"Mr. Cecil Rhodes, … accustomed as he was to success, quick

movement and rapid developments, in his great career, had …

watched with impatient eyes the setting back of the clock

within the South African Republic. His chief lieutenant, Dr.

Jameson, who had shared with him the labour of reclaiming from

barbarism and developing Rhodesia, and whose ambition was no

less than his superior's, discussed with him the desirability

of some active outside pressure; and between them was evolved

what is known as the Jameson plan. Mr. Beit, the capitalist

most largely interested in the mines of the Rand, an old

financial colleague of Mr. Rhodes, both in the De Beers

amalgamation and in the establishment of the Chartered

Company, promised both his influence and his purse in support

of the plan. Overtures were then made to Mr. Lionel Phillips,

who was at the head of the Chamber of Mines, and Mr. Charles

Leonard, the Chairman of the National Union. … The plan at

this early stage was presented in a very attractive form. A

force under Dr. Jameson was to be quietly gathered on the

border. The Johannesburg agitation, reinforced with capitalist

support, was to be steadily pushed forward. Rifles and

ammunition were to be smuggled into Johannesburg. Both the

High Commissioner and the Colonial Office might be counted on,

it was said, to support a vigorous forward movement for

reform. Mr. Phillips and Mr. Leonard, sick and weary of the

hopelessness of unsupported constitutional action, and of the

continual set back in Boer politics, already casting round in

their minds for some new departure, accepted and from that

time forth co-operated with Mr. Rhodes and Dr. Jameson in the

development of the Jameson plan.

"In October, 1895, a meeting took place at Groote Schuur, Mr.

Rhodes' residence near Cape Town, at which were present, in

addition to Mr. Cecil Rhodes, Mr. Lionel Phillips, Mr.

Hammond, Mr. Charles Leonard, and Colonel Frank Rhodes. At

this meeting the plan was more fully discussed and matured;

and in November, 1895, when Dr. Jameson visited Johannesburg,

the details were finally settled. The letter of invitation was

written, signed and handed to Dr.Jameson, and the date of

combined action provisionally fixed for the end of December.

Dr. Jameson's force was to be about 1,000 strong, and the

start to be made when finally summoned by the signatories of

the letter. In the meantime the Johannesburg leaders were to

have sent in to them 4,500 rifles and 1,000,000 rounds of

ammunition, and were, if possible, to arrange for an attack on

the Pretoria Arsenal simultaneously with the move from

outside. With regard to the letter of invitation which was

subsequently used by Dr. Jameson as a justification for his

start, … Mr. Leonard, Colonel Rhodes, and Mr. Phillips have

all distinctly stated that this letter was never intended as

an authority to Dr. Jameson to enter the Transvaal, unless and

until he received a further summons from them. Such was in

brief the history of the Jameson plan as far as concerned

Johannesburg. And it is necessary here to refer to the

position with regard to it of the bulk of the men who

subsequently constituted the Reform Committee. They at this

time, with the exception of a few of their number, of which I

personally was one, were entirely ignorant of what was going

on. … The Johannesburg leaders, relying on the general

sentiment of the community, assumed the responsibility of

arranging a basis of operations. So that the plan when it was

gradually revealed to various men had either to be accepted by

them in its entirety or rejected. … Men demanded and received

assurance that the movement was to be a republican one, and in

no way to be an attempt on the independence of the country. A

sufficient number of rifles were also to be forthcoming, and

the High Commissioner was to be on the spot to expedite the

adjustment of matters immediately disturbances arose."

_A. P. Hillier,

Raid and Reform,

pages 47-53._

The practical working of the conspiracy proved less easy than

the planning of it. Arms and ammunition were smuggled into

Johannesburg, but not in sufficient quantities. The time of

action had been fixed for the 28th of December. When it came

near there were found to be only 2,500 rifles at hand, instead

of the 10,000 that were wanted. A scheme for the surprising of

the Boer arsenal at Pretoria was pronounced at the last moment

impracticable. Still more disconcerting to many was a report

which came from Cape Town, that Jameson would require the

rising to be made under and in favor of the British flag. "The

movement within the Transvaal," says Mr. Hillier, "had from

its outset been one in favour, not of a British Colony, but of

a sound Republic. … Many Americans and South Africans had

accorded their support only on this understanding." Until a

clearer arrangement with the Rhodesians on this point could be

reached, the leaders in Johannesburg determined not to act.

Accordingly, on the 26th of December, two days before the

appointed date of insurrection, they telegraphed to Jameson,

in covert language which he understood, that it was

"absolutely necessary to postpone the flotation." On the

following day they issued a lengthy manifesto, setting forth

all their grievances, and deferring until the 6th of January a

general meeting of the National Union which had been called

for the 27th of December—the eve of the intended rising. The

manifesto concluded as follows:

"We have now only two questions to consider:

(a) What do we want?

(b) how shall we get it?

I have stated plainly what our grievances are, and I shall

answer with equal directness the question, 'What do we want?'

We want:

(1) the establishment of this Republic as a true republic:

(2) a Grondwet or Constitution which shall be framed by

competent persons selected by representatives of the whole

people and framed on lines laid down by them—a constitution

which shall be safeguarded against hasty alteration;

(3) an equitable franchise law, and fair representation;

(4) equality of the Dutch and English languages;

(5) responsibility of the Legislature to the heads of the

great departments;

(6) removal of religious disabilities;

(7) independence of the courts of justice, with adequate and

secured remuneration of the judges;

(8) liberal and comprehensive education;

(9) efficient civil service, with adequate provision for pay

and pension;

(10) free trade in South African products.

That is what we want. There now remains the question which is

to be put before you at the meeting of the 6th January. viz.,

How shall we get it?"

_Great Britain: Papers by Command, 1896, C.—7933._

{466}

Acting, as appears, on his own responsibility, Dr. Jameson

refused to be stopped by the postponement at Johannesburg,

and, on the evening of December 29, he entered the Transvaal

territory, from Pitsani-Pitlogo, in Bechuanaland, with a force

of about 500 men. His movement created consternation in all the

circles of the conspiracy, and received no effectual support.

It was promptly disavowed and condemned by the British

authorities, and by the home officials of the British South

Africa Company. Cecil Rhodes could do nothing but tacitly

acknowledge his responsibility for what his lieutenant had

done (though the precipitation of the raid was evidently a

surprise and a trouble to him) by resigning the premiership of

Cape Colony. Meantime, the invaders had learned that the Boers

were not to be ridden over in the easy fashion they supposed.

Hasty levies had intercepted their march, had repulsed them at

Krugersdorp, with a heavy loss in killed and wounded,

surrounded them at Doornkop, and forced them to surrender on

New Year's day. A few days later, the Uitlanders at

Johannesburg, some of whom had made a confused and ineffectual

attempt to take arms, proclaiming a provisional government,

and around whose town the excited Boers had gathered in large

force, were persuaded by the British High Commissioner to

submit to the Transvaal authorities, and more than fifty of

the leaders were placed under arrest.

"With great difficulty, President Kruger overcame the desire

of his people that Jameson and his officers should be brought

to trial and punished in the country they had outraged by

their invasion, and they were handed over to the British

government for removal to England and trial by an English

court. The trial took place in July (20-28), before the Lord

Chief Justice (Lord Russell of Killowen), Baron Pollock, and

Justice Hawkins, with a special jury. The charge on which the

prisoners were tried was that of having fitted out a warlike

expedition against a friendly state, in violation of the

Foreign Enlistment Act. The charge of the Lord Chief Justice

gave the following questions to the jury: Were preparations

for a raid made by the defendants? Did they aid, abet,

counsel, or procure such preparation? Were they employed in

the actual expedition? Did the Queen exercise dominion and

sovereignty in Pitsani-Pitlogo? The jury returned affirmative

answers, which were held to constitute a verdict of "guilty,"

and sentence was pronounced,—fifteen months of imprisonment

for Dr. Jameson, and terms varying from five to ten months for

his four subordinate officers. During the trial and after

there were many demonstrations of popular sympathy with the

prisoners. Meantime, in April, the Transvaal authorities had

brought the imprisoned leaders of the Johannesburg "reform

committee" to trial at Pretoria on charges of treason and had

convicted them all. Four, namely, Colonel Rhodes (brother of

Cecil), Lionel Phillips, George Farrar, and John Hays Hammond

(an American), were sentenced to death; the remainder to a

payment of heavy fines. The death sentences were soon

commuted, first to imprisonment for fifteen years, and

subsequently to fines of $125,000 on each of four prisoners.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1896 (January).

Message of the German Emperor to President Kruger,

relative to the Jameson Raid.

The critical situation of affairs produced by the Jameson raid

was dangerously complicated at the beginning by the

publication of the following telegram, sent to President

Kruger, on the 3d of January, by the German Emperor: "I

express my sincere congratulations that, supported by your

people and without appealing for help to friendly powers, you

have succeeded by your own energetic action against the armed

bands which invaded your country as disturbers of the peace,

and have thus been enabled to restore peace, and safeguard the

independence of your country against attacks from without."

President Kruger replied: "I testify to Your Majesty my very

deep and heartfelt thanks for Your Majesty's sincere

congratulations. With God's help we hope to do everything

further that is possible for the holding of our dearly bought

independence and the stability of our beloved republic." This

kindled a white heat of indignation in England. It was

supposed to signify a disposition on the part of the German

Emperor to recognize the absolute independence which the South

African Republic claimed, and to threaten interference as

between Great Britain and the Boers. A powerful "flying

squadron" was instantly put in commission, and several ships

were ordered to Delagoa Bay. For some time the relations

between Great Britain and Germany were seriously strained; but

various influences gradually cooled the excited feeling in

England, though not a little distrust of German intentions has

remained.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1896 (January-April).

Urgency of the British Colonial Secretary for redress of

Uitlander grievances.

Invitation to President Kruger to visit England.

His requirement that Article IV. of the London Convention

shall be discussed.

Deadlock of the parties.

The complaints of the Uitlanders, effectually silenced for the

time being at Johannesburg by the vigorous action of the

Boers, were now taken up by the British Secretary of State for

the Colonies, Mr. Chamberlain, and pressed in strenuous

despatches to the High Commissioner in South Africa, Sir

Hercules Robinson. On the 4th of January, 1896, four days

after the surrender of Jameson and four days before the

insurgent Uitlanders at Johannesburg had laid down their arms,

a long despatch was cabled by Mr. Chamberlain to the High

Commissioner, instructing him to make "friendly

representations" to President Kruger on the subject of those

complaints. "I am aware," wrote the Colonial Secretary, "that

victory of Transvaal Government over Administrator of

Mashonaland may possibly find them not willing to make any

concessions. If this is the attitude they adopt, they will, in

my opinion, make a great mistake; for danger from which they

have just escaped was real, and one which, if the causes which

led up to it are not removed, may recur, although in a

different form. I have done everything in my power to undo and

to minimise the evil caused by late unwarrantable raid by

British subjects into the territory of the South African

Republic, and it is not likely that such action will be ever

repeated; but the state of things of which complaint has been

made cannot continue forever. If those who are now a majority

of inhabitants of the Transvaal, but are excluded from all

participation in its government, were, of their own

initiative, and without any interference from without, to

attempt to reverse that state of things, they would, without

doubt, attract much sympathy from all civilised communities

who themselves live under a free Government, and I cannot

regard the present state of things in the South African

Republic as free from danger to the stability of its

institutions.

{467}

The Government of the South African Republic cannot be

indifferent to these considerations, and President of South

African Republic himself has on more than one occasion,

expressed his willingness to inquire into and to deal with

just reasons for discontent; and the Volksraad have now the

opportunity to show magnanimity in the hour of their success

and to settle all differences by moderate concessions. They

must fully admit the entire loyalty of yourself and of Her

Majesty's Government to the terms of London Convention, as

shown by their recent intervention, and they must recognise

that their authority in crisis through which they have passed

could not have been so promptly and effectively asserted

without that intervention. If they will recognise this by

making concessions in accordance with our friendly advice, no

one will be able to suggest that they are acting under

pressure, and their voluntary moderation will produce best

effect among all who are interested in well-being of the

Transvaal and in future of South Africa."

On the 13th of January the Colonial Secretary pursued the

subject in another despatch to Sir Hercules Robinson, as

follows: "Now that Her Majesty's Government have fulfilled

their obligations to the South African Republic, and have

engaged to bring the leaders in the recent invasion to trial,

they are anxious that the negotiations which are being

conducted by you should result in a permanent settlement by

which the possibility of further internal troubles will be

prevented. The majority of the population is composed of

Uitlanders, and their complete exclusion from any share in the

government of the country is an admitted grievance which is

publicly recognised as such by the friends of the Republic as

well as by the opinion of civilised Europe. There will always

be a danger of internal disturbance so long as this grievance

exists, and I desire that you will earnestly impress on

President Kruger the wisdom of making concessions in the

interests alike of the South African Republic and of South

Africa as a whole. There is a possibility that the President

might be induced to rely on the support of some foreign Power

in resisting the grant of reforms or in making demands upon

Her Majesty's Government; and in view of this I think it well

to inform you that Great Britain will resist at all costs the

interference of any foreign Power in the affairs of the South

African Republic. The suggestion that such interference was

contemplated by Germany was met in this country by an

unprecedented and unanimous outburst of public feeling. In

order to be prepared for all eventualities, it has been

thought desirable by Her Majesty's Government to commission a

Flying Squadron of powerful men-of-war, with twelve

torpedo-ships; and many other vessels are held in reserve. Her

Majesty's Government have no reason, at the present moment, to

anticipate any conflict of interest with foreign Powers; but I

think it right for you to know that Great Britain will not

tolerate any change in her relations with the Republic, and

that, while loyally respecting its internal independence,

subject to the Conventions, she will maintain her position as

the Paramount Power in South Africa, and especially the

provisions of Article IV. of the Convention of 1884. It is my

sincere hope that President Kruger, who has hitherto shown so

much wisdom in dealing with the situation, will now take the

opportunity afforded to him of making of his own free will

such reasonable concessions to the Uitlanders as will remove

the last excuse for disloyalty, and will establish the free

institutions of the Republic on a firm and lasting basis."

To this Sir Hercules replied with a remonstrance, saying:

"Your telegram 13 January No.1 only reached me last night

after I had left Pretoria. I could, if you consider it

desirable, communicate purport to President of South African

Republic by letter, but I myself think such action would be

inopportune. … Nearly all leading Johannesburg men are now in

gaol, charged with treason against the State, and it is

rumoured that Government has written evidence of a

long-standing and wide-spread conspiracy to seize Government

of country on the plea of denial of political privileges, and

to incorporate the country with that of British South Africa

Company. The truth of these reports will be tested in the

trials to take place shortly in the High Court, and meanwhile

to urge claim for extended political privileges for the very

men so charged would be ineffectual and impolitic. President

of South African Republic has already promised municipal

government to Johannesburg, and has stated in a Proclamation

that all grievances advanced in a constitutional manner will

be carefully considered and brought before the Volksraad

without loss of time; but until result of trials is known

nothing, of course, will now be done." Mr. Chamberlain saw

force in the High Commissioner's objections, and assented to a

momentary suspension of pressure on the Transvaal President,

but not for long. "I recognise," he telegraphed on the 15th,

"that the actual moment is not opportune for a settlement of

the Uitlanders' grievances, and that the position of the

President of the South African Republic may be an embarrassing

one, but I do not consider that the arrest of a few score

individuals out of a population of 70,000 or more, or the

supposed existence of a plot among that small minority, is a

reason for denying to the overwhelming majority of innocent

persons reforms which are just in themselves and expedient in

the interests of the Republic. Whatever may be said about the

conduct of a few individuals, nothing can be plainer than that

the sober and industrious majority refused to countenance any

resort to violence, and proved their readiness to obey the law

and your authority. I hope, therefore, to hear at an early

date that you propose to resume the discussion with President

of South African Republic on lines laid down in my previous

telegrams. I do not see that the matter need wait until the

conclusion of the trial of the supposed plotters."

On the 28th of January the High Commissioner, under

instructions from London, addressed to President Kruger the

following invitation: "I am directed by Her Majesty's

Government to tender to your Honour a cordial invitation to

visit England, with a view to discussing with them all those

questions which relate to the security of the South African

Republic and the general welfare of South Africa. I am to add

that, although Her Majesty's Government cannot consent to

modify Article 4 of the London Convention [see above; A. D.

1884-1894], other matters are open to friendly discussion.

