that the struggle for the control of raw materials was fully as important
a factor in the great conflict as the struggle of the armies themselves,
and that the food supply exercised a greater effect on the morale of a
nation than its casualties on the battle-field. Other factors which,
it was realized, had to be taken into consideration in estimating the
fighting ability and staying powers of a nation were labor conditions,
finance, shipping and ship-building, all of which bear an intimate
relation to the production of munitions and essential supplies. There
existed government agencies, such as the Department of Commerce and Labor
and the Department of Agriculture, as well as many others born of the
emergency, that were organized for the purpose of collecting data on all
these subjects, but the results of their activities were not readily
available for the purpose of the General Staff. As a consequence the need
arose for a section of the Military Intelligence Division to gather,
collate, and co-ordinate such economic information, and, in particular,
to interpret it from the military standpoint. The Economic Subsection of
the Positive Branch was created, therefore, to supply this need.
The chief, and indeed the most important, function of the subsection was
the compilation and the constant revision—based on the latest and most
accurate data obtainable—of the economic portion of the _Current Estimate
of the Strategic Situation_. Dealing as it did with vital economic
conditions in all the countries of the world; it enabled the high command
of the A. E. F. and the other organizations, both military and civil,
to whom it was distributed, to keep in constant and intimate touch with
the economic situation throughout the world. This work constituted, in
fact, an up-to-the-minute encyclopedia of the most vital economic factors
as they related to the strategic situation. The I. W. W. troubles in
the spruce forests of the Northwest, the spread of boll-weevil in the
cotton-growing districts of the South and of hoof-and-mouth disease on
the Texas cattle-ranges, riots in Korea, revolutions in Russia, the
assassination of a dictator in a Central American republic, a shortage
of the Brazilian coffee crop, a change of government in Chile, a textile
strike in Lowell, Mass., the price of bread in Bavaria, the increased
use of paper clothing and leather substitutes in Prussia, the speech of
a Socialist deputy in Paris, all were carefully weighed and given due
consideration, the conclusions thus arrived at, when condensed and put
into graphic form, enabling the military chiefs in Washington to gauge
with amazing accuracy the economic conditions throughout the world and to
forecast the effect which they might be expected to have on the fighting
armies.
Commencing early in 1918, the subsection contributed to the confidential
_Weekly Intelligence Summary_ specially written articles dealing with
particular phases of the economic situation in various countries, such
as “_Germany’s Raw Materials_,” “_The Food Supplies of Germany_,”
“_Turkish Finances_,” and the like. These articles, which were frequently
accompanied by specially prepared maps, tables, and diagrams, were all
of a confidential nature, and were of great importance to a complete
understanding of the strategic situation and its constantly shifting
phases. The signing of the Armistice naturally brought about a sudden
change in the nature of the subsection’s work, its articles becoming more
monographic in character and dealing with conditions from all points of
view but with particular reference to the future. Such articles included
“_The Coal Situation in Germany_,” which was a detailed account of
Germany’s use of the coal-fields which she occupied during the war; “_The
Left Bank of the Rhine_,” being a comprehensive study of this territory
from the view-point of the effect which its neutralization would have on
the future of Europe; “_Economic Resources of Czecho-Slovakia_,” with
a valuable map of railroads and mineral deposits in that newly born
nation; “_Palestine_,” with an account of the resources, railroads, and
prospects of the “State of Zion”; “_Baltic Ports_,” a monograph which
showed the necessity of developing these ports and their hinterlands for
the development of Russia. Upon the despatch of the American expedition
to Siberia, the Economic Subsection produced a weekly economic report on
Russia, with particular reference to the Asiatic territories, which was
regularly forwarded to the commander of the expedition at Vladivostok.
There were also prepared for the use of our forces in Siberia monographs
on the food and raw-material resources, the communications, the
industries, and the finances of Russia, these proving of enormous value
to the staff of the expedition, which was operating in a region of which
next to nothing was known save by a handful of scientists and explorers.
Among the countless other reports prepared by the subsection perhaps
the most important was the one on the fortifications and the territory
surrounding the great German stronghold of Metz, which, had the war
continued, would have been attacked by our forces. The completeness
and exactitude of the information contained in this report, which was
verified by persons familiar with the fortress and its environs, would,
I imagine, have given the chiefs of the German Intelligence Bureau some
very uncomfortable nights, had they known of its existence.
