THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES.
15th July, 1917, to 1st August, 1917.
On the 17th July, 1917, the preliminary bombardment of the enemy lines
by our guns commenced. In the early morning ten shells from a Hun high
velocity gun landed on Battalion Headquarters, one actually entering
the Colonel’s dugout and exploding there without injuring him!
On the night following, a fighting patrol of ours had a brush with a
Hun patrol in NO MAN’S LAND, and did good work, bringing back a dead
German, who turned out to belong to the 449th Infantry Regiment, who
were expected to be opposite to us. On the 20th Second Lieutenant
Vincent took a raiding party of 20 in to the enemy lines and found a
post of four men; two fled, one was bayonetted, and one taken prisoner.
During these days artillery had been active, and our casualties were 6
killed, 13 wounded, 2 gassed.
On the 21st we suffered rather heavily from enemy artillery, a single
shell hitting 9 men, our total casualties on that day being 11 killed
and 14 wounded, of whom 2 afterwards died--our worst day since the
SOMME. The Quartermaster, Lieutenant March, was wounded but remained
on duty. In the evening we were relieved by the 1/5th King’s Liverpool
Regiment, and went back to a canvas camp near POPERINGHE, where all had
a bath, and then marched on to WATOU, resting there for three days and
returning to the canvas camp on the 25th. Captain L. Duckworth rejoined
us here, and Second Lieutenant Holmes reported for duty.
During the night of the 27th enemy aeroplanes dropped bombs near our
camp.
The following Operation Order and the details of the attack are
taken verbatim from the War Diary, the official record, and are
very complete, but a few prefatory words are necessary to make them
intelligible to the general reader.
The 55th Division was at this time in the 19th Corps of the 5th Army,
which, with the 2nd Army and the 1st French Army, were to attack the
enemy’s GHELUVELT-LANGEMARCK line; the task allotted to our Brigade
(164), was to pass through the other two Brigades of the Division when
they had taken their objectives and capture the third-line system,
mostly consisting of concrete blockhouses, which we were to meet for
the first time.
The barrage is officially stated to have been the most intense which
had ever been put down up to that time, and largely contributed to the
success of the attack. Another novelty for us was “B team,” a nucleus
of Officers, Warrant Officers, N.C.O.’s and men who were kept out of
the attack so that the Battalion could be reorganised as quickly as
possible afterwards; the Order had been issued by the Higher Command
some months before, and to it was largely due the wonderful speed with
which units recovered from battles which in earlier years would have
taken nearly all their leaders and specialists and rendered them unfit
for action for at least six months.
The following Officers actually went up with the Battalion for the
battle, the remainder being on B team. Of those that went up, only the
Commanding Officer, Adjutant, Transport Officer, and Second Lieutenant
Higson came through unwounded.
Lieutenant-Colonel R. Hindle Commanding.
Captain Ord Second in Command.
Captain Shegog, R.A.M.C. Medical Officer.
Captain Caley Chaplain.
Lieutenant Buckmaster Adjutant.
Second Lieutenant Ashcroft Signalling Officer.
Second Lieutenant Williams Intelligence Officer.
Second Lieutenant Bardsley Transport Officer.
Captain A. L. Harris }
Second Lieutenant Ordish } A Company.
Second Lieutenant Tyldesley }
Second Lieutenant Macsweeny }
Lieutenant Ogden }
Second Lieutenant Vincent } B Company.
Second Lieutenant Easterby }
Second Lieutenant Rigby }
Captain Hore }
Second Lieutenant Higson } C Company.
Second Lieutenant Mather }
Lieutenant Ostrehan }
Second Lieutenant Fullerton } D Company.
Second Lieutenant Holden }
The aeroplane photograph read in conjunction with the map will help
to give the reader some idea of the country as it actually was, for
though July as a whole had been fine, there was a heavy thunderstorm
on the 29th, which turned the tracks and roads into morasses and
filled the shell holes with water. “The succeeding days were dull and
heavy, making the completion of the artillery preparation peculiarly
difficult, and typical Flanders weather prevailed on the morning of the
31st--the moment chosen for the attack.
“Low-lying clouds which made aerial observation and co-operation as
difficult as could be imagined; a dampness of atmosphere, threatening
rain at any moment; a half-sodden ground, greasy and depressing--such
was the luck of the weather when the barrage opened.”[H]
The Operation Order for the attack is set out below practically in
full. It is impossible to summarize it without losing some detail which
may be of interest to readers.
[Illustration]
THE OPERATION ORDER.
1. On Z Day, the 55th Division will take part in a general attack.
Battalion on the right--6th Cameron Highlanders.
Battalion on the left--2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers.
165th Brigade will capture the FREZENBERG line before the
advance of the 164th Brigade begins.
Brigade support--1/8th Liverpool Regiment, who will, after the
capture of final objectives, consolidate the general line K of
KEIR FARM--SCHULER FARM.
Brigade reserve--1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment, who will,
after the capture of final objectives, consolidate the general
line GALLIPOLI--SOMME--HINDU COT.
2. At ZERO plus 4hrs. 40mins. the Battalion will advance in artillery
formation from the position of assembly and deploy as necessary, at the
discretion of the Platoon Commanders, before crossing the Black Line.
The attack will then be made behind a creeping barrage, in four waves.
The BLACK DOTTED LINE will be captured and held as an outpost line, the
GREEN LINE being consolidated.
3. Distribution and Formation for Attack.
Right Front Company D.
Left Front Company A.
Right Support Company C.
Left Support Company B.
