As he concluded the reading of this letter his children

came round him and kissed him. “But you will succeed all

the same, won’t you, father?” they kept on repeating; and

one of the younger children, a little girl about seven,

coming up to me, said, “Did the Right vote against papa,

Monsieur?” I replied, “I do not think so, Mademoiselle.”

She said, “Ah!” and, delighted at having had her say, she

rushed into her mother’s arms, who, still thinking of

the vote, repeated, “It is infamous, and will drive six

hundred thousand subscribers to revolt. It will be the

ruin of all these poor folk.”

The experience of the Panama Canal Company, has only been a repetition,

on a large scale, of that of the Panama Railway projectors. That line

was commenced in 1850 and completed in 1855. The distance which it

traverses, between Aspinwall and Panama, is 47½ miles, and the cost of

construction was 48,600_l._ per mile, as compared with an average cost

of under 12,000_l._ per mile for the railways of the United States as

a whole. The great summit-level was attained at a height of 264 feet

above the mean tide of the Atlantic, and the ascent required gradients

of 1 in 18. The greatest source of the heavy expense of the Panama

Railroad was the labour difficulty, resulting from the influences of

the climate. Of this Dr. Otis[187] says:—

“The working force was increased as rapidly as possible,

drawing labourers from almost every quarter of the

globe. Irishmen were imported from Ireland, coolies

from Hindostan, Chinamen from China, English, French,

Germans, and Austrians, amounting in all to more than

7,000 men, were thus gathered in, appropriately, as it

were, to construct this highway for all nations. It was

now anticipated that, with the enormous forces employed,

the time required for the completion of the entire work

would be in a ratio proportionate to the numerical increase

of labourers, all of whom were supposed to be hardy,

able-bodied men. But it was soon found that many of these

people, from their previous habits and modes of life,

were little adapted to the work for which they had been

engaged. The Chinamen, 1000 in number, had been brought to

the isthmus by the company, and every possible care taken

which could conduce to their health and comfort. Their

hill-rice, their tea, and opium in sufficient quantities

to last several months, had been imported with them; they

were carefully housed and attended to; and it was expected

that they would prove efficient and valuable men. But they

had been engaged upon the work scarcely a fortnight before

almost the entire body became affected with a melancholic

suicidal tendency, and scores of them ended their unhappy

existence by their own hands. Disease broke out among them,

and raged so fiercely that in a few weeks scarcely 200

remained. The freshly-imported Irishmen and Frenchmen also

suffered severely, and there was found no other resource

but to re-ship them as soon as possible, and replenish from

the neighbouring provinces and Jamaica, the natives of

which, with the exception of the northmen of America, were

found best able to resist the influences of the climate.”

_The proposed Panama Canal locks._—The original plans of the Panama

Canal provided for a waterway that should be 28 feet below the mean

ocean level throughout its entire length. It has since been found that

this design would involve an enormous expenditure and a serious delay,

and hence the decision in 1888 to provide a series of four locks on the

Pacific, and four locks on the Atlantic side. On the Atlantic side,

two of the locks were to have a fall of 8 metres (26 feet 5 inches),

and two others a fall of 11 metres each (36 feet 3 inches), while on

the Pacific side, three locks were to have a fall of 11 metres each

(36 feet 3 inches), and one a fall of 8 metres (26 feet 5 inches). The

height of the water level on the Pacific side would, therefore, be 41

metres (135·6 feet), and on the Atlantic side it would be 38 metres

(125·7 feet). The width of the lock gates was to be 18 metres (59·5

feet), and the length was 180 metres (595·5 feet). The locks and their

gates were to be constructed in iron, and it was estimated that 20,000

tons of cast, and 15,000 tons of wrought, iron would be employed in

their construction. The effect of this modification of the original

plans would, of course, be to reduce the amount of excavation necessary

in the Culebra cut by at least one-third, but it would also obviously

alter the entire character of the canal as first projected.

The opinion of some engineers appears to be that the frequent opening

and shutting of the sluice-gates, with such a considerable pressure of

water, would not be without a certain amount of danger. The pressure

would be increased little by little until it had been raised to a

breadth of 10 metres, and even as much as 15·40 metres. It is not

unusual to find a pressure of this extent at dock gates, but in the

largest canals hitherto constructed with locks, the pressure has seldom

exceeded three to four metres. In order to meet similar cases, it has

been proposed, where there was a constant use of a canal at all hours

of the day and night, to employ a very large number of small sluices

adapted to the slopes of the canal. This expedient has been put in

practice in the case of the eight successive sluices known as Neptune’s

Staircase, on the Caledonian Canal, and, on the Canal du Midi in

France, in the case of the seven sluices of the staircase of Béziers.

It is, however, held by _Le Génie Civil_ that such small sluices,

although more easy to open and offering perhaps greater resistance,

are, nevertheless, not well adapted to the necessarily rapid and

constant working of a canal like that of Panama. This expedient having,

therefore, been abandoned, there remained that of movable caissons

suspended by the upper part, which is known as the Eiffel system. This

system, with its movable gate shut, and the recess into which it fits

when open on the right, is illustrated in one of the drawings attached

to this chapter, while another drawing shows the lock gate open.

[Illustration: TRACING AND PROFILE OF THE PANAMA CANAL.]

[Illustration: M. EIFFEL’S PROPOSED SLUICES FOR THE PANAMA CANAL.]

The proposed modification of the original plans has been so designed

as to enable the works of the tide-level canal to be continued without

interruption. The lock canal was to be at sea-level from Colon to the

fourteenth mile, where the first lock with a lift of 26¼ feet would

be placed. The second lock with the same lift was to be placed 23-1/9

miles from Colon, and the third and fourth locks, with lifts of 36-1/11

feet each, at 27¼ and 28¾ miles respectively, making the summit-level

124⅔ feet above the Atlantic. The canal was to descend to the Pacific

by three locks of 36-1/11 feet drop, situated at 35½, 35-9/10, and 38-2/5

miles respectively from Colon, and one lock of 26¼ feet drop at 36¾

miles, thus making up the difference in level of 134½ feet between

the summit-level and low-water of spring tides at Panama. It has been

suggested that in the event of difficulties occurring in the excavation

of the Culebra cutting, the summit-level might be raised to 160¾ feet,

by inserting a lock with a lift of 36-1/11 feet on each slope of the

Cordilleras, whereby time might be gained by a further reduction in the

amount of excavation. The section adopted for the level canal was to

be maintained in each reach. The width of the locks was to be 59 feet,

and their available length 590 feet. At the Colon entrance, the canal

was to have a bottom width of 590 feet for 1·86 mile, and at the Panama

end, 164 feet for 3¼ miles; whilst the channel in the Pacific, from the

shore at Boca to Naos, was to be 164 feet wide. Allowing a speed of 6¼

miles per hour in the long reaches, and 2¼ miles in the short reaches,

and one hour for passing through a lock, a single ship would traverse

the canal in seventeen hours twenty-eight minutes, and in a convoy in

twenty-eight hours twenty-five minutes. Accordingly, ten vessels, or

25,000 tons, could pass through the canal in twenty-four hours, so

that, if necessary, 9,125,000 tons of traffic could be accommodated

annually. The water supply required for this traffic was estimated

at 1,050,000 cubic yards per day, which could be obtained from the

Chagres, the Obispo, and the Rio Grande. With the summit-level at 124⅔

feet above the sea, it could be supplied from the reservoir created by

the large dam at Gamboa; but if the summit-level was raised to 160¾

feet above the sea, pumps not exceeding 3600 H.P. would be

needed for lifting the supply the additional height. The gates for

the locks were designed to be hollow-iron counterbalanced caissons,

suspended from a frame with rollers, running on a roadway supported by

a swing-bridge across the lock, and continued above the recess at the

side, into which the caisson was to retreat for opening the lock.

The watertight compartments at the lower part of the caisson, as well

as the bottom portion, arranged to serve as a working-chamber, were

to communicate with the outer air by shafts, provided with air-locks,

so that water or compressed air could be introduced at pleasure. This

arrangement would enable the counterpoise of the caisson to be readily

adjusted, the different chambers to be easily reached for repairs,

and the working-chamber at the base to be used for cleaning the sill

from silt or _débris_. The caisson gates, in a lock of 36-1/11 feet

lift, would be 69 feet high, 71 feet long, 13⅛ feet broad at the tail,

and 32¾ feet high, 71 feet long, and 9⅚ feet broad at the head of the

lock. The locks, being situated in rock, would have the sides of their

chambers formed of the natural rock, with a slight facing of masonry

where necessary; but the side walls below the gates were to be iron

caissons, 18 feet broad, filled with concrete. The swing-bridges, of

iron or steel, were to be 18 feet wide, and 112 feet long, the swing

portion being 78 feet; and the recesses for the caissons were to be

98½ feet long; and 23 feet wide at the top. The filling and emptying

of the locks were to be effected by two cast-iron pipes, each 9⅙

feet diameter, and it was calculated that the required volume of

52,300 cubic yards of water could be admitted or shut out in fifteen

minutes.[188]

_Special Features of the Enterprise._—Probably no great engineering

or constructive work of either ancient or modern times has been of

such a gigantic and difficult character as that of the canalisation

of the Isthmus of Panama. It is not that the length of the canal is

exceptional; it is, on the contrary, shorter than that of many existing

canals, some of which are of very small account indeed—being less

than one-half the Suez Canal, less than one-third that of the canal

of Languedoc, and less than one-fourteenth that of the Grand Canal of

China. It is probable, also, that the building of the Great Wall of

China, the Pyramids of Egypt, and several other works of antiquity

that might be named, extended over a much longer period, and involved

the employment of a greater number of men. The _Royal_ or _Grand Canal_

of China, which was completed in the year 980, is said to have occupied

the labour of thirty thousand men for forty-three years.[189] But none

of the great works of previous epochs have been environed with so

many difficulties as the Panama Canal. The scheme, on the face of it,

does not look so formidable. It is only when we come to look into its

details, and compare them with those of other similar undertakings,

that we realise its magnitude. And it is only when we, in like manner,

compare its engineering features with those of the other great

engineering works of the world that we can appreciate the vast energy,

enterprise, and resource that has ventured to essay so colossal a task.

The first and the most serious difficulty to be encountered was that

of controlling the waters of a torrential stream, almost equal to

that of some of the chief rivers of Italy, through which the canal

was to run. This stream, which crosses and recrosses the line of the

canal twenty-seven times, as shown in the drawing attached hereto, has

several different levels, and would, if left to itself, be certain to

destroy the canal in a very short time. It had therefore to be dealt

with by constructing an enormous embankment raised 45 feet above the

waters of the Chagres, so as to allow of their gradual escape. In this

dam there are 26 millions of cubic yards of cutting; in the Culebra

Col, a channel cut right through a mountain more than 300 feet above

sea level, there were estimated to be 37 millions more; and in the

entire line of the canal there were calculated to be about 75 to 100

millions of cubic yards of excavation, to accomplish which a serious

writer in the _Edinburgh Review_ maintained that it would require the

labour of 20,000 men for forty-two years.

Worse than all, however, was the dreadful and deadly climate. Five

months of the year are continually wet. There are few fine days in the

other seven months. The annual rainfall is twelve to fifteen times

that of Europe. The mortality is excessive. The cost of labour is

consequently high,[190] but pay what they may, the company could not

command the amount of labour it was anxious to employ. For the most

part the labour has had to be imported from Europe and the West Indies.

The men were brought to Panama at the expense of the Company, but a

very large proportion of them left again immediately, for various

reasons, so that the company has not been able to keep up the proper

quotas of men with which they undertook to provide their contractors,

who were left at liberty to throw up their contracts when they ceased

to be remunerative. The cost of the undertaking was thus enormously

increased beyond the original estimates. The difficulty of procuring

ways and means, and the high prices that had to be paid for borrowed

money, have also seriously added to the expenditure. Another serious

element of cost has been the outlay incurred in providing hospital and

other facilities, and the maintenance of the usually very considerable

numbers who were stricken with illness, induced by their unhealthy

surroundings. These and other difficulties have so seriously weighed

upon the undertaking that its accomplishment has been pronounced

impossible, and M. de Lesseps and his colleagues have been denounced

for following a “will-o’-the-wisp.” They have, however, persevered

with their task for about eight years, and have made heroic, and

almost superhuman efforts to keep the enterprise on its legs. In this

effort they have had to depend absolutely upon their own countrymen,

although they have much less maritime interest in the matter than the

people of England and the United States of North America. In the latter

countries the canal has all along been regarded with disfavour, not to

say declared hostility. In the United States especially, M. de Lesseps

has been told again and again that he was “beating the wind,” and that

nothing but failure could come of his project. For the time being it

looks as if his candid friends were right, and M. de Lesseps was wrong.

