For the Lords to appeal to the people at a moment when the people were

of their party was naturally not an unpopular thing to do, and for some

time after the fall of Lord Rosebery's government they rather gained

than lost ground in the esteem of the public. The Conservatives, indeed,

declared that the House had renewed its youth, and had become once more

an important organ of the state by asserting its right to appealing from

the cabinet and the majority in the Commons to the nation itself. The

Lords were said to have attained the function of demanding a sort of

referendum on measures of exceptional gravity; but useful as such a

function might be, if in the nature of things a possible one, the

existing House of Lords cannot really exercise it, because their object

in doing so is essentially partisan. In attempting to appeal to the

electorate, they act at the behest of one party alone. Thus in 1893 the

Lords were quite ready to force the issue whether the cabinet retained

the confidence of the country; but in 1905 when a series of adverse

by-elections made it exceedingly doubtful whether the Conservative

government had not lost its popularity, nothing was further from their

intention than to cause a dissolution.

Now, a power to provoke a referendum or appeal to the people, which is

always used in favour of one party and against the other, however

popular it may be at a given moment, and however much it may be

permanently satisfactory to the party that it helps, cannot fail in the

long run to be exceedingly annoying to its rival; nor is it likely to

commend itself to the great mass of thinking men as a just and

statesmanlike institution. The House of Lords is a permanent handicap in

favour of the Tories, which is believed to have helped them even in

elections for the House of Commons. The workingmen have been told that

although the Conservatives promise them less, they are better able to

fulfil their promises than the Liberals who cannot control the House of

Lords. These things must be borne in mind in discussing a possible

reform of the upper House; but before coming to that question it will be

well to look at the Lords under some other aspects--at their

non-partisan activity, their treatment of private members' bills, and of

private bill legislation, and at the personal influence of the leading

peers.

[Sidenote: Non-political Legislation.]

So far we have considered only government bills, backed by the authority

of a responsible ministry, which the upper House must treat with

circumspection. The Lords do not feel the same restraint in regard to

private members' bills sent to them from the Commons. These lie beyond

the immediate range of party conflicts, and although they may

occasionally deal with important subjects, neither the cabinet nor the

parties take sides officially upon them. The Lords can, therefore, amend

or reject them without fear; but it has become so difficult for a

private member to get through the Commons any bill to which there is

serious opposition, that this function of the upper House is not of

great use. Still less vital is its power to initiate measures. In order

the better to employ the time of the Commons the government introduces

some of its secondary bills first in the Lords;[412:1] but measures

proposed by individual peers have little chance of success. It is hard

enough for a private member of the Commons to put his bill through its

stages in that House, with all the sittings reserved for the purpose in

the earlier part of the session; and it is even harder to pass a bill

brought from the Lords at a later date. The result is that of the few

private members' bills enacted each session only about one sixth

originate with the peers.

[Sidenote: Private Bill Legislation.]

The relation of the House of Lords to private bill legislation is very

different, for bills of that kind are in a region quite outside of

politics. In their case, as already observed, the action of the Lords

is, if anything, even more important than that of the Commons; and, in

fact, the private bill committees of the upper House inspire in general

a greater confidence, because the members are men of more

experience.[412:2] While, therefore, the House of Lords occupies a

subordinate place in regard to public measures of all kinds, and a

position of marked inferiority in the case of government bills, in

private and local legislation, which in England is of great importance,

its activity is constant and highly useful.

[Sidenote: Personal Influence of the Peers.]

The personal influence of the Lords is far greater than their collective

authority. With the waning of the landed gentry the respect for the old

territorial aristocracy has been replaced by a veneration for titles,

and this has inured to the benefit of the peerage. One sees it even in

business affairs, although the Lords as a class are little qualified by

experience for dealing with matters of that kind, the nobility having

until recently been debarred by tradition from commercial life. One of

the devices of that arch promoter Hooley for inducing the public to

embark in his schemes was to include a number of peers in his list of

directors--guinea-pig directors, as they were called, because their most

visible function was to pocket a guinea for attendance at each meeting.

The Hooley revelations some years ago checked this practice; but the

fact that it should have existed shows the confidence that titles were

believed to inspire among a large class of investors.

The glamour of rank appears to be if anything more dazzling as one

descends in the social scale; and a scion of a noble family, even when

he has no landed interest at his back, is usually a strong Parliamentary

candidate in a working-class constituency. The extension of the

franchise has thus rather increased than diminished the influence of the

nobility. The House of Commons, no doubt, makes a show of insisting that

the peers shall take no part in general elections; but they are,

nevertheless, active in politics and even in great electioneering

organisations, particularly in those that stand, like the Primrose

League, a little outside of the regular party machinery. When a general

election is not in progress the leaders of the House of Lords speak

constantly in public; and at the present day speeches from the platform

are reported in the daily press quite as fully, and read at least as

widely, as those delivered in the House of Commons. A foreigner is

impressed by the popular confidence in those peers who have attained a

position in the forefront of politics. There seems to be a feeling that

they are raised above the scrimmage of public life; that in rank,

wealth, and reputation they possess already the goal of ambition, and

are beyond the reach of the temptations that beset the ordinary man.

[Sidenote: Reform of the House of Lords.]

[Sidenote: Objects of Reform.]

The adoption by the Lords, in the autumn of 1906, of amendments to the

Education Bill, so contrary to its spirit that they were rejected in the

Commons by an overwhelming majority without any attempt at compromise,

has brought the question of a reform of the upper House again

prominently before the country. No one would now think of creating the

House of Lords as it stands; but, as Mr. (now Lord) Courtney remarks,

"The public judgment may long tolerate a machine which works without

unnecessary friction, although it would not construct it in the same

fashion if it had to be for the first time devised."[414:1] This is

particularly true if it is difficult to propose something that would

work better; and therefore in discussing the reform of the House of

Lords it is important to have clearly in mind the objects to be

attained. Now, there are four possible objects of a reform: to make the

House less powerful; to make it more powerful; to change the nature of

its power; or to bring it into greater harmony with the popular elements

in the state; and it may be interesting to examine these objects in

turn.

[Sidenote: To Reduce the Power of the House.]

The National Liberal Federation has repeatedly passed resolutions in

favour of restricting what is called the veto of the House of Lords.

This is most natural, for besides the objection in principle to

hereditary legislators, there is the galling fact that the House is

always hostile to the Liberal party. No one would suggest that so long

as a second chamber is suffered to exist it should be wholly deprived of

the right to reject or amend bills sent to it from the Commons. It is

proposed, however, that the veto shall not be repeated after a certain

interval, and the vital question is what that interval shall be. A

provision that the Lords should not reject a bill passed by the Commons

in two successive Parliaments, would probably be a mere legal

ratification of their present constitutional position; for although,

after a fresh general election has proved that the cabinet retains the

confidence of the nation, the Lords may refuse a second time to enact

one of its measures, they have never done so, and are not very likely to

venture so far. A provision, on the other hand, that the Lords should

not reject or amend a bill passed by the Commons in two successive

sessions of the same Parliament would mean that except in the last

session of an expiring Parliament, they could reject or amend seriously

no government bill, whether convinced that the nation approved of it or

not.[415:1] This would be almost equivalent to an entire abolition of

the second chamber so far as government measures are concerned, because

the shred of authority left would amount to little more than that of

requiring the ministers to reconsider their position, which they could

hardly do without stultifying themselves. The President of the French

Republic has a similar right in relation to the chambers, but it is

never exercised. A change of this kind could certainly be made, but

whether it would be wise or not is another question.

Moreover, if a rule that the Lords should not reject or amend a

government bill passed by the Commons in two successive sessions did not

virtually destroy the power of the House of Lords altogether, it would

not accomplish the object of the Liberals. It would not put them upon a

footing of equality with the Conservatives, for it would mean that it

would take them two sessions to pass any legislation of a far-reaching

character, while the Conservatives could do it in one.

We are not concerned now with the question of reducing the power of the

hereditary members of the House, by introducing other members in their

stead; but of reducing the power of the House as a whole. Those persons

who are seriously interested in reforming the composition of the body

are usually more anxious to increase than to diminish its authority, and

it would be somewhat strange to make the House of Lords more

representative or more popular, while at the same time taking away the

last remnants of its power in political questions.

[Sidenote: To Increase its Power.]

In considering suggestions to reform the House of Lords for the sake of

increasing its efficiency we are met by the question whether with a

parliamentary system, that is with government by party, as highly

developed as it is in England, a more powerful upper House is possible.

Fifty years ago second chambers were defended on the ground that they

acted as a drag on radical legislation. But, as we have seen, the House

of Lords does not really perform that function. It does not try to check

legislation by one of the parties, and only under peculiar circumstances

can it seriously restrain the other. Nor could any upper House render

that service effectively in England to-day. The fact is that although

historically the position of the House of Lords may have been the

consequence of its hereditary, non-representative character, it is now

doomed to its present condition by the inexorable logic of a political

system. Its limitations in dealing with government bills are imposed by

the principle of a ministry responsible to the popular chamber, and

working through highly developed parties; its inability to exert a

substantial influence upon other public legislation is the result, not

of its own inherent weakness, but of the condition of the House of

Commons; while in private bill legislation, which lies outside the

domain of politics, it shares in full measure the authority of a

coordinate branch of Parliament.

[Sidenote: To Change the Nature of its Power.]

The same reasoning would apply to any proposal to alter in character the

powers exercised by the Lords. The channels of possible activity of any

second chamber are fixed in England by the system itself, and they are

not far from the ones in which the House of Lords now moves. The House

could, no doubt, be shorn of the remnant of political authority that it

still wields, and it could be deprived of its right to take part in

private bill legislation; but it would seem that, except by merely

reducing their extent, the nature of its powers cannot be very

materially changed.

[Sidenote: To Bring it into Harmony with the Nation.]

[Sidenote: Creation of Peers.]

During the generation following the Reform Act of 1832, men spoke of the

possibility of making new peers as a sufficient safeguard against

obstinacy on the part of the upper House. It was felt that a ministry

with the nation at its back could, if necessary, force the Lords to

yield by advising the Crown to create peers enough to turn the scale.

Lord Grey's government proposed to do this as a last resort to pass the

Reform Bill of 1832, and obtained the consent of William IV.; but the

threat was enough, and the Lords gave way. Such a drastic means of

coercion is probably useless to-day; and would be only a temporary

remedy. It is really not with the Commons that the House of Lords now

comes into serious conflict, but with the cabinet which represents, or

claims to represent, the nation, or to be more accurate the major part

of the nation; and no creation of peers would be made to force a bill

through the House of Lords unless the party in power had a mandate from

the people to pass it. This is the real meaning of the saying that the

House of Lords can force a referendum, or appeal to the nation, on a

measure to which they object. A creation of peers to swamp the upper

House would, therefore, not be tried until a general election had proved

the persistent will of the electorate upon the measure in question, and

then the Lords would in any case submit. Differences of opinion may, of

course, arise on the question whether there is sufficient evidence of

the popular will or not. In 1893, for example, the Liberals contended

that the preceding general election had been carried on the issue of

Home Rule, while the Conservatives insisted that it had really turned on

other matters; and the same thing happened in the case of the Education

Bill of 1906. Such a discussion may be conducted with heat, but

especially with the enormous number of peers now required to turn a

majority in their House, there is little danger of precipitate action.