Between Assembly Line and Black Line, the formation will be four lines
of Platoons in file or fours, at 50 yards’ distance.
After crossing the Black Line the formation will be four waves at 50
yards’ distance.
The second wave will close up to the first, and the third wave to
the second, before the first and second waves reach their respective
objectives.
4. Machine Guns.
One sub-section will move in rear of each supporting Company. They
will occupy the outpost line, one gun being placed in each of the four
strong points that will be constructed, upon receiving orders from the
O.C. Battalion.
5. Objectives of Waves and Commanders.
The first wave will capture the line of trenches D 20 a 33 90--D 14 a
10 20 and all buildings north-west of KANSAS CROSS within the Battalion
boundary and on the south-west side of the ZONNEBEKE--WINNIPEG road. A
special party will be told off to bomb forward along the trench leading
towards the Green Line from D 14 c 30 70. This line will be under
command of O.C. D Company.
The second wave will capture the Green Line; this line will be under
the command of O.C. A Company.
Third wave will pass through first and second waves, and will capture
BLACK DOTTED LINE and will be under command of O.C. C Company.
Fourth wave will collect Nos. 4, 5, and 6 mopping-up parties and will
help in the consolidation of the Green Line. This wave will be prepared
to assist the third wave in the capture of its objectives.
6. Consolidation.
The consolidation, which will commence at once, will be carried out in
depth and will take the form of three lines of strong points, namely,
those held by Nos. 1, 2, and 3 waves.
These strong points will ultimately be joined up to form trenches.
One Company of the 1/8th Liverpool Regiment will be available to assist
in digging.
It is essential that artillery shelters for the Garrison should be
constructed before dawn on Z plus 1 day.
Strong points will be constructed at the following places:--
D 14 d 05 30.--By the second wave, where touch will be gained
with Battalion on right.
Also at--
D 14 b 20 05. }
D 14 a 9 5. } By the third wave, and touch gained with the
D 8 c 7 1. } Battalion on our left.
One machine gun will move up into each of these strong points as soon
as the ground has been gained and consolidation begins.
7. Battalion Headquarters.
Prior to advance will be in the mined dugout in CONGREVE WALK.
During advance Battalion Headquarters will move between the two rear
Companies.
A temporary headquarters will be established about POMMERN CASTLE.
8. Assembly.
The Battalion, with machine guns, trench mortars, and mopping-up
parties, will occupy CONGREVE WALK between POTIJZE road and LONE
street. Order from right to left:--
15 Platoon.
Mopping-up party No. 1.
9 Platoon.
16 Platoon.
Right sub-section machine guns.
13 Platoon.
12 Platoon.
Mopping-up party No. 5.
Mopping-up party No. 4.
14 Platoon.
Trench mortars.
Battalion Headquarters.
3 Platoon.
Mopping-up party No. 2.
6 Platoon.
1 Platoon.
Left sub-section machine guns.
7 Platoon.
2 Platoon.
5 Platoon.
Mopping-up party No. 6.
Mopping-up party No. 3.
4 Platoon.
9. Mopping-up Parties.
For during the attack will follow:
1. Trenches north-west of IBERIA and dugouts at
D 19 b 10 65 15 Platoon.
2. Gallipoli dugouts and trenches as far west as
Somme exclusive 3 Platoon.
3. Somme and trenches north-west as far as Battalion
boundary 4 Platoon.
4. Works at D 14 c 1 2 14 Platoon.
5. Keir Farm 14 Platoon.
6. Buildings 100 yards west of Kansas Cross 4 Platoon.
Parties 1, 2, and 3 will be furnished by 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment.
Parties 4 and 5 by C Company 1/4th North Lancashire Regiment.
Party 6 by B Company 1/4th North Lancashire Regiment.
These parties will merge into the waves immediately in front of them
before reaching their objectives.
Parties found by the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment will be absorbed by
their own unit as soon as it reaches them.
Parties found by the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment will be
furnished from fourth wave, and upon completion of their task will be
absorbed by that wave as it passes over them.
Each mopping-up party will consist of one Platoon.
10. Trench Mortars.
One sub-section of trench mortars will assemble in CONGREVE WALK, close
to the mined dugouts, and will move near Battalion Headquarters in the
attack, ready to deal with any points of resistance that may hold out.
They will take up position on the line D 14 Central--Toronto Farm,
after all objectives have been taken.
11. Medical.
Aid post prior to advance I 4 a 6 4.
During the advance, the Medical Officer will move in rear of the centre
of the Battalion and will establish an aid post in the vicinity of
POMMERN CASTLE.
12. Communications.
During the advance, communications will be by runner--visual being
established whenever halted. Second Lieutenant ASHCROFT will
establish:--
1. A Battalion command post, about D 19 a 4 4, and will
arrange telephonic communication with 164th Brigade office
near Rat Farm.
2. An advance command post about Hill 35, and connect up by
telephone with Brigade forward station, near Somme Farm.
3. Runner relay post about D 19 a 2 8.
13. Dress and Equipment.
Dress:--Fighting order with packs.
Ammunition:--120 rounds S.A.A on every man except--
(1) Signallers.
(2) Scouts.
(3) Runners.
(4) Lewis Gunners.
(5) Bombers.
(6) Rifle Grenadiers, carrying No. 20 grenades.
All of whom will carry 50 rounds S.A.A.
In addition, every N.C.O. and man will carry:--
(1) In the pack.--Towel and soap, spare oil tin, holdall,
rations (see para. 14), extra water bottle (containing cold
tea without sugar or milk), groundsheet, and mess tin.
