REORGANISATION, AND THE BATTLE OF THE MENIN ROAD.
On the 2nd August, 1917, the remnant of the Battalion was relieved by
the 9th Royal Irish Rifles (36th--Ulster--Division), and assembled at
a camp near VLAMERTINGHE, where they found the members of B team and
food, and had a good sleep. At 10 p.m. that night we moved in motor
’buses to the WATOU area, where we took over our old camp. Lieutenant
G. M. Fismer, R.A.M.C., and one Other Rank had been wounded in coming
out of the line, and Lieutenant J. E. Ratcliffe reported as Medical
Officer; on the following day Lieutenant W. L. Price and Second
Lieutenants R. Grisdale and A. P. Smith and 108 Other Ranks reported as
reinforcements.
On the 5th we marched to ABEELE, where we entrained and travelled via
ST. OMER and WATTEN to AUDRUICQ, arriving there about 5 p.m. Here we
found lurries waiting to take us to our new billeting area, AUDREHEM, a
pleasant village just big enough to hold us.
On the 7th, Second Lieutenant Holden came back from attachment to the
R.E.’s with 23 Other Ranks, and Captain C. M. Denton and 34 Other Ranks
reported as reinforcements. During the next few days Captain Houghton,
Second Lieutenant Vincent and Second Lieutenant Swaine rejoined us and
Major de Wend Fenton. Second Lieutenant F. Shippobottom and Second
Lieutenant A. B. Fergie reported for duty along with nine Other Ranks,
while on the 18th Second Lieutenant J. Hailwood and A. Martin, and on
the 21st Second Lieutenants A. H. Doleman, S. A. H. Pruden, and Iners
joined us, followed by Second Lieutenants H. W. C. Griffiths, H. Dance,
and J. Oldham on the 22nd.
The following honours were announced for gallantry in action in the
recent battle:--
BAR TO D.S.O. Lieutenant-Colonel R. Hindle, D.S.O.
MILITARY CROSS Second Lieutenant H. C. Vincent, B Company.
Second Lieutenant H. Lonsdale, C Company.
D.C.M. 24908 Lance-Corporal E. Ashton, A Company.
201260 Lance-Corporal T. Butcher, A Company.
MILITARY MEDAL 200057 Sergeant J. Heaps, Headqrs.
201530 Lance-Corporal P. Norris, B Company.
200643 Sergeant J. E. Cookson, D Company.
34879 Sergeant J. Cosgrove, C Company.
200809 Corporal F. Pitcher, B Company.
200414 Lance-Corporal W. H. Clarkson, Headqrs.
202761 Private J. Spencer, D Company.
200146 Private J. Bates, Transport.
200357 Private J. H. Parkinson, Transport.
12910 Private D. Rathbone, C Company.
31987 Lance-Corporal J. Walmsley, A Company.
It is fashionable among fighting men to belittle the honours which
they themselves have earned, knowing as they do that many individuals
employed at bases have received decorations which were never meant to
be conferred for anything except gallantry in action, while others
who have abundantly deserved them have either died before they were
granted or have had no witness surviving to report their conduct; it is
therefore only fair to mention that when “immediate awards,” such as
the above, are made to fighting men, it is as a result of reports sent
in by eyewitnesses, which, in our Battalion at any rate, were tested by
cross-examining those mentioned in them as to the deeds of others, the
resulting list of recommendations being further checked and often cut
down by Brigade.
We enjoyed our stay at AUDREHEM, knowing that our last battle
had raised us to the status of Storm Troops, and that when we
moved up again it would be for another attack and not back to the
demoralising influences of trench life. With this in view we carefully
reorganised and trained, all ranks working together keenly with one
end in view--efficiency, with the result that in six weeks a tired,
straggling, muddy, shaken remnant was transformed once more into a
smart Battalion, well organised and equipped, and trained with special
reference to attacking concrete blockhouses. Officers daily attended
lectures by one of their number on some phase of the attack, and
Company Commanders held daily conferences of their N.C.O.’s and senior
Privates, so that however heavy might be the casualties among leaders,
someone might remain with the necessary knowledge to carry on. Every
fine day Companies marched with their cookers to the training area at
GUEMY, and remained there all day doing progressive field training;
there was football, boxing, a Divisional horse show, and other
delights, as well as Brigade days, and the Commander-in-Chief himself
came one day to see us at work; so the days slipped by until the 14th
September. Captain Duckworth went as Second in Command to the 1/8th
King’s Liverpool Regiment, and various other Officers left us sick or
to other units, so that when B team had been detailed the following
Officers moved up to take part in the attack:--
Lieutenant-Colonel R. Kindle, D.S.O. Commanding.
Captain A. T. Houghton Second in Command.
Captain R. N. Buckmaster Adjutant.
Lieutenant Bardsley Transport Officer.
Second Lieutenant Brooke Intelligence Officer.
Second Lieutenant Whitehouse Signalling Officer.
Lieutenant Radcliffe, R.A.M.C. Medical Officer.
Lieutenant E. G. Baker }
Second Lieutenant A. P. Smith } A Company.
Second Lieutenant H. Dance }
Second Lieutenant J. Oldham }
Captain F. W. S. Baker }
Major Fenton } B Company.
