upon the Boers; but it cannot be said that they have at

present given evidence of personal demoralization.

Comparatively small bodies, lightly equipped, still hold the

field and show much activity over a wide area. It is

impossible to provide British garrisons for every town and

village, and wherever the roving bands of the enemy appear

there is a recrudescence of local hostility, even in districts

which have been apparently tranquil for months. Large mobile

columns are employed in pursuit, but the Boers carefully avoid

general engagements and attack only when there appears to be a

chance of surprising and overpowering small detachments. …

Mounted forces, marching as light as possible and capably

commanded, are the principal requirements of the situation. It

is necessary to give the roving commandos no rest and to make

every effort to capture their leaders. The work is not easy,

and it requires great energy and sound military judgment; but

it will be successfully accomplished, and the scale of the

operations will steadily dwindle into measures of police.

Meanwhile a gradual withdrawal of troops from South Africa is

taking place, and progress is doubtless being made with the

new organization under Lieutenant-General Baden-Powell, which

will be specially fitted for the work that now lies before us.

…

"The total casualties of the war up to the 31st ult. are

estimated at about 46,000, and 'the reduction of the military

forces' due to a campaign of more than a year is returned at

12,769, of which total 11,739 are accounted for by death,

including 6,482 victims to disease. It is impossible to rank

the Boer war among the great campaigns of the British Army;

but the peculiar difficulties must never be forgotten. The

closest parallel is probably that of the American Civil war,

in which an armed people long resisted far superior forces and

carried invasion into the territory of the stronger Power. The

military potentiality of the Southern States was at first as

little realized in Washington as was that of the Boers in

London, and disasters therefore resulted. In both cases the

issue was certain as soon as adequate force in strong hands

was available. The Southern leaders, like the Boers, hoped and

strove for foreign intervention in vain; but the former were

far less prepared for war than the latter. On the other hand

the Boers, though ably led in a limited sense, have produced

no commanders with a genius for war comparable to that of Lee

and of Jackson, nor have they shown the discipline and the

cohesion which characterized the Southern armies when at their

best. Desultory and irregular warfare may still be prolonged

for a time; great activity and ample vigilance will still be

required."

_London Times,

November 5, 1900._

At the end of the year the "Times" summed up the later

features of the situation as follows: "The spirit of the Boers

remained unbroken, and small mobile commandos, scattered over

the vast area of the countries which we had undertaken to

occupy, perfectly familiar with the ground, and in close touch

with the civil population, have succeeded up to the present

time in making the task of the British Generals one of extreme

difficulty. The Boer resistance has centered chiefly in three

men, Commandants Louis Botha in the northeast, Delarey to the

west of Pretoria, and De Wet in the Orange Free State. The

first, who since the death of General Joubert, was in chief

command in Natal, and afterwards in the Eastern Transvaal, has

not been conspicuously active since September, but the other two

have achieved a great deal with their very limited resources,

and have earned enduring fame as guerrilla

chieftains.

{505}

De Wet, especially, after having been 'routed' and

'surrounded' times without number, has succeeded in giving

occupation to several British Generals and their forces up to

the present time, has kept the eastern part of the Orange

Colony in a continual ferment, and till now has defied the

energetic efforts of General Charles Knox to capture him.

Delarey, after remaining fairly quiescent for several weeks,

suddenly advanced through the Magaliesburg in the middle of

the present month with a force variously estimated at 1,500 or

3,000 men, surrounded and captured a position held by four

companies of the Northumberlands, and compelled the retreat of

General Clements and the evacuation of his camp. It is true

that these things are but the episodes of the later stages of

a war in which there will be no more great battles, but they

are exhausting, costly, and sometimes humiliating."

_London Times,

December 31, 1900._

SOUTH AFRICA: The Field of War: A. D. 1900 (August-December).

Farm-burning by the British troops.

Under proclamations issued by Lord Roberts in August and

September, aimed at the suppression of irregular warfare, a

punitive policy was adopted, which included the burning of

farmhouses where guerrilla bands were sheltered, or whose

inmates acted with such bands, and which soon came to be

denounced as one of shameful barbarity. Such different

representations have been made, as to the manner in which the

orders of Lord Roberts were carried out, and as to the measure

of devastation and suffering produced, that it seems to be

impossible to judge whether the British farm-burning in the

Transvaal and Orange Free State has or has not gone beyond the

usual brutalities that belong to the very nature of war. Mr.

Kruger, in speeches made after he went to Europe, represented

it as monstrous beyond example. "The war waged against us," he

said, on landing at Marseilles, "is a war of barbarians. I

have witnessed wars of barbarians and never have I seen

committed barbarities so monstrous as those committed daily

among us. Our farms, which we had had so much difficulty to

construct, are burned. The women whose husbands are at the war

are hunted down and brutally separated from their children,

who are deprived of bread and necessaries." The Afrikanders of

Cape Colony held similar language. Men of conscience and heart

in England were troubled by such accusations. Mr. Trevelyan, M.

P., wrote to "The Times," on the 24th of November: "What so

many of us feel, in the first place, is that we are not in a

position to form a fair judgment from sheer lack of the most

elementary reliable information of what has been done and is

still doing. An officer returned from the war about two months

told me the other day that he supposed only about 40 farms had

been burnt. I read in the 'Westminster Gazette' from an

equally honourable gentleman that it would not be an

exaggeration to say that one-third of the farms in the Orange

River Colony were in ashes. Clearly it is impossible for the

nation to make out the truth when such contradictory

statements are universally current. … One thing we do know for

certain—that on September 2 Lord Roberts, regarding the war as

having degenerated into guerrilla fighting, proclaimed that

all farms would be burnt within a radius of ten miles of any

point upon the railway raided by the Boers. It is now November

24. We know that many people innocent of any dealing with De

Wet have lost all they possess owing to his misguided energy.

Has it diminished sensibly the Boer forces in the field? If

not, what is its utility? … If the resistance of the Boers is

being lessened by these destructions, let us at least have the

poor consolation of knowing it. Again, we want to know what

really happens to the women and children whom our soldiers

conduct, I believe, generally to the nearest town after their

homes have been burned. People whose property has been totally

destroyed in a country where war has stopped all industry

obviously cannot keep themselves."

When Parliament met in December the subject was brought up

there, by Mr. Trevelyan and others, and debated at length,

without much clearer light on it being found. The government

could give no definite information as to what was being done,

but stoutly upheld the course which the military leaders had

taken. Mr. Balfour said: "The ordinary laws of war as

practised by civilized countries depend essentially upon

drawing a sharp distinction between combatant and

non-combatant. The combatant has his particular privileges,

the non-combatant has his particular privileges. What has been

universally found intolerable is that a man should oscillate,

according to his convenience, from one category to the

other—be a peaceful agriculturist when it suits him and an

effective combatant when circumstances seem to be favourable.

That practice is so intolerable that I believe all nations

have laid down the severest rules for repressing it. I have in

my hands the instructions to the army of the United States in

the field, dated 1898. I should like to read to the House two

extracts from this document. Rule 52 says:— 'If a people of a

country, or any portion of same already occupied by the army,

rises against it, they are violators of the laws of war, and

are not entitled to their protection.' The 82nd rule is to the

effect that men, or squads of men, who take part in raids of

any kind without permission, and without being part or portion

of an organized hostile army, are not public enemies, and

therefore if captured are not entitled to be treated as

prisoners of war, but shall be treated as highway robbers or

pirates."