(2) In each top pocket of the jacket.--One No. 23 rifle
grenade complete with rod and cartridge (except Rifle
Grenadiers carrying No. 20 grenades).
(3) In each bottom pocket of the jacket.--One aeroplane flare.
(4) Under the braces of the pack.--Three sandbags.
In addition to the above--
(a) Each bomber will carry eight No. 23 grenades in bomb
buckets.
(b) Sixteen extra pairs wirecutters will be issued to each
Company and will be equally distributed amongst Platoons.
(c) S.O.S. signals will be issued at the rate of five per
Company.
(d) All Rifle Grenadiers wearing grenade carriers will carry
six No. 20 grenades. These will not be detonated until the
Battalion arrives at CONGREVE WALK.
Rifle Grenadiers will carry their 50 rounds of ammunition in a
bandolier and will discard their S.A.A. pouches.
Orders re carrying of heavy tools will be issued later.
Men carrying heavy tools will not carry entrenching tool.
All the stores mentioned above will be issued in the concentration area
on X/Y night.
14. Supply.
(a) Rations.
(1) Rations for consumption on Z day will be delivered to
Companies from Quartermaster’s Stores on X day.
(2) Rations for Z plus 1 day will be drawn at the
concentration area on the night X/Y.
(3) Rations for Z plus 2 day will be at the Brigade Dump,
near junction of Milner Trench and Congreve Walk, and will
ultimately be brought forward by pack transport.
Scale of rations for Z, Z plus 1 and Z plus 2 day will be as follows:--
Preserved Meat 1lb.
Biscuits 1lb.
Sugar 2oz.
Tea 5-8oz.
Jam 3oz.
Solidified Alcohol One 8oz. tin for eight men.
(b) Water.
800 gallons of water will be held in reservoirs for 164
Brigade on the line Liverpool Trench--Congreve Walk, and water
bottles will be filled from this source on Y/Z night.
On Z day, 800 gallons of water for the Brigade will be sent
forward in petrol tins for use on Z plus 1 day.
15. Dumps.
Brigade dumps will be formed as follows:--
Advanced dump on road at about D 13 c 1 8.
Right Forward dump--GALLIPOLI.
The advanced dump will be formed and maintained by transport with the
following stores:--
S.A.A.
Lewis gun drums.
No. 23 grenades.
No. 20 grenades.
Flares.
Blank Cartridges.
Verey Lights.
1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment will be responsible for carrying from
the advanced dump to the forward dump and will provide one Platoon for
carrying from the forward dump to Companies.
EXTRACTED FROM WAR DIARY.
POPERINGHE.
28th July. Announced to be W day in connection with forthcoming
operations. Bombs again dropped during night fairly near our camp.
Second Lieutenant W. Young and three Other Ranks to Field Ambulance
sick.
29th July. X day in connection with forthcoming operations.
Preparations made for moving into concentration area. At 9 p.m. the
Battalion (less party of 100 Other Ranks and seven Officers who were
being left out of the attack) marched off from camp by Platoons at
300 yards’ distance. There was comparatively little shelling, and
the concentration area was reached (H 10 c) without casualties. It
consisted of camouflaged trenches and bivouac sheets erected under
hedges. Battalion Headquarters was established in a ruined farm with
a siege battery of R.G.A. at 2 30 a.m. The Battalion was fitted out
with rations for Y, Z, and Z plus 1 days, bombs, wirecutters, aeroplane
flares, S.O.S. signals, sandbags, etc.
VLAMERTINGHE.
30th July. Y day. Strict orders had been issued with regard to
restricting movement, so as to preclude the possibility of the
concentration being made known to the enemy. As a matter of fact, it
was a very dull day, and visibility was never even fair. During the
late afternoon, the Brigadier and Divisional Commander visited the
Battalion and wished us good luck. At 9 25 p.m., in drizzling rain, the
first Platoon moved off towards the trenches, followed by the remaining
Platoons at intervals of 200 yards. The mopping-up parties (three in
number) provided for our Battalion by 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment
moved with us into such positions as to arrive in their correct
position of assembly.
30th July. The route taken was the main VLAMERTINGHE--YPRES road to
the WATER TOWER I 7 c 85 95, thence by tramline to where it joined
No. 5 track, running parallel and in between the YPRES--POTIJZE road
and YPRES--ST. JEAN road, joining CONGREVE WALK, our assembly trench,
at about I 4 a 45 90. On arrival here, Battalion Headquarters was
established in the mined dugout at the VINERY I 4 a 65 80. CONGREVE
WALK was reached without a casualty, not a shell being fired during the
whole time the Battalion was on the roads and tracks. Our artillery
was very active, raining gas shells on the enemy continuously for four
hours from about 10 p.m. to 2 a.m. At one time--about 11 30 p.m.--the
enemy sent a few mustard-gas shells, in the vicinity of CONGREVE WALK,
causing momentary sneezing and a temporary cessation of the work of
drawing tools. After tools had been drawn there was nothing further to
do except have hot tea--two cookers being concealed near ST. JEAN with
this end in view.
Two Other Ranks wounded.
31st July. Z day. At ZERO hour (3 50 a.m.) the 55th Division assaulted,
taking part in a general attack of the 5th Army, part of the 2nd Army,
and the 1st French Army.