As might be expected, there have been very conflicting calculations

made as to the amount of traffic which an interoceanic canal on the

American isthmus would be likely to carry. The Geographical Congress,

held at Antwerp in 1871, did not venture to go beyond 4,000,000 tons

per annum. When the Canal Company was started, the expected tonnage

was raised to about 6,000,000 tons annually. In 1887 M. de Lesseps, in

his letter to the French Premier, put the quantity at 7,500,000 tons.

A writer in the _Revue-Gazette Maritime et Commerciale_ (Paris) has

estimated that if the Panama Canal had been opened in 1884, there would

have passed through it the following tonnage:—

──────────┬──────────┬───────────

│ Ships. │ Tonnage.

├──────────┼───────────

Europe │ 4,226 │ 4,650,390

Asia │ 2,255 │ 1,212,178

America │ 2,987 │ 3,441,598

├──────────┼───────────

Totals │ 9,468 │ 9,304,166

──────────┴──────────┴───────────

This latter estimate appears to be greatly exaggerated. It is

apparently founded on the assumption that the greater part of the

Australasian trade would pass that way. But the fact is that the

geographical distance to Sydney does not differ by quite 500 knots

between any of the four routes that are, or would be, available—that

is, the Cape of Good Hope, the Suez Canal, Cape Horn, and Panama, the

distances increasing in the order stated. Nautical distance, moreover,

as has been properly remarked, “is only one element in determining

choice of route; prevailing winds and currents, avoidance of stormy

seas or of rock-bound coasts, have all to be studied by the mariner;

and the comparatively trifling difference in the length of the course

from the Thames to Sydney by four such different routes is enough to

show how important it is to have this question of routes illustrated by

the experience of the skilled navigator. This consideration is enhanced

by the remark that the dues for the passage of the canal would amount

to as much as the cost of more than 800 knots of additional voyage.”[191]

A much more reasonable and modest estimate than that of either of the

foregoing, is that made in a recent report on the proposed Nicaraguan

Canal. This estimate, based ostensibly on the United States Treasury

Reports, puts the total tonnage that would have made use of the canal

in 1885 at 4,252,000 tons, which is stated to be an increase of 53

per cent. in six years. At the same rate of increase, the tonnage

available in 1892, when the canal was expected to be completed, would

be 6,506,000 tons.[192]

The diagrams attached hereto show the enormous difficulties that

have just been referred to in a much more graphic way than any mere

description could do. It will be observed from the illustration (p.

298) that the Rio Chagres crosses the course of the canal no fewer than

five times in little more than five kilometres, and that the Rio Obispo

also steps in to add to the complications of the situation. On the San

Pablo section again, within a distance of three kilometres, the river

crosses the line of canal three times.

The Chagres river, which is so great an obstacle in the project of the

Panama Canal, rises on the western slopes of the Cordilleras, and runs

through a broken and irregular country, to the north of the auriferous

granite hills which branch off to Cruces and Gorgona. This river and

its affluents is said to drain an area of about 1550 square miles.[193]

From Matachin, where the Panama canal parts company with the valley

of the Chagres, to the sea, there is a total distance of twenty-eight

miles, in the course of which the river falls about 35 feet.[194] The

rain of a single day is said to raise the waters of the Chagres from 35

to 40 feet, and below Matachin there is a cataract of 50 to 60 feet.

It was part of the project to abandon at this point the valley of the

Chagres, and to cut through the Cordilleras. The level of the bottom

of the canal is here 100 feet below that of the bed of the Chagres, or

140 feet below the mean level of the nearest indicated points on the

section of the plans above and below the intersection. In a length of

nine miles, at the foot of the ascent of the Cordillera at Matachin,

the lowest point is 166 feet, and the highest 333 feet above the bed of

the canal. A tunnel of 7720 metres in length was at one time proposed

to be cut through this section, but M. de Lesseps stood out for a

cutting _á ciel ouvert_, and it has been remarked that according to the

plans there has been an assumption that the sides of this vast cutting

will stand so nearly perpendicular as to slope only one foot horizontal

in every ten feet vertical. In a dry climate, with good firm clay or

rock, this might not involve difficulty or danger, but the climate of

Panama is exposed to a tropical rainfall. A rainfall of six or seven

inches in a few hours is not uncommon.

The flood volume of the river Chagres has been estimated at 1600 metric

tons of water per second, which is four times the volume of the highest

flood ever measured on the Thames, and the rainfall, as a whole, has

been known to exceed 120 inches in a single year. Besides all this, it

was reported by M. de Lesseps himself,[195] that the borings on the

Culebra range, had reached the depth of 100 feet without having met

with rock. Some engineers have therefore condemned this part of the

plans as faulty, arguing that such a cutting could not be expected to

stand at a slope of one to one, even in a much drier climate—which

means that the cutting through the Culebra would require to assume

greatly larger dimensions, if it were to be of any value.

One of the most serious undertakings connected with the Panama canal

was the proposal to retain the flood waters of the Chagres, by means

of the enormous embankment already referred to, between the Cerro

Gamboa on the south, and the Cerro Barneo on the north, thus raising

the level of the waters from 40 to 45 feet above the river, in order

to allow of their escape. Other two projects were submitted to meet

this difficulty—the first, that of constructing a canal for the

flood waters of the Chagres alongside of the navigable canal; and the

second, that of tapping the Chagres at Matachin, and diverting its

waters to the Pacific. As regards the first of these two alternatives,

it was objected that, as large affluents flow into the river below

Matachin, three parallel canals of large size would require to be

constructed, in order to make the alternative of any real value; the

second alternative, it was held, would afford no relief to the floods

of the Trinidad, the Gatun, and the smaller affluents of the Chagres

below Matachin, while it would be likely to increase the difficulties

of construction at the one end as much as it reduced them at the other.

Nor is it admitted by some authorities that the Gamboa dam would be

likely to answer its purpose. It is contended that many embankments

would be required, instead of only one, and that the construction of

such an embankment from such a cutting could hardly by any possible

effort be completed in twenty-six years, so that it would not be until

after that time had elapsed that the canal could be commenced between

Chagres and Matachin, with its bed 30 feet under sea level.

The low-water flood of the Chagres river, just below the site of the

proposed Gamboa Dam, is 209 feet wide by 7 feet 6 inches deep, the bed

being triangular in cross section. In November 1885, a flood occurred

here, under the influence of which the river was swollen to a width of

1560 feet, with a maximum depth of 28 feet, so that it was twelve times

as wide as the canal and almost as deep at its deepest point. It is

stated that the last four feet of the rise took place in four hours,

and in thirty-six hours the water had risen about 20 feet. The general

consensus of opinion among engineers appears to be that this immense

flood has to be provided for in some way. M. de Lesseps originally

proposed to meet the difficulty by constructing a dam, or embankment,

two-thirds of a mile long, 1300 feet wide at the base, and 164 feet in

height. This dam was to be designed so as to retain the floods which

descend the Chagres river, storing the water and allowing it to escape

gradually. The only alternative was to provide the flood waters with

such a rapid means of escape to the ocean that they could not flood the

canal.

From considerations of economy, it was recently determined to abandon

the lock gates at the port of Panama. It was intended in the original

scheme to provide these gates in order to control the rise and fall of

the tide at this end of the canal. This movement of the tide varies

from 20 to 27 feet, being at least twelve times as much as at the other

end of the canal. Obviously, therefore, the canal would be seriously

affected by a tidal movement of so considerable a character, and

leading engineers have not hesitated to say that without the lock gates

at Panama the canal is an impossibility.

AMERICAN VIEWS OF THE ENTERPRISE.

“American engineers,” we are told, “have never had but one opinion of

the canal. As a general thing they have never believed that it could be

built on the lines, within the time, nor for the money specified by M.

de Lesseps.” The same writer adds that “M. de Lesseps, having won fame

by scooping out some sand hills and connecting some lakes and streams

at Suez, thought it was a simple matter to make a canal anywhere.

He has persistently refused to see any difficulties, or to squarely

look the undertaking in the face, and to estimate the chances for and

against its completion, and the collapse of all this will simply be a

question of time.”[196]

Another American writer adopts much the same view, in even more

emphatic language, when he says[197] that, “of the final cost of M. de

Lesseps’s sea-level canal at Panama, if there could be anything about it

save utter failure, nothing can be known, except that it will be a

fabulous amount.... The great difficulties and expense of excavation

are still before them, and the knotty, perhaps impossible, problem of

the Chagres river is still unsolved.”

Further light on the difficulties in the way of the enterprise was

thrown upon it in a report made by Lieut. Kemball, in 1887, to the

United States Government. He found on the Pacific slope, a short

distance west of the summit, that the route of the canal was here

crossed and recrossed by the Rio Grande, which had been trained in a

straight line down the north side of the valley, at a considerable

height above the level of the canal.[198] It was found, however, when the

rainy season had set in, that in different places the hillside began

to slide into the cutting made for the deflection of the river, and

that one bank moved almost intact across the cut, with the top surface

unbroken, and without any disturbance of the vegetation. The existence

of a substratum of a greasy clay bank was the cause of this trouble.

Such a foundation is, of course, not to be relied on. It is ready, as

has been pointed out, to “swell upwards, or glide sideways, on the

slightest provocation, and it may easily develop into a difficulty of

the most formidable character, requiring the river to be carried round

the back of the hills away from the canal.”[199]

In the summer of 1887, Lieut. Rogers, of the United States Navy,

visited the canal works, and made a report on them. He declared that

in 1886, 11,727,000 cubic metres of excavation had been done, bringing

the total quantity completed up to that date at 30 millions of cubic

metres. This had, however, been done in the face of tremendous odds.

An American dredger of greater power was steadily engaged on the same

spot for weeks, the pressure of the material laid on the bank forcing

up the soft spongy bed of the cut so rapidly that the machine could do

little more than merely hold its own. The canal bed had here and there

been destroyed by floods. Lines and trucks had been buried under two

metres of silt. In the Culebra cut, the mountain to the left hand of

the cut was found to be moving towards the canal, at the rate of 11 to

12 inches per annum. Seeing that this was the case when not one-third

of the excavation had been completed, the query is naturally suggested,

What will be the rate of movement when the bed of the canal is 250 feet

or more under the level of the surrounding country?

[Illustration: AMERICAN DREDGER ON THE PANAMA CANAL.]

Nor have English writers been slow to condemn the project both from

its economic and from its engineering points of view. The following

quotation is given as typical of much that has been written elsewhere:—

“We cannot avoid the remark that if the Inter-oceanic

Canal be regarded, not as a Bourse speculation, but as

an excavation which it is proposed to make by human

agency, the question of its actual feasibility has not

yet been really entered upon. An excavation which, if the

last accounts of the borings be correct, would contain

at least twenty times the bulk of the great pyramid; an

embankment holding more than a third of the contents of

that excavation, and requiring twenty-six years for its

execution at the wholly unprecedented rate (from one end)

of a million cubic yards in a year; a canal displacing for

its execution a torrential river of four times the volume

of the Thames in its heaviest flood, and with its bed at a

depth of thirty feet below sea level—all this to be done

while as yet the preliminary observations of rainfall,

river discharge, and cross section of country have to be

made—the proposal of such an enterprise seems rather

worthy to adorn the name of Alexandre Dumas, or of the

author of the tales of the Arabian Nights, than that of any

person familiar with the practical execution of engineering

work.”[200]

With reference to the actual state of affairs at the Panama Canal in

1887, Mr. Froude has written in the following unmeasured terms[201]:—

“If half the reports which reached me are correct,

in all the world there is not perhaps now concentrated

in any single spot so much swindling and villainy, so

much foul disease, such a hideous dungheap of moral and

physical abomination, as in the scene of this far-famed

undertaking of nineteenth century engineering. By the

scheme, as it was first propounded, £26,000,000 of English

money were to unite the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, to

form a highway for the commerce of the globe, and enrich

with untold wealth the happy owners of original shares.

The thrifty French peasantry were tempted by the golden

bait, and poured their savings into M. de Lesseps’ lottery

box. Almost all that money, I was told, has been already

spent, and only a fifth of the work is done. Meanwhile, the

human vultures have gathered to the spoil. Speculators,

adventurers, card sharpers, hell keepers, and doubtful

ladies have carried their charms to this delightful

market. The scene of operations is a damp tropical

jungle, intensely hot, swarming with mosquitoes, snakes,

alligators, scorpions, and centipedes; the home, even as

nature made it, of yellow fever, typhus, and dysentery,

and now made immeasurably more deadly by the multitudes

of people who crowd thither. Half buried in mud lie about

the wrecks of costly machinery, consuming by rust, sent

out under lavish orders, and found unfit for the work for

which they were intended. Unburied altogether lie skeletons

of the human machines which have broken down there, picked

clean by the vultures. Everything which imagination can

conceive that is ghastly and loathsome seems to be gathered

into that locality just now. I was pressed to go on and

look at the moral surroundings of ‘the greatest undertaking

of our age,’ but my curiosity was less strong than my

disgust.”

[Illustration: PROPOSED SLUICE OF 11 METRES ON THE PANAMA CANAL,

SHOWING THE ROLLING GATE OPEN.]