It is one of many cases where the conventions of the Constitution may

appear to be strained, but where one may be sure they will not be

broken.[417:1]

Moreover, if the creation of peers were within the region of practical

politics to-day, it would be only a temporary remedy for existing

grievances. Contrary to the prevalent opinion, Lord John Russell thought

that in 1832 the authority of the House of Lords suffered, on the whole,

more from the abstention of its members under threat, than it would have

from an actual creation of peers that might have brought it into harmony

with the people. He remarks that the Tory majority of eighty, hostile to

Lord Grey's government, was held back by Wellington, but employed by

Lyndhurst to kill unpretending but useful measures.[418:1] Subsequent

events have shown the impossibility of maintaining harmony between the

Houses by a single creation of peers, for had a batch of Lord Grey's

supporters been given seats in the Lords in 1832, the House would have

been heavily Conservative again within a generation.

The difficulty to-day is not so much that the peers are permanently out

of accord with the nation, as that they are bound to one of the two

parties into which the country is divided. A mere reduction in the size

of the Tory majority would do little or no good; nor would the

difficulty be solved if the majority were transferred to the other

party, or even if it shifted at different periods. In a country governed

by party as strictly as England is to-day, the majority in the upper

House must at any one time belong to one side or the other. If the

majority shifted, there would not be permanent irritation in the same

quarter; but first one side, and then the other, would complain that the

Lords thwarted the popular will. While, therefore, the occasional

creation of a large number of peers, either hereditary or for life,

might, at a sacrifice of the self-respect of the House of Lords, produce

for the moment a greater similarity of views between the two branches of

Parliament, a constant political harmony could be attained only by such

additions to the upper House by each new set of ministers as would make

it a mere tool in their hands. In short, an upper House in a true

parliamentary system cannot be brought into constant accord with the

dominant party of the day without destroying its independence

altogether; and to make the House of Lords a mere tool in the hands of

every cabinet would be well-nigh impossible and politically absurd.

[Sidenote: Reform in the Composition of the House.]

What is true of the creation of peers is true also of any other method

of changing the membership of the House. Suggestions for reforming its

composition have been based mainly upon the desire to reduce the

hereditary element, and supply its place by representative men selected

in other ways. The House contains, of course, many drones, who have

inherited the right, without the desire, for public work. Either they do

not attend at all, or they come only to swell a foregone majority upon

some measure that has attracted popular interest. They give no time or

thought to the work of the House, and their votes, on the rare occasions

when they are cast, are peculiarly exasperating to their opponents. As

the regular attendants at the sittings are few, it has been suggested

that the English, like the Scotch and Irish, nobility should choose

representatives of their own order, and that the rest should have no

right to vote. Just as the Scotch and Irish representative peers are

solidly Unionist, so a change of this kind would merely result in

increasing the Conservative majority of the House, unless some principle

of minority representation were adopted, in which case the majority,

though numerically smaller, would be equally constant and more subject

to party dictation.

On the other hand, it has been proposed to make the House more broadly

representative of the nation by a more or less extended creation of life

peers, nominated, in part, perhaps, by sundry public bodies in the

United Kingdom. It may be doubted, however, whether life peers are

needed to increase the eminence or, in one sense, the representative

character of the House. The peerage has been opened freely to men

distinguished in various fields; and while many men without wealth have

doubtless been precluded from an honour that would burden their

descendants, many others have come in. The number of hereditary members

of the House has increased nearly, although not quite, in proportion to

population; and only about one fourth of the present members sit by

virtue of titles dating before 1800. A large share of the creations have

been made for political service; but others have been conferred in

consequence of wealth amassed in commercial and industrial pursuits; the

most distinguished lawyers and soldiers have always been rewarded by a

peerage; and so in more recent times have a few men of eminence in

science and literature. A body that contains, or has recently contained,

such men as Tennyson, Acton, Kelvin, Lister, Rayleigh, and many more,

can bear comparison in personal distinction with any legislative chamber

the world has ever known. Therefore one may fairly doubt whether the

defect to be remedied by a creation of life peers is either a lack of

brains in the House, or a failure of its members to represent the deeper

currents of national life.

[Sidenote: Reform Unlikely to Add Much Strength.]

But the personal distinction of members, in fields outside of public

affairs, has very little connection with the political power of a body;

and the House of Lords itself furnishes one of the most striking proofs

of that fact. The men whose names have been mentioned have taken no part

in the work of the House, and such people rarely do. Moreover, if they

take part they rarely do it well. Occasionally such a man may have a

chance to say something on the subject of his own profession that

carries weight. The speech of Lord Roberts in July, 1905, for example,

about the inefficiency of the British Army, was considered a very

impressive utterance, but, except for the rule of office that sealed his

mouth in any other place, he might have delivered it with just as much

effect elsewhere. Men who would be created life peers on account of

their distinction in other lines would either take no interest in

politics, or would take it so late in life that they would rarely carry

weight with the public. Such influence and repute as the House of Lords

now possesses is derived not from the personal fame of the members but

from the social lustre of the peerage, and no creation of life peers

would be likely to add anything to that. The authority of a public body

depends not upon the eminence but upon the political following of its

members; and it is self-evident that no leading English statesman in the

full tide of his vigour and popularity would willingly exchange a seat

in the House of Commons for an appointment for life in any second

chamber, so that a House of Lords constructed on these principles would

become in large part an asylum for decrepit politicians.

Another suggestion of a similar kind is that the House should be

remodelled upon the lines of the Privy Council, but the Privy Council

to-day as a working body is nothing but the ministry, the other members

attending only on ceremonial occasions. It is a mere instrument of

government in the hands of the cabinet; nor, so far as English politics

are concerned, can it very well be anything else. The proposal that

colonial members should sit in the House of Lords is interesting from

other points of view, but clearly it could not be applied in the case of

domestic legislation. That the will of the House of Commons on English

questions should be thwarted by representatives from other parts of the

empire would be far more unfortunate than to have it thwarted by

hereditary English nobles.

[Sidenote: Other Probable Results.]

But if a change in the composition of the House of Lords would be very

unlikely to raise its political position as a whole, it might well

reduce the personal influence of individual peers. If the House came to

be regarded as mainly a collection of persons holding seats for life,

the social position of its members might be very different from that of

an hereditary nobility. A radical reform in the composition of the House

might also very well produce a change of another kind. Perhaps the most

important function of the House of Lords at the present day, and

probably the chief privilege of its members, comes from the fact that it

is largely a reservoir of ministers of state. By the present traditions

ministers must be all taken from one House or the other; and a large

proportion of them are always taken from the peers. This gives a

nobleman, who is sincerely interested in public life, even if of

somewhat slender ability, a fair prospect of obtaining a position of

honour and usefulness. Now, if a number of life peers were to be

created, it would clearly be possible to confer a title upon a man for

the purpose of making him a minister. If this were done commonly, it

might affect not only the position of the existing peers, but also that

of the House of Commons. For a man not born to a coronet would be able

to achieve a high office of state without an apprenticeship in the

popular chamber. Thus a channel might be opened for a direct connection

between the cabinet and the political forces of the nation without the

mediation of the House of Commons. The change might be a first step in

lessening the authority of Parliament, because cabinets, as will be

explained in the following chapter, being really made or destroyed by

the popular voice uttered in general elections, much of the power of the

House of Commons is based upon the fact that it is the sole recruiting

ground for all ministers not hereditary peers.

Unsatisfactory, therefore, as the present position of the House of Lords

is to many people in England, the difficulties that surround the

question of reform are very great; and a half-unconscious perception of

these explains in large part the fact that although proposals to reform

the House have been made of late years by leading men of every shade of

political opinion, none of them has borne fruit, or even taken the shape

of a definite plan commanding any considerable amount of support. To

reform the House of Lords, or to create some other satisfactory second

chamber may not be an impossible task, but it is one that will require

constructive statesmanship in a high degree; and to obtain the best

chance of success it ought to be undertaken at the most unlikely time, a

time when the question provokes no passionate interest.

FOOTNOTES:

[406:1] "The Governance of England," 218.

[406:2] In 1830 the House of Lords contained 326 hereditary members.

From that time until the fall of Mr. Gladstone's cabinet, in 1885, the

Liberals made 198 additions to these members; and during the same period

the Conservatives made 70. Since 1885 the Conservatives have been in

power by far the greater part of the time, and their creations of peers

have been correspondingly more numerous.

[409:1] See the chapter on "The Strength of Party Ties," _infra_.

[412:1] When the Liberals are in power this is not much use for bills

which the Lords are likely to amend seriously, because the amendments

would have to be reversed in the Commons at a cost of much time.

[412:2] Rep. of Com. on Priv. Bill Legislation, Com. Papers, 1888, XVI.,

1.

[414:1] "The Working Constitution," 120.

[415:1] Probably the advocates of this policy would not want to apply it

in the case of private bill legislation.

[417:1] The power to create peers enough to swamp the House has a

potential value. It could be used once for all to abolish or transform

the body, and this fact has, no doubt, its effect on the general

attitude of the members, but that does not affect the argument that as a

means of maintaining harmony between the Houses the power is useless.

[418:1] "Recollections and Suggestions," 110-11.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE CABINET AND THE COUNTRY

[Sidenote: Transfer of Power from Parliament to the People.]

[Sidenote: Its Causes; (1) the Growth of Power of the Cabinet.]

If the predominance of the House of Commons has been lessened by a

delegation of authority to the cabinet, it has been weakened also by the

transfer of power directly to the electorate. The two tendencies are

not, indeed, unconnected. The transfer of power to the electorate is due

in part to the growing influence of the ministers, to the recognition

that policy is mainly directed, not by Parliament, but by them. The

cabinet now rules the nation by and with the advice and consent of

Parliament; and for that very reason the nation wishes to decide what

cabinet it shall be that rules. No doubt the ministry depends for its

existence upon the good pleasure of the House of Commons; but it really

gets its commission from the country as the result of a general

election. Even if its life should be cut short by the Commons, the new

cabinet would not now rest for support upon that Parliament; but would

at once dissolve and seek a fresh majority from the electors. This was

by no means true forty years ago. The Parliament elected in 1852, which

sat a little more than four years, supported during the first half of

that time a coalition ministry of Liberals and Peelites, and during the

second half a ministry of Liberals alone. The following Parliament

affords an even better illustration. It met in 1857 with a large

majority for the Liberal cabinet of Lord Palmerston; but in less than a

year he was defeated and resigned, to be succeeded by the Conservatives

under Lord Derby, who carried on the government for another year before

dissolving. The case of the next Conservative administration is more

striking still. Coming into office in 1866, in face of a hostile

majority, strongly Liberal, but hopelessly divided upon questions of

reform, it remained in power more than two years, and brought to pass a

drastic extension of the franchise before it dissolved Parliament.

Nothing of the kind has occurred since that time. Every subsequent

change of ministry has either been the immediate consequence of a

general election, or if not, the new cabinet has kept the old Parliament

together only so long as was absolutely necessary to dispose of current

business, and has then appealed to the people. Practically, therefore, a

change of ministry to-day is either the result of, or is at once

ratified by, a general election.

[Sidenote: (2) The Increase of the Electorate.]

The decline in the power of the House is partly due also to the

extension of the franchise, and the consequent growth in size of the

electorate, which has become so large that the voters cannot be reached

by private or personal contact, but only by publicity. A cynic might

well say that if oligarchy fosters intrigue, democracy is based upon

advertisement, for in order to control the electorate it is no longer

enough, as it was a hundred years ago, to be backed by a few influential

patrons or to enlist the support of the members of Parliament. The

immense mass of the voters must be addressed, and hence public questions

must be discussed not only in Parliament, but in the ears of the people

at large.