At ZERO the 165th and 166th Infantry Brigades attacked and captured
the Blue Line. The artillery barrage commenced at ZERO. It did not
provoke any reply in the neighbourhood of CONGREVE WALK until about 4
15 a.m., when a few 4.2’s and 5.9’s fell in the trench and caused a
few casualties. From 4 30 a.m. onwards, German prisoners came past
in continuous streams, in many cases being utilised to carry down our
wounded. From the Blue Line the 165th and 166th Brigades moved on to
the Black Line; the artillery provided a protective barrage to cover
consolidation. At ZERO plus 4 hours 40 minutes, the 164th Infantry
Brigade moved off in artillery formation from CONGREVE WALK, 1/4th
Loyal North Lancashires on the right, with 1/4th Royal Lancaster
Regiment in support and 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers on the left with
1/8th (Irish) Liverpools in support.
Second Lieutenant Ashcroft (Signalling Officer) was killed by a nosecap
as we started off, otherwise everything went off satisfactorily.
The enemy were dropping shells, both high-explosive and shrapnel,
promiscuously between CONGREVE WALK and our original front line, but
there was no difficulty in eluding the areas to which attention was
being paid. It was a dull misty morning, and so there were neither
aeroplanes nor balloons in the air to detect the advancing troops. As
we passed over NO MAN’S LAND, Companies were well shaken out into their
various squares and the direction was being well kept. The enemy wire
in front of his first line system was practically non-existent and
provided no obstacle. The trenches appeared very badly smashed in and
in places obliterated, though here and there appeared small concrete
dugouts apparently still intact.
The advance continued to go well, and the Platoon Commanders with the
help of their compasses maintained their direction. The enemy were
apparently pre-occupied finding out exactly where their own infantry
were and also in moving back some of their guns. Consequently, we
were very little troubled by shells, but machine gun fire caused us
considerable annoyance. It was mostly coming apparently from our right
flank, perhaps from some strong point which had not been sufficiently
mopped-up. However, although bullets were flying everywhere, the
range had not been correctly estimated, and so we suffered very few
casualties in this way before reaching the Black Line.
At ZERO plus 6hrs. 20mins. (10 10 a.m.) the 164th Infantry Brigade
formed up under the protective barrage, which stood about 200 yards on
the enemy’s side of the Black Line, and moved forward to attack and
consolidate the Green Line. Just before forming up under the barrage,
we were caused a little trouble by some snipers who had apparently been
swept over by the barrage and were lying out in shell holes. From now
onwards the artillery barrage was rather thin, owing to the fact that
it was out of range for some of the guns which had fired during the
initial assault and because it was being provided by batteries who had
moved forward since ZERO to positions in the vicinity of the original
NO MAN’S LAND. When the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashires moved off from
the Black Line, touch had been obtained with the 2/5th Lancashire
Fusiliers on the left and the 6th Cameron Highlanders (45th Infantry
Brigade, 15th Division) on the right. During the subsequent advance
from the Black Line to the Green Line the casualties, which were
particularly heavy amongst Officers, were again principally caused by
machine gun fire. Reports were received from several Officers giving
their location, and those machine guns immediately in our line of
advance were effectively dealt with, but we were still troubled by
guns firing from high ground beyond the Green Line and also by guns
enfilading us from our right flank.
Several strong points had to be dealt with in the course of the
advance, particular mention being made of SOMME FARM, GALLIPOLI, and
KEIR FARM. SOMME FARM provided us with 60 prisoners; it consisted of
several concrete dugouts, one being an aid post, and had evidently been
used as a Battalion Headquarters. There were also concrete dugouts at
KEIR FARM and GALLIPOLI, each of which provided us with prisoners.
The Green Line was reported captured at 11 40 a.m., and consolidation
was at once put in hand. While this was in progress, hostile machine
guns again proved troublesome, especially from NILE FARM. During the
advance to the Green Line six batteries--77mm.--were encountered. The
gunners continued to fire them until our advancing waves were within
about 200-250 yards, and then withdrew. On arrival at the Green Line
difficulty was experienced in husbanding the available resources of
ammunition until a further supply could be brought up. Demands were
received from all parts of the line, but they were unable to be met for
some considerable time, owing to the fact that the pack animals, which
were bringing up supplies, were experiencing difficulties owing to the
unexpected quantity of uncut wire.
Meanwhile, while the GREEN LINE was being energetically consolidated,
the third wave moved on to take the BLACK DOTTED or OUTPOST LINE. This
was established along a line running about 200 yards in front of the
GREEN LINE. Our own barrage appeared to fall a trifle short at this
point, and consequently our line was held up slightly and could not be
established on the intended line. Fifty prisoners were captured and
sent back by the Platoons comprising the outpost line. A message timed
11 41 a.m. stated “enemy in full flight.”
At 12 10 p.m. our protective barrage ceased. Meanwhile the outpost line
was being put into a state of defence by the construction of a series
of strong points, though considerable difficulty was being experienced
in maintaining touch on the left. On the right we appeared to be in
touch, but it was obvious that the right flank Company of the 6th
Camerons was not up to its alignment, and, consequently, their line was
swung back.
The difficulties about ammunition continued to increase. Many Lewis
guns were used until every round had been expended, but there was
still none available for issue at Battalion Headquarters. Things went
well until 2 30 p.m., when a report was received that the enemy were
forming up for counter-attack in the vicinity of BOETLEER. At 2 35 p.m.
a strong counter-attack developed on the right, and the 6th Camerons
on our right were seen to be withdrawing. This attempt on the part of
the enemy was immediately followed by an attack on our left. With the
enemy advancing on both flanks and closing together in the centre, our
outpost line, seriously weakened, particularly on the left, withdrew,
and was absorbed into the GREEN LINE. This line in turn then had to
withdraw as there was no touch on the right, and the 2/5th Lancashire
Fusiliers had had to fall back well behind the GREEN LINE owing to the
GREEN LINE not having been taken by the Divisions on their left.
