RODNEY

1719-1792

Unlike Hawke, Rodney drew his descent from the landed gentry of England,

and had relatives among the aristocracy. The name was originally Rodeney.

We are told by his son-in-law and biographer that the Duke of Chandos, a

connection by marriage, obtained the command of the Royal yacht for the

admiral's father, Henry Rodney. In one of the trips which George I.

frequently made between England and Hanover, he asked his captain if

there were anything he could do for him. The reply was a request that he

would stand sponsor for his son, who accordingly received the name of

George; his second name Brydges coming from the family through which

Chandos and the Rodneys were brought into relationship. The social

position and surroundings resulting from such antecedents contributed of

course to hasten the young officer's advancement, irrespective of the

unquestionable professional merit shown by him, even in early years; but

to them also, combined with narrow personal fortune, inadequate to the

tastes thus engendered, was probably due the pecuniary embarrassment

which dogged him through life, and was perhaps the moving incentive to

doubtful procedures that cast a cloud upon his personal and official

reputation.

Rodney was born in February, 1719, and went to sea at the age of

thirteen; serving for seven years in the Channel Fleet. Thence he was

transferred to the Mediterranean, where he was made lieutenant in 1739.

In 1742 he went again to the Mediterranean with Admiral Mathews, who

there gave him command of a "post" ship, with which he brought home the

trade,--three hundred merchant vessels,--from Lisbon. Upon arriving in

England his appointment by Mathews was "confirmed" by the Admiralty.

Being then only twenty-four, he anticipated by five years the age at

which Hawke reached the same rank of post-captain, the attainment of

which fixed a man's standing in the navy. Beyond that, advancement went

by seniority; a post-captain might be "yellowed,"--retired as a rear

admiral,--but while in active service he kept the advantage of his early

promotion.

When Rodney was in later years commander-in-chief in the West Indies, he

made his son a post-captain at fifteen; an exercise of official powers

which, though not singular to him, is too characteristic of the man and

the times to be wholly unmentioned. His own promotion, though rapid, was

not too much so for his professional good; but it is likely that

neither that consideration, nor the good of the service, counted for

much alongside of the influence he possessed. He appears, however, to

have justified from the first the favor of his superiors. His employment

was continuous, and in a military point of view he was more fortunate

than Hawke was at the same period of his career. Within two years, when

in command of a forty-gun ship, he fought and took a French privateer of

the same nominal force, and with a crew larger by one hundred than his

own. Thence he was advanced into the _Eagle_, sixty, in which, after

some commerce-destroying more lucrative than glorious, he bore an

extremely honorable part in Hawke's battle with L'Etenduère, already

related. The _Eagle_ was heavily engaged, and was one of the three small

ships that on their own initiative pursued and fought, though

unsuccessfully, the two escaping French vessels. Rodney shared Hawke's

general encomium, that "as far as fell within my notice, the commanders,

their officers, and ships' companies, behaved with the greatest spirit

and resolution." Rodney came under his close observation, for, the

_Eagle's_ "wheel being shot to pieces and all the men at it killed, and

all her braces and bowlines gone," she drove twice on board the

flag-ship. This was before her pursuit of the two fliers.

In the subsequent trial of Captain Fox,--the minutes of which the

present writer has not seen,--it appears, according to the biographer

of Lord Hawke,[6] that it was Captain Saunders's and Captain Rodney's

"sense of being deserted by Fox, and of the two French ships having

escaped through his failure of duty, which forms the chief feature of

the Court-Martial. Rodney especially describes his being exposed to the

fire of four of the enemy's ships, when, as he asserted, Fox's ship

might well have taken off some of it." The incident is very noteworthy,

for it bears the impress of personal character. Intolerance of

dereliction of duty, and uncompromising condemnation of the delinquent,

were ever leading traits in Rodney's course as a commander-in-chief. He

stood over his officers with a rod, dealt out criticism unsparingly, and

avowed it as his purpose and principle of action so to rule. It is not

meant that his censures were undeserved, or even excessive; but there

entered into them no ingredient of pity. His despatches are full of

complaints, both general and specific. When he spared, it was from a

sense of expediency,--or of justice, a trait in which he was by no

means deficient; but for human weakness he had no bowels. Hawke

complains of but this one captain, Fox, and towards him he seems not to

have evinced the strong feeling that animated his juniors. Each man has

his special gift, and to succeed must needs act in accordance with it.

There are those who lead and those who drive; Hawke belonged to the one

class, Rodney to the other.

In direct consequence of this difference of temperament, it will be

found, in contrasting the schools of which Hawke and Rodney are the

conspicuous illustrations, that the first represents the spirit, and the

second the form, which were the two efficient elements of the progress

made during the eighteenth century. The one introduces into a service

arrested in development, petrified almost, by blindly accepted rules and

unintelligent traditions, a new impulse, which transforms men from

within, breaking through the letter of the law in order to realize its

forgotten intent; the other gives to the spirit, thus freed from old

limitations, a fresh and sagacious direction, but needs nevertheless to

impose its own methods by constraint from without. It is the old

struggle, ever renewed, between liberty and law; in the due, but

difficult, combination of which consist both conservation and progress.

And so in the personality of the two great admirals who respectively

represent these contrasting schools of practice; while we find in both

these two elements, as they must exist in every efficient officer, yet

it is to be said that the one inspires and leads, the other moulds and

compels. The one, though seemingly reserved, is in character

sympathetic, and influences by example chiefly; the other, austerely

courteous, is towards associates distant and ungenial, working by fear

rather than by love. For these broad reasons of distinction it is

Mathews's battle that best measures the reaction of which Hawke is the

type, for there was especially illustrated defect of spirit, to cover

which the letter of the law was invoked; whereas in Byng's action,

extremely bad form, in the attempt to conform to the letter of the

Instructions, emphasizes the contrast with Rodney's methods, precise and

formal unquestionably, but in which form ceases to be an end in itself

and is reduced to its proper function as the means to carry into effect

a sound military conception. Of these two factors in the century's

progress, it needs hardly to be said that the one contributed by Hawke

is the greater. In spirit and in achievement he, rather than Rodney, is

the harbinger of Nelson.

A short time after the action with L'Etenduère the cruise of the _Eagle_

came to an end. When she was paid off Rodney was presented at Court by

Anson, the First Lord of the Admiralty; a merited and not unusual honor

after distinguished service in battle. The King was struck by his

youthful appearance, and said he had not known there was so young a

captain in the Navy. As he was then nearly thirty, and had seen much and

continuous service, it is singular that his face should not have borne

clear traces of the facts. Anson replied that he had been a captain for

six years, and it was to be wished that His Majesty had a hundred more

as good as he. Making allowance for courtly manners and fair-speaking,

the incident may be accepted as showing, not only that aptitude for the

service which takes its hardships without undue wear and tear, but also

an official reputation already well established and recognized.

Professional standing, therefore, as well as family influence, probably

contributed to obtain for him in 1749 the appointment of Commodore and

Commander-in-chief on the Newfoundland station; for he was still junior

on the list of captains, and had ten years more to run before obtaining

his admiral's flag. He remained in this post from 1749 to 1752. They

were years of peace, but of peace charged full with the elements of

discord which led to the following war. Canada was still French, and the

territorial limits between the North American possessions of the two

nations remained a subject of dispute and intrigue. The uncertain state

of political relations around the Gulf of St. Lawrence added to the

responsibility of Rodney's duty, and emphasized the confidence shown in

assigning him a position involving cautious political action.