[Sidenote: (3) The Control by Public Opinion.]

A third reason why power tends to pass away from the House is the

greater control exerted in political affairs by public opinion, in

consequence of the rapid means of disseminating knowledge and of forming

and expressing a judgment. Whatever may be the importance of the

editorial columns of the daily press in creating, or giving voice to,

the general sentiment--and there is reason to suppose that editorials

are of less consequence in both respects than they were formerly--it is

certainly clear that the multiplication of cheap newspapers has made it

possible for vastly larger numbers of men to become rapidly acquainted

with current events; while the post and telegraph, and the habit of

organisation, have made it much more easy for them to express their

views. A debate, a vote, or a scene, that occurs in Parliament late at

night is brought home to the whole country at breakfast the next

morning, and prominent constituents, clubs, committees and the like, can

praise or censure, encourage or admonish, their member for his vote

before the next sitting of the House. Rousseau's charge that the English

were free only at the moment of electing a Parliament, and then were in

bondage during the whole of its term, was by no means really true when

he wrote it, and is far less true to-day. It is for this reason that

there has ceased to be any clamour for annual Parliaments, almost the

only one of the famous six points in the People's Charter that has not

been substantially achieved.[425:1] Parliaments have not grown shorter.

On the contrary, in the twenty years from 1832 to 1852, when the cry of

the Chartists was heard, the average duration of Parliaments was four

years, and since the extension of the suffrage in 1868 they have

averaged four years and three-quarters.

[Sidenote: Its Manifestations.]

The passing of political power from the House of Commons to the people

is shown by many unmistakable signs, and by none more clearly than by

the frequent reference in Parliament itself to the opinions of the "man

in the street." He is said to fear this, or be shocked by that, or

expect the other; and the House is supposed to pay some regard to his

views, not because he is peculiarly gifted with knowledge, experience,

or wisdom, in greater measure than the members themselves. Far from it.

He is cited as a specimen of average humanity; the person to whom

Carlyle referred when he spoke of modern Parliaments with twenty-seven

millions, mostly fools, listening to them.[425:2] The members of the

House are supposed to heed him because they are his representatives; for

he is taken as a type of the voter of fair intelligence. In fact he is

the personification of what is believed to be outside opinion.

[Sidenote: The Doctrine of Mandate.]

Another sign of the times is found in the doctrine, now sanctioned by

the highest authority, that Parliament cannot legislate on a new

question of vital importance without a mandate from the nation. The

theory that the individual representative is a mere delegate of his

constituents, so that he is bound to resign and submit to reelection if

he changes his views, has long been a subject of discussion; but the

idea that Parliament as a whole exercises a delegated authority in the

sense that it is morally restrained from dealing with questions that

have not been laid before the people at the preceding general election

would formerly have been regarded as a dangerous political heresy. Yet

during the recent agitation in regard to fiscal policy, Mr. Balfour,

while repudiating the suggestion that the existing Parliament, having

been elected on the single issue of the South African War, ought to be

dissolved when peace was made,[426:1] refused to grant time for a debate

on free food, on the ground that it would be constitutionally improper

for Parliament to act on the question until it had been submitted to the

people at a general election,[426:2] and that it would be unwise for the

House to discuss a subject on which it could not act.[426:3]

Based upon a similar principle is the claim reiterated by the Opposition

during the latter part of Mr. Balfour's administration, that, although

supported by a majority in the House of Commons, he ought to resign,

because a long series of by-elections had shown that he had lost the

confidence of the country. His retention of office under those

conditions was said to be contrary to the spirit of the

Constitution;[426:4] and Mr. Balfour's resignation late in 1905, when

Parliament was not in session, involved an acknowledgment, if not of the

necessity, at least of the propriety, of withdrawing from office in

such a case. Former cabinets have sometimes broken up on account of

dissensions among their members, or the impossibility of maintaining an

efficient government; but there has been no previous instance of a

cabinet, supported by a majority in Parliament, which has resigned

apparently in consequence of a change of popular sentiment.

[Sidenote: Waning Interest in Reports of Debates.]

But perhaps the most ominous sign that power is passing away from the

House is the slowly waning interest in parliamentary debates. In the

eighteenth century the House strove to prevent the publication of its

discussions. Now the debates are printed under a contract with the

government, which provides that no speech shall be reported at less than

one third of its actual length;[427:1] and most of the members like to

appear in the newspapers as prominently as they can. But, if the desire

of the members to be reported is still increasing, the eagerness of the

public to read what they say is less keen. Men who are thoroughly

familiar with the reporters' gallery tell us that the demand for long

reports of speeches in Parliament has declined, and that editors find it

for their interest to cut them down, often substituting for the remarks

of the members themselves descriptive sketches of what took

place.[427:2] One cause of this is, no doubt, the length of the debates,

and the number of minor speakers taking part, which tends naturally to

dull the popular craving to read them. Then there is the fact that

Parliament is no longer the only place where the party leaders make

notable speeches. In short, the predominance of the House of Commons as

the great forum for the discussion of public questions has been

undermined by the rise and growth of the platform.

[Sidenote: History of the Platform.]

After a long slumber the habit of speaking at public meetings revived

about the middle of the eighteenth century;[428:1] and a little later it

was taken up, in connection with the early political associations, as a

systematic means of agitation in the hope of bringing pressure to bear

upon Parliament. At an early time leaders of the party in opposition

were present; but after the outbreak of the French Revolution public

meetings came to be used mainly by the working classes, and were

regarded as seditious. Men who took part in them were prosecuted, and

acts were passed to suppress them. These were so effective that by the

opening of the next century political meetings had ceased to be held;

except at elections, when some of the candidates for Parliament made

speeches to their constituents. The repressive statutes were, however,

temporary, and, although they were reenacted more than once, the

meetings revived during the intervals of freedom. The last of these

special statutes, one of the famous Six Acts of 1819, expired in 1825,

and from that time the platform entered upon a fresh career, marked by

three new features: the participation of all classes; the organised

effort to bring about a definite political change by a legitimate

creation of public opinion; and the growing use of public speaking by

parliamentary leaders as a regular engine of party warfare. Moreover,

the influence of the platform was much enlarged by the practice, which

began shortly before that time, of reporting the meetings and speeches

at considerable length in the provincial press.

[Sidenote: The Platform and Popular Movements for Reform.]

The first movement at this period in which the platform played a leading

part was conducted by the Catholic Association in Ireland, and ended in

the removal of Catholic disabilities by the Act of 1829. But far more

important examples of the use of public meetings are to be found in

England. Throughout the agitation that accompanied the passage of the

Reform Act of 1832, public meetings were innumerable, and the platform

was raised to a dignity and influence much greater than ever before. In

fact its position as a recognised power in English public life began at

that time. Its rapid advance in good repute was much helped by the fact

that during the struggle for reform it was used mainly to strengthen the

hands of the ministry; but this was not yet its characteristic function.

For the next score of years it was chiefly employed in attempts to force

upon the attention of Parliament, by popular agitation, measures which

did not otherwise receive serious consideration. Two efforts of the kind

are especially noteworthy. One of them, that of the Anti-Corn-Law

League, by the completeness of its organisation, by the cohesion and

eloquence of its leaders, by confining its attention to one point, and

by good fortune, succeeded in accomplishing its object. The other, that

of the Chartists, lacking these advantages, failed; and although most of

the demands of the Chartists were afterward obtained, that was the

result not of their endeavours, but of other causes.

[Sidenote: The Platform and the Ministers.]

Meanwhile the platform was used more and more freely by the

parliamentary leaders, but this came gradually. Pitt spoke only in the

House of Commons; and in fact until a few years before the Reform Bill

almost no minister, except Canning, made political speeches outside, and

his were addressed mainly to his own constituents. In 1823, however, he

delivered a speech at Plymouth, in which for the first time a statement

about foreign policy was made by a minister in public, and five years

later the change in the government's policy about Catholic disabilities

was announced at a banquet. With the reform movement the ministers began

to take the public a little more into their confidence. At the general

election of 1831, Lord John Russell made the first public speech

intended as an election cry,[429:1] and aroused an echo at meetings

throughout the land. In the same year Lord Grey talked about the bill at

the Lord Mayor's dinner, a festivity that became in after years a

regular occasion for announcements of government policy. From that time

the use of the platform grew rapidly in favour with the cabinet. In 1834

Lord Brougham made the unfortunate series of harangues in Scotland that

wrecked his political career. A little later Lord Melbourne explained

his own dismissal in a public speech; and Peel, on taking office,

declared his policy in an address to his constituents. So important a

matter, indeed, did the platform become in public life, that Lord

Melbourne, referring to the performances of Brougham and O'Connell,

spoke of the vacation as a trying time.[430:1] Thereafter the platform

was constantly used both by ministers and leaders of the Opposition to

bring public opinion to their side.

As usual in English politics, practice outran theory; for so late as

1886 Mr. Gladstone, in answer to a remonstrance from the Queen, felt it

necessary to excuse himself for making speeches outside of his

constituency, on the ground that in doing so he was merely following the

example of the Conservatives.[430:2] Yet in 1879 he had set the nation

ablaze by his Midlothian campaign; and although his orations there were

delivered as a candidate for the seat, they were, and must have been

intended to be, published by the newspapers all over the country.[430:3]

It was, in fact, at this very time that Lord Hartington spoke of the far

greater interest taken in public speeches than in debates in

Parliament.[430:4] Not that the platform became at once of especial

value to the party leaders. On the contrary, it was at first used much

more frequently by the Anti-Corn-Law League, the Chartists and others.

But since the introduction of something very near manhood suffrage,

which began in 1868, great popular movements, unconnected with party

politics, have become well-nigh impossible. In a real democracy there is

little use in trying to overawe the government by a display of physical

force, and hence an agitation has for its natural object the winning of

votes. But the House of Commons has now been brought so fully into

accord with the masses of the people that any strong popular sentiment

is certain to find immediate expression there. Once in the House it is

on the edge of a whirlpool, for even if it originates quite outside of

the existing parties, and gives rise, at first, to a new political

group, it can hardly fail, as it gathers headway, to be drawn into the

current of one of the two great parties, and find a place in their

programme. Now in any question connected with party politics the highest

interest attaches to the speeches of the party leaders, both because

they are the standard bearers in the fight, and because they are the men

who have power, or at the next turn of the wheel will have power, to

give effect to their opinions.

[Sidenote: Public Speaking now Universal.]

The platform has thus had a perfectly natural evolution. So long as

elections to the House of Commons were controlled by a small number of

persons, public speaking could be effective only occasionally, when

popular feeling could be deeply stirred over some grievance; and it was

employed chiefly by outsiders in an effort to force the hands of

Parliament. This was in part true even after 1832. But when the suffrage

was more widely extended in 1868, so that elections depended upon the

good-will of the masses, it became necessary for any one with political

aspirations to reach the public at large, and the most obvious means of

so doing was from the platform. Speeches by candidates at elections

became universal, and in order not to let the flame of loyalty burn low,

it has been increasingly common to fan it at other times, by the talking

of members to their constituents, and still more by addresses to the

whole community on the part of leaders of national reputation. Public

speaking has, therefore, become constant, without regard to the

existence of any issue of unusual prominence. James Russell Lowell long

ago made a remark to the effect that democracy is government by

declamation, and certainly household suffrage has loosened the tongues

of public men. An observer at the present day is struck by the fluency

of Englishmen upon their feet, and by the free use of humour as a means

of emphasis, instead of the sonorous phrases formerly styled oratory.