The withdrawal was carried out in perfect order, the troops fighting as
they moved back. By this time our supporting Battalion, the 1/4th Royal
Lancaster Regiment, had merged itself into our line, and the combined
forces of the two Battalions formed a line of resistance just in front
of the BLACK LINE. Posts of Lewis and machine guns were thrown out as
soon as it was dark, and our protective barrage and S.O.S. line was
withdrawn to conform with our new line.
In the evening, about 10 p.m., a warning order was received to the
effect that the Brigade would be relieved by units of the 165th Brigade.
Further general observations will be made under date August 1st.
Casualties during operations on the 31st July.:--
Officers:--Killed--Captain A. L. Harris (commanding A Company),
Second Lieutenant G. Ashcroft (Signals),
Second Lieutenant B. H. Williams (Intelligence
Officer), Second Lieutenant V. Mather, Second
Lieutenant F. Fullerton, and Second Lieutenant
J. H. Ogden (Commanding B Company).
Died of Wounds--Captain R. W. Shegog, R.A.M.C.
Wounded and Missing--Lieutenant D. H. Ostrehan (Commanding D
Company), and Second Lieutenant C. Rigby.
Missing--Second Lieutenant D. H. MCSweeney and Second
Lieutenant H. S. Holden.
Wounded--Second Lieutenant H. Tyldesley, Second Lieutenant
H. C. Vincent, Second Lieutenant F. C. Jenkinson,
Second Lieutenant E. M. Easterby, Captain R. Ord,
Captain W. L. B. Caley, Second Lieutenant L.
Howarth (with 164th T.M.B.), and Second
Lieutenant J. E. Ordish.
Other Ranks:--Killed 44, Wounded 179, Missing 77.
Total Casualties:--Officers 19, Other Ranks 300.
1st August, 1917. Following message has been received:--
“Well done, one-six-four. I am very proud of what you did to-day. It
was a fine performance, and no fault of yours you could not stay.”
GENERAL JEUDWINE.
“I congratulate all units on having earned this praise, which I know to
be well deserved.”
C. I. STOCKWELL,
Brigadier-General,
Commanding 164th Infantry Brigade.
The above account may now be amplified and illuminated by a short
summary of the adventures of each Company and Platoon--taken from the
original narratives of the Battalion, which, written in most cases from
the account of surviving private soldiers, are now in the custody of
Colonel C. F. Coop, D.S.O., at Liverpool.
A Company lost its Commander, Captain Harris, soon after passing
the Black Line--he was shot by a sniper; C.S.M. Dudley was later on
wounded and taken prisoner; No. 1 Platoon had its Commander (Sergeant
Entwistle) and the Lewis Gun Corporal wounded when leaving CONGREVE
WALK. It came under machine gun fire just before reaching the BLACK
LINE, and by the time it reached KANSAS CROSS only eleven were left.
“About 12 45 p.m. a heavy machine gun barrage started on our line, and
about 2 p.m. the enemy were seen counter-attacking over ridge on our
right, and I saw the Highlanders withdrawing. This was immediately
followed by an attack on our left. We held on for fully half an hour,
when the order came down from the right, ‘Go back, one by one.’ Only
six of our Platoon were left. We withdrew to shell holes 50 yards back,
though the people on our left and right had fallen farther back. The
enemy were then very close to us, and I think he captured one or two
prisoners.
“At this point we lost touch on both flanks, because we were in advance
of the rest of the line; we therefore withdrew as well as we could,
fighting and firing as we went. We managed to rejoin our own line
just before dusk, and found a few more of our Platoon who had become
separated.”
No. 2 was held up in front of SOMME FARM, a machine gun playing on it
from there; a tank came up and reported to Second Lieutenant McSweeny
and moved to attack.
No. 2 rushed the machine gun and took 60 prisoners. The position
consisted of about six very strong concrete dugouts, one of which was a
Regimental Aid Post and contained several wounded enemy.
At the GREEN LINE they came under heavy shell fire. The enemy could be
seen in full flight, and our Lewis gunners fired on them. There were 15
or 16 of the Platoon left, and they began to dig in; they were in touch
on both flanks.
Later they saw the enemy advancing to counter-attack over the ridge
in front, in several waves, extending to about one and a half yards
between each man, and Second Lieutenant McSweeny was taken prisoner.
Second Lieutenant Tyldsley, commanding No. 3, was wounded just after
passing the BLACK LINE, when it came under very heavy machine gun fire
but advanced to the GREEN LINE without ever being held up.
No. 4 Platoon had ten killed and three wounded by one shell before
leaving Congreve Walk, and Second Lieutenant Ordish was wounded during
the advance.
They were held up by SOMME and by a further line of strong points 150
yards beyond, from which they got about 20 prisoners.
Lieutenant Ogden, Commanding B Company, was killed.
No. 5 went through SOMME, and most of the garrison gave themselves up.
A few tried to run away, and were fired on.
They went through to the outpost line and began to dig in. Second
Lieutenant Mather was siting the trench when he was killed by a
sniper’s bullet, and Sergeant Nabb took over the Platoon.
No. 6, after A Company had dealt with SOMME, moved on to a line of
posts about 500 or 600 yards farther on, which they passed on the flank
and moved on to the outpost line.