Explicit confirmation of this indirect testimony is found in a private

letter to him from the Earl of Sandwich, who had succeeded Anson as

First Lord in 1748. "I think it necessary to inform you that, if the

Governor of Nova Scotia should have occasion to apply to you for succor,

and send to you for that purpose to Newfoundland, it would be approved

by Government if you should comply with his request. It is judged

improper, as yet, to send any public order upon a business of so

delicate a nature, which is the reason of my writing to you in this

manner; and I am satisfied that your prudence is such as will not suffer

you to make any injudicious use of the information you now receive.

There are some people that cannot be trusted with any but public orders,

but I shall think this important affair entirely safe under your

management and secrecy." Language such as this undoubtedly often covers

a hint, as well as expresses a compliment, and may have done so in this

instance; nevertheless, in after life it is certain that Rodney gave

proof of a very high order of professional discretion and of independent

initiative. It is therefore perfectly reasonable to suppose that he had

thus early convinced the Government that he was a man competent and

trustworthy under critical conditions, such as then characterized the

intercolonial relations of the two states. The particular incident is

farther noteworthy in connection with the backwardness, and even

reluctance, of the Government to employ him in the War of the American

Revolution, though Sandwich was again First Lord, and Rodney a strong

political supporter of the party in power. The precise cause for this is

probably not ascertainable; but it is a matter of perfectly reasonable

inference that the early promise of the young officer had meanwhile

become overclouded, that distrust had succeeded to confidence, for

reasons professional, but not strictly military. Rodney's war record

continued excellent from first to last; one not good only, but of

exceptional and singular efficiency.

In October, 1752, Rodney returned to England, having been elected to

Parliament. The Seven Years War, which, after two years of irregular

hostilities, began formally in 1756, found him still a captain. With its

most conspicuous opening incident, the attempted relief of Minorca, and

the subsequent trial and execution of the unsuccessful commander,

Admiral Byng, he had no connection, personal or official; nor was he a

member of the Court-Martial, although he seems to have been in England

at the time, and was senior to at least one of the sitting captains. The

abortive naval engagement off Port Mahon, however, stands in a directly

significant relation to his career, for it exemplifies to the most

exaggerated degree, alike in the purpose of the admiral and the finding

of the Court, the formal and pedantic conception of a correctly fought

fleet action, according to the rules and regulations "in such cases

prescribed" by the Fighting Instructions.[7] It was Rodney's lot to

break with this tradition, and to be the first to illustrate juster

ideas in a fairly ranged battle, where the enemy awaited attack, as he

had done at Malaga in 1704, and at Minorca in 1756. Precisely such an

opportunity never came to Hawke; for, although L'Etenduère waited, he

did so under conditions and dispositions which gave the ensuing affair a

nearer analogy to a general chase than to a pitched battle. Though the

British approach then was in a general sense parallel to the enemy's

line, it was from the rear, not from the beam; and through this

circumstance of overtaking, and from the method adopted, their vessels

came under fire in succession, not together. This was perfectly correct,

the course pre-eminently suited to the emergency, and therefore

tactically most sound; but the conditions were not those contemplated by

the Fighting Instructions, as they were in the case of Byng, and also in

the battle most thoroughly characteristic of Rodney--that of April 17,

1780. The contrast in conduct between the two commanders is strikingly

significant of progress, because of the close approach to identity in

circumstances.

Rodney accompanied the Rochefort expedition of 1757, under Hawke, some

account of which is given in the life of that admiral; and he commanded

also a ship-of-the-line in Boscawen's fleet in 1758, when the reduction

of Louisburg and Cape Breton Island was effected by the combined British

and colonial forces. After this important service, the necessary and

effectual antecedent of the capture of Quebec and the fall of Canada in

the following year, he returned to England, where on the 19th of May,

1759, he was promoted to Rear Admiral; being then forty. He was next,

and without interval of rest, given command of a squadron to operate

against Havre, where were gathering boats and munitions of war for the

threatened invasion of England; with the charge also of suppressing the

French coastwise sailings, upon which depended the assembling of the

various bodies of transports, and the carriage of supplies to the fleet

in Brest, that Hawke at the same time was holding in check. The service

was important, but of secondary interest, and calls for no particular

mention beyond that of its general efficiency as maintained by him.

In 1761, Rodney was again elected to Parliament, and, with a certain

political inconsequence, was immediately afterwards sent out of the

country, being appointed to the Leeward Islands Station, which embraced

the smaller Antilles, on the eastern side of the Caribbean Sea, with

headquarters at Barbados; Jamaica, to the westward, forming a distinct

command under an admiral of its own. He sailed for his new post October

21, 1761, taking with him instructions to begin operations against

Martinique upon the arrival of troops ordered from New York. These

reached Barbados December 24th, a month after himself, and on the 7th of

January, 1762, the combined forces were before Martinique, which after a

month of regular operations passed into the possession of the British on

the 16th of February. Its fall was followed shortly by that of the

other French Lesser Antilles,--Grenada, Santa Lucia, and St. Vincent.

Guadaloupe had been taken in 1759, and Dominica in June, 1761.

Up to this time the contest on the seas had been between Great Britain

and France only; but on March 5th a frigate reached Rodney with

instructions, then already nine weeks old, to begin hostilities against

Spain, whose clearly inimical purpose had induced the British Government

to anticipate her action, by declaring war. The same day another vessel

came in with like orders from the admiral at Gibraltar, while a third

from before Brest brought word that a French squadron of seven

ships-of-the-line, with frigates and two thousand troops, had escaped

from that port at the end of the year. With these circumstances before

him Rodney's conduct was like himself; prompt and officer-like. Lookout

ships were stationed along the length of the Caribbees, to windward, to

bring timely intelligence of the approach of the enemy's squadron; and

as its first destination was probably Martinique, the fall of which was

not yet known in Europe, he concentrated his fleet there, calling in

outlying detachments.

So far there was nothing in his course markedly different from that of

any capable officer, dealing with well ascertained conditions within the

limits of his own command. Occasion soon arose, however, to require more

exceptional action, and thus to illustrate at once the breadth of view,

and the readiness to assume responsibility, which already raised Rodney

conspicuously above the average level. On the 9th of March two lookout

vessels came in with news that they had sighted a fleet, corresponding

in numbers to the Brest division, fifteen miles to windward of

Martinique and standing to the southward; the trade wind making it

generally expedient to round the south point of the island in order to

reach the principal port on the west side,--Fort Royal. The British

squadron at once weighed anchor in pursuit; but the enemy, having

ascertained that the surrender was accomplished, had turned back north,

and were soon after reported from Guadaloupe as having passed there,

standing to the westward.

Rodney at once inferred that they must be gone to Santo Domingo. To

follow with the object of intercepting them was hopeless, in view of the

start they had; but the direction taken threatened Jamaica, the exposed

condition of which, owing to inadequate force, had been communicated to

him by the military and naval authorities there. His measures to meet

the case were thorough and deliberate, as well as rapid; no time was

lost either by hesitancy or delay, nor by the yet more facile error of

too precipitate movement. Orders for concentration were already out, but

the point on which to effect it was shifted to Antigua, where, although

inferior in natural resources to Martinique, the established British

naval station with its accumulated equipment was fixed; and the work of

provisioning and watering, so as to permit long continuance at sea

unhampered by necessity of replenishing, there went on apace. It was the

admiral's intention to leave his own command to look out for itself,

while he took away the mass of his fleet to protect national interests

elsewhere threatened.