Now, though the non-military person may not have realized it, an
exceedingly important factor in the successful conduct of operations is
an adequate supply of up-to-date geographical monographs and handbooks,
describing in completest detail the regions where the operations are
taking place. Imagine, for example, how much difficulty you would
experience and how little information you would obtain if you were to
visit the galleries of the Vatican, the museums of Florence, or the
churches of Venice without a guide-book. As few of the statues and
pictures are labelled, you could only hazard a guess as to what you were
seeing; you would not know where to go next or how to get there. The
same thing holds almost equally true of armies. Land an expeditionary
force in Patagonia, let us say, and imagine how helpless it would be if
it had no accurate and detailed information as to the topography of the
country, the size and locations of the towns and villages, the nature of
the crops, and the customs of the natives. To fill this urgent need there
was created the Military Monograph Subsection. The gradual evolution in
the methods of this subsection may be summed up by saying that stiff
official letters, the very tone of which was about as reassuring to the
recipient as a court summons, have given place to informal, friendly
communications which immediately create a bond of personal sympathy
between the Intelligence Division and the person from whom information
is desired; the questionnaires sent out by the subsection to those
believed to have special knowledge of certain regions have dwindled from
ponderous and forbidding volumes, the mere labor involved in answering
which was appalling, to single pages of easily comprehended questions;
and sets of stereotyped queries have, wherever possible, been replaced
by intimate personal interviews. In other words, letters which addressed
the recipient as “Sir” were so humanized that, when the war ended, they
frequently began “Dear Bill.”
The most important work of the Military Monograph Subsection was the
preparation of military handbooks which described, with almost incredible
wealth of detail, the regions in which our forces were operating or in
which they might operate at some future time, the volumes being by no
means confined to Europe and Asiatic Russia. The method followed in the
preparation of these small, pocket-sized, linen-covered volumes was as
follows: From standard sources, such as Baedeker’s and Murray’s guides,
the best possible description of a given region or route is compiled, or,
should guide-books on the region in question be unobtainable, an account
is obtained from some experienced and reliable traveller. This skeleton
is then enlarged, improved, and brought up to date by the careful perusal
of consular and other reports and of all sorts of confidential documents
issued by our own and other governments, and by reference to reliable
books of travel. An even more fruitful method of obtaining new and
valuable information is through interviews with travellers, explorers,
mining engineers, consuls, commercial travellers, sea-captains, and
others who have had opportunities to familiarize themselves with the
regions about which information is desired. If these men were asked to
sit down and dictate accounts of their observations, the results would
probably, in nine cases out of ten, prove highly unsatisfactory, but
if a written account of the region under discussion is given them, it
invariably acts as a great stimulus to their memories. Though a man may
not be able to write as good an account from first-hand knowledge as the
intelligence officer has prepared from material obtained in a library, he
is easily able to point out errors, to suggest additions, and in other
ways to improve the version placed before him. The last and potentially
the most valuable of the methods used in gathering information for these
handbooks is the employment of the Military Intelligence Division’s own
agents, such as military attachés, diplomatic and consular officers, and
other civilian agents who are sent to foreign countries with specific
instructions as to the information which it is desired to obtain. I
might add that this has shown itself to be the most satisfactory source
of information for monographs and handbooks. It is no exaggeration to
say that each of these handbooks—and already a score or more of them
have been completed—represents the combined knowledge of from forty to a
hundred people.
The Siberian handbooks published by M. I. undoubtedly present the fullest
and most accurate date on routes of transportation in that country to
be found anywhere save only in the archives of the Russian, Japanese,
and German armies. The handbook entitled _Southwestern Russia_ contains
minute descriptions of all the ports on the Black Sea from Varna, in
Bulgaria, around to Batoum, in the Caucasus. It also contains such
information as would be required by an expedition in regard to the
selection of ports for the disembarkation of troops and supplies, the
garrisoning of these ports, and their maintenance as bases for operations
in the interior. In August, 1918, when the American Expeditionary Force
was about to set sail for Vladivostok, the Military Monograph Subsection
was suddenly called upon to furnish the staff of the expedition with a
handbook on eastern Siberia. Though much of the necessary material was
contained in documents which had not yet been translated, and though
there were available only a few persons who were intimately acquainted
with the region in question, the subsection, by placing its entire
personnel at the task and by working eighteen hours a day, succeeded
in producing a preliminary but really admirable little handbook which
was mimeographed in time to go with the expedition. It is scarcely
necessary to add that the preparation of these monographs demanded men
of exceptional ability who possessed wide and intimate knowledge of
the regions whereof they wrote. In order to provide such a corps of
writers, commissions in the Military Intelligence Division were given to
travellers, explorers, authors, scientists, archæologists, and others
whose work or pleasure had acquainted them with the world’s far places.