{468}

Her Majesty's Government hope that your Honour will come as

the guest of the British Government." While this invitation

was being considered, and before a reply to it had been made,

the British Colonial Secretary reopened his own discussion of

the questions at issue, February 4, in a despatch of great

length, reviewing the whole history of the relations of the

Uitlanders to the government of the South African Republic,

and of the recent occurrences which had been consequent upon

their discontent. It praised "the spirit of wisdom and

moderation" shown by President Kruger, who "kept within bounds

the natural exasperation of his burghers," and it gave

especial attention to a proclamation which President Kruger

had addressed to the inhabitants of Johannesburg, on the 10th

of January, in which he had said: "It is my intention to

submit a draft Law at the first ordinary session of the

Volksraad, whereby a Municipality with a Mayor at its head

will be appointed for Johannesburg, to whom the whole

municipal government of this town will be entrusted."

On this the Secretary made the following suggestions: "Basing

myself upon the expressed desire of President Kruger to grant

municipal government to Johannesburg, I suggest, for his

consideration, as one way of meeting the difficulty, that the

whole of the Rand district, from end to end, should be erected

into something more than a municipality as that word is

ordinarily understood; that, in fact, it should have a

modified local autonomy, with powers of legislation on purely

local questions, and subject to the veto of the President and

Executive Council; and that this power of legislation should

include the power of assessing and levying its own taxation,

subject to the payment to the Republican Government of an

annual tribute of an amount to be fixed at once and revised at

intervals, so as to meet the case of a diminution or increase

in the mining industry. As regards judicial matters in such a

scheme, the Rand, like the Eastern Provinces and the Kimberley

District of the Cape Colony, might have a superior court of

its own. It would, of course, be a feature of this scheme that

the autonomous body should have the control of its civil

police, its public education, its mine management, and all

other matters affecting its internal economy and well-being.

The central Government would be entitled to maintain all

reasonable safeguards against the fomenting of a revolutionary

movement, or the storage of arms for treasonable purposes

within the district. Those living in, and there enjoying a

share in the government of, the autonomous district, would

not, in my view, be entitled to a voice in the general

Legislature or the Central Executive, or the presidential

election. The burghers would thus be relieved of what is

evidently a haunting fear to many of them—although I believe

an unfounded one—that the first use which the enfranchised

newcomers would make of their privileges would be to upset the

republican form of government. Relieved of this apprehension,

I should suppose that there would not be many of them who

would refuse to deal with the grievances of the comparatively

few Uitlanders outside the Rand on those liberal principles

which characterized the earlier legislation of the Republic.

The President may rest assured that in making the above

suggestions I am only actuated by friendly feeling towards

himself and the South African Republic. They are not offered

in derogation of his authority, but as the sincere and

friendly contribution of Her Majesty's Government towards the

settlement of a question which continues to threaten the

tranquillity of the Republic and the welfare and progress of

the whole of South Africa. A proper settlement of the

questions at issue involves so many matters of detail which

could be more easily and satisfactorily settled by personal

conference, that I should be glad to have the opportunity of

discussing the subject with the President, if it suited his

convenience, and were agreeable to him, to come to this

country for the purpose. Should this be impracticable, I rely

upon you to make my views known to him and to carry on the

negotiations."

This despatch, as soon as it had been forwarded from the

Colonial Office, was published in the "London Gazette," so

that a telegraphed summary of its contents reached President

Kruger before it came to him officially,—which naturally added

something to the irritations existing at Pretoria. However,

the President, on the 8th of February, by telegram to the High

Commissioner, and more fully on the 25th by letter, responded

to the invitation to visit England. In his telegram he said:

"In order to give me the liberty to let the Honourable

Volksraad judge whether permission and power to act will be

given me to go out of the country, an understanding must, of

course, first be come to as to what points will he discussed

or not, so that I may lay those points before the Volksraad

for deliberation and resolution." In his letter he wrote:

"At the commencement, I wish to observe that the object of

this letter is to pave the way for a friendly discussion of

the matters herein mentioned, in order to arrive at a

satisfactory solution, and further that, although as yet I

desire no positive and direct assent to the desires expressed

herein, I would, nevertheless, to prevent a misunderstanding,

desire to have an assurance that they will be taken into the

most mature consideration with the earnest endeavour and the

sincere desire to comply with my wishes. The desire to receive

this assurance will be respected by your Excellency and Her

Majesty's Government as reasonable, when I say that,

considering especially my advanced age and the unavoidable

delay, owing to my absence, in the transaction of matters

affecting the highest State interests, I would, with

difficulty, be able to make the sacrifice in going only to

discuss matters without arriving at the desired result, and it

is evident that if the assurance referred to by me cannot be

given by Her Majesty's Government, in all probability the

Honourable Volksraad would not grant its consent and

commission. … Although, as already said, the Government could

tolerate no interference in its internal relations and the

official discussion of affairs with the object of requiring

changes therein will have to be avoided, on the other hand I

wish it to be understood that private hints given by statesmen

of experience in the true interest of the country and its

independence will always be warmly appreciated by me, from

whatever side they may come.

{469}

"Going over to a summing up of the points which, in my

opinion, should be brought under discussion, I wish to mention

in the first place:—

1. The superseding of the Convention of London with the eye,

amongst others, on the violation of the territory of the South

African Republic: because in several respects it has already

virtually ceased to exist; because in other respects it has no

more cause for existence; because it is injurious to the

dignity of an independent Republic; because the very name and

the continual arguments on the question of suzerainty, which

since the conclusion of this Convention no longer exists, are

used as a pretext, especially by a libellous press, for

wilfully inciting both white and coloured people against the

lawful authority of the Republic; for intentionally bringing

about misunderstanding and false relations between England and

the Republic, whereby in this manner the interests of both

countries and of their citizens and subjects are prejudiced

and the peaceful development of the Republic is opposed. In

the discussion of the withdrawal of the Convention as a whole,

Article IV. should naturally not be kept back. I have reason

to believe that the British Government has come to the

decision to make no alteration in this on account of false

representations made to it and lying reports spread by the

press and otherwise with a certain object, to the effect that

the Government of the Republic has called in, or sought, the

protection of other Powers. While I thankfully acknowledge and

will ever acknowledge the sympathy of other Powers or their

subjects, and the conduct of the last named has, in the light

of the trials recently passed through, on the whole offered a

favourable contrast to that of British subjects, there is

nevertheless nothing further from my thoughts than to strive

for the protection of a foreign power, which I will never even

seek. Neither I nor the people of the Republic will tolerate an

interference with the internal relations from any power

whatever, and I am prepared, if the course proposed by me be

adopted, to give the necessary assurances for this, in order

that Her British Majesty's Government need have no fear that

Her interests in South Africa should be injured.

2. Further should be discussed the superseding of the

Convention by a treaty of peace, commerce and friendship, by

which the existing privileges of England in the dominion of

commerce and intercourse and the interests of British subjects

in the Republic will be satisfactorily guaranteed on the

footing of the most-favoured nation, and herein I would be

prepared to go to the utmost of what can reasonably be asked.

3. Then the necessary guarantees will have to be given against

a repetition of the violation of territory out of the

territory of the Chartered Company or the Cape Colony, and of

disturbing military operations and unlawful military or police

or even private movements on the borders of the Republic.

4. Further should be discussed the compensation for direct and

indirect injury to be given or caused to be given by England

for and by reason of the incursion that recently took place.

The reasons for this are evident and need no argument. The

amount to be demanded it is impossible as yet to determine,

but, if required, it can still be given before my departure to

England.

5. I would, although in the following respects I would not

insist beforehand on an assurance such as that intended with

regard to the above-mentioned points, nevertheless wish to

request the earnest consideration of a final settlement of the

Swaziland question, in this sense, that that country shall

henceforth become a part of the Republic. …

6. Further, I would very much like to have discussed the

revocation of the charter of the Chartered Company, which, if

this does not take place, will continue to be a threatening

danger to the quiet and peace of the Republic and thereby also

to the whole South Africa. I am of opinion that all the above

desires are fair and just. … I will be pleased to receive the

views of Her Majesty's Government on the points herein brought

forward, in order that I may be enabled to bring the matter

for decision before the Honourable Volksraad."

Mr. Chamberlain's reply to this communication was, in part, as

follows: "Her Majesty's Government regret that President has

given no definite reply to invitation to visit England which

was sent to him on 28th January. This invitation was the

result of private information conveyed to Her Majesty's

Government that the President was desirous of arranging with

them a settlement of all differences, and of placing on a

permanent and friendly basis the relations between the United

Kingdom and the South African Republic. Before forwarding the

invitation, Her Majesty's Government knew that his Honour was

in full possession of their opinion, that no arrangement can

be satisfactory or complete which does not include a fair

settlement of those grievances of the Uitlander population

which have been recognized by the general public opinion of

South Africa, and which have been the cause of discontent and

agitation in the past, and are likely—unless remedied—to lead

to further disturbances in future, Her Majesty's Government

also took care to satisfy themselves that the President had

been made aware that they were not prepared to modify in any

way the provisions of Article IV. of the Convention of 1884,

and this was again made clear in the formal invitation to

visit England. Under these circumstances, it was with great

surprise that Her Majesty's Government learnt from the

Despatch of the President of 25th February that his Honour

objected to discuss the question of the reforms asked for by

the Uitlanders, and that he desired to propose withdrawal of

Article IV. of the Convention, and Her Majesty's Government

regret that they were not informed of his Honour's views on

the subject at an earlier date, as they would not have felt

justified in inviting the President to encounter the fatigue

of a journey to this country if they had not been led to

believe that he was in agreement with them as to the general

object of such a visit.

"In their view, Her Majesty's Government were able to offer a

complete guarantee in the future to the South African Republic

against any attack upon its independence, either from within

any part of Her Majesty's dominions or from the territory of a

foreign Power. In return, they assumed that the President

would make known to them the measures which he proposed to

take to remedy the acknowledged grievances of the Uitlanders,

and to consider any suggestions which Her Majesty's Government

might wish to offer as to the adequacy of these measures for

the removal of all cause of internal disturbances. … Such a

discussion as they contemplate would not involve any

acknowledgment on the part of the President of a right of

interference in the internal concerns of the Republic, but

would only at the most amount to a recognition of the friendly

interest of Her Majesty's Government in its security, and in

the general welfare of South Africa.

{470}

The President would be, of course, at liberty to accept or to

reject any advice that might be tendered to him by Her

Majesty's Government, but in the latter case the

responsibility for the result would naturally rest wholly with

him. Her Majesty's Government have already expressed a

willingness to give full consideration to any representations

which his Honour may wish to make on the other points named in

his letter, although some of them are matters wholly in

jurisdiction of Her Majesty's Government. But unless the

President is satisfied with the explanations I have now given,

Her Majesty's Government are reluctantly obliged to come to

the conclusion that no good purpose can be served by the

proposed visit."

In return to this despatch, President Kruger, on 17th of

March, expressed his "deep disappointment" at its contents, by

reason of which, he said, "it is not possible for me to

proceed to convene a special session of the Volksraad at once"

for the purpose of action upon the invitation of the British

Government. Thereupon (April 27), the Colonial Secretary

cabled to the High Commissioner in South Africa: "Her

Majesty's Government have no alternative but to withdraw the

invitation, which it appears from the President's message was

given under a misapprehension of the facts." Thus the two

parties were at a deadlock.

_Great Britain, Papers by Command: 1896,

C. 7933, pages 19-91; and C. 8063, pages 11-17._

SOUTH AFRICA: Rhodesia: A. D. 1896 (March-September).

Matabele revolt.

Taking advantage of the confusion in affairs which followed

the Jameson raid, and its removal of part of the police force

from the country, the Matabele rose in revolt. The main

provocation of the rising appears to have been from severe

measures that were adopted for stamping out rinderpest in the

country. Many whites were killed in the regions of scattered

settlement, and Buluwayo and Gwelo, where considerable numbers

had taken refuge, were in much danger for a time. But prompt

and vigorous measures were taken by the colonial and imperial

authorities, as well as by the officers of the South Africa

Company. Troops were sent from Cape Colony, Natal, and

England, and Major-General Sir Frederick Carrington was

ordered from Gibraltar to take command. Cecil Rhodes hastened

to Salisbury on the first news of the outbreak and organized a

force of volunteers for the relief of the beleaguered towns. The

Transvaal government offered help. By June, when General

Carrington arrived, and Lord Grey had succeeded Dr. Jameson as

Administrator, the insurgent natives had been put on the

defensive and had nearly ceased their attacks. They were

driven into the Matoppo hills, where their position was

formidably strong. At length, in August, Mr. Rhodes opened

negotiations with some of the chiefs, and went, with three

companions, unarmed, into their stronghold. He there made an

agreement with them, which the British military authorities

and many of the Matabele warriors refused to be bound by. But

the revolt had been practically broken and soon came to an

end.

SOUTH AFRICA: British South Africa Company: A. D. 1896 (June).

Resignation of Mr. Rhodes.

On the 26th of June the resignations of Cecil J. Rhodes and

Mr. Beit from the Board of Directors of the British South

Africa Company, and of Mr. Rutherford Harris as its Secretary,

were accepted by the Board.

SOUTH AFRICA: Cape Colony: A. D. 1896 (July).

Investigation of the Jameson Raid.

Responsibility of Cecil J. Rhodes.

On the 17th of July a Select Committee of the Cape Colony

House of Assembly, appointed in the previous May "to inquire

into the circumstances, as affecting this colony, in connexion

with the preparations for and carrying out of the recent armed

inroad into the territory of the South African Republic," made

its report, rehearsing at length the facts ascertained, with

evidence in full, and submitting a number of "conclusions,"

among them the following: "Your Committee are of opinion that

no member of the then Colonial Government with the exception

of the then Prime Minister [Mr. Cecil J. Rhodes], had any

knowledge whatever or suspicion of the intention to send an

armed force across the border of the South African Republic. …

Your Committee is convinced that the stores and workshops of

the De Beers Consolidated Mines were for some time previous to

the inroad used for the storage and for the unlawful

exportation of arms destined for the South African Republic,

in connexion with this inroad, and also that 11 men were sent

from De Beers to Johannesburg, who were afterwards allowed to

resume their positions. The evidence is clear, and leaves no

room for doubt on this point. The local directors give an

emphatic denial to any guilty knowledge on their part, and

your Committee must acquit them of anything beyond negligence,

which, looking to the magnitude of the transactions and the

length of time over which they extended, must have been very

marked. It is not conceivable that such proceedings could have

been permitted without the knowledge and approval of the

Chairman and Life Governor, Mr. C. J. Rhodes. With regard to

the Chartered Company, your Committee find that the principal

officials in Cape Town either knew, or were in a position to

have known, the existence of this plot. Two at least of the

directors, Mr. Beit and the Right Honorable C. J. Rhodes,

were, together with the Administrator, Dr. Jameson, and Dr.

Harris, the South African Secretary of the Company, active as

promoters and moving spirits throughout, and they were from

time to time kept informed of the preparations. … The whole

movement was largely financed and engineered from outside, and

in both cases certain directors and officials of the Chartered

Company of British South Africa were active throughout. As

regards the Right Honorable C. J. Rhodes, your Committee can

come to no other conclusion than that he was thoroughly

acquainted with the preparations that led to the inroad. That

in his capacity as controller of the three great joint-stock

companies, the British South Africa Company, the De Beers

Consolidated Mines, and the Gold Fields of South Africa, he

directed and controlled the combination which rendered such a

proceeding as the Jameson raid possible. … It would appear

that Mr. Rhodes did not direct or approve of Dr. Jameson's

entering the territory of the South African Republic at the

precise time when he did do so, but your Committee cannot find

that that fact relieves Mr. Rhodes from responsibility for the

unfortunate occurrences which took place. Even if Dr. Jameson

be primarily responsible for the last fatal step, Mr. Rhodes

cannot escape the responsibility of a movement which had been

arranged, with his concurrence, to take place at the precise

time it did, if circumstances had been favourable at

Johannesburg."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command: 1897,

C. 8380, pages 7-9._

{471}

SOUTH AFRICA: British South Africa Company: A. D. 1896 (July).

Parliamentary movement to investigate its administration.

In the British House of Commons, on the 30th of July, Mr.

Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, made a

motion for the appointment of a select committee of fifteen to

conduct an inquiry into the administration of the British

South Africa Company, and the motion was adopted.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1896-1897 (May-April).

Continued controversies between the British Colonial

Secretary, Mr. Chamberlain, and the Government of the

South African Republic.

Complaints and counter complaints.

Aliens Immigration Law, etc.

