THE WATERWAYS OF BRITISH INDIA.
“Flies tow’rd the springs
Of Ganges or Hydaspes.”
—_Milton._
It has long been a contested point between different sections of the
officials charged with the government of India whether canals or
railways were likely to provide the cheapest and the most suitable
means of communication for that extensive country. The enormous area of
British India, the generally level character of the immense plains that
form so prominent a feature of her physical conformation, the generally
slow pace at which everything is carried on, and the comparatively
little importance that is attached to a high rate of speed, all seemed
to mark out the Indian possessions of the British Crown as extremely
favourable for the construction of an extensive system of artificial
waterways adapted to the twin purposes of irrigation and navigation.
Sir Arthur Cotton has even advocated the summary and indefinite
suspension of nearly all railway schemes and works, in order that
the attention of the Government might be concentrated upon canals,
mainly for irrigation, but also adapted for purposes of navigation.[135]
Irrigation is, indeed, one of the absolutely indispensable requirements
of the country, and the State has expended many millions for this
purpose. But the work has been carried out, for the most part, for
agricultural purposes alone, and it was not discovered until too late
that a valuable source of power and economy was lost in not, at the
same time, adapting them for navigation purposes.[136] In some of the
later canals this oversight has been repaired. In the great deltas
most of the principal irrigation canals recently constructed have been
adapted for navigation, as well as some of the larger canals in the
North-western Provinces and the Punjaub. In the Madras Presidency,
again, there is a system, commencing with the Buckingham Canal, at
the town of Sadras, and continuing along the Delta Canal and by the
Kistna and Godavery lines, which affords 456 miles of unbroken water
communication.[137] This canal, however, is, like the railway system of
India, exposed to the serious disadvantage of a broken gauge.
The locks on this system are all of the same dimensions, viz. 150 feet
long by 20 feet broad, with a minimum of 5 feet on the sills of the
lower gate. That portion of it which is dependent on a tidal supply
consists of level reaches, with only one lock, near Madras. When it
leaves the coast, there is an ascent of about 50 feet to be overcome to
the Kistna, a difference of about 20 feet between the low-water levels
of the Kistna and Godavery, and a descent from the latter of 35 feet to
the port of Cocanada.
In the Tida Section near Madras the surface width of the canal is 60
feet, and there is a minimum depth of 4½ feet. The tonnage of the boats
plying on the Buckingham Canal was, in 1882, registered at 10,215 tons,
and the receipts, consisting of licence fees and tolls, amounted to
12,000_l._, showing an increase of 1000_l._ over the previous year. In
the fresh-water reaches, the width varies from 120 to 60 feet, with an
average depth of 6 feet, and a current varying from ½ to 1¼ mile per
hour. Every variety of boat is to be found on this canal, ranging from
3 to 80 tons.
In the Delta canals there is a large number of passenger boats,
built on improved English models, but the majority of the craft are
built on native lines, clumsy in appearance, but good cargo carriers
notwithstanding, and almost all are decked. The haulage is almost
entirely carried on by men; no cattle are used. On the Godavery and
Kistna, small steamers have run in connection with the Government
works, but, practically, no steam towing, though practised on the river
itself, has as yet been used on the canals.
The cost of traction cannot be accurately stated; but, as far as
General Rundall could make out from independent inquiries, the cost of
working native boats is about one-eighth of a penny per ton-mile; the
charge varies with the demand and the description of cargo.
The carriage of material for the Government Works used to be contracted
for at three-eighths of a penny per ton mile, and the charge made to
native merchants was probably about the same; but to European traders
it was higher.
There is no other purely navigation canal in the Madras Presidency, but
there is a considerable boat traffic carried on in the lagoons on the
western coast.
The Godavery Delta is composed of three principal tracts. A main canal
is led off from the river to each tract, and from it are thrown off
several main branches, most of which are fitted with locks.