Second Lieutenant Holmes }
Second Lieutenant Fergie }
Captain R. H. Tautz }
Second Lieutenant Pruden } C Company.
Second Lieutenant Grisdale }
Lieutenant Holden }
Lieutenant Price } D Company.
Second Lieutenant Martin }
Second Lieutenant Myers }
On the 14th the Battalion, including B team, marched to AUBRUICQ,
proceeding thence by train to a point near YPRES, where we took over
a bivouac camp near GOLDFISH CHATEAU--a muddy field with pits dug all
over it, each just big enough to shelter two or three men, and covered
with sheets of corrugated iron.
[Illustration: Aeroplane Photo taken 9th September, 1917, from a point
near Pond Farm.]
Since 31st July, 1917, the ground along the STEENBEEK captured by us
on that day had been the scene of bloody fighting, two attempts by
other Divisions to advance beyond the Black Line of the previous attack
having been made and having failed, so that with small variations the
front taken over by us on 15th September was identical with that held
when we had come out six weeks before.
The ground over which we had to pass was commanded by two spurs--the
GRAFENSTAFEL SPUR half a mile to the north, and the GALLIPOLI SPUR,
part of which was within our frontage, to the south; and apart from the
concrete blockhouses on our own front, every yard of our advance was
raked by machine gun bullets from innumerable others on our flanks, so
that until these were put out of action no advance was possible without
appalling losses. Add to this the total absence of landmarks in that
amorphous wilderness, where no trees, no blade of grass remained, every
square yard of ground having been churned up by our shell fire--the
extreme difficulty of distinguishing one blockhouse from another--the
fact that Companies had been reduced to three Platoons and Platoons
to only 20 men owing to lack of sufficient reinforcements--and when
you have studied the maps and photographs and tried to visualise the
ground, you may form some idea of what the Battalion had to do on the
20th September, 1917. The GRAFENSTAFEL ROAD was our one hope of keeping
direction--the road which, as the photographs clearly show, became
utterly indistinguishable from the surrounding mire within 200 yards of
our starting point; when this failed, general direction was only kept
by use of the compass.
The material paragraphs of the Operation Order and the official account
of the battle are as follows:--
THE OPERATION ORDER.
1.
(a) The 55th Division will attack on Z day. The 9th Division
will be on the right, and the 58th Division on the left.
(b) The 165th Infantry Brigade will be on the right, the 164th
Infantry Brigade on the left, the 166th Brigade less two
Battalions will be in reserve.
(c) The 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment and the 1/4th Loyal
North Lancashire Regiment will be in the right or KEIR
sector.
The 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers in the centre or COTTS sector.
The 1/8th Liverpool Regiment in the left or SCHULER sector.
The 1/5th Royal Lancaster Regiment will be attached to the
164th Infantry Brigade and be available for the
countering of enemy counter-attacks.
2. On the night 13th/14th the (German) 2nd Guards Reserve Division came
into the line opposite to the 55th Divisional front and is reported
to be holding the line with all three regiments up, one Battalion of
each Regiment being in the line, one in support, and one in immediate
reserve.
Those in reserve are located west of the PASSCHENDALE RIDGE.
3.
(a) First pause of the barrage RED DOTTED LINE.
First objective in YELLOW LINE.
Final objective in GREEN LINE.
4. It is the intention to capture and occupy as a line of resistance
the GREEN LINE.
The attack will be made in stages under cover of a creeping barrage.
There will be a pause of at least half an hour on the RED DOTTED LINE
and again on the YELLOW LINE.
5. The plan of attack and objectives will be as follows:--
In the KEIR sector:
The 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment will attack at ZERO in four waves,
the first two waves extended and the second two in columns.
Objectives:--First two waves Red Dotted Line.
Second two waves Yellow Line,
after which they will support the capture of the Green Line.
In the COTTS sector:--
The 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers will attack at ZERO, in four waves.
Objectives:--First wave Red Dotted Line.
Second wave Yellow Line.
Third wave Green Line, an advanced strong
point established at Green House.
In the SCHULER sector:--
Two Companies 1/8th Liverpool Regiment will attack at ZERO in two
waves.
Objectives:--First wave Red Dotted Line.
Second wave Yellow Line.
Two Companies will be in the hands of the Officer Commanding 1/8th
Liverpool Regiment.
[Illustration:
_I. 15^{th} June 1917._
_II. 16^{th} June 1917._
_III. 27^{th} July 1917. Three days before
the 3^{rd} Battle of YPRES._
_IV. 13^{th} August 1917._
_V. 13^{th} September 1917.
Seven days before the battle
of the MENIN ROAD._
Five Aeroplane Photographs showing the gradual disappearance of
all features and landmarks in Map square D.13.c., between June and
September, 1917.]
[Illustration:
Map No. 3
OBJECTIVES in the BATTLE of the MENIN ROAD Sept. 20th, 1917]
6. The Battalion will assemble in three lines at 20 yards’ distance,
the leading line being about 150 yards west of the assembly line of the
1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment in the following order:--
First wave, from right to left--14 Platoon, 13 Platoon, 1
Platoon, 2 Platoon.
Second wave, from right to left--9 Platoon, 10 Platoon, 11
Platoon, 5 Platoon, 6 Platoon, 7 Platoon.