[Illustration: DINGLE’S DREDGER AT WORK AT GATUN, ON THE EXCAVATION

OF THE PANAMA CANAL.]

The time has not yet come when the true history of the Panama Canal

Scheme can be written. It may have been an ill-judged project, or

it may not. It has, however, had enormous difficulties to contend

with. Those difficulties began with the climate, continued with the

administration and finances, and concluded with the open hostility

of very many individuals and interests that were never very friendly

to its success. The enterprise was essentially French, alike in its

conception, initiation, engineering, and finances. The phenomenal

success that attended the Suez Canal probably led the majority of the

unfortunate people who put money into the Panama Canal to suppose that

it was to be another Egyptian Canal “writ large;” but there has also

been a strong feeling of _esprit de corps_, which we cannot fail to

admire, however disastrously it may have turned out for themselves,

which the French have put into this matter. The truth is that the

French people have come to regard themselves as a royal race in canal

construction. The Languedoc Canal, which they constructed in the

reign of Louis XIV. cost 14,000,000 livres, and marked a new epoch in

the history of canal construction.[202] Of the Suez Canal, the leading

features of which are so well known, it is unnecessary to say more than

that its success has not only been phenomenal, but has been achieved

in the face of the most discouraging attitude on the part of the

engineers of other countries, including England. At the time that the

Panama Canal was being promoted, M. de Lesseps was able to point his

countrymen to the fact that the shares in the Suez Canal, which had

been issued at 500 francs, had risen to a value of 2200 francs, while

the debentures issued at 300 francs were worth 565. The impressionable

French people did not stay to recollect that the two enterprises

were totally different in character, in cost, in accessibility, in

practicability, and in prospects. And it is only fair to recollect

that the original estimate of the cost of the canal has been largely

exceeded by circumstances that were hardly capable of being foreseen.

The repeated attacks made by inimical interests, led to the company

having to borrow on higher terms, as well as to the suspension of work

on the isthmus for nearly a year. A much larger amount and higher rate

of interest has had to be paid to share and debenture holders than was

ever expected. The Company have also had to contend with a want of

navvies, and with labour disturbance, that told unfavourably on their

interests.

The Report of the Special Commission appointed in 1889 to inquire

into the affairs of the Panama Canal was published in May, 1890, and

describes in detail the position of the undertaking. It is estimated

that some 30 millions will be required to complete it, so that its

ultimate construction does not appear at present very probable.

FOOTNOTES:

[165] In 1588 P. Acosta, an old Spanish historian, wrote, with

reference to the proposal to construct a canal between the two

oceans, that “it would be just to fear the vengeance of Heaven for

attempting such a work.”

[166] William Paterson, the originator of the Darien Expedition, was

also the founder of the Bank of England.

[167] Dampier was born in Somersetshire in 1652. In 1673 he served in

the Dutch war under Sir Edward Sprague. He was afterwards for some

years overseer of a plantation in Jamaica. Several vicissitudes of

fortune followed, and it is stated that for a time he was one of a

band of pirates who roved about the Peruvian coasts. He made several

voyages to the northern coast of Mexico, to the East Indies, and

to the islands in the Pacific. His ‘Voyages’ have been many times

reprinted.

[168] Lionel Wafer was bred a surgeon in London, and in 1677 embarked

as such on board a ship bound for Bantam. He afterwards engaged with

Linch and Cook, two celebrated buccaneers, which brought him into the

company of Dampier. The two did not, however, agree, and Wafer was

left on shore on the Isthmus of Darien, where he spent some years

among the Indians. He returned to England in 1690, and published an

account of his adventures.

[169] De Ulloas was born at Seville in 1716. He distinguished himself

as an engineer and man of science. In 1730 he was sent to Peru to

measure a degree of meridian, and remained nearly ten years in South

America. Afterwards visiting England, he contributed several papers

to the Royal Society, and was appointed by Ferdinand III. to collect

information as to the condition of the arts and sciences in Europe.

[170] Letter to Mr. F. Kelly, in ‘Proceedings’ of the Royal

Geographical Society for 1856.

[171] Vide ‘Philosophical Trans.,’ 1830, p. 62 _et seq._

[172] The details of the survey are in the library of the Royal

Society, to which the author communicated a paper on the subject.

Captain Lloyd also gave an account of the country and its productions

to the Royal Geographical Society.

[173] ‘Edinburgh Review,’ April 1882.

[174] ‘Minutes of Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers,’

vol. xv., p. 378.

[175] ‘Bulletin du Canal Interocéanique,’ An. 1, No. 2, p. 10.

[176] ‘Edinburgh Review,’ April 1882.

[177] At this congress Admiral Ammen represented the United States;

General Sir John Stokes, England; Vice-Admiral Likhatchof, Russia;

Commander Christoforo, Italy; and Colonel Coêlle, Spain.

[178] The items adopted by the Commission as the probable cost of the

undertaking were as follows:—

Millions of francs. 1. Excavation 570 2. Barrage 100 3. Rigoles de

déviation 75 4. Portes de marée 12 5. Jetées 10 6. Imprevus, 10 per

cent. 76 ─── 843 ═══

[179] ‘Minutes of Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers,’

vol. lxxiii., p. 421.

[180] It may be interesting to state how this sum had been expended.

The items are as follows:—

Francs.

The purchase of the concession 10,000,000

Caution money to the Colombian Government 750,000

Expenses incurred before the company was founded 23,393,605

Repayment of advances to founders 2,000,000

Cost of administration at Panama 26,415,927

Expenses of the company 26,036,551

Interest on money advanced and shares 55,700,148

Construction, purchase of land, &c. 25,289,743

Purchase of materials and equipment 83,537,568

Installations, &c. 115,137,354

───────────

368,260,896

═══════════

[181] This was a journal, published at Paris, which, at an early

stage of the enterprise, was issued periodically as the official

organ of the Canal Company.

[182] This sum was raised by the issue of 409,667 4 per cent. bonds,

sold at 333 francs on 500.

[183] 458,000 shares out of 500,000 offered, were taken at 450 on

1000 francs.

[184] The manual work is and has all along been performed mainly by

West Indians and natives, the number of Europeans employed being

relatively very small.

[185] The Consultative Committee of 1879 based their Report on an

anticipated annual traffic of over 4 millions of tons.

[186] The _Times_ of the 17th December declared, in a leading

article, that “it would be surprising if the collapse of the Panama

scheme had not a momentous effect upon French politics. The small

investors who have lost their money would not be human if they

omitted to turn and rend the Parliament which, after affording

legislative facilities to M. de Lesseps, now refuses to lift a hand

to save the colossal scheme from ruin. Some of the French journals

are already beginning to say that Saturday was the beginning of the

end for the Republic. It is possible to commend the action of the

Chamber, and at the same time to feel that ‘Parliamentarism’ hardly

realised the magnitude of the forces which he challenged with such

a light heart. All the vague discontent which has been accumulating

against Parliamentary government will now naturally be brought to a

head. The Panama collapse will furnish a specific grievance which

will appeal with irresistible force to the unfortunate subscribers,

and send them crowding into the ranks of the enemies of the Republic.”

[187] ‘Isthmus of Panama,’ p. 35.

[188] ‘Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers,’ vol. xcii.

p. 447.

[189] Prestley’s ‘Historical Account of Canals,’ preface.

[190] In 1880, when the canal had been commenced, unskilled labour

was paid 3_s._ 8_d._ per day. The supply at that rate was, however,

insufficient, and the rate of wages was increased from time to time,

until in 1877 they had reached a minimum of 7_s._ per day.

[191] ‘Edinburgh Review.’

[192] Paper read in 1887 before the American Association for the

Advancement of Science.

[193] According to M. Reclus, 4010 square kilometres (‘Comptes

Rendus,’ p. 265).

[194] This has been established by the levels of Col. Lloyd.

[195] ‘Comptes Rendus de l’Académie des Sciences,’ vol. xciii. 1887.

[196] _Engineering_, August 26, 1887.

[197] Commander Taylor’s paper on “The General Question of Isthmian

Transit,” read before the American Association for the Advancement of

Science, August 1887.

[198] The bottom of the canal is here 164 feet below the river,

which, again, is 80 feet below the Panama Railway. The three courses

run parallel at this point.

[199] _Engineering_, Aug. 5, 1887.

[200] ‘Edinburgh Review,’ August 1882.

[201] ‘The English in the West Indies.’

[202] The history of this canal, which crosses the isthmus that

connects Spain with France, is told elsewhere in this volume.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE NICARAGUAN CANAL.

One of the most important and costly of isthmian canal projects

that now looms on the horizon is that which is designed to afford a

communication between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans _viâ_ the

Lake of Nicaragua. This is a purely American project. It is put forward

by American citizens, it has been drawn up by American engineers,

and it is in favour with the American people. After the Nicaraguan

Canal project had been before the world in one shape or another for

many years, and after many different routes had been proposed and

considered, the plans for a canal have now been definitively adopted,

and the work of construction has, it is stated, actually begun. It

has not yet been announced whether the capital required has been

subscribed, but the United States, which approves the scheme, and has

raised from first to last some 9000 millions of dollars for railway

enterprise, is perhaps hardly likely to allow the canal to drop for

want of the 20 millions sterling required to complete it.

None of the many schemes for a canal across the American isthmus has

obtained more extensive support, both in America and in Europe, than

that _viâ_ the Lake of Nicaragua. It had the very earnest support of

the Emperor Napoleon between 1845 and 1848. In 1846, the Emperor,

then Prince Louis Napoleon, wrote a pamphlet on the subject,[203] in

the course of which he pronounced against the Panama route, and he

once declared, as regards the rival Nicaraguan scheme that, “from the

embouchure of the river San Juan to the Pacific Ocean the canal would

run in a straight line about 278 miles, enhancing the prosperity on

either bank of more than a thousand miles of territory. The effect that

would be produced by the annual passage through this fine country of

two or three thousand ships, exchanging foreign produce with that of

Central America, and spreading everywhere activity and wealth, would be

almost miraculous.”[204]

[Illustration: SECTION AND PLAN OF THE PROPOSED NICARAGUA CANAL.]

The expense of the Nicaraguan Canal was estimated by Napoleon at

only four millions sterling; but it is obvious, from the Prince’s

own statements, that such a passage as he contemplated would only

have afforded draught of water for vessels of 300 tons. Napoleon’s

object was, however, quite as much to promote emigration, trade, and

civilisation in the State of Nicaragua, as to open a communication

between the two oceans.[205]

The river San Juan de Nicaragua directly connects the Atlantic with

the south end of the lake of the above name, from the northern end of

which but a few miles intervene to the Pacific. Various surveys have

been made of the river, with a view to the construction of a canal.

In 1837-8 Lieutenant Baily[206] was employed by the Central American

Government to explore the route. He found that the surface of the lake

of Nicaragua is 121 feet 9 inches above low water in the Atlantic.

The river San Juan, in its course of 79 miles from the lake, varies

in depth from 9 feet to 20 feet, and its course is broken by various

rapids, some of which are of considerable length. The summit-level

of the mountain chain which divides the valley of the lake from the

Pacific is 487 feet above the lake, and a tunnel of nearly 16 miles

long would have to be pierced through this wall in order to reach

the port of San Juan del Sur on the Pacific. The total length of

navigation, through river, lake, and canal, according to Mr. Baily’s

plans, would be 190 miles.

The port of San Juan del Sur is narrow at the entrance, but widens

within the harbour. It is surrounded by high land, except from W.S.W.

to W. by S. The depth of water at the entrance is 3 fathoms, and the

width 1100 yards. Ships could thence go up for a mile and a half, but

the amount of excavation required for a canal 30 feet deep and 50 feet

wide was estimated at not less than 162 million cubic yards, which has

been stated to be more than that required for the construction of 2000

miles of English railway—a figure quite conclusive against this scheme.

In 1852 the route was surveyed by Colonel Childs,[207] who proposed to

descend from the lake by fourteen locks to Brito, on the Pacific,

where, however, there was no harbour. The length of this route was

given as 194 miles.

To avoid the difficulty of cutting through the ridge, it has been

proposed to continue the navigation from the extreme north of the

Lake of Nicaragua, by the Estero de Panaloya and the river Tipitapa

to the Lake Leon, or Managua, and thence to the port of Realejo, on

the Pacific, or, yet more to the north, to the Estero Real, an arm

of the Gulf of Fonseca. But it has been pointed out that the length

of the navigation would thus be increased by a hundred miles, and it

is doubtful whether Lake Leon could furnish the water necessary for

lockage, in both directions, which it would have to supply.

The Nicaragua route, therefore, whatever may be its advantages, if

any, over that of Panama, is liable to the objections of great length,

large works, numerous locks, and the no less formidable danger, to use

the words of Humboldt, that “there is no part of the globe so full of

volcanoes as this part of America, from the 11th to the 13th degrees of

latitude.”[208]

The distance from ocean to ocean by the route that has recently

received the approval of the United States Government, and is now in

course of apparent realisation, is 169·8 miles. Of actual canal there

will be 40·3 miles, the remaining 129·5 miles being free navigation

through Lake Nicaragua, the Rio San Juan, and the valley of the Rio San

Francisco.