For a time after the abandonment of the proposed visit of

President Kruger to England, the older questions at issue

between Great Britain and the Transvaal fell into the

background; but new ones were constantly rising. Each party

watched the other with suspicious and critical eyes, sharply

questioning things that would hardly have been noticed in

ordinary times. The Boer authorities, on their side, were

naturally disturbed and made inquisitive by every movement of

troops or arms in the surrounding British territory, both of

which movements were being somewhat increased by the revolt of

the Matabeles. They were impatient, too, for some action on

the part of the British government against the chief authors

of the recent invasion,—the officials of the British South

Africa Company,—and against the Company itself. On the 11th of

May, 1896, the State Secretary of the Transvaal government

telegraphed to the British High Commissioner as follows: "The

newspapers of the last few days state that Her Majesty's

Government still continue to take the part of the Directors of

British South Africa Company, especially Mr. Rhodes. This

Government will not believe the accuracy of these reports, but

it is of opinion that the Chartered Company as administering

the Government up to now is a source of danger to whole of

South Africa. The inroad into this Republic was made by

officers, troops, and arms of that Chartered Company, and even

the explicit prohibition of Her Majesty's Government was

unable to restrain them, notwithstanding the Chartered Company

had taken upon itself the international obligations of Great

Britain. The behaviour of the persons who knew of the scheme

of the inroad beforehand and supported it is, as we see,

defended by saying that they acted thus in the interests of

and for the extension of Imperialism in South Africa. This

Government does not believe that the end justifies the means,

and is convinced that Her Majesty's Government does not wish

to be served by misdeed."

When this had been communicated to the British Colonial

Secretary, Mr. Chamberlain, he replied (May 13) that the

President of the South African Republic "has been misinformed

if he supposes that Her Majesty's Government have taken the

part of any of British South Africa Company Directors,

including Mr. Rhodes, with regard to any connexion which they

may be hereafter proved to have had with the recent raid. … On

the contrary, while appreciating Mr. Rhodes's services in the

past, Her Majesty's Government have condemned the raid, and

the conduct of all the parties implicated by the telegrams

recently published. Her Majesty's Government have promised a

full Parliamentary inquiry, as soon as legal proceedings

against Dr. Jameson and his officers have been concluded, to

examine the Charter granted to British South Africa Company

and the operation of its provisions, and to consider whether

any improvements in it are desirable. Such an inquiry will go

into the whole subject, not only of recent events, but of the

whole administration. Her Majesty's Government cannot be

expected to announce any decision as to the future of the

Company until the Parliamentary Committee has made its

recommendations."

On the 15th President Kruger replied: "This Government is very

pleased at receiving the assurance that a searching inquiry is

being instituted against British South Africa Company and its

Directors, and will follow its course with interest." But the

following month found the authorities at Pretoria still

unsatisfied as to the intention of the British government to

bring Mr. Rhodes and the South Africa Company to account for

what they had done. On the 19th of June, the then Acting High

Commissioner (Sir Hercules Robinson having gone to England on

leave) transmitted to Mr. Chamberlain two telegrams just

received by him from the government of the South African

Republic. The first was as follows: "Acting under

instructions, I have the honour to acquaint your Excellency,

for the information of Her Majesty's Government, that, with a

view to the welfare and peace of South Africa, this Government

is convinced that the proofs in the possession and at the

disposal of Her Majesty's Government now completely justify

and compel the bringing to trial of Messrs. Cecil Rhodes,

Alfred Beit, and Doctor Rutherford Harris, as has already been

done with Doctor Jameson and his accomplices. In the interests

of all South Africa, this Government feels itself obliged to

press the taking of this step upon Her Majesty's Government. I

have also the honour to request your Excellency to communicate

this despatch by cable to Her Majesty's Government in London."

The second was in this language: "This Government regards with

great regret the delay in the matter of the inquiry with

respect to the complicity and responsibility of British South

Africa Company in connexion with the raid of Doctor Jameson

and his band within the territory of this Republic. This

Government considers it its right and duty to press for the

speedy holding of the inquiry, not merely because it is the

injured party but also because of its interest and share in

the well-being of South Africa, whose interests, as repeatedly

intimated, are also dear to Her Majesty the Queen. This

Government is also convinced that it is urgently necessary

that the entire control and administration, as well civil as

military, be taken out of hands of British South Africa

Company and transferred to Her Majesty's Government, and I am

instructed to press this point on behalf of this Government. I

have further the honour to request your Excellency to cable

this despatch to Her Majesty's Government in London."

{472}

To these communications Mr. Chamberlain made a somewhat

haughty response. "Inform the Government of the South African

Republic," he cabled on the 25th of June, "that Her Majesty's

Government have received their telegrams of the 19th June,

which were published in London almost simultaneously with

their receipt by me. Her Majesty's Government do not require

to be reminded of their duty in regard to the recent invasion

of the South African Republic, and they cannot admit the claim

of the Government of the Republic to dictate the time and

manner in which they shall fulfil their obligations. I am

unable to understand the reasons which have suddenly

influenced the Government of the South African Republic to

make representations which are inconsistent with their

previous statements. On 18th April and on 15th May the

Government of the Republic appeared to be satisfied with the

assurances given them by Her Majesty's Government, from which

there has never been any intention of departing. It would not

be in accordance with English ideas of justice to condemn the

British South Africa Company and deal with its powers as

proposed in the telegrams before an enquiry had been made, and

before the Company had been heard in its own defence. With

regard to the demand of the Government of the South African

Republic that the three gentlemen specifically named shall now

be placed on their trial, you will remind them that Her

Majesty's Government can only act in this matter upon the

advice of the Law Officers of the Crown, and in accordance

with the principles of English law."

But Mr. Secretary Chamberlain, on his side, was

equally—perhaps more than equally—watchful and critical of the

doings and omissions of the government of the South African

Republic. He kept an eye upon them that was especially alert

for the detection of infractions of the London Convention of

1884 (see above: A. D. 1884-1894), with its provisions very

strictly construed. He found treaties negotiated with foreign

powers in contravention of Article IV. of that Convention, and

laws passed which he deemed an infringement of its Article

XIV. He arraigned the government of the Republic upon each as

it came to his knowledge, and then, on the 6th of March, 1897,

went back over the record of his complaints and summed them

up, as follows: "It will be convenient if I recapitulate

briefly the occasions for such complaint, beginning with the

cases relating to Article IV. of the Convention. …

"1.—Netherlands Treaty.

On the 9th November 1895, an Extradition Treaty between the

South African Republic and the Netherlands was signed at the

Hague, and the ratifications were exchanged on the 19th June

last, without the Treaty being submitted for the approval of

Her Majesty. The case was therefore one of a clear infraction

of the Convention, inasmuch as the Treaty had not been

submitted to Her Majesty's Government on its completion, and

had been concluded by the exchange of ratifications without

obtaining the previous approval of the Queen. The Government

of the South African Republic, on their attention being called

to the infraction, did not deny that there had been a

departure from the general practice, but urged that they had

made no publication of the Treaty in anticipation of the

approval of Her Majesty. The Treaty had, however, been

published in the 'Netherlands Gazette' of the 3rd July, and I

observed that when the Treaty was published in the 'Staats

Courant' of the South African Republic after Her Majesty's

approval had been given, the official notice merely stated

that the Treaty was signed and ratified on certain dates, no

reference being made to that approval.

"2.-The Accession of the South African Republic to the

Geneva Convention.

After Dr. Jameson's raid, owing to a report made by the St.

John's Ambulance Association, Her Majesty's Government

determined to invite the South African Republic to accede to

the Geneva Convention, and the necessary instructions were

sent to Sir J. de Wet, who, however, omitted to carry them

out. The South African Republic, on the 30th September,

formally communicated to the Swiss Government, through their

Representative at the Hague, their act of accession to the

Geneva Convention. Her Majesty's Government, in the

circumstances, did not hesitate to convey the Queen's

approval, but the action of the Government of the Republic

none the less constituted a breach of the London Convention.

"3.—Portuguese Treaty.

An Extradition Treaty between the South African Republic and

Portugal was signed on the 3rd November 1893, but, contrary to

the usual practice, has not yet been submitted for the Queen's

approval, although two years have elapsed since Lord Ripon, in

his Despatch of the 25th February 1895, requested your

predecessor to call the attention of the President to the

omission to communicate this Convention to Her Majesty's

Government under the provisions of Article IV. of the London

Convention. … I now pass to the consideration of some of the

recent legislation of the Volksraad in its relation to Article

XIV. It will be found that it involves in more than one case

actual or possible breaches of the Convention. Article XIV.

runs as follows:—'All persons, other than natives, conforming

themselves to the laws of the South African Republic

(a) will have full liberty, with their families, to enter,

travel, or reside in any part of the South African

Republic;

(b) they will be entitled to hire or possess houses,

manufactories, warehouses, shops, and premises;

(c) they may carry on their commerce either in person or by

any agents whom they may think fit to employ;

(d) they will not be subject, in respect of their persons

or property, or in respect of their commerce or industry,

to any taxes, whether general or local, other than those

which are or may be imposed upon citizens of the said

Republic.'

"4.—The Aliens Immigration Law.

This law imposes upon aliens conditions of a new and

burthensome character in excess of the simple requirement that

they must conform themselves to the laws of the Republic. … 2.

The Aliens Expulsion Law. This law empowers the President,

with the advice and consent of the Executive Council, after

consulting the State Attorney, to expel, without an appeal to

the Court, any foreigner who, by word or writing, excites to

disobedience or transgression of the law, or takes any steps

dangerous to public peace and order. … Her Majesty's

Government … do not admit that the Government of the Republic

have a right to expel foreigners who are not shown to have

failed to conform to the laws of the Republic, and they

reserve the right to object to proceedings under the Act which

may amount to a breach of the Convention.

{473}

3. The Press Law. This law empowers the State President, on

the advice and with the consent of the Executive, to prohibit

entirely or for a time the circulation of printed or published

matter the contents of which are, in his judgment, contrary to

good morals or a danger to the peace and order in the

Republic. The suppression of the 'Critic' newspaper, the

property of a British subject, under this law, is a matter

which may raise a serious question as to whether the action of

the Government of the Republic has been consistent with the

Convention, but as Her Majesty's Government have not yet

received the explanation of the Government of the Republic in

that case, it is only necessary for me to make a passing

allusion to it in this Despatch.

"In several of the cases above cited, the strict letter of the

Convention could apparently have been observed without any

difficulty, while in others the objects which the Government

of the South African Republic had in view could have been

attained without any infringement of the Convention by a

previous understanding with Her Majesty's Government. Her

Majesty's Government therefore cannot conceal from themselves

that the Government of the South African Republic have in

these cases failed to give effect in practice to the

intention, so frequently expressed in public and official

utterances, of upholding the Convention on the part of the

Republic, and of maintaining that good understanding with Her

Majesty's Government which is so necessary in the interests of

South Africa."

Of the laws complained of by Mr. Chamberlain, that relating to

immigrant aliens had raised the most protest, because of its

requirement that all such aliens who were permitted to enter

and remain in the country must carry "travelling and

residential passes," to be shown on demand. The Transvaal

Government had met Mr. Chamberlain's first remonstrance on

this subject, in January, by saying: "It is an evident fact

that, especially during the last time, the immigration of

aliens of the lowest class and without any means of

subsistence has been increasing in a disquieting manner. These

persons are dangerous to the peace of the inhabitants and of

the State itself, and, in the opinion of this Government, no

country whatever can be obliged to admit such undesirable

persons. The regulation of unrestricted entry, as it at

present takes place, is thus, from the point of view of police

requirement, not only necessary but also entirely justified

and constitutes no infringement of Article 14 of the

Convention. This Government does not desire as yet to express

any opinion on the suggestion that under the circumstances

mentioned it should have approached Her Britannic Majesty's

Government with a view to arriving at an understanding. In

case, however, the Government of Her Britannic Majesty has

another practical measure to propose whereby its

above-mentioned subjects, whose presence here is not desired

for the reasons stated, can be prevented from seeking an

outlet on the soil of the South African Republic, and that

measure can be found to be applicable to the subjects of other

Powers as well (since the law makes no distinction in that

respect) it will be ready, with gratitude, to give its full

consideration to such measure."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command: 1897, C. 8423._

SOUTH AFRICA: Cape Colony and Natal: A. D. 1897.

Conference of colonial premiers with

the British Colonial] Secretary.

See (in this volume)

ENGLAND: A. D. 1897 (JUNE-JULY).

SOUTH AFRICA: British South Africa Company: A. D. 1897 (January).

Compulsory labor in Rhodesia.

In January, 1897, the Deputy Commissioner of the British

government in Rhodesia made a report to the High Commissioner

on several subjects pertaining to the native administration of

the British South Africa Company which he had been instructed to

investigate. One question to be answered was "whether there

exists a law or practice whereby compulsory labor is exacted

from natives, either by the government of the British South

Africa Company, or by private persons with consent of the

government, or by both?" From his lengthy report on this

subject the High Commissioner deduced the following summary of

conclusions, which he communicated to the colonial secretary:

"(1.) That compulsory labour did undoubtedly exist in

Matabeleland, if not in Mashonaland.

(2.) That labour was procured by the various Native

Commissioners for the various requirements of the Government,

mining companies, and private persons.

(3.) That the Native Commissioners, in the first instance,

endeavoured to obtain labour through the indunas, but, failing

in this, they procured it by force."

_Great Britain,

Papers by Command: 1897, C.—8547._

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1897 (January-March).

Conflict of the Judiciary with the Executive and the Volksraad.

The case of R. E. Brown.

In January, 1897, a decision was rendered by the High Court of

the Republic which brought it into conflict with President

Kruger and the Volksraad. This decision was given in

connection with a suit brought against the government of the

South African Republic by an American engineer, Mr. R. E.

Brown, and the claim of Mr. Brown had arisen out of

circumstances which were subsequently related by a speaker in

the United States Senate, as follows: Mr. R. E. Brown, a young

American mining engineer, living and operating in the Cœur

d'Alene district, in the State of Idaho, about eight years

ago, at the invitation of English capitalists, left this

country to go to the South African Republic for the purpose of

assisting in the development of the gold mines of that

country. It was about that time that Hammond, Clements, and

other American engineers went there, and it is not too much to

say that the genius and the energy of those young Americans

more than anything else made that country a great gold

producer and its mines the most valuable of any in the world.

At that time most of the mines were held by English companies

or Germans. The laws were very simple, but in some respects

appear to have been drawn in the interest of the wealthy

syndicates. Upon the discovery of new mines the President of

the Republic by proclamation opened them to mining locations,

fixing a day and hour at which they would be opened to such

location. Thereafter persons desiring to stake out mines had

to go to the office of the responsible clerk of the district

in which the mines were located to make application for

licenses to locate the mines, and thereafter they were

authorized, either in person or by deputy, to go on the ground

and make mining locations.

{474}

Under this system most of the valuable mines of the country

had been absorbed, as I said, by English and German

syndicates. The mode in which they operated to absorb the

mines was to place their men upon the newly opened ground and

at the earliest possible moment apply for licenses to locate

the mines, and then by means of couriers with swift horses, or

by signals from mountain to mountain where that was possible, to

convey information to their men and cause the mines to be

located before their rivals could get on the ground. Mr. Brown

had not been in the country very long before he learned of this

antiquated system, and he determined on the next opening of

mines to apply to their location some of the snap and go of

American methods.

"In June, 1895, President Kruger by proclamation opened the

mines on the Witfontein farm, district of Potchefstroom, the

responsible clerk for which resided at Doornkop, in that

district. Mr. Brown determined that he would acquire some of

these mines, at least, and as large a number of them as

possible. Witfontein was only 30 miles from Doornkop. The

mines were known to be very valuable, because they had been

prospected on each side and it was found that valuable

gold-bearing reefs ran through them from end to end.

Accordingly he purchased heliographic instruments and employed

expert heliographic operators, and without the knowledge of his

rivals established heliographic communication between Doornkop

and Witfontein. Then he placed his men upon the ground, and on

the 19th day of July, 1895, the earliest period at which he

was permitted to do so, he appeared at the office of the

responsible clerk and sought licenses to locate 1,200 mines

upon this ground. However, on the day before the opening of

the mines his rivals had found out about the heliographic

communication, but they were beaten in the race. In that

extremity they communicated with President Kruger by wire and

induced him on the night of the 18th to issue a second

proclamation, withdrawing the mines of Witfontein from the

privilege of mining locations, and when Mr. Brown appeared at

the office of the responsible clerk and tendered his money he

was met with the information of this action on the part of the

President of the South African Republic, and his application

was refused. But nothing daunted he caused his agents on the

ground to locate the mines the same as if the licenses had

been granted to him, and then he brought suit before the high

court of justice of the South African Republic against the

Republic, alleging the facts substantially as I have stated

them and praying that the authorities be compelled to issue to

him licenses for the mines located, or in lieu thereof that

compensation be made to him in the sum of £372,400, amounting

to about $1,850,000. While this suit was pending it was sought

to re-enforce the action of the President in withdrawing these

lands, and the Volksraad [passed a resolution approving the

withdrawal and declaring that no person should be entitled to

compensation on account of it]."