[Sidenote: The Platform has Increased the Influence of Party Leaders.]

It has now become a settled custom for the cabinet ministers and the

leaders of the parliamentary Opposition to make a business of speaking

during the late autumn and the spring recess; and the habit tends to

magnify their power, for they are the only persons who have fully the

ear of the public. Except for a few important utterances, the debates in

Parliament are not very widely read; editorials in the press are read

solely by members of one political faith; the remarks of private members

to their constituents are published only in the local papers; but public

speeches by the chief ministers, and to a less extent those by the

principal leaders of the Opposition, are printed at great length by the

newspapers of both parties, and are read everywhere.[432:1]

Moreover, the platform gives a greater freedom than the floor of the

House. The ministers do not want to bring before Parliament a policy

they are not immediately prepared to push through, nor would it be easy

to find time amid the business of a session to do so. It is not

altogether an accident, it is rather a sign of the times, that Mr.

Chamberlain broached his plan of preferential tariffs, not in

Parliament, but at a public meeting in Birmingham. It was, indeed, a

strange thing to see an ardent discussion on a most important question

conducted in public meetings and in the press, while the ministers were

striving to prevent debate upon it in the House of Commons. It was a

mark of the limitation which the course of events has placed upon

Parliament. The platform has brought the ministers face to face with the

people, and this has increased the political importance of both. Not

only is the electorate the ultimate arbiter in political matters, but

the platform has in some degree supplanted the House as the forum where

public questions are discussed.

[Sidenote: Its Benefits.]

Frequent public addresses by the men in whom the whole responsibility

for the conduct of national affairs is concentrated, and by those who

will be responsible when the next change of ministry occurs, cannot fail

to educate the voters, and quicken their interest in all the political

issues of the day. Moreover, the process is not confined to the

intermittent periods of election, but goes on all the time; and although

the practice, brought into vogue by the Anti-Corn-Law League, of joint

debates at public meetings has not taken permanent root in England, the

same result is reached in another way, because the party leaders answer

one another's speeches from different platforms, and if the listeners

are not identical, the public reads both arguments. Sir Henry Maine

spoke of the tendency to look upon politics as a "deeply interesting

game, a never-ending cricket-match between Blue and Yellow";[433:1] and

the fact that this aspect of the matter is more marked in England than

anywhere else makes English politics the most interesting, and the most

easy to follow, in the world. The rulers of the country, and those who

both have been and will be her rulers, fight at close range across a

table for six months of the year, and during the rest of the time they

carry on the ceaseless war by public speaking. As in the Athenian

democracy, the citizens witness a constant struggle among rival

statesmen for supremacy, but in England they are merely spectators until

a general election summons them to give their verdict. One can hardly

conceive of a system better calculated to stimulate interest in politics

without instability in the government.

[Sidenote: Its Perils.]

But if the platform educates the voter, it has its dangers also.

Bismarck is reported to have said that the qualities of the orator are

not only unlike, but incompatible with, those of the statesman; and

certainly the continual need of taking the public into one's confidence

is hard to reconcile with the execution of far-reaching plans for the

national welfare, for until the results are in sight, these cannot be

made intelligible to the mass of the people. The English statesman is

called upon at all times to show his hand, at the risk of seeming

disingenuous or secretive if he does not do so. His whole policy is

analysed and criticised; the seeds he plants are dug up prematurely to

see if they are sprouting. Hence he is under a strong temptation to take

a stand that will win immediately popular approval. In short, he lives

in a glass house, which is likely to mean a very respectable but rather

superficial life.

Moreover, in the custom of speaking from the platform there lurks a

danger to the system of cabinet government; for that system is based

upon the principle that the initiative in public policy rests with the

ministers, and the main issue decided at a general election is whether

the cabinet shall remain in power. Now ministers have not always been in

the habit of arranging what shall be said upon the platform with the

same care as what measures shall be brought before Parliament. But in

view of the present importance of the platform it is obvious that if the

cabinet system is to continue, the ministers must present a unanimous

front to the public as well as to Parliament; and this consideration

leads to a study of the function of party in the English political

system.

FOOTNOTES:

[425:1] The six points were: universal suffrage, annual Parliaments,

equal electoral districts, abolition of property qualification, vote by

ballot, and payment of members. Of all these demands annual Parliaments

and payment of members alone have not been substantially attained.

[425:2] "Latter Day Pamphlets: The Stump Orator," No. 5.

[426:1] _E.g._ Hans. 4 Ser. CXXXII., 1013-15; CXLI., 162.

[426:2] _Ibid._, CXXXI., 679; CXLVI., 987-89.

[426:3] _Ibid._, CXLI., 163; CXLV., 622, 627; CXLVI., 496.

[426:4] _Ibid._, CXXXII., 1005, 1019; CXLI., 122-23, 180-82.

[427:1] Cabinet ministers and the leaders of the Opposition are reported

in full in the Parliamentary Debates, and other members usually at about

two-thirds length. Macdonagh's "Book of Parliament" contains an

interesting chapter on "The Reporters' Gallery."

[427:2] Macdonagh, 315. And see an article by Alfred Kinnear, and an

answer by A. P. Nicholson in the _Contemporary Review_ for March and

April, 1905, LXXXVII., 369, 577.

[428:1] The best work on this subject is Jephson's "The Platform: Its

Rise and Progress."

[429:1] Jephson, II., 65.

[430:1] Walpole, "Life of Lord John Russell," I., 248.

[430:2] Morley, "Life of Gladstone," III., 344.

[430:3] Mr. Lecky expressed a common opinion in the introduction to the

second edition of his "Democracy and Liberty" (p. liii.), where he spoke

of Mr. Gladstone as "the first English minister who was accustomed, on a

large scale, to bring his policy in great meetings directly before the

people," adding that he "completely discarded the old tradition that a

leading minister or ex-minister should confine himself almost

exclusively to Parliamentary utterances and should only on rare

occasions address the public outside." Mr. Gladstone's power was,

indeed, due quite as much to the effect of his public speeches as to his

influence over the House of Commons.

[430:4] Quoted by Jephson, II., 391.

[432:1] Mr. Kinnear in the _Contemporary Review_ for March, 1905, says

that the demand by newspapers for public speeches by leading statesmen

has declined. They would probably have more readers, though less

hearers, if they were neither so long nor so frequent.

[433:1] "Popular Government," 149.

PART II.--THE PARTY SYSTEM

CHAPTER XXIV

PARTY AND THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM

[Sidenote: Lack of a Psychology of Political Parties.]

The last generation has made great strides in the study of psychology.

The workings of the individual mind, and its reaction to every stimulus

or impression, especially under morbid conditions, have been examined

with far more care than ever before. Social psychology has also come

into view, and attempts have been made to explain the psychology of

national traits, and of abnormal or unhealthy popular movements, notably

mobs. But the normal forces that govern the ordinary conduct of men in

their public relations have scarcely received any scientific treatment

at all. In short, we are almost wholly lacking in a psychology of

political parties, the few scattered remarks in Maine's "Popular

Government" being, perhaps, still the nearest approach to such a thing

that we possess.[435:1]

[Sidenote: Although Parties are Universal.]

The absence of treatises on the subject is all the more remarkable

because the phenomena to be studied are almost universal in modern

governments that contain a popular element. Experience has, indeed,

shown that democracy in a great country, where the number of voters is

necessarily large, involves the permanent existence of political

parties; and it would not be hard to demonstrate that this must in the

nature of things be the case. That parties exist, and are likely to

continue to do so, has provoked general attention. By all statesmen they

are recognised as a factor to be reckoned with in public life; and,

indeed, efforts have been made in various places to deal with them by

law. In the United States, for example, the local caucuses, or

conventions of the parties, and their methods of nominating candidates,

have of late years been regulated by statute; while in Switzerland and

Belgium, elaborate schemes of proportional representation have been put

into operation to insure a fair share of seats to the groups in the

minority.

[Sidenote: Modern View of Parties.]

But if political parties have become well-nigh universal at the present

time, they are comparatively new in their modern form. No one in the

eighteenth century foresaw party government as it exists to-day,

enfolding the whole surface of public life in its constant ebb and flow.

An occasional man like Burke could speak of party without

condemnation;[436:1] but with most writers on political philosophy

parties were commonly called factions, and were assumed to be subversive

of good order and the public welfare. Men looked at the history with

which they were familiar; the struggles for supremacy at Athens and at

Rome; the Guelphs and Ghibelines exiling one another in the Italian

republics; the riots in the Netherlands; the civil war and the political

strife of the seventeenth century in England. It was not unnatural that

with such examples before their eyes they should have regarded parties

as fatal to the prosperity of the state. To them the idea of a party

opposed to the government was associated with a band of selfish

intriguers, or a movement that endangered the public peace and the

security of political institutions.

Foreign observers, indeed, point out that for nearly three hundred years

political parties have existed in England, as they have not in

continental countries; and that the procedure of the House of Commons

has consistently protected the Opposition in its attacks upon the

government.[437:1] This is true, and there is no doubt that even in the

seventeenth century party struggles were carried on both in Parliament

and by pamphlets and public speeches, with a freedom unknown in most

other nations; but still they were a very different thing from what they

are now. They were never far removed from violence. When the Opposition

of those days did not actually lead to bloodshed, it was perilously near

to plots and insurrection; and the fallen minister, who was driven from

power by popular feeling or the hostility of Parliament, passed under

the shadow at least of the scaffold. Danby was impeached, and

Shaftesbury, his rival, died a refugee in Holland. With the accession of

the House of Hanover, and the vanishing of the old issues, political

violence subsided. The parties degenerated into personal factions among

the ruling class; and true parties were evolved slowly by the new

problems of a later generation.

[Sidenote: "His Majesty's Opposition."]

The expression, "His Majesty's Opposition," said to have been coined by

John Cam Hobhouse before the Reform Bill,[437:2] would not have been

understood at an earlier period; and it embodies the greatest

contribution of the nineteenth century to the art of government--that of

a party out of power which is recognised as perfectly loyal to the

institutions of the state, and ready at any moment to come into office

without a shock to the political traditions of the nation. In countries

where popular control of public affairs has endured long enough to be

firmly established, an Opposition is not regarded as in its nature

unpatriotic. On the contrary, the party in power has no desire to see

the Opposition disappear. It wants to remain in power itself, and for

that reason it wants to keep a majority of the people on its side; but

it knows well that if the Opposition were to become so enfeebled as to

be no longer formidable, rifts would soon appear in its own ranks. In

the newer democracies, such as France and Italy, there are large bodies

of men whose aims are revolutionary, whose object is to change the

existing form of government, although not necessarily by violent means.

These men are termed "irreconcilables," and so long as they maintain

that attitude, quiet political life with a peaceful alternation of

parties in power is an impossibility.

[Sidenote: Conditions of Good Party Government.]

The recognition of the Opposition as a legitimate body, entitled to

attain to power by persuasion, is a primary condition of the success of

the party system, and therefore of popular government on a large scale.

Other conditions of success follow from this.

[Sidenote: Opposition must not be Revolutionary.]