No. 7 Platoon, except Lewis gunners, were detached to carry trench
mortar ammunition for the 164th Trench Mortar Battery. Eighteen men
were detached for this purpose. Ten became casualties before leaving
CONGREVE WALK, one shell hitting the lot. The remaining eight carried
up their loads, but quickly became casualties; only two arrived at the
GREEN LINE, carrying four rounds each.
Sergeant Ward was killed.
No. 8 Platoon was detached to mop up Kansas Cross, and was formed up in
rear of No. 4 Platoon, A Company. It suffered ten casualties from shell
fire before leaving CONGREVE WALK, all the bombers being knocked out,
and had a few more casualties before reaching the BLACK LINE, and when
it got to KANSAS Cross it was only about eight or nine strong. “There
were a few concrete dugouts and a trench just on our side of KANSAS
CROSS, also a few ruined buildings. We captured 50 prisoners here, all
of whom gave themselves up without a fight--slightly wounded men taking
them back. After completing the mopping-up, we moved on to assist in
consolidation. Here Second Lieutenant Rigby was wounded.”
No. 9 Platoon suffered many casualties from machine gun traversing
fire, but went on to the OUTPOST LINE. Second Lieutenant Jenkinson was
badly wounded just before getting to the GREEN LINE, and four Germans,
who gave themselves up, carried him down. Prisoners were coming in in
20’s and 30’s.
No. 10, under Second Lieutenant Higson, mopped up KEIR FARM, where
two concrete dugouts were found and a number of prisoners taken, also
documents, some of which were taken from an enemy Liaison Officer. They
advanced to the GREEN LINE, and commenced to consolidate. “No British
contact ’planes flew over; we only saw three enemy ’planes, who flew so
low that they fired at us; also an observation balloon ascended from
ABRAHAM HEIGHTS.
“About two hours after reaching the GREEN LINE the enemy were observed
to be forming up on the heights in front of us, and eventually
counter-attacked on our right against the 15th Division, who commenced
to retire. We formed a defensive flank on our right to get enfilade
fire on the enemy and so cover the retreat of the 15th Division, but
they retired behind us and could give us no assistance when we were
compelled to retire. By this time the enemy had got a machine gun
barrage on our front, also enfilading us on our left, and caused a
number of casualties; we fought a rearguard action along with the rest
of the Battalion until we reached the BLACK LINE.
“S.O.S. signals were sent up from the GREEN LINE, but they all failed
to burst.”
No. 11, under Lieutenant Lonsdale, got held up by the belt of wire
running down the left of Hill 35. This wire had hardly been touched,
but they cut a way through after some time and managed to catch up the
barrage.
“From SOMME FARM came a lot of machine gun fire, so we hung back a bit
and waited for our left flank to come up; we trained our Lewis gun on
to the farm to assist the people on our left. When they approached
fairly close about a dozen of the enemy attempted to make off, but were
either caught by our fire or gave themselves up. From the trenches
running through D 13 central, the enemy began to retire. We opened fire
on them and caused some casualties; some got away and seemed to have
left their equipment and rifles. GALLIPOLI held out for some time, but
we engaged it with the Lewis gun while the remainder worked round it.
The garrison surrendered--about 25 in number. Men went in the rear
side and reported strong machine gun emplacements. From KEIR FARM I
saw about six men run without tunics, but a lot held out until we got
round them; about 20 men gave themselves up from here. The point D 14 c
1 2 was searched and found to be a battery position--as far as I could
make out, three guns. A Corporal and two men were told off to search
for papers, documents, etc. I pressed on with the Platoon, and at a
line in front and to the left of MARTHA HOUSE we came under point-blank
artillery fire from near KANSAS CROSS, but did not stop our advance; it
only seemed to be from one or two guns. At D 14 c 38 we found a battery
position, two guns untouched but several damaged, and an Officer gave
himself up with several men. We then pushed on to the GREEN LINE and
got in touch with the people on our right and sent out patrols to the
left, but could not get in touch. Some of the King’s Own then came up
and were sent on to the left. Having pushed Lewis guns forward with
patrols, we commenced to consolidate, and put in a good two and a half
hours. At 2 30 p.m. the patrols reported a counter-attack on the right
and left. We stood to and opened a heavy rifle and Lewis gun fire on
them, sending up two S.O.S.’s, but neither of them worked.
“In the meantime three enemy aeroplanes flew over our lines, dropping
flares and opening machine gun fire on us. The machine gun fire from
the left began to account for a lot of our men. The enemy appeared
in strength, being in open order. I counted six lines, and yet there
were more following. The sections on our right began to retire across
our rear, and the enemy was beginning to get well behind us. The left
were also pressing, so we decided to retire from the left, covering
the retirement with rifle and Lewis gun fire. We then took up a line
running from Approx. D 20 a 89 to D 14 c 72 in shell holes. We formed a
defensive flank of three Lewis guns along a small ridge to our right.
The enemy pressed on, although we were accounting for a large number
with our rifle fire and the enfilade Lewis gun fire on the right. The
Lewis guns ran short of S.A.A. After we had made a stand for about an
hour, the S.A.A. for the rifles ran short; we collected as much as we
could from the dead and wounded, but it was only about ten rounds per
man. The enemy again succeeded in working round our right, so we had to
retire, fighting a rearguard action on to the old FREZENBERG LINE.”