Third wave, from right to left--15 Platoon, machine guns, 3
Platoon.
Captain Houghton will be responsible for the taping of these lines and
supplying two guides to each Company to lead them to their position of
assembly.
7. Distribution of Companies during the advance:--
First wave, from right to left--Two Platoons D Company, two
Platoons A Company.
Second wave, from right to left--C Company, B Company.
Third wave, from right to left--One Platoon D Company, one
Platoon A Company.
The first wave will form two lines of extended order before crossing
the Yellow Line.
The objective of the first wave will be an outpost line passing through
FOKKER FARM--D 14 c 9 9 and D 14 d 1 5.
Garrisons will be detailed in advance:--For FOKKER FARM by A Company,
and dugouts D 14 d 1 6 by D Company.
Strong points will be constructed at these points and others in between
should it be found necessary, the principle being that the whole front
should be:--
(a) Covered by enfilade machine gun or Lewis gun fire.
(b) Under observation.
The objective of the second wave will be approximately the Green Line.
The garrison will be detailed beforehand for the dugouts D 14 c 4 9 by
B Company.
The objectives of the third wave will be to ensure that the first and
second waves reach their objectives.
Garrisons will be detailed beforehand for dugouts D 14 c 4 4 and MARTHA
HOUSE by D Company.
Dugouts at D 14 a 2 O and KANSAS HOUSE by A Company.
8. Unexpected concrete defences encountered during the advance will be
garrisoned and consolidated, as soon as the final objective is taken,
on the following principle: Each wave will be responsible for all
ground between itself and the leading line of the wave in its rear.
Should any pockets of the enemy still remain, they will be mopped up as
this is taking place.
12. The reserve Battalion (1/5th Royal Lancaster Regiment) will arrive
in the area AISNE--HINDU COT--POND FARM about the time that the Green
Line is taken.
The role of this Battalion will be to deliver an immediate
counter-stroke against any hostile counter-attack.
13. Prisoners’ escorts, messengers, etc., when returning to their
Companies from the rear, will take back six bandoliers of S.A.A. from
the forward dumps.
14. Dress:--Fighting order, with packs instead of haversacks. Every
N.C.O. and man will carry:--
1 No. 23 rifle grenade.
2 Aeroplane flares.
4 Sandbags.
1 Bandolier extra S.A.A.--Carried in the pack.
1 Lewis gun magazine
Parties of men specially selected to deal with dugouts will carry two
No. 23 rifle grenades.
Every rifle grenadier will carry six Hales No. 24 rifle grenades.
Shovels will be carried by every man, less runners, signallers,
stretcher-bearers, and Nos. 1 and 2 of Lewis gun teams.
Men carrying shovels will not carry the entrenching tool.
Bayonets will not be fixed until immediately before leaving the
assembly line.
15. The Battalion will be fitted out on the early morning of Y day.
Bombs and S.A.A. will be drawn from the St. Jean dump by small parties
from each Company. At the same time parties will draw shovels and
sandbags from the Divisional R.E. dump, St. Jean--Wieltje Road, 600
yards west of Wieltje. These carrying parties must have returned to
Congreve Walk--Liverpool Line by 5 30 a.m. on Y day. After that hour
there must be no movement over the open.
16. The Brigade main dump is at C 23 c 3 1 (old German front line).
Advanced Brigade dumps are established at Spree Farm (C 18 d 5 3) and
at dugouts C 18 d 7 5.
17. All ranks will carry during the attack the iron ration and the
unexpended portion of Z day’s rations.
Rations for Z plus 1 day will be dumped as far forward as possible.
Water bottles will be filled from the water-carts on the evening of Y
day.
18. Barrage map will be issued later.
19. Points for Liaison:--
With 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers KANSAS HOUSE.
D 14 a 0 2.
With 1/6th Liverpool Regiment D 14 c 5 4.
D 14 c 95 40.
20. Headquarters 164th and 165th Infantry Brigades will be the Wieltje
dugout. Battalion Headquarters will be at the commencement Capricorn
Keep and dugouts C 18 d 8 6; subsequent moves will be notified.
21. Aid Post:--Pond Farm, C 18 b 8 0.
22. ZERO HOUR will be 5 40 a.m.
Watches will be synchronised.
23. Communication between Companies and Battalion Headquarters will be
by runner and visual.
All messages will be duplicated by a second means of transmission.
Two pigeons will be carried by D Company and two by A Company, moving
in the leading wave.
Second Lieutenant Whitehurst will be responsible for:--
(a) Laying a wire from Battalion Headquarters to Brigade
forward station at Pond Farm, and from Battalion
Headquarters to Battalion forward command post.
(b) Establishing visual between Battalion Headquarters
and Battalion forward command post about D 13 central,
if practicable.
(c) Establishing relay runner posts about D 13 c 2 6, D 13 d 1
6, and Keir Farm.
[Illustration: Oblique Aeroplane Photograph showing our objectives in
the Battle of the MENIN ROAD--(Contrast the condition of the
foreground and the middle distance).]
Contact ’plane can be recognised by a rectangular attachment on both
lower planes and a white dumb-bell on either side of the body.
Whenever the ’plane calls for signals by sounding the klaxon horn or
firing a white Verey light, the most advanced lines of infantry will:--
(a) Light flares in the bottom of a shell hole.