The lines which skirt the edge of the Delta are carried with a very
small slope, and therefore require no locks, except at the terminus,
where, on one side (the right bank), the canal is connected with a
similar line led from the Kistna, and on the left bank, at a distance
of 30 miles, it is connected with the port of Cocanada by a short
junction canal, in which are built the locks necessary to overcome the
difference of level, about 30 feet above the sea. All the main lines
are dropped into the tidal reaches of the respective branches of the
Godavery, and are in this manner connected with one another.
The total length of navigable canals, exclusive of the tidal portions
of the river, and the various salt-water creeks permeating the lower
part of the Delta, extends for between 458 and 502 miles.
The canals are open to any carriers. Tolls are not levied generally,
but only on unlicensed boats, as the water rates derived from
irrigation yield a large return on the capital expenditure.
The majority of boats pay the small registration fee which is exacted
in preference to tolls.
_s._
The fees on cargo boats, per ton of 50 cubic feet, were 4
” passenger boats, 1st class ” 8
” ” 2nd class ” 6
These rates were increased from January 1882 to:—
Cargo boats, per ton of 75 cubic feet 7
Passenger boats, 1st class ” 14
” 2nd class ” 10
These fees free boats over the whole system of canals during the
calendar year. Unlicensed boats pay 6_d._ per ton for a single trip.
The charge for third-class passengers on boats is one-eighth of a penny
per mile.
Between the river Tumbaddra and the river Pennar there is a large
canal, which was originally constructed by the Madras Irrigation
Company, and, although intended primarily for an irrigation line, was
fitted with locks, in order to enable it to be used for navigation.
This canal is, however, only available for about eight months of the
year, as the water supply in the river has to be passed on for use in
the Kistna Delta.
The Ganges and the Brahmapootra are connected with the Hoogly by
means of a number of creeks, which are really natural canals, and are
connected by two artificial canals: the first called the Circular, or
Baliaghatta Canal, and the other Tolly’s Nullah.
The Calcutta Canal route for boats extends eastward for about 115 miles
to Khoohia, the capital of the Sunderbunds, and is situated at the
junction of the rivers named the Atharabanka and Bhoyrab, respectively.
The former is an offshoot of the Madhumatti, down which comes all the
produce from the north; the latter carries all that which comes from
Backergunge on the eastward. The total number of laden boats registered
on the canals in 1874 was 77,096, and the total tonnage of all the
cargoes imported into Calcutta by the Sunderbunds route was 521,000
tons.
A large traffic is carried on along the three branches from the Ganges
known as the Nuddeah rivers into Calcutta. In the years 1873-74 the
total number of boats passing up and down was 32,887 and 27,242,
conveying 378,200 and 323,000 tons respectively, of which over
two-thirds was down traffic. The first canals met with in the Bengal
series, other than the purely navigation lines, are those comprised in
the Orissa Scheme. They are divided into three sections. The largest
are those constructed in Orissa proper, the navigated portion measuring
162 miles, but when fully completed this system will extend to about
500 miles. There is a canal from Midnapore to Calcutta 70 miles in
length, of which 53 miles are artificial, and the remainder follows
the course of the Hoogly river. A canal about 30 miles in length has
been cut at Hidgedee, in order to enable boats to escape the dangers of
the lower reaches of the Hoogly. This canal is to be continued until
it enables water communication to be established for the 250 miles
that separate Calcutta and Cuttack. The canal varies from 120 to 60
feet, with a minimum depth of 6 feet, while the head locks and those
on the main line are 150 feet by 20 feet. This canal cost 6200_l._
per mile, while the Orissa Canal is stated to have cost 3000_l._,
and the Midnapore Canal 4400_l._ per mile, attributable specially to
navigation. In Bengal there is a system of canals connecting with
the river Ganges, which passes through the province of South Behar.
There are three principal branches in this system—named the Patna,
the Arrah, and the Buxar—their total length being 217 miles. On this
system there were 8613 boats in 1882, the aggregate tonnage of which
was 88,657 tons. Navigation is carried on in the North-west Provinces
and on the Upper and Lower Ganges Canal. The Agra Canal, which leaves
the Jumna eight miles below Delhi, has also been adapted for navigation.