Mr. Chamberlain said: "Lord Roberts's proclamation was to the

effect that, in the first instance, general officers were

authorized to burn down farmhouses as a punishment in cases in

which they were used as fortified places or places for the

concealment of arms, or in which the white flag had been

improperly used, or where they had been the scenes of gross

treachery and of acts contrary to the laws of war. As a matter

of right and morality, the Government are prepared to sustain

Lord Roberts absolutely. … Lord Roberts was placed in the most

difficult position in which a general could possibly be

placed. He had his base 1,500 miles away at least from his

front, through a most difficult country, and he was served

only by a single line of railway, and any catastrophe to the

railway might have meant a catastrophe to the whole army. It

is all very well to talk of humanity, but you must take first

account of our own people.

{506}

Now, Sir, it was of the first importance, it was the clear

duty of Lord Roberts, to take any steps in his power to

prevent the cutting of the line and the danger which would

thereby accrue to his force, and he accordingly issued a

proclamation that in the case of the destruction of the line

persons in the vicinity would be held responsible, and that

farmhouses in the vicinity might be destroyed. We understood

his proclamation to mean that he would require evidence of

some complicity on the part of the persons whose farmhouses

were destroyed. … We inquired the other day, when the matter

assumed greater importance, whether the construction we

placed upon the proclamation was true, and we have a reply

from Lord Kitchener, who has now taken the place of Lord

Roberts, that we are perfectly right in that assumption. …

According to the proclamation of Lord Roberts, whose humanity

is proverbial, and who therefore could not under any

circumstances be accused of unnecessary cruelty, cattle are

always to be paid for by the troops, or a receipt given,

which is as good as payment, except in those cases in which

the owner of the cattle has been guilty of acts of war or of

outrages which are punishable by all civilized nations who

are at war. Therefore the taking of cattle does not mean

necessarily that the owner of the cattle is placed in the

impossibility of continuing his occupation. If he has not got

the cattle he has got the money for them except in the cases

in which destruction has taken place as a punitive measure.

In all other cases the instructions are precise, and I

believe from all the information we have obtained from the

reports of the generals in the field they have been strictly

carried out. Never in the history of war has war been carried

out with so much humanity on the part of the officers and of

the soldiers concerned as in the present war. The honourable

member also spoke of the deportation of women. That sounds

like something serious, but I believe it will be found that

it is only for their own protection. If we are unable in this

vast country to occupy and garrison every bit of it, when our

troops are removed, if women and children are left alone they

remain there in some danger—in danger from those marauding

bands of which I have spoken and also from the vast native

population. And, Sir, this native population is answerable, I

believe, for every case of proved outrage either upon women

or children. I believe, and the last reports we have received

confirm that belief, that in no case has a British soldier

been justly accused of such an outrage."

The following proclamation, issued by Lord Roberts, November

18, seems to indicate that there had been practices in

farm-burning, before that time, which he could not approve:

"As there appears to be some misunderstanding with reference

to burning of farms and breaking of dams, Commander-in-Chief

wishes following to be lines on which General Officers

Commanding are to act:—No farm is to be burnt except for act

of treachery, or when troops have been fired on from premises,

or as punishment for breaking of telegraph or railway line, or

when they have been used as bases of operations for raids, and

then only with direct consent of General Officer Commanding,

which is to be given in writing, the mere fact of a burgher

being absent on commando is on no account to be used as reason

for burning the house. All cattle, wagons, and foodstuffs are

to be removed from all farms; if that is found to be

impossible, they are to be destroyed, whether owner be present

or not."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command:

Cd. 426, 1900, page 23._

SOUTH AFRICA: Rhodesia: A. D. 1900 (September).

Protectorate over Barotsiland.

The "Cape Times" of September 19, 1900, stated that a

"Government Gazette Extraordinary" had been issued containing

an Order in Council proclaiming a protectorate over

Barotsiland—North-Western Rhodesia. "The limits of the country

included in the protectorate are the parts of Africa bounded

by the River Zambesi, the German South-West African

Protectorate, the Portuguese possessions, the Congo Free

State, and the Kafukwe or Loengi River. The Order provides

that the British South Africa Company may nominate officials

to govern the territory, and that these are to be confirmed by

the High Commissioner. The High Commissioner may, amongst

other things, from time to time by proclamation provide for

the administration of justice, the raising of revenue by the

imposition of taxes (which may include a tax in respect of the

occupation of native huts), and Customs duties or otherwise,

and generally for the peace, order, and good government of all

persons within the limits of the order, including the

prohibition and punishment of acts tending to disturb the

public peace. The expenses of the administration of this

country, if not entirely borne by the revenues of the country,

will be borne by the British South Africa Company, and if the

revenue more than meet the expenses, the excess will be paid

to the Chartered Company."

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1900 (September).

Leave of absence to President Kruger.

His departure for Europe.

Proclamation of Lord Roberts.

The following proclamation by the Executive Council of the

Boer government was issued from Nelspruit on the 10th of

September, 1900: "Whereas the advanced age of His Honour the

State President makes it impossible for His Honour further to

accompany the Commandos; and whereas the Executive Council is

convinced that the highly-valued services of His Honour can

still be usefully applied in the interest of Land and People,

the Executive Council hereby determines to grant His Honour

leave of absence to Europe for the period of six months, in

order still to advance our cause there, and Mr. S. W. Burger,

Vice-President, takes his place according to law.

[Signed] S. W. BURGER, Vice President.

F. W. REITZ, State Secretary."

Lord Roberts seems to have regarded the acceptance of this

"leave of absence" by President Kruger as equivalent to a

resignation of his office; for he published, on the 14th of

September, a proclamation in the following words:

"The late President, Mr. Kruger, and Mr. Reitz, with the

archives of the South African Republic, have crossed the

Portuguese frontier, and arrived at Lourenço Marques with a

view to sailing for Europe at an early date. Mr. Kruger has

formally resigned the position he held as President of the

South African Republic, thus severing his official connection

with the Transvaal. Mr. Kruger's action shows how hopeless in

his opinion is the war which has now been carried on for

nearly a year, and his desertion of the Boer cause should make

it clear to his fellow burghers that it is useless for them to

continue the struggle any longer.

{507}

"It is probably unknown to the inhabitants of the Transvaal

and Orange River Colony that nearly 15,000 of their

fellow-subjects are now prisoners of war, not one of whom will

be released until those now in arms against us surrender

unconditionally. The burghers must by this time be cognisant

of the fact that no intervention on their behalf can come from

any of the Great Powers, and, further, that the British Empire

is determined to complete the work which has already cost her

so many valuable lives, and to carry to its conclusion the war

declared against her by the late Governments of the South

African Republic and Orange Free State, a war to which there

can be but one ending. If any further doubts remain in the

minds of the burghers as to Her Britannic Majesty's

intentions, they should be dispelled by the permanent manner

in which the country is gradually being occupied by Her

Majesty's Forces, and by the issue of the Proclamations signed

by me on the 24th May and 1st September 1900, annexing the

Orange Free State and the South African Republic respectively,

in the name of Her Majesty.

"I take this opportunity of pointing out that, except in the

small area occupied by the Boer army under the personal

command of Commandant-General Botha, the war is degenerating,

and has degenerated, into operations carried on in an

irregular and irresponsible manner by small, and in very many

cases, insignificant bodies of men. I should be failing in my

duty to Her Majesty's Government and to Her Majesty's Army in

South Africa if I neglected to use every means in my power to

bring such irregular warfare to an early conclusion. The means

which I am compelled to adopt are those which the customs of

war prescribe as being applicable to such cases. They are

ruinous to the country, and entail endless suffering on the

burghers and their families, and the longer this guerrilla

warfare continues the more vigorously must they be enforced."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command:

1900, Cd. 420, page 78, and Cd. 426, page 17._

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1900 (October).

Proclamation of annexation to the British Dominions.

