“This German propaganda had for its essential purpose the
creation in Denmark of a nation-wide sentiment favorable to
Germany and hostile to England, but it could also represent an
attempt to prepare the ground for the introduction into Denmark
of a Nazi system of government by collecting surreptitiously all
manifestations of discontent in Denmark against the democratic
regime in order to use such data as documentary proof in the
event of a liberation action in the future. Thus, in January
1940, the propaganda was no longer content merely with attacking
England and her methods of conducting the war, or the Jews and
their mentality; but it proceeded to make serious attacks on the
mentality of the government and the Danish Parliament.”
Finally, in this connection the Danish report mentions a very revealing
incident:
“At the end of February 1940, the Danish police seized from a
German subject, a document entitled, ‘Project for Propaganda in
Denmark.’”
In saying this, I am summarizing the first paragraph of Page 7 of this
report. This document contains a characteristic sentence. It is the last
sentence in that paragraph, in German, and is in quotation marks with a
French translation in parenthesis:
“It should be possible for the Legation and its collaborators to
control the daily press.”
Germany did not limit herself to the use of her own subjects as agents
inside the country and for carrying out propaganda, but the Nazis also
inspired the organization of Danish political groups which were
affiliated with the Nazi Party.
This campaign first of all found favorable ground in southern Jutland,
where there was a German minority. The Germans thus were able to promote
the organization of a group called Schleswig’sche Kameradschaft, or SK,
which exactly corresponds to the German SA. The members of this group
received military training. Likewise a group called Deutsche
Jugendschaft Nordschleswig had been organized on the pattern of the
Hitler Jugend.
I want to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that I am now
summarizing the statements in the Danish report in order to avoid
reading in full. These statements are developed in detail in the
following chapters of the report and what I have just said is on Page 7.
This German infiltration had been completed by social institutions such
as the Wohlfahrtsdienst founded in 1929 at Tinglev, and the Deutsche
Selbsthilfe, founded in 1935, and also by economic organizations, the
model of which was Kreditanstalt Vogelgesang, which by very clever and
secret financing on the part of the Reich, had succeeded in taking over
important agricultural properties.
The movement formed in southern Jutland then tried to spread to the
whole of Denmark. Thus, there existed, even before the war, a National
Socialist Party of Denmark, whose leader was Fritz Clausen. We read in
the governmental report, Pages 6 and 7:
“With regard to the relations of the Party with Germany prior to
the occupation it can be said that Fritz Clausen, himself, as
well as the members of the Party, were assiduous participants at
the Party Days held in Nuremberg and at the Congress of
Streicher at Erfurt and that, in any event, Fritz Clausen
personally was in very close relation with the German Foreign
Office.
“This propagation of Nazism in Denmark, starting in southern
Jutland and spreading to the rest of the country, is illustrated
by the fact that the Nazi newspaper, called _Das Vaterland_,
which at first was published in Jutland, was transferred in
October 1939 to Copenhagen, where it was published from then on
as a morning daily.”
Such, then, was the situation when the occupation started. As I have
indicated, the Germans did not establish a formal occupation authority;
and it follows that the two principal agents for the usurpation of
sovereignty in Denmark were diplomatic representation, on the one hand,
and the Danish Nazi Party on the other.
The German Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark was at first Von
Renthe-Fink, and from October 1942, Dr. Best.
Cases of diplomatic infringement on Danish sovereignty were numerous;
and the demands, made at first in a discreet manner, became more and
more sweeping. I shall quote, for example, a document which is contained
in the government report. This document is a memorandum submitted by the
Reich Plenipotentiary on 12 April 1941.
May I point out to the Tribunal that this text is to be found in Book
Number 3 of the report submitted. This third book is entitled, “Second
Memorandum,” or rather, it is a continuation of this third book and
there is a sheet entitled “Annex One.” I am now quoting:
“The German Reich Plenipotentiary has received instructions to
demand from the Royal Government of Denmark:
“First: A formal declaration as to whether His Majesty, the King
of Denmark, to whom M. De Kauffmann, Minister of Denmark now
refers, or any other member of the Royal Danish Government had,
prior to its publication, any knowledge of the treaty concluded
between M. De Kauffmann and the American Government.