Beginning on the Pacific side, the canal starts from the port of Brito,

situated about 12 miles north-west of San Juan del Sur, the Pacific

terminus of the famous gold-fever transit route, where there is a broad

channel, 342 feet wide at high water, reaching inland about 1½ miles to

the tidal lock. This lock lifts the canal 24·2 feet above high tide of

the Pacific.

From this lock, which is really the beginning of the canal—the portion

between the lock and Brito being in reality an extension of the

harbour—the canal ascends the broad gently-sloping lower valley of the

Rio Grande, which is to be diverted into the lake by an artificial

channel, rising by means of three or more locks of from 26 feet to 29

feet lift, till, at a point 8¾ miles from Brito, it reaches the western

end of the summit level, 110 feet above mean tide; thence it proceeds

through the upper valley of the Rio Grande and across a moderately

rolling country to the summit or “divide,” between the Pacific and the

lake, 41·4 feet above the level of the water in the canal; then through

the valley of the Guscoyol, a tributary of the Lajas, and along the bed

of the diverted Lajas to the lake, a total distance of 8½ miles from

the last lock and 17·27 miles from Brito.

Between the lake and Brito one small stream is taken into the canal by

a receiving weir. The river Tola and several small streams coming from

the north are to be passed under the canal, and along its lower portion

there will be ditches to intercept the surface drainage, which is

inconsiderable, and convey it to the sea.

The material to be excavated in this division is sand, gravel,

clay, and in the “divide” cut rock, which will be utilised in the

construction of the breakwater at Brito, in pitching the canal slopes,

and in concrete for the locks, culverts, weirs, and the dam across the

Rio Grande. The location of the canal in this division is the same as

that proposed by the engineer Menocal on his return from Nicaragua

in 1880. The prism, however, has been increased, the number of locks

reduced, and their location changed. The enlargement of the terminal

section is also a new feature.

The canal enters Lake Nicaragua, an inland sea, 40 miles wide, and over

90 miles long, which forms its summit level, and with the Chontales

Mountains on the left, the route is continued to Fort San Carlos at

the outlet of the lake into the Rio San Juan. Throughout this distance

of 56½ miles, 28 feet of water can be carried to within 2400 feet

of the mouth of the Lajas on the west shore of the lake, and within

eight miles of Fort San Carlos on the south-eastern shore. In the

former distance some dredging and rock excavation under water will be

necessary, and in the latter, dredging in soft mud to an average depth

of 3½ feet. From Fort San Carlos the route proceeds 64 miles down the

San Juan river, which, with the exception of the 28 miles from the lake

to Toro Rapids, has a depth varying from 28 feet to 130 feet, to the

dam thrown across the river at Ochoa just below the mouth of the Rio

San Carlos. Throughout this stretch of river, the only work to be done

is dredging in mud and gravel, and some rock excavation under water

to an average depth of four feet along a distance of 24 miles, below

Fort San Carlos, and light excavation above water on some points in the

lower river in order to flatten the bends.

The dam just mentioned is located between two steep, rocky hills, at

a point where the river is 1133 feet wide between the banks, with an

average depth of 6·6 feet. Its length on the crest will be 1255 feet,

its height 52 feet, the depth of foundations 20 feet below present

water level, and it is to be constructed entirely of concrete, with

timber-lined crest, front, and apron, and rip-rap protected back,

forming a monolith wedged between rock abutments. This dam will back

the water of the river the entire distance to Fort Carlos and into the

lake, maintaining the water of the latter at the proposed level of 110

feet, and will convert the upper San Juan into an extension of the

lake, with a fall of ¾ inch per mile.

The valley referred to, flooded by the back water from the dam,

affords an excellent basin at the entrance of the canal, free from

the influence of the river current, and the latter forms a natural,

ready-made canal, 3300´ long, needing only slight excavation on the

points of two or three spurs for rectifying the channel. From the

head of this valley, a canal 1·82 miles long extends across a broken

country of moderate elevation, intersecting one deep narrow ravine,

debouching towards the San Juan, across which a short embankment will

be necessary, and enters the valley of the river San Francisco. This

river San Francisco flows east, north-east, and east, approximately

parallel to the San Juan, and separated from it by a range of hills

to a point about nine miles (in straight line) from the dam, then,

receiving a considerable tributary (the Cano de los Chanchos) from the

north-east, turns abruptly to the south-east and south, and enters the

San Juan. Its valley thus forms an irregular flattened Y, with its foot

or stem resting on the San Juan, one arm extending westerly to within a

short distance of the dam, and the other easterly in the direction of

Greytown.

Across the stem of this Y, just below the junction of the two arms,

will be built an embankment 6500 feet long on the crest, and having a

maximum height of 51 feet. This embankment will retain the water of the

San Francisco and its tributaries, flooding the whole upper valley (the

arms of the Y) to a depth of from 30 to 50 feet, and forming a large

lake at the same level as the river above the dam—in other words, a

continuation of the summit level.

Proceeding from the end of the short canal already described,

the main canal passes down the westerly arm of this broad, deep,

crescent-shaped basin, past the embankment, then up the easterly arm

to the western foot of the divide between the San Francisco and the San

Juanillo, 12·55 miles from the dam, and within 19·48 miles of Greytown.

Here the eastern division of the canal is entered, beginning at the

Saltos de Elvira, whence it proceeds nearly due east, through the

broad, flat upper valley of the Arroyo de las Cascadas, cutting a spur

here and there to the “divide,” less than one mile from the Saltos,

and 280 feet above the sea. Then curving gradually to the south-east,

across the little plain at the summit, it cuts a steep, narrow spur,

enters the valley of the Deseado, a stream flowing into the San

Juanillo, follows its bed a short distance, then crosses to the left

bank, and reaches the site of the upper lock of the eastern flight,

14,200 feet from the Saltos. The average cut for this distance is 149

feet.

At this lock, excavated in the rock foundations of a spur of the

northern hills, the summit level, reaching back through the San

Francisco basin, up the San Juan, and across the lake to the first

lock on the west side, a distance of 144·8 miles, ends, and the canal,

lowered 53 feet by the lock, passes by easy curves down the widening

valley of the Deseado to the next lock, less than a mile beyond. Here

another drop of 27 feet occurs, and then the canal follows the still

widening and gradually descending valley in a north-easterly direction

for less than three miles to the third and last lock at the mouth of

the valley. This lock lowers the canal to the sea level, and from here

it takes a direct course across the flat low basin of the San Juanillo

and the Lagoon region, to the harbour of San Juan del Norte, or

Greytown, about 11½ miles distant.

The surface drainage to be provided for in this division is not

extensive, and it is especially small on the western slope of the

“divide,” where three short artificial channels will divert it all

into the San Francisco Lake at some distance from the canal. Across

the “divide,” and as far as the first intersection of the canal and

the Deseado, the natural drainage is away from the canal. From this

point to the San Juanillo the canal will be protected on both sides by

drains formed partly by the present bed of the Deseado, and partly by

artificial channels. The remainder of the canal, through the lowland

from the San Juanillo to Greytown, will be protected by embankments

formed by the material deposited by the dredgers, an artificial channel

being cut on the south to divert the San Juanillo, and another on the

north to give Laguna Bernard and its tributaries an independent outlet

to the sea. From the last lock to Greytown the canal is enlarged, as at

Brito, on the west side, forming an extension of the harbour 11½ miles

inland. The material to be excavated in this division is sand, gravel,

and alluvial soil (all dredgable material) for a distance of 12 to 15

miles from Greytown, then clay, gravel, and rock in the deeper cuts,

and finally, in the “divide,” cut rock, which will be utilised as on

the west side, in the construction of the embankment, in the breakwater

at Greytown, in pitching the canal slopes, and in concrete for the dam

and locks.

About 27 miles of the actual canal will be ordinary excavation,

and it is proposed that the remaining 13 miles will be largely, if

not entirely, excavated by dredgers. In the western division, the

excavation of the portion of the canal between the last lock and the

Pacific by dredgers will solve the problem of the drainage of the

work for that division, as on the remaining excavation, being above

sea-level, the question of drainage will be perfectly simple.

In the eastern division, as in the western, the portion of the canal

between Greytown harbour and the first lock, a distance of 11½ miles,

will be dredged.

The “divide” cut from the basin of the San Francisco to the upper

lock, 14,200 feet in length, and with an average depth of 149 feet,

is admitted to be a serious work; but with the neighbouring streams

offering water at a high head for removing the surface earth by

hydraulic mining, with a large plant of power drills worked by

compressed air from the same source, and the use of modern explosives

to loosen the rock, with a large proportion of the excavated rock to

be used in the construction of the locks and the dam, and in pitching

the slopes of the canal, a still larger quantity utilised in the

construction of the harbour at Greytown, and convenient dumping-grounds

for the remainder, the engineers claim that the work can be

accomplished.

The following description of the proposed locks is taken from the

report of Mr. Menocal, one of the engineers:—

“The locks proposed have a uniform length of 650 feet

between the gates, and at least a width of 65 feet between

the gate abutments. Locks Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 have lifts

of 26, 27, 26·4, 29·7, and 29·7 feet respectively. No. 3

has a lift of 53 feet, and No. 7, being a combination tide

and lift lock, its lift will vary between 24·2 and 33·18

feet, depending on the state of the tide. It is believed

that Nos. 1 and 7 will rest on firm, heavy soil, but

timber and concrete foundations have been provided for in

the estimates. Nos. 2 and 4 are estimated to rest on solid

rock, and as for Nos. 5 and 6, the borings taken in 1873

show that stiff clay, compact sand and gravel will be met

with. No. 3 is proposed to be cut out of the solid rock in

the eastern slope of the ‘divide,’ by which the maximum

strength will be secured with the least expense, concrete

will be used only to the extent required to fill cavities,

to give the proper dimensions to the various parts, and

to give a surface to the blasted rock. The other locks it

is proposed to build of concrete, and all of them, No. 3

included, will have a heavy timber lining in the chambers

and bays, extending from the top of the walls to 15 feet

below the low-water level.

“Cribs on firm bottom, or fender piles, when piles can

be driven, have been provided at the approaches to the

locks for the protection and better guidance of ships into

the locks. Provision has also been made for making ships

fast to the lock walls, so that the lines will, by means

of floats, rise or fall with the ship, thus preserving the

same tension on the lines while the vessel is kept in the

axis of the lock. Each lock will be filled or emptied by

conduits extending from the upper to the lower reach of the

canal, and branch culverts connecting the main conduit with

the lock chamber. The only operation required for either

filling or emptying the lock will be, irrespective of the

movements of the lock gate, the opening and closing of the

upper and lower main culvert-gates. The time required to

fill or empty lock No. 3, of 53 feet lift, will be fifteen

minutes, and for the other locks an average of eleven

minutes. The question of the best style of gates for these

locks has been a subject of much consideration. It is

desirable to combine strength, economy in construction,

rapid and simple movements, facilities for repairs or

for renewing the gates, and the least danger of accident

by vessels entering or leaving the locks. The necessary

machinery for moving the locks and culvert-gates, for

hauling ships in and out of the locks, for electric lights,

and other purposes, will be worked by hydraulic power

furnished by the locks themselves.”

The chamber width of the locks will be 80 feet, so that these

structures will contain almost any merchant vessel afloat.

In the plans proposed for the canal, not only have enlarged prisms been

provided for, but large basins are proposed at the extremities of the

locks. These basins, the enlargement of the canal at each end, with the

lake, the river and the San Francisco basin, will permit vessels to

pass each other without delay at almost every point on the route. Mr.

Menocal states that—

In 22·37 miles, or 57 per cent. of the canal in

excavation, the prism is large enough for vessels in

transit to pass each other, and of a sectional area in

excess of the maximum area in the Suez Canal; the remaining

distance in which large vessels cannot conveniently pass

each other is so divided that the longest is only 3·67

miles in length; with two exceptions, those short reaches

of narrow canal are situated between the locks, and can be

traversed by any vessel in less time than is estimated for

the passage of a lock; consequently, unless a double system

of locks be constructed, nothing will be gained by an

enlargement of the prisms. The exceptions referred to are

the rock-cuts through the eastern and western ‘divides,’

2·58 and 3·67 miles, respectively, in length. The possible

detention in the transit, due to those narrow cuts, which

should not in any case exceed 45 minutes, would not

justify the necessary increase of expense involved in an

enlargement of the cross-section proposed. Both the bottom

width and the depth of the proposed canal are larger than

those of the Suez Canal.

In the lake and in the largest portion of the San Juan

River vessels can travel almost as fast as at sea. In some

sections of the river, and possibly in the basin of the San

Francisco, although the channel is at all points deep and

of considerable width, the speed may be somewhat checked by

reason of the curves.

Estimated time of through-transit by steamer.