In terms similar to those used in proclaiming the annexation

of the Orange Free State (see above: MAY) the annexation of

the Transvaal to the Dominions of Her British Majesty was

proclaimed with great ceremony at Pretoria on the 25th of

October.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Field of War: A. D. 1900 (November).

Return of Lord Roberts to England, leaving Lord Kitchener

in command.

Having been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the British Army,

in the place of Lord Wolseley, Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, on

the 29th of November, delivered the command in South Africa to

Lord Kitchener, and returned to England. At the same time,

Lord Kitchener was raised to the rank of Lieutenant-General.

SOUTH AFRICA: Cape Colony and the Transvaal:

A. D. 1900 (December).

Afrikander Congress.

Lord Kitchener to the burghers of Pretoria.

From 6,000 to 8,000 persons were reported to be in attendance

at an "Afrikander Congress," held at Worcester, in Cape

Colony, December 6, which adopted the following resolutions:

"1. We men and women of South Africa assembled and represented

here, having heard the report of the people's deputation to

England, and having taken into earnest consideration the

deplorable condition into which the people of South Africa

have been plunged, and the grave danger threatening our

civilization, record our solemn conviction that the highest

interests of South Africa demand, first, the termination of

the war now raging with untold misery and horror, such as the

burning of houses, the devastation of the country, the

extermination of the white nationality, and the treatment to

which women and children are subjected, which will leave a

lasting heritage of bitterness and hatred, while seriously

endangering further relations between civilization and

barbarism in South Africa; secondly, the retention by the

Republics of their independence, whereby alone the peace of

South Africa can be maintained.

2. The congress desires full recognition of the right of the

people of this colony under its Constitution to settle and

manage their own affairs and to express grave disapproval of

the policy pursued and the attitude adopted in this matter by

the Governor and High Commissioner, his Excellency Sir Alfred

Milner.

3. The congress solemnly pledges itself to labour in a

constitutional way unceasingly for the above resolutions, and

resolves to send a deputation to his Excellency Sir Alfred

Milner, asking him to bring the resolutions officially to the

notice of her Majesty's Government."

On the 21st of December Lord Kitchener addressed a meeting, at

Pretoria, of burghers who had surrendered to the British and

who desired to bring about peace. In his remarks he was

reported to have said: "The Boers had fought a good fight, but

they were overpowered. There would be no dishonour in the

leaders recognizing this fact. The proclamations that had been

issued were of little use, as means were adopted to prevent

them from reaching the burghers. He trusted that the committee

would endeavour to acquaint the Boers in the field with the

true position. He desired to give them every chance to

surrender voluntarily, and to finish the war by the most

humane means possible. If the conciliatory methods now being

adopted failed he had other means which he would be obliged to

exercise. He would give the committee notice if the time

arrived to consider conciliation as a failure. The principal

difficulties were that burghers desirous of surrendering were

afraid they would not be allowed to remain in their own

districts or that they would be punished for violating their

oath of neutrality. General Kitchener declared that he had

issued instructions that burghers who surrendered would, with

their families and stock, be protected in their own districts.

Those who had broken the oath of neutrality under compulsion

would be accorded the same treatment. Deserted women and

children would be kept in laagers, where their friends could

freely join them. It was essential to clear the country. While

food remained the commandos were enabled to continue in the

field. General Kitchener added that it must be understood that

the British would not be responsible for stock unless it was

brought in and kept within protected limits. In conclusion

General Kitchener said that he had come to speak to the

burghers personally in order that they might be able to tell

their friends what they had heard from his own lips."

{508}

SOUTH AFRICA: The Field of War: A. D. 1900 (December).

Numbers of British troops employed in the war from the

beginning, and their losses.

See (in this volume)

ENGLAND: A. D. 1900 (DECEMBER).

SOUTH AFRICA: British Colonies: A. D. 1901 (January).

New heads of the Colonial Governments.

The following appointments were announced by the British

Colonial Office on the 4th of January, 1901: Sir Alfred Milner

to be Governor of the Transvaal and British High Commissioner.

The Honourable Sir Walter Francis Hely-Hutchinson (Governor of

Natal and Zululand since 1893) to be Governor of Cape Colony.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Henry C. McCallum (Governor of

Newfoundland since 1898, and aide-de-camp to the Queen since

1900) to be Governor of Natal. Major Hamilton John Goold-Adams

(Resident Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate) to be

Lieutenant-Governor of the Orange River Colony.

SOUTH AFRICA: Cape Colony: A. D. 1901 (January).

Boer invasion.

Declaration of martial law.

On New Year's Day, 1901, the Cape Town correspondent of the

"London Times" was compelled to write: "The immediate aspect

of affairs in Cape Colony at the opening of the new year is

scarcely less gloomy than at the beginning of 1900. The number

of Boers invading the country to-day may be less than it was a

year ago, but they have penetrated further south, and their

presence near such centres of hostile Dutch feeling as Graaf

Reinet constitutes an element of danger which was not present

last January. The proclamation issued this morning by the High

Commissioner calling for volunteers to defend the lines of

communication proves that the military authorities are at last

alive to the critical nature of the situation, but the measure

comes very late in the day."

On the 17th of January a cable message from Cape Town

announced: "An extraordinary gazette issued this afternoon

contains a proclamation placing the whole of the Cape Colony

under martial law, with the exception of the Cape Town,

Wynberg, Simonstown, Port Elizabeth and East London districts

and the territories of the Transkei, Tembuland, Griqualand and

East Pondoland. The gazette also states that the

peace-preservation act will be enforced in the Cape Colony,

Wynberg and Simonstown districts. Under this act all the civil

population will be called upon to deliver up their arms."

SOUTH AFRICA: Orange Free State: A. D. 1901 (January).

Peace movement.

Condition of country described.

Defiant proclamation of Steyn and De Wet.

Early in January, a "Central Peace Committee," formed at

Kroonstad, addressed an open letter to their fellow citizens,

appealing for submission and peace, saying: "The country is

literally one vast wilderness. The farmers are obliged to go

to the towns for protection, and huge refugee camps have been

formed by the British for them and their families. These

people have lost everything, and ruin and starvation stare

them in the face. All this misery is caused by a small and

obstinate minority, who will not bow to the inevitable and who

make the majority suffer. Any encouragement to the men still

on commando to continue the hopeless struggle can only injure

us and cause us further misery. We have done our best and

fought to get Africa under one flag, and we have lost. Let

there be no mistake about this. England has spent millions and

sacrificed thousands of lives, and no reasonable being can

believe for one moment that she will now give up the fruits of

victory. It is, therefore, a duty for us, her beaten foe, to

accept the terms offered by our conqueror. … We appeal to you

and ask you to appoint another congress, and nominate men of

influence out of your midst to visit Mr. Steyn and General De

Wet, and try to persuade them to accept the terms offered by

England. These two men are the only obstacles to peace. We ask

you to believe us when we say that Mr. Kruger and the late

Transvaal Government have been willing twice already to accept

British terms, but Mr. Steyn refused to have anything to do

with surrender. He continued the war and encouraged the

burghers in the hope that we should get European assistance.

To-day he is cut off from all communication with the outside

world. You know and we know how unfounded that hope is and it

is your duty to assist us to make him understand this. We

appeal to you to help us to make an end to this unhappy state

of affairs, which is plunging everybody into poverty and

despair."