“Second: The immediate putting into effect of the recall of M.
De Kauffmann, Minister of Denmark, by His Majesty, the King of
Denmark.
“Third: The delivery without delay to the American Chargé
d’Affaires in Copenhagen of a note disavowing M. De Kauffmann,
communicating the fact that he is being recalled, and stating
that the treaty thus concluded is not binding upon the Danish
Government, and formulating the most energetic protest against
the American procedure.
“Fourth: A communication to be published in the press, according
to which the Danish Royal Government clearly states that M. De
Kauffmann acted against the will of His Majesty, the King, and
of the Danish Royal Government and without their authorization;
that he has been recalled, and that the Danish Government
considers the treaty thus concluded as not binding upon it and
has formulated the most energetic protests against the American
procedure.
“Fifth: The promulgation of a law according to which the loss of
nationality and the confiscation of property may be pronounced
against any Danish subject who has been guilty of grave offenses
abroad against the interests of Denmark, or against the
provisions laid down by the Danish Government.
“Sixth: M. De Kauffmann is to be brought to trial for the crime
of high treason, by virtue of Article 98 of the penal code, and
of Article 3, Section 3, of the law of 18 January 1941, and to
lose his nationality in conformity with a law to be promulgated,
as mentioned under Paragraph 5.”
I believe that this very characteristic example shows how the
sovereignty of the legitimate Danish Government was violated by the
Germans. They gave orders in the sphere of international relations,
although liberty in this sphere constitutes the essential attribute of
the sovereignty and the independence of the State. They even go so far,
as the Tribunal has seen in the last two paragraphs, as to demand that a
law be passed in accordance with their wishes and that a prosecution for
high treason be made in conformity with such law, on the supposition
that it will be promulgated at their instance.
To conclude the subject, I should like to read a passage from the Danish
Government report which appears in the second supplementary memorandum
on Page 4, the third book in the green file:
“In the month of October there occurred a sudden crisis. The
Germans claimed that His Majesty, the King, had offended Hitler
by giving too short a reply to a telegram which the latter had
sent to him. The Germans reacted abruptly and with extreme
violence. The German Minister in Copenhagen was immediately
recalled. The Danish Minister in Berlin was then recalled to
Denmark. Minister Von Renthe-Fink was replaced by Dr. Best, who
arrived in the country with the title of Plenipotentiary of the
German Reich and who brought with him sweeping demands on the
part of the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Von Ribbentrop,
including a demand for a change in the Danish Government and the
admission of National Socialists into the Government. These
demands were refused by Denmark and, the government having
dragged out the matter, they were finally abandoned by Dr.
Best.”
THE PRESIDENT: This may be a convenient time to break off.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 4 February 1946 at 1000 hours._]
FIFTIETH DAY
Monday, 4 February 1946
_Morning Session_
MARSHAL: May it please the Court, I desire to announce that the
Defendant Kaltenbrunner will be absent from this morning’s session on
account of illness.
M. FAURE: May it please the Tribunal, Mr. Dodd would like to give some
explanations.
MR. DODD: May it please the Court, with reference to the prospective
witness Pfaffenberger, over the weekend it occurred to us, after talking
with him, that perhaps if Defense Counsel had an opportunity to talk to
him we might save some time for the Court. Accordingly we made this
Witness available to Dr. Kauffmann for conversation and interview; he
has talked with him as long as he has pleased, and has notified us that
in view of this conversation he does not care to cross-examine him, and
as well other Counsel for the Defense have no desire to cross-examine
him.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness Pfaffenberger can be released?
MR. DODD: That is what we would like to do, at the order of the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
M. FAURE: Gentlemen, during the last session I reached the end of the
first period of the German occupation of Denmark. In connection with
that first period I should like still to mention a circumstance which is
established by the Danish report, Document Number RF-901, second
memorandum, Page 4. I quote:
“When the German aggression against Russia took place on 22 June
1941”—that is the third book of the report—“one of the most
serious encroachments was made on the political liberties which
the Germans had promised to respect. They forcibly obliged the
government to intern the Communists, the total number of which
was 300.”
The explanations which I gave in the previous session related to the
improper interference on the part of the first instrument of German
usurpation, the diplomatic representation.
