being difficult to suppose an eternity, it is the most difficult thing
in the world to suppose any thing but an eternity. A mind, not afraid
to think, will find it the most easy contemplation in the world to
dwell upon. It is at least a bold assertion, that _nothing can be more
evident_ than that plants and animals could not have proceeded from each
other by succession from all eternity. Surely to this may be answered,
that it is more evident that two and two make four. But Dr. Priestley
goes on to say, "that the primary cause of a man cannot be a man, any
more than the cause of a sound can be a sound." Experience shews us all
sound is an effect of a cause. Does experience shew us more of a man
than that he came from a man and a woman? To allow therefore that all
men must have come from a man and a woman is as far as we can argue
upon the subject, whilst in reasoning we trust to experience. An
argument is well built upon similarity, therefore it is probable if one
horse had a cause all horses had. But will not the argument be more
consonant to itself, in supposing all horses had the same cause, and as
one is seen to be generated from a horse and a mare so all were from
all eternity. It were a better argument in favour of a Deity or some
invisible agent to shew that a new animal came every now and then into
life, without any body's knowing how or where.
It is allowed by Priestley and all other reasoners, that the most
capital argument that can be formed in support of any thesis is to be
built upon experience, or analogy to experience. Yet will many of these
reasoners, Dr. Priestley at least for one, contend at the same time for
the probability of a future life, when no instance can be given of any
revival whatsoever. The same will contend, that their Deity can at
pleasure form new species of animals, though in fact we never do see
new beings come into existence. We ought only to argue from experience;
and experience would teach us, that the species of all animals has
eternally existed. Grant that we do not know, whether man has been
eternal, or from a time, is it therefore because we do not know, that
we must say he came from God? That unknown Being, as he is sometimes
pompously and ridiculously called! The Devil is equally an unknown
Being. The admission of evil under a good Deity opens a ready door to
the manichean system, which seems much more rational than simple Deism.
The following chain of reasoning, as used by Dr. Priestley, is well
linked together to prove the weight and force of experience in
reasoning, but it proves nothing more. "Chairs and tables are made by
men or beings of similar powers, because we see them made by men; and
we cannot suppose them made by a tree or come into being of themselves,
because that is against experience. No one will say one table might
make another, or that one man might make another. We see nothing come
into being without an adequate cause." Yet for this adequate cause we
are at the same time referred to a belief in a causeless secret
invisible agent, and to our own experience, for a proof of his nature.
Dr. Priestley allows, that what is _visible_ in man may be the feat of
all his powers, for it is (as he says,) a rule in philosophy not to
multiply causes without necessity. But he affirms that what is _visible_
in the universe cannot be the feat of intelligence. This is breaking
the very rule of reasoning which he himself has chosen to adopt; and he
gives no other reason for it, than because we do not see the universe
think as we do man. Sensible of this dilemma, soon afterwards he
inclines to allow principle of thought to the universe, for he adds,
that if we allow it, yet the universe has so much the appearance of
other works of design that we must look out for its author as much as
that of a man; and it is allowed that most probably it had the same
author.
Every difficulty vanishes with the energy of nature, or at least is
as well accounted for as from an independent Deity. It is an usual
question to those philosophers, who maintain that the present existence
of things is the result of the force and energy of nature acting upon
herself, "why this force does not perpetually operate and produce new
appearances?" Besides that this question may be retorted upon the
supporters of a Deity, I am thoroughly persuaded, that this force is
constantly in action, and that every change which animals and
vegetables undergo, whether of dissolution or renovation, is a manifest
and undeniable proof of it. Man, and the other Beings which occupy this
terrestrial globe, are evidently suited to its present state, and an
alteration in their habitation, such as that of extreme or excessive
heat, would inevitably destroy them. This is so certain, that bones of
animals have been dug up which appertain to no species now existing,
and which must have perished from an alteration in the system of things
taking place too considerable for it to endure. Whenever the globe
shall come to that temperament fit for the life of that lost species,
whatever energy in nature produced it originally, if even it had a
beginning, will most probably be sufficient to produce it again. Is not
the reparation of vegitable life the spring equally wonderful now as
its first production? Yet this is a plain effect of the influence of
the sun, whose absence would occasion death by a perpetual winter. So
far this question from containing, in my opinion, a formidable
difficulty to the Epicurean system, I cannot help judging the continual
mutability of things as an irrefragable proof of this eternal energy of
nature. Those who ask, why the great changes in the state of things are
not more frequent, would absurdly require them to ensue within the
short space of their existence, forgetting that millions of ages are of
no importance to the whole mass of matter, though Beings of some
particular forms may find a wish and an advantage to prolong the term
of their duration under that form.