As if in response to this cry for peace, Steyn and De Wet

issued the following proclamation a few days later: "Be it

known to all that the war which was forced on the Republics by

the British Government still rages in the Orange Free State

and in the South African Republic; and that the customs of

civilized warfare and also the Conventions of Geneva and The

Hague have not been observed by the enemy, who has not

scrupled, contrary to the Geneva Convention, to capture

doctors and ambulances and to deport them, in order to prevent

our wounded from getting medical assistance. He has seized

ambulances and material appertaining thereto, and has not

hesitated, contrary to the recognized primitive rules of

warfare, and contrary to his solemn agreement at The Hague, to

arrest neutrals and deport them, and to send out marauding

bands to plunder, burn, and damage the burghers' private

property. He has armed Kaffirs and natives and made use of

them against us in war. He has been continually busy capturing

women and children, old and sickly men. Many women's deaths

have been occasioned because the so-called Christian enemy had

no consideration for women on a sick bed or for those whose

state of health should have protected them against rough

treatment. Honourable women and tender children have not only

been treated roughly, but also in an insulting manner by the

soldiers, by order of their officers. Moreover, old mothers

and women have been raped, even wives and children. The

property of prisoners of war, and even of killed burghers, has

not been respected. In many instances the mother and father

have been taken from the house, which was thus left

unprotected, and all have been left to their fate, an easy

prey to the savage. The world has been untruthfully informed

by the enemy that he was obliged to carry out this destruction

because the burghers blew up the line and cut the wires, or

misused the white flag. Nearly all the houses in the two

Republics have been destroyed, whether in the neighbourhood of

the railway line or not; while with regard to the misuse of

the white flag, that is simply a continuance of the

everlasting calumny against which the Afrikander has had to

strive since God brought him into contact with Englishmen.

Robbing his opponent of his goods has not satisfied him; he

will not be satisfied till he has robbed him of his good name

also.

{509}

"Then he wishes to inform the world that the Republics are

conquered and the war ended, and that only here and there

small plundering bands are to be found who continue the strife

in an irresponsible manner. It is an untruth. The Republics

are not yet conquered. The war is not finished. The burgher

forces of the two Republics are still led by responsible

leaders, as from the commencement of the war, under the

supervision of the Governments of both Republics. The fact

that Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener choose to term the

burgher forces marauding bands does not make them such.

Similarly, saying that the war is over does not put an end to

it while fighting still continues. When was this war over?

After the battle of Spion Kop or after Paardeberg? After the

occupation of Bloemfontein or Pretoria? Or perhaps after the

battles of Dewetsdorp or Commando Nek, in both of which

irregulars were captured and the enemy totally vanquished. The

burghers would be less than men if they allowed the enemy to

go unpunished after ill-treating their wives and destroying

their homes from sheer lust of destruction. Therefore a

portion of our burghers have again been sent into Cape Colony,

not only to wage war, but to be in a position to make

reprisals as they have already done in the case of the

ambulances. Therefore we again warn the officers of her

Majesty's troops that unless they cease the destruction of

property in the Republics, we shall wreak vengeance by

destroying the property of her Majesty's subjects who are

unkindly disposed to us; but at the same time, to avoid being

misunderstood, we hereby openly declare that the women and

children will always remain unmolested, despite anything done

to ours by her Majesty's troops. We ask for nothing from our

brothers in Cape Colony, but we call upon them, as well as

upon the civilized world, to assist on behalf of civilization

and Christianity in putting an end to the barbarous manner of

the enemy's warfare. Our prayer will always be that the God of

our fathers will not desert us in this unrighteous strife.

"On the field, January 14. STEYN. DE WET."

SOUTH AFRICA: The Field of War: A. D. 1901 (February).

Report of British military forces in South Africa from the

beginning of the war, with the number of killed and wounded

and the deaths from wounds and disease.

A Parliamentary paper issued on the 26th of February, 1901,

contained the following table, showing the strength of the

garrison in South Africa on the 1st of August, 1899, before

the beginning of the war, with the subsequent reinforcements

and casualties, and the total strength of forces on the 1st of

February, 1901:

|NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND MEN.

OFFICERS|CAVALRY|ARTILLERY|INFANTRY|OTHERS|TOTAL|TOTAL

AND OFFICERS

MOUNTED AND MEN

INFANTRY

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. Garrison on

Aug. 1, 1899 318 1,127 1,035 6,428 1,032 9,622 9,940

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

II.

Reinforcements,

Aug. 1, 1899,

to Oct. 11, 1899

(outbreak of war)

(1.) From Home. 280 … 743 5,620 … 6,363 6,643

(2.) From India

(some of these did

not reach South

Africa until after

the outbreak of

hostilities) 259 1,564 653 3,427 … 5,644 5,903

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

539 1,564 1,396 9,047 … 12,007 12,546

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Further

reinforcements

from Oct. 11,

1899, to end

of July, 1900

Regulars

(1.) From Home

and Colonies. 5,748 11,003 14,145 110,292 14,347 149,787 155,535

(2.) From India. 132 713 376 670 … 1,759 1,891

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5,880 11,716 14,521 110,962 14,347 151,546 157,426

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Colonials

(1.) From Colonies

other than

South African. 550 287 692 9,788 267 11,034 11,584

(2.) Raised in

South Africa. 1,387 … … … … 28,932 30,319

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1,937 … … … … 39,966 41,903

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Imperial yeomanry. 536 … … … … 10,195 10,731

Volunteers from

United Kingdom. 342 … 358 9,995 434 10,787 11,129

Militia. 831 … 617 19,753 256 20,626 21,457

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total all arms

sent to, and

raised in,

South Africa

up to Aug. 1, 1900,

including garrison

on Aug. 1, 1899. 10,383 … … … … 254,749 265,132

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Further

reinforcements

from Aug. 1, 1900,

to Jan. 31, 1901

(1.) Regulars 820 3,213 652 10,439 975 15,279 16,099

(2.) Militia 7 … … 1,141 … 1,141 1,148

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

11,210 … … … … 271,169 282,379

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

{510}

NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND MEN.

Officers Cavalry. Artillery. Infantry Others. Total. Total

and Officers

Mounted and Men

Infantry

V. Numbers

(1.) Killed to

Jan. 31, 1901 334. 3,346 3,680

(2.) Wounded to

Jan 31, 1901. 1,242. 14,914 16,156

(3.) Died of disease

or wounds or accidentally

killed in South Africa

to Jan. 31, 1001. 301. 9,008 9,309

(4.) Disbanded and

discharged in South Africa. 299. 5,231 5,530

(5.) In hospital in South

Africa on Dec. 28, 1900

(latest returns). 415. 13,716 14,131

VI. Numbers left

South Africa

(1.) For England

not invalids. 1,214 11,109 12,323

(2.) For England

sick, wounded, and

died on passage 1,703 39,095 40,198

(3.) Returned to India

direct from South Africa. 20 70 90

(4.) Returned to Colonies

direct from South Africa

(a) Regulars, including two

battalions to Ceylon. 98 2,041 2,139

(b) Colonials. 177 3,384 3,561

VII. Present strength of

Forces in South Africa,

Feb. 1, 1901

(1.) Regulars. 4,305 12,600 12,000 99,700 12,885 137,185 141,490

(2.) Colonials. 1,339 27,000 28,339*

(3.) Imperial yeomanry 495 7,500 7,995

4.) Volunteers. 200 7,500 7,700

5.) Militia. 725 18,700 19,425

TOTAL 7,064 197,885 204,949*

* Exclusive of recently raised Colonials whose numbers have not yet been reported.

On the 9th of February the following announcement was issued

officially from the British War Office:

"In view of recent Boer activity in various directions his

Majesty's Government have decided, in addition to the large

forces recently equipped locally in South Africa, to reinforce

Lord Kitchener by 30,000 mounted troops beyond those already

landed in Cape Colony. The recruiting for Imperial Yeomanry

has proceeded so rapidly that it is anticipated not less than

10,000 will be shortly available. The South African Mounted

Constabulary, including those enlisted in the colonies, may be

relied upon to the extent of 8,000. The new colonial

contingents to replace those withdrawn will probably reach

5,000. The remainder of the force will be made up by cavalry

and mounted infantry from the home establishment. The

enlistment of Volunteer companies to replace those who have

served a year in South Africa is also being proceeded with.