No. 12 ran into two strong points, and in each case the garrison
gave themselves up. Fifty prisoners came out of one. Both consisted
of concrete dugouts, with trenches in front, and behind one of them
there was a concrete gun emplacement. Sergeant Whiteside, the Platoon
Commander, was wounded. “When the enemy counter-attacked on our right
the Scots retired, and Lieutenant Hore sent some of our party to form a
defensive line on the right flank. We held on for about three-quarters
of an hour, and then we withdrew, dropping in shell holes and firing
as we went back. They fired machine guns on us as we withdrew. A good
number of our wounded were captured, but no unwounded prisoners, as far
as I know.”
No. 13 got to the GREEN LINE and consolidated this, but got mixed up
with other Platoons. “None of us know what happened to Sergeant Yates.
We saw him just before the withdrawal, and he was then unwounded.
Nobody saw him again.”
Second Lieutenant Easterby, Commanding No. 14, was wounded twice,
the second time being just beyond the BLACK LINE. “Two snipers who
caused trouble near GALLIPOLI were captured. The Platoon consolidated
the GREEN LINE until 2 30 p.m., when the enemy counter-attacked on
the right. The Scots on the right were seen to withdraw, and Second
Lieutenant Fullerton, who had taken over command of the whole line,
shouted to us to hang on. He himself established a defensive flank on
our right, but was shortly afterwards killed.”
No. 15, after going 500 or 600 yards, ran into a strong point. “The
barrage had knocked out a machine gun which had been playing on us,
but rifle fire continued to come from this place. We went straight on,
and when we neared the place they gave themselves up. There were about
three dugouts--connected--and about 20 prisoners were taken.”
“On reaching our objective we dug in under machine gun fire from our
left. About 1 15 p.m. we saw the smoke of an engine on the other side
of the ridge. About half an hour after this the enemy appeared over
the ridge, and advanced towards us. We opened on him with Lewis guns.
He was covering his advance with machine guns on the left. The 6th
CAMERONS were seen retiring, and took up a position in a strong point
about 150 yards behind our trench. We hung on to our trench for 20
minutes or half an hour. Second Lieutenant Fullerton acted with great
gallantry during this trying period. He persuaded the whole of our line
to hang on--he was the only Officer left in the GREEN LINE--and it was
a great loss when he was killed, just before we withdrew.”
Only seven of this Platoon survived.
No. 16 was first held up at GALLIPOLI, but continued the advance,
and 150 yards further on found another strong point, consisting of
a trench and a few dugouts. The garrison of the post--about 25 in
all--gave themselves up immediately. They then moved on to the GREEN
LINE, and commenced to dig in. They had been digging for over an hour
when the enemy counter-attacked on the right. “Twenty minutes previous
we had seen the smoke of a train. For a time he was disorganised by
our machine guns and Lewis gun fire; then he advanced on the front of
the Battalion on our right, which withdrew immediately, and the enemy
followed. Second Lieutenant Fullerton ordered us to line the hedge on
our right, and we held on there for half an hour. Meanwhile the enemy
tried to get round behind us, and to a certain extent succeeded.
“Our position was then so bad and our ammunition supply so small
that we had to withdraw, moving back step by step in small parties.
Gradually we worked back to the BLACK LINE, though some of our
men--including Lieutenant Holden--were captured.”
EXTRACT FROM WAR DIARY--Continued.
At 12 midnight, July 31st/August 1st, the Battalion held a line of
resistance just in front of the Black Line. At 1 15 a.m. completion of
relief by the 165th Infantry Brigade was reported, and the remnant of
the Battalion were ordered to concentrate in our original front line
between Warwick Farm and Lone Street. This was done, and Battalion
Headquarters was established at the mined dugouts in Oxford Trench. At
10 a.m. Headquarters was transferred to the mined dugout at WIELTJE.
Meanwhile an effort was being made to collect our stragglers. During
the withdrawal a great many men had become separated from their
Platoons, and by 2 p.m. on the 1st of August only 90 of our men had
assembled in the old front line. In ones and twos they were eventually
brought in, though some remained behind with the 165th and 166th
Brigades in the Black Line till 24 hours or more after the Battalion
had been relieved.
The weather was desperate; rain was pouring down all day, and the
trenches were in a terrible state. Four or five derelict tanks could
be counted, stuck deep in the mud, either in our old front line or in
the German original front line. The day was fairly quiet, and there was
only a little shelling in the vicinity of WIELTJE.
About mid-day the enemy counter-attacked on the front of the Division
on our right, and succeeded in making a small breach in the Black Line.
In the evening of this day a cooker was brought up with hot tea, etc.,
for the men.
Lieutenant G. J. Fismer, R.A.M.C., reported for duty vice Captain R. W.
Shegog, R.A.M.C., died of wounds.
Casualties:--Officers: Lieutenant C. L. Hore, M.C., to Field Ambulance
sick; Other Ranks: Nil.
With reference to the attack in which the Battalion took part, the
following points are of interest:--
1. Ammunition ran short in every Company, a proof of the fact that the
rifle has again come to its own as the chief weapon of the infantryman.
2. It is estimated that quite 90 per cent. of the casualties were
caused by machine gun fire and snipers.
3. Casualties amongst Officers were exceedingly heavy, and great
responsibility devolved upon N.C.O.’s. This fact emphasised the
necessity for careful preparation, by means of daily lectures and
demonstrations to all Platoon Sergeants and Section Commanders.
4. It is generally agreed that on this occasion the men were far too
heavily laden. It is thought that in an attack of this kind, when a
distance of several thousand yards has to be traversed, it is far
better to go lightly equipped, and to trust to the probability of being
able to get additional supplies of water and rations from the rear as
soon as darkness falls.