Hrs. Mins.

38·98 miles of canal, at 5 miles an hour 7 48

8·51 miles in the San Francisco basin, at 7 miles an hour 1 14

64·54 miles in the San Juan River, at 8 miles an hour 8 4

56·50 miles in the lake, at 10 miles an hour 5 39

Time allowed for passing 7 locks, at 45 minutes each 5 15

Allow for detention in narrow cuts, &c. 2 0

───────

Total time 30 0

The experience of the Suez Canal shows that the actual

time of transit is more likely to fall under than to exceed

the above estimate.[209]

The traffic of the canal is limited by the time required

to pass a lock, and on the basis of 45 minutes (above

estimated), and allowing but one vessel to each lockage,

the number of vessels that can pass the canal in one day

will be 32, or in one year 11,680,[210] which, at the average

net tonnage of vessels passing the Suez Canal, will give

an annual traffic of 20,440,000 tons. This is on the basis

that the navigation will not be stopped during the night.

With abundant water power at the several locks and the

dam, there is no reason why the whole canal should not

be sufficiently illuminated by electric lights; and with

beacons and range lights in the river and lake, vessels can

travel at all times with perfect safety. The estimated cost

of the canal is 64 millions of dollars, or 13,000,000_l._

including electric lighting, &c., and it is calculated that

the work can be completed in six years.

ESTIMATES OF COST MADE IN 1888.

Per cubic yard.

TABLE OF PRICES. dols.

Excavation in earth 0·40

Excavation in rock 1·50

Excavation in rock (submarine) 5·00

Dredging 0·20 and 0·40

Concrete 6·00 and 9·00

Stone pitching 2·00

Stone in breakwaters 1·50

Puddle 0·75

Timber 0·50

_Western Division:—_ dols.

Excavation and embankment 8,496,292

Diversion of Rio Grande and Rio Lajas 1,870,447

Other auxiliary work, including R. R. 753,329

Locks (four) 4,762,480

Harbour of Brito 1,611,500

───────────

Total $17,484,048

_Middle Division:—_ dols.

Lake Nicaragua 379,520

River San Juan 3,074,791

Valley of R. San Francisco 1,112,413

Dam across R. San Juan 1,858,975

Embankment across R. San Francisco 1,331,262

Embankment near Ochoa 45,578

Railroad 240,000

──────────

Total $8,042,539

_Eastern Division:—_ dols.

The “Divide” 11,982,938

From the “Divide” to Greytown 8,077,294

Locks (three) 3,561,515

Railroad 320,000

Harbour of Greytown 1,766,625

───────────

Total $25,708,372

RECAPITULATION.

dols.

Western Division 17,484,048

Middle Division 8,042,539

Eastern Division 25,708,372

───────────

Total $51,234,239

Surveys, hospitals, shops, &c.; management and

contingencies, 25 per cent. 12,808,740

───────────

Grand total $64,043,699

═══════════

The Canal Company has received from the Nicaraguan Government a

concession which allows a period of 2½ years from 1887, within which to

begin operations, a grant of 1,000,000 acres of land, and immunity from

taxation and import duties for 99 years. The Canal Company estimate

that by 1894, shipping to the amount of 8,000,000 to 9,000,000 of tons

would avail itself of this route. The leading commercial bodies of New

York, New Orleans, St. Louis, Cincinnati, Chicago, Indianapolis, and

San Francisco, have expressed themselves favourable to the project,

which has also been supported by the Legislatures of California and

Oregon.

The great majority of the people of the United States are only

interested in the construction of a canal across the American isthmus,

in so far as it will tend to make them independent of the Pacific

railway companies, which have of late years shown a disposition to

work together and pool their traffic at the expense of the traders.

There is, perhaps, very little to complain of in this respect, so far

as the average range of American railway rates is concerned. But the

Americans are ’cute enough to know that if they could play off the

steamship against the railway, the ultimate result, though it might

be disastrous to both transportation agencies, would be favourable to

the trader so long as the competition lasted. The actual present sea

distance from New York to San Francisco, with an isthmian canal opened,

would be shortened by 8000 miles. The distance, therefore, would not

be materially greater by canal than by railway. The ship, however,

all other things being equal, will always carry more cheaply than the

locomotive.[211] Whether the difference would be very material when the

canal company’s tolls have been paid remains to be seen.

It is probable, that with the opening of the canal, a great stimulus

would be given to the coasting trade of the United States, and

especially between the two ports of New York and San Francisco, to

the probable detriment, at least for a time, of the trans-continental

railways. The very large trade that is now being cultivated between

the United States and Central America, the republics of Peru, Chili,

and Ecuador, and something like one-half of Mexico, would be equally

benefited by the new means of communication. With all this to depend

upon, the promoters of the canal are probably not over-sanguine in

expecting that its financial results would be fairly satisfactory. The

experience of the Suez Canal at least encourages that hope, although it

is to be remarked that the cost of the Nicaraguan canal, will probably,

when completed, have been more than that of the Suez waterway.

The local advantages of the Nicaragua route for a ship canal are

generally recognised in the United States. A recent writer[212] on the

subject states that—

“The range of what in other parts of Northern and Central

America are mountains, and at Panama has proved one of

the obstacles that have wrecked the French Company, on

the Nicaragua line, dwindles to its lowest elevation, as

if inviting a junction between the Atlantic and Pacific

Oceans. The western shore of Lake Nicaragua is but fifteen

miles from the Pacific, and the ‘divide,’ which north

and south at this point assumes mountainous proportions,

is less than 50 feet above the level of the lake, and

about 150 feet above the mean level of the Pacific Ocean.

Although so close to the Pacific slope, and with so

slight a barrier holding back its waters, the great lake

of Nicaragua drains through the river San Juan to the

East into the Caribbean Sea. The lake itself is deep and

unobstructed, and that portion of the river San Juan needed

for navigation purposes requires but little work to adapt

it for the heaviest draught vessels. The Lake of Nicaragua

is undoubtedly the key to the situation, forming the summit

level, and supplying the immense amount of water required

to operate a lock canal on the large scale projected.”

The route from Greytown, on the Atlantic, to Brito, on the Pacific, a

distance of 170·099 miles, has been divided thus:—

Free Canal in

navigation. excavation.

East side .. 16·048

West side .. 11·160

Six locks .. 0·759

Deseado basin 4·220 ..

San Francisco and Machado basins 11·368 ..

Tola basin 5·504 ..

River San Juan 64·540 ..

Lake Nicaragua 56·500 ..

─────── ──────

Total miles 142·132 27·907

The minimum radius of curvature is 2500, and the principal dimensions

of the canal in excavation are as follows: rock, width, bottom, 80

feet; top, 80 feet; depth, 30 feet; earth—width, bottom, 120 feet,

top, 180 feet; depth, 46 feet; sand and loose material—width, bottom,

120 feet; top, 360 feet; depth, 30 feet.

The most important parts of the work are the construction of the

harbours—Greytown on the Caribbean Sea, and Brito on the Pacific;

the damming of the San Juan river, for the purpose of raising and

maintaining the level of Lake Nicaragua and the river at about 110 feet

above mean tide level; the formation of artificial basins at different

levels by means of dams, and the use of locks to pass from one level to

another.

The harbour of Greytown is now closed by a sand bar, and nothing of

greater draught than six feet can enter, but it is said that in three

months or less from the commencement of the work vessels drawing 15

feet of water will be able to land materials. It is proposed to make

this opening through the sand bar by means of a temporary jetty of

brush and pile, to furnish protection to a dredger cutting through

the bar. This jetty will also give the necessary protection for the

maintenance of the passage by diverting the shore current which has

deposited the sand.

The branch mouth of the river San Juan, which at present empties into

the harbour, and is constantly, with every heavy rain, adding to the

accumulation of silt in it, will be cut off, and, by a short canal,

diverted so as to empty by the principal mouth of the San Juan some

miles to the south.

The heaviest piece of work on the canal is a rock cut through the

“divide” on the eastern portion of the summit level, commencing about

four miles to the west of lock No. 3. This cut is about 2·9 miles long

and the average depth is about 150 feet, involving a removal of about

2,150,000 cubic yards of earth, and 7,500,000 cubic yards of rock.

Lake Nicaragua has a watershed of 8000 miles. The only outlet of the

lake is the San Juan river, which discharges, at its lowest stage, near

the close of the dry season, 11,390 cubic feet of water per second. For

thirty-two double lockages, it is estimated that 129½ million cubic

feet of water will be required, being little more than one-eighth of

the total supply of the lake alone. It is claimed that as this supply

is from the summit, a dry summit level is almost impossible, while

importance is attached to the fact that the canal will be a fresh-water

one.

The principal distances to be saved by the Nicaraguan Canal, as

compared with the only existing alternative route by Cape Horn, are

said by the Company to be:—

────────────────────┬───────────┬────────────┬─────────

│ │ By │

│ By │ Nicaraguan │ Distance

│ Cape Horn.│ Canal. │ Saved.

├───────────┼────────────┼─────────

│ miles. │ miles. │ miles.

_New York to_— │ │ │

San Francisco │ 14,840 │ 4,760 │ 10,080

Hong Kong │ 18,180 │ 11,038 │ 4,163

Yokohama │ 17,679 │ 9,363 │ 6,827

Melbourne │ 13,502 │ 10,000 │ 3,290

Sandwich Islands │ 14,230 │ 6,388 │ 7,842

│ │ │

_Liverpool to_— │ │ │

San Francisco │ 14,690 │ 7,508 │ 7,182

Guayaquil │ 11,321 │ 5,890 │ 5,431

Callao │ 10,539 │ 6,461 │ 4,078

Valparaiso │ 9,600 │ 7,448 │ 2,152

────────────────────┴───────────┴────────────┴─────────

The promoters of the Nicaraguan Canal appear to have got fairly to

work. A considerable quantity of machinery, as well as a number

of surveyors and engineers, have been forwarded to the scene of

operations, and the latest reports are favourable to the prospect of

the enterprise being carried out. It will necessarily, however, involve

several years of close work before it is available, even under the most

favourable circumstances, for the commerce of the world.

FOOTNOTES:

[203] In 1842 several influential persons in Central America wrote

to the Prince, then a prisoner in the fortress of Ham, suggesting

that he should endeavour to obtain his liberation from the French

Government, under an engagement to proceed forthwith to Central

America. In 1845 this overture was more formally repeated in a

despatch from M. Castellon, then Minister of the Central American

States in Paris; and a few months later, Señor del Montenegro

announced to the Prince that the Government of Nicaragua had

conferred on his highness full powers to conduct and execute the

undertaking. The refusal of the French Government to liberate the

Prince put an end to the scheme at that time; but after his escape

and arrival in London he was not indisposed to renew the negotiation,

and he then wrote the pamphlet referred to.

[204] Min. Proc. Inst. C. E., vol. vi. p. 428.

[205] ‘Edinburgh Review,’ April, 1882.

[206] Vide ‘Central America,’ by John Baily, R.M., London, 1850.

[207] Min. Proc. Inst. C. E., vol. xv. p. 379.

[208] ‘Edinburgh Review,’ April, 1882.

[209] The time of passage through the Suez Canal is now about 16

hours.

[210] In July, 1886, 1296 vessels passed through the St. Mary’s Canal

lock.

[211] The cost of transport of a ton of traffic by an Atlantic

freight steamer has been reduced to one penny for some forty miles.

[212] ‘Engineering and Mining Journal’ (New York), Map 4, 1889.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE MANCHESTER SHIP CANAL.

“Rivers diverted from their native course,

And bound with chains of artificial force,

From large cascades in pleasing tumult rolled,

Or rose through figured stone or breathing gold.”

—_Prior._

Whether we regard the magnitude of the enterprise, the importance of

the district it is intended to serve, the difficulties and opposition

that have had to be surmounted, or the many and varied influences that

it is likely to exercise upon the future of transport in the United

Kingdom, the Manchester Ship Canal is undoubtedly one of the most

remarkable undertakings of modern times.

It is not that the canal is unique in point of the expenditure

involved, or in so far as the engineering problems to be dealt with

are concerned. The Suez Canal is at once a much more costly and a much

more extensive work, its actual cost having been about 20,000,000_l._

sterling, as against less than half that sum for the Manchester

enterprise; and its length having been about 100 miles, as against

35. The Panama Canal, again, although approximately about the same

length as the ship canal between Manchester and the sea, has cost,

up to the present time, about 60,000,000_l._ sterling, including the

expenditure on financing. The Nicaraguan Canal, again, which is now

about to be undertaken in real earnest, is estimated to cost from

13,000,000_l._ to 20,000,000_l._, and will involve the cutting of some

28 miles of canal, in addition to the almost equally serious work of

canalising the St. Juan River. But these are all works of a different

character, and having a different object in view. The Suez, Panama,

Nicaraguan, and Corinth Canals are isthmian waterways, intended, or

constructed with the view of connecting together seas or oceans that

Nature had divorced, and thereby carried out with the primary, if not

with the sole, object of abridging distance. The Welland and the St.

