“A. Civilians not subject to military service.
“It is obvious that these men could not be considered soldiers
according to French law. They can be classified, according to
age, into three groups:
“(a) Men under 21 not yet called to the colors. Example:
Flanquart, Alexandre, 18 years old, captured by the German
troops at Courrières, Pas-de-Calais, at the time of the arrival
of the latter in that region. His address in captivity was
Number 65/388, Stalag II-B.
“(b) Men between 21 and 48 who were not mobilized, who were
demobilized, or who were considered unfit for service.”
There follows a rather lengthy list which the Tribunal will perhaps
accept without my reading it. It consists merely of proper names. In the
middle of the page:
“(c) Men specially assigned to the army. I will classify them
into two groups:
“1. Men mobilized into special corps, which are military
formations established at the time of the mobilization by
different ministerial departments, according to the following
chart . . . .”
At the top of Page 21:
“2. Men specially assigned, who at mobilization were kept in the
positions which they held in time of peace in military services
or establishments. Example: Workmen in artillery depots.
“Civilians specially assigned. Contrary to those mentioned
above, the civilians who were specially assigned did not belong
to military formations and were not subject to military
authority. Nevertheless they were arrested. Example:”—I skip
several lines—“Moisset, Henri, specially assigned to the
Marret-Bonin factory.”—I skip a few more lines.
“Address in captivity: Number 102 Stalag II-A.”
Those people were not all freed, far from it. Some remained prisoners
until the end of the war.
We shall cite now a document submitted under Exhibit Number RF-362
(Document Number F-224), the text of which is in your document book, on
Page 15a. This text may be summarized in a few words. It is the story of
Dutch officers who were freed after the capitulation of the Dutch Army
and recaptured shortly afterwards and sent in captivity to Germany.
Paragraph 3 of this document:
“On 9 May 1942 a summons addressed to all regular officers of
the former Dutch Army who were on active service on 10 May 1940
was published in the Dutch newspapers, according to which they
were to present themselves on Friday, 15 May 1942, at the
Chassée Barracks in Breda . . . .”
Paragraph 5:
“More than one thousand regular officers reported to the Chassée
Barracks on 15 May 1942. The doors were closed after
them. . . .”
Paragraph 7:
“A German officer of high rank came into the barracks and
declared that the officers had not kept their word to undertake
no action against the Führer and, as a result of this, they were
to be kept in captivity. . . .”
The following paragraph states that “they were taken from the station at
Breda to Nuremberg, in Germany.”
Numerous obstacles were placed in the way of the release of French
prisoners of war who, for reasons of health, should have been sent back
to their families. I shall quote a document already submitted under
Exhibit Number RF-297 (Document Number F-417), Page 23 of your document
book; and I read, Paragraph 1:
“The question of releasing French generals, prisoners of war in
German hands, for reasons of health or age was taken up on
several occasions by the French authorities.”
This reproduction of the stencil is not quite clear. I continue with
Paragraph 2:
“So far as this question is concerned, the Führer has always
refused to consider either their release or allowing them to be
placed in hospitals in neutral countries.”
Paragraph 3:
“Today release or sending to hospitals is more out of the
question than ever. . . .”
And a written note reads: “No reply to be given to the French note.”
This note, in fact, was addressed by the Supreme Command of the German
Army to the German Armistice Commission, who had asked for instructions
as to whether or not they should reply to the request concerning the
release of French generals who were ill, a request made by the Vichy
Government.
Much more serious measures were undertaken against our prisoners of war
by the German authorities when, for reasons of a patriotic nature, some
of our prisoners gave the Germans to understand that they were not
willing to collaborate with Germany. The German authorities considered
them as incapable of being assimilated and dangerous; their courage and
their determination gave much concern to Germany, and the measures taken
against them amounted to nothing less than murder. We know of numerous
examples of murder of prisoners of war. The victims were mainly: 1) men
who had taken part in commando actions; 2) airmen; 3) escaped prisoners.
These murders were carried out by means of deportation and the
internment of these prisoners in concentration camps.
While interned in these camps, they were subjected to the regime about
which you know and which was bound to cause their death, or else they
were killed quite simply with a bullet in the back of the neck,
according to the KA method which has been described by our American
colleagues and on which I will not dwell. In other cases they were
lynched on the spot by the population, in accordance with direct orders,
or with the tacit consent of the German Government. In yet other cases,
they were handed over to the Gestapo and the SD, who, as you will see at
the end of my statement, during the last years of the occupation had the
right to carry out executions.
With the Tribunal’s permission, we shall study two cases of
extermination of combat troops captured after military operations: that
of commandos and that of airmen.
As the Tribunal knows, men who were commandos were almost always
volunteers. In any case, they were selected from among the most
courageous fighters and those who showed the greatest physical aptitude
for combat. We can consider them, therefore, as the elite and the order
to exterminate them as an attempt to annihilate the elite and spread
terror through the ranks of the Allied Armies. From a legal point of
view the execution of the commandos cannot be justified. The Germans
themselves, moreover, used commandos quite extensively; but whereas, in
the case of their own men being taken prisoners, they always insisted
that they be recognized as belligerents, they denied that right to our
men or to those of the Allied Armies.
The main order concerning this was signed by Hitler on 18 October 1942,
and it was extensively carried out. Moreover, this order was preceded by
other orders of the OKW, which show that the question had been carefully
studied by the General Staff before becoming the subject of a final
order by the head of the German Government.
Under Document Number 553-PS, the Tribunal will find, on Page 24 of the
document book, an order signed by Keitel which we submit as Exhibit
Number RF-363. This order prescribes that all isolated parachutists or
small groups of parachutists carrying out a mission shall be executed.
It is dated 4 August 1942.
THE PRESIDENT: Do not read it.