5. All systems of communication, except runners, broke down. Visual was
impossible owing to the dull mist which prevailed, and wires, when once
laid, were soon broken.
6. Tanks were a failure (except possibly in one case), the ground being
far too wet and heavy. One tank is said to have done useful work in
co-operation with the infantry in reducing Somme Farm.
7. Aeroplanes for some reason failed us, the R.F.C. evidently
considering the bad visibility sufficient reason to cancel flying.
This was particularly unfortunate, as the enemy were not slow to
take advantage accordingly, and three hostile machines are reported
to have been flying over our positions practically all the time that
consolidation was in progress. In one case a machine gun was fired at
our troops.
8. Lastly, many acts of extreme gallantry and devotion to duty were
reported after the fighting of the 31st July, on the part of all ranks
of the Battalion.
In fact the 55th Division as a whole, and particularly the 164th
Brigade, will ever be remembered for its share in the attack which
started the third battle of YPRES. The 164th Infantry Brigade in
particular can ever be proud of the advance from the Black Line to the
Green Line.
Copies of the following messages and letters are attached:--
(1) From Major-General H. S. JEUDWINE, C.B., G.O.C. 55th
Division, to Brigadier-General C. I. STOCKWELL, D.S.O.,
Commanding 164th Brigade.
(2) 55th Division Special Order of the Day.
(3) Letter from 5th Army Headquarters to XIX. Corps.
(4) 5th Army Commander’s Congratulations.
Fifth Army.
2nd August, 1917.
Appendix to D.R.O.’s of 7th August, 1917.
Army Commander’s Congratulations.
1. The Army Commander wishes to offer his heartiest congratulations to
the troops under his command on the success gained by them on July 31st.
2. For a fortnight prior to the attack the enemy has maintained a
heavy and continuous artillery fire, including an unprecedented use
of H.V. guns against back areas and a new form of gas shell, all of
which caused severe casualties. Despite this and the fact that the
forward area was dominated by the enemy at all points, the necessary
preparations for the battle were completed and the difficult forward
march and assembly of nine Divisions successfully carried out and the
assault launched. This alone constitutes a performance of which the
Army may well be proud.
3. As a result of the battle, the enemy has once again been driven by
the 1st French Army and ourselves from the whole of his front system on
a front of about eight miles, and we are now firmly established in or
beyond his second line on a front of seven miles.
4. We have already captured 5,448 prisoners, including 125 Officers. Up
to date the capture of eight guns, 10 trench mortars, and 36 machine
guns has been reported.
5. In addition we have inflicted extremely heavy casualties on the
enemy. Owing to losses during our preliminary bombardment, he was
forced to bring up six fresh Divisions. Since then three more Divisions
have been withdrawn shattered. Thus, in a fortnight, we have disposed
of seven or eight Divisions and severely handled 10 more, several of
which must be shortly withdrawn.
6. The 2nd Army on our right and the 1st French Army on our left have
been as successful as ourselves. The French captures to date number 157
prisoners and three guns. The 2nd Army have also taken 390 prisoners
and several machine guns.
7. Despite the weather on the day of the battle, we shot down five
enemy machines and one balloon, losing only one machine ourselves.
(Signed) R. T. COLLINS,
Lieutenant-Colonel,
For Major-General, G.S.
* * * * *
55th (West Lancashire) Division.
Special Order of the Day.
3rd August, 1917.
To All Ranks of the 55th (West Lancashire) Division.
Before you went into action on the 31st July, I told you how confident
I was that the Division would do its duty and maintain its reputation
and the reputation of the grand Regiments to which you belong.
You have done more than that.
The attack you made on the 31st is worthy to rank with the great deeds
of the British Army in the past, and has added fresh glory to the
record of that Army.
The courage, determination, and self-sacrifice shown by Officers,
Warrant Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and men is beyond praise.
It is a fine exhibition of true discipline, which comes from the mutual
confidence of all ranks in themselves, their comrades, their leaders,
and those under them. This in its turn is the product of hard training.
Your doings on the 31st show how well you have turned this training to
account.
You captured every inch of the objectives allotted to you. It was not
your fault that you could not hold all you took. You have broken and
now hold, in spite of weather and counter-attacks, a line that the
enemy has strengthened and consolidated at his leisure for more than
two years.
This will, I believe, be the beginning of the end. When your turn comes
to go forward again you will know your own strength and the enemy will
know it too.
I am proud of what you have done and am confident that with such troops
ultimate victory is certain.
H. S. JEUDWINE,
Major-General,
Commanding 55th (West Lancashire) Division.
* * * * *
Fifth Army.
3rd August, 1917.
XIX. Corps.
The Army Commander wishes to convey his thanks and congratulations to
the G.O.C. and all ranks of the 164th Brigade on their fine performance
on July 31st. They carried out their task in a most gallant manner and
fought splendidly to retain their hold on the ground won. All Officers
showed energy, courage, and initiative in dealing with the situation,
and the men under their command, in spite of heavy losses, did their
utmost, by carrying out their orders, to ensure our success and the
enemy’s defeat.
Great credit and praise is due to the G.O.C. 164th Brigade for the
magnificent behaviour of the troops under his command.
(Signed) N. MALCOLM,
Major-General, G.S.
The Brigadier-General commanding has much pleasure in forwarding
the above remarks of the Army Commander and directs that these be
communicated to all ranks.
He considers that all the credit and praise is due to the Officers and
men of the Brigade.
Captain,
Acting Brigade Major,
164th Infantry Brigade.
6th August, 1917.