(b) Show Watson fans--white and coloured sides alternately 30
seconds.
The ’plane will call for signals at ZERO plus 1 hour.
ZERO plus 2 hours.
ZERO plus 2½ hours.
and at such other times as may be necessary.
S.O.S. signal is a rifle grenade bursting into two red and two green
lights.
24. Second Lieutenant Brooke will be responsible for:--
(a) Keeping liaison with 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment during
their advance to the Yellow Line.
(b) Establishing a Battalion forward command post about D 13
central and keeping the whole front under close
observation.
25. Acknowledge in writing.
18th September, 1917. (Signed) R. N. L. BUCKMASTER,
Issued at 8 a.m. Captain and Adjutant,
1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment.
* * * * *
EXTRACTED FROM WAR DIARY.
YPRES.
15th September. Fairly quiet day.
One Other Rank reinforcement. One Other Rank to Field Ambulance sick.
16th September. About 10 45 a.m. 10 enemy aeroplanes dropped bombs in
the vicinity of the camp, causing one casualty. Road near camp heavily
shelled at dusk.
Two Other Ranks wounded.
17th September. Situation normal. Reconnaissance of forward area
carried out. W day in connection with forthcoming operations.
One Other Rank killed in VLAMERTINGHE.
18th September (X day). Day spent in fitting out, etc. On the evening
of this day the Battalion moved forward to the Congreve Walk--Liverpool
Trench line, running through the village of St. Jean. Our artillery
were very active throughout the night.
Two Other Ranks wounded. One Other Rank died of wounds.
ST. JEAN (TRENCHES).
19th September. Commencing at dawn, our artillery opened the 24 hours’
bombardment preparatory to the attack. The enemy’s reply during the day
was exceedingly feeble.
Commencing 9 30 p.m., the Battalion moved off from ST. JEAN by Platoons
at 200 yards’ distance, via the WIELTJE--GRAVENSTAFEL road. The night
was quiet, and there was practically no hostile shelling.
Battalion Headquarters were established at CAPRICORN KEEP (C 18 d
55 65) at 11 p.m. The KEEP consisted of six very strong dugouts of
reinforced concrete. Three were taken over as headquarters by this unit
and three by the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment.
Casualties:--Two Other Ranks killed; three Other Ranks wounded.
20th September. The Battalion was reported in position of assembly at
1 a.m. The lines to be taken up by the various waves were marked by
tape, which had been laid as soon as darkness permitted. When once in
position the assaulting troops lay in shell holes until ZERO hour. A
continuous drizzling rain made the ground sticky and the going bad.
The line of assembly was a north--south line running through SOMME (D
13 c 50 25). During the night things were fairly quiet, though lively
artillery fire developed on our right soon after 3 a.m.
ZERO hour was at 5 40 a.m., at which time the artillery barrage opened.
The 1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment moved forward from the
assembly position in rear of the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment. The
1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment had for its objective (1) the RED DOTTED
LINE and (2) the YELLOW LINE, and it was intended that the 1/4th Loyal
North Lancashire Regiment should “leap-frog” at the YELLOW LINE and
capture and consolidate the GREEN LINE.
The enemy barrage was promptly opened on the approximate line of our
assembly position--a proof that the enemy were fully prepared for the
attack. This caused the three rear waves, i.e., the four Companies of
the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, to close well up on to the
1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment, and it appears that in a good many
cases this was overdone, causing the two units to be intermingled and
considerably undermining the principles of organisation.
The creeping barrage was being governed by two new principles, tried
for the first time and designed to combat and counteract the enemy’s
new system of defence:--(1) there were two definite pauses in the
barrage, during which it was intended that Companies should replace
casualties from the rear and generally reorganise; (2) the barrage
started to move forward at the rate of six minutes every hundred yards
and later at the rate of eight minutes every hundred yards.
The attack to commence with went well, though a great many casualties
were inflicted by enemy machine gun fire, which from the start was
very well directed. AISNE FARM was reported taken at 6 5 a.m., though
a Platoon of the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashires had to give assistance
in the attack on this strong point. A message timed 8 17 a.m. stated,
“Attack appears to be going well.”
The first pause was made on the RED DOTTED LINE, though apparently
very little reorganisation was found practicable. Soon after moving
forward again considerable trouble was caused by hostile machine guns
on the flanks bringing enfilade fire to bear on our advancing troops.
According to reports received, this was particularly the case on the
right, where the left Battalion of the 165th Infantry Brigade was held
up before GALLIPOLI, as a result of which an enemy machine gun on Hill
37 was playing havoc with the waves in the valley through which we were
advancing.
The result of these obstructions on either flank was that the men of
this Battalion in many cases inclined outwards, leaving an exceedingly
thin line facing the original objective. In some cases whole Platoons
found themselves attacking strong points on the frontage of other
Battalions. Particularly was this so in the case of GALLIPOLI, in
the ultimate capture of which men of this Battalion very materially
assisted.
Very few of our men reached the YELLOW LINE, though a message from the
Battalion O.P., timed 8 45 a.m., stated that it appeared to be taken
and consolidation commenced. Finally, therefore, a line of resistance
was sited and consolidated about mid-day between the RED DOTTED and
YELLOW LINE, with posts of Lewis gun teams thrown out 50 to 100 yards
to the front.