The second instrument of German interference was, as might be expected,
the local National Socialist Party of Fritz Clausen, about which I spoke
previously. The Germans hoped that in the favorable circumstances of the
occupation, and thanks to the support they would bring to it, this party
might develop enormously. But their calculations were completely wrong.
In effect, in March 1943 elections took place in Denmark; and these
elections resulted in the total defeat of the Nazi Party. This party
obtained only a proportion which represented 2.5 percent of the votes,
and it obtained only 3 seats out of 149 seats in the Chamber of
Deputies. I point out to the Tribunal that in some copies of my brief
there is a printing mistake and that 25 percent is indicated instead of
2.5 percent, which is the correct figure and which shows what very
little success the Clausen party had at the elections.
The conduct of the Germans in Denmark showed a notable change in the
period following the month of August 1943. The first reason for this
change was clearly the failure of the plan which consisted in seizing
power in a legal manner, thanks to the aid of the Clausen party. On the
other hand, about the same time, the Germans were equally disappointed
in another direction. They had sought, as has been shown in my brief on
economic questions, to mobilize Danish economy for the benefit of their
war effort. But the Danish population, which had refused political
nazification, did not wish to lend itself to economic nazification
either. And so the Danish industries and the Danish workmen offered
passive resistance, and by a legitimate reaction against the irregular
undertakings of the occupying power they organized a sabotage program.
There were strikes accompanied by various incidents. Faced with this
double failure, the Germans decided to modify their tactics.
In this connection we read in the government report, Page 6 of the
second memorandum, the following sentence:
“As a result of these events, the Plenipotentiary of the German
Reich, Dr. Best, was on 24 August 1943, called to Berlin, from
whence he returned with claims in the nature of an ultimatum
addressed to the Danish Government.”
I should now like to submit the text of this ultimatum, which is also to
be found in the official Danish report. This is Appendix Number 2 of
this report. The ultimatum is dated Copenhagen, 28 August 1943. At the
end of the first three books there are several loose sheets which are
the appendices. I now come to the second appendix—on Saturday I read
the first appendix—which is the second sheet and it has also been
copied in my brief:
“Claims of the Reich Government:
“The Danish Government must immediately declare the entire
country in a state of military emergency.
“The state of military emergency must include the following
measures:
“1. Prohibition of public gatherings of more than five persons.
“2. Prohibition of all strikes and of any aid given to strikers.
“3. Prohibition of all meetings in closed premises or in the
open air; prohibition to be in the streets between 2030 hours
and 0530 hours; closing of restaurants at 1930 hours. By 1
September 1943 all firearms and explosives to be handed over.
“4. Prohibition to hamper in any way whatsoever Danish nationals
because of their collaboration or the collaboration of their
relatives with the German authorities, or because of their
relations with the Germans.
“5. Establishment of a press censorship with German
collaboration.
“6. Establishment of courts-martial to judge acts contravening
the measures taken to maintain order and security.
“Infringement of the measures mentioned above will be punished
by the most severe penalties which can be imposed in conformity
with the law in force concerning the power of the Government to
take measures to maintain calm, order, and security. The death
penalty must be introduced without delay for acts of sabotage
and for any aid given in committing these acts, for attacks
against the German forces, for possession after 1 September 1943
of firearms and explosives.
“The Reich Government expects to receive today before. 1600
hours the acceptance by the Danish Government of the
above-mentioned demands.”
The Danish Government, mindful of its dignity, courageously refused to
yield to that ultimatum, although it found itself under the material
constraint of the military occupation. Direct encroachments upon the
sovereignty then started. The Germans themselves took the measures which
they had not succeeded in getting the national government to accept.
They declared a state of military emergency; they took hostages; they
attacked without warning, which is contrary to the laws of war; and at a
time when—let me recall it—a state of war did not exist, they attacked
the Danish Army and Navy and disarmed and imprisoned their forces. They
pronounced death sentences and deported a certain number of persons
considered to be Communists and whose internment, as I pointed out, they
had previously required. From 29 August 1943, the King, the Government,
and the Parliament ceased to exercise their functions. The
administration continued under the direction of high officials who in
urgent cases took measures called, “Emergency Laws.” During this same
period there existed three German authorities in Denmark:
First, the Plenipotentiary, who was still Dr. Best; second, the military
authority under the orders of General Hannecken, replaced subsequently
by General Lindemann; and third, the German police.