Such a decision may seem superficially a commonplace matter of course;

that it was much more is a commonplace historical certainty. The merit

of Rodney's action appears not only in the details of execution, but in

its being undertaken at all; and in this case, as in a later instance in

his career, his resolution received the concrete emphasis that a sharp

and immediate contrast best affords. Prior to the enemy's arrival he had

laid the conditions before his colleague in service, General Moncton,

commanding the forces on shore, and asked a reinforcement of troops for

destitute Jamaica, if necessity arose. The result is best told in his

own words; for they convey, simply and without egotistic enlargement,

that settled personal characteristic, the want of which Jervis and

Nelson in their day noted in many, and which Rodney markedly possessed.

This was the capacity, which Sandwich eighteen years later styled

"taking the great line of considering the King's whole dominions under

your care;" an attribute far from common, as Moncton's reply showed. "I

acquainted him that I should certainly assist them with all the naval

force that could possibly be spared from the immediate protection of His

Majesty's Caribbee islands. I have again solicited the General for a

body of troops, since the enemy left these seas, and must do him the

justice to say, that he seems much concerned at the present distress of

Jamaica, but does not think himself sufficiently _authorized_ to detach

a body of troops without orders from England. I flatter myself their

Lordships will not be displeased with me if I take the liberty to

construe my instructions in such a manner as to think myself _authorized

and obliged_ to succor any of His Majesty's colonies that may be in

danger; and shall, therefore, without a moment's loss of time, hasten to

the succor of Jamaica, with ten sail-of-the-line, three frigates and

three bombs."[8]

It was not because, in so doing this, the obligation was absolute, and

the authority indisputable, that Rodney's course was professionally

meritorious. In such case his action would have risen little above that

obedience to orders, in which, as Nelson said, the generality find "all

perfection." The risk was real, not only to his station, but to the

possible plans of his superiors at home; the authority was his own only,

read by himself into his orders--at most their spirit, not their letter.

Consequently, he took grave chance of the penalty--loss of reputation,

if not positive punishment,--which, as military experience shows, almost

invariably follows independent action, unless results are kind enough to

justify it. It is, however, only the positive characters capable of

rising to such measures that achieve reputations enduring beyond their

own day. The incident needs to be coupled with Sandwich's compliment

just quoted, as well as with the one paid him when on the Newfoundland

command. Taken together, they avouch a personality that needs only

opportunity to insure itself lasting fame.

As it happened, Rodney not only took the responsibility of stripping his

own station to the verge of bareness in favor of the general interest,

but in so doing he came very near traversing, unwittingly, the plans of

the general government by his local action, laudable and proper as that

certainly was. He was, however, professionally lucky to a proverb, and

escaped this mischance by a hair's breadth. The purposed detachment had

already started for Jamaica, and he was accompanying it in person, when

there joined him on March 25th, off the island of St. Kitt's, not far

from Antigua, a frigate bearing Admiralty despatches of February 5th.

These required him to desist from any enterprises he might have in hand,

in order to give his undivided attention to the local preparations for

an expedition, as yet secret, which was shortly to arrive on his

station, under the command of Admiral Pocock, with ultimate destination

against Havana.

To be thus arrested at the very outset of a movement from which he

naturally expected distinction was a bitter disappointment to Rodney.

Several years later, in 1771, he wrote to Sandwich, who was not the

First Lord when Pocock was sent out, "I had the misfortune of being

superseded in the command of a successful fleet, entrusted to my care in

the West Indies, at the very time I had sailed on another expedition

against the enemy's squadron at Santo Domingo, and was thereby deprived

of pursuing those conquests which so honorably attended upon another,

and which secured him such great emoluments,"--for Havana proved a

wealthy prize. His steps, however, upon this unexpected reversal of his

plans, were again characterized by an immediateness, most honorable to

his professional character, which showed how thoroughly familiar he was

with the whole subject and its possible contingencies, and the

consequent readiness of his mind to meet each occasion as it arose;

marks, all, of the thoroughly equipped general officer. The order as to

his personal movements being not discretional, was of course absolutely

accepted; but his other measures were apparently his own, and were

instantaneous. A vessel was at once sent off to Barbados to notify

Admiral Pocock that the best place in the West Indies for his rendezvous

was Fort Royal Bay, in the newly acquired Martinique. The ten

sail-of-the-line, accompanied by two large transports from St. Kitt's,

were then sent on to Jamaica to move troops from there to join Pocock;

the command of the detachment being now entrusted to Sir James Douglas,

who received the further instruction to send back his fastest frigate,

with all the intelligence he could gather, directing her to keep in the

track Pocock would follow, in order to meet him betimes. The frigate

thus sent, having first made a running survey of the unfrequented

passage north of Cuba, by which the expedition was to proceed, joined

Pocock, and, by the latter's report, acted as pilot for the fleet.

"Having taken sketches of the land and cayos on both sides, Captain

Elphinstone kept ahead of the fleet, and led us through very well." This

service is claimed to the credit of Rodney's foresight by his

biographer. This may very well be, though more particular inquiry and

demonstration by his letters would be necessary to establish specific

orders beyond the general instructions given by him. It is, however,

safe to say that such particularity and minuteness of detail would be

entirely in keeping with the tenor of his course at this period. His

correspondence bears the stamp of a mind comprehensive as well as exact;

grasping all matters with breadth of view in their mutual relations, yet

with the details at his fingers' ends. The certainty of his touch is as

obvious as the activity of his thought.

In accordance with the spirit of his instructions, Rodney went in person

to Martinique, the spot named by him as best for the rendezvous, there

to superintend the preparations; to sow the seed for a harvest in which

he was to have no share. Incidental mention reveals that the sending of

the ships-of-the-line with Douglas had reduced him to three for his own

command; and also that Moncton, having now superior authority to do so,

found himself able to spare troops for Jamaica, which were afloat in

transports by the time Pocock came. In the same letter the admiral

frankly admits his anxiety for his station, under the circumstances of

the big detachment he had made; a significant avowal, which enhances the

merit of his spontaneous action by all the credit due to one who endures

a well-weighed danger for an adequate end.

The despatch of Pocock's expedition, which resulted in the fall of

Havana, August 13, 1762, practically terminated Rodney's active service

in the Seven Years War. In a career marked by unusual professional good

fortune in many ways, the one singular mischance was that he reached a

foremost position too late in life. When he returned to England in

August, 1763, he was in his full prime, and his conduct of affairs

entrusted to him had given clear assurance of capacity for great things.

The same evidence is to be found in his letters, which, as studies of

official character and competency, repay a close perusal. But now

fifteen years of peace were to elapse before a maritime war again broke

out, and the fifteen years between forty-five and sixty tell sorely upon

the physical stamina which need to underlie the mental and moral forces

of a great commander. St. Vincent himself staggered under the load, and

Rodney was not a St. Vincent in the stern self-discipline that had

braced the latter for old age. He had not borne the yoke in his youth,

and from this time forward he fought a losing fight with money troubles,

which his self-controlled contemporary, after one bitter experience, had

shaken off his shoulders forever.