If the Opposition is not to be regarded as revolutionary, its objects

must not be of that character, either in the eyes of its own adherents,

or in those of other people. As Professor Dicey has put it, parties must

be divided upon real differences, which are important, but not

fundamental. There is, of course, no self-evident line to mark off those

things that are revolutionary or fundamental; and herein lies an

incidental advantage of a written constitution restricting the

competence of the legislature, for it draws just such a line, and goes

far to confine the immediate energies of the parties to questions that

are admitted not to be revolutionary.[438:1] In the absence of a

constitution of that kind, party activity must be limited to a

conventional field, which is regarded by the public opinion of the day

as fairly within the range of practical politics. Clearly the issues

must not involve vital matters, such as life or confiscation. When,

during the progress of the French Revolution, an orator argued in favour

of the responsibility of the ministers, and added "By responsibility we

mean death," he advocated a principle inconsistent with the peaceful

alternation of parties in power.

[Sidenote: Lines of Cleavage must not be Social.]

For the same reason there is grave danger when the lines of cleavage of

the parties coincide with those between the different social classes in

the community, because one side is likely to believe that the other is

shaking the foundations of society, and passions are kindled like those

that blaze in civil war. This is true whenever the parties are separated

by any of the deeper feelings that divide mankind sharply into groups;

and especially when two or three such feelings follow the same channel.

The chief difficulty with Irish Nationalism, as a factor in English

politics, lies in the fact that to a great extent the line of cleavage

is at once racial, religious, social, and economic.

[Sidenote: Issues must be Based on Public Matters.]

In order that the warfare of parties may be not only safe, but healthy,

it must be based upon a real difference of opinion about the needs of

the community as a whole. In so far as it is waged, not for public

objects, but for the private gain, whether of individuals, or of

classes, or of collective interests, rich or poor, to that extent

politics will degenerate into a scramble of self-seekers.

[Sidenote: Relation of Parties to Political Institutions.]

Before inquiring how far these conditions have been fulfilled in England

we must consider the form that party has assumed there, and the

institutions to which it has given birth. England is, in fact, the only

large country in which the political institutions and the party system

are thoroughly in harmony.

[Sidenote: In America.]

The framers of the Constitution of the United States did not foresee the

role that party was to play in popular government,[439:1] and they made

no provision for it in their plan; yet they established a system in

which parties were a necessity. It was from the first inevitable, and

soon became clear, that the real selection of the President would not be

left to the judgment of the electoral college--a result made the more

certain, first, by providing that the members should assemble by States,

and hence should not meet together as a whole for deliberation; and

second, by excluding from the college all congressmen and holders of

federal offices, that is, all the leading men in national public

life.[440:1] If the electoral college was not really to select the

President, it must become a mere machine for registering the results of

a popular vote throughout the nation, and the candidates for the

presidency must be designated beforehand in some way.

In a small district where the voters are few, and an interchange of

opinions naturally takes place by informal conference, public officers

may be elected by popular vote without the existence of any machinery

for nomination; but in a large constituency, where the voters are not

personally acquainted with each other, men who have the same objects in

view must get together, agree upon a candidate, and recommend him to the

public. Otherwise votes will be thrown away by scattering them, and it

will be mere chance whether the result corresponds with the real wishes

of the voters or not. In short, there must be some process for

nominating candidates; that is, some party organisation; and the larger

the electorate the more imperative the need of it. Now the electorate

that practically chooses the President of the United States is by far

the largest single constituency that has ever existed in the world. It

is, in fact, noteworthy that democracy throughout Europe adheres to the

custom of dividing the country for political purposes into comparatively

small electorates; while in the United States it is the habit to make

whole communities single constituencies for the choice of their chief

magistrates--state governors or national president--a condition of

things that involves elaborate party machinery for nomination, and

hence the creation of huge party organisations on a popular basis.

The form of government in the United States has thus made parties

inevitable; and yet they were furnished with no opportunity for the

exercise of their functions by the regular organs of the state. There

were no means provided whereby a party could formulate and carry through

its policy, select its candidates for high office, or insure that they

should be treated as the real leaders of the party and able to control

its action.[441:1] The machinery of party, therefore, from the national

convention to the legislative caucus, has perforce been created outside

the framework of the government, and cannot be nicely adjusted thereto.

[Sidenote: In Continental Europe.]

The European countries, on the other hand, that have adopted the English

parliamentary system, have usually copied those features, like the

responsibility of the ministers, which were most readily perceived,

without acquiring at the same time the substructure on which the system

rests, the procedure which prevents friction, or the national traditions

which supply the motive power. The result has been that a form of

government well fitted to the great English parties has proved very

imperfectly suited to the numerous political groups that exist in most

of the continental legislatures.[441:2] In France the conditions have

indeed changed much in the last few years, the procedure has been

gradually better adapted to the parliamentary system, and the

ministries have gained in stability; but as yet the difficulties are by

no means overcome. In some of the smaller countries, such as Belgium and

Switzerland, the organs of government and the system of parties are less

inconsistent; in Belgium because she followed British precedents more

faithfully; in Switzerland because she was enabled by her small size,

coupled with a federal structure, to create a novel polity of her own,

in which parties are given no constitutional sphere of action, and play

an unusually subordinate part. In none of these countries, however, is

the form of government so fully consonant with the party system as it is

in Great Britain.

[Sidenote: English Parliamentary System Grew out of Parties.]

In England the party system is no more in accord with the strictly legal

institutions, with King, Lords and Commons, than it is elsewhere; but it

is in absolute harmony with those conventions, which, although quite

unknown to the law, make up the actual working constitution of the

state. It is in harmony with them because they were created by the

warfare of parties, were evolved out of party life. Government by a

responsible ministry was not the inevitable consequence of the long

struggle between the House of Commons and the Crown. Some other means

might very well have been devised for taking the executive power out of

the personal control of the King. It was rather the result of the

condition of the House itself; for it is inconceivable that this form of

government should have appeared if Parliament had not been divided into

Whigs and Tories. In fact the whole plan would be senseless if parties

did not exist. The reason for the resignation of a ministry upon the

rejection of a measure it has proposed is that the defeat indicates a

general loss of confidence in the policy of the party in power, and the

preference for another body of leaders with a different policy. If this

were not so, the Swiss practice of remaining in office, but yielding on

the point at issue, would be far more sensible. The parliamentary system

is thus a rational expression of the division of the ruling chamber into

two parties.

[Sidenote: It has Made Parties Stronger.]

Neither the parliamentary system nor the party system, neither the

responsibility of ministers to the House of Commons nor the permanent

division into two parties, grew up in a day. Throughout the eighteenth

century the principle of cabinet responsibility was but dimly

recognised; while parties at times disintegrated, and the wheels of

government were kept going by means of corruption, which has served in

all ages as a lubricant for ill-adjusted political machinery. But little

by little, with halting steps, the rivalry of parties built up the

responsibility of ministers, and this in turn helped to perpetuate the

party divisions; for the parliamentary system, like every rational form

of government, reacts upon and strengthens the conditions of its own

existence. It is based upon party, and by the law of its nature tends to

accentuate party. Ministers perceived that their security depended upon

standing together, presenting a united front, and prevailing upon their

friends to do the same. The leaders of the Opposition learned also that

their chance of attaining to power was improved by pursuing a similar

course. In this way two parties are arrayed against one another

continually, while every member of Parliament finds himself powerfully

drawn to enlist under one banner or the other, and follow it on all

occasions. He cannot consider measures simply on their merits, but must

take into account the ultimate effect of his vote. As soon as men

recognise that the defeat of a government bill means a change of

ministry, the pressure is great to sacrifice personal opinions on that

bill to the greater principles for which the party stands; and the more

fully the system develops, the clearer becomes the incompatibility

between voting as the member of Parliament pleases on particular

measures, and maintaining in power the party he approves. In short, the

action of the House of Commons has tended to become more and more party

action, with the ministers, as we have already seen, gradually drawing

the initiative in legislation, and the control over procedure, more and

more into their own hands.

[Sidenote: It is Government by Party.]

The English government is builded as a city that is in unity with

itself, and party is an integral part of the fabric. Party works,

therefore, inside, instead of outside, the regular political

institutions. In fact, so far as Parliament is concerned, the machinery

of party and of government are not merely in accord; they are one and

the same thing. The party cabal has become the Treasury Bench. The

ministers are the party chiefs, selected not artificially but by natural

prominence, and the majority in the House of Commons, which legislates,

appropriates money, supervises and controls the administration, and

sustains or discards ministers, is the party itself acting under the

guidance of those chiefs. The parliamentary system, as it has grown up

spontaneously in England, is in its origin and nature government by

party, sanctioned and refined by custom. In that respect it differs, not

only from national political systems elsewhere, but also from British

local government. This last is not an outgrowth of party, but, like most

of the existing popular institutions in other countries, was designed,

not evolved. In it, as we shall see hereafter, party has no organic

connection with the ruling bodies, and has not the same controlling

authority as in national affairs.

[Sidenote: It can Thrive only with Two Parties.]

If the existence of a responsible ministry normally involves government

by party, it also requires as a condition of success that there shall be

only two parties. The ills that have flowed from the subdivision of the

French, the Italian and other parliaments, into a number of groups are

now an oft-told tale. The consequences there are very different from

those that occur where the executive is not responsible to the

legislature. In this last case the presence of several groups may result

in the election of a president, a council or an assembly, representing a

minority of the voters, and if so the popular will may not be truly

expressed. Yet the government will go on unshaken until the next

periodic election. But with similar conditions under the parliamentary

system the administration itself will be weak, its position unstable,

its tenure of office dependent upon the pleasure of a group that may be

ready to sacrifice everything else for a single object. Parnell was

quite right in his reckoning that if he could keep the Home Rulers

together until they held the balance of power in the House, one or other

of the great parties must make terms with them, or parliamentary

government would be unworkable.

[Sidenote: Opposition not Entirely Genuine.]

In the English system the initiative in most matters of importance has

come into the hands of the cabinet ministers, as the representatives and

leaders of the predominant party. It is their business to propose, and

it is the business of the Opposition to oppose. But the attitude of the

latter is not quite spontaneous. On rare occasions it congratulates the

government upon some action, which it supports heartily. More commonly

it seeks to criticise everything, to find all imaginable faults.

Impotent to legislate, it tries to prevent the majority from doing so;

not content with expressing its views and registering a protest, it

raises the same objections at every stage in the passage of a bill; and

sometimes strives to delay and even to destroy measures which it would

itself enact if in power. Its immediate object is, in fact, to discredit

the cabinet. Now this sounds mischievous, and would be so were

Parliament the ultimate political authority. But the parties are really

in the position of barristers arguing a case before a jury, that jury

being the national electorate; and experience has shown, contrary to the

prepossessions of non-professional legal reformers in all ages, that the

best method of attaining justice is to have a strong advocate argue on

each side before an impartial umpire. Unfortunately the jurymen in this

case are not impartial, and the arguments are largely addressed to their

interests, but that is a difficulty inseparable from democracy, or,

indeed, from any form of government.

[Sidenote: Waste of Capacity.]

Another result of party government that is constantly decried is the

waste of capacity it involves. Why, it is asked, should an excellent

administrator leave his post, because some measure quite unconnected

with his department--a measure, it may be, that he has himself opposed

in the cabinet--is rejected by the House of Commons? Such a system

interferes with that continuity of policy which is often essential to

success both in foreign and internal affairs, and this is, no doubt, an

evil; but owing to the presence of a highly trained body of permanent

officials, who carry on the traditions and largely control the policy of

the departments, it is not so important in England as one might suppose.

The system also debars one half of the talent in public life from the

service of the state; but this misfortune is one that, for one reason or

another, has existed to some extent in all countries at all times. The

idea of a state where all the ablest men in the land join, without

regard to political opinions, to devote the best of their talents to the

public service, is enchanting, but it has never been permanently

realised anywhere.