The Propaganda Subsection of Military Intelligence was formed for the
purpose of studying enemy propaganda, to combat it by means of suitable
counter-propaganda, and to take steps for the dissemination in the
enemy armies and enemy countries of positive propaganda of our own.
Though propaganda, as used by the United States, was nothing but the
truth, it had been so abused by the Central Powers as to have become
almost a term of reproach, the American Government steadily opposing
its use—at least under that name—during the earlier months of the war.
German propaganda had, indeed, achieved such an unenviable name that
it was found advisable, in the spring of 1918, to change the name of
this branch to “Psychologic Subsection.” Misleading and frequently
flagrantly untruthful though their propaganda was, the Central Powers
had made use of it with such marked success, particularly in Italy—for
the disaster at Caporetto was primarily due to Austrian propaganda
introduced into the Italian lines—that our government was reluctantly
compelled to recognize its efficacy and to initiate propaganda of its
own, this delicate and highly psychological work being intrusted to a
civilian organization—the Committee on Public Information. Despite the
vast amount of publicity which has been given to the work of Mr. Creel’s
organization, truth compels me to assert that it was very far from
being the success which the public has been led to believe. Memorandums
concerning the foreign situation, together with comments and suggestions,
were sent almost daily by Military Intelligence to the committee, thus
giving the civilian organization the military point of view and bringing
to its attention urgent calls for American propaganda made by its
representatives in many parts of the world. This should have been of
great value to the committee, since through its attachés, agents, and
other sources, Military Intelligence was able to obtain a vast amount of
information about enemy propaganda and morale which would not otherwise
have been accessible to Mr. Creel’s organization. Although the committee
agreed in general with the Intelligence Division as to the scope of our
propaganda, lack of funds and of experienced personnel made it unable to
act, in the majority of cases, on the information thus given. Incredible
as it may seem, in view of the immense importance attached to the use
of propaganda by other nations, it was not until after the Armistice had
been signed that the army was formally authorized to make use of this
potent weapon. I mention this because it illustrates how difficult it is
to obtain a satisfactory liaison between two such bodies as the Military
Intelligence Division and the Committee on Public Information, whose
respective activities were based on entirely dissimilar foundations, and
who carried on their work along entirely different lines. This is not
saying, however, that the officers of the Psychologic Subsection attached
to the expeditionary forces in France were idle all this time; on the
contrary, they succeeded in getting three million leaflets over the lines.
Early in the spring of 1918 Military Intelligence recommended the
immediate purchase of 6,500 balloons to be used for distributing great
quantities of propaganda leaflets behind the German front. As, however,
a sufficiently large appropriation could not be obtained, and as it was
feared that there would not be an adequate supply of gas for the purpose
in the A. E. F., it was finally decided to order only 500 balloons.
Though delivery was promised by November 1, they did not arrive then, nor
were they received before the Armistice was signed, such few balloons
as were used by the Propaganda Section of the A. E. F. being British
ones. These were paper affairs, about nine feet long and carrying four
pounds of leaflets strung on a slow-burning 12-inch fuse in such a manner
that they were dropped in small bunches, thus securing a wide area
of distribution. But bad weather, the shortage of hydrogen-gas, the
difficulties in transporting the gas-cylinders, and the rapid changes
in the battle-line combined to make the number of balloons actually
despatched very small. Great expectations were based, however, on the
balloon campaign which was planned for the winter of 1918-1919 against
interior Germany, particularly the Rhine towns. A large number of
leaflets were also distributed by American aviators, who, taking their
lives in their hands, frequently flew so low that they could see the
Germans picking up the literature which came fluttering down on them from
the skies.
In order to intelligently distribute propaganda by balloon, it was first
of all necessary to ascertain the actual state of the enemy’s morale,
which was principally done by questioning prisoners. The officers in
charge of the work—all of whom possessed, of course, a fluent knowledge
of German—after carefully studying the daily intelligence reports at
General Headquarters, would visit the war-cages near Toul and Souilly and
hold long interviews with prisoners of all ranks and from all parts of
the empire. By this means it was possible to gauge with a considerable
degree of accuracy the existing conditions beyond the Rhine and the
degree of importance which various sections of the German people attached
to America’s entry into the war. Arguments which had been suggested as
suitable for propaganda use were tried out on the prisoners and their
effect noted. Specimens of Allied propaganda were discussed with them and
they were asked to give their opinions of it. A sufficient knowledge was
thus gained of the Teutons’ mental processes to give the officers of the
Propaganda Section a fairly accurate idea of the sort of arguments which
would make the strongest appeal. The text of the proposed literature was
then prepared and, after being approved by General Headquarters, was
printed in Paris, the leaflets being sent to the field-stations which the
Propaganda Section had established at Bar-le-Duc and Toul. As a result of
the close liaison maintained with the Air Service, leaflets were sent to
the various flying-fields for distribution by airplane, careful records
being kept of the areas thus covered.