The externals of Rodney's career during the period now in question are

sufficiently known; of his strictly private life we are left largely to

infer from indications, not wholly happy. He returned to England a

Vice-Admiral of the Blue, and had advanced by the successive grades of

that rank to Vice-Admiral of the Red, when, in January, 1771, he was

appointed Commander-in-chief at Jamaica. At this time he had been for

five years Governor of Greenwich Hospital, and he took it hard that he

was not allowed to retain the appointment in connection with his new

command, alleging precedents for such a favor; the latest of which,

however, was then twenty-five years old. The application was denied by

Sandwich. From the earnest tone in which it was couched, as well as the

comparatively weak grounds upon which Rodney bases his claims to such a

recognition, it can scarcely be doubted that pecuniary embarrassment as

well as mortification entered into his sense of disappointment. It is

the first recorded of a series of jars between the two, in which,

although the external forms of courtesy were diligently observed, an

underlying estrangement is evident.

The Jamaica Station at that day required, in an even greater degree than

Newfoundland before the conquest of Canada, a high order of political

tact and circumspection on the part of the naval commander-in-chief. The

island lies in the centre of what was then a vast semi-circular sweep of

Spanish colonies--Porto Rico, Santo Domingo, Cuba, Mexico, Central

America, and the mainland of South America from the Isthmus to the

Orinoco. Over this subject empire the mother country maintained

commercial regulations of the most mediæval and exclusive type;

outraging impartially the British spirit of commercial enterprise, and

the daily needs of her own colonists, by the restrictions placed upon

intercourse between these and foreigners. Smuggling on a large scale,

consecrated in the practice of both parties by a century of tradition,

was met by a coast-guard system, employing numerous small vessels called

guarda-costas, which girt the Spanish coasts, but, being powerless to

repress effectually over so extensive a shore line, served rather to

increase causes of vexation. The British government, on the other hand,

not satisfied to leave the illicit trade on which Jamaica throve to

take care of itself, sought to increase the scope of transactions by the

institution of three free ports on the island,--free in the sense of

being open as depots, not for the entrance of goods, but where they

could be freely brought, and transshipped to other parts of the world by

vessels of all nations; broker ports, in short, for the facilitation of

general external trade.

To this open and ingenuous bid for fuller advantage by Spanish resort,

Spain replied by doubling her custom-house forces and introducing

renewed stringency into her commercial orders. The two nations, with

France in Hayti for a third, stood on ceaseless guard one against the

other; all imbued with the spirit of exclusive trade, and differing only

in the method of application, according to their respective day-to-day

views of policy. The British by the free-port system, instituted in

their central geographical position, hoped to make the profits of the

middleman. Rodney reported that the effect had been notably to

discourage the direct Spanish intercourse, and to destroy carriage by

British colonial vessels in favor of those of France, which now flocked

to Jamaica, smuggled goods into the island, and apparently cut under

their rivals by the greater benevolence shown them in Spanish ports.

"Commerce by British bottoms has totally ceased." Herewith, he added,

disappeared the opportunities of British seamen to become familiar with

the Spanish and French waters, while their rivals were invited to

frequent those of Jamaica; so that in case of war--which in those days

was periodical--the advantage of pilotage would be heavily on the side

of Great Britain's enemies. He also stated that the diminution of

employment to British merchant vessels had greatly impaired his means of

obtaining information from within Spanish ports; for British ships of

war were never allowed inside them, even when sent with a message from

him. The French permitted them indeed to enter, but surrounded them

throughout their visits with flattering attentions which wholly

prevented the making of observations.

Under these conditions of mutual jealousy between the governments and

officials, with the subjects on either side straining continually at the

leashes which withheld them from traffic mutually beneficial, causes of

offence were quick to arise. Rodney, like Sandwich, was a pronounced

Tory, in full sympathy with traditional British policy, as well as an

officer naturally of haughty temper and sharing all the prepossessions

of his service; but he found himself almost at once involved in a

difference with his superiors in his political party, which throws a

good deal of side light on personal as well as political relations. The

British man-of-war schooner _Hawke_ was overhauled off the Venezuelan

coast by two Spanish guarda-costas and compelled to enter the harbor of

Cartagena, under alleged orders from the Governor of the colony. After a

brief detention, she was let go with the admonition that, if any British

ships of war were found again within twelve leagues of the coast, they

would be taken and their crews imprisoned.

Rodney's course was unimpeachable, as far as appears. He wrote a civil

letter to the Governor, and sent it by a ship of war, the captain of

which was directed to deliver it in person. He was confident, he wrote,

that the Governor would disavow the action by calling to strict account

the officers concerned, and would also confirm his own belief that it

was impossible such a menace could have proceeded from any adequate

authority. A sufficient intimation of what would follow an attempt to

carry out the threat was conveyed by the words: "The British officer who

has dishonoured his King's colours by a tame submission to this insult

has been already dismissed the service."

It is difficult to see what less could have been done; but the British

government was at the moment extremely reluctant to war, and sensitive

to any step that seemed to make towards it. Spain was thought to be

seeking a quarrel. She had entered the Seven Years War so near its

termination as not to feel exhaustive effects; and the capture of Havana

and Manila, with the pecuniary losses involved, had left her merely

embittered by humiliation, prone rather to renew hostilities than to

profit by experience. At the same time the foreign policy of Great

Britain was enfeebled by a succession of short ministries, and by

internal commotions; while the discontent of the American continental

colonies over the Stamp Act emphasized the weakness of her general

position. Barely a year before the _Hawke_ incident the insult by Spain

at the Falkland Islands had brought the two nations to the verge of

rupture, which was believed to have been averted only by the refusal of

Louis XV., then advanced in years, to support the Spanish Bourbons at

the cost of another war.

Under these circumstances Rodney's report of the occurrences at

Cartagena filled the ministry with apprehensions, and brought him from

Sandwich an expression of dissatisfaction little removed from a

reprimand. The communication is remarkable rather for what it intimates,

and from the inferences naturally deducible, than for its direct

utterances. "I cannot help cautioning you, as a friend, to be upon your

guard, to avoid by every justifiable means the drawing this country into

a war, which, if it comes on too speedily, I fear we shall have cause to

lament." The warning is renewed in a later part of the letter, but in

itself has little significance compared with other hints, rather

personal than official. "I cannot conceal from you, that many people

have industriously spread stories here, that, among the foreign

ministers and others, you have expressed your wishes for a Spanish

war." Such expressions--if used--were asserted of the time succeeding

his appointment to Jamaica, and near his departure for it; for Sandwich

adds, "This sort of declaration is too little founded on your

instructions, and too indiscreet, to allow me to give them the least

credit." It is clear, however, that he thought them not improbable,--a

Spanish war was popular with seamen for the prize-money it brought, and

Rodney was poor,--for he adds, "I shall discredit the idea till I have

received your answer to this letter." He concludes with a warning, not

to be misunderstood, that a war, so far from helping Rodney, would

probably cause his supersession. "I will add one word more: Upon a

declaration of war larger squadrons must be sent out, and, very

probably, senior officers to most of our stations in foreign parts." In

face of an intimation thus thinly veiled, one scarcely needs to be told

what was being said round the table of the Cabinet.

That Rodney would have welcomed war for reasons personal as well as

professional, for money and for glory, can readily be believed; but his

measures in this case give no ground for such an innuendo as Sandwich

conveyed. Therefore, after making full allowance for the panic of

ministers ready to fear the worst, and to throw blame on anybody, it is

the more significant that he should have been suspected of an unworthy

personal motive underlying a worthy official act. It is an indication

of reputation already compromised by damaging association with pecuniary

embarrassments; an evidence of latent distrust easily quickened into

active suspicion. An officer of his rank and service, so far from home,

and with the precedents of his day, could scarcely be faulted for what

he had done to uphold the honor of the country; and his manner of doing

it was dignified and self-restrained, as well as forcible. There was no

violence like that of Hawke at Gibraltar, less than twenty years before,

which that admiral had boldly vindicated to Pitt himself; but there were

no weak joints in Hawke's armor. In the particular instance, time and

cooler judgment set Rodney right in men's opinion; but subsequent events

showed that his general reputation did not recover, either then, or

through his Jamaica career.