[Sidenote: Issues not Decided solely on their Merits.]

Another criticism levelled at party government in England arises from

the impossibility of supporting the party in power on one issue and

opposing it on another. A voter at the last election who objected

strongly to any change in fiscal policy, and equally strongly to any

concessions on the subject of Home Rule, found himself on the horns of a

dilemma. He was compelled to make up his mind which issue he thought

most important, and trust to Providence about the other. In a party

government, where the cabinet must resign if any of its vital measures

are rejected, those measures cannot be considered by individuals on

their merits. The policy of one party or the other must be supported as

a whole. This is certainly a limitation on personal freedom of action,

and it acts as a restraint just to the extent that the government is

conducted strictly on party lines. The party system certainly involves

compromise of opinion; but then there is some compromise required for

the enactment of every public measure, whether parties exist or not, for

it never happens that the legislators who vote for any bill are all

perfectly satisfied with every one of its clauses.

Government by party is not an ideal regimen. Like everything else it

contains both good and evil. A political organisation, indeed, that

avoided all strife and all waste would certainly be impossible, and

would probably, by relaxing effort and sapping the springs of human

nature, prove undesirable. As yet it is too early to strike a final

balance between the merits and the defects of the party system in

England, and it would be hopeless to attempt it here. Both good and evil

will appear more fully as we proceed.

FOOTNOTES:

[435:1] Rohmer's _Lehre von den politischen Parteien_, which attempts to

explain the division into parties by natural differences of temperament

corresponding to the four periods of man's life, is highly suggestive,

but is rather philosophic than psychological; and like most

philosophical treatises on political subjects it is based upon the

writer's own time and place rather than upon a study of human nature

under different conditions.

[436:1] In his oft-quoted, but very brief, remarks in the "Observations

on 'The Present State of the Nation,'" and "Thoughts on the Cause of the

Present Discontents." But twenty-five years later in a letter to Richard

Burke he falls into the current talk about the evils of domination by a

faction.

[437:1] _E.g._ Redlich, _Recht und Technik_, 74-79.

[437:2] _Cf._ Review of his unpublished "Recollections of a Long Life,"

in the _Edinburgh Review_, April, 1871, p. 301.

[438:1] Neither in France nor in Italy does the constitution really

perform that service; because in each case it does little more than fix

the framework of the government, without placing an effective restraint

upon legislative action; and because the constitution itself is not felt

to be morally binding by the irreconcilables.

[439:1] For the views of these men on the relation of parties or

"factions" to public life see "The Federalist," No. 10, written by

Madison.

[440:1] Professor Max Farrand has pointed out to me that the question of

having the electors for the whole country meet in one place was

discussed in the Constitutional Convention, and was rejected in favour

of the present plan, because under the latter, "As the Electors would

vote at the same time throughout the U.S. and at so great a distance

from each other, the great evil of cabal was avoided." G. Hunt's

"Writings of Madison," IV., 365-66. Cabal had a vague and spectral

meaning, but covered anything in the nature of party. The exclusion from

the electoral college of members of Congress and federal office-holders

was defended on the same ground. _Cf._ "The Federalist," No. 68.

[441:1] In his "Rise and Growth of American Politics," a book full of

penetrating suggestions, Mr. Henry Jones Ford has argued that party

exists in America in order to bring about an accord among public bodies

that were made independent by the Constitution; to force into harmonious

action the various representatives of the people. Professor Goodnow

develops the same idea from a different standpoint in his "Politics and

Administration." But, especially in view of the comparatively small

accord among public bodies, or harmonious action of the public

representatives, and the enormous influence of parties in elections, it

seems to the writer more correct to say that parties in America exist

mainly for the selection of candidates.

[441:2] This subject is treated in Dupriez's admirable work _Les

Ministres_, in Bodley's "France," and in the writer's "Governments and

Parties in Continental Europe."

CHAPTER XXV

PARTY ORGANISATION IN PARLIAMENT

[Sidenote: The Need of Whips.]

In every legislative body a vote is supposed to express the sense of the

House, and there is a universal fiction that all the members are

constantly present; but this is often far from being the fact; and it

always behooves any one interested in a particular matter to expend no

small amount of labour in making sure that those persons who agree with

him are on hand when the decisive moment comes. All this applies with

peculiar force to the House of Commons; for not only the fate of the

particular measure under consideration, but the very life of the

ministry itself, may depend upon a single division; and it is the more

true because the average attendance, while a debate is going on, is

unusually small. When the division bell rings, two minutes are, indeed,

given for the members to rush in from the lobbies, the library, the

smoking and dining rooms, and the terrace, yet the government cannot

trust to luck for the presence of enough of its followers in the

precincts of the House to make up a majority. There must be someone

whose duty it is to see that they are within call.

[Sidenote: Who They Are.]

The duty of keeping the members of a party on hand is performed by the

whips, whose name is abbreviated from the men who act as whippers-in at

a fox-hunt. They are all members of the House, and those on the

government side receive salaries from the public purse on the theory

that it is their business to "keep a house" during supply; that is, to

insure the presence of a quorum, so that the appropriations may be

voted. The chief government whip holds the office of Parliamentary

Secretary to the Treasury, with a salary of 2000_l._ Formerly he was

often called simply the Secretary of the Treasury--an expression

occasionally confusing to the readers of books written a generation ago.

He is sometimes called, also, Patronage Secretary of the Treasury; and

in old times no small part of his functions consisted in distributing

patronage, in the days when it was freely employed to secure the support

of members of Parliament. In fact he is still a channel for the

disposition of such minor patronage as remains in the gift of the Prime

Minister, including the creation of lesser titles. He is assisted by

three other members, who hold the office of Junior Lords of the

Treasury, with the salary of 1000_l._ apiece.[449:1] As has already been

explained, the Treasury Board never meets, so that the duties of the

Junior Lords are to-day almost entirely confined to acting as whips;

and, to enable them to do that more effectively, one of them is always a

Scotch member. The position of whip is one of great importance, but it

entails some sacrifices, for by custom the whips take no part in debate,

and although their work is felt throughout the House, it is little seen

by the public. The chief whip, however, is often given afterwards a

position in the ministry, or otherwise rewarded.

The Opposition also has its whips, usually three in number, whose

position is important; though not so important as that of the government

whips, because while a failure to have the full strength of the party

present may be unfortunate, it cannot, as in the case of the government,

be disastrous. Naturally the Opposition whips have no salaries, but they

are sustained by the hope that their turn will come.

[Sidenote: Duties of the Whips.]

The government whips act as the aides-de-camp, and intelligence

department, of the leader of the House. In the former capacity they

arrange for him with the whips on the other side those matters in which

it is a convenience to have an understanding. The membership of select

committees, for example, is generally settled between the chief whips

on the two sides of the House; and the time when the test vote on some

great measure will take place is usually arranged beforehand in the same

way.

[Sidenote: They bring in the Members.]

When an important division is likely to occur, each side musters its

whole force for a great trial of strength; and not only the majority,

but the size of the majority, is a matter of importance to the

ministers, for it shows how completely they can depend upon the support

of their followers. But it is not on vital questions alone that the

government must avoid being beaten, because a defeat, even though not

such a one as would cause resignation, nevertheless weakens to some

extent the credit of the cabinet. It gives the public the impression

that the ministers are losing popularity; either that their followers

are becoming rebellious and voting against them, or, at least, that they

are so far indifferent or disaffected as to stay away. Nothing succeeds

like success; and it is a maxim in politics as well as in war that one

must maintain a reputation for being invincible. Any defeat of the

government always causes cheers of triumph among the Opposition; and

especially of late years, when defeats have become more rare, it is a

thing that requires explanation.

The whips must, therefore, always keep a majority within sound of the

division bell whenever any business that may affect the government is

under consideration. For this purpose they are in the habit of sending

out almost every day to all their supporters lithographed notices

stating that a vote on such and such a matter is likely to come on, and

requesting the attendance of the member. These notices are underscored,

in accordance with the importance of attendance, from a single line,

meaning that the whip desires the member's attendance, to four lines, or

a couple of very thick lines, which mean "come on pain of being thought

a deserter." In fact the receipt of messages of this kind is the test of

party membership. In 1844 a correspondence on the subject took place

between Peel and Disraeli shortly before the final breach occurred.

Disraeli, who had been criticising the policy of the government in

Ireland and Servia, was not sent the usual whips, and protested on the

ground that he had not ceased to be a member of the party.[451:1]

All this is not so important in the case of the Opposition; for, the

consequences of being caught napping are not so serious. It is enough

for them to summon their full force from time to time, when a good

chance for a large vote occurs. The proceedings of their whips,

therefore, though generally the same, are somewhat less systematic.

[Sidenote: They must Know that the Members are Present.]

[Sidenote: Snap Votes.]

The whips act also as an intelligence department for the government

leader. It is their business not only to summon the members of the party

to the House, but to know that they are there. By the door leading to

the coat room, through which the members ordinarily enter the House from

Palace Yard, there are seats; and here may always be seen one of the

government whips, and often one from the Opposition. Each of them takes

note of every member who goes in and out, sometimes remonstrating with

him if he is leaving without sufficient reason. By this means the whip

is expected to be able, at any moment, to tell just how large a majority

the government has within the precincts of the House; and on the most

important divisions the whip sees that every member of the party, who is

well, is either present or paired. Of course, the same thoroughness

cannot be attained on smaller questions; and although the government

whip tries to have constantly on hand more members of his own party than

of the Opposition, it is not always possible to do so. He may have

expected a vote to take place at a given hour, and sent out a notice to

every one to be present at that time, and the debate may suddenly show

signs of coming to an end earlier. In that case it is usually possible

to get some member of the government to talk against time while the

needed members are fetched in. At times even this resource fails, and

the government is occasionally defeated on what is known as "a snap

vote."

[Sidenote: That of 1895.]

Humorous anecdotes are told of frantic attempts to bring in the members,

and of practical jokes in trying to prevent it;[452:1] but the only one

of these cases that led to serious results occurred in 1895. The Liberal

government had been desperately clinging for life to a small majority of

about a dozen, when there came on for debate a motion to reduce the

salary of the Secretary of State for War, made in order to draw

attention to an alleged lack of cordite. The whips sitting by the

regular entrance of the House had in their tally the usual majority for

the government; but a score of Tories had gone from the Palace Yard

directly to the terrace, without passing through the ordinary coat-room

entrance. When the division bell rang they came straight from the

terrace to the House, and to the surprise no less of the tellers than of

every one else, the government was defeated by a few votes. This was

clearly a "snap" division, which would not ordinarily have been treated

as showing a lack of confidence in the ministry. But the time comes when

a tired man in the sea would rather drown than cling longer; and that

was the position of Lord Rosebery's government.

[Sidenote: Whips must Know the Temper of the Party.]

The whips keep in constant touch with the members of their party. It is

their business to detect the least sign of disaffection or discontent;

to know the disposition of every member of the party on every measure of

importance to the ministry, reporting it constantly to their chief. A

member of the party, indeed, who feels that he cannot vote for a

government measure, or that he must vote for an amendment to it, is

expected to notify the whip. If there are few men in that position, so

that the majority of the government is ample, and the result is not in

danger, the whip will make no objection. A novice in the strangers'

gallery, who hears three or four men on the government side attack one

of its measures vigorously, sometimes thinks that there is a serious

risk of defeat; but if he watched the countenance of the chief whip on

the extreme end of the Treasury Bench, he would see no sign of anxiety,

and when the division takes place the majority of the government is

about the normal size. The fact is that the whip has known all along

just how many men behind him would vote against the government, just how

many would stay away, and that it really made no difference.