Mary’s Falls Canals, in Canada and the United States, are of much the

same character, their object being that of uniting waters that were

originally kept apart by natural barriers. But the Manchester Ship

Canal has but few antetypes. The canals already in existence that most

nearly correspond to it in character are the Erie Canal, which connects

Buffalo with New York, and thereby secures an unbroken line of water

communication between Chicago and New York, a distance of over 1000

miles; and the Poutiloff Canal, 38 miles in length, which connects

Cronstadt with St. Petersburg, and has converted the latter city into a

seaport. The design of the Manchester Ship Canal is to transform that

large centre of population and industry from a landlocked city into a

seaport, and to confer the same facilities on a number of other towns

in the neighbourhood.

There is no district and probably no community that appears to offer

better facilities for making the experiment of providing a great inland

waterway of this description. Manchester and Liverpool, with their

immediate suburbs contain at least a million and a half of souls. But

the trade and industry of the two towns are even more important than

their population, relatively to other districts. The cotton trade of

the world is carried on in this part of Lancashire. Manchester and

Liverpool together have obtained and maintained a great repute as the

centre of large industrial operations of almost every kind: engineering

works, shipbuilding works, alkali works, tobacco factories, chemical

and copper works, and many others. Liverpool has to-day a larger export

shipping trade than any other port in the world, and is only eclipsed

by the Thames in the matter of imports. But this great business of

imports and exports is not originated in Liverpool herself. She is only

the distributing centre for a very large and a very populous district,

and a centre moreover that did not appear to offer to that district the

economical facilities and advantages to which it was entitled. The port

and harbour dues at Liverpool were heavy and onerous, and the rates

charged by the railway companies for the transportation of traffic

between the Mersey and the interior of the country were deemed to be

much higher than they should have been, having regard to the importance

of the traffic.

The proposal to construct a canal is by no means a new one. Manchester,

as every one knows, has for more than a century and a quarter been

the foremost in all plans and operations designed to secure economy

and facility of transport. Many years ago it was proposed to convert

the Irwell into a navigable river, and this, of course, would have

connected Manchester with the Mersey and so with the sea. But the

Irwell—a tortuous, narrow, and in many respects unsatisfactory

stream—did not readily lend itself to a grand proposal of this kind,

and the little that was done to make it a maritime highway was never

attended with any real advantage to trade and commerce. The Bridgwater

Canal was a larger and more ambitious venture. It also connected

Manchester with the sea by the Mersey, as well as with many inland

towns by auxiliary canals—Bolton, by the Manchester, Bolton, and Bury

Canal; Rochdale, by the Rochdale Canal; Blackburn and Accrington,

by the Leeds and Liverpool Canal; Ashton and Huddersfield, by the

Manchester and Huddersfield Canal; and so with some other large towns.

The truth is that Manchester is, and has been for more than a century,

the centre of a vast network of canals, whereby water communication was

made possible with nearly every other important town and district

in the country. But this possibility was one that could only be

taken advantage of to a very limited extent. The canals surrounding

Manchester have been of small size and depth, admitting of the passage

of small boats and barges only, so that they could not be utilised

for sea-going craft. For most practical purposes, such waterways

were therefore of little use. What was felt to be necessary was a

canal sufficiently broad and deep to admit of the passage of large

ocean-going steamers right up to the warehouses and mills of Manchester

and the neighbouring towns. This necessity was all the more keenly

felt, and all the more readily acted upon, that the railway rates

between Manchester and Liverpool were generally onerous and oppressive.

[Illustration: TRACING OF THE MANCHESTER SHIP CANAL.]

It was under the circumstances just stated that a meeting was held at

the house of Mr. Daniel Adamson, in June 1882, to discuss the question

of constructing a canal from Manchester to the sea.

The outcome of this meeting was the appointment of Mr. Hamilton

Fulton and Mr. E. Leader Williams as engineers, with instructions

to investigate the subject, and to submit separate schemes to a

provisional committee showing the best means of carrying out such

a work. Mr. Fulton’s scheme was to improve the existing navigation

through the estuary of the Mersey by dredging and retaining walls, and

to excavate, straighten, and improve the Mersey and Irwell Navigation

to Manchester, leaving, when completed, a tidal canal to Manchester,

with a depth of 22 feet at low water spring tides. Passing places were

to be left every 3 or 4 miles, and the traffic was to be worked as on

the Suez Canal. Docks were to be constructed, and all necessary works.

The gross estimate, including water and land, was 5,072,291_l._

Mr. Williams’s proposal was to construct a canal 22 feet deep and 100

feet wide, with three locks. The channel through the estuary was to be

confined between training walls from Garston to Runcorn, and from there

the channel was to be improved and straightened to Latchford (first

lock), and be practically a tideway. Between Latchford and Manchester

it was to be a canal with locks, the existing navigation to be improved

and utilised where practicable, otherwise to be filled up; while docks

were to be made at Latchford, Irlam, and Barton. The water-level in the

docks at Manchester were to be 8 feet below the level of the quays.

The estimate of cost, including works, water, and land, was about

5,160,000_l._

[Illustration: MANCHESTER SHIP CANAL MANCHESTER AND SALFORD DOCKS.]

Mr. Williams argued that were the tide to be brought to Manchester, the

bottom of the dock would be 92 feet below the surface of the ground,

and therefore most inconvenient for working. The docks and canal ending

abruptly, would, moreover, form a depositing place for silt brought up

by the tide, and the tide flowing up or down would materially affect

the passage of vessels proceeding the reverse way.

Mr. Abernethy, who had, in the meantime, been appointed consulting

engineer, considered both of these proposals, and reported favourably

on Mr. Williams’s scheme, practically endorsing his views, but

suggesting an additional dock at Warrington, and some deeper dredging,

and estimating the cost of the work at 5,400,000_l._, or 240,000_l._

more than Mr. Williams had provided for. Mr. Abernethy also expressed

the opinion that if the work was carried out with energy, it could be

completed within four years from the commencement. Upon the basis of

the report of Mr. Williams, endorsed by Mr. Abernethy, the committee

decided in the end to proceed with the scheme.

The promoters had to secure the power to acquire “all the easements,

rights, powers, authorities, and privileges of the company of the

proprietors of the Mersey and Irwell Navigation,” as the ship canal,

if constructed, would clash with and extinguish these. The Bridgwater

Navigation Company were possessed of the foregoing rights, and were a

wealthy corporation, owning a going and paying concern, with a capital

of over 1,300,000_l._ Notice had to be served that power would be

sought to absorb this company also. Then, again, the powers sought by

the ship canal were certain to clash materially with the dock and other

interests in Liverpool, as well as with the several lines of railway

at present dominating the carrying trade of Manchester. The property

owners along the route, and many other interests, joined together to

oppose the new enterprise.

After the most arduous and prolonged struggle in the annals of private

bill legislation, the Manchester Ship Canal Bill became law, and

received the Royal Assent as an Act of Parliament on the 6th August,

1885.

The inquiries of the six Parliamentary Select Committees appointed to

investigate into the merits of the project extended over a period of

175 days. The total number of individual witnesses (including both

promoters and opponents) was 285, and the number of repeated witnesses

(including those on both sides) was 543. As illustrating the exhaustive

character of these inquiries, it may be mentioned that no less than

87,936 questions were put and answered.

The Right Honourable W. E. Forster, Chairman of the Commons Select

Committee, which was the last to deal with the Bill, in announcing that

their decision was favourable, said, “The conclusion we have come to is

unanimous,” the Committee considering the preamble proved, subject to

certain obligations being imposed upon the promoters, but none of an

onerous character.

The House of Commons Select Committee, before which the first

inquiry was made, acting entirely upon its own initiative, inserted

the following clause in the Bill, a proceeding said to be without

precedent:—“And whereas it appeared from the evidence adduced that if

the scheme could be carried out with due regard to existing interests,

the Manchester Ship Canal would afford valuable facilities, and ought

to be sanctioned.”

It is worthy of remark that though two Select Committees declined to

take the responsibility of passing the Bill absolutely in the form in

which it was presented to them, all the six Committees were satisfied

as regards the necessity of the undertaking.

The Manchester Ship Canal Company is incorporated by 48 and 49 Vict.

cap. 118, for the following amongst other purposes:—

To construct a ship canal from the river Mersey at Eastham, near

Liverpool, past Ellesmere Port, Weston Point, and Runcorn, to

Warrington, Salford, and Manchester, available for the largest class of

ocean steamers, with docks at Manchester, Salford, and Warrington, and

other incidental works.

To purchase the entire undertakings of the then existing Bridgwater

Navigation Company (Limited), including not only the Bridgwater canals

and the Runcorn and Weston canal, but the Mersey and Irwell Navigation,

the Runcorn docks, the Duke’s dock in Liverpool, and all that company’s

warehouses, wharves, buildings, lands, rents, rights, and privileges,

as a going concern.

A further Bill, authorising the payment by the Manchester Ship

Canal Company of interest at the rate of 4 per cent. per annum to

shareholders during the construction of the works, became law and

received the Royal Assent as an Act of Parliament on 26th June, 1886.

During the progress of this Bill, on a division in the House of Commons

on a motion by a Liverpool member for reference to Committee and

_locus_ for opponents, the motion was negatived by 375 votes as against

61 votes.

The authorised share capital of the Manchester Ship Canal Company is

8,000,000_l._, with borrowing powers to the extent of 1,812,000_l._,

making the total authorised capital 9,812,000_l._, a sum sufficient to

enable the company to complete the construction of the works, to pay

interest during their construction, and to carry into effect all the

objects of the Act and leave an ample surplus.

The Act provides that the Bridgwater Navigation Company shall sell the

whole of the Bridgwater undertakings for the sum of 1,710,000_l._

These undertakings earn a net revenue of nearly 60,000_l._ per annum.

Under the auspices of the Manchester Ship Canal Company, a considerable

development of the traffic on the Bridgwater canal system is expected

to result from the abolition of the bar tolls, which obstruct traffic,

and from throwing open the canal to general carriers.

DESCRIPTION OF THE CANAL WORKS.

A brief description of the canal works may here be introduced. The

engineering journals, from which we have mainly borrowed our facts,

have dealt with them so fully as to render a detailed statement quite

unnecessary.

The Manchester Ship Canal begins at Eastham, on the south bank of the

Estuary of the Mersey, and about midway between its mouth and head near

Runcorn. The canal follows this bank for 13½ miles, the greater portion

being in entirely solid ground, but, sometimes going below high-water

mark, it is confined by embankments and retaining walls until reaching

Runcorn, where it leaves the waters of the Mersey, and takes an

independent and almost direct course to its terminus in the docks at

Salford and Manchester.

The total length of the canal is slightly over 35½ miles. This is

practically one continuous cutting, but it has been subdivided into

thirty lengths or sections, each with a local name and number; these

vary in cubical contents from 223,000 cubic yards in the smallest, to

3,345,000 cubic yards in the largest. The total quantity of earthwork

to be moved is 44,428,535 cubic yards, composed of 6,970,815 cubic

yards of rock, and 37,457,720 cubic yards of soft materials. Of the

rock, 1,591,570 cubic yards will be utilised for lock and river wall

work, abutments of railway bridges, facing slopes of the canal in soft

ground, and other operations, the remainder going to spoil. Of the soft

excavations 3,603,690 cubic yards are to be used in forming the

embankments of the canal, 5,176,278 cubic yards for forming embankments

on railway diversions, 1,555,000 cubic yards in filling up what will be

the disused bed of the Irwell and other water-courses; 552,000 cubic

yards in raising quays and making roads; 800,000 cubic yards are to be

stacked along the canal banks for future use in maintenance; and the

remainder, amounting to 31,149,997 cubic yards, will go to spoil.

The carrying of the Bridgwater Navigation across the Manchester Canal

at the distance of 32 miles, will be one of the most interesting works

in the contract, because an entirely new departure will be undertaken

in the aqueduct. It was on this navigation that Brindley made his

famous viaduct, the precursor of the more splendid structures of Rennie

and Telford.

As the level of the Bridgwater Navigation has to be maintained, and as

the saving of water is a consideration, Mr. Williams proposes to make

the aqueduct in the form of a swing bridge, which may be opened, swung,

and closed again without losing any water either from the swinging

portion or from the canal. Here also, parallel to the aqueduct, will be

constructed a hydraulic lift, to lower barges and boats from the waters

of the navigation, to the canal, where they will cross on its level to

a similar lift, there to be raised to their former waters and level. A

similar lift has been at work for some years with satisfactory results

at Anderton on the Weaver Navigation, of which Mr. Leader Williams was

formerly the engineer.