The enemy was not finally dislodged from the vicinity of GALLIPOLI and
the adjoining SUVLA until after 10 a.m., by which time the barrage was
of no further assistance.
20th September. At 10 50 a.m. the enemy was reported massing for a
counter-attack in the vicinity of NILE and FOKKER FARMS, but nothing
except heavy shelling materialised on our front. Soon after 1 p.m.
various S.O.S.’s were sent up, and apparently local counter-attacks,
without any success, were launched on both our flanks.
In the afternoon an effort was made to reorganise the Battalion, which
was now reported to consist of only four Officers and 60 rifles in
the firing line. The right Battalion frontage was now being held by a
mixed line of the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment and the 1/4th Loyal
North Lancashire Regiment, stiffened by two Companies of the 1/5th
Royal Lancaster Regiment, who, as Battalion in Brigade reserve, and
detailed to assist in the capture of the objective and to deal with any
hostile counter-attack, had dug themselves in on a line in rear of our
consolidated positions.
About 7 p.m. an Officers’ patrol went forward to reconnoitre KEIR FARM
and discover whether it was held by the enemy. This patrol, however,
did not succeed in its objective and lost its way, and the project had
to be postponed till the following morning.
As soon as darkness allowed, an effort was made to examine our
positions and to find out whether measures for defence were complete.
They were found to be held by at least six Lewis guns, while there were
in all four machine guns, two of which were German, and proved very
useful against the enemy.
During the night patrols were sent out, and a further effort made to
find the defences of KEIR FARM. KEIR FARM was not identified, and it
was therefore assumed that it no longer existed as a concrete defence.
No signs of the enemy were seen. The night passed without incident,
though shelling on both sides was maintained fairly consistently.
Casualties:--
Officers:--
Killed--Captain F. W. S. Baker (Commanding B Company),
Second Lieutenant A. B. Fergie.
Wounded--Captain R. H. Tautz, M.C. (Commanding C Company),
Second Lieutenant E. G. Baker (Commanding A
Company), Second Lieutenant A. P. Smith, Second
Lieutenant H. Dance, Second Lieutenant J. Oldham,
Second Lieutenant R. Grisedale, Second
Lieutenant A. Martin, Second Lieutenant B. Myers,
Second Lieutenant C. B. Holmes (died of wounds,
28th September, 1917).
Other Ranks:--Killed 23, Wounded 161, Missing 11; Total 195.
Four Other Ranks reinforcements from base.
The following notes by an Officer who was present are added to complete
the account:--
At about 10 p.m. the Battalion began to arrive by Platoons, each
Platoon coming up in silence, knowing we were close up to the enemy
outposts, winding in single file over the uneven ground, being shown
its tape, filing along it and lying down to wait for the dawn; the
assembly was completed by 1 a.m.--the hour fixed, and apparently
unknown to the enemy.
At this hour, to add to the discomfort, a steady drizzle set in, but a
tot of rum was served out and most of the men were soon asleep, to be
waked at dawn by the crash of our opening barrage.
Battalion Headquarters retired to CAPRICORN KEEP, while the Medical
Officer and his men settled in POND GALLERIES. Both these blockhouses
had been built of concrete by the Boche to shelter his reserves from
our shelling in earlier days--during the days that followed they were
severely tested, but never failed us.
At ZERO, 5 40 a.m., while it was still dark, down came our creeping
barrage, and the King’s Own began to advance. Our men had been told
to give them a good start and, full of eagerness as they were, would
have done so had the answering enemy barrage not come down on their
tails; this had been foreseen and its position judged from previous
registration, and the assembly position was just in front--but only
just--and the “shorts” got some of our men, causing the rest to hurry
and close up on the King’s Own, who were already passing AISNE FARM. We
had to complete the capture of this, and lost heavily in the process.
Under terrific machine gun fire from the front and both flanks, causing
casualties at every step, the two Battalions struggled forward to get
to grips with their unseen enemies, and soon arrived at the two groups
of blockhouses, LOOS and GALLIPOLI, with four others lying between them.
These two groups, though the latter was off the allotted front, at
once became the immediate objectives--the left hand Companies took the
LOOS blockhouses one by one, nine in all, with bomb and bayonet; the
Companies on the right swung round and joined the King’s Liverpool
Regiment in storming GALLIPOLI; in the centre small parties of men,
their Officers having been hit, took the other four and so reached the
RED LINE.
Lieutenant Brooke went forward, and, with a few signallers, established
a forward command post near LOOS; our machine gunners came up and
turned five of the newly-taken Hun machine guns round on the enemy, and
things seemed to be going well, but the hour-long pause of the barrage
was too long, the hail of cross-fire from more distant machine guns
still continued, and the men, who had sought cover in shell holes, were
out of sight and scattered, though strenuous efforts to reorganise were
made by the few leaders who remained, and with a certain amount of
success. But the line had lost its cohesion, and when the barrage went
on only a portion of the line saw it and attempted to follow.
Lieutenant Brooke had notified the capture of the Red Line to Battalion
Headquarters, but no further message coming through, the Second in
Command went forward to clear up the situation; on reaching the Red
Line he could at first see no one, but soon stumbled into a shell hole
full of men, and was able, running from one hole to another, to locate
the whole line up to the flanks of the adjoining Battalions, and to
estimate the casualties.