[Sidenote: Methods of Pressure on Members.]

[Sidenote: Fear of Dissolution.]

If, on the other hand, the majority of the government is narrow, or the

number of refractory members is considerable, the whip will try to

reason with them; and in a crisis, where a hostile vote will be followed

by a dissolution, or by a resignation of the ministry which involves, of

course, a dissolution, his reasoning is likely to be effective; for no

member wants to face unnecessarily the expense of a general election, or

the risk of losing his seat. The strength of motives of this kind

naturally depends very much upon his tenure of the seat. If, as

sometimes happens, he is the only member of the party who has a good

chance of carrying the seat, or if his local or personal influence there

is so strong that he is certain to carry it, he will hold a position of

more than usual independence. But this is rarely the case.

[Sidenote: Action of Constituents.]

Nor is the fear of dissolution the only means by which pressure can be

brought to bear upon a member who strays too far from the party fold.

His constituents, or the local party association--which for this purpose

is much the same thing--can be relied upon to do something. Any direct

attempt by the whips to bring pressure upon a member through his

constituents would be likely to irritate, and do more harm than good.

But it is easy enough, in various ways, to let the constituents know

that the member is not thoroughly supporting his party; and unless his

vote against the government is cast in the interest of the constituents

themselves, they are not likely to have much sympathy with his

independence.

[Sidenote: Social Influence.]

Another means of pressure is found in social influence, which counts for

much in English public life; and for that reason it is considered

important to have as chief whip a man of high social standing as well as

of pleasant manners and general popularity. The power of social

influence has always been great in England, more particularly among the

Conservatives. In 1853, Disraeli, who was trying hard to build up the

Tory party, and had at the time little else to build it with, urged the

importance of Lord Derby's asking all his followers in Parliament to

dinner in the course of the session.[454:1] Nor does the use of

influence of this kind appear to have declined. It has been said of late

years that if a Unionist did not vote with his party, he was not invited

to the functions at the Foreign Office; and the weakness of the Liberals

for nearly a score of years after the split over Home Rule was due in no

small part to the fact that they had very little social influence at

their command. A sudden political conversion some years ago was

attributed to disappointment of the member at the small number of

invitations received through Liberal connections; and the change of

faith no doubt met its reward, for it was followed in time by

knighthood.

[Sidenote: Payment of Election Expenses.]

Finally the whips have, upon a certain number of members, a claim

arising from gratitude. Elections are expensive for the candidate, and

it is not always easy to find a man who is ready to incur the needful

cost and trouble, especially when the chance of success is not large.

Under these conditions the central office of the party, which is under

the control of the leaders and the whip, will often contribute toward a

candidate's expenses. It is done most frequently in well-nigh hopeless

constituencies, and therefore the proportion of men who have received

such aid is much greater among defeated than among elected candidates;

although the cases are by no means confined to the former class. How

often aid is given, and in what cases it is given, is never known, for

the whip naturally keeps his own counsel about the matter; but the

number of members on each side of the House, a part of whose election

expenses have been paid from the party treasury, is not inconsiderable.

Upon these men the whips have, of course, a strong claim which can be

used to secure their attendance and votes when needed.

If all the means of pressure which the whips can bring to bear are

unavailing, and the supporters of the government who propose to vote

against it are enough to turn the scale, or if the whips report that the

dissatisfaction is widespread, the cabinet will, if possible, modify its

position. This is said to have been the real cause of the apparent

surrender of the Liberal ministry to the demands of the Labour Party

upon the bill to regulate the liability of trade unions in 1906. The

whips found that many of their own followers had pledged themselves so

deeply that they could not support the government bill as it stood.

[Sidenote: The Whips as Tellers.]

When the government is interested in the result of a vote, it informs

the Speaker that it would like its whips appointed tellers in the

division, a suggestion with which he always complies. This is the sign

that the ministers are calling for the support of all their followers,

and that the division is to be upon party lines. Often in the course of

a debate upon some amendment to a government bill, one hears a member,

rising behind the Treasury Bench, appeal to the leader of the House not

to put pressure upon his supporters on that question. He means that the

government whips shall not be made the tellers, in which case each

member is free to vote as he thinks best without a breach of party

loyalty, and the result, whatever it may be, is not regarded as a defeat

for the cabinet. Occasionally this is done, but not often; because on

the question so treated the government, in abandoning its leadership, is

exposed to a charge of weakness; and also because it is unsafe to do it

unless the ministers are quite indifferent about the result, for the

effect of the pressure on the votes of many members is very great.

[Sidenote: No Other Party Machinery in Parliament.]

The whips may be said to constitute the only regular party organisation

in the House of Commons, unless we include under that description the

two front benches. The very fact, indeed, that the ministry and the

leaders of the Opposition furnish in themselves the real party machinery

of the House, avoids the need of any other. The ministers prepare and

carry out the programme of the party in power, while a small coterie of

leaders on the other side devise the plans for opposing them. The front

bench thus does the work of a party committee or council, and in neither

of the great parties is there anything resembling a general caucus for

the discussion and determination of party policy. Sometimes a great

meeting of the adherents of the party in Parliament is called at one of

the political clubs or elsewhere, when the leaders address their

followers. But it is held to exhort, not to consult; and, in fact,

surprise is sometimes expressed by private members that the chiefs take

them so little into their confidence.[456:1]

The organisation of the two great parties in Parliament has almost a

military character, with the cabinet as the general staff, and the

leader of the House as the commander in the field. This is naturally far

less true of lesser groups, which have not the tradition of cabinet

leadership to keep them in line. In their case a real caucus of the

party, to consider the position it shall assume in a crisis, is not

unknown. Two particularly celebrated meetings of that kind took place

within a few years of each other: one held by the Liberal Unionists

before the vote on the Home Rule Bill in 1886; the other the meeting of

the Irish Nationalists which deposed Parnell from the leadership of the

party in 1890.

A caucus of one of the two great parties has occasionally been held to

select a leader in the House, in those rare cases where it has found

itself in Opposition without a chief. This happened, for example, in

1899, when the post of leader having been left vacant by the retirement

of Sir William Harcourt therefrom in the preceding December, the Liberal

members of the House met on the day before the opening of the session,

and chose Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman to succeed him. Sir Henry

thenceforward led the party in the Commons, and became, in due course,

Prime Minister, when the Liberals came to power in 1905. Except,

however, for an accident of that sort, neither of the two great parties

has any machinery for choosing its chiefs, or deciding upon its course

of action. The leaders, and when the party comes to power the ministers,

are, no doubt, indirectly selected by the party itself, for they are the

men who have shown themselves able to win its confidence, and command

its support. But the choice is not made by any formal vote; nor is it

always precisely such as would result from a vote. The Prime Minister,

if not himself in the Commons, appoints the leader of the House and his

principal lieutenants, being guided in the choice by his own estimate of

their hold upon the party, and by the advice of the other chiefs. When

appointed, the leader leads, and the party follows.

FOOTNOTES:

[449:1] Formerly the Parliamentary Groom in Waiting acted also as a

whip; but the office was abolished in 1892.

[451:1] Parker, "Sir Robert Peel," III., 144-47.

[452:1] Macdonagh, "Book of Parliament," 372-78.

[454:1] Malmesbury, "Memoirs of an Ex-Minister," I., 382.

[456:1] See, for example, Sir Richard Temple, "Life in Parliament," and

especially pp. 39-40.

CHAPTER XXVI

NON-PARTY ORGANISATIONS OUTSIDE OF PARLIAMENT

[Sidenote: Different Kinds of Political Organisations.]

The political organisations outside the walls of Parliament may, for

convenience, be classified under four heads; although the groups so set

apart are not always perfectly distinct, and a particular organisation

is sometimes on the border line between two different groups. These four

heads are:--

1. Non-party organisations, whose object is to carry into effect some

one project or line of policy, but not to obtain control of the general

government, or to act as an independent political group in the House of

Commons.

2. Local party organisations, each confined to one locality, whose

primary object is to nominate party candidates and carry the elections

in that place, although they may incidentally bring their influence to

bear on the national policy of the party.

3. National party organisations, whose object is to propagate the

principles of the party, to aid in carrying the elections throughout the

country, and also to formulate and control to a greater or less extent

the national party policy. Of the organisations formed for such a

purpose, the most famous was early dubbed by its foes the "Caucus," and

under that title the career of these bodies on the Liberal and the

Conservative side will be described in Chapters XXIX. and XXX., the

Labour Party being treated in a later chapter by itself.

4. Ancillary party organisations. These are handmaids to the party,

which make no pretence of trying to direct its policy, but confine

themselves to the work of extending its popularity, promoting its

interests, and preparing the way for its success at the polls. They will

be discussed hereafter, but a few words must be said here about the most

important of them all, because without a knowledge of its character, the

history of the caucus, with which it has come into contact, can hardly

be understood. It is the central association, or central office, of the

party, composed of paid officials and agents, with or without the help

of a group of wealthy and influential men. It raises and disburses the

campaign funds of the party, and takes charge of general electioneering

interests; but it always acts in close concert with the party leaders

and the whips, and is, in fact, under their immediate direction and

control. The central office is thus a branch of the whip's office, which

attends to the work outside of Parliament, and it is really managed by a

principal agent or secretary directly responsible to the parliamentary

chiefs.

[Sidenote: They are Distinct from the Organs of State.]

Unlike the instruments of party inside of Parliament, all of these four

classes of exterior political organisation are wholly unconnected with

the constitutional organs of government; save that the central office is

directed by the whip. Outside of Parliament, as in the United States,

the organisation of parties is artificial or voluntary, that is, the

mechanism stands quite apart from that of the state, and its effect

thereon is from without, not from within. From this fact have flowed

important consequences that will be noted hereafter.

[Sidenote: The Non-Party Organisations.]

Among the different kinds of political organisation those here called

non-partisan are by far the oldest. Yet the term itself may be

misleading. It does not mean that they have confined their efforts to

cultivating an abstract public opinion in favour of their dogmas, for

they have often sought to elect to Parliament men who would advocate

them there. Nor does it mean that they have had no connection with the

existing parties, for sometimes one of the parties has countenanced and

supported their views, and in that case they have thrown their influence

in favour of the candidates of that party. The term is used simply to

denote a body whose primary object is not to achieve victory for a

regular political party. Curiously enough, such a group of persons often

comes nearer than the great parties of the present day to Burke's

definition of party as "a body of men united for promoting by their

joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular principle in

which they are all agreed." For each of the leading parties includes men

who are not wholly at one in their principles. Party aims are

complicated and confused, and are attained only by a series of

compromises, in which the ultimate principle is sometimes obscured by

the means employed to reach it. A party in modern parliamentary

government would be more accurately defined as a body of men united by

the intent of sustaining a common ministry.

[Sidenote: Their Early History.]

Various organisations of the kind termed here "non-partisan" arose

during the latter part of the eighteenth century. The first of these of

any great importance appears to have been the Society for Supporting the

Bill of Rights, founded in 1769 to assist Wilkes in his controversy with

the House of Commons, and in general to maintain the public liberties

and demand an extension of the popular element in the constitution.