Almost from the start the liveliest interest was shown and the heartiest
co-operation afforded by all branches of the army concerned. The
Meteorological Section of the Signal Corps carried on an elaborate series
of experiments to determine the rate of ascension of the various types
of balloons. The G-2’s of many corps and divisions constantly sent in
requests for propaganda and offered many suggestions. And the aviators,
who were, after all, the ones most directly concerned, showed not the
slightest hesitation in undertaking the exceedingly dangerous work of
distribution, for more than one German commander announced that he would
execute any flyer captured in the act of distributing propagandist
literature. In only one quarter was opposition encountered. That was
where the out-of-date conviction was still held that “propaganda has no
place during operations.”
Nearly a score of types of leaflets were distributed by airplane or
balloon. Among the most successful was one known as the “Prisoner
Leaflet,” containing a translation of an extract from the orders
prescribing the treatment to be accorded by the A. E. F. to prisoners
of war. Appended to it was a list of rations issued to the American
soldier and prescribed for enemy prisoners. More than a million copies
of this leaflet were sent over the enemy lines. The “Prisoner Post-Card”
leaflet was a variation of the one just described, being printed in
close imitation of the German _Feldpostkarte_. This was predicated on
the idea that the first interest of the German soldier was solicitude
for his family and that the _Feldpostkarte_ form was one to which he was
accustomed. A number of these were found on the persons of prisoners.
Another leaflet had a picture of a file of soldiers rapidly increasing
in size, thereby impressing even the most illiterate of the enemy with
the amazing expansion of the American Army. Still another contained
the German request for an armistice and President Wilson’s reply. The
principal reason for dropping these over the German troops was the
belief, which proved to be well founded, that their full import, and
indeed even their complete texts, had been kept from reaching the German
soldier. In addition to the above, the Propaganda Section distributed
some 20,000 copies of a leaflet designed to appeal to those natives of
Alsace-Lorraine serving in the German armies.
The leaflets intended for the Alsace-Lorrainers were the work of Captain
Osamm of the 4th Corps, and were part of a plan which was to culminate
in a venturesome attempt at fraternization. Captain Osamm was perfectly
familiar with German Army organization and knew the names of hundreds
of German officers and men in the 224th Division, which was largely
recruited from the natives of Alsace-Lorraine. After the 224th had been
all but snowed under by the leaflets, and after a sufficient time had
elapsed for the arguments which they contained to penetrate the German
mind, Captain Osamm planned to crawl out into No Man’s Land, and when
within speaking distance of the German patrols to call out the names of
individuals in that division. He admitted that he expected to be met by
a few bursts of machine-gun fire, but he was convinced that the patrols
would eventually themselves come forward to meet him, whereupon, by a
verbal reinforcement of the arguments contained in the leaflets, he
expected to bring about wholesale desertions. He based his assumption
that the enemy would respond to his summons, I imagine, on the British
contention that all Germans had originally been waiters, and that, if
one were to shout, “Hi, Fritz, bring me a beer!” they would respond
from force of habit. The beginning of active operations abruptly halted
this amazing performance, however, thereby deeply disappointing the
adventurous captain.
The speed with which events moved during the last few weeks of the
war prevented the trial of a distinctively American idea, known as
_The International Bulletin_. This was to be issued in the form of a
newspaper, printed in parallel columns of English and German, and
distributed on both sides of the line. The intention was for the American
forces to honestly share a newspaper with the Germans! It was believed
that the very frankness of such a proceeding would serve to diminish the
suspicions of the enemy that all leaflets which fell into their hands
were “doctored.” The bulletin, as planned, was to contain news items,
chiefly concerning the A. E. F., maps, pictures, and cartoons, the
intention being to distribute it in large numbers among our own troops as
well as behind the enemy lines; then to collect the old copies from the
Americans, together with any comments which the fun-loving Yanks may have
written on the margins, and send them over to the Boche by balloon.