If it is said, Nature or the energy of nature is another name for the
Deity, then may Dr. Priestley and his answerer shake hands; the one is
no more an atheist than the other. And if it is observed that the
Energy of Nature having produced men may be capable of re-producing
them, so that an atheist is not sure to escape punishment for his
crimes, it is easy to say in return, neither is a Deist sure. A good
atheist has no more reason to be afraid to be re-produced than a good
Deist or a Christian. It may be useful for both of them to be good. If
necessary let it again be repeated, that it is not at all meant in this
answer to make atheism a plea or protection for immorality. That is a
charge long and most unjustly put upon the poor undefended atheist. The
knowledge of a God and even the belief of a providence are found but
too slight a barrier against human passions, which are apt to fly out
as licentiously as they would otherwise have done. All, which this
creed can in reality produce, scarce goes beyond some exterior
exercises, which are vainly thought to reconcile man to God. It may
make men build temples, sacrifice victims, offer up prayers, or perform
something of the like nature; but never break a criminal intrigue,
restore an ill gotten wealth, or mortify the lust of man. Lust being
the source of every crime, it is evident (since it reigns as much among
idolaters and anthropomorphites, as among atheists) idolaters and
anthropomorphites must be as susceptible of all of crimes as atheists,
and neither the one set nor the other could form societies, did not a
curb, stronger then that of religion, namely human laws, repress their
perverseness. If no other remedy were applied to vice than the
remonstrances of divines, a great city such as London, would in a
fortnight's time, fall into the most horrid disorders. Whatever may be
the difference of faith, vice predominates alike with the Christian and
the Jew, with the Deist and the atheist. So like are they in their
actions, that one would think they copied one another. Religion may
make men follow ceremonies; little is the inconvenience found in them.
A great triumph truly for religion to make men baptise or fast? When
did it make men do virtuous actions for virtue's sake, or practise
fewer inventions to get rich, where riches could not be acquired
without poverty to others? The true principle most commonly seen in
human actions, and which philosophy will cure sooner than religion, is
the natural inclination of man for pleasure, or a taste contracted for
certain objects by prejudice and habit. These prevail in whatsoever
faith a man is educated, or with whatever knowledge he may store his
mind.
But it will be said, those who commit crimes are atheists at the time
at least they do so. But an atheist cannot be superstitious, and
criminals are often so at the very moment of their crimes. Religious
persuasion men are not doubted to have when they vent their rage upon
others of a different way of thinking, when they express a dread of
danger or a zeal for ceremonies. These at least are not virtues; and
few indeed must be those, who at any time are really Theists, if their
faith is lost or forgotten every time they have a mind to indulge a
vitious passion. To support still the efficacy of religion in making
men virtuous is to oppose metaphysical reasoning to the truth of fact;
it is like the philosopher denying motion, and being refuted by one of
his scholars walking across the room. If then it is true, as history
and the whole course of human life shew it is, that men can still
plunge themselves into all sorts of crimes, though they are persuaded
of the truth of religion, which is made to inform them that God
punishes sin and rewards good actions, it cannot but be suspected that
religion even encourages crimes, by the hopes it gives of pardon
through the efficacy of prayer; at all events it must be granted, that
those who hold up a belief in God as a sufficient proof and character
of a good life are most egregiously mistaken.
Some Theists may have lighter sense of personal dignity than some
atheists. If the Theist thinks himself allied to and connected with
the Deity he may plume himself upon his station; but how apt are
those worshipers of a God, instead of having a high sense of personal
dignity, to debase themselves into the most abject beings, dreading
even the shadow of their own phantom. An atheist feeling himself to be
a link in the grand chain of Nature, feels his relative importance and
dreads no imaginary Being. An atheist, who is so from inattention and
without intelligence, may indeed feel himself as much debased as the
meanest and most humble Theist.
Another argument against atheists is, that where men are atheists it is
generally found that their usual turn of thinking and habits of life
have inclined to make them so. Is not this to be turned upon Theists?