After immediate apprehension had subsided, Rodney's action was justified

by the government. Sandwich wrote him, a little later, that no

commander-in-chief stood upon a better footing, and assured him that his

private interests were safe in his hands. Sandwich, however, was an

extremely practical politician, who had much personal use for his own

patronage; and Rodney's necessities were great. Fulfilment therefore

fell far short of promise. Employment was necessary to the admiral, and

his hopes fixed upon a colonial governorship when his present

appointment should expire; Jamaica being his first choice. Sandwich

renewed assurances, but advised a personal application also to the Prime

Minister and other Cabinet officers. New York was mentioned, but nothing

came of it all. After three years Rodney was superseded, with permission

to remain in the island instead of returning to England. This he

declined. "I cannot bear to think of remaining here in a private

station, after commanding in chief with the approbation of the whole

island." How far this approbation was universal, or unqualified, is

perhaps doubtful; but the letters quoted by his biographer from his

correspondence bear continuous evidence, in this peace employment, of

the activity and perspicacity of mind characteristic of his more

strictly military proceedings.

In September, 1774, Rodney landed again in England, a disappointed man

and in embarrassed circumstances. Professional occupation was almost

hopeless, for in peace times there were few positions for an officer of

his rank; and, although recognized for able, he had not then the

distinction by which he is known to us. It is also evident, from

subsequent events, that he just now lacked the influence necessary to

obtain a preference over rivals in quest of employment. Under the

circumstances, his debts determined his action, and to escape

harassments he before long passed over into France and settled in Paris.

In that capital, as in London, he mixed with the best society; and

there, as before, the mode of life among his associates led him beyond

his means and involved him in further distresses. Consequently, when war

between France and Great Britain became imminent, in 1778, the vigilance

of his creditors prevented his going home in person to offer his

services. In February of that year, however, he made formal application

to the Admiralty to be sent at a moment's warning on any enterprise. To

this Sandwich, who was still First Lord, despite his previous assurances

of friendship, paid no attention beyond the formal customary

acknowledgment given to all such letters when they came from officers of

Rodney's standing. No indication was shown of intention, or even of

wish, to employ him.

Rodney was therefore compelled to look on idly while others, of

well-earned reputation indeed but as yet of less experience than himself

in high command, were preferred before him. Howe had already been sent

to North America in 1776, on a mission at once diplomatic and military;

and there he still was when war began. As it became imminent, Keppel was

appointed to the Channel Fleet, and Byron to the North American command,

from which Howe had asked to be relieved. All these were junior to

Rodney; and, as though to emphasize the neglect of him, rear-admirals

were sent to the two West India stations, Jamaica and the Leeward

Islands, which he had formerly commanded, and to which it would seem,

from one of his letters, that he desired to return. He had, too, now

reached the rank, the want of which had formed the burden of Sandwich's

warning that he was in danger of supersession at Jamaica; for in a

general flag promotion in January, 1778, he had become Admiral of the

White Squadron, than which no higher then obtained, commissions as

Admirals of the Red not being issued. For this persistent ignoring of an

officer of his unquestionable ability there were necessarily reasons

more controlling than appears on the surface; for the naval conditions

and the national emergency called for men of demonstrated high capacity.

Such Rodney was professionally; and although his age--he was now in his

sixtieth year--was against him, this consideration did not in those days

weigh; nor should it, unless accompanied by probable indication of

powers sapped.

The conclusion is inevitable that the objection lay in personal record

as bearing upon military efficiency. The Administration, responsible for

results, knew Rodney's capacity, though its full extent was yet to be

revealed; the question in their minds clearly must have been, "Can we

depend upon its exertion, full, sustained, and disinterested?" Sandwich,

despite the coldness with which he had received Rodney's

application,--going so far as to refuse to support it actively,--was

apparently in a minority among his colleagues in believing that they

could. He declared in the House of Lords that, "When it was first

proposed in the Council to employ Sir George, I, who knew him from a

very young man, declared that Rodney _once afloat_ would do his duty."

Naval officers will recognize a familiar ring in these words, and will

recall instances where high professional ability has been betrayed by

personal foible. Nor does Sandwich stand alone in offering a clue to the

hesitation of the Government. Rodney's biographer and son-in-law quotes

without reprobation the account of Mr. Richard Cumberland, who professed

to have interested himself warmly for Rodney's employment and to have

secured the support of the Secretary for War, Lord George Germaine. "The

West India merchants had been alarmed, and clamoured against the

appointment so generally and so decidedly as to occasion no small

uneasiness in my friend and patron, Lord George, and drew from him

something that resembled a remonstrance for the risk I had exposed him

to. But in the brilliancy of the capture of Langara's squadron all was

done away, and past alarms were only recollected to contrast the joy

which this success diffused." The opposition of the commercial class in

the West Indies might arise from an officer's over-faithfulness to duty,

as Nelson found to his cost; but it seems clear that in this case

distrust rested upon personal observation, which raised doubts as to the

singlemindedness of Rodney's administration of a command. Of the

particulars of observation or experience from which the feeling sprang,

we have no information; but St. Eustatius was destined to show that

apprehension was not wholly unfounded.

A summons to active employment would at once have silenced Rodney's

creditors by the assurance of increase of means, both through regular

income and probable prize-money; Admiralty neglect left him in fetters.

Lady Rodney returned to England to negotiate the means for his

liberation; but the matter dragged, and in the end he owed his release

to the friendly intervention of a French nobleman, the Maréchal Biron,

who volunteered in warm terms to make him an advance to the amount of

£2,000. This chivalrous offer was for some time declined; but finally

conditions became so threatening, and his position so intolerable, that

he accepted a loan of about a thousand louis. "Nothing but a total

inattention to the distressed state I was in," he wrote to his wife,

"could have prevailed upon me to have availed myself of his voluntary

proposal; but not having had, for a month past, a letter from any person

but Mr. Hotham and yourself, and my passport being expired, it was

impossible for me to remain in this city at the risk of being sued by my

creditors, who grew so clamorous it was impossible to bear it; and had

they not been overawed by the Lieutenant of police, would have carried

their prosecutions to the greatest length. Their demands were all

satisfied this day,"--May 6th, 1778. Friends in England enabled him to

repay Biron immediately after his return.

This benevolent interference on behalf of a national enemy, although in

its spirit quite characteristic, at once of the country and of the class

to which the individual extending it belonged, has retained a certain

unique flavor of its own among military anecdotes; due undoubtedly to

the distinction subsequently acquired by Rodney at the expense of the

people to which his liberator belonged, rather than to anything

exceptional in its nature. As it is, it has acquired a clear

pre-eminence among the recorded courtesies of warfare. It is pleasant to

add that Great Britain had the opportunity in after times to requite

Biron's daughters an act from which she had so greatly benefited. They

having sought refuge, though with loss of fortune, from the early

excesses of the French Revolution, received for some time pensions from

the British Government.

Rodney came back to England feeling anything but cordial towards

Sandwich, whose decided support he had found wanting throughout a very

critical period of his career. More than any one else the First Lord had

had both the opportunity and the insight to see his professional value.