_United States Congressional Record,

January 21, 1901, page 1370._

On Mr. Brown's suit, the High Court of the Republic decided

that the claimant's right to the land was good, and could not

be set aside by ex post facto measures of the Executive or the

Legislature. The President and the Volksraad refused to submit to

this decision, and passed a law to overrule it, on the ground

that, under the Grondwet (constitution), the Volksraad is the

highest power in the state. In a subsequent public statement

of the matter, Justice Kotze, the Chief Justice, explained the

issue that was thus raised between his court and the

President, and also related the circumstances of a compromise

by which it was settled temporarily, as follows:

"This so-called Law Number 1 of 1897 seeks to deprive the

judges of the testing right, authorizes the President to put a

certain question to the members of the bench that they would

not arrogate to themselves the so-called testing power, and

empowers him to instantly dismiss the judge or judges from

whom he receives no answer, or, in his opinion, an

unsatisfactory answer. The judges for the future are also

subjected to a humiliating form of oath. This measure, it

seems almost superfluous to observe, is no law. It alters the

constitution of the country without any previous reference to

the people, and for the reasons given in the Brown case it is

devoid of all legal validity. The five judges, on March 1,

1897, unanimously issued a declaration, stating that by this

so-called Law Number 1 of 1897 a vital violation of the

independence of the bench had taken place, and that the judges

were exposed in future to the suspicion of bribery. In fact,

the nature and tendency of this measure are so immoral that

one of the judges openly said that no honorable man can occupy

a seat on the bench while Law Number 1 of 1897 remains on the

statute book.

"The question above referred to was duly put by the President

to the judges, who had unanimously signed a letter to the

effect that they did not feel themselves at liberty to give

any answer, when the chief justice of the Cape Colony arrived

in Pretoria, and through his mediation a written understanding

was proposed by the judges on March 19, and accepted without

any qualification by the President on March 22, 1897. By the

terms of this compact the judges undertook not to test laws

and resolutions of the Volksraad on the distinct understanding

that the President would as soon as possible submit a draft

Grondwet to the Volksraad providing how alone the Grondwet can

be altered by special legislation in a manner analogous to the

provisions contained in the constitution of the Orange Free

State on the subject, and incorporating the guaranties for the

independence of the judiciary. By these means the judges

intended to protect both the constitution and the bench

against sudden surprises and attacks, such as, for instance,

the oft-quoted measure known as Law Number 1, of 1897. They

did this to avert a crisis, and, in order to help the

Government and Volksraad out of a difficulty of their own

creation, placed themselves under a temporary obligation upon

the faith of the President as speedily as possible complying

with his portion of the understanding."

_United States, 56th Congress, 1st Session,

House Document Number 618._

The promised amendment of the Grondwet was not made, and the

issue concerning it was brought to a crisis in the next year.

See below: A. D. 1898 (JANUARY-FEBRUARY).

SOUTH AFRICA: A. D. 1897 (February):

Appointment of Sir Alfred Milner.

In February, Sir Alfred Milner was appointed High Commissioner

for South Africa and Governor of Cape Colony, to succeed Sir

Hercules Robinson, retired, and raised to the peerage as Lord

Rosmead.

{475}

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1897 (February).

The franchise.

The government of the Transvaal extended the full franchise to

862 Uitlanders who supported it at the time of the Jameson

raid.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1897 (February.)

Indemnity claimed by the South African Republic for

the Jameson Raid.

On the 16th of February, 1877, the State Secretary of the

South African Republic, Dr. W. J. Leyds, presented to the

British High Commissioner the following "specification of the

compensation to which the Government of the South African

Republic lays claim for and in connexion with the incursion

into the Territory of the South African Republic by Dr.

Jameson and the Troops of the Chartered Company at the end of

December 1895 and the beginning of January 1896.

1. Expenditure for military and commando

services In connexion with the incursion,

the sum of. £136,733 s.4 d.3

2. Compensation to the Netherlands South

African Railway Company for making use,

in accordance with the concession granted

to that Company, of the railway worked by

it during the commando on account of the

incursion of Dr. Jameson. £9,500 s.0 d.0

3. Disbursements to surviving relatives

of slain and wounded. £234 s.19 d.6

4. For annuities, pensions, and disbursements

to widows and children of slain burghers and

to relatives of unmarried slain burghers, as

also to wounded burghers, a total sum of. £28,243 s.0 d.0

5. Expenses of the telegraph department,

for more overtime, more telegrams on service

in South African communication, more

cablegrams, &c. £4,692 s.11 d.9

6. Hospital expenses for the care of the

wounded and sick men, &c. of Dr. Jameson. £225 s.0 d.0

7. For support of members of the families of

commandeered burghers during the commando. £177 s.8 d.8

8. Compensation to be paid to the and the

commandeered burghers for their services

troubles and cares brought upon them. £62,120 s.0 d.0

9. Account of expenses of the Orange

Free State. £36,011 s.19 d.1

Total £677,936 s.3 d.3

"Moral or intellectual compensation to which the Government of

the South African Republic lays claim for and in connexion

with the incursion into the Territory of the South African

Republic by Dr. Jameson and the Troops of the Chartered

Company at the end of December 1895 and the beginning of

January 1896. One million pounds sterling (£1,000,000)."

To this claim the British colonial secretary, Mr. Chamberlain,

replied on the 10th of April, saying, with reference to the

specification under the second head, "for moral or

intellectual damage," that "Her Majesty's Government … regret

that they do not feel justified in presenting it to the

British South Africa Company"; and adding: "Her Majesty's

Government fear that they may be compelled to take similar

exception to certain of the items composing the first head,

especially in view of the very short period which elapsed

between the crossing of the frontier by Dr. Jameson's force

and its surrender; but as it is apparent from the nature of

the figures that the Government of the South African Republic

have proceeded on very precise data in arriving at the various

sums to which they lay claim, Her Majesty's Government, before

offering any observations on this part of the claim, would ask

his Honour to be so good as to furnish them with full

particulars of the way in which the different items comprised

in the first head have been arrived at."

_Great Britain,

Papers by Command: C.—8404, 1897; and C.—8721, 1898._

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1897 (February-July).

British parliamentary investigation of the Jameson Raid.

A Committee of the British House of Commons, appointed "to

inquire into the origin and circumstances of the incursion

into the South African Republic by an armed force, and into

the administration of the British South Africa Company," began

its sittings on the 16th of February, 1897. Among the members

of the Committee were the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the

Attorney-General, Mr. Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for

the Colonies, Sir William Harcourt, Sir John Lubbock, Sir H.

Campbell-Bannerman, Mr. Labouchere, Mr. John Ellis, Mr.

Buxton, Mr. Blake, and others. Mr. Rhodes, who was first

examined by the Committee, read a statement of the

circumstances leading up to the raid, in which he said that,

as one largely interested in the Transvaal, he felt that the

unfriendly attitude of the Boer Government was the great

obstacle to common action among the various states in South

Africa, and that, therefore, he had assisted the movement in

Johannesburg with his purse and influence. "Further," he said,

"acting within my rights, in the autumn of 1895 I placed a

body of troops under Dr. Jameson, prepared to act in the

Transvaal in certain eventualities." Subsequently Mr. Rhodes

declared: "With reference to the Jameson raid, I may state

that Dr. Jameson went in without my authority." He concluded

his statement by declaring that in what he did he was greatly

influenced by his belief that the policy of the Boer

Government was to "introduce the influence of another foreign

Power into the already complicated system of South Africa."

Mr. Rhodes was kept under examination before the Committee for

four days, and then "almost the next thing heard of him was

that he had started for South Africa on his way back to

Rhodesia." Another witness examined was Sir Graham Bower,

Secretary to the High Commissioner at the Cape. "His evidence

was certainly most startling, and at the same time of great

importance. He stated that late in October, 1895, Mr. Rhodes

came into his office and said: 'I want you to give me your

word of honour that you will not say a word to anyone about

what I am going to tell you.' Sir Graham Bower—who, as he

said, had a great many Cape secrets in his possession—pledged

his word, and soon found he was in possession of a secret

which it was his official duty to disclose to the High

Commissioner and his private duty not to disclose. Mr. Rhodes

then said that he was negotiating about the Protectorate, that

there was going to be a rising in Johannesburg, and that he

wished to have a police force on the border. He added in

substance: 'If trouble comes I am not going to sit still. You

fellows are infernally slow.' It further transpired that on

the fateful Sunday (December 28) Mr. Rhodes had told him that

Jameson had gone in, but that he hoped that the message he had

sent would stop him."

{476}

When Dr. Jameson was examined he fully acknowledged his

conspiracy with the Johannesburg revolutionists, and stated

that he had given information of it to Mr. Rhodes, adding; "He

agreed, and we arranged that when the rising took place he

should go to Johannesburg or Pretoria with the High

Commissioner and Mr. Hofmeyr to mediate between the Transvaal

Government and the Uitlanders. With these matters settled, I

left Cape Town and joined my camp at Pitsani. I required no

orders or authority from Mr. Rhodes, and desired neither to

receive nor to send any messages from or to Cape Town."

In the course of the inquiry, Mr. Chamberlain, the Colonial

Secretary, desired to give testimony, and related that Dr.

Harris, the Secretary in South Africa to the British South

Africa Company, said to him, "I could tell you something in

confidence," or "I could give you some confidential

information"; but that he (Chamberlain) stopped him at once,

saying, "I do not want to hear any confidential information. I

am here in an official capacity, and I can only hear

information of which I can make official use"; and adding: "I

have Sir Hercules Robinson in South Africa. I have entire

confidence in him, and I am quite convinced he will keep me

informed of everything I ought to know." In concluding his

testimony, Mr. Chamberlain said: "I desire to say, in the most

explicit manner, that I did not then have, and that I never

had, any knowledge or—until, I think it was, the day before

the raid took place—the slightest suspicion of anything in the

nature of a hostile or armed invasion of the Transvaal." The

Committee having called upon Mr. Rhodes' solicitor, a Mr.

Hawksley, to produce telegrams which had passed between Mr.

Rhodes and himself, refused to do so.

"The proceedings which ensued were not to the credit of the

Committee, for instead of reporting the matter to the House at

once in a special report, they decided to refer to it in the

interim report on the raid. Mr. Labouchere and Mr. Blake alone

opposed this course, which was either a confession of

unwillingness to reach the bottom of the business, or the

suggestion that somebody was to be shielded. … Having devoted

two days to hearing counsel on behalf of Mr. Rhodes, Mr. Beit

and Dr. Harris, the Committee adjourned to consider its

report. The general feeling was that the proceedings had been

conducted with singular laxity or want of skill. Those

interested in keeping secret the true history of the raid were

entirely successful, and it was generally by the merest chance

that any fact of importance was elicited from the witnesses.

The representatives of the Opposition, Sir William Harcourt,

Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman and Mr. Buxton, were, after Mr.

Rhodes had been unaccountably permitted to quit England,

willing to allow the breakdown of the proceedings; and what

was even more surprising in so strict a parliamentarian as Sir

William Harcourt, a witness was allowed to treat the Committee

with defiance, and to pass unchecked. To a very great extent the

inquiry had been obviously factitious, but in whose interest

concealment was considered necessary remained undivulged. It

was surmised that reasons of State had been found which

outweighed party considerations, and that the leaders of the

Opposition had been privately convinced that the alleged

grounds were sufficient for the course adopted."

The report of the majority of the Committee, signed by all of

its members except Mr. Labouchere and Mr. Blake (the former of

whom submitted a minority report), was made public on the 13th

of July. The results of its inquiry were summed up under the

following heads:

I. "Great discontent had, for some time previous to the

incursion, existed in Johannesburg, arising from the

grievances of the Uitlanders.

II. Mr. Rhodes occupied a great position in South Africa; he

was Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, and, beyond all other

persons, should have been careful to abstain from such a

course of action as that which he adopted. As managing

director of the British South Africa Company, as director of

the De Beers Consolidated Mines and the Gold Fields of South

Africa, Mr. Rhodes controlled a great combination of

interests; he used his position and those interests to promote

and assist his policy. Whatever justification there might have

been for action on the part of the people of Johannesburg, there

was none for the conduct of a person in Mr. Rhodes' position

in subsidising, organising, and stimulating an armed

insurrection against the Government of the South African

Republic, and employing the forces and resources of the

Chartered Company to support such a revolution. He seriously

embarrassed both the Imperial and Colonial Governments, and

his proceedings resulted in the invasion of the territory of a

State which was in friendly relations with her Majesty, in

breach of the obligation to respect the right to

self-government of the South African Republic under the

conventions between her Majesty and that State. Although Dr.

Jameson 'went in' without Mr. Rhodes' authority, it was always

part of the plan that these forces should be used in the

Transvaal in support of an insurrection. Nothing could justify

such a use of such a force, and Mr. Rhodes' heavy

responsibility remains, although Dr. Jameson at the last

moment invaded the Transvaal without his direct sanction.

III. Such a policy once embarked upon inevitably involved Mr.

Rhodes in grave breaches of duty to those to whom he owed

allegiance. He deceived the High Commissioner representing the

Imperial Government, he concealed his views from his

colleagues in the Colonial Ministry and from the board of the

British South Africa Company, and led his subordinates to

believe that his plans were approved by his superiors.

IV. Your committee have heard the evidence of all the

directors of the British South Africa Company, with the

exception of Lord Grey. Of those who were examined, Mr. Beit

and Mr. Maguire alone had cognisance of Mr. Rhodes' plans. Mr.

Beit played a prominent part in the negotiations with the

Reform Union; he contributed large sums of money to the

revolutionary movement, and must share full responsibility for

the consequences.

V. There is not the slightest evidence that the late High

Commissioner in South Africa, Lord Rosmead, was made

acquainted with Mr. Rhodes' plans. The evidence, on the

contrary, shows that there was a conspiracy to keep all

information on the subject from him. The committee must,

however, express a strong opinion upon the conduct of Sir

Graham Bower, who was guilty of a grave dereliction of duty in

not communicating to the High Commissioner the information

which had come to his knowledge. Mr. Newton failed in his duty

in a like manner.

VI. Neither the Secretary of State for the Colonies nor any of

the officials of the Colonial Office received any information

which made them, or should have made them or any of them,

aware of the plot during its development.

{477}

VII. Finally, your committee desire to put on record an

absolute and unqualified condemnation of the raid and of the

plans which made it possible."

"The result caused for the time being grave injury to British

influence in South Africa. Public confidence was shaken, race

feeling embittered, and serious difficulties were created with

neighbouring States. The course of action subsequently taken by

the Government increased the suspicions which were aroused by

such an emasculated report. Two days after its publication

(July 15), Mr. Balfour was asked to set apart a day for the

formal discussion of so important a matter. To this request

Mr. Balfour, with the tacit concurrence of the front

Opposition bench, replied that he saw no useful purpose to be

served by such a debate."

Those who were known as the "Forward Radicals," or "Forwards,"

in the House, were not to be silenced in this manner, and

debate was forced upon a motion expressing regret at "the

inconclusive action and report of the select committee on

British South Africa," and summoning Mr. Hawksley to the bar

of the House, to produce "then and there," the telegrams which

he had refused to the committee. In the course of the

discussion which followed, Mr.Chamberlain expressed his

conviction that, "while the fault of Mr. Rhodes was about as

great a fault as a politician or statesman could commit, there

existed nothing which affected his personal character as a man

of honour." When Sir Elliott Lees, a supporter of the

government, rose to protest against such a doctrine, he was

met by cries which silenced his speech. The House then

divided, and the resolution was defeated by 304 to 77. "It was

an open secret that throughout the debate one member,

unconnected with either front bench, sat with the famous

telegrams in his pocket, and with them certain correspondence

relating thereto which he had been instructed to read in the

event of Mr. Rhodes' character being aspersed."

_Annual Register, 1897._

"The position … stands thus. The Colonial Office conceals its

own documents. From none of its officials have we had any

detailed or frank statement as to their relations to South

African affairs during the critical period. The High

Commissioner himself has not been examined. Mr. Rhodes has

been allowed to go without any serious inquiry into this

branch of the case. The most important cables are refused by

Mr. Rhodes's order, and the Committee decline to exercise

their power to compel the production of them. The story, in

fact, so far as it concerns this question of the truth or

falsity of the allegation that Mr. Chamberlain was 'in it,' is

being smothered up, with an audacious disregard of the

principles which guide all ordinary tribunals. The last steps

in this proceeding have been taken with the direct assent of

the leader of the Opposition. Everybody, therefore, is

inquiring what reason can have induced Sir William Harcourt to

execute this startling change of front. There is only one

reason that can, with any probability, be assigned-that is,

that some member of the Government has made a 'Front Bench

communication' to the leader of the Opposition, indicating to

him explicitly that there are 'reasons of State' for stopping

the disclosures. There can be little doubt that this is what

has happened, and conjecture, not only in this country but

elsewhere, will naturally be keen to know what the nature of

this momentous disclosure was.