Indeed, the German police were installed in Denmark a few days after the
crisis of which I have just spoken to you. The SS Standartenführer,
Colonel Dr. Mildner, arrived in September as Chief of the German
Security; and on 1 November there arrived in Denmark as the Supreme
Chief of the Police, the Obergruppenführer and Lieutenant General of the
Police, Günther Pancke, of whom I shall have occasion to speak again.
General of Police Günther Pancke had under his authority Dr. Mildner,
whose name I mentioned at first and who was replaced on 5 January 1944
by SS Standartenführer Bovensiepen.
The Tribunal will find in the Danish Government’s report, on which I
base this information, a chart showing the German officials in Denmark.
This chart is to be found in the second memorandum, Page 2. It is
interesting, although we are not concerned here with individual cases,
insofar as it shows the organization of the German network in this
country. During the whole period which I am speaking about now, of the
three German authorities already mentioned, the police played the most
important role and was the principal organ of usurpation of sovereignty
by the Germans. For that reason we might consider that while Norway and
Holland represent cases of civil administration and Belgium and France
represent cases of military administration, Denmark represents the
typical case of police administration. At the same time we must never
forget that these different types of administration in all these
occupied countries were always interdependent. The seizure of authority
by the German police in Denmark during the period from September 1943
until the liberation was responsible for an extraordinary number of
crimes. Unlike other administrations, the police did not act under legal
or statutory regulations, but it interfered very effectually in the life
of the country by the exercise of orderly and systematic _de facto law_.
I shall have the opportunity of treating certain aspects of this police
administration in the fourth section of my brief. For the moment, within
the scope of my subject, I should like simply to cite the facts which
constitute direct and general violation of sovereignty. In this
connection, I believe that it is indispensable that I inform the
Tribunal of a quite exceptional event which took place on 19 September
1944. At that date the Germans suppressed the police—I mean the
national police of Denmark—and totally abolished this same institution
which is naturally indispensable and essential in all states.
I am going to read on this point what the government report says, second
memorandum, that is to say, still the third book of the file, Page 29. I
shall begin in the middle of the paragraph, after the first sentence.
The extract is to be found in my brief. I quote:
“The fact that the Germans had not succeeded in exerting any
influence among the Danish police or among their leaders or in
the ranks, was partly the reason why the German military
authorities at the end of the summer of 1944 began to fear the
police. Pancke explained that General Hannecken himself was
afraid that the police, numbering 8,000 to 10,000 well-trained
men, might fall upon the Germans in the event of an invasion. In
September 1944, believing that an invasion of Denmark was
probable, Pancke and Hannecken planned the disarming of the
police and the deportation of a part of it. Pancke submitted the
plan to Himmler, who consented to it in writing, adding in the
letter that the plan had been approved by Hitler. He had
moreover discussed the plan with Kaltenbrunner. The operation
was carried out by Pancke and Bovensiepen, who had discussed the
plan with Kaltenbrunner and Müller of the RSHA, and the regular
troops aided this operation with the consent of General
Hannecken.
“At 11 o’clock in the morning of 19 September 1944 the Germans
caused a false air-raid alarm to be given. Immediately
afterwards, the police soldiers forcibly entered the police
headquarters in Copenhagen as well as the police stations in the
city. Some policemen were killed. They acted in the same way
throughout the whole country. Most of the policemen on duty were
captured. In Copenhagen and in the large cities of the country
the prisoners were taken to Germany in ships, which
Kaltenbrunner had sent for this purpose, or in box cars. As has
already been said before, the treatment to which they were
subjected in German concentration camps was horrible beyond
description. In the small country towns the policemen were
freed.
“At the same time Pancke decreed what he called a state of
police emergency. The exact meaning of this expression has never
been explained, and even the Germans do not seem to have
understood what it meant. In practice, the result was that all
police activities, ordinary as well as judicial, were suspended.
Maintenance of order and public security was left to the
inhabitants themselves.