Tory though Rodney was, he hoped that "Lord Chatham (Pitt) would be

minister, and another First Lord of the Admiralty be appointed." "We

hear of a change of Administration. I hope it is true, and that I may

have a chance of being employed, should another be at the Admiralty."

"The refusal of Lord Sandwich does not surprise me. He cannot say but I

have offered my services, and some friend will let the King know I have

so done." Apparently he was to be ignored as well as overlooked.

Circumstances, however, soon compelled his employment. Sandwich was an

able man, but his personal character inspired mistrust. Not only was he

controlled by political considerations in administration; he was

suspected of corruptly using the Navy for party advantage. Whatever

might be thought of Byng's conduct, his execution, but twenty years

before, was commonly ascribed to political exigency, making him a

vicarious sacrifice to cover the neglects of a Government. As in Byng's

case, the material of the service was believed to be now inadequate to

the emergency come upon it; and it was known to have deteriorated

gravely during the seven years of Sandwich's tenure of office. He was a

Tory, as were his colleagues of the Cabinet; the leaders of the Navy in

professional estimation, Hawke and Keppel, with other distinguished

officers, were pronounced Whigs, whom it was thought the Administration

would be willing to destroy. Keppel evidently feared an intention to

ruin him by the command of the Channel Fleet, and the public discussion

of the Courts-Martial which followed his indecisive action with

D'Orvilliers, in July, 1778, assumed a decided and rancorous party

tone. His accuser then was his third-in-command, Vice-Admiral Palliser,

who had left his place on the Admiralty Board to take this position in

the fleet; and popular outcry charged him with having betrayed his chief

in the battle. So far was professional feeling moved that twelve

prominent admirals,--not all of whom were Whigs,--with Hawke at their

head, presented to the King a memorial, deprecating "particularly the

mischief and scandal of permitting men, _who are at once in high office

and subordinate military command_, previous to their making

recriminating accusations against their commander-in-chief, to attempt

to corrupt the public judgment by the publication of libels on their

officers in a common newspaper, thereby exciting mutiny in your

Majesty's Navy," etc. The words italicized show that this was aimed at

Palliser; and at Sandwich, who inferentially had "permitted" his action,

and ultimately rewarded him with the Governorship of Greenwich Hospital.

In this demoralized condition of professional sentiment the Admiralty

could no longer command the services of the best men. Howe came home in

disgust from America. Keppel threw up the command of the Channel Fleet,

and Barrington subsequently refused it on the expressed ground of

self-distrust, underlying which was real distrust of the ministry. He

would serve as second, but not as first. Byron, after relieving Howe in

New York, went to the West Indies, there made a failure, and so came

home in the summer of 1779. The Channel squadron fell into the hands of

men respectable, indeed, but in no way eminent, and advanced in years,

whose tenures of office were comparatively short. Hardy was sixty-three,

Geary seventy; and on both Hawke, who was friendly to them, passed the

comment that they were "too easy." The first had allowed "the discipline

of the fleet to come to nothing," and he feared the same for the other.

Not until the fall of the ministry, consequent upon Cornwallis's

surrender, was the post filled by a distinguished name, when Howe took

the command in 1782.

The Administration was thus forced back upon Rodney; fortunately for

itself, for, as far as history has since revealed, there was no other

man then in the service, and of suitable rank, exactly fitted to do the

work he did. Samuel Hood alone, then an unproved captain, and

practically in voluntary retirement, could have equalled and surpassed

him. Howe, like Rodney, was an accomplished tactician, and in conception

far in advance of the standards of the day. In his place he did

admirable service, which has been too little appreciated, and he was

fortunate in that the work which fell to him, at the first, and again at

the last of this war, was peculiarly suited to his professional

characteristics; but he was not interchangeable with Rodney. In the

latter there was a briskness of temper, a vivacity, very

distinguishable from Howe's solidity of persistence; and he was in no

sense one to permit "discipline to come to nought," the direction in

which Howe's easy though reserved disposition tended. The West Indies

were to be the great scene of battles, and, while the tactical ideas of

the two appear to have been essentially alike, in the common recognition

of combination as imperative to success, the severity of Rodney was

needed to jerk the West India fleet sharply out of sleepy tradition; to

compel promptness of manoeuvre and intelligent attention to the

underlying ideas which signals communicate. Flexibility of movement,

earnestness and rapidity of attack, mutual support by the essential

coherence of the battle order without too formal precision,--these were

the qualities which Rodney was to illustrate in practice, and to enforce

by personal impression upon his officers. The official staff of the

fleet had to pass under the rod of the schoolmaster, to receive new

ideas, and to learn novel principles of obedience,--to a living chief,

not to a dead letter crusted over by an unintelligent tradition. Not

till this step had been made, till discipline had full hold of men's

affections and understanding, was there room for the glorious liberty of

action which Nelson extended to his officers; preaching it in word, and

practising it in act. Hawke re-begat the British Navy in the spirit he

imparted to it; Rodney, first of several, trained its approaching

maturity in habits which, once acquired, stand by men as principles;

Nelson reaped the fulness of the harvest.

On October 1, 1779, Rodney was again appointed to the command of the

Leeward Islands Station. The year had been one of maritime misfortune

and discouragement. The French declaration of war in 1778 had been

followed by that of Spain in June, 1779; and a huge allied

fleet--sixty-six ships-of-the-line, to which the British could oppose

only thirty-five--had that summer entered and dominated the English

Channel. Nothing was effected by it, true; but the impression produced

was profound. In the West Indies Grenada had been lost, and Byron badly

worsted in an attempt to relieve it. On assuming his command, Rodney

could not but feel that he had more to do than to establish a

reputation; he had a reputation to redeem, and that under a burden of

national depression which doubly endangered the reputation of every

officer in responsible position. He must have known that, however

undeservedly, he had not the full confidence of the government, although

party and personal ties would naturally have predisposed it in his

favor. He therefore entered upon his career under the necessity to do

and to dare greatly; he had not a strong hand, and needed the more to

play a game not only strong, but to some extent adventurous.

To the radical difference between his personal standing at this opening

of his command, and that which he had at its close, in 1782, may

reasonably be attributed the clear difference in his action at the two

periods. The first was audacious and brilliant, exhibiting qualities of

which he was capable on occasion, but which did not form the groundwork

of his professional character. The display was therefore exceptional,

elicited by exceptional personal emergency. It was vitally necessary at

the outset, if opportunity offered, to vindicate his selection by the

government; to strike the imagination of the country, and obtain a hold

upon its confidence which could not easily be shaken. This prestige once

established, he could safely rest upon it to bear him through doubtful

periods of suspense and protracted issues. It would have been well had

he felt the same spur after his great battle in 1782. A necessity like

this doubtless lies upon every opening career, and comparatively few

there be that rise to it; but there is an evident distinction to be

drawn between one in the early prime of life, who may afford to wait,

who has at least no errors to atone, and him who is about to make his

last cast, when upon the turning of a die depends a fair opportunity to

show what is in him. Rodney was near sixty-one, when he took up the

command which has given him his well earned place in history.

He experienced at once indications of the attitude towards him; and in

two directions, from the Admiralty and from his subordinates. A month

before he was ready, Sandwich urges him, with evident impatience, to get

off. "For God's sake, go to sea without delay. You cannot conceive of

what importance it is to yourself, to me, and to the public" (this very

order of importance is suggestive), "that you should not lose this fair

wind; if you do, I shall not only hear of it in Parliament, but in

places to which I pay more attention.... I must once more repeat to you

that any delay in your sailing will have the most disagreeable

consequences." On the other hand, he had to complain not only of

inattention on the part of the dockyard officials, but of want of zeal

and activity in the officers of the fleet, many of whom behaved with a

disrespect and want of cordiality which are too often the precursor of

worse faults. Rodney was not the man to put up with such treatment. That

it was offered, and that he for the moment bore with it, are both

significant; and are to be remembered in connection with the fast

approaching future.