In the Presidency of Madras there are upwards of 53,000 tanks, or
reservoirs for irrigation purposes alone, exclusive of small tanks near
villages, all executed by the natives prior to the occupancy of the
Deccan by the British. The aggregate length of the embankment of these
reservoirs is fully 30,000 miles; bridges, culverts, sluices, &c., are
more than 300,000 in number. The stored-up waters, sent forth at the
proper season, still brings to the exchequer of the Madras Presidency
a yearly income of a million and a half sterling (one-sixth of the
whole revenue), although many of the finest of these reservoirs are in
ruins, or useless from want of being properly kept up. One of them, the
Ponairy Reservoir, in the district of Trichinopoly, has a superficial
area of about 80 square miles, or say 50,000 acres; the banks are 30
miles in extent. Another, the Veranum Reservoir, has nearly 35 square
miles of area, or upwards of 20,000 acres, and 10 miles of banks.
An expenditure of a considerable amount has been incurred for nearly
half a century by the Government of the Madras Presidency in keeping
open the existing narrow waterway through the rocky reef which connects
the island of Ramisseram with the mainland of India. Even so, however,
the navigation has been extremely unsatisfactory. The tide, when
making southwards, heaps up the water at the northern entrance to the
channel to such an extent that even full-powered steamers require to
employ kedges and warps to surmount and pass it. The Madras Government,
therefore, are favourable to a proposed new channel, which will at
once relieve them of a serious outlay, provide greater security to
navigation, and materially reduce the time now occupied in steaming
between Ceylon and their own seaboard.
It has been proposed to increase the maritime facilities of India and
Ceylon by cutting a canal through the island of Ramisseram, which at
the present time excludes the possibility of ships drawing more than
12 feet of water from passing northward to the Bay of Bengal. For this
reason ships proceeding to Madras or Calcutta have to steer to the east
of Ceylon, which entails a voyage of 300 or 400 miles longer than would
be required if the route by the Gulf of Manaar and the Palk Straits
were open to them.
For some years previous to 1887 negotiations had been carried on
between the parties promoting this canal and the Government of India,
with a view of obtaining such concessions as were deemed necessary to
the realisation of the scheme. Authority has been given to obtain land
and cut the canal, and the aid of the Government has been promised
towards obtaining from the railway companies in the south of India
an extension of their system to the new port which it is proposed to
establish at the Indian end of the canal.
The inland navigation of India is, however, chiefly carried on upon the
great rivers—the Indus, the Ganges, the Brahmaputra. Taking the limit
of the Ganges, and Jumna to the west and south, the Brahmaputra and
Megna to the east, the country intersected by navigable rivers, &c.,
may be computed as covering an area exceeding 180,000 square miles.
There is an uninterrupted navigation of 1000 miles up the Indus from
the sea to Lahore, which is situated on the Ravee, or Hydrastes, one of
the most meandering of the five Punjab rivers or branches composing the
Chenab. But, owing to the numerous shallows and sandbanks in some parts
of the Indus, this extensive navigation can only be said to be open
to the flat-bottomed boats of the country, which draw about four feet
of water. There are, however, few rivers on which steam could be used
with better effect than on the Indus, which is said to discharge four
or five times as much water as the Ganges. It has no rocks nor rapids,
and, unless when swollen, the current does not exceed 2½ miles an hour.
The swell commences about the end of April, increases till July, and
disappears altogether in September.
There are many canals connected with the Indus, but they are
principally for the purpose of irrigation, and the greater part of
them, being mostly natural creeks, have no water except during the
swollen state of the river. Such canals intersect the Delta, and are
likewise pretty numerous between the latitudes of 26° 20´ and 28°,
particularly on the west side of the river; but the most ancient
artificial canals connected with this river seem to belong to the
Punjab district.
