beneficence which men suppose in God, they continue to call him good.
When we bewail the miserable victims of those disorders and calamities
that so often overwhelm our species, we are confidently told that these
ills are but apparent, and that if our short-sighted mind could fathom
the depths of divine wisdom, we should always behold the greatest
blessings result from what we denominate evil. How despicable is so
frivolous an answer! If we can find no good but in such things as
affect us in a manner which is agreeable and pleasing to our actual
existence, we shall be obliged to confess that those things which
affect us, even but for a time, in a painful manner, are as certainly
evil to us. To vindicate God's visiting mankind with these evils some
tell us, that he is just, and that they are chastisements inflicted on
mankind to punish the wrongs he has received from men. Thus a feeble
mortal has the power to irritate and injure the almighty and eternal
Being who created this world. To offend any one is, to afflict him,
to diminish in some degree his happiness, to make him feel a painful
sensation. How can man possibly disturb the felicity of the
all-powerful sovereign of nature! How can a frail creature, who
has received from God his being and his temper, act against the
inclinations of an irresistable force which never consents to sin and
disorder? Besides justice, according to the only ideas which we can
have of it, supposes a fixt desire to render every one his due. But
theologians constantly preach that God owes us nothing, that the good
things he affords are the voluntary effects of his beneficence, and
that without any violence of his equity he can dispose of his creatures
as his choice or caprice may impel him. In this doctrine I see not the
smallest shadow of justice, but the most hideous tyranny and shocking
abuse of power. In fact do we not see virtue and innocence plunged into
an abyss of misery, while wickedness rears its triumphant head under
the empire of this God whose justice is so much extalled? "This misery,
say you, is but for a time." Very well, Sirs, but your God is unjust
for a time. "He chastises whom he loves (you will say) for their own
benefit." But if he is perfectly good, why will he let them suffer at
all? "He does it, perhaps to try them" But, if he knows all things,
what occasion is there for him to try any? If he is omnipotent, why
need he vex himself about the vain design any one may form against him?
Omnipotence ought to be exempt from any such passions, as having
neither equals nor rivals. But if this God is jealous of his glory, his
titles and prerogative, why does he permit such numbers of men to
offend him? Why are any found daring enough to refuse the incense which
his pride expects? _Why am I a feeble mortal permitted to attack his
titles, his attributes, and even his existence?_ Is this permission of
punishment on me for the abuse of his grace and favour? He should never
have permitted me to abuse them. Or the grace he bestowed should have
been efficacious and have directed my steps according to his liking.
"But, say you, he makes man free." Alas? why did he present him with a
gift of which he must have foreseen the abuse? Is this faculty of free
agency, which enables me to resist his power, to corrupt and rob him of
his worshippers, and in fine to bring eternal misery on myself, a
present worthy of his infinite goodness? In consequence of the
pretended abuse of this fatal present, which an omniscient and good God
ought not to have bestowed on Beings capable of abusing it,
everlasting, inexpressible torments are reserved for the transitory
crimes of a Being made liable to commit them. Would that father be
called good, reasonable, just and kind, who put a sharp-edged and
dangerous knife into the hand of a playful, and imprudent child, whom
he before knew to be imprudent, and punished him during the remainder
of his life for cutting himself with it? Would that prince be called
just and merciful, who, not regarding any proportion between the
offence and the punishment, should perpetually exercise his power of
vengeance, over one of his subjects who, being drunk, had rashly
offended against his vanity, without causing any real harm to him,
especially, when the prince had taken pains to make him drunk? Should
we consider as almighty a monarch, whose dominions were in such
confusion and disorder, that, except a small number obedient servants,
all his subjects were every instant despising his laws, defeating his
will and insulting his person? Let ecclesiastics then acknowledge, that
their God is an assemblage of incompatible qualities, as
incomprehensible to their understanding as to mine. No: they say, in
reply to these difficulties, that wisdom and justice in God, are
qualities so much above or so unlike those qualities in us, that they
bear no relation or affinity towards human wisdom and justice. But,
pray how am I to form to myself an idea of the divine perfection,
unless it has some resemblance to those virtues which I observe in my
fellow creatures and feel in myself? If the justice of God is not the
same with human justice, why lastly do any men pretend to announce it,
comprehend and explain it to others?"
POSTSCRIPT.
Previous to this publication the editor sent the following Letter
to Dr. Priestley.
"Reverend Sir,
Had you thought it impossible for man to hold different sentiments
respecting Natural religion and the proof of the existence of a God
than you do, the Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever would not have
appeared, much less would you have invited an answer by promising a
reply to every objection. Differing from you in sentiment I am the man
who enter with you in the lists; but I find myself upon consultation
with my friends under more difficulties than you were, and more to
stand in need of courage in taking up the glove, than you needed to
have in throwing it down. For this dispute is not like others in
philosophy, where the vanquished can only dread ridicule, contempt and
disappointment; here, whether victor or vanquished, your opponent has
to dread, beside ecclesiastical censure, the scourges, chains and
pillories of the courts of Law.
I accuse you not of laying a trap for an unguarded author, but I ask
your friendly opinion, whether I can, with temporal safety at least,
maintain the contrary of your arguments in proof of a Deity and his
attributes. If I cannot, no wonder the Theist cries _Victoria!_ but
then it is a little ungenerous to ask for objections. Of you, I may
certainly expect, that you will promise to use your influence, as well
with lawyers as ecclesiastics, not to stir up a persecution against a
poor atheist in case there should be one found in the kingdom, which
people in general will not admit to be possible; or, if a persecution
could ensue, that you and your friends, favourers of free enquiry,
will at least bear the expences of it.
I am,
Reverend Sir,
Your most humble obedient servant,
WILLIAM HAMMON.
Oct. 23. 1781.
_To the Reverend Dr. Priestley._
To this letter Dr. Priestley sent no answer; or no answer ever came
to hand.
THE END.