"If Mr. Chamberlain was as absolutely free from knowledge of

the Jameson plan as he has professed to be, it is hard to see

how full disclosure could do any damage to the Empire, or

could do anything but good to the Colonial Secretary himself.

Mr. Chamberlain, of course, professes in words his private

desire that everything should come out. He has not, however,

assisted in the attainment of that result. The consequence is

that a national and international question of very grave

importance has arisen. It is said in circles usually well

informed, that when the Raid occurred, it became necessary to

give assurances to foreign Governments, and in particular to

Germany, that the Queen's Government was in no way

compromised. These assurances, it is said, were given. It is

even said that they were given expressly in the name of the

Queen. Something of this kind may well have happened; but it

is hard to see how, if it did happen, and if the Colonial

Office was as innocent as it claims to be, the disclosure of

the facts can do anything but confirm the Queen's word. That

documents exist which are supposed to be compromising, and

which the very authors of them allege to be compromising, is a

fact past hiding. It casts, unless it is cleared up, a damning

doubt. Therefore it would appear to be the duty of all honest

men, and, above all, of the Parliament of Great Britain, to

see that an immediate end is put to a policy which may be

aptly described as 'thimble-rigging,' and that the truth,

whether it suits Mr. Rhodes or Mr. Chamberlain, or neither of

them, must be told at fist."

_Contemporary Review,

July, 1897._

SOUTH AFRICA: Orange Free State and Transvaal: A. D. 1897 (April).

Treaty of alliance.

In April, the two republics entered into a treaty for mutual

support and defense against attacks on the independence of

either, each opening its political franchises to the citizens

of the other on the taking of an oath of allegiance.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1897 (April).

Military expenditure by British and Boer Governments.

The budget of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer,

submitted to the House of Commons in April, contained an item

of '£200,000 for increased military expenditure in South

Africa. This was promptly attacked by the opposition, who

accused the government of pursuing a war policy in its

dealings with the Transvaal. Sir William Harcourt declared

that Mr. Chamberlain had, "in every utterance of his during

the last few months, been endeavouring to exasperate sentiment

in South Africa, and to produce what, thank God! he had failed

in producing—a racial war." Mr. Chamberlain retorted that Sir

William Harcourt's attitude was unpatriotic and injurious to

the cause of peace. He denied aggressiveness in the policy of

the government, asserting that the South African Republic had

been spending millions on armaments imported from abroad, in

view of which the strengthening of the British garrison at the

Cape by an additional regiment and three batteries was no

unreasonable measure. Mr. Balfour, also, begged the House and

the country to believe that the troops were sent only as a

measure of precaution, to maintain admitted rights.

{478}

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1897 (May-October).

The British assertion of suzerainty and declination of

proposal to arbitrate disagreements.

On the 7th of May, 1897, the Acting State Secretary of the

South African Republic addressed to the British Agent at

Pretoria a communication of great length, reviewing the

positions taken by Mr. Chamberlain in his several arraignments

of the government of the Republic for alleged violation of the

London Convention of 1884, and proposing an arbitration of the

questions involved. "The complaint," he wrote, "which Her

British Majesty's Government has advanced in an unmistakably

pronounced manner over an actual or possible breach of the

Convention has deeply grieved this Government, as it thinks

that it has fulfilled its obligations. It sees in the

fulfilment of the mutual obligations under the Convention one

of the best guarantees for the maintenance of a mutual good

understanding and for the promotion of reciprocal confidence.

To this good understanding and that confidence, however,

severe shocks have been given by events which cannot be

lightly forgotten. And if it were not that this Government

wishes to guard itself against adopting a recriminating tone,

it might put the question whether, for example, the incursion

of Dr. Jameson, whether considered as a breach of the

Convention or a grievance, is not of immeasurably greater

importance than the various matters adduced by Her British

Majesty's Government would be, even if the contention that

they constitute breaches of the Convention could be accepted.

There should, in the view of this Government, be a strong

mutual endeavour to restore the shocked confidence and to calm

the excited spirit which this Government with sincere regret

sees reigning throughout almost the whole of South Africa.

This Government is anxious to co-operate for this end, for the

desire of the Republic, with the maintenance of its

independence and rights, is for peace, and where for the

reasons given it has been unable to entertain the proposal of

Her British Majesty's Government in the matter of the Aliens

Law,—and it appears very difficult to arrive at a solution of

the question by means of correspondence,—it wishes to come to

a permanent good understanding along a peaceful course, not

only with respect to its undisturbed right to make an alien

law, but also with regard to all points touching the

Convention which are referred to in the two Despatches under

reply by Her British Majesty's Government. While it respects

the opinion of Her British Majesty's Government, it takes the

liberty, with full confidence in the correctness of its own

views, to propose to Her British Majesty's Government the

principle of arbitration with which the honourable the First

Volksraad agrees, in the hope that it will be taken in the

conciliatory spirit in which it is made. …

"Although this Government is firmly convinced that a just and

impartial decision might be obtained even better in South

Africa than anywhere else, it wishes, in view of the

conflicting elements, interests, and aspirations, which are

now apparent in South Africa, and in order to avoid even the

appearance that it would be able or desire to exercise

influence in order to obtain a decision favourable to it, to

propose that the President of the Swiss Bondstate, who may be

reckoned upon as standing altogether outside the question, and

to feel sympathy or antipathy neither for the one party nor

for the other, be requested to point out a competent jurist,

as has already oftener been done in respect of international

disputes. The Government would have no objection that the

arbitrator be subject to a limitation of time, and gives the

assurance now already that it will willingly subject itself to

any decision if such should, contrary to its expectation, be

given against it. The Government repeats the well-meant wish

that this proposal may find favour with Her British Majesty's

Government, and inasmuch as the allegations of breaches of the

Convention find entrance now even in South Africa, and bring

and keep the feelings more and more in a state of suspense,

this Government will be pleased if it can learn the decision

of Her Majesty's Government as soon as possible."

Mr. Chamberlain's reply to this proposal was not written until

the 16th of the following October, when he, in turn, reviewed,

point by point, the matters dealt with, in the despatch of Mr.

Van Boeschoten. With reference to the Jameson raid he said: "Her

Majesty's Government note with satisfaction that the

Government of the South African Republic see in the fulfilment

of the mutual obligations under the London Convention one of

the best guarantees for the maintenance of a mutual

understanding and for the promotion of reciprocal confidence.

Her Majesty's Government have uniformly fulfilled these

obligations on their part, and they must strongly protest

against what appears to be an implication in the Note under

consideration that the incursion of Dr. Jameson can be

considered as either a breach of the Convention by Her

Majesty's Government or a grievance against them. That

incursion was the act of private individuals unauthorised by

Her Majesty's Government, and was repudiated by them

immediately it became known. The immense importance to the

Government of the South African Republic of that repudiation,

and of the proclamation issued by the High Commissioner under

instructions from Her Majesty's Government, is recognised

throughout South Africa. Her Majesty's Government maintain

strongly that since the Convention of 1881 there has never

been any breach or even any allegation of a breach on their

part of that or the subsequent Convention, and, as the subject

has been raised by the implied accusation contained in the

Note under consideration, Her Majesty's Government feel

constrained to contrast their loyal action in the case of the

Jameson raid with the cases in which they have had cause to

complain that the Government of the South African Republic

failed to interfere with, if they did not countenance,

invasions of the adjacent territories by its burghers in

violation of the Convention, and they feel bound to remind the

Government of the Republic that in one of these cases Her

Majesty's Government were compelled to maintain their rights

by an armed expedition at the cost of about one million

sterling, for which no compensation has ever been received by

them."

Concerning the proposal of arbitration, the reply of the

British colonial secretary was as follows: "In making this

proposal the Government of the South African Republic appears

to have overlooked the distinction between the Conventions of

1881 and 1884 and an ordinary treaty between two independent

Powers, questions arising upon which may properly be the

subject of arbitration.

{479}

By the Pretoria Convention of 1881 Her Majesty, as Sovereign

of the Transvaal Territory, accorded to the inhabitants of

that territory complete self-government subject to the

suzerainty of Her Majesty, her heirs and successors, upon

certain terms and conditions and subject to certain

reservations and limitations set forth in 33 articles, and by

the London Convention of 1884 Her Majesty, while maintaining

the preamble of the earlier instrument, directed and declared

that certain other articles embodied therein should be

substituted for the articles embodied in the Convention of

1881. The articles of the Convention of 1881 were accepted by

the Volksraad of the Transvaal State, and those of the

Convention of 1884 by the Volksraad of the South African

Republic. Under these Conventions, therefore, Her Majesty

holds towards the South African Republic the relation of a

suzerain who has accorded to the people of that Republic

self-government upon certain conditions, and it would be

incompatible with that position to submit to arbitration the

construction of the conditions on which she accorded

self-government to the Republic. One of the main objects which

Her Majesty's Government had in view was the prevention of the

interference of any foreign Power between Her Majesty and the

South African Republic, a matter which they then held, and

which Her Majesty's present Government hold, to be essential

to British interests, and this object would be defeated by the

course now proposed. The clear intention of Her Majesty's

Government at the time of the London Convention, that

questions in relation to it should not be submitted to

arbitration, is shown by the fact that when the delegates of

the South African Republic, in the negotiations which preceded

that Convention, submitted to Her Majesty's Government in the

first instance (in a letter of the 26th of November, 1883,

which will be found on page 9 of the Parliamentary Paper C.

3947 of 1884) the draft of a treaty or convention containing

an arbitration clause, they were informed by the Earl of Derby

that it was neither in form nor in substance such as Her

Majesty's Government could adopt."

_Great Britain, Papers by Command.

C.—8721, 1898._

SOUTH AFRICA: Natal: A. D. 1897 (December).

Annexation of Zululand.

See (in this volume)

AFRICA: A. D. 1897 (ZULULAND).

SOUTH AFRICA: Cape Colony: A. D. 1898.

The position of political parties.

The Progressives and the Afrikander Bund.

"The present position of parties at the Cape is as unfortunate

and as unwarranted as any that the severest critic of

Parliamentary institutions could have conjured up. … The Cape

has always had the curse of race prejudice to contend with.

Time might have done much to soften, if not to expunge it, if

home-made stupidities had not always been forthcoming to goad

to fresh rancour. The facts are too well known to need

repetition. It is true not only of the Transvaalers that 'the

trek has eaten into their souls,' and up to the time of

emancipation and since, every conceivable mistake has been

committed by those in authority. Thus, when the breach was, to

all appearances, partly healed, the fatal winter of 1895 put

back the hands of the clock to the old point of departure. As

Englishmen, our sympathies are naturally with the party that

is prevalently English, and against the party that is

prevalently Dutch; but to find a real line of political

difference between them other than national sentiment requires

fine drawing. … According to our lines of cleavage both

Bondsmen [Afrikander Bund] and Progressives are Conservatives

of a decided type. Practically they are agreed in advocating

protective duties on sea-borne trade, although in degree they

differ, for whilst the Bond would have imposts as they are,

the Progressives wish to reduce the duties on food stuffs to

meet the grievance of the urban constituencies, and might be

induced to accord preferential treatment to British goods. On

the native question neither party adopts what would in England

be considered an 'advanced' programme, for education is not

made a cardinal point, and they would equally like, if

possible, to extend the application of the Glen Grey Act,

which, by levying a tax on the young Kaffirs who have not a

labour certificate, forces them to do some service to the

community before exercising their right of 'putting the

spoon,' as the phrase is, 'into the family pot.' Neither party

wishes to interfere with the rights of property or the

absolute tenure of land under the Roman-Dutch law. A tax on

the output of diamonds at Kimberley has been advocated by some

members of the Bond as a financial expedient, but it is

understood to have been put forward rather as a threat against

Mr. Rhodes personally than as a measure of practical politics.

Questions of franchise are tacitly left as they are, for no

responsible politicians wish to go back upon the enactment

which restricted the Kaffir vote to safe and inconsiderable

limits. The redistribution of seats was the subject of a Bill

upon which the last House was dissolved, after the rebuff that

the Ministry received upon a crucial division, but it has been

dealt with rather for practical than theoretical reasons. Two

schemes of redistribution have been formulated, and each has

been proposed and opposed with arguments directed to show the

party advantage to be derived. For political reform, in the

abstract, with or without an extension of the suffrage, there

is no sort of enthusiasm in any quarter. Railway

administration furnishes, no doubt, an occasional battle-field

for the two sides of the House. Roughly, the Progressives

favour the northern extension, and are willing to make

concessions in rates and charges to help on the new trade with

Rhodesia; whilst the Bond declare themselves against special

treatment of the new interests, and would spend all the money

that could be devoted to railway construction in the farming

districts of the colony itself. Mr. Rhodes, however, has

warned the Cape that any hostile action will be counteracted

by a diversion of traffic to the East, and it is unlikely that

any line of policy will be pursued that is likely to injure

the carrying trade of the southern ports. Between the

followers of Mr. Rhodes and the followers of Mr. Hofmeyr there

is no wide divergence of principle on public affairs of the

near future, so far as they have been or are to be the subject

of legislation; where the difference comes in is in the

attitude they severally assume towards the two republics and

the territories of the north, but when talk has to yield to

action it is improbable that there will be much in their

disagreement."

_N. L. W. Lawson,

Cape Politics and Colonial Policy

(Fortnightly Review, November 1898)._

{480}

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1898 (January-February).

Re-election of President Kruger.

Renewed conflict of the Executive with the Judiciary.

Dismissal of Chief-Justice Kotze.

The Presidential election in the South African Republic was

held in January and February, the polls being open from the 3d

of the former month until the 4th of the latter. President

Kruger was re-elected for a fourth term of five years, by

nearly 13,000 votes against less than 6,000 divided between

Mr. Schalk Burger and General Joubert, who were opposing

candidates. Soon afterwards, the conflict of 1897 between the

Judiciary and the Executive (see above: A. D. 1897,

JANUARY-MARCH), was reopened by a communication in which

Chief-Justice Kotze, of the High Court, called the attention

of the President to the fact that nothing had been done in

fulfilment of the agreement that the independence of the Court

and the stability of the Grondwet should both be protected by

law against arbitrary interference, and giving notice that he

considered the compromise then arranged to be ended. Thereupon

(February 16) President Kruger removed the judge from his

office and placed the State Attorney in his seat. Justice

Kotze denied the legality of the removal, and adjourned his

court sine die. In a speech at Johannesburg, some weeks

afterwards, he denounced the action of President Kruger with

great severity, saying: "I charge the President, as head of

the State, with having violated both the constitution and the

ordinary laws of the land; with having interfered with the

independence of the High Court; and invaded and imperilled the

rights and liberties of everyone in the country. The

guarantees provided by the constitution for the protection of

real and personal rights have disappeared, and these are now

dependent on the 'arbitrium' of President Kruger."

SOUTH AFRICA: Rhodesia and the British South Africa Company:

A. D. 1898 (February).

Reorganization.

In February, the British government announced the adoption of

plans for a reorganization of the British South Africa Company

and of the administration of its territories. The Company,

already deprived of military powers, was to give up, in great

part, but not wholly, its political functions. It was still to

appoint an Administrator for Rhodesia south of the Zambesi,

and to name the majority of members in a council assisting

him, so long as it remained responsible for the expenses of

administration; but, by the side of the Administrator was to

be placed a Resident Commissioner, appointed by the Crown, and

over both was the authority of the High Commissioner for South

Africa, to whom the Resident Commissioner made reports. At

home the status of the Board of Directors was to be

considerably altered. The life directorships were to be

abolished, and the whole Board of Directors in future to be

elected by the shareholders,—any official or director removed

by the Secretary of State not being eligible without his

consent. The Board of Directors was to communicate all

minutes, etc., to the Secretary of State, and he to have the

power of veto or suspension. Finally, the Secretary of State

was to have full powers to inspect and examine all documents;

Colonial Office officials named by him were, in effect, to

exercise powers like those of the old Indian Board of Control.

SOUTH AFRICA: Cape Colony: A. D. 1898 (March-October).

Election in favor of the Afrikander Bund.

Change in the government.