By means of the Ganges and its subsidiary streams all sorts of
articles can be conveyed between the sea and the north-west portions
of Hindustan over a distance of more than 1000 miles. The commercial
capital, Calcutta, upon the Hoogly branch of the Ganges, is favourably
situated for internal navigation. It is about 100 miles from the sea,
and 130 from the Sandheads; but it has a very intricate and tedious
navigation through the banks of sand and mud, which occasionally shift
their beds in the Hoogly River, as well as in the other branches of the
Ganges. The Nuddeah rivers, which connect the Ganges with the Hoogly,
are likewise, for eight months in the year, so extremely shallow, that
the water communication between Calcutta and the upper country is,
during that time, maintained by the Sunderbund passages at a great
expense of time and labour. To obviate this inconvenience, it has been
proposed to construct a canal which, branching off from the Ganges at
Rajamahl, shall join the Hoogly at Mirzapore near Kulna; for, owing to
the difference of level at the extremities, amounting to 60 feet, and
the height of the Ganges itself, varying 30 feet at different seasons,
an open cut without locks would not suffice. The intended route,
besides being 300 miles shorter than the present route, would traverse
a country rich in iron ore and limestone, and would pass near to
extensive coalfields.
Among other works of the kind carried out in India during the present
century may be named a canal to unite the Damrah and Churamunee;
the re-opening of Feroze Shah’s canal in Delhi; the restoration of
Zabita Kahn’s canal in the Upper Dooab; the course of Ali Murdher’s
canal drawn into Delhi; a new cut from the Votary Nullah; a canal at
Chumnapore. A canal of 70 miles has been executed in the King of Oude’s
dominions, between the Ganges and its tributary the Goomty. There are
several canals in Agra, but they are chiefly used for irrigation, some
of them being of considerable antiquity.
South Malabar, and nearly all Travancore, are naturally provided near
their coasts with a system of inland navigation called the Backwater,
which extends from Chowghaut in Malabar on the north, to Trivanderam,
the capital of Travancore, within 50 miles of Cape Comorin, on the
south, a distance of 170 or 180 miles. A continuation of it is
navigable 90 miles farther for small boats during the rains, from
Chowghaut to Cotah, 16 miles south of Tellicherry. The Backwater runs
nearly parallel to the sea-shore, sometimes at a distance of a few
hundred yards, and at other times of three or four miles. Its breadth
varies from 200 yards to 12 or 14 miles; its depth from many fathoms to
a few feet. Into this Backwater all the numerous rivers flowing from
the Western Ghauts are discharged and retained. The Backwater empties
itself into the sea by six mouths; of which the only one navigable for
ships is the mouth on the south bank of which is situated Cochin. There
is a bar at this mouth, but on it there are 17 or 18 feet of water at
spring tides.
In May 1871 an influential deputation waited on the Duke of Argyll,
when that nobleman was Secretary for India, to urge the making of a
new ship canal through the narrow neck of land projecting from the
continent of India, which separates the Gulf of Manaar from the Palk
Straits. At the close of the discussion, his Grace frankly admitted
that if the statements made by the several members of the deputation
were correct, which he did not doubt, and if the work could be executed
at the cost estimated, or anything near it, it would doubtless be
worthy of adoption, and he, therefore, would address the Indian
Government with the view of obtaining an official estimate, and then
give his best consideration to the subject. The project has not yet,
however, been carried out.
FOOTNOTES:
[135] Report from the Select Committee on East India (Public Works),
1879, p. xiv.
[136] Evidence of Sir Bartle Frere before the Select Committee on
Canals, 1883, p. 159.
[137] Report made by General Rundall, to the Select Committee on
Canals, p. 280.
SECTION II.
SHIP CANALS.
CHAPTER XX.
THE SUEZ CANAL.
“Let the wide world his praises sing
Where Tagus and Euphratus spring,
And from the Danube’s frosty banks to those
Where, from an unknown head, great Nilus flows.”
—_Roscommon._
The greatest artificial waterway constructed up to the present time has
been the Suez Canal. Longer canals have been made both in Europe and in
the United States, but no canal hitherto completed has been built of
the same large dimensions, nor has any other canal cost so considerable
a sum of money. It is not too much to say that no other waterway has
been more important to commerce, nor has any other been attended
with the same momentous and permanent political consequences. It is
satisfactory to be able to add that few waterways of modern times have
been so successful from a financial point of view.