“During the last 6 months of the occupation, the Danish nation
found itself in the unheard-of situation, unknown in other
civilized countries, of being deprived of its police force and
the possibility to maintain order and public security. This
state of affairs might have ended in complete chaos if the
respect for the law and the discipline of the population,
strengthened by the indignation at this act of violence, had not
warded off the most serious consequences.”
Despite the bearing of the Danish population, the absence of the police
during these last 6 months of the occupation naturally resulted in a
recrudescence of all forms of criminality. You can get an idea of this
if you consider—and that detail will suffice—that the premiums of
insurance companies had to be raised to 480 percent—it says so in the
report—whereas previously they were limited to half of the normal rate.
We are justified in considering that the crimes committed under these
conditions involved the responsibility of the German authorities who
could not fail to foresee and who accepted this state of affairs. We see
here further proof of the total indifference of the Germans to the
consequences arising from decisions taken by them to suit their ends at
the time.
Finally, I should like to conclude this section on Denmark by quoting to
the Tribunal a passage from a document which I shall present as Exhibit
Number RF-902. This document belongs to the American documentation under
the Number 705-PS, but it has not yet been submitted, and I should like
to read an extract, one quotation, which seems to me to be interesting.
This is a report drawn up in Berlin on 12 January 1943, and concerns a
meeting of the SS Committee of the Research Institute for Germanic
Regions (Ausschuss der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für den Germanischen Raum).
At this meeting there were present 14 personages of the SS. This report
contains a special paragraph which concerns Denmark. Other paragraphs of
the same document are of interest in connection with the section which
will follow this. Therefore, in order to avoid having to refer to this
document twice, I shall read the whole of the passages which I should
like to submit as evidence. I start on Page 3 of the document, towards
the end of the page.
“Norway. In Norway the Minister Fuglesang meanwhile has become
the successor to the Minister Lunde, who has been killed in an
accident. Despite the promises made by Quisling’s party, Norway
may not be expected to furnish an important quota.
“Denmark. In Denmark the situation is extremely encouraging on
account of the taking over of power by SS Gruppenführer Dr.
Best. We may be convinced that the SS Gruppenführer Dr. Best
will furnish a classical example of the ethnical policy of the
Reich. The relations with the Party Leader Clausen have recently
become difficult. Clausen agreed only to the project for the
establishment of a Front Combatant Corps as a preliminary to the
Germanic Schutzstaffel in Denmark, on the condition that members
of this corps will be barred from membership to the Party.
Negotiations about this urgently needed central organization of
front combatants are going on. The monopoly of the Party is
untenable; all rejuvenating elements must be mobilized although
Clausen personally has to stand in the foreground but without
his clique.
“Netherlands. In the Netherlands Mussert has in the meantime
been proclaimed Führer of the Dutch people by the Reich
Commissioner, Seyss-Inquart. This measure has produced an
extremely disquieting effect in other Germanic countries,
particularly in Flanders. The decisive role again falls to the
General Commissioner whose principle of exploiting Mussert and
then dropping him cannot be accepted under a Germanic Reich
policy as approved by the SS.
“Flanders: In Flanders the development of the VNV (the Flemish
National Movement) continues to be unfavorable. Even the shrewd
policy of the new leader of the VNV, Dr. Elias, can no longer
deceive us about this. Besides, he once expressed the opinion
that Germany was prepared to make concessions in ethnological
policy only when she was in bad straits.”
This information is quite characteristic. In the first place, it is
firmly established that the Germanic regions should include Norway,
Denmark, the Netherlands, and Flanders. Naturally I speak only of the
western countries. In the second place, we clearly see how the Germans
used the Nazi-inspired local parties as an instrument for the usurpation
of sovereignty. In the third place, we see it is quite true that the
German diplomatic agents were also instruments for this policy of
usurpation and completely exceeded their normal functions. In the fourth
place, the document confirms the interdependence which existed between
the different agents of German interference, which we stressed a short
time ago and on which we cannot lay too much emphasis. The case of Dr.
Best is a good example. Dr. Best was a minister with plenipotentiary
powers; therefore, he was a diplomatic agent. We have seen that this
same Dr. Best was previously an agent of the military administration in
France, and we see by this document that besides his being a
Plenipotentiary Minister he is a General in the SS, and in this
capacity, so the document states, he seized power in Denmark. The
information contained in the document concerning Norway and the
Netherlands is a transition for the following part of this section, and
I ask the Tribunal to take the file entitled, “Norway and the
Netherlands.”