Arrangements have been made for the prompt equipment and

transportation of the force."

In reply to a question in Parliament the 18th of February,

1901, Mr. Brodrick, the Secretary of State for War, stated

that the total number of cases of typhoid or enteric fever in

the British army, from the beginning of the war to the end of

December, 1900, had been 19,101; deaths 4,233; invalided and

sent home, 10,075.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Field of War: A. D. 1901 (February).

The declared policy of the British Government.

Speaking in the House of Commons on the 18th of February,

1901, the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Chamberlain, declared the

government policy of dealing with the Boers, with strong

emphasis, in the following words:

"From the moment when the invasion took place, and the first

shot was fired by the Boers, from that moment we declared our

policy, that not one shred of the independence which the Boers

had abused should ever again be conceded to them. That was the

policy stated by the Prime Minister in his answer to the

representations which were made to him by the Presidents of

the two Republics. That was the policy, is the policy, and

will be the policy of His Majesty's Government to the end. Let

there be no mistake about that. It is no use arguing with us

on the subject of independence. That, as far as we are

concerned, is a closed question. Raise it, if you like to

raise it, not in speeches, but by amendments. We are quite

ready. We challenged you at the last election. You have never

ceased to complain of the challenge. We challenge you in the

House of Commons. If you believe the annexation we have

announced ought to be repudiated; if you think, with the

honorable and learned gentleman who has just spoken, that we

ought to restore the independence of these two Republics, in

any form, it is for you to say so in a definite amendment. It

is for you to put the issue before the House of Commons and

the country and we are perfectly prepared to meet you.

Assuming that we are all agreed that annexation cannot be

undone, then the policy of the Government is to establish

equality and protection and justice for the native population

and to grant the fuller liberties involved in our definition

of self-government as soon as that can safely be conceded. …

The Boers know perfectly well, they have been told again and

again, directly and indirectly, and it has been repeatedly

stated in this House that at the earliest possible moment they

will be granted self-government."

{511}

The Liberal leader interrupted the speaker to intimate that he

understood a Crown colony government to be in contemplation,

and that his objection was to that. On which Mr. Chamberlain

proceeded to say: "Either the right honourable gentleman does

not know what Crown colony government is or else he is

quibbling about words. Will he be satisfied if I call it a

civil government, with Ministers and a Governor appointed by

his Majesty and a council to advise him? That is civil

government, and it has this about it—that the Imperial

Government has control in the last resort. That is what we

mean. … We are quite ready to establish the civil government

of which I have spoken, we are ready to maintain equality, we

are ready to secure justice to all the inhabitants of the

Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, but we are not prepared

to put into their hands the whole control of the

administration and civil government until we know it will be

safe to do so. It is said that our views have not been

communicated to the Boers and that a proclamation which I

promised I would endeavour to have circulated has not yet been

so distributed. I wish to say that, so far as the leaders are

concerned, I am convinced they know perfectly well what terms

we are willing to offer. There is no excuse on their part. It

is possible that many of their followers, being ignorant

people—when they come to us we find they have been deceived as

to what is going on—do not know the terms we are willing to

offer. We have by various means endeavoured to get to the rank

and file a knowledge of the terms which are being offered, and

we know what the result has been. The emissaries have been

sent—emissaries not sent by us, permitted by us to go, who

volunteered themselves in what they believed to be the

interests of their countrymen, to make these representations—

these emissaries have been apparently, as far as our

information goes, brutally ill-used, tortured before

execution, shot as spies after having been flogged. "

SOUTH AFRICA: The Field of War: A. D. 1901 (February).

Attitude of the English Liberal party towards the war.

See (in this volume)

ENGLAND: A. D. 1901 (FEBRUARY).

SOUTH AFRICA: The Field of War: A. D. 1901 (February-March).

Unsuccessful peace parley between Lord Kitchener and

Commandant Botha.

By the intermediation of the wife of the Boer Commandant Louis

Botha, an interview between that officer and Lord Kitchener

was brought about, on the last day of February, for discussion

"as to means of bringing the war to an end." The questions raised

in the conversation were reported by Lord Kitchener to Mr.

Brodrick, the British Secretary for War, in a telegram from

Pretoria, March 1, as follows: "I have had a long interview

with Botha, who showed very good feeling and seemed anxious to

bring about peace. He asked for information on a number of

subjects which he said that he should submit to his Government

and people, and if they agreed he should visit Orange River

Colony and get them to agree. They should all then hand in

their arms and finish the war. He told me that they could go

on for some time, and that he was not sure of being able to

bring about peace without independence. He tried very hard for

some kind of independence, but I declined to discuss such a

point, and said that a modified form of independence would be

most dangerous and likely to lead to war in the future.

Subject was then dropped, and—

"Firstly.—The nature of future government of Colonies asked

about. He wanted more details than were given by Colonial

Secretary, and I said that, subject to correction from home, I

understood that when hostilities ceased military guard would be

replaced by Crown Colony administration, consisting of

nominated Executive, with elected assembly to advise

administration, to be followed after a period by

representative government. He would have liked representative

government at once, but seemed satisfied with above.

"Secondly.—Whether a Boer would be able to have a rifle to

protect him from native? I said I thought he would be by a

licence and on registration.

"Thirdly.—He asked whether Dutch language would be allowed? I

said that English and Dutch would, I thought, have equal

rights. He expressed hope that officials dealing with farmers

would know Dutch.

"Fourthly.—The Kaffir question. This turned at once on

franchise of Kaffirs, and a solution seemed to be that

franchise should not be given to Kaffirs until after

representative government was granted to Colonies. Orange Free

State laws for Kaffirs were considered good.

"Fifthly.—That Dutch Church property should remain untouched.

"Sixthly.—Public trusts and orphan funds to be left intact. He

asked whether British Government, in taking over the assets of

Republics, would also take over legal debts. This he made

rather a strong point of, and he intended it to include debts

legally contracted since the war began. He referred to notes

issued amounting to less than a million.

"Seventhly.—He asked if any war tax would be imposed on

farmers? I said I thought not.

"Eighthly.—When would prisoners of war return?

"Ninthly.—He referred to pecuniary assistance to repair burnt

farms, and enable fanners to start afresh. I said I thought

some assistance would be given.

"Tenthly.—Amnesty to all at end of war. We spoke of Colonials

who joined Republics, and he seemed not adverse to their being

disfranchised.

"I arranged with him that I should write and let him know the

view of the Government on these points. All I said during the

interview was qualified by being subject to confirmation from

home. He was anxious to get an answer soon."

Two days later, General Kitchener drafted and submitted to

High Commissioner Sir A. Milner the reply which he wished to

be authorized to make to the questions of Commandant Botha.

This was transmitted, in turn, by the High Commissioner to

Colonial Secretary Chamberlain, with approval of all the

suggestions of Lord Kitchener, except on the subject of

amnesty to the rebel "Afrikanders" of Cape Colony and Natal,

who had joined the ranks of the Boers. Lord Kitchener wished

to say that "on the cessation of hostilities and the complete

surrender of arms, ammunition, cannon, and other munitions of

war now in the hands of the burghers in the field or in

Government depots or elsewhere, His Majesty's Government is

prepared at once to grant an amnesty in the Transvaal and

Orange River Colony for all bona fide acts of war committed

during the recent hostilities; as well as to move the

Governments of Cape Colony and Natal to take similar action

but qualified by the disfranchisement of any British subjects

implicated in the recent war."