The story of the Suez Canal has been often told. It has always,
however, lacked completeness, which indeed is impossible of attainment
in reference to an undertaking that is making history at the same rapid
rate that this has done, and is still doing.
It is remarkable that some of the earliest canals of which we have any
record were constructed between Suez and the Nile during the existence
of the eighteenth dynasty (about fifteen centuries before Christ). But
the communication thus opened was not apparently found of much service,
seeing that the canals were allowed to fill up and fall into such decay
as to compel their abandonment.[138] Another canal, probably over the
same route, was opened some centuries later by Pharaoh Necho, with a
view to facilitating the communication between Assyria and Egypt, which
was then frequent and considerable. This canal was open, and in regular
use, during the reign of Darius.
Ptolemy Philadelphus, finding the waterway neglected, reopened and
completed it from the Pelusiæ, or Eastern Branch of the Nile, near
Bubastes, to Arsinoe, on the Red Sea. This canal is stated by Strabo
to have been 50 yards wide and 1000 stadia in length. The Romans, to
whom this highway was known as the Trajanus Amnis, improved and widened
it. At a later period the Arabs, after conquering Egypt, developed
the canal for the purpose of carrying grain from Egypt to the holy
cities of Mecca and Medinah, and it was so employed for a century and a
quarter.
It has been contended, as an argument against the Suez canal, that
if it were practicable to keep open a great waterway between the two
oceans, the canal which passed through so many vicissitudes would not
have been allowed again and again to become obliterated, nor would
cargoes have been discharged at Myos Hormos, the great port at the
entrance to the Gulf of Suez, and carried overland to the Nile, a
distance of some 80 miles, at a time when the canal appears to have
been available, if it had been entirely satisfactory. But there are
several considerations entering into the question of transport at that
time that cannot be very readily appreciated now. The camel was then
the ship of the desert to a much greater extent than it has been in
more modern times. The knowledge of navigation was far from perfect,
and the dangers of the Red Sea, which are now trifling, were then
deemed so formidable that vessels discharged their cargoes in the
harbour of Massowah, whence they were sent 1500 miles across the desert
on the backs of camels, rather than face the Red Sea route _viâ_ Suez,
although, as the canal was then open, a vessel from the east might have
made use of it and reached Alexandria or Ostia without breaking bulk.
To our own times, and in the light of our fuller knowledge, this seems
to be little short of incredible. Many centuries later than the time of
which we write, St. Jerome, in speaking of the Red Sea, declared that
mariners who had been six months at sea deemed themselves fortunate if
they had traversed its full length, and reached a port of safety.[139]
The first recorded attempt at the construction of a canal was made in
this very region, Neco, the son of Psammiticus, having connected the
Gulf of Heroopolis with the Pelusiac branch of the Nile at Bubastis
(Zigazig).[140] The narrow channel which here connected the Gulf of
Heroopolis with the Red Sea, appears to have been closed by an upheaval
of the soil. At the southern end of the gulf (Bitter Lakes) goods were
landed and carried onward to the Red Sea. Darius subsequently dug a
canal along the line of the ancient junction of the Gulf of Heroopolis
with the Red Sea, as shown in the annexed sketch by the letters A A.
This canal, which was also called the canal of the Pharaohs and of
Trajan, is understood to have finally disappeared in the eighth century.
[Illustration: THE CANAL OF RAMESES.]
The last attempt at a passage from the Red Sea to the Nile was made by
Amru ibn el Aas, the general of the Caliph Omar, who conquered Egypt in
the seventh century. A great famine reigning in Mecca, Amru was ordered
to take measures for forwarding thenceforth grain from Egypt by the
quickest route. “He dug a canal of communication from the Nile to the
Red Sea, a distance of 80 miles, by which provisions might be conveyed
to the Arabian shores. This canal had been commenced by Trajan, the
Roman emperor,”[141] who, the Pelusiac arm of the Nile being no longer
navigable, joined his canal to the river at Cairo, instead of
Bubastis or Zigazig. This occurred in the year of the great mortality
A.D. 639, and in 767 the Caliph Abou Giaffar el Mansour, to
prevent food being sent to the insurgents of Medina, caused the canal
to be destroyed by filling up the junction of Neco’s canal and the
Bitter Lakes. The winds and the sands completed the work, and produced
the ridge of Serapeum, which is believed by some to cover the site of
the ancient city of Heroopolis.