Elections to the Upper House of the Cape Parliament, in March,

gave the party called the Progressives, headed by Mr. Rhodes, a

small majority over the Afrikander Bund—more commonly called

the Bond. The Parliament opened in May, and the Progressive

Ministry, under Sir Gordon Sprigg, was defeated in the Lower

House in the following month, on a bill to create new

electoral divisions. The Ministry dissolved Parliament and

appealed to the constituencies, with the result of a defeat on

that appeal. The Bond party won in the elections by a majority

of two, which barely enabled it to carry a resolution of want

of confidence in the government when Parliament was

reassembled, in October. The Ministry of Sir Gordon Sprigg

resigned, and a new one was formed with Mr. Schreiner at its

head.

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1898-1899.

Continued dispute with the British Government

concerning Suzerainty.

During 1898 and half of 1899, a new dispute, raised by Mr.

Chamberlain's emphatic assertion of the suzerainty of Great

Britain over the South African Republic, went on between the

British Colonial Office and the government at Pretoria.

Essentially, the question at issue seemed to lie between a

word and a fact and the difference between the disputants was

the difference between the meanings they had severally drawn

from the omission of the word "suzerainty" from the London

Convention of 1884. On one side could be quoted the report

which the Transvaal deputation to London, in 1884, had made to

their Volksraad, when they brought the treaty back, and

recommended that it be approved. The treaty, they reported,

"is entirely bilateral [meaning that there were two sides in

the making of it] whereby your representatives were not placed

in the humiliating position of merely having to accept from a

Suzerain Government a one-sided document as rule and

regulation, but whereby they were recognized as a free

contracting party. It makes, then, also an end of the British

suzerainty, and, with the official recognition of her name,

also restores her full self-government to the South African

Republic, excepting one single limitation regarding the

conclusion of treaties with foreign powers (Article 4). With

the suzerainty the various provisions and limitations of the

Pretoria Convention which Her Majesty's Government as suzerain

had retained have also, of course, lapsed."

On the other side, Mr. Chamberlain could quote with effect

from a speech which Lord Derby, then the British Colonial

Secretary, who negotiated the Convention of 1884 with the Boer

envoys, made on the 17th of March, that year, in the House of

Lords. As reported in Hansard, Lord Derby had then dealt with

the very question of suzerainty, as involved in the new

convention, and had set forth his own understanding of the

effect of the latter in the following words: "Then the noble

Earl (Earl Cadogan) said that the object of the Convention had

been to abolish the suzerainty of the British Crown. The word

'suzerainty' is a very vague word, and I do not think it is

capable of any precise legal definition.

{481}

Whatever we may understand by it, I think it is not very easy

to define. But I apprehend, whether you call it a

protectorate, or a suzerainty, or the recognition of England

as a paramount Power, the fact is that a certain controlling

power is retained when the State which exercises this

suzerainty has a right to veto any negotiations into which the

dependent State may enter with foreign Powers. Whatever

suzerainty meant in the Convention of Pretoria, the condition

of things which it implied still remains; although the word is

not actually employed, we have kept the substance. We have

abstained from using the word because it was not capable of

legal definition, and because it seemed to be a word which was

likely to lead to misconception and misunderstanding."

_Great Britain,

Papers by Command: C. 9507, 1899, pages 24 and 34._

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1899 (March).

Petition of British subjects to the Queen.

A fresh excitement of discontent in the Rand, due especially

to the shooting of an Englishman by a Boer policeman, whom the

Boer authorities seemed disposed to punish lightly or not at

all, led to the preparation of a petition to the British

Queen, from her subjects in the South African Republic,

purporting to be signed in the first instance by 21,684, and

finally by 23,000. The genuineness of many of the signatures

was disputed by the Boers, but strenuously affirmed by those

who conducted the circulation of the petition. It set forth

the grievances of the memorialists at length, and prayed Her

Majesty to cause them to be investigated, and to direct her

representative in South Africa to take measures for securing

from the South African Republic a recognition of their rights.

The petition was forwarded to the Colonial Office on the 28th

of March.

_Great Britain, Papers by Command: 1899, C. 9345._

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1899 (May-June).

The Bloemfontein Conference between President Kruger and

the British High Commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner.

There seems to be no mode in which the questions at issue

between the British and the Boers, and the attitude of the two

parties, respectively, in their contention with each other,

can be represented more accurately than by quoting essential

parts of the official report of a formal conference between

President Kruger and the British High Commissioner in South

Africa, Sir Alfred Milner, which was held at Bloemfontein, the

capital of the Orange Free State, during five days, May

31-June 5, 1899. The meeting was arranged by President Steyn,

of the Orange Free State, with a view to bringing about an

adjustment of differences by a free and full discussion of

them, face to face. In the official report of the

conversations that occurred, from which we shall quote, the

remarks of President Kruger are given as being made by the

"President," and those of the High Commissioner as by "His

Excellency." The latter, invited by the President to speak

first, said:

"There are a considerable number of open questions between Her

Majesty's Government and the Government of the South African

Republic on which there is at present no sign of agreement. On

the contrary, disagreements seem to increase as time goes on.

… In my personal opinion the cause of many of the points of

difference, and the most serious ones, arises out of the

policy pursued by the Government of the South African Republic

towards the Uitlander population of that Republic among whom

many thousands are British subjects. This policy, the bitter

feeling it engenders between the Government and a section of

Uitlanders, and the effect of the resulting tension in South

Africa, and the feeling of sympathy in Great Britain, and even

throughout the British Empire generally, with the Uitlander

population, creates an irritated state of public opinion on

both sides, which renders it much more difficult for the two

Governments to settle their differences amicably. It is my

strong conviction that if the Government of the South African

Republic could now, before things get worse, of its own motion

change its policy towards the Uitlanders, and take measures

calculated to content the reasonable people among them, who,

after all, are a great majority, such a course would not only

strengthen the independence of the Republic but it would make

such a better state of feeling all round that it would become

far easier to settle outstanding questions between the two

Governments. … The President, in coming here, has made a

reservation as to the independence of the Republic. I cannot

see that it is in any way impairing the independence of the

Republic for Her Majesty's Government to support the cause of

the Uitlanders as far as it is reasonable. A vast number of

them are British subjects. If we had an equal number of

British subjects and equally large interests in any part of

the world, even in a country which was not under any

conventional obligations to Her Majesty's Government we should

be bound to make representations to the Government in the

interests of Her Majesty's subjects, and to point out that the

intense discontent of those subjects stood in the way of the

cordial relations which we desire to exist between us. I know

that the citizens of the South African Republic are intensely

jealous of British interference in their internal affairs.

What I want to impress upon the President is that if the

Government of the South African Republic of its own accord,

from its own sense of policy and justice, would afford a more

liberal treatment to the Uitlander population, this would not

increase British interference, but enormously diminish it. If

the Uitlanders were in a position to help themselves they

would not always be appealing to us under the Convention. …

"President.—I shall be brief. I have come with my commission,

in the trust that Your Excellency is a man capable of

conviction, to go into all points of difference. … I should

like His Excellency to go point by point in this discussion,

so that we can discuss each point that he thinks requires

attention, not with a view to at once coming to a decision,

but to hear each side, and we can go back on any point if

necessary, and see if we can arrive at an understanding. I

would like to give concessions as far as is possible and

practicable, but I want to speak openly, so that His

Excellency may be able to understand. I should like to say

that the memorials placed before Her Majesty's Government came

from those who do not speak the truth. I mean to convey that

we do give concessions wherever we think it practicable to do

so, and after we have discussed it in a friendly way Your

Excellency will be able to judge whether I or the memorialists

are right. I have said that if there are any mistakes on our

side, we are willing to discuss them. Even in any matter

concerning internal affairs I would be willing to listen to

his advice if he said it could be removed in this way or that

way. But when I show him that by the point we may be

discussing our independence may be touched, I trust he will be

open to conviction on that subject. …

{482}

"His Excellency.—I think the point which it would be best to

take first, if the President agrees, … would be the Franchise.

… There are a number of questions more or less resting upon

that. … I should like to know a little more about the

President's views. I want to know more because if I were to

begin and say I want this, that, and the other, I know I

should be told this was dictation. I do not want to formulate

a scheme of my own, but I can, if necessary.

"President.—As long as I understand that it is meant in a

friendly manner, and you mean to give hints, I won't take it

that they are commands. It has already been arranged that you

give me friendly hints and advice, and I will not take it as

dictation, even though it should be on points on which I

should consider you have no right to interfere. … I would like

you to bear one point in view, namely, that all kinds of

nations and languages, of nearly all powers, have rushed in at

the point where the gold is to be found. In other countries …

there are millions of old burghers, and the few that come in

cannot out-vote the old burghers, but with us, those who

rushed in to the gold fields are in large numbers and of all

kinds, and the number of old burghers is still insignificant;

therefore we are compelled to make the franchise so that they

cannot all rush into it at once, and as soon as we can assure

ourselves by a gradual increase of our burghers that we can

safely do it, our plan was to reduce the time for anyone there

to take up the franchise, and that is also my plan. … As His

Excellency doubtless knows, I have proposed to the Volksraad

that the time should be reduced by five years, and gradually

as more trusted burghers join our numbers, we can, perhaps, go

further. There are a number who really do not want the

franchise, but they use it as pretext to egg on people with

Her Majesty. … You must remember, also, on this subject, that

the burghers in our Republic are our soldiers, who must

protect the land, and that we have told these men to come and

fight when we have had difficulties with the Kaffirs. They

wanted the vote, but they would not come and fight. Those who

were willing to help obtained the franchise, but it appears

that many do not want to have it.

"His Excellency.—They did not want to take the obligations

without the rights of citizenship, and in that I sympathize

with them. If they should obtain that right, then naturally

they would have to take those burdens upon them.

"President.—Those who want the franchise should bear the

burdens.

"His Excellency.—Yes. Immediately they get the franchise they

take upon themselves the obligations connected therewith."

[From this the talk wandered to the subject of commandeering,

until the High Commissioner brought it back to the franchise

question.]

"His Excellency.—If I made a proposal to admit strangers under

such conditions as to swamp the old burghers it would be

unreasonable. But the newcomers have, at present, no influence

on the legislation of the Republic, which makes an enormous

difference. They haven't got a single representative. The

First Volksraad consists of 28 members, and not one member

represents the feelings of the large Uitlander population.

"President.—Men from any country could after two years vote

for the Second Volksraad, and after two years more sit in the

Second Raad. There are Englishmen who have obtained the full

franchise in that way, and are eligible for the Volksraad. And

now I have proposed to shorten the last ten years of the

period required for the full franchise and make it five years.

"His Excellency.—There are a great many objections of the

gravest kind to the process by which men may now obtain

burgher rights. First of all, before he can begin the process

of gradually securing burgher rights—which will be completed

in 14 years at present, and in 9 years according to the

President—he has to forswear his own allegiance. Take the case

of a British subject, which interests me most. He takes the

oath, and ceases to be a British subject by the mere fact of

taking that oath; he loses all the rights of a British

subject, and he would still have to wait for 12 years, and

under the new plan 7 years, before he can become a full

citizen of the Republic. British subjects are discouraged by

such a law from attempting to get the franchise. Even if they

wanted to become citizens, they would not give up their

British citizenship on the chance of becoming in 12 years

citizens of the Republic.

"President.—The people are the cause of that themselves. In

1870 anyone being in the land for one year had the full

franchise.

"His Excellency.—That was very liberal.

"President.—In 1881, after the war of independence, some of

our officials and even members of our Raad then said that they

were still British subjects, although they had taken the oath

of allegiance, and I had to pay back, out of the £250,000,

what I had commandeered from them. That was the reason the

oath had to be altered. …

"His Excellency.—In 1882, after all this had happened, there

was a franchise law in the Transvaal, which demanded five

years' residence, but it did not require the oath that is now

taken. It required a simple declaration of allegiance to the

State, though all this that the President refers to happened

before. Why was not it necessary to introduce this alteration

then?

"President.—The people who, before the annexation, had taken

that oath, but had not forsworn their nationality, 1887, sent

a lying memorial, as they are sending lying memorials now, to

say that everybody was satisfied, as they now say that

everybody is dissatisfied.

"His Excellency.—I think I must just explain a little more

clearly my views on the point we are now discussing. … I think

it is unreasonable to ask a man to forswear one citizenship

unless in the very act of giving up one he gets another, and I

think it is also unnecessary to ask him to do more than take

an oath of fealty to the new State, of willingness to obey its

laws and to defend its independence, when it is known and

certain that the taking of that oath deprives him of his

existing citizenship. I think the oath should be a simple oath

of allegiance, and that it should not be required of a man

until the moment he can get full rights in a new State. Now

that was the position under the law of 1882, and all these

reasons which the President has been giving are based on what

happened before that.

{483}

Why were they not considered and acted upon when the law of

1882 was made? … As for the period required to qualify for the

full franchise, I do not see why the length of time should be

longer in the South African Republic than in any other South

African State. They are all new countries. In the new country

which is springing up in the north, and which is getting a new

Constitution this year, the period is one year. The people who

have conquered that country for the white race may find that

the newcomers are more numerous than they are. But I do not

expect that anything like that will be done in the South

African Republic; something far short of that would be

reasonable. What I do think and desire, and that is the object

of my suggestion, is this: that the numerous foreign population

engaged in commerce and industry—to which the country, after

all, owes its present great position in wealth and influence—

should have a real share in the government of the Republic,

not to over-rule the old burghers—not at all—but to share the

work of Government with them, to give them the benefit of

their knowledge and experience, which is in many cases greater

than that of the old burghers, so that through their gradual

co-operation a time may come when, instead of being divided

into two separate communities they will all be burghers of the

same State. It is not enough that a few people should be let

in. It is obvious, however, that you could not let in the

whole crowd, without character or anything—I do not ask

it—but you want such a substantial measure that in elections

of members of the Volksraad the desires of the new industrial

population should have reasonable consideration. They have not

got it now, and when the questions that interest them come

before the Volksraad it is too evident that they are discussed

from an outside point of view. The industrial population are

regarded as strangers. … I do not want to swamp the old

population, but it is perfectly possible to give the new

population an immediate voice in the legislation, and yet to

leave the old burghers in such a position that they cannot

possibly be swamped.

"President.—I hope you will be open to conviction on that

point. I would like to convince you on the subject, and to

show you that it would be virtually to give up the

independence of my burghers. In the Republic the majority of

the enfranchised burghers consider they are the masters. Our

enfranchised burghers are probably about 30,000, and the

newcomers may be from 60,000 to 70,000, and if we give them

the franchise to-morrow we may as well give up the Republic. I

hope you will clearly see that I shall not get it through with

my people. We can still consult about the form of oath, but we

cannot make the time too short, because we would never get it

through with the people—they have had bitter experience. I

hope His Excellency will think about what I have said, and

weigh it well.

"His Excellency.—I see your point, and want to meet it.

"President.—I will think over what has been said, and will try

and meet every difficulty.

At the opening of the Conference on the second day the

President spoke of reports of an increase of British forces in

South Africa, which the High Commissioner assured him were

untrue. The latter in turn referred to accounts that had

appeared of an extensive purchase of arms in the Transvaal;

and was assured by the President that the armament of the

burghers was only for their proper preparation to deal with

the surrounding natives. The President then produced a

memorial purporting to be signed by 21,000 Uitlanders,

contradictory of the representations contained in the memorial

sent to the Queen in March (see above). After discussion upon

this, the conversation returned to the question of the

franchise.

"His Excellency.—What makes this whole discussion so difficult

is the intense prejudice on the side of the present burghers,

and their intense suspicion of us. They think Her Majesty's

Government wants to get their country back in one way or

another. Her Majesty's Government does not; but what it does

desire is that it should have such a state of rest in the

country as will remove causes of friction and difficulty

between the Republic and Her Majesty's possessions in South

Africa, and the whole of the British Empire, and my

suggestions here are directed to that end. I do not want to

say it over and over again, I say it once for all. …

"President.—I should like to make a slight explanation to His

Excellency. His Excellency yesterday mentioned that in some

States those going in from outside speedily got burgher

rights, but he must not forget, as I said before, they are

glad of the people who come in. But, here we have all nations

and all kinds, and if they were to get burgher rights quickly

then that would be the end of our independence, and then they

could send us away where they liked. I would like His

Excellency to bear that in mind.

"His Excellency.—I do not see how the old burghers can have it

both ways. They cannot have a very large population streaming

in to develop the resources of the country, and giving it a

much higher position in the world than it would otherwise

have, and at the same time exclude these people from

participation in the Government of the country.

"President.—Your Excellency must bear this in mind. There is

no Gold Law in the world that is so liberal as that of the

Republic."