But granting that the idea of a supreme author is more pleasing, and
that the argument with respect to the existence or non-existence of a
God was in _equilibrio_, it is not therefore right to conclude that the
mind ought to be determined by this or any other bias. Nor is it quite
clear if there is no God (by which term let it again be noticed, is
meant a Being of supreme intelligence, the contriver of the material
universe and yet no part of the material system) that the world in
which man inhabits is either fatherless or deserted. The wisdom of
nature supplies in reality what is only hoped for from the protection
of the Deity. If the world has so good a mother, a father may well be
spared especially such a haughty jealous, and vindictive one as God is
most generally represented to be. Dr. Priestley being clear in his
opinion; that the being of a God is capable of being proved by reason,
is not so weak as some of his fellow-labourers, who hold the powers of
reason in so low estimation as to be incapable of themselves to arrive
at almost any truth. He must however allow, if reason proves a Deity
and his attributes there was less use of revelation to prove them. But
the learned advocates of a Deity differ greatly among themselves,
whether his existence is capable of being ascertained by fixt
principles of reason. After such a difference and the instance of so
many great men in all ages, from Democritus downward, who have
confidently denied the being of a God, whose arguments the learned Dr.
Cudworth, in the last century, only by fully and fairly stating, with
all the answers in his power to give (though his zeal in religion was
never doubted) was thought by other divines to have given a weight to
atheism not well to be overturned, it is surprising that it should be
the common belief of this day, that an argument in support of atheism
cannot stand a moment, and that even no man in his senses can ever hold
such a doctrine. All that Epicurus and Lucretius have so greatly and
convincingly said is swept away in a moment by these better reasoners,
who yet scruple not to declare, with Dr. Priestley, that what they
reason about is not the subject of human understanding. But let it be
asked, is it not absurd to reason with a man about that of which that
same man asserts we have no idea at all? Yet will Dr. Priestley argue,
and say it is of no importance, whether the person with whom he argues
has a conception or not of the subject. "Having no ideas includes no
impossibility," therefore he goes on with his career of words to argue
about an unseen being with another whom he will allow to have no idea
of the subject and yet it shall be of no avail in the dispute, whether
he has or no, or whether he is capable or incapable of having any.
Reason failing, the passions are called upon, and the imagined God is
represented at one time, with all the terrors of a revengeful tyrant,
at another with all the tenderness of an affectionate parent. Shall
then such a tremendous Being with such a care for the creatures he has
made, suffer his own existence to be a perpetual doubt? If the course
of nature does not give sufficient proof, why does not the hand divine
shew itself by an extraordinary interposition of power? It is allowed
miracles ought not to be cheap or plenty. One or two at least every
thousand years might be admitted. But this is a perpetual standing
miracle, that such a Being as the depicted God, the author of nature
and all its works, should exist and yet his existence be perpetually in
doubt, or require a Jesus, a Mahomet or a Priestley to reveal it. Is
not the writing of this very answer to the last of those three great
luminaries of religion a proof, that no God, or no _such_ God at least,
exists. Hear the admirable words of the author of "The System of
Nature;" _Comment permet il qu'un mortel comme moi ose attaquer ses
droits, ses titres, son existence meme?_
Dr. Clarke, Mr. Hume and Helvetius, are writers whose arguments for and
against a Godhead Dr. Priestley has much noted. The former says, "the
Deity must have been infinite, if self-existent, because all things in
the universe are made by him." Are all things in the universe infinite?
Why an infinite maker of a finite work? It is juster to argue, that
whatever is self-existent must have been eternal. Nor is there any
great objection to the converse of the proposition properly taken, that
whatever is not self-existent must have been created and therefore
cannot have been eternal. If this is fair arguing, matter cannot
according to Dr. Priestley's system have been created and be eternal
also. But Dr. Priestley has no inclination to reconcile his opinions
with those of Dr. Clarke. He has chosen a fairer method, and that is,
to refute the arguments of former asserters of a Deity as well as to
establish his own. Dr. Clarke he most effectually exposes where he
enters upon the subject of space. It seems as if Dr. Clarke, having
asserted that the Deity necessarily existed, had a mind that nothing
else should necessarily exist but the Deity; and conscious that space
at least also necessarily existed, he makes universal space an
attribute of the Deity. With this reverie in his head he raises a
syllogism of complete nonsense (_vide Priestley's Letters_, P. 170.)
where he supposes space to be nothing though he also supposes it to be
an attribute of the Deity. Making it therefore an attribute of the
Deity and knowing that space is eternal and unmeasurable he takes upon
himself thereby also clearly to have proved that the Deity is so.