The barrage had already passed the Green Line and the machine guns in
the blockhouses were active. Their crews could see every movement, and
the troops on both flanks were stationary, so that at the moment no
further advance was likely to succeed--moreover, everyone had had time
to feel the reaction. So the order was given to dig in and to send out
small patrols to try to occupy the ground immediately in front, and by
this means the line was advanced still further.
Lieutenant Holden took charge of one of these, while Second Lieutenant
Pruden supervised consolidation.
About this time the Hun seems to have realised the position, for he
opened out with every gun he had, shelling the captured pillboxes and
putting a very heavy barrage all round the aid post and Battalion
Headquarters, but his attempt at counter-attack was beaten off by
machine gun, Lewis gun, and rifle fire.
We afterwards found out that SUVLA and THE CAPITOL had not been taken,
nor had CROSS COTS--had they been the cross-machine gun fire on us
would have been much less intense.
No praise is too high for our stretcher-bearers, who--all through that
day and the succeeding days--toiled without intermission bringing in
wounded; the aid post was in the line of the Hun barrage, a concrete
structure, with a passage two feet wide on the enemy side with chambers
opening off it; the stretcher cases had to be dressed out in the open,
while the passage was crowded with walking wounded, some of them
Huns--the look of utter weariness and dejection on the faces of the
latter was a thing not easily forgotten.
The runners did splendid work; a few were killed as they made their way
over the shell-tossed ground--the wonder is that any escaped.
For five days the Battalion remained in those shell holes, beating off
one counter-attack after another with the help of our gunners, who were
truly magnificent. At first it was impossible to reorganise properly
owing to the mixing of Battalions, but ultimately a definite frontage
was allotted to us by Brigade, and that night we sorted ourselves out
from the King’s Own and Companies were picked out and given a definite
bit of line--A and B in front, C and D in close support. At the same
time the line was advanced considerably, especially on the right, the
posts on HILL 37 having been taken by the right Brigade.
Getting rations up to the line was a terrible business--runners and
guides kept losing their way, and more than one party nearly entered
Hun territory; but guide wires were laid to Companies, the C.Q.M.S.’s
did their work splendidly, and the men were fed and kept going.
About 25th September we were relieved by the 59th Division, a genial
lot--full strength--who seemed to expect to find trenches and dugouts!
Thanks to the tapes and wires which had been laid, relief was quick,
and we all dribbled back to ST. JEAN, where Companies assembled by
the cookers and had hot tea and rum served out. They were actually
singing--the revulsion, I suppose.
After a lot of delay we got into trucks on the DECAUVILLE railway (a
metre gauge affair). The Commanding Officer was balanced on the back
of the little engine, and as we started, some wit shouted out, “Don’t
move, sir! You might upset her!”
Additional light is thrown on the course of the battle by the Platoon
narratives:--
Lieutenant E. G. Baker, Commanding A Company, was hit in the head
during the advance. No. 1 Platoon Commander, Lieutenant Smith, was
badly wounded in the thigh before the first strong point was reached.
Private Wyre fired some rifle grenades into it, after which the Platoon
rushed it with men of other units, and bombed and bayonetted the enemy
out. Sergeant Beaumont then led them towards SCHULER GALLERIES, when he
was shot through the head about 50 yards behind the Red Line. About 16
men under Private Wyre found their way to the Red Line; others, with an
Officer of the King’s Own, went forward on the left. He said he would
take them to the Yellow Line, but was killed by a sniper. They were
willing to go on, but had no leader till Sergeant Knowles of No. 3 came
up and took a small party out under heavy cross-machine gun fire to the
domed strong point on the road.
No. 2 got on all right till Lieutenant Dance was hit in the arm. They
took a small strong point on the right with others helping, and also
helped to take AISNE FARM, where one Hun Officer and eight men were
taken.
Sergeant Knowles took eight men to the left to take the strong point in
the road, but there were about 30 enemy in a trench in front of it, and
he was compelled to fall back again for lack of support. Two sections
helped to take the strong point in front of LOOS.
Captain Baker, Commanding B Company, was wounded at 6 30 a.m., but
continued to advance; he was killed at 7 a.m. at a strong point about
150 yards to the right of LOOS. At this same point five out of the
Lewis gun team of seven were put out of action (one killed and four
wounded). Sergeant-Major Roberts bombed the strong point.
Sergeant Pitcher, of No. 6, with five men, assisted in the attack
on the strong points at LOOS and was severely wounded. Second
Lieutenant Fazackerley, during the pause in the barrage, advanced with
Lance-Corporal Clayton and four men to a point on a ridge to find a
possible position for Lewis gun. Here they were subject to intense
enfilade machine gun fire from the right flank in the direction of
GALLIPOLI, which made it impossible to advance further until the right
flank had advanced.
Second Lieutenant Martin, Commanding No. 11, was badly wounded
immediately after zero, and Sergeant Murphy assumed command. This
Platoon assisted in the capture of AISNE HOUSE; at least 20 Germans
were taken there.