Gibraltar was then at the beginning of the three years siege, and his

intended departure was utilized to give him command of the first of the

three great expeditions for its relief, which were among the

characteristic operations of this war. He sailed from Plymouth on the

29th of December, 1779, having under him twenty-two sail-of-the-line, of

which only four were to continue with him to the West Indies. With this

great fleet, and its attendant frigates, went also a huge collection of

storeships, victuallers, ordnance vessels, troop ships, and merchantmen;

the last comprising the "trade" for Portugal and the West Indies, as the

other classes carried the reinforcements for the Rock.

On January 7th, the West India trade parted company off Cape Finisterre,

and the next day began the wonderful good fortune for which Rodney's

last command was distinguished. It is no disparagement to his merit to

say that in this he was, to use Ball's phrase about Nelson, "a

heaven-born admiral." A Spanish convoy of twenty-two sail, seven of

which were ships of war, the rest laden with supplies for Cadiz, were

sighted at daylight of the 8th, and all taken; not one escaped. Twelve

loaded with provisions were turned into the British convoy, and went on

with it to feed the Gibraltar garrison. A prince of the blood-royal,

afterwards King William IV., was with the fleet as a midshipman. One of

the prizes being a line-of-battle ship, Rodney had an opportunity to

show appositely his courtliness of breeding. "I have named her the

_Prince William_, in respect to His Royal Highness, in whose presence

_she had the honor to be taken_."

Repeated intelligence had reached the admiral that a Spanish division

was cruising off Cape St. Vincent. Therefore, when it was sighted at 1

P.M. of January 16th, a week after the capture of the convoy, he was

prepared for the event. A brief attempt to form line was quickly

succeeded by the signal for a general chase, the ships to engage to

leeward as they came up with the enemy, who, by taking flight to the

southeast, showed the intention to escape into Cadiz. The wind was

blowing strong from the westward, giving a lee shore and shoals to the

British fleet in the approaching long hours of a wintry night; but

opportunity was winging by, with which neither Rodney nor the Navy could

afford to trifle. He was already laid up with an attack of the gout that

continued to harass him throughout this command, and the decision to

continue the chase was only reached after a discussion between him and

his captain, the mention of which is transmitted by Sir Gilbert Blane,

the surgeon of the ship, who was present professionally. The merit of

the resolution must remain with the man who bore the responsibility of

the event; but that he reached it at such a moment only after

consultation with another, to whom current gossip attributed the chief

desert, must be coupled with the plausible claim afterwards advanced for

Sir Charles Douglas, that he suggested the breaking of the enemy's line

on April 12th. Taken together, they indicate at least a common

contemporary professional estimate of Rodney's temperament. No such

anecdote is transmitted of Hawke. The battle of Cape St. Vincent,

therefore, is not that most characteristic of Rodney's genius. Judged by

his career at large, it is exceptional; yet of all his actions it is

the one in which merit and success most conspicuously met. Nor does it

at all detract from his credit that the enemy was much inferior in

numbers; eleven to twenty-one. As in Hawke's pursuit of Conflans, with

which this engagement is worthy to be classed, what was that night

dared, rightly and brilliantly dared, was the dangers of the deep, not

of the foe. The prey was seized out of the jaws of disaster.

The results were commensurate to the risk. The action, which began at 4

P.M., lasted till two the following morning, the weather becoming

tempestuous with a great sea, so that it was difficult to take

possession of the captured vessels. Many of the heavy British ships

continued also in danger during the 17th, and had to carry a press of

sail to clear the shoals, on which two of their prizes were actually

wrecked. One Spanish ship-of-the-line was blown up and six struck, among

them the flag-ship of Admiral Langara, who was taken into Gibraltar.

Only four escaped.

Two such strokes of mingled good fortune and good management, within ten

days, formed a rare concurrence, and the aggregate results were as

exceptional as the combination of events. Sandwich congratulated Rodney

that he had already "taken more line-of-battle ships than had been

captured in any one action in either of the two last preceding wars."

Militarily regarded, it had a further high element of praise, for the

enemy's detachment, though in itself inferior, was part of a much

superior force; twenty-four allied ships-of-the-line besides it being at

the moment in Cadiz Bay. It is the essence of military art thus to

overwhelm in detail. A technical circumstance like this was doubtless

overlooked in the general satisfaction with the event, the most evident

feature in which was the relief of the Government, who just then stood

badly in need of credit. "The ministerial people feel it very sensibly,"

Lady Rodney wrote him. "It is a lucky stroke for them at this juncture."

Salutes were fired, and the city illuminated; the press teemed with

poetical effusion. Sandwich, somewhat impudently when the past is

considered, but not uncharacteristically regarded as an officeholder,

took to himself a large slice of the credit. "The worst of my enemies

now allow that I have pitched upon a man who knows his duty, and is a

brave, honest, and able officer.... I have obtained you the thanks of

both houses of Parliament." The letter does not end without a further

caution against indiscreet talking about the condition of his ships. It

all comes back on the Government, he laments. What Rodney may have said

to others may be uncertain; to his wife, soon after reaching his

station, he wrote, "What are the ministers about? Are they determined to

undo their country? Is it fair that the British fleet should be so

inferior to the French, and that the British officers and men are

always to be exposed to superior numbers? What right had the

administration to expect anything but defeat?" Then he passes on to

remark himself, what has been alluded to above, the change in his

personal position effected by his successes. "Thank God, I now fear no

frowns of ministers, and hope never again to stand in need of their

assistance. I know them well. All are alike, and no dependence is to be

placed on their promises." It is to be feared his sense of obligation to

Sandwich did not coincide with the latter's estimate.

In his official report Rodney gave much credit to his officers for the

St. Vincent affair. "The gallant behaviour of the admirals, captains,

officers and men, I had the honour to command, was conspicuous; they

seemed animated with the same spirit, and were eager to exert themselves

with the utmost zeal." Here also, however, he was biding his time for

obvious reasons; for to his wife he writes, "I have done them all like

honour, but it is because I would not have the world believe that there

were officers slack in their duty. Without a thorough change in naval

affairs, the discipline of our navy will be lost. I could say much, but

will not. You will hear of it from _themselves_;" that is, probably, by

their mutual recriminations. Such indulgent envelopment of good and bad

alike in a common mantle of commendation is far from unexampled; but it

rarely fails to return to plague its authors, as has been seen in

instances more recent than that of Rodney. He clearly had told Sandwich

the same in private letters, for the First Lord writes him, "I fear the

picture you give of the faction in your fleet is too well drawn. Time

and moderation will by degrees get the better of this bane of

discipline. I exceedingly applaud your resolution to shut your ears

against the illiberal language of your officers, who are inclined to

arraign each other's conduct." In this two things are to be remarked:

first, the evident and undeniable existence of serious cause of

complaint, which was preparing Rodney for the stern self-assertion soon

to be shown; and, second, that such imputations are frequent with him,

while he seems in turn to have had a capacity for eliciting

insubordination of feeling, though he can repress the act. It is a

question of personal temperament, which explains more than his relations

with other men. Hawke and Nelson find rare fault with those beneath

them; for their own spirit takes possession of their subordinates. Such

difference of spirit reveals itself in more ways than one in the active

life of a military community.