The institution of Reich Commissioner was applied in Norway and in the
Netherlands, and in these two countries only; it constitutes a definite
concept in the general plan of Germanization, in which these two
countries occupy parallel positions. In both cases the establishment of
the civil administration followed hard upon the military occupation of
the country. The military men, therefore, did not have to take over the
administration, and during the few days which preceded the appointment
of the Reich Commissioner, they confined themselves to measures
concerning order.
In Norway the decree of 24 April 1940 appointed Terboven as Reich
Commissioner. This decree is signed by Hitler, Lammers, and the
Defendants Keitel and Frick. In Holland the decree of 18 May 1940
appointed the Defendant Seyss-Inquart as Reich Commissioner. This decree
is signed by the same persons as the preceding decree, and it bears in
addition the signatures of Göring and Ribbentrop.
The decrees appointing the Reich-Commissioners also defined their
functions as well as the division of the functions between the civil
commissioner and the military authorities. I am not submitting these two
decrees as documents since they are direct acts of German legislation.
The decree concerning Norway provides in its first article:
“The Reich Commissioner has the task of safeguarding the
interests of the Reich, and of exercising supreme power in the
civil domain.”—The decree adds—“The Reich Commissioner is
directly under me and receives from me directives and
instructions.”
As far as the division of functions is concerned, I give the text of
Article 4, “The Commander of the German troops in Norway exercises the
rights of military sovereignty. His orders are carried out in the civil
domain by the Reich Commissioner.”
This decree was published in the _Official Gazette of German Decrees_
for 1940, Number 1. The same instructions are given in a similar decree
of 18 May 1940 concerning the Netherlands. The establishment of
Reich-Commissioners was accompanied at the beginning by some
pronouncement intended to reassure the population. Terboven proclaimed
that he intended to limit, as much as possible, the inconveniences and
costs of the occupation. This is in a proclamation of 25 April 1940
which is in the _Official Gazette_, Page 2.
Likewise, after his appointment, the Defendant Seyss-Inquart addressed
an appeal to the Dutch people. This is to be found in the _Official
Gazette_ for Holland for 1940, Page 2, and in it he expressed himself as
follows—he starts off with a categorical phrase:
“I shall take all measures, including those of a legislative
nature, which will be necessary for carrying out this
mandate”—and he says also—“it is my will that the laws in
force up to now shall remain in force and that the Dutch
authorities shall be associated with the carrying out of
government affairs and that the independence of justice be
maintained.”
But these promises were not kept. It is evident that the Reich
Commissioner was to become in Norway and in Holland the principal
instrument for the usurpation of sovereignty. He was to act, however, in
close relation with a second instrument of usurpation, the National
Socialist organization in the country. This collaboration of the local
Nazi Party with the German authority, represented by the Reich
Commissioner, took perceptibly different forms in each of the two
countries under consideration. Thus, the exercise of power by the Reich
Commissioner presents in itself differences between Norway and Holland
which were more apparent than real.
In both countries the local National Socialist Party existed before the
war. It grew and was inspired by the German Nazi Party and had its place
in the general plan of war preparations and the plan for Germanization.
I should like to give some information concerning Norway.
The National Socialist Party was called “Nasjonal Samling.” It had as
leader the famous Quisling. It was a perfect imitation of the German
Nazi Party. I submit to the Tribunal as Document Number RF-920, the text
of the oath of fidelity subscribed to by members of this Nasjonal
Samling Party. I quote:
“My pledge of allegiance: I promise on my honor:
“1. Unflinching allegiance and loyalty towards the National
Socialist movement, its idea, and its Führer.”—This is the
third page of the Document RF-920.
“2. To stand up energetically and fearlessly for the cause,
always to offer reliability and loyal discipline at my work, and
to do all I can in order to acquire the knowledge and abilities
which my work for the Movement demands.
“3. To the best of my abilities to live in compliance with the
National Socialist concept and to show solidarity,
understanding, and good comradeship to all my companions.
“4. To obey any orders given by the Führer or by his appointed
officials insofar as such orders are not in disagreement or do
not violate the directions of the Führer.