Finding that the society was used to promote the personal ambition of

Wilkes, some of the leading members withdrew, and founded the

Constitutional Society with the same objects. Ten years later county

associations were formed, and conventions composed of delegates

therefrom met in London in 1780 and 1781 to petition for the redress of

public grievances. Other societies were established about the same time,

and they were not always of a radical character. The Protestant

Association, for example, was formed under the lead of Lord George

Gordon to maintain the disabilities of the Roman Catholics, and brought

about the riots of June, 1780, which are still called by his name.

The political societies of those days were short-lived, and most of them

died soon; but the outbreak of the French Revolution sowed the seed for

a fresh crop. In 1791 the working classes of the metropolis organised

the London Corresponding Society, and the next year men of less extreme

views founded the Society of the Friends of the People to promote

moderate reform. Whether radical or moderate, however, associations of

that kind could not live in those troublous times. The repulsion and

alarm provoked by the course of events in France were too strong to be

resisted, and a number of repressive statutes were passed to break them

up. First came an Act of 1794 to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, then

in the following session another to prevent seditious meetings, and,

finally, a statute of 1799, which suppressed the London Corresponding

Society by name, and any others that were organised with branches. These

acts and a series of prosecutions drove out of existence all the

societies aiming at political reform; and during a few years, while the

struggle with France was at its height, the course of domestic politics

was unvexed by such movements. But the distress that followed the wars

of Napoleon caused another resort to associations, which was again met

by hostile legislation.

[Sidenote: The Catholic Association, and Movements for Reform.]

The repressive statutes were, however, temporary, and when the last of

them expired in 1825, the way for popular organisations was again free.

The Catholic Association had already been formed in Ireland to procure

the removal of religious disabilities, and just as it disbanded, with

its object won, in 1829, the shadow of the coming Reform Act brought

forth a number of new political societies in England. In that very year

Thomas Atwood founded at Birmingham the Political Union for the

Protection of Public Rights, with the object of promoting parliamentary

reform; and after the introduction of the Reform Bill similar unions,

formed to support it, sprang up all over the country. An attempt was

even made to affiliate them together in a great national organisation;

but the government declared the plan illegal, and it was abandoned.

Among the most interesting of the societies of this kind were those

organised in London. Here, in 1831, the National Union of the Working

Classes was founded by artisans, disciples of Robert Owen, commonly

known as the "Rotundanists," from the name of the hall where their

meetings were held. But Francis Place, the tailor, a notable figure in

the agitations of the day, had no sympathy with the socialistic ideas of

these men, and dreaded the effect of their society upon the fate of the

Reform Bill. He had a much keener insight into the real situation, and

started as a counterstroke the National Political Union, with the sole

object of supplying in London the popular impulse needed, in his

opinion, to push the measure through.[462:1] The Bill was no sooner

passed than the many associations, which had been founded upon a union

of the middle and lower classes to effect a particular reform, began to

die out.

[Sidenote: The Anti-Slavery Societies.]

Meanwhile two successive organisations of a non-partisan, and, indeed,

of a non-political, character, had been carrying a purely humanitarian

movement to a triumphant end. The Committee for the Abolition of the

Slave Trade was formed in 1787, and strove, by the collection of

evidence, by petitions, pamphlets and corresponding local committees, to

enlighten public opinion and persuade Parliament. After working for a

score of years, supported by the tireless efforts of Wilberforce in the

House of Commons, it prevailed at last upon Parliament to suppress the

slave-trade by the Acts of 1806 and 1807. Sixteen years thereafter the

Anti-Slavery Society was formed to urge the entire abolition of slavery

throughout the British dominions, and this it brought about in 1833, the

strength of its advocates in the Commons, backed by popular agitation

outside, being great enough to compel Lord Grey's government to bring in

a bill for the purpose.[462:2]

[Sidenote: Non-Party Organisations after 1832.]

[Sidenote: The Chartists.]

Since 1832 the non-party organisations have been, on the whole, more

permanent, and more widely extended than before; and, with some marked

exceptions like that of the Chartists, they have tended to rely less

upon a display of physical force, and more upon appeals to the

electorate--a change following naturally enough upon the enlargement of

the franchise. Chartism developed out of a large number of separate

local organisations of workingmen, who realised that they had gained no

political power from the Reform Act, and demanded a reform of Parliament

in a really democratic spirit. The movement took its name from the

People's Charter, with its six points, published in 1838 by the London

Working Men's Association. To this the various local bodies adhered,

sending the next year delegates to a great People's Parliament in

London. But the violence of the language used by the Chartists opened a

door for prosecution; the leaders became frightened, and for the moment

the agitation lost its force. In 1840 it was reorganised, and was

supported by several hundred affiliated bodies. From first to last,

however, it was weakened by dissensions among the leaders, relating both

to the methods of operation and to subordinate issues. The movement

culminated in 1848, in the mass meeting on Kennington Common, which was

to form in procession, and present a mammoth petition to Parliament. The

plan had caused grave anxiety; troops were brought up, thousands of

special constables were sworn in; but at the last minute Feargus

O'Connor, the leader of the Chartists, lost his nerve, and gave up the

procession. The great demonstration was a fiasco, and soon after the

whole movement collapsed.

[Sidenote: The Anti-Corn-Law League.]

One of the many reasons for the failure of Chartism was the existence at

the same time of the most successful non-partisan organisation that

England has ever known, the Anti-Corn-Law League. This, like the

Anti-Slavery Association of an earlier day, was formed to advocate a

single specific reform, and to its steadfast fidelity to that principle

its success was largely due. It excluded rigidly all questions of party

politics, and in fact its most prominent leader, Cobden, always retained

a profound distrust of both parties. The reform embodied, however, in

the eyes of its votaries, both an economic and a moral principle, so

that they were able to appeal at the same time to the pocket and the

conscience of the nation--a combination that goaded Carlyle into his

reference to Cobden as an inspired bagman preaching a calico millennium.

As the League appealed to more than one motive, so it used freely more

than one means of making the appeal. After a number of local

associations had been formed, a meeting of delegates from these, held in

1839, founded the League, which proceeded to organise branches all over

the country, sent forth speakers and lecturers, worked the press,

collected information, issued pamphlets by the ton, petitioned

Parliament, and strove to elect candidates who would support its views.

All this was done upon a huge scale with indefatigable energy. The

movement derived its force from the middle-class manufacturers, but they

strained every nerve to indoctrinate the working classes in the cities,

and later the rural population, until at last public opinion was so far

won that the crisis caused by the failure of the Irish potato crop

brought about the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. The League had done

its work and dissolved.

[Sidenote: Other Non-Partisan Associations.]

There have been, and still are, a large number of other associations of

a non-partisan character, which bestir themselves about some political

question. Often they exist in pairs to advocate opposing views, like the

Marriage Law Reform Association, and the Marriage Law Defence Union, the

Imperial Vaccination League, and the National Anti-Vaccination League.

These associations are of many different kinds. Some of them are

organised for other objects, concerning themselves with legislation only

incidentally, and taking no part at elections, like the Association of

Chambers of Commerce, and the Association of Municipal Corporations.

Some exist primarily for other purposes, but are very active in

politics, like certain of the trade unions;[464:1] others are formed

solely for the diffusion of political doctrines, but generally abstain

from direct electoral work, like the Fabian Society, with its socialist

ideals; and, finally, there are organisations which, although not

primarily partisan, in fact exert themselves vigorously to help the

candidates of one of the great parties. To the last class belongs the

Liberation Society, formerly very active in urging the disestablishment

of the Church, and throwing its influence in favour of the Liberals; and

also its opponent, the Committee for Church Defence, equally strong on

the side of the Conservatives. More active than either of them at the

present day is the Free Church Federation, which has been brought into

the political arena by its repugnance to the Education Act of 1902. In

the same category must be placed the National Trade Defence Association,

an organisation formed by the liquor dealers to resist temperance

legislation, and perhaps Mr. Chamberlain's recent Tariff Reform League,

both of which support the Tories. It so happens that the societies that

oppose the last two bodies are not so consistently devoted to the

Liberals. Then there are societies of another type formed for a

transitory purpose in foreign affairs: such as the Eastern Question

Association of 1876, which opposed Disraeli's Turkish policy, and the

present Balkan Committee working for freedom in Macedonia.

All associations that attempt to influence elections are in the habit of

catechising the candidates and publishing their answers, sometimes

producing a decided effect upon the vote. Now it may be suggested that

societies which take an active part in elections, and always throw their

influence on the same side, ought not to be classed as non-partisan, but

rather as adjuncts to the great parties; and yet they differ from the

true ancillary organisations because their primary object as societies

(whatever the personal aim of individual members may be) is not to place

the party in power, but to carry through a particular policy with which

that party happens to be more nearly in sympathy than its rival.

FOOTNOTES:

[462:1] Graham Wallas, in his "Life of Francis Place," gives a graphic

description of the movements in London.

[462:2] For these movements see Clarkson's "History of the Slave Trade,"

"The Life of Wilberforce," by his sons, and "The Memoirs of Sir T.

Fowell Buxton."

[464:1] This does not refer to the political labour organisations that

have grown out of the trade unions, but must now be classed as regular

parties. For the earlier political activity of the trade unions, as

such, see Sidney and Beatrice Webb, "Industrial Democracy," I., 247 _et

seq._

CHAPTER XXVII

LOCAL PARTY ORGANISATIONS

Contrasted with those bodies which are non-partisan, but extend over the

whole country, or at least over an indefinite area, stand the local

party organisations. Before the Reform Act of 1832 local organisations

such as exist to-day for the election of parliamentary candidates were

almost unknown. They would, indeed, have been of little use in most of

the old electorates. Not to speak of the rotten boroughs, which were

sold for cash, a large number of the smaller constituencies were pocket

boroughs, in the hands of patrons who would not have suffered any one

else to influence the voters. In 1807, when Lord Palmerston was elected

to Parliament for Newtown in the Isle of Wight, Sir Leonard Holmes, who

controlled the seat, made a stipulation that he should "never, even for

an election, set foot in the place. So jealous was the patron lest any

attempt should be made to get a new interest in the borough."[466:1]

Even in the counties the voters were so much under the personal lead of

the landowners that party machinery would have been superfluous. A few

of the large boroughs had, indeed, an extended franchise and a wide

electorate. Most notable among them was Westminster, and here a real

political organisation for the election of members to Parliament existed

for some years before the great reform. It was, however, conducted in

the interest neither of the Whigs, nor of the Tories, but of Radical

Reformers, who were truly independent of both parties.[466:2]

[Sidenote: Their Origin.]

With the extension of the franchise a change began in the political

status of the voters. In many constituencies it was no longer enough to

secure the support of a few influential persons; and the winning of a

seat by either party depended upon getting as many of its adherents as

possible upon the voting lists. The watchword of the new era was given

by Sir Robert Peel in his celebrated advice to the electors of Tamworth

in 1841, "Register, register, register!" It was the more important for

the parties to take the matter in hand, because disputes about the

complex electoral qualifications, instead of being settled on the

initiative of the state, were left to be fought out before the revising

barrister by the voters themselves, who were apt to be very negligent

unless some one made a systematic effort to set them in motion. It was

not less necessary for the parties to keep the matter constantly in

hand, because, the duration of Parliament being uncertain, it could not

be put off until shortly before the election. The lists must be kept

always full in view of a possible dissolution. Often the work was done

on behalf of the sitting member or the prospective candidate by his

agent on the spot, without any formal organisation. But this was not

always true, and, in fact, the Reform Bill was no sooner enacted than

local registration societies began to be formed, which for some years

increased rapidly in number among both Liberals and Conservatives.[467:1]

[Sidenote: Their Early Objects.]