If there was joy in England over Rodney's achievement, still more and

more sympathetic was the exultation of those who in the isolation of

Gibraltar's Rock, rarely seeing their country's flag save on their own

flagstaff, witnessed and shared the triumph of his entrance there with

his train of prizes. The ships of war and transports forming the convoy

did not indeed appear in one body, but in groups, being dispersed by the

light airs, and swept eastward by the in-drag of the current from the

Atlantic to the Mediterranean; but the presence of the great fleet, and

the prestige of its recent victory, secured the practical immunity of

merchant vessels during its stay. Of the first to come in, on January

15th, an eye-witness wrote, "A ship with the British flag entering the

Bay was so uncommon a sight that almost the whole garrison were

assembled at the southward to welcome her in; but words are insufficient

to describe their transports on being informed that she was one of a

large convoy which had sailed the latter end of the preceding month for

our relief." The admiral himself had been carried beyond and gone into

Tetuan, in Morocco, whence he finally arrived on January 26th, having

sent on a supply fleet to Minorca, the garrison of which was undergoing

a severance from the outer world more extreme even than that of

Gibraltar. Upon the return thence of the convoying ships he again put to

sea, February 13th, with the entire fleet, which accompanied him three

days sail to the westward, when it parted company for England; he with

only four ships-of-the-line pursuing his way to his station. On March

27th he reached Santa Lucia, where he found seventeen of-the-line,

composing his command. Three weeks later he met the enemy; barely three

months, almost to a day, after the affair at St. Vincent.

The antecedent circumstances of the war, and the recent history of the

French navy, gave a singular opportuneness of occasion, and of personal

fitness, to Rodney's arrival at this moment. The humiliations of the

Seven Years War, with the loss of so much of the French colonial empire,

traceable in chief measure to naval decadence, had impressed the French

government with the need of reviving their navy, which had consequently

received a material development in quality, as well as in quantity,

unparalleled since the days of Colbert and Seignelay, near a century

before. Concomitant with this had been a singular progress in the theory

of naval evolutions, and of their handmaid, naval signalling, among

French officers; an advance to which the lucid, speculative, character

of the national genius greatly contributed. Although they as yet lacked

practice, and were numerically too few, the French officers were well

equipped by mental resources, by instruction and reflection, to handle

large fleets; and they now had large fleets to handle. No such

conjunction had occurred since Tourville; none such recurred during the

Revolution.

The condition was unique in naval history of the sail period. To meet

it, assuming an approach to equality in contending fleets, was required,

first, a commander-in-chief, and then a competent body of officers. The

latter the British had only in the sense of fine seamen and gallant men.

In courage there is no occasion to institute comparisons between the two

nations; in kind there may have been a difference, but certainly not in

degree. The practical superiority of seamanship in the British may be

taken as a set-off to the more highly trained understanding of military

principles and methods on the part of their enemy. For commander-in-chief,

there were at this time but two, Howe and Rodney, whose professional

equipment, as shown in practice, fitted them to oppose the French methods.

Of these Rodney was the better, because possessed of a quicker power of

initiative, and also of that personal severity required to enforce strict

conformity of action among indifferent or sullen subordinates.

Rodney has therefore a singularly well defined place among British naval

chiefs. He was to oppose form to form, theory to theory, evolution to

evolution, upon the battle ground of the sea; with purpose throughout

tactically offensive, not defensive, and facing an adversary his equal

in professional equipment. Had he arrived a year before he would have

met no fair match in D'Estaing, a soldier, not a sailor, whose

deficiencies as a seaman would have caused a very different result from

that which actually followed his encounter with Byron, who in conduct

showed an utter absence of ideas and of method inconceivable in Rodney.

The French were now commanded by De Guichen, considered the most capable

of their officers by Rodney, whose recent abode in Paris had probably

familiarized him with professional reputations among the enemy.

Everything therefore conspired to make the occasion one eminently fitted

to his capacities. Such are the conditions--the man _and_ the hour--that

make reputations; though they do not form characters, which are growths

of radically different origin.

De Guichen put to sea from Martinique on April 15th, with a convoy for

Santo Domingo which he intended to see clear of British interference.

Rodney, whose anchorage was but thirty miles away, learned instantly the

French sailing and followed without delay. On the evening of April 16th,

the two fleets were in sight of each other to leeward of Martinique, the

British to windward; an advantage that was diligently maintained during

the night. At daylight of the 17th the two enemies were twelve to

fifteen miles apart, ranged on nearly parallel lines, the British twenty

heading northwest, the French twenty-three southeast. The numerical

difference represents sufficiently nearly the actual difference of

force, although French vessels averaged more powerful than British of

the same rates.

At 6.45 A.M. Rodney signalled that it was his intention to attack the

enemy's rear with his whole force. This was never annulled, and the

purpose governed his action throughout the day. This combination--on the

rear--is the one generally preferable to be attempted when underway, and

the relative situations of the fleets at this moment made it

particularly opportune; for the British, in good order, two cables

interval between the ships, were abreast the rear centre and rear of the

enemy, whose line was in comparison greatly extended,--the result

probably of inferior practical seamanship. To increase his advantage,

Rodney at 7 ordered his vessels to close to one cable, and at 8.30, when

the antagonists were still heading as at daybreak, undertook to lead the

fleet down by a series of signals directive of its successive movements.

In this he was foiled by De Guichen, who by wearing brought what was

previously his van into position to support the extreme threatened. "The

different movements of the enemy," wrote Rodney, "obliged me to be very

attentive and watch every opportunity of attacking them at advantage;" a

sentence that concisely sums up his special excellencies, of which the

present occasion offers the most complete illustration. It may be fully

conceded also that it would have vindicated his high title to fame by

conspicuous results, had the intelligence of his officers seconded his

dispositions.

The forenoon passed in manoeuvres, skilfully timed, to insure a definite

issue. At 11.50 Rodney considered that his opportunity had arrived.

Both fleets were then heading in the same direction, on the starboard

tack, and he had again succeeded in so placing his own that, by the

words of his report, he expected to bring "the whole force of His

Majesty's fleet against the enemy's rear, and of course part of their

centre, by which means the twenty sail of British ships would have been

opposed to only fifteen sail of the enemy's, and must in all probability

have totally disabled them before their van could have given them any

assistance." It would be difficult to cite a clearer renouncement of the

outworn "van to van," ship to ship, dogma; but Rodney is said to have

expressed himself in more emphatic terms subsequently, as follows:

"During all the commands Lord Rodney has been entrusted with, he made it

a rule to bring his whole force against a part of the enemy's, and never

was so absurd as to bring ship against ship, when the enemy gave him an

opportunity of acting otherwise." Though not distinctly so stated, it

would seem that his first movement on the present occasion had failed

because of the long distance between the fleets permitting the enemy to

succor the part threatened, before he could close. He was now nearer,

for at this second attempt only an hour proved to be needed for the

first British ship to open fire at long range. It may be for this

reason, also, that he at this stage threw himself upon his captains, no

longer prescribing the successive movements, but issuing the general

signal to bear down, each vessel to "steer," according to the 21st

Article of the _Additional_ Fighting Instructions, "for the ship of the

enemy which from the disposition of the two squadrons it must be her lot

to engage, notwithstanding the signal for the line ahead will be kept

flying: making or shortening sail in such proportion as _to preserve the

distance assigned by the signal for the line_, in order that the whole

squadron may, as near as possible, come into action at the same time."