“5. Never to reveal to unauthorized persons details of NS
methods of work or anything detrimental to the Movement.
“6. At all times to make the utmost effort to contribute to the
progress of the Movement, and to the achievement of its purpose,
and to play the part in the fighting organization which I have
undertaken to do under promise of fidelity, quite conscious that
I should be guilty of an unworthy and vile act if I broke this
promise.
“7. If circumstances should make it impossible for me to
continue as a member of the fighting organization, I promise to
withdraw in a loyal manner. I shall remain bound by the vow of
secrecy which I made and I shall do nothing to harm the
Movement.
“Our aim. The aim of the Nasjonal Samling is: A new state, a
Norwegian and Nordic fellowship within the world community,
organically constructed on the basis of work, with a strong and
stable administration, a combination of common and private
weal.”
This party therefore conforms completely to the Leadership Principle and
while it shows a Norwegian facade, it is nothing but a facade. In fact
on the very day of the invasion the Nazis imposed the establishment of
an alleged Norwegian Government, presided over by Quisling. At that time
the Norwegian Supreme Court appointed a board of officials who were to
be invested, under the title of Administrative Council, with powers of
higher administration. This Administrative Council constituted
therefore, in the exceptional circumstances in which it was set up, a
qualified authority for representing the legitimate sovereignty, at
least in a conservative way. It functioned only for a short time. By
September the Nazis found that it was not possible for them to obtain
the participation or even passive acceptance of the Administrative
Council and of the administrators. They themselves then appointed 13
commissioners, of whom 10 were selected among the members of the
Quisling party. Quisling himself did not exercise any nominal function,
but he remained the Führer of his party.
Finally, a third period began on 1 February 1942. At that date Quisling
returned to power as Minister President, and the commissioners
themselves assumed the title of ministers. This situation lasted until
the liberation of Norway. Thus, except for a few months in 1940, the
Germans completely usurped all sovereignty in Norway. This sovereignty
was divided between their direct agent, the Reich Commissioner, and
their indirect agents, first called State Councillors and then the
Quisling Government, but always an emanation of National Socialism.
There is no doubt whatever that the independence of these organizations
vis-à-vis the German authorities was absolutely nil. The fact that the
second organization was called a government did not mean a strengthening
of its autonomous authority. These were merely differences of form, the
nature of which I shall point out to the Tribunal. I submit, in this
connection, two documents, Documents RF-921 and RF-922. By comparing
these two documents you will see that what I have just affirmed is
correct. These two documents are instructions addressed by the Reich
Commissioner to his offices concerned with legislative procedure.
Document Number RF-921 is dated 10 October 1940; that is the very
beginning of the period of the State Councillors. I quote an extract
from this document, “All the decrees of the State Councillors must be
submitted to the Reich Commissioner before publication.” This is to be
found in the second paragraph. It is the only point which I should like
to bring out in this document. Therefore all the decrees of the higher
Norwegian administration were under the control of the Reich
Commissioner.
The second document, Document Number RF-922, is dated 8 April 1942. It
relates to the period shortly after the establishment of the second
Quisling Government. I start at the second sentence of this document:
“In view of the formation of the National Norwegian Government
on 1 February 1942 the Reich Commissioner has decided that from
now on this form of agreement”—a prior agreement in
writing—“is no longer required. Nevertheless, this modification
of formal legislative procedure does not mean that the Norwegian
Government may proclaim laws and decrees without the knowledge
of the competent department of the Reich Commissioner. His
Excellency, the Reich Commissioner, expects every department
chief to acquaint himself, by close contact with the competent
Norwegian departments, with all legislative measures which are
in preparation, and to find out in each case whether these
measures concern German interests, and to assure himself, if
necessary, that German interests will be taken into
consideration.”