{512}

Sir Alfred Milner proposed to amend the latter clause as

follows: "British subjects of Cape Colony or Natal, though

they will not be compelled to return to those Colonies, will,

if they do so, be liable to be dealt with under the laws of

those Colonies specifically passed to meet the circumstances

arising out of the present war and which greatly mitigate the

ordinary penalties of rebellion." "While willing," he said,

"to concede much in order to strengthen Botha in inducing his

people to submit, the amnesty of rebels is not, in my opinion,

a point which His Majesty's Government can afford to concede.

I think it would have a deplorable effect in Cape Colony and

Natal to obtain peace by such a concession." Mr. Chamberlain

agreed with the High Commissioner, writing in reply: "His

Majesty's Government feel that they cannot promise to ask for

complete amnesty to Cape and Natal rebels who are in totally

different position to burghers without injustice to those who

have remained loyal under great provocation, and they are

prepared substantially to adopt your words, but you must

consider whether your last line is strictly applicable to

Natal." Mr. Chamberlain made numerous other criticisms of Lord

Kitchener's suggested letter, and amended it in many

particulars, the most important of which related to the form

of government under which the late republics would be placed.

Lord Kitchener would have said: "Military law will cease and

be at once replaced by civil administration, which will at

first consist of a Governor and a nominated Executive with or

without an advisory elected Assembly, but it is the desire of

His Majesty's Government, as soon as circumstances permit, to

establish representative Government in the Transvaal and

Orange River Colony." His political superior instructed him to

change the statement as follows: "For 'military law will

cease' say 'military administration will cease.' It is

possible that there may be disturbed districts for some time

after terms have been accepted, and Governor of Colonies

cannot abandon right of proclaiming martial law where

necessary. In the same sentence omit the words 'at the same

time' and 'at once' and substitute at the beginning the words

'at the earliest practicable date.' For 'consist of a

Governor' down to 'Assembly' read 'consist of a Governor and

an Executive Council composed of the principal officials with

a Legislative Council consisting of a certain number of

official members to whom a nominated unofficial element will

from the first be added.' In place of the words 'to establish

representative government' substitute 'to introduce a

representative element, and ultimately to concede to the new

Colonies the privilege of self-government.' It is desirable at

this stage to be quite precise in order to avoid any charge of

breach of faith afterwards."

Out of the instructions he received, Lord Kitchener finally

framed the following letter to Commandant Botha, sent to him

on the 7th of March: "With reference to our conversation at

Middelburg on 28th February, I have the honour to inform you

that in the event of a general and complete cessation of

hostilities and the surrender of all rifles, ammunition,

cannon, and other munitions of war in the hands of the

burghers or in Government depots or elsewhere, His Majesty's

Government is prepared to adopt the following measures:

"His Majesty's Government will at once grant an amnesty in the

Transvaal and Orange River Colonies for all bona fide acts of

war committed during the recent hostilities. British subjects

belonging to Natal and Cape Colony, while they will not be

compelled to return to those Colonies, will, if they do so, be

liable to be dealt with by the law of those Colonies specially

passed to meet the circumstances arising out of the present

war. As you are doubtless aware, the special law in the Cape

Colony has greatly mitigated the ordinary penalties for high

treason in the present cases.

"All prisoners of war now in St. Helena, Ceylon, or elsewhere

will, on the completion of the surrender, be brought back to

their country as quickly as arrangements can be made for their

transport.

"At the earliest practicable date military administration will

cease and will be replaced by civil administration in the form

of Crown Colony Government. There will therefore be, in the

first instance, in each of the new Colonies a Governor and an

Executive Council, consisting of a certain number of official

members, to whom a nominated unofficial element will be added.

But it is the desire of His Majesty's Government, as soon as

circumstances permit, to introduce a representative element

and ultimately to concede to the new Colonies the privilege of

self-government. Moreover, on the cessation of hostilities a High

Court will be established in each of the new Colonies to

administer the law of the land, and this Court will be

independent of the Executive.

"Church property, public trusts, and orphans funds will be

respected.

"Both the English and Dutch languages will be used and taught

in public schools where parents of the children desire it, and

allowed in Courts of Law.

"As regards the debts of the late Republican Governments, His

Majesty's Government cannot undertake any liability. It is,

however, prepared, as an act of grace, to set aside a sum not

exceeding £1,000,000 to repay inhabitants of the Transvaal and

Orange River Colonies for goods requisitioned from them by the

late Republican Governments, or, subsequent to annexation, by

Commandants in the field being in a position to enforce such

requisitions. But such claims will have to be established to

the satisfaction of a Judge or Judicial Commission appointed

by the Government to investigate and assess them, and if

exceeding in the aggregate £1,000,000, they will be liable to

reduction pro rata.

"I also beg to inform your Honour that the new Government will

take into immediate consideration the possibility of assisting

by loan the occupants of farms who will take the oath of

allegiance to repair any injury sustained by destruction of

buildings or loss of stock during the war, and that no special

war tax will be imposed on farmers to defray the expense of

the war.

"When burghers require the protection of fire-arms such will

be allowed to them by licence and on due registration,

provided they take the oath of allegiance. Licences also will

be issued for sporting rifles, guns, &c., but military

firearms will only be allowed for means of protection.

{513}

"As regards the extension of the franchise to Kaffirs in the

Transvaal and Orange River Colony, it is not the intention of

His Majesty's Government to give such franchise before

representative government is granted to these Colonies, and if

then given it will be so limited as to secure the just

predominance of the white races. The legal position of

coloured persons will, however, be similar to that which they

hold in Cape Colony.

"In conclusion, I must inform your Honour that if the terms

now offered are not accepted after a reasonable delay for

consideration they must be regarded as cancelled."

On the 16th of March the following reply came from the Boer

Commandant: "I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your

Excellency's letter stating what steps your Excellency's

Government is prepared to take in the event of a general and

total cessation of hostilities. I have advised my Government

of your Excellency's said letter; but, after the mutual

exchange of views at our interview at Middelburg on 28th

February last, it will certainly not surprise your Excellency

to know that I do not feel disposed to recommend that the

terms of the said letter shall have the earnest consideration

of my Government. I may add also that my Government and my

chief officers here entirely agree to my views." This ended

the negotiations.

A discussion of the negotiations in Parliament occurred on the

28th of March, when Mr. Bryce (Liberal) said "they were agreed

that the Government took an onward step when they allowed the

peace negotiations to be entered into, and it was important to

observe that, not only Lord Kitchener, but Sir Alfred Milner

was persuaded that General Botha meant business. It was

possible there were causes at work with which the House were

not acquainted which caused the negotiations to be broken off.

General Botha wrote to Lord Kitchener:—'You will not be

surprised to hear that my answer is in the negative.' One of

two things must have happened—either Lord Kitchener heard from

General Botha something that the House had not heard of, or

else General Botha was so much struck by the difference

between the terms which Lord Kitchener had discussed and the

terms contained in the letter that he conceived a distrust of

us altogether and believed that the Government would not

accept what Lord Kitchener had offered. He thought the

Government were right in asking that the oath of allegiance

should be taken, that they were entitled to insist upon the

provision that all hostilities must cease, and that they could

not pledge themselves as to the precise time when they would

bring back the prisoners. But there were three points on which

there were substantial differences between the terms Lord

Kitchener appeared to have offered and the terms in the final

letter. The first is the question of amnesty for the Cape

rebels. Lord Kitchener and General Botha appeared to have come

to an agreement on that subject. General Botha did not object

to the disfranchisement of the Cape rebels, and Lord Kitchener

did not appear to have conveyed any suggestion whatever of

anything except disfranchisement. He could conceive nothing

more likely to turn back the pacific desires of the Boers than

the fact that they found that, instead of the Cape rebels

having nothing but disfranchisement to fear, they were to be

held subject to the Cape laws as to treason. He was not

arguing whether that was right or wrong. The question was what

the Boers would think, and he put it to the House that it was

the most natural thing that they should be struck by the

contrast between the terms which Lord Kitchener appeared to

offer and the terms which were offered when the final letter

came, and that that was just the point upon which brave men,

feeling for their comrades, would be inclined to stand out.