In No. 10 Lance-Corporal Charnley was wounded immediately after zero,
and during the pause Mr. Myers and one or two others were sniped, and
when they moved forward again only one bomber remained.
In No. 9, at nightfall, Mr. Fergie, Mr. Holmes, and two Sergeants went
forward to reconnoitre a forward position. The two Officers were struck
by a shell and were both very badly wounded. Lance-Corporal Anderton
took over command. Private Pendlebury was wounded on the afternoon of
the 23rd for the third time. C Company Commander (Captain Tautz) was
wounded at the first pause.
No. 13, owing to the darkness, got mixed up with the 1/4th King’s Own
on the left flank, and helped the Lancashire Fusiliers to carry SCHULER
GALLERIES.
D Company Headquarters Lewis gun team, when near GALLIPOLI, was shot
down by machine gun fire, but Corporal Prescott retrieved the gun.
Visual communication with the Battalion forward signalling post was
opened from behind a dugout at D 13 b 1 0 by Private Roocroft, Company
Signaller, and Private Parkinson, of B Company, and was maintained
by shutter and lamp until the night of the 21st. On the morning of
the 21st, Corporal Prescott and Private Goodwin, Company Runner, went
forward of the line and shot some enemy snipers who had been annoying
the troops in the line. On the evening of the 23rd, during an intensely
heavy bombardment, Corporal Prescott volunteered and kept observation
all the time, though wounded in the shoulder by shrapnel, and refused
to go to the aid post until the troops were relieved.
No. 14 attacked the strong point at D 13 d 2 6 in conjunction with
a party of the 1/4th King’s Own, then Second Lieutenant Holden and
the remaining men of his party moved to attack GALLIPOLI, which was
holding up the advance. This fight lasted about an hour.
On the 21st September, Second Lieutenant Holden, who was patrolling to
KEIR FARM, was writing a message to send by pigeon when he was killed.
There were four other casualties, and the pigeons were killed.
No. 15. At 10 a.m. on 21st September, Second Lieutenant Pruden took a
small patrol to KEIR FARM. During the night an advanced post held by
Lance-Corporal Gorton and five men with two Lewis guns was buried. One
gun was in action again immediately, and the other after six hours.
* * * * *
EXTRACTED FROM WAR DIARY.
TRENCHES.
21st September. There was fairly lively shelling at dawn, but the
situation was reported quiet at 7 30 a.m. The front was continually
patrolled before daylight and no signs of the enemy found. During the
morning a further Officers’ patrol worked forward to KEIR FARM and
confirmed the previous report that it was practically non-existent. On
the afternoon of this day the strength of the Companies in the line was
reported at 90, though it was known there were still many more men of
this unit who had become merged in the Battalions on either flank.
At about 4 40 p.m. the 1/8th King’s Liverpool Regiment, on the left of
the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers, attacked and occupied SCHULER FARM.
Owing to the small amount of resistance encountered it was decided that
the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers should take CROSS COTTS and that then
the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment should conform by moving
forward to the new alignment. The attack on CROSS COTTS, however,
never materialised, as at 6 30 p.m. heavy enemy counter-attacks were
launched on Hill 37 on our right, and on the London Division on our
left, the front held by this unit simply being subjected to an intense
bombardment. Our artillery promptly replied to the S.O.S., and no enemy
succeeded in reaching our lines.
During the ensuing night a further effort was made to complete the
reorganisation by separating the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment and the
1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment. This unit took over the south,
viz., 200 yards of the KEIR sector, extending approximately from D 13
d 23 32 to D 13 d 23 75. By this means a few more men were collected
together. The Battalion was then organised on a two-Company frontage
with two Companies in support, and the whole line was straightened and
pushed forward an average depth of 50 yards. It was found that the only
practicable way of doing this was by arranging a system of guide wires
of a fixed length, which were taken out by posts in advance and, after
their direction, etc., had been checked, the rear wave advanced along
them by Platoons and took up the new alignment. It was intended that
this process should be repeated by leap-frogging the two waves until
the YELLOW LINE was reached, but owing to the still imperfect state
of organisation, it was decided to postpone this movement until the
following night.
During this night, however, guide wires were laid from the main line
to the isolated Lewis gun posts 100 yards in front. This ensured
cohesion and gave the most forward men confidence. Guide wires were
also made from the main line of resistance to Battalion Headquarters to
facilitate the work during the night of carrying parties bringing up
S.A.A. and food.
The enemy’s artillery was quiet during the night, but our own was very
busy, apparently with gas shells, upon the enemy’s batteries.
Killed:--Second Lieutenant H. Holden and two Other Ranks.
Wounded:--Two Other Ranks.
22nd September. There was a certain amount of shelling about dawn,
otherwise the day was quiet.
As soon as it was dark, the right of the Battalion was advanced 150
yards and connected with a machine gun in a shell hole near KEIR FARM
about D 13 d 60 55. This movement, which was successfully carried
out with the help of guide wires, brought our line round in such
a way as to face the enemy, whose position now ran approximately
north-west--south-east. Connection was also maintained with the 165th
Brigade on our right, but in view of the fact that the latter were
being relieved, it was not considered advisable to carry out any
further advance, so as to avoid any possibility of bringing down an
enemy S.O.S. barrage.
The usual posts were pushed out in advance of the new line.