The President then recurred to the right which the Uitlanders

might obtain, of voting for the Second Volksraad after two

years, and becoming eligible to seats in it after four years,

and said that it was in the Second Volksraad that their own

interests were dealt with—not in the First. The High

Commissioner asked if the Second Raad could act without

consent of the First. The President acknowledged that the

latter could alter any law which "appears to be against the

general welfare," but contended that it had no wish to go into

gold field matters, though it has the power, and that it had

interfered with action of the Second Rand in but three or four

instances. The High Commissioner remarked that Uitlanders who

abandoned their own nationality to wait years for full

citizenship in the Republic might have the latter prospect

taken away from them at any moment by a single resolution of

the First Raad. The President replied: "They haven't done it

yet. The legislatures of all the world have the same power."

To which the High Commissioner made answer: "This power

existing, the new comers cannot be expected—I should not

recommend one of them—to give up his present citizenship for

the mere chance of becoming a citizen of the new country."

{484}

"His Excellency.—If the President thinks we are asking too

much … I must report to Her Majesty's Government that the

President rejects our friendly suggestions.

"The President.—I would be misleading you if I should tell you

that I can give all the strangers the franchise in a very

short time. I would consider that our independence was

sacrificed thereby: but I say this, let His Excellency keep

impartially in view my points of difficulty, and let him make

his proposals and submit them to us, so that we can consider

them and judge about them. … I have already said that perhaps

means may be found to alter the form of oath. … I would now

like His Excellency to propose a scheme.

"His Excellency.— … What I suggest is this: That every

foreigner who can prove satisfactorily that he has been

resident in the country for five years, and that he desires to

make it his permanent place of residence, that he is prepared

to take the oath to obey the laws, to undertake all the

obligations of citizenship, and to defend the independence of

the country, should be allowed to become a citizen on taking

that oath. This should be confined to persons possessing a

certain amount of property, or a certain amount of yearly

wages, and who have good characters. In order to make that

proposal of any real use for the new citizens who mostly live

in one district in the Republic, and a district which only

returns one member in 28 to the First Raad, and one in 28 to

the Second Raad, I propose that there should be a certain

number of new constituencies created, the number of which is a

detail upon the discussion of which I will not now enter. But

what is vital from my point of view is that the number of

these districts should not be so small as to leave the

representatives of the new population in a contemptible

minority.

"President.—With us the majority of the enfranchised burghers

constitutes the ruling voice, and must be listened to in the

Volksraad. If the 60,000 came in immediately, they would swamp

the 30,000. … I mean this: that if they are all enfranchised then

they would at once form the majority of the whole population,

and the majority of enfranchised burghers, according to our

law, must be listened to by the Volksraad; since in a Republic

we cannot leave the sovereign voice out of account.

"His Excellency.—This is pure theory, that the Volksraad have

to do what the majority of the people desire. The Volksraad

does what it considers right in its own eyes; it is elected by

the people, and does what it thinks right, and the President has

made it quite clear during the last year or two that anything

the Volksraad does is law."

At an afternoon meeting on the same day, there was a long

discussion of the dynamite grievance of the Uitlanders, and

the President wished to bring up other points; but the High

Commissioner objected:

"His Excellency.—I think the discussion will be of

interminable length if we are to proceed in this way, and if

we cannot approach one another on the point on which I have

made my suggestions, and which lies outside all the pending

questions between the two Governments, these other

controversies may as well be allowed to go on in the usual

course. If the President to-morrow will give me an answer on

the first subject I raised, and then wishes to bring forward

his grievances, I will consider them to-morrow. I do not want

to go on with a long list of my own until I understand what is

the basis on which I stand in regard to what I consider the

most important question of all.

"President.—I think it would be as well if we returned in a

little while to discuss our points, but I would like to give

His Excellency some things to think over. The first point I

would like to mention is my wish that Swaziland should now be

handed over to me as a portion of my land. … Secondly, the

demand made with regard to the damages for the Jameson Raid,

Mr. Chamberlain said he was against paying the million, but he

is not against paying the expenses incurred. Thirdly, that

differences such as those now existing between us, should be

settled by arbitration, and then no war or quarrel could arise

between us. … These are some of the questions I wish His

Excellency to think about."

At the opening of the Conference on the third day, the

President sought to commit the High Commissioner to an

"understanding," that "if we came," he said, "to some

agreement on the franchise Her Majesty's Government then would

engage not in any way to concern itself with internal affairs in

the Republic any longer, and that in future questions that

then may arise, whether out of the Convention or otherwise,

Her Majesty would agree to have such questions referred to

arbitration." The High Commissioner declined to deal with the

subject of the franchise as a matter of "bargain." It was a

subject of grievances and discontent, dangerous to the

Republic and dangerous to the relations between the Republic

and Great Britain, which ought to be dealt with on its merits

alone. Nevertheless, after some controversy, he said:

"His Excellency.— … As far as the Jameson Indemnity is

concerned I know that a despatch is on the way to me at this

present moment, which forwards a statement from the British

South Africa Company examining the details of the claim which

has been sent in, and asking that the question of the amount

payable in respect of the Raid may be submitted to

arbitration. I have received a telegram that that despatch is

coming. The position is this—the British Government have

admitted in principle that the Company must pay what is fairly

due on account of that raid; but the question of the amount is

still under discussion, and I hope that this proposal will lead

to a settlement. As to the question of arbitration, which I

think is the matter that interests the President most, I am in

so far entirely with him that I want if possible to have in

future as few questions to discuss with the Government of the

South African Republic, as I now have with the Government of

the Orange Free State. I feel that the President will need, if

he accepts my scheme of franchise, or any other similar

proposal, to have some assurance that there shall not be

perpetual controversies between him and England, and that if

there are controversies, some regular way of dealing with them

should be devised.

{485}

The President once proposed that some question, or a number of

questions, should be submitted to the President of the Swiss

Republic. The British Government refused that on the general

principle—from which I am sure they will not depart—that they

will not have any foreign Government, or any foreign

interference at all, between them and the South African

Republic. But if some other method can be devised of

submitting to an impartial tribunal questions that may in

future arise between us, and perhaps even some questions which

exist at present—but in any case to provide for the future—if

such a plan can be devised and suggested to me, I will lay it

before Her Majesty's Government and do what I can personally

to assist in a satisfactory solution of the matter. The

President must understand that I cannot pledge Her Majesty's

Government in any way on this subject. The question has taken

me by surprise; I didn't come here contemplating a discussion

on it, but I must say if it could be satisfactorily arranged

while excluding the interference of the foreigner, it would

seem to me to open a way out of many difficulties. But all the

same, I adhere firmly to my proposal that we should first try

and settle on the scheme which the President would accept as

regards the matter which I put forward."

At the close of the morning interview, both parties expressed

hopelessness of agreement. On meeting again in the afternoon,

the President submitted in writing the following proposals

concerning the franchise: "As the purpose I had in view at

this Conference principally consists in the removal of

existing grounds of disagreement and further to provide for

the friendly regulation of the way of settling future disputes

by means of arbitration, the following proposals with regard to

the franchise must be considered as conditional and dependent

on the satisfactory settlement of the first mentioned points,

and on the request that my request to incorporate Swaziland in

the South African Republic shall be submitted by the High

Commissioner to Her Majesty's Government. Subject to the

foregoing I undertake to submit without delay to the approval

of the Volksraad and the people the following proposals about

the franchise:

"I. Every person who fixes his residence in the South African

Republic has to get himself registered on the Field-cornets'

books within fourteen days after his arrival according to the

existing law; will be able after complying with the conditions

mentioned under 'A.,' and after the lapse of two years to get

himself naturalised; and will five years after naturalisation,

on complying with the conditions mentioned under 'B.,' obtain

the full franchise.

"A.—

1. Six months' notice of intention to apply for naturalisation;

2. Two years' continued registration;

3. Residence in the South African Republic during that period;

4. No dishonouring sentence;

5. Proof of obedience to the laws; no act against Government

or independence;

6. Proof of full State citizenship and franchise or title

thereto in former country;

7. Possession of unmortgaged fixed property to the value of

£150 approximately, or occupation of house to the rental of

£50 per annum, or yearly income of at least £200. Nothing,

however, shall prevent the Government from granting

naturalisation to persons who have not satisfied this

condition;

8. Taking of an oath similar to that of the Orange

Free State.

"B.—

1. Continuous registration five years after naturalisation;

2. Continuous residence during that period;

3. No dishonouring sentence;

4. Proof of obedience to the laws, &c.;

5. Proof that applicant still complies with the condition A(7).

"II. Furthermore, the full franchise shall be obtained in the

following manner:—

(a.)

Those who have fixed their residence in the South African

Republic before the taking effect of Act 4, 1890, and who get

themselves naturalised within six months after the taking

effect of this Act on complying with the conditions under 1A,

shall obtain the full franchise two years after such

naturalisation on proof of compliance with the conditions

mentioned under 1B (altering the five into two years). Those

who do not get themselves naturalised within six months under

Article 1,

(b.)

Those who have been resident in the South African Republic for

two years or more can get themselves immediately naturalised

on compliance with the conditions under 1A., and shall five

years after naturalisation obtain the full franchise on

compliance with the conditions under 1B.

(c.)

Those who have been already naturalised shall five years after

naturalisation obtain the full franchise on compliance with

the conditions under 1B."

At the meeting next day, the High Commissioner presented to

the President a written memorandum in reply to the proposals

of the latter. He admitted that "the scheme proposed is a

considerable advance upon the existing provisions as to

franchise," but said that he could not recommend its

acceptance as adequate to the needs of the case. "Under this

plan," he continued, "no man who is not already naturalised,

even if he has been in the country 13 or 14 years, will get a

vote for the First Volksraad in less than 2½ years from the

passing of the new law. There will be no considerable number

of people obtaining that vote in less than five years, that is

if they come in and naturalise. But I fear the majority of

them will not come in, because the scheme retains that

unfortunate provision, first introduced in 1890, by which,

owing to the two stages—first, naturalisation with a partial

franchise, and then, after five years, full franchise—a man

has to abandon his old citizenship before he becomes a

full-fledged citizen of his new country. My plan avoided this.

My doctrine is that, however long a period of residence you

fix before a man becomes a citizen of your State, you should

admit him, once for all, to full rights on taking the oath of

allegiance. And this is especially important in the South

African Republic, because, owing to the facility and frequency

with which laws—even fundamental laws—are altered, the man who

takes the oath and thereby loses his old country will never

feel quite sure that something may not happen in the interval,

when he is only half a citizen, to prevent his becoming a whole

one. The vote for the First Volksraad is the essential point.

According to the present constitution of the Transvaal, the

First Volksraad and the President really are the State. But

under this scheme it will be a considerable time before any

number of Uitlanders worth mentioning can vote for the First

Volksraad, and even then they will only command one or two

seats. My point was to give them at once a few

representatives. They might be a minority, even a small

minority.

{486}

I have said over and over again I do not want to swamp the old

burghers. But as long as the representatives of the new comers

are entirely excluded from the supreme legislative council,

they will, as a body, remain an inferior caste. The

co-operation and gradual blending of the two sections of the

population will not take place. The old separation and

hostility will continue. I see no prospect here of that

concord to which I had looked both to bring about a more

progressive system of government, and to remove causes of

friction between the Government of the South African Republic

and Great Britain. For these reasons I regret to say the

scheme seems to me so inadequate that I think it would be

wasting the time of the Conference to discuss its details."

The President rejoined in another memorandum, which added one

more to his former proposals, namely this: "I am ready to

propose and to recommend to the First Volksraad to increase

the number of members of the First Volksraad, whereby the Gold

Fields will be represented by five, instead of as now by two,

members."

The response to this by the High Commissioner was a review, at

length, of all that had been proposed, leading to the

conclusion which he expressed as follows:

"If I am asked whether I think they will satisfy the Uitlander

community, and are calculated to relieve the British

Government from further solicitude on the score of its

Uitlander subjects, I cannot answer in the affirmative. Still

less can I encourage the idea that the British Government can

be asked to give something in exchange for such legislation

as the President proposes. My own proposal was put forward in

no bargaining spirit. I asked myself, in advancing it, what is

the smallest measure of reform that will really be of any use,

that is to say, which will allay the present unrest and enable

the Uitlanders to exercise within a reasonable time an

appreciable influence on the Government of the country. It was

in that spirit that I suggested the outline of a scheme,

intentionally not working it out in detail (for I was ready to

listen as to details), but indicating a certain minimum from

which I am not prepared to depart. … When I came here I came

in the hope that I might be able to report to Her Majesty's

Government that measures were about to be adopted which would

lead to such an improvement in the situation as to relieve Her

Majesty's Government from pressing for the redress of

particular grievances on the ground that the most serious

causes of complaint would now gradually be removed from

within. I do not feel that what His Honour has seen his way to

propose in the matter of franchise or what he indicates as the

extreme length to which he might, at some future time, be

willing to go in the extension of local government is

sufficient to justify me in reporting in that sense."

The Conference was ended by a last memorandum from the

President, in which he said: "As it is my earnest wish that

this Conference should not be fruitless, I wish to make the

following proposal to His Excellency, viz.:—As according to

his own admission my proposal about franchise is an important

step in the right direction, I shall be prepared to lay my

proposal before the Volksraad and to recommend it, even though

His Excellency does not fully agree with it. From his side I

shall then expect that His Excellency will lay before and

recommend to Her Majesty's Government my request about

arbitration on future matters of difference under the

Convention. His Excellency will, however, readily understand

that if Her Majesty's Government should not meet me so far, so

as to grant my acknowledged fair request for arbitration, it

could be with difficulty expected that the people of the South

African Republic would approve of my comprehensive proposal

with regard to franchise."

_Great Britain,

Papers by Command: 1899, C. 9404._

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1899 (May-August).

Advice to President Kruger from Cape Afrikanders, and

from Holland and Germany.

Several private letters written at the time of these

occurrences by Sir J. E. De Villiers, a leading Afrikander,

Chief Justice of Cape Colony, and one of the Commissioners who

negotiated the Convention of 1881, addressed to persons who

might have influence with President Kruger, were made public a

year later. In the first of these letters, written to

President Steyn of the Orange Free State, on the 21st of May,

1899, Justice De Villiers used strong expressions, as follows:

"On my recent visit to Pretoria I did not visit the President

as I considered it hopeless to think of making any impression

on him, but I saw Reitz, Smuts, and Schalk Burger, who, I

thought, would be amenable to argument, but I fear that either

my advice had no effect on them, or else their opinion had no

weight with the President. I urged upon them to advise the

President to open the Volksraad with promises of a liberal

franchise and drastic reforms. It would have been so much

better if these had come voluntarily from the Government

instead of being gradually forced from them. In the former

case they would rally the greater number of the malcontents

around them, in the latter case no gratitude will be felt to

the Republic for any concessions made by it. Besides, there

can be no doubt that as the alien population increases, as it

undoubtedly will, their demands will increase with their

discontent, and ultimately a great deal more will have to be

conceded than will now satisfy them. The franchise proposal

made by the President seems to be simply ridiculous. I am

quite certain that if in 1881 it had been known to my fellow

Commissioners that the President would adopt his retrogressive

policy, neither President Brand nor I would ever have induced

them to consent to sign the Convention. They would have

advised the Secretary of State to let matters revert to the

condition in which they were before peace was concluded; in

other words, to recommence the war. … If I had any influence

with the President I would advise him no longer to sit on the

boiler to prevent it from bursting. Some safety-valves are

required for the activities of the new population. In their

irritation they abuse the Government, often unjustly, in the

press, and send petitions to the Queen; but that was only to

be expected. Let the Transvaal Legislature give them a liberal

franchise and allow them local self-government for their

towns, and some portion of the discontent will be allayed. The

enemies of the Transvaal will not be satisfied; on the

contrary, the worst service that can be done to them is the

redress of the grievance, but it is the friends of the country

who should be considered."

{487}

On the 31st of July, the Justice wrote still more urgently and

impatiently to a Mr. Fischer, who was in close relations with

the Transvaal President: "I do not think that President Kruger

and his friends realize the gravity of the situation. Even now

the State Secretary is doing things which would be almost

farcical if the times were not so serious. Some time ago I

begged of him to drop the censorship of telegrams because it

serves no useful purpose and only delays the publication of

lies by a few days. His answer was that the Government should

not disseminate lies by its own wires. He might as well have

said Government should not disseminate lies by its own

post-office. To crown all, I see that he has now gone so far

as to stop a private telegram (which had been paid for)

because it contained a lie. I really do not know where he is

going to stop or whether he intends to guarantee that all

telegrams allowed to pass contain the truth and nothing but

the truth. Could you not induce him to stop such childish

nonsense? The Transvaal will soon not have a single friend

left among the cultivated classes. Then there is the Franchise

Bill, which is so obscure that the State Attorney had to issue an

explanatory memorandum to remove the obscurities. But surely a

law should be clear enough to speak for itself, and no

Government or Court of Law will be bound by the State

Attorney's explanations. I do not know what those explanations

are, but the very fact that they are required condemns the

Bill. That Bill certainly does not seem quite to carry out the

promises made to you, Mr. Hofmeyr, and Mr. Herholdt. The time

really has come when the friends of the Transvaal must induce

President Kruger to become perfectly frank and take the

newcomers into his confidence. It may be a bitter pill to have

to swallow in yielding to further demands, but it is quite

clear to the world that he would not have done as much as he

has done if pressure had not been applied. What one fears is

that he will do things in such a way as to take away all grace

from his concessions. Try to induce him to meet Mr.