Exclude the Deity, space will still exist and still be eternal and
immense. Dr. Priestley knew well that Dr. Clarke's argument in this
respect was all a fallacy, and therefore he shews his sense in not
adopting it. It is in fact an abuse of terms unworthy of a scientific
reasoner.
The only argument attempted by Dr. Clarke, why the Deity must have
had no cause, is, because it is necessary he should have none.
Dr. Clarke says roundly that necessity is the cause of the existence
of the Deity. This is very near the language of the ancients, who
held that Fate controuled the Gods. Necessity is therefore the first
God. Why then any other God than Necessity? What more has Helvetius
said than that?
It is an old and unanswerable argument that, granting a God and his
power infinite, whatever he wills is executed; but man and other
animals are unhappy, therefore he does not will they should be happy.
Or take the argument the other way and it will equally conclude against
his power. With regard to Mr. Hume's famous observations upon the
evidence of miracles, Dr. Priestley thinks to make a short havock of
them by observing that new, and therefore miraculous appearances, are
continually presenting themselves; but although such new appearances
may be instanced, they are not contrary to former experience, only in
addition to it. With this allusion to Natural Philosophy, Dr. Priestley
thinks himself in one short sentence to have discussed all Mr. Hume's
observations upon miracles. _"Which is more likely, that the relater of
a miracle should have lied or been deceived, or that the thing related
should have existed contrary to experience prior and subsequent?"_
Let the force of this observation be considered and believe in the
history of miracles who can! To give a finishing stroke to poor
Mr. Hume, Dr. Priestley observes that literary fame was Hume's only
motive and consolation, as he said himself, in all his laborious
enquiries and enlightened writings. At this he exclaims, "What gloomy
prospect and poor comfort he must have had at his death!" If so,
how much was he the greater man so well to have gone through that
last scene!
The honour which Dr. Priestley gives to Helvetius, the author of that
ingenious and satisfactory work intitled "The System of Nature," does
credit to his own candour. He applauds him for speaking out, he ought
therefore to applaud this answer for the same reason. It is true he
seems to have discovered one incongruity in the reasoning of Helvetius.
The words he imputes to him are, "that nature has no object, because
nature acts necessarily; man has an object; yet man also acts
necessarily." In the same way nature might have an object though it
acted necessarily. But Helvetius adds, that the object which man has is
a necessary object. The best defence of Helvetius (not in behalf of
that passage, but of his general system) is to let him speak at large
for himself; and the following quotation Dr. Priestley and the reader
may accept as a specimen of the strength and justice of his argument,
and as the conclusion of this answer.
"Theologians tell us, that the disorder and evil, which is seen in the
world, is not absolute and real, but relatively and apparently such,
and does not disprove the divine wisdom and goodness. But may not one
reply, that the goodness and wonderful order which they so much extol,
and on which they found their notions of those qualities in God, are in
a similar way only relative and apparent. If it be only our co-existence
with the causes which surround us, and our manner of perceiving them,
that constitute the order of nature for us, and authorise us to attribute
wisdom and goodness to the maker of what surround us, should not also
our mode of existence and perception authorise us to call what is
hurtful to us disorder, and to attribute impotence, ignorance, or
malice, to that Being which we would suppose to actuate nature.
Some pretend that the supremely wise God can derive goodness and
happiness to us from the midst of those ills which he permits us to
undergo in this world. Are these men privy counsellors of the Divinity,
or on what do they found their romantic hopes? They will doubtless say,
that they judge of God's conduct by analogy, and that from the present
appearance of his wisdom and goodness, they have a right to infer his
future wisdom and goodness. But do not the present appearances of his
want of wisdom or goodness justify us in concluding, that he will
always want them? If they are so often manifestly deficient in this
world, what can assure us that they will abound more in the next? This
kind of language therefore rests upon no other basis than a prejudiced
imagination, and signifies, that some men, having without examination,
adopted an opinion that God is good, cannot admit that he will consent
to let his creatures remain constantly unhappy. Yet this grand
hypothesis, of the unalterable felicity of mankind hereafter, is
insufficient to justify the Divinity in permitting the present sleeting
and transitory marks of injustice and disorder. If God can have been
unjust for a moment, he has derogated, during that moment at least,
from his divine perfection, and is not unchangeably good; his justice
then is liable to temporary alteration, and, if this be the case, who
can give security for his justice and goodness continuing unalterable
in a future life, the notion of which is set up only to exculpate his
deviation from those qualities in this?