Thus, in the one case, there is a formal control with written
authorization. In the other case there is a control by information among
the different departments, but the principle is the same. The
establishment of local authority under one form or under another form
was merely a means of finding out the best way of deceiving public
opinion. When the Germans put Quisling into the background, it was
because they thought the State Councillors, being less well-known, might
more easily deceive the public. When they returned Quisling, it was
because the first maneuver had obviously failed and because they thought
that perhaps the official establishment of an authority qualified as
governmental would give the impression that the sovereignty of the
country had not been abolished. One might, however, wonder what was the
reason for these artifices and why the Nazis used them, instead of
purely and simply annexing the country. There is a very important reason
for that. It operates for Norway and it will operate for the
Netherlands. The Nazis always preferred to maintain the fiction of an
independent state and to gain a definite hold from within by using and
developing the local Party. It is with this end in view that they
granted the Party in Norway advantages of prestige; and if they did not
act in an identical manner in Holland, their general conduct was,
however, imbued with the same spirit.
This policy of the Germans in Norway is perfectly illustrated by the
Norwegian law, or so-called Norwegian law, of 12 March 1942, (Norwegian
_Official Gazette_, 1942, Page 215, which I offer in evidence as
Document Number RF-923). I quote:
“Law concerning the Party and the State, 12 March 1942, Number
2.
“Paragraph 1. In Norway the Nasjonal Samling is the fundamental
party of the State and closely linked with the State.
“Paragraph 2. The organization of the Party, its activity, and
the duties of its members are laid down by the Führer of the
Nasjonal Samling.
“Oslo, 12 March 1942”—signed—“Quisling, Minister President.”
On the other hand, the Nazis organized on a large scale the system of
the duplication of functions which existed among the higher authorities.
In fact, it is the transposition of the German system, which shows a
constant parallelism between the state administration and the party
organizations. Everywhere German Nazis were installed to second and
supervise the Norwegian Nazis who had been put in official positions.
As this point is interesting from the point of view of seizure of
sovereignty and of action taken in the administration, I think I may
submit two documents, which are Documents RF-924 and RF-925. These are
extracts of judicial interrogations by the Norwegian Court of two high
German officials of the Reich Commission at Oslo. Document Number RF-924
refers to the interrogation of Georg Wilhelm Müller, interrogation dated
5 January 1946. Wilhelm Müller was the Ministerial Director in the
Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. The information which
he gives concerns more particularly the functioning of the propaganda
service, but similar methods were used in a general way, as this
statement admits. I quote Document RF-924:
“Question: ‘In 1941 nobody in your country thought that military
difficulties would arise. At that time they certainly tried to
mold the Norwegian people along Nationalist Socialist lines?’
“Answer: ‘They did this until the very end.’
“Question: ‘Which were the practical measures for achieving this
National Socialist molding?’
“Answer: ‘They supported the NS Samling as far as possible; and
they did it, in the first place, by strengthening the Party
organization considerably.’”
I may point out that this translation into French is not first rate; it
is, however, comprehensible.
“Question: ‘In what way was it strengthened?’
“Answer: ‘In each Fylke’—or province—‘picked German National
Socialists were assigned to aid the Norwegian National
Socialists.’
“Question: ‘Were there other practical measures?’
“Answer: ‘That was done in all domains, even in the field of
propaganda, by the Einsatzstab propagandists placed at their
disposal. This was also done in Oslo at the central offices of
the NS Samling.’
“Question: ‘How did these propagandists work?’
“Answer: ‘They worked closely with similar Norwegian
propagandists and made suggestions to them. Grebe did this by
virtue of his double capacity as Chief of Propaganda in the
Reichskommissariat and Chief of the Landesgruppe.’
“Question: ‘How was this done?’
“Answer: ‘These consultations and conferences were even arranged
for the very top of the Party hierarchy. There was a man who was
specially appointed for this; first Wegeler, then Neumann, then
Schnurbusch, who had the task of strengthening National
Socialist ideas within the NS Samling.’
“Question: ‘In the Einsatzstab there were experts from the
different branches whose task it was to contact Norwegians and
give them useful advice. In what domains?’
“Answer: ‘There were organizers, and above all instructors for
the Hird, leaders of the SA and SS. Until he, himself, became
leader of the Einsatzstab, we had at the head a press man, a
propagandist, Herr Schnurbusch, an accountant, an expert on
social welfare questions in the same way as in the NSV in
Germany.’”
The Tribunal will notice in this document the name of Schnurbusch, as
being that of the leader of the Einsatzstab, and of the organism for
liaison with, and penetration into, the local Party. I am now going to
quote an extract from the interrogation of Schnurbusch, which is found
in Document Number RF-925.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you putting these documents in?