Chamberlain in a friendly manner and at once remove all the

causes of unrest which have disturbed this unhappy country for

so many years. As one who signed the Convention in 1881, I can

assure you that my fellow Commissioners would not have signed

it if they had not been led to believe that President Kruger's

policy towards the Uitlanders would have been very different

from what it has been."

Three confidential despatches sent to President Kruger, in the

same period, by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the

Netherlands government were laid before the States General at

The Hague, October 25, 1900, and made public through Reuter's

press agency, as follows:

"In the first despatch, which is dated May 13, 1899, the

Minister states that news received from different capitals

leads him to believe in the imminence of the danger of a

violent solution of the problem in South Africa. As a faithful

friend he counsels Mr. Kruger in the true interests of the

Republic to show himself as conciliatory and moderate as

possible, and adds that he learns from a trustworthy source

that the German Government fully shares that opinion. Mr.

Kruger replied that he had always been conciliatory and did

not desire war, but that he could not sacrifice the

independence of the Republic. He was willing enough to grant

the suffrage, but he could not tolerate Englishmen remaining

subjects of the Queen while receiving at the same time the

right to vote in the Republic. In the second despatch, dated

August 4, 1899, the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs

advised President Kruger, in the interests of the country, not

to refuse peremptorily the British proposal for an

international commission. Mr. Kruger replied that the

commission would not be international, but an Anglo-Transvaal

commission. He intended to ask for further information from

Great Britain as to the scope and composition of the

commission, and did not mean to give a decided refusal.

Finally, the Netherlands Minister, in a telegram dated August

15, 1899, stated that the German Government entirely shared

his opinion as to the inadvisability of declining the English

proposal, adding that the German Government, like himself, was

convinced that any request to one of the Great Powers at such

a critical moment would be barren of result and highly

dangerous to the Republic. To this Mr. Kruger replied that the

British proposal would result in very direct interference by

the English in the internal affairs of the Republic. He added

that he had no intention of appealing to a Great Power."

Speaking in the German Reichsrath, on the 10th of December,

1900, the Imperial Chancellor, Count von Bülow, referred to

the above publications by the Dutch government, and confirmed

them, saying that it was in accordance with the views of the

German Government that the Dutch Foreign Minister "strongly

advised Mr. Kruger to maintain a moderate attitude. In June,

1899, Mr. Kruger was advised by Germany through the Dutch

Government to invite mediation, but Dr. Leyds informed the

Dutch Minister in Paris that Mr. Kruger did not consider 'that

the moment had yet come for applying for the mediation of

America.' Some time afterwards Mr. Kruger made the attempt to

obtain arbitration, but 'feeling had become too heated,' and

in August Mr. Kruger complained to the Dutch Government that

arbitration could not be arranged. The answer to this

complaint is given in the Dutch Yellow-book under the date of

August 15, 1899, and points out that the German Government

would at that date have regarded any appeal to a Great Power

as hopeless and as very dangerous for the Republics. The

German Government also shared the Dutch view that Mr. Kruger

ought not to reject the English proposal then before him."

SOUTH AFRICA: The Transvaal: A. D. 1899 (July-September)

Amendment of the Franchise Law.

After much discussion and many changes, an amended Franchise

Law was adopted by the First Volksraad of the Republic and

published on the 26th of July. It conceded to foreigners who

had already been resident in the Republic for seven years a

possibility of obtaining full burgher rights simultaneously

with the taking of the oath of allegiance, but subjected the

proceeding to conditions which would make it, in Uitlander

opinion, of service to very few. The judgment of Sir Alfred

Milner, the High Commissioner, as expressed to Secretary

Chamberlain, was to the effect that "the bill, as it stands,

leaves it practically in the hands of the Government of the

South African Republic to enfranchise or not enfranchise the

Uitlanders as it chooses. If worked in a liberal spirit, its

clumsy and unreasonable provisions may be got over.

{488}

But if it is to be enforced rigidly, there will be practically

unlimited opportunities of excluding persons whom the

Government may consider undesirable, nor does the tone of the

debate in the Raad leave much doubt as to the spirit in which

some at least of the authors of the Bill would like to see it

worked." His criticism applied especially to the certificate

required from every applicant. "The certificate," he said,

"which every applicant must obtain from three different

officials, as to (a) continuous registration and domicile, (b)

obedience to the laws, (c) committing no crime against the

independence of the country, is one which these officials,

even if well disposed, would be able in hardly any case to

give. None of them can have any such knowledge of the

Uitlander population as would enable them to give this

comprehensive certificate; it is acknowledged that some of the

Johannesburg lists have been lost; and the Field-cornet has, I

believe, held his present office for less than four years."

Moreover, a requirement of "continuous" registration "may

mean," said the High Commissioner, "(and I cannot understand

what else it could mean) registration for seven years in one

ward and district; so that a person having resided and been

registered in one district and subsequently removed to another

would forfeit the benefit of his first period of residence. Even

if this were not so, he would doubtless have to get a double

set of certificates."

Simultaneously with the publication of the new Franchise Law

it was announced that the Executive Council had decided to

give the Witwatersrand Gold Fields a representation of five

members (out of 31) in the First Volksraad, as well as

representation by the same number in the Second Volksraad. To

the British Agent at Pretoria, Mr. Conyngham Greene, this

seemed to be "so wholly inadequate as not to be worthy of

serious consideration."

In view of the complexities and uncertainties involved in the

new Franchise Law, the High Commissioner addressed the

following communication to the government of the South African

Republic, August 1:

"Her Majesty's Government authorize me to invite President

South African Republic to appoint delegates to discuss with

delegates to be appointed by me on behalf of Her Majesty's

Government, whether Uitlander population will be given

immediate and substantial representation by franchise law

recently passed by Volksraad, together with other measures

connected with it, such as increase of seats, and, if not,

what additions or alterations may be necessary to secure that

result. In this discussion it should be understood that the

delegates of Her Majesty's Government would be free to make

any suggestions calculated to improve measures in question and

secure their attaining the end desired."

The reply to this proposal was given by the Boer government to

the British Agent at Pretoria in two notes, the first, dated

August 19, as follows: "With reference to your proposal for a

joint enquiry contained in your despatches of the 2nd and 3rd

August, Government of South African Republic have the honour

to suggest the following alternative proposal for

consideration of Her Majesty's Government, which this

Government trusts may lead to a final settlement.

(1.) The Government are willing to recommend to the Volksraad

and the people a 5 years' retrospective franchise, as proposed

by His Excellency the High Commissioner on the 1st June, 1899.

(2.) The Government are further willing to recommend to the

Volksraad that 8 new seats in the First Volksraad, and, if

necessary, also in the Second Volksraad, be given to the

population of the Witwatersrand, thus with the 2 sitting

members for the Goldfields giving to the population thereof 10

representatives in a Raad of 36, and in future the

representation of the Goldfields of this Republic shall not

fall below the proportion of one-fourth of the total.

(3.) The new Burghers shall equally with the old Burghers be

entitled to vote at the election for State President and

Commandant-General.

(4.) This Government will always be prepared to take into

consideration such friendly suggestions regarding the details

of the Franchise Law as Her Majesty's Government, through the

British Agent, may wish to convey to it.

(5.) In putting forward the above proposals Government of

South African Republic assumes:

(a) That Her Majesty's Government will agree that the

present intervention shall not form a precedent for future

similar action and that in the future no interference in

the internal affairs of the Republic will take place.

(b) That Her Majesty's Government will not further insist

on the assertion of the suzerainty, the controversy on the

subject being allowed tacitly to drop.

(c) That arbitration (from which foreign element other than

Orange Free State is to be excluded) will be conceded as

soon as the franchise scheme has become law.

(6.) Immediately on Her Majesty's Government accepting this

proposal for a settlement, the Government will ask the

Volksraad to adjourn for the purpose of consulting the people

about it, and the whole scheme might become law say within a

few weeks.

(7.) In the meantime the form and scope of the proposed

Tribunal are also to be discussed and provisionally agreed

upon, while the franchise scheme is being referred to the

people, so that no time may be lost in putting an end to the

present state of affairs. The Government trust that Her

Majesty's Government will clearly understand that in the

opinion of this Government the existing Franchise Law of this

Republic is both fair and liberal to the new population, and

that the consideration that induces them to go further, as

they do in the above proposals, is their strong desire to get

the controversies between the two Governments settled, and

further to put an end to present strained relations between

the two Governments and the incalculable harm and loss it has

already occasioned in South Africa, and to prevent a racial

war from the effects of which South Africa may not recover for

many generations, perhaps never at all, and therefore this

Government, having regard to all these circumstances would

highly appreciate it if Her Majesty's Government, seeing the

necessity of preventing the present crisis from developing

still further and the urgency of an early termination of the

present state of affairs, would expedite the acceptance or

refusal of the settlement here offered.

(Signed) F. W. REITZ."

The second note, which followed on the 21st of August, was

in these terms:

{489}

"In continuation of my despatch of the 19th instant and with

reference to the communication to you of the State Attorney

this morning, I wish to forward to you the following in

explanation thereof, with the request that the same may be

telegraphed to His Excellency the High Commissioner for South

Africa, as forming part of the proposals of this Government

embodied in the above-named despatch.

(1.) The proposals of this Government regarding question of

franchise and representation contained in that despatch must

be regarded as expressly conditional on Her Majesty's

Government consenting to the points set forth in paragraph 5

of the despatch, viz.:

(a) In future not to interfere in internal affairs of the

South African Republic.

(b) Not to insist further on its assertion of existence of

suzerainty.

(c) To agree to arbitration.

(2.) Referring to paragraph 6 of the despatch, this Government

trusts that it is clear to Her Majesty's Government that this

Government has not consulted the Volksraad as to this question

and will only do so when an affirmative reply to its proposals

has been received from Her Majesty's Government.

(Signed) F. W. REITZ."

The above notes were repeated by cable, in full, to the

Colonial Secretary, at London, and, on the 28th of August, he

returned by the same medium his reply, as follows:

"Her Majesty's Government have considered the proposals which

the South African Republic Government in their notes to the

British Agent of 19th and 21st August have put forward as an

alternative to those contained in my telegram of 31st July.

Her Majesty's Government assume that the adoption in principle

of the franchise proposals made by you at Bloemfontein will

not be hampered by any conditions which would impair their

effect, and that by proposed increase of seats for the

Goldfields and by other provisions the South African Republic

Government intend to grant immediate and substantial

representation of the Uitlanders. That being so, Her Majesty's

Government are unable to appreciate the objections entertained

by the Government of the South African Republic to a Joint

Commission of Inquiry into the complicated details and

technical questions upon which the practical effect of the

proposals depends. Her Majesty's Government, however, will be

ready to agree that the British Agent, assisted by such other

persons as you may appoint, shall make the investigation

necessary to satisfy them that the result desired will be

achieved and, failing this, to enable them to make those

suggestions which the Government of the South African Republic

state that they will be prepared to take into consideration.

Her Majesty's Government assume that every facility will be

given to the British Agent by the Government of the South

African Republic, and they would point out that the inquiry

will be both easier and shorter if the Government of the South

African Republic will omit in any future Law the complicated

conditions of registration, qualification and behaviour which

accompanied previous proposals, and would have entirely

nullified their beneficial effect. Her Majesty's Government

hope that the Government of the South African Republic will

wait to receive their suggestions founded on the report of the

British Agent's investigation before submitting a new

Franchise Law to the Volksraad and the Burghers. With regard

to the conditions of the Government of the South African

Republic: First, as regards intervention; Her Majesty's

Government hope that the fulfilment of the promises made and

the just treatment of the Uitlanders in future will render

unnecessary any further intervention on their behalf, but Her

Majesty's Government cannot of course debar themselves from

their rights under the Conventions nor divest themselves of

the ordinary obligations of a civilized Power to protect its

subjects in a foreign country from injustice. Secondly, with

regard to suzerainty Her Majesty's Government would refer the

Government of the South African Republic to the second

paragraph of my despatch of 13th July. Thirdly, Her Majesty's

Government agree to a discussion of the form and scope of a

Tribunal of Arbitration from which foreigners and foreign

influence are excluded. Such a discussion, which will be of

the highest importance to the future relations of the two

countries, should be carried on between the President and

yourself, and for this purpose it appears to be necessary that

a further Conference, which Her Majesty's Government suggest

should be held at Cape Town, should be at once arranged. Her

Majesty's Government also desire to remind the Government of

the South African Republic that there are other matters of

difference between the two Governments which will not be

settled by the grant of political representation to the

Uitlanders, and which are not proper subjects for reference to

arbitration. It is necessary that these should be settled

concurrently with the questions now under discussion, and they

will form, with the question of arbitration, proper subjects

for consideration at the proposed Conference."

On the 2d of September the Boer government replied to this at

length, stating that it considered the proposal made in its

note of August 19 to have lapsed; again objecting to a joint

inquiry relative to the practical working of the Franchise

Law, but adding: "If they [the Government] can be of

assistance to Her Majesty's Government with any information or

explanation they are always ready to furnish this; though it

appears to it that the findings of a unilateral Commission,

especially when arrived at before the working of the law has

been duly tested, would be premature and thus probably of

little value."

Meantime, on the 31st of August, Sir Alfred Milner had

telegraphed to Mr. Chamberlain: "I am receiving

representations from many quarters to urge Her Majesty's

Government to terminate the state of suspense. Hitherto I have

hesitated to address you on the subject, lest Her Majesty's

Government should think me impatient. But I feel bound to let

you know that I am satisfied, from inquiries made in various

reliable quarters that the distress is now really serious. The

most severe suffering is at Johannesburg. Business there is at

a standstill; many traders have become insolvent; and others

are only kept on their legs by the leniency of their

creditors. Even the mines, which have been less affected

hitherto, are now suffering owing to the withdrawal of

workmen, both European and native. The crisis also affects the

trading centres in the Colony. In spite of this, the purport

of all the representations made to me is to urge prompt and

decided action; not to deprecate further interference on the

part of Her Majesty's Government. British South Africa is

prepared for extreme measures, and is ready to suffer much in

order to see the vindication of British authority. It is

prolongation of the negotiations, endless and indecisive of

result, that is dreaded."

{490}

On the 8th of September, the High Commissioner was instructed

by Mr. Chamberlain to communicate the following to the

government of the Transvaal:

"Her Majesty's Government are still prepared to accept the

offer made in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the note of the 19th

August taken by themselves, provided that the inquiry which

Her Majesty's Government have proposed, whether joint—as Her

Majesty's Government originally suggested—or unilateral, shows

that the new scheme of representation will not be encumbered

by conditions which will nullify the intention to give

substantial and immediate representation to the Uitlanders. In

this connection Her Majesty's Government assume that, as

stated to the British Agent, the new members of the Raad will

be permitted to use their own language. The acceptance of

these terms by the Government of the South African Republic

would at once remove the tension between the two Governments,

and would in all probability render unnecessary any further

intervention on the part of Her Majesty's Government to secure

the redress of grievances which the Uitlanders would

themselves be able to bring to the notice of the Executive and

the Raad."

In a lengthy response to this by State Secretary Reitz,

September 16, the following are the essential paragraphs:

"However earnestly this Government also desires to find an

immediate and satisfactory course by which existing tension

should be brought to an end, it feels itself quite unable, as

desired, to recommend or propose to South African Republic

Volksraad and people the part of its proposal contained in

paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of its note 19th August, omitting the

conditions on the acceptance of which alone the offer was

based, but declares itself always still prepared to abide by

its acceptance of the invitation [of] Her Majesty's Government

to get a Joint Commission composed as intimated in its note of

2nd September. It considers that if conditions are contained

in the existing franchise law which has been passed, and in

the scheme of representation, which might tend to frustrate

object contemplated, that it will attract the attention of the

Commission, and thus be brought to the knowledge of this

Government. This Government has noticed with surprise the

assertion that it had intimated to British Agent that the new

members to be chosen for South African Republic Volksraad

should be allowed to use their own language. If it is thereby

intended that this Government would have agreed that any other

than the language of the country would have been used in the

deliberations of the Volksraad, it wishes to deny same in the

strongest manner."