The engineers of Ptolemy II. advised him not to cut a canal across the
isthmus, because the land, being lower than the level of the Red Sea,
would be laid under water; but that prince turned the difficulty by
causing flood-gates to be erected at proper points, in order to keep
back the waters of the sea at high tides, and those of the canal at low
ebb, so that navigation became possible both ways. Now, this opening,
in as perfect state of preservation at certain places, according to
M. de Lesseps, as it was in the eighth century, really forms part, to
the extent of four kilometres, near Shaloof, of the present canal,
which opens into the Red Sea by means of sluices having a fall of three
metres (9 feet), being the altitude of the mouth above the average
level of the sea. This seems to prove that eleven centuries ago the sea
was about as much higher as it is now, so that the isthmus has, indeed,
experienced an upheaval. At the time that the Hebrews quitted Egypt the
rock of Shaloof, the last offshoot of the Geneffay Hills, must have
been entirely under water. When, by the gradual rising of the land,
the top of this rock emerged from the water, it became covered with an
accumulation of earthy or sandy matter, brought by wind and tide, until
a barrier was formed which could only be swept over at high water. The
lakes were consequently precluded from experiencing any ebb or flow.
The slow upheaval of the soil continuing, the _terra firma_ of Shaloof
assumed a permanent shape, and the requirements of navigation led to
the idea of cutting a canal. Herodotus speaks of it as having been open
in his time: this fixes its date at 450 years B.C. It was repaired
under the Ptolemies, improved during the Roman domination by a supply
of water from Cairo, dredged by the Caliph Omar in the seventh century,
and abandoned to decay in the eighth.
From this period, to the beginning of the present century, save for
half-hearted projects of the Venetians, and, later, of the Porte
itself, we hear no more of the question till Napoleon invaded Egypt,
and ordered an immediate survey of the isthmus with a view to the
establishment of a maritime canal.[142] Napoleon was himself no mean
engineer, and he employed on this work a man who seems to have
possessed a remarkable grasp of the problem presented for solution,
but who, nevertheless, shared the then common impression that the Red
Sea was at a higher level than the Mediterranean, and that to join
the waters of the two seas would be to submerge a great part of the
country. This man was M. Lépère. He made a survey of the route between
the two seas, and declared that he had found the Red Sea to be 30 feet
above the Mediterranean.[143]
When Napoleon Buonaparte, at the time of the French expedition to
Egypt, ordered a complete survey to be made of the isthmus between the
Mediterranean and the Red Sea by M. Lépère, the latter proposed that
vessels should ascend the Nile to Bubastis, and pass by a canal, 18
feet deep and 77 miles long, to the basin of the Bitter Lakes. Thence,
a second canal, 13 miles in length, was to lead to the Red Sea. The
cost of this undertaking was calculated at 691,000_l._, but additional
works in the mouth and bed of the Nile, and the restoration of the
canals of Faroumah, Chebri-el-Koum, and Alexandria, was estimated to
raise the cost to 1,200,000_l._ Surveys of the country were afterwards
made by Captain Chesney, in 1830, and by Mr. Robert Stephenson in 1847,
with a view to the opening up of a waterway between the two seas.
Captain Chesney reported on the Isthmus of Suez as offering great
facilities for the construction of a canal. “There are,” he said, “no
serious difficulties; not a mountain intervenes, scarcely what deserves
to be called a hillock.” Stephenson, however, who personally examined
the ground, considered that any canal made across the isthmus should be
provided with locks, as the absence of current would otherwise allow of
silting. Admiral Spratt, ten years later, came to the same conclusion
as Stephenson, but both were opposed by M. de Lesseps, who, in his
final plan, resolved upon a dead level canal for the whole distance of
103 miles.