Owing to the exhaustion of several Officers in the line, two were
brought down for a rest to Battalion Headquarters, and the Signalling
and Intelligence Officers took over control of the Companies. The night
was quiet. Two Companies of the 2/6th North Staffordshires came into
support to our Brigade.
Casualties:--Two Other Ranks wounded.
23rd September. The day passed without incident. Patrols before dawn
saw nothing of the enemy. An S.O.S. was sent up on our right at 3 50
p.m., but nothing materialised.
At 5 p.m. the enemy heavily bombarded our positions, and our front
line system and the vicinity of Battalion Headquarters were heavily
bombarded for three hours. By 8 15 p.m. all was quiet again and the
relief was begun. The relieving unit was the 2/6th North Staffordshires
(59th Division), who took over our frontage with one Company. Relief
was completed without casualties about 11 p.m.
A special effort was made to secure identifications before being
relieved, and a patrol that went out with this object in view returned
with two prisoners, who were encountered in NO MAN’S LAND. The capture
of these prisoners proved the presence of the third German Division
opposite this part of the line since the attack was launched on the
20th.
Upon relief, Companies concentrated at St. Jean, where, after hot tea
had been supplied from the cookers, a train was provided to take the
Battalion to VLAMERTINGHE.
24th September. The Battalion arrived at camp south of VLAMERTINGHE
at 4 30 a.m. Morning was spent in resting, etc. At 3 p.m. the Brigade
entrained and travelled from VLAMERTINGHE to POPERINGHE, detrained at
POPERINGHE, and boarded ’buses at a point about one mile south-west of
the town. By this means we went to WATOU area, and were accommodated in
tents at Hill Camp (K 12 d 7 8).
143 Other Ranks from reinforcement camp.
11 Other Ranks from base.
* * * * *
TELEGRAMS:
“Please convey to all ranks 55th Division the Army Commander’s
congratulations on the fine record of the Division during the hard
fighting of the past two months. The Army Commander wishes specially
to thank all ranks for their splendid efforts, which have contributed
greatly to the success of the last attack and to wish them all good
luck and success in the future. Despite their long period in the line
prior to commencement of operations they have well maintained and
increased their high reputation.
“FIFTH ARMY.”
“Brigadier-General Stuart and all ranks West Lancashire Reserve Brigade
send heartiest congratulations to West Lancashire Division on their
splendid success.”
“Well done, 55th West Lancashire Division! Accept my most hearty
congratulations. I sincerely trust your losses are not heavy.
“DERBY.”
* * * * *
To All Ranks of the 55th (West Lancashire) Division.
I regret that owing to the move of the Division I have not been able to
see all units since the fight on 20th September. I hope to do so later
as opportunity offers.
The messages received from higher Commanders and others since the
battle have been published from time to time as received and have no
doubt been read by all ranks, who will see from these messages how well
the higher Commanders have appreciated the work of the Division.
In addition, I have recently been allowed to see the reports on the
Division rendered to General Headquarters by the Army and the Corps in
which we served. In these reports the Division is spoken of as “a good
fighting Division possessing the right spirit” and as “a first-rate
Division.” I know that all ranks throughout the Division will share the
pride that I feel myself in reading those opinions of the Commanders
under whom we have served.
I have also had the advantage of reading scores of stories of
individual courage, determination, endurance, and self-sacrifice,
narrated by Commanding Officers in bringing the services of individuals
of all ranks to notice for recognition. These stories increase my pride
in the Division and my confidence in it.
The West Lancashire Division had a good reputation before the recent
fighting in front of Ypres. You have now won for it a reputation second
to none in the Expeditionary Force, and every soldier in the Division
may well be proud of belonging to it. That reputation I feel confident
you will cherish and maintain. We are now in an easy part of the line,
but ordinary trench duties demand constant alertness, endurance, and
conscientious observance of orders; besides it is up to us at all times
to take advantage of any opportunities for aggressive action which will
cause loss or damage to the enemy. It is by such action, as well as
by smartness and good discipline when out of the line, that the great
reputation of the West Lancashire Division can, and I am sure will, be
kept up by each soldier in it, of every rank.
H. S. JEUDWINE,
55th Division Headquarters, Major-General,
10th October, 1917. Commanding 55th Division.
* * * * *
The following decorations were awarded in respect of the battle and
announced on 11th November:--
MILITARY CROSS Captain A. T. Houghton.
Second Lieutenant S. A. H. Pruden.
Second Lieutenant L. Brooke.
D.C.M. 200051 C.S.M. Roberts, H.
200077 Corporal Prescott, S.
MILITARY MEDAL 200782 Private Parks, T.
201197 Corporal Thompson, J.
200682 Private Coupe, F.
200895 Lance-Sergeant Knowles, R.
12154 Lance-Corporal Cayton, R.
290665 Private Pendlebury, T.
202967 Private Yates, W.
291178 Private Goodwin, H.
201350 Corporal Robinson, J.
29679 Private Parkinson, T.
34304 Private Jones, T.
16940 Private Cunningham, D.
202099 Private Wyre, F.
200756 Lance-Corporal Gorton, F.
201542 Sergeant Bell, H.
6693 Lance-Sergeant Murphey, J.
200352 Private Thistleton, T.
238002 Private Roocroft, W.