The visit of the French squadron under Admiral Gervais to England has
revived in many a nautical mind the recollection of that oft-repeated
controversy as to the relative advantages of armored belts and
citadels. Now that a typical French battleship of the belted class has
been brought so prominently to our notice, it may not be considered an
inappropriate season to dwell shortly upon the various idiosyncrasies
of thought which have produced, in our two nations, types of war
vessels differing so materially from each other as to their protective
features. In order to facilitate a study of these features, the
accompanying sketch has been prepared, which shows at a glance the
relative quantities of armored surface that afford protection to the
Nile, the Camperdown, the Marceau, the Royal Sovereign, and the Dupuy
de Lôme; the first three of these vessels having been actually present
at the review on the 21st of August and the two others having been
selected as the latest efforts of shipbuilding skill in France and
Great Britain. Nothing but the armored surface in each several class
is shown, the same scale having been adhered to in all cases.
[Illustration: Armored Surface for Various Ships]
Two impressions cannot fail to be made upon our minds, both as to
French and British armor plate disposition. These two impressions, as
regards Great Britain, point to the Royal Sovereign as embodying the
idea of two protected stations with a narrow and partial connecting
belt; and to the Nile as embodying the idea of a vast and absolutely
protected raft. For France, we have the Marceau as representing the
wholly belted type with four disconnected but protected stations; and
the Dupuy de Lôme, in which the armor plating is thinned out to a
substance of only 4 in., so as entirely to cover the sides of the
vessel down to 5 ft, below the water line; this thickness of plating
being regarded as sufficient to break up upon its surface the dreaded
mélinite or guncotton shell, but permitting the passage of
armor-piercing projectiles right through from side to side; provision
being made to prevent damage from these latter to engines and vitals
by means of double-armored decks below, with a belt of cellulose
between them. Thus, as we have explained, two prominent ideas are
present in the disposition of armor upon the battleships of Great
Britain, as well as in that of the battleships of France. But, while
in our country these two ideas follow one another in the natural
sequence of development, from the Inflexible to the Royal Sovereign,
the citadel being gradually extended into two redoubts, and space
being left between the redoubts for an auxiliary battery--this latter
being, however, singularly placed above the armored belt, and _not
within its shelter_--in France, on the other hand, we find the second
idea to be a new departure altogether in armored protection, or rather
to be a return to the original thought which produced the Gloire and
vessels of her class. In point of fact, while we have always clung to
the armored citadel, France has discarded the belt altogether, and
gone in for speed and light armor, as well as for a much lighter class
of armament. Time alone, and the circumstances of actual warfare, can
prove which nation has adopted the wisest alternative.
A glance at the engraving will show the striking contrast between the
existing service types as to armored surface. The Marceau appears
absolutely naked by the side of the solidly armed citadel of the Nile.
The contrast between the future types will be, of course, still more
striking, for the reasons given in the last paragraph. But while
remarking upon the paucity of heavy plating as exhibited in the
service French battleships, we would say one word for the angle at
which it is placed. The receding sides of the great vessels of France
give two very important attributes in their favor. In the first place,
a much broader platform at the water line is afforded to secure
steadiness of the ship and stable equilibrium, and the angle at which
the armor rests is so great as to present a very oblique surface to
the impact of projectiles. The trajectory of modern rifled guns is so
exceedingly flat that the angle of descent of the shot or shell is
practically _nil_. Were the sides of the Royal Sovereign to fall back
like those of the Marceau or Magenta, we seriously doubt whether any
projectile, however pointed, would effect penetration at all. We
conclude, then, that a comparison of the Marceau with the Nile as
regards protective features is so incontestably in favor of the
latter, that they cannot be classed together for a moment. In speed,
moreover, though this is not a point under consideration, the Nile has
the advantage. It is impossible, however, to avoid the conviction that
the Dupuy de Lôme would be a most powerful and disagreeable enemy for
either of the eight great ironclads of Great Britain now building to
encounter on service. The Hood and Royal Sovereign have many
vulnerable points. At any position outside of the dark and light
colored portions of armor plate indicated in our drawing, they could
be hulled with impunity with the lightest weapons. It is true that gun
detachments and ammunition will be secure within the internal
"crinolines," but how about the other men and _matériel_ between
decks? Now, the Dupuy de Lôme may be riddled through and through bf a
13½ in. shell if a Royal Sovereign ever succeeds in catching her; but
from lighter weapons her between decks is almost secure. We cannot
help feeling a sneaking admiration for the great French cruising
battleship, with her 6,300 tons and 14,000 horse power, giving an easy
speed of 20 knots in almost any weather, and protected by a complete 4
in. steel panoply, which will explode the shells of most of our
secondary batteries on impact, or prevent their penetration. In fact,
there is little doubt that the interior of the Trafalgar, whether as
regards the secondary batteries or the unarmored ends, would be
probably found to be a safer and pleasanter situation, in the event of
action with a Dupuy de Lôme, than either of the naked batteries or the
upper works of the Royal Sovereign. This is what Sir E.J. Reed was so
anxious to point out at the meeting of naval architects in 1889, when
he described the modern British battleship as a "spoiled Trafalgar."
There was perhaps some reason in what he said.--_The Engineer._
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