Throughout the entire length of the canal, hard red sandstone forms the

bedrock, and the formation, of course, varies according to the nature

of the stratification. For instance, at 1½ miles distance, where the

canal works are inside high-water mark, all layers of deposit have been

washed away, and only from 2 feet to 4 feet of black sludge overlies

the rock. Occasionally the rock dips and leaves the bottom of the

canal in the softer deposits, in some places beds of what has been

termed black river sludges, but which are, in all probability, peaty

deposits, are sandwiched in, and underlie deposits of from 15 feet to

16 feet of clean river sand. At 5½ miles between Stanlow Point and Ince

Lighthouse, large beds of blue loam are met with, varying in depth to

25 feet; and at 6 miles black sludge comes in again, about 20 feet in

thickness. At 6½ miles there is a peculiar erosion of the underlying

sandstone, apparently from some creek having cut across the line of

canal. At 8 miles the section overlies a bed of gravel, and at 9 miles

the bottom of the canal runs into a large deposit of sand. From about

10 to 10½ miles the strata becomes very soft, being sludge, sand, and

gravel mixed. At 11 miles 45 chains the bottom of the canal is again

very soft ground, the sandstone suddenly dipping and not appearing

again until about 12 miles.

At 13 miles 70 chains the first of the deep cuttings begin, the bottom

of the canal being 67 feet below the surface of the ground, and the

strata is much less complex than along the estuary. It is near to this

place that the canal leaves the waters of the Mersey, and takes an

independent and almost direct course to its terminus.

From 15 miles, 50 chains to 16 miles there is again a very considerable

alteration in the strata, the rock dipping sharply, and softer deposits

coming in. At 15 miles 68 chains, where a bore was put down, no rock

was encountered to a depth of 88 feet. Following along from 16 miles,

where the bedrock rises, a fairly even contour of its surface is

maintained, together with overlying strata of soil, sand, and gravel,

to near 18 miles 20 chains, where the London and North-Western main

line, and the Birkenhead, Lancashire, and Cheshire Junction railways

are crossed.

From this point the surface rises gradually to 19 miles, opposite the

Warrington Dock entrance, where the cutting is 50 feet deep. Near

Warrington the existing river bed will be shortened by a cut-off and

diverted from the course of the canal. At 21 miles 20 chains Latchford

Lock is reached; the section through it is very similar to that in the

preceding 5 miles. At 21 miles 70 chains the bedrock again disappears,

giving place to a deep bed of quicksand and marl. The Mersey is twice

crossed between 22 miles 10 chains and 22 miles 35 chains. There is

another cut-off and diversion of the river near 22 miles 50 chains,

where the bottom becomes soft brown sandy clay, and sludge, being in

a bed 24 feet thick, which reaches 18 inches or 20 inches below the

bottom of the canal; this runs into gravel and clay at 23 miles 10

chains, which again dies into a large bed of quicksand from about 23

miles 25 chains to 75 chains. At 24 miles 2 chains the rock is again

struck by a bore at a depth of 12 feet below the bottom of the canal.

The Mersey is again twice crossed at 23 miles 40 chains, and 70 chains,

and the river is to be diverted through the existing channel, called

the “Butchersfield Cut.” At 24 miles 20 chains the Mersey joins with

the Bollin; from there the canal will become practically the river to

Manchester, and the old river bed will be filled up. A sand and gravel

formation continues to about 25 miles, where a bed of marl is reached,

overlaid by hard and soft shale, but from the point where this runs

out, about 25 miles 40 chains to Manchester, the canal follows more or

less the bed of the river, wherein a much more complicated strata is

met with than along the line of route which is away from the influence

of the river, at between 14 and 25½ miles. Loam and streaks of sand,

overlying hard red sand are met with from 25 miles 60 chains, to 26

miles 20 chains, where gravel and red rock come in, to 25 miles 15

chains, between which points the bottom of the canal by a strange

coincidence follows almost parallel with the upper surface of the

bedrock. At 27 miles 15 chains the rock dips and is not met with again

for nearly half a mile. The Irlam locks are at 28 miles 50 chains;

just at the entrance, rock again crops up and forms the bottom of the

canal. At 29 miles a wedge-shaped layer of brown clay comes in which

runs about half a mile, reaching a depth of 20 feet at the Manchester

end; this suddenly ends in a deep bed of loam which it partially

overlies—evidently it is a deposit from the river which flows

above—then loam, sand, and gravel make the strata to about 29½ miles,

when rock again appears, and runs almost to the surface at 29 miles 68

chains. At 30 miles 30 chains the rock runs out again from the bottom,

and a heavy bed of loam, 36 feet deep, covers it, the cutting at this

point being entirely in loam. A little further on, the rock bottom

again rises, and from there sand and rock are chiefly met with to 31

miles 10 chains, where the rock dies out again, and blue loam comes in,

forming a deep bed overlying sand, sludge, gravel and marl; near the

Barton Locks this runs into heavy beds of loam near 33½ miles. At 34

miles soil, clay, and rock are the formations met with, each in nearly

equal beds of 10 feet deep, until about 34 miles 50 chains, when much

sand shows; at 34 miles 55 chains the bedrock dips, and sand over clay

and loam form the strata to the terminal dock entrances at Throstle

Nest. This completes the course of the canal proper.

The canal is to be constructed with a minimum width of 120 feet on the

bottom. From Barton to the terminus, a distance of 3½ miles, the width

on the bottom is to be increased to 170 feet; on the Salford side of

this increased width of waterway, one mile of wharfage is to be built,

giving a total length of 4½ miles of quay or wharfage frontage at the

Manchester end, and leaving 2½ miles of frontage available for mooring

lighters or vessels along this portion of the canal.

[Illustration: SECTIONS OF SHIP CANALS.

PANAMA CANAL

SUEZ CANAL

MANCHESTER SHIP CANAL

ORDINARY SECTION

SECTION THRU ROCK]

[Illustration: SECTIONS OF SHIP CANALS.

BRUSSELS CANAL

NORTH HOLLAND CANAL

WELLAND CANAL

AMSTERDAM SHIP CANAL]

The sections of the canal are compared with those of other large ship

canals in the diagrams at pp. 340-41.

The total rise from the level of the mean tide at Eastham to the Docks

at Manchester is nearly 60 feet. This is overcome by the average rise

of 15 feet at each of the locks. The water level in the Manchester

Docks is to be the same as the present river level at this point.

The depth of the canal throughout is to be 26 feet, but the sills of

the docks are to be put in at a depth of 28 feet, so as to allow for a

deepening throughout should the traffic demand it.

As compared with existing large canals, the Manchester Ship Canal will

be capable of carrying much the greatest traffic. The widths on the

bottom, and the depths are: Ghent Canal 55 feet 6 inches, depth 21 feet

2 inches; Suez Canal, 72 feet, depth 26 feet; and Amsterdam Canal, 88

feet 7 inches, depth 23 feet. On the Suez Canal it has been necessary

to provide passing places, otherwise the traffic could only be worked

in one direction at a time, but on the Manchester Canal there will be

ample room for two large size vessels to pass at any point

The estimates for the canal works include large docks in Manchester,

Salford, and Warrington, as sanctioned by the Company’s Act, with a

water area of 114½ acres, containing more than five miles of quays, the

area of quay space being 152 acres. There will also be a mile of quay

space near Manchester on the Ship Canal, in addition to wharves at many

places alongside its course. The docks will be of the most approved

construction, and special provision will be made to secure the rapid

loading and discharging of vessels. Extensive shed accommodation will

be provided at the docks, and the cost of some fifty hydraulic cranes

is included in the estimates.

The level of the docks at Manchester, which is 60 feet 6 inches above

the ordinary level of the tidal portion of the canal, will be reached

by four sets of locks. The locks will be of a size sufficient to admit

the largest merchant steamers afloat. Each set comprises (_a_) a large

lock, 550 feet by 60 feet; (_b_) a smaller lock 300 feet by 40 feet for

ordinary vessels; and (_c_) one lock 100 feet by 20 feet, for small

coasters and barges. All will be capable of being worked together.

Each set of locks will be worked by hydraulic power, enabling vessels

to be passed in 15 minutes. It has been ascertained by careful gaugings

that the rivers Irwell and Mersey (which will be diverted into the

upper reaches of the canal) will supply more than sufficient water for

the locks, even in the driest season.

There will be tidal gates at the entrance to the canal, which will be

worked as locks at low water, so that large vessels can enter and leave

at almost any state of the tide, instead of only during a period of 40

minutes of each tide as at Liverpool. Small vessels will be able to

enter and leave at any time.

It is claimed that vessels will be able to navigate the canal with

safety at a speed of five miles an hour, and it is estimated that the

journey from the entrance at Eastham to Manchester will be accomplished

in eight hours, which is less time than is now taken to cart goods

from ship to rail in Liverpool, and to carry them thence by rail to

Manchester.

One of the most interesting operations to be carried out in connection

with the canal works, will be the removal and rebuilding of the

aqueduct which Brindley constructed for the Bridgwater Navigation in

1765. The aqueduct and the neighbouring viaduct (shown in the old

print at p. 344) pass over the Mersey and Irwell Navigation at such a

height as to allow the passage through the archways of small vessels.

To accommodate the larger vessels that will pass up the Ship Canal, the

archways of the aqueduct and viaduct would have to be more than double

the height. This was the engineering difficulty which the Ship Canal

promoters had first of all to encounter and by many it was regarded as

insuperable. The suggestion was made that the Ship Canal should end at

a point below the aqueduct. Mr. E. Leader Williams, the engineer of

the company has, however, proposed to construct a short diversion of

the Bridgwater Canal immediately over the line at which it would cross

the Ship Canal. The length of the Bridgwater over the Ship Canal will

then be formed in the manner of a long movable iron caisson or trough,

somewhat deeper in the centre than at the two ends, supported by and

turning (when required) upon a circle of live rollers. This caisson is

to be filled with water to a depth equal to that of the canal itself,

and is to be fitted at either end with watertight gates, which are also

to be fixed at either end of the approaches from the canal.

[Illustration: THE BRIDGWATER CANAL.—(_a_) Across the Irwell

(_b_) Barton Bridge.]

Upon the completion of this work, the central portion of Brindley’s

aqueduct will be removed, the ends being allowed to remain. The manner

of working the new aqueduct will be as follows:—The operator in charge

of the machinery will, on descrying an approaching steamship, cause the

four watertight gates at the ends of the caisson and of the approaches

to be closed, and will then, by means of hydraulic machinery, cause

the caisson to revolve for a quarter of a circle upon the live roller

which will support it, thus leaving a perfectly clear passage for the

vessel. Through this passage, up- or down-going vessels will be able

readily to steam, and when clear of the aqueduct the process will be

reversed—that is to say, the attendant will cause the caisson to turn

back into its original position, and will have his watertight gates

opened once more, when the line of the Bridgwater traffic will be clear

again, after a very brief interval, and without any loss of the water

in the canal.

At the ends of the existing line of the canal (after the removal of

Brindley’s old aqueduct) it is proposed to construct hydraulic lifts as

already stated, by means of which it will be competent to lower barges

with full cargoes (the barges remaining afloat throughout the whole

operation) from the Bridgwater to the Ship Canal, or, _vice versâ_, to

raise them from the Ship Canal to the Bridgwater, thus making Barton

a point of interchange of traffic between the high and the low level

navigation.

The works on the Manchester Ship Canal were commenced in 1886, and

are to be completed, under contract, in 1892. The estimate of the

promoters is that the canal will have a traffic of 3,000,000 tons per

annum, from which a net annual income of 709,000_l._ may be expected.

This estimate, however, did not include any coastwise traffic, nor

such goods as coal, salt, and iron, and took no account of the future

expansion of trade. Another estimate, submitted to Parliament, which

included these items, calculated on a revenue of over 9½ millions of

tons, and a net revenue of over a million and a half sterling.

Whatever the financial results of this great undertaking may be, its

future can hardly fail to be well assured, and Lancashire has reason

to be satisfied with the energy, capacity, and public spirit that have

placed such a valuable means of communication at the disposal of its

principal industrial centres.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE ISTHMUS OF CORINTH CANAL.

One of the many schemes that have been put forward from time to time,

with a view to affording a more direct communication between the Ægean

and the Black Sea, appears likely to become an accomplished fact by the

cutting of the Isthmus of Corinth, which at the point where the ship

canal has been undertaken, is about 3¾ miles in breadth. The scheme now

being carried out, is understood to have originated with General Tarr,

who obtained a concession from the Greek Government for the purpose.

The required capital was estimated at some 30,000,000 francs, and

this sum was readily subscribed. The undertaking does not present any

very considerable engineering difficulties, although it has involved

a considerable amount of excavation, the earthwork requiring to be

removed being estimated at 10,000,000 cubic metres.

The Isthmus of Corinth obliges vessels passing from the Mediterranean

and Adriatic Seas to the Archipelago and the Black Sea to make a

considerable bend to the south. The idea of piercing the isthmus

originated several centuries before the Christian era, and the works

were actually commenced before the reign of Nero. The route across the

isthmus will shorten the distance between the Piræus and Marseilles 11

per cent.; Genoa, 12·2 per cent.; Venice and Trieste, 18·4 per cent.;

and Brindisi, 32·4 per cent. The probable traffic through the canal

has been estimated at over 4,500,000 tons. The works were commenced in

1882, following the straight course indicated by the traces of Nero’s

canal. The canal will have a depth of 26¼ feet, and a bottom width

of 72 feet, like the original section of the Suez Canal; but, as the

Corinth Canal has a total length of only about four miles, the transit

of vessels through it will be effected without the aid of passing

places. The principal mass of the excavation is concentrated within

the central 2½ miles, and the greatest depth of cutting is 285 feet.