They would be told that they would displease the loyalists at

the Cape if they did not exact all the penalties for treason.

He hoped they would never in that House consider it any part

of their business to satisfy the vindictive feeling of the

colonists at the Cape."

As to the difference between the terms of future government

for the inhabitants of the late republics proposed by Lord

Kitchener and those laid down by the Colonial Secretary, Mr.

Bryce said: "He should like to have known what the proposals

were that General Botha made with regard to a modified

independence, for he thought it was quite possible that it

might turn out in the long run that some kind of what was

called modified independence, protection, would be a great

deal easier for this country to work than a system of Crown

colony government. He thought the contrast between the

elective assembly which Lord Kitchener offered and the purely

arbitrary and despotic system which the final letter conveyed

must at once have struck the Boers as indicating the

difference between the views which the military man on the

spot entertained and the proposal which they might expect from

the Government. Of course there were objections to the

immediate grant of self-government. So also there were

objections to any course, and that course should be chosen

which was open to the fewest objections. But the proposal of

Crown colony government was, of all courses, the worst that

could be suggested. It had been suggested that members of the

Liberal party had asked for full-grown representative and

responsible government, but they never had suggested that.

What they had objected to was Crown colony government. They

admitted that when the war ended there must be an intermediate

period of administration, military or civil, but there was all

the difference in the world between an admittedly provisional

administration understood to be provisional and the creation

of the whole apparatus of Crown colony government. The Boer

population had an aversion to Crown colony administration,

associated in their minds with the days of Sir Owen Lanyon,

and an arbitrary form of government it was known to be. Of

course it was arbitrary; honourable members who questioned

that could not know what Crown colony administration was. The

existence of a nominated council did not prevent it being

arbitrary inasmuch as the members were obliged to vote as they

were directed by the Governor. He could not help thinking that

Lord Kitchener might, if he were asked to do so, throw some

light on a remarkable expression in the letter from General

Botha in which he said, after the mutual interchange of views

at their meeting, Lord Kitchener would not be surprised to

learn that he was not disposed to recommend the terms

proposed."

{514}

The radical Mr. Labouchere was sharper in his criticism: "He

held that it was nonsense to call the terms offered to the

Boers liberal and lenient; they were neither. We had burnt

their farms and desolated their country, and then we offered

them a small gift of money to put them back on their farms

while we took away their independence and their flag. He

honoured the men who resisted, no matter at what cost, when

the question was the independence of their native land. How

right General Botha was in distrusting the alterations made by

the Secretary for the Colonies in the matter of the gift was

shown by the right honourable gentleman himself, when he said

that, whereas the gift was to be limited to a certain sum, the

loyalists were to be paid first. In that case what would

remain to the burghers of the two colonies? The position of

the Boers in the Empire under the terms of the Colonial

Secretary would be little better than that of Kaffirs. As far

as ultimate self-government was concerned, they were to put

their faith in the Colonial Secretary. If he might offer them

a word of advice it would be—Put no faith in the Colonial

Secretary; get it in black and white. We had lost a great

opportunity of ending the war and settling South Africa. Peace

won by the sword would create a dependency in which racial

feuds would go on and the minority would be maintained over

the majority by a huge British garrison. The Dutch majority

was certain to increase every decade. The Transvaal farmers

lived in a poor, rude manner which English people would not

accept. …

"He did not particularly admire the Boers. To his mind they

had too much of the conservative element in them; but, judging

between the Afrikanders and the English who went to South

Africa, whilst fully recognizing that among the latter there

were many respectable men, he thought, taking them

collectively, the Boers were the better men. If we wanted to

maintain our rule in South Africa the Boers were the safest

men with whom to be on good terms. What were the Boers ready

to do? As he read the correspondence, they were ready to enter

the area of the British Empire, but only upon terms. Surely

our problem was to find terms honourable to us and to them,

which would lead to South Africa becoming one of those great

commonwealths connected with the Empire such as existed in

Australia and Canada. He suggested that, in the first place,

we should offer a full and absolute amnesty. He urged that the

Orange State and the Transvaal should as soon as possible be

made self-governing colonies. The Orange State was regarded by

every Englishman who had written about it as a model State. As

to the Transvaal, he admitted there was a difficulty, but he

would suggest that the main area of the country should be

separated from the Rand. The Rand might be administered by a

governor, a military governor if they liked, while in the rest

of the country the Dutch would have a majority. If this course

were adopted, instead of our giving some sort of pecuniary aid

to the Transvaalers, they might be paid a reasonable rent for

the Rand district, of which they would be deprived. … They on

that side of the House would be perfectly ready to agree to

the establishment of a provisional government, military or

civil—he should himself prefer Lord Kitchener to Sir Alfred

Milner—to carry on the country while they were arranging for

the colony to be self-governing. They were accustomed to be

told that Sir Alfred Milner was a sort of divine pro-consul.

He believed Sir Alfred Milner to be a most honourable man, and

very intelligent in many walks of life; but the truth was that

he began life as an Oxford don and then became an official in

the Treasury, facts which militated against his success in

practical politics. He believed that a man like Lord Dufferin

would do more for the cause of peace in South Africa than all

our soldiers."

SOUTH AFRICA: The Field of War: A. D. 1901 (February-April).

The High Commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner, on the situation

and prospects.

Leave of absence obtained by Sir Alfred.

A British Blue Book, made public in London on the 18th of

April, contains an interesting despatch from Sir Alfred

Milner, frankly reviewing the general situation in South

Africa, as it appeared to him on the 6th of February, when he

wrote, from Cape Town, and giving his forecast of future

prospects. The following are the more important passages of

the communication:

"A long time has elapsed since I have attempted to send to you

any general review of South African affairs. The reason is

twofold. In the first place, I am occupied every day that

passes from morning till night by business, all of which is

urgent, and the amount and variety of which you are doubtless

able to judge from the communications on a great variety of

subjects, which are constantly passing between us. In the next

place, I have always hoped that some definite point would be

reached at which it might be possible to sum up that chapter

of our history which contained the war, and to forecast the

work of administrative reconstruction which must succeed it.

But I am reluctantly forced to the conclusion that there will

be no such dividing line. I have not the slightest doubt of

the ultimate result, but I foresee that the work will be

slower, more difficult, more harassing, and more expensive

than was at one time anticipated. At any rate, it is idle to

wait much longer in the hope of being able to describe a clear

and clean-cut situation. Despite the many other calls upon my

time, and despite the confused character of the present

position, I think it better to attempt to describe, however

roughly and inadequately, the state of things as it exists

to-day.

"It is no use denying that the last half-year has been one of

retrogression. Seven months ago this Colony was perfectly

quiet, at least as far as the Orange River. The southern half

of the Orange River Colony was rapidly settling down, and even

a considerable portion of the Transvaal, notably the

south-western districts, seemed to have definitely accepted

British authority, and to rejoice at the opportunity of a

return to orderly government, and the pursuits of peace.

To-day the scene is completely altered. It would be

superfluous to dwell on the increased losses to the country

caused by the prolongation of the struggle, and by the form

which it has recently assumed. The fact that the enemy are now

broken up into a great number of small forces, raiding in

every direction, and that our troops are similarly broken up

in pursuit of them, makes the area of actual fighting, and

consequently of destruction, much wider than it would be in

the case of a conflict between equal numbers operating in

large masses.