Alluvial soil is mostly found for about two-thirds of a mile from each

end; but the central portion consists of close chalk underlying hard

calcareous conglomerate and compact sand, necessitating blasting and

the use of the pick. Depths of 33 feet are reached within 550 yards

of the coast, both in the Bay of Corinth and the Gulf of Egina, and

the dredging required at the entrances of the canal is not large. The

west entrance, at Poseidonia, is protected by two converging jetties,

forming a roadstead; and the east entrance, at Isthunia, is sheltered

by a single curved jetty on the northern side. These three jetties,

formed with natural blocks, are nearly completed. The canal will be

open throughout, as the variations in the level of the sea are very

slight; and the only large work of construction is the metal bridge of

262 feet span, which crosses the canal at a height of 170 feet above

the water level, and will carry the Piræus and Peloponesus Railway and

the road to Corinth over the canal.

It is not a little remarkable that both the Greeks and the Romans

proposed to make a canal across the Isthmus of Corinth, in order to

obtain a navigable passage by the Ionian Sea into the Archipelago.

Demetrius Poliorcetes, Julius Cæsar, Nero, and Caligula renewed the

attempt, but without success.[213] Before their time, the Cnidians had

made the same endeavour, which called forth the famous reply of the

Pythia—a reply that may be translated thus—

“Delve not, nor towers upon the Isthmian pile:

Had Jove so wished, himself had made an isle.”

The Isthmus of Corinth Canal has been cut through the tongue of land

which is situated between the gulfs of Athens and Lepantus and unites

the classic mainland with the shores of the Morea. By its geographical

position, this isthmus, as we have seen, bars the union between the

Adriatic and the Archipelago, and obliges all vessels passing from the

one sea to the other to round Cape Matapan. Its existence materially

lengthens the voyages of all ships bound from the western parts of

Europe to the Levant, Syria, Asia Minor, and Smyrna. The last-mentioned

port is the emporium to which the numerous caravans from the interior

of Asia, from Persia, and the Caucasian regions have long transported

the rich products of oriental countries still more distant. In a

similar manner it lengthens the route from Europe to the Black Sea,

which is a matter of serious importance, as from the ports on the

latter are shipped the enormous quantities of wheat and other cereals

which supply a considerable portion of Western Europe. The junction of

the waters of the Adriatic with those of the Archipelago is expected

to effect a saving in time of two days in the voyage from the harbours

of Brindisi, Ancona, and Trieste, to the Levant. It will also greatly

facilitate the establishment of local traffic, and probably lead to the

adoption of a regular system of steam communication, of which Greece is

much in want. At present, the coast is not particularly well furnished

with harbours, but those that do exist are said to be easily capable of

extension, and there is some inducement to construct new ones, as the

adjoining bays are deep, and afford a secure anchorage for vessels of

heavy tonnage.

The extreme points of the Isthmus of Corinth are Heapolis and

Kalamakis, and supposing them, like Suez and Port Said, to represent

the respective mouths of the canal, its length would not exceed three

miles at most—an insignificant cutting, so far as the actual lineal

dimensions are concerned. It was anticipated, and experience has now

demonstrated, that the nature of the material through which the Suez

Canal is excavated will constitute the principal and possibly the sole

difficulty to be contended with in future. As it is, the reduction of

the present batter of the side slopes is imperative. If not performed

by excavation, the operation will proceed spontaneously by the gradual

sliding of the sand into the water, whence it will be removed by the

dredgers, which, under any circumstances, will have a busy time of it

for some years to come. Fortunately this difficulty does not exist in

the canal in the Morea. The earth is of a tenacious character, which

will offer a better resistance to the disintegrating action of the

water agitated by the passage of ships, and the motion of screws and

paddles, and thus reduce the cost of maintenance and repair. It was

estimated that this important work could be carried out at the moderate

cost of half a million sterling. Without taking into account the number

of contingent steam and sailing ships which would avail themselves of

the passage _viâ_ the Corinth Canal, a regular traffic of the boats of

the Messageries Impériales, of the Company of Marseilles, of those of

the Austrian Lloyd’s, and of those belonging to the Italian service

was looked for. With the canal completed, Kalamakis, which at present

is but a village, was expected to speedily become a maritime town of

importance, and numerous cities, long since abandoned, and, as it were,

buried, were to be disinterred, restored to life, and ultimately to

become commercial centres, from which the mineral wealth with which the

country abounds may be exported.

On the 19th February, 1870, the concession for the construction of

the Isthmus of Corinth Canal was given to M. Maxime Chollet, on the

understanding that the works should be commenced within eighteen

months, and completed within six years. The Hellenic Government granted

to the concessionnaires all the land required for the canal, and 12,350

acres on each side, as well as the privilege of working the mines,

quarries, and forests of the State, within a distance of 19 miles of

the canal.[214] It was not, however, until 12 years afterwards that the

work was actually proceeded with, so that the terms of the original

concession were not carried out.

The canal was not formally commenced until the 23rd of April, 1882, the

first mine being fired by Her Majesty Queen Olga, in the presence of

His Majesty King George, the Diplomatic Corps, and the principal Greek

Government officials.

According to the plans ultimately adopted, the entrances to the channel

will be 100 metres in breadth, diminishing to 22 metres, and the depth

will be 8 metres.

The nature of the ground through which this channel has to be cut is

composed, according to the report of the engineers of the company, of

three distinct kinds:—

Firstly.—From the Gulf of Corinth, through a plain, consisting of sand

and alluvial soil, for the distance of 1¼ kiloms.

Secondly.—Through a mountain range, varying in height from 40 to 80

metres, of the length of 4½ kiloms.

Thirdly.—Beyond the mountain range to the sea, in the Bay of Kalamaki,

the canal will traverse a little plain of the length of 600 metres,

composed of alluvial soil and rocks.

The excavation of those parts of the canal situated in the plains

presented no difficulties, but this was not the case as regards the

mountainous part, where a mass of 8,000,000 metres of solid rock has

had to be excavated and transported to a distance, which labour,

according to the contract, had to be done within the comparatively

short period of three years.

The following plan of executing the works was decided on by the

engineers of the company, M. Gerster and M. Kauser:—[215]

1. That part of the canal situated in the plains to be

excavated by ordinary means, namely, hand labour, dredging

machines, and sand pumps. This portion of the work was to

be finished at the end of 1883.

2. At the same time as the above-mentioned work was

in progress, the upper portion of the rocky crest to be

blasted, and the refuse carried away by railway.

3. Towards the end of the year 1883 several large

dredging machines, constructed on the most approved

principles, were delivered to the company. These machines

were capable of removing 5500 cubic metres of soil in

ten hours. They were each of 300 horse-power, and were

constructed by the firm of Messrs. Sâtre and Demange, of

Lyons. They cost 550,000 fr. each.

As regards the system of excavating the rock, M. Gerster’s plan was to

sink vertical shafts to the level of the canal, by means of machines

constructed for the purpose, for which cartridges of dynamite were to

be employed at distances of 2 to 3 metres from each other, which were

to be exploded simultaneously.

The execution of this enterprise was confided to the Société des Ponts

et Travaux en Fer (ancienne maison Joret et Cie), in conjunction

with L’Association des Constructeurs. These two companies engaged to

undertake the cutting of the canal for the sum of 24,600,000 fr., under

forfeit if it is not completed within the prescribed time.

The annexed general and sectional diagrams (p. 351) explain the method

by which it was proposed to carry out the execution of the enterprise.

The Isthmus of Corinth Canal Company was compelled, in consequence of

unforeseen delays in their works, to obtain in 1887 an extension of

three years for their completion. The canal was to have been opened in

1888. The geological strata to be passed through in excavation does

not appear to have been accurately ascertained, and as a consequence

of having to work to some extent upon rock, instead of in sand or

gravel, the progress made was less than had been anticipated. For this

reason also it has been found necessary to raise additional capital

to the amount of double the original capital; that is to say, by an

issue of 60,000 additional shares of 500 francs each, bearing 6 per

cent. interest. In order that the canal may become a remunerative

undertaking, it is calculated that 3½ million francs of net revenue

must be realised annually. Whether the canal will ever realise this

financial result is doubtful, but, if it is ever completed, it will be

of undoubted advantage to commerce in saving 100 to 250 miles in the

passage from the Ægean to the Black Sea, and in avoiding the dangers of

the coast of Southern Greece.

[Illustration: THE ISTHMUS OF CORINTH CANAL.]

Meanwhile, the canal works, for which the capital was chiefly found

in France, have been abandoned, pending the acquisition of additional

funds. There are those who hold that it is little likely that the canal

will ever be consummated, and the unfortunate issue of the works on

the Panama Canal appears to justify the view that the French nation,

who are almost alone concerned, will hesitate before they put their

hands very deeply into their pockets in order to carry to completion an

undertaking which is by no means certain to be a financial success.

FOOTNOTES:

[213] Plin., t. iv. c. 4.

[214] ‘Moniteur de la Banque et de la Bourse.’

[215] These particulars are taken from a report made to the Foreign

Office by Her Majesty’s Secretary of Legation at Athens.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE RIVER THAMES.

“My eye, descending from the hill, surveys

Where Thames along the wanton valley strays.”

—_Denham._

The river Thames is in many respects one of the most remarkable in the

world. No other river has so large a commerce, no other river can boast

such a display of shipping, no other river is the highway for such a

large population, no other river has such a romantic and interesting

history. The Thames is, however, eclipsed by many other waterways as

regards natural advantages for maritime commerce. It has an extremely

tortuous, irregular, and dangerous channel; it is subject to great

fluctuations of tides; it is liable to be silted up with the deposits

of sand and sewage from its lower reaches; and it is inadequately

provided with artificial light to enable the mariner to find his way up

the stream after nightfall. These disadvantages have again and again

been the subject of serious accidents to life and limb, heavy losses to

shipping and marine insurance companies, complaints and proposals on

the part of the shipping interest, and representations to the Trinity

House, the Board of Trade, and other constituted authorities. Only

quite recently, the Chamber of Shipping sent a deputation to the Board

of Trade, in order to urge that the Duke of Edinburgh channel should be

better lighted, and it was then stated that the shifty and temporary

character of the channel made the lighting of the Thames difficult at

this point. For this reason, and owing to the influence of the tides,

steamers have generally to cast anchor off Gravesend, if they reach the

Thames after darkness has set in. This is so unpleasant an alternative

for passenger steamers that they frequently brave the dangers of the

river—much more serious, as a rule, than the dangers of the ocean—and

run the risk of grounding or collision, in order that they may reach

their destined berth or dock. Those who have had the misfortune to be

on board a vessel under such circumstances must have felt devoutly

thankful that they ever reached their destination without accident, and

must have registered a vow that they would never repeat the experiment.

Within the last few years, search lights have been shown from some

of the docks, which, although intended to assist the navigator to

his intended haven, have been found to produce the opposite effect,

inasmuch that they cast into deeper shadow a great part of the

intermediate channel. These dangers and difficulties are increasing,

as it is natural they should do, when no adequate provision is made to

overcome them.

The importance of this matter can only be fairly appreciated by giving

an idea of the magnitude of the trade that is now carried on between

the Thames and other ports. The largest amount of tonnage that entered

and cleared from the Thames in any recent year was as under:—

───────────┬────────────┬───────────┬───────────

│ Entered. │ Cleared. │ Total.

├────────────┼───────────┼───────────

Foreign │ 6,591,225 │ 4,127,045 │ 10,718,270

Coastwise │ 5,025,724 │ 1,756,565 │ 6,782,189

├────────────┼───────────┼───────────

Totals │ 11,616,949 │ 5,883,610 │ 17,500,559

───────────┴────────────┴───────────┴───────────

This represents nearly one-fifth of the total shipping trade of England

in the same year, and an average of about 48,000 tons of shipping per

day. The total value of our imports from, and exports to, foreign

countries and British possessions has in some recent years amounted,

for the port of London alone, to upwards of 200 millions sterling. The

value of our coastwise trade is not recorded, but it will probably be

sixty or seventy millions more, which would bring up the total annual

value of the shipping trade of the Thames to close on 300 millions. The

extent to which this trade has increased within the last twenty-five

years has been quite phenomenal. In 1860 the total entrances and

clearances of the port of London amounted to only 9,506,000 tons,

so that the trade has nearly doubled within twenty-seven years.

The tonnage entered and cleared over the last few years represents

an average of over four tons per head of the population of the

metropolis—taking the latter at, say, 4 millions over the four years

ending 1887.