{515}

Moreover, the fight is now mainly over supplies. The Boers

live entirely on the country through which they pass, not only

taking all the food they can lay hands upon on the farms,

grain, forage, horses, cattle, &c., but looting the small

village stores for clothes, boots, coffee, sugar, &c., of all

which they are in great need. Our forces, on their side, are

compelled to denude the country of everything moveable, in

order to frustrate these tactics of the enemy. No doubt a

considerable amount of the stock taken by us is not wholly

lost, but simply removed to the refugee camps, which are now

being established at many points along the railway lines. But

even under these circumstances, the loss is great, through

animals dying on the route, or failing to find sufficient

grass to live upon when collected in large numbers at the

camps. Indeed, the loss of crops and stock is a far more

serious matter than the destruction of farm buildings, of

which so much has been heard. I say this not at all as an

advocate of such destruction. I am glad to think that the

measure is now seldom if ever resorted to. At the same time,

the destruction of even a considerable number of farms, having

regard to the very rough and inexpensive character of the

majority of these structures in the Orange River Colony and

Transvaal, is a comparatively small item in the total damage

caused by the war to the agricultural community.

"To the losses incidental to the actual course of the

campaign, there has recently been added destruction of a

wholly wanton and malicious character. I refer to the injury

done to the head-gear, stamps, and other apparatus of some of

the outlying mines by Boer raiders, whose sole object was

injury. For this destruction there is, of course, no possible

excuse. … Fortunately the damage done to the mines has not

been large, relatively to the vast total amount of the fixed

capital sunk in them. The mining area is excessively difficult

to guard against purely predatory attacks having no military

purpose, because it is, so to speak, 'all length and no

breadth'—one long thin line, stretching across the country

from east to west for many miles. Still, garrisoned as

Johannesburg now is, it is only possible successfully to

attack a few points in it. Of the raids hitherto made, and

they have been fairly numerous, only one has resulted in any

serious damage. In that instance the injury done to the single

mine attacked amounted to £200,000, and it is estimated that

the mine is put out of working for two years. This mine is

only one out of a hundred, and is not by any means one of the

most important. These facts may afford some indication of the

ruin which might have been inflicted, not only on the

Transvaal and all South Africa, but on many European

interests, if that general destruction of mine works which was

contemplated just before our occupation of Johannesburg had

been carried out. However serious in some respects may have

been the military consequences of our rapid advance to

Johannesburg, South Africa owes more than is commonly

recognized to that brilliant dash forward, by which the vast

mining apparatus, the foundation of all her wealth, was saved

from the ruin threatening it.

"The events of the last six or seven months will involve a

greater amount of repair and a longer period of recuperation,

especially for agriculture, than anybody could have

anticipated when the war commenced. Yet, for all that, having

regard to the fact that both the Rand and Kimberley are

virtually undamaged, and that the main engines of prosperity,

when once set going again, will not take very long to get into

working order, the economic consequences of the war, though

grave, do not appear by any means appalling. The country

population will need a good deal of help, first to preserve it

from starvation, and then, probably, to supply it with a

certain amount of capital to make a fresh start. And the great

industry of the country will need some little time before it

is able to render any assistance. But, in a young country with

great recuperative powers, it will not take many years before

the economic ravages of the war are effaced.

"What is more serious to my mind than the mere material

destruction of the last six months is the moral effect of the

recrudescence of the war. I am thinking especially of the

Orange River Colony, and of that portion of the Transvaal

which fell so easily into our hands after the relief of

Mafeking, that is to say, the country lying between

Johannesburg and Pretoria, and the border of Bechuanaland.

Throughout this large area the feeling in the middle of last

year was undoubtedly pacific. The inhabitants were sick of the

war. They were greatly astonished, after all that had been

dinned into them, by the fair and generous treatment they

received on our first occupation, and it would have taken very

little to make them acquiesce readily in the new regime. At that

time too, the feeling in the Colony was better than I have

ever known it. The rebellious element had blown off steam in

an abortive insurrection, and was glad to settle down again.

If it had been possible for us to screen those portions of the

conquered territory, which were fast returning to peaceful

pursuits, from the incursions of the enemy still in the field,

a great deal of what is now most deplorable in the condition of

South Africa would never have been experienced. The vast

extent of the country, the necessity of concentrating our

forces for the long advance, first to Pretoria and then to

Komati Poort, resulted in the country already occupied being

left open to raids, constantly growing in audacity, and fed by

small successes, on the part of a few bold and skilful

guerrilla leaders who had nailed their colours to the mast.

The reappearance of these disturbers of the peace, first in

the south-east of the Orange River Colony, then in the

south-west of the Transvaal, and finally in every portion of

the conquered territory, placed those of the inhabitants who

wanted to settle down in a position of great difficulty.

Instead of being made prisoners of war, they had been allowed

to remain on their farms on taking the oath of neutrality, and

many of them were really anxious to keep it. But they had not the

strength of mind, nor, from want of education, a sufficient

appreciation of the sacredness of the obligation which they

had undertaken, to resist the pressure of their old companions

in arms when these reappeared among them appearing to their

patriotism and to their fears. …

{516}

"As the guerrilla warfare swept back over the whole of the

western Transvaal, and practically the whole of the Orange

River Colony, its effect upon the Cape Colony also became very

marked. There was a time, about the middle of last year, when

the bulk of the Dutch population in the Cape Colony, even

those who had been most bitter against us at the outset,

seemed disposed to accept the 'fait accompli,' and were

prepared to acquiesce in the union of all South Africa under

the British flag. Some of them even began to see certain

advantages in such a consummation. The irreconcilable line

taken in the Cape Parliament, during its recent Session from

July to October, was a desperate effort to counteract this

tendency. But I doubt whether it would have succeeded to the

moderate extent to which it has, had it not been for the

recrudescence of the war on the borders of the Colony, and the

embittered character which it assumed. Every act of harshness,

however necessary, on the part of our troops, was exaggerated

and made the most of, though what principally inflamed the

minds of the people were alleged instances of needless cruelty

which never occurred. Never in my life have I read of, much

less experienced, such a carnival of mendacity as that which

accompanied the pro-Boer agitation in this Colony at the end

of last year. And these libels still continue to make

themselves felt. …

"The present position of affairs, alike in the new territories

and in a large portion of the Cape Colony, if by no means the

most critical, is possibly the most puzzling that we have had

to confront since the beginning of the war. Naturally enough

the public are impatient, and those who are responsible for

the government of the country are bombarded with most

conflicting advice. On the one hand, there is the outcry for

greater severity and for a stricter administration of Martial

Law. On the other hand, there is the expression of the fear

that strict measures would only exasperate the people.

Personally, I am of the opinion, which I have always held,

that reasonable strictness is the proper attitude in the

presence of a grave national danger, and that exceptional

regulations for a time of invasion, the necessity of which

every man of sense can understand, if clearly explained and

firmly adhered to, are not only not incompatible with, but

actually conducive to, the avoidance of injustice and cruelty.

I am satisfied by experience that the majority of those Dutch

inhabitants of the Colony who sympathize with the Republics,

however little they may be able to resist giving active

expression to that sympathy, when the enemy actually appear

amongst them, do not desire to see their own districts

invaded, or to find themselves personally placed in the

awkward dilemma of choosing between high treason and an

unfriendly attitude to the men of their own race from beyond

the border. There are extremists who would like to see the

whole of the Cape Colony overrun. But the bulk of the farmers,

especially the substantial ones, are not of this mind. …