The plan ultimately adopted has no doubt been the most advantageous to
commerce, inasmuch as it has facilitated the time and labour involved
in passing vessels through the canal. It has, however, necessitated a
considerable annual outlay for dredging. Nearly two millions of cubic
yards of material have had to be removed in a single year from the bed
of the canal, in order to maintain the requisite depth.
In advocating his plan for the construction of a canal across the
Isthmus of Suez, M. de Lesseps calculated that in 1851 the value of the
commerce with countries to the east of Egypt was a hundred millions
sterling, and the tonnage employed in its transport was four millions
of tons.[144] This figure he raised in 1855 to sixteen millions of tons;
but he was content to adopt six millions as the tonnage that would
represent the Eastern trade, of which he reckoned that one-half would
make use of the canal. These were described by the ‘Quarterly Review’
as “preposterous speculations,” and figures were quoted from the ‘Revue
des deux Mondes’ to prove their fallacy. In the latter periodical,
M. Baude had calculated the total trade with the East at that time
(1850-53) at 1¾ millions, and M. Dupontès at two millions of tons. The
calculations of M. de Lesseps do not seem to have been stated with much
precision. There is no statement of the description of tonnage referred
to, which is of very material importance. If gross tonnage was meant,
then the estimate of M. de Lesseps was realised five years after the
canal had been opened. If net tonnage, then it was not reached until
1880. In 1885, the gross tonnage was close on nine millions, and the
net over 6¾ millions.
In 1773, Mr. Volney walked over the country traversed by the present
Suez Canal, for the purpose of endeavouring to reconcile the various
opinions and reports made up to that time as to the practicability of
constructing a ship canal across the isthmus. The conclusion come to
by that engineer was that there would be a difficulty in preventing
the silting up of the harbours, and that for that reason the scheme
was a doubtful one.[145] M. de Lesseps himself appears, in 1855, to have
repudiated the credit of being the author of the project, when he wrote
to a friend a letter in which the following passage occurs:—
“Vous savez qui Linant-Bey est, de puis trente années en Egypt, et
qu’il s’y occupe constamment de travaux de canalisation. Lorsque
j’étais consul au Caire en 1830, c’est lui qui m’a initié à ses projets
de l’ouverteure de l’Isthme de Suez, et qui a fait naître en moi ce
violent désir que je n’ai jamais abandonné au milieu de toutes les
vicissitudes de ma carrière de participer de tous mes moyens à la
réalisation d’une ouvre aussi importante.”[146]
The Suez Canal Company was incorporated in December 1858, with a
capital of 8,000,000_l._, divided into 40,000 shares of 20_l._ each.
Interest at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum was to be paid to the
shareholders during construction. A sinking-fund of 4/100 per cent.
was established, to be a first charge on the profits available for
distribution.
Although the first sod of the canal was cut on the 25th April, 1859,
it was two years before any real progress was made with the work of
excavation. These years were not, however, unemployed. They were
chiefly taken up with the work of preliminary preparation, which, on
such a vast enterprise, was necessarily considerable. One of the most
essential duties required to be undertaken was the construction of
a fresh-water canal, for the purpose of supplying the wants of the
vast number of labourers employed. Much of this labour was forced,
or _corvée_ labour, provided, under engagement, by the Egyptian
Government. In 1864, however, after the works had been about four years
in progress, the Egyptian Government claimed to withdraw the fellaheen,
finding the supply of from 15,000 to 20,000 of the most able-bodied
men in the country a serious tax on their resources. The difference
between the company and the Government on this score was submitted to
the arbitrament of the Emperor Napoleon, who awarded the company an
indemnity of 1,520,000_l._
In order to provide the ways and means for the prosecution of the work,
and to fulfil concessions made to the company, the Egyptian Government
made considerable sacrifices. It had given up its customs dues on the
canal company’s imports, its tolls on the fresh-water canal, its postal
telegraph services, its fishery rights on the canal and lakes, the
hospitals on the isthmus with their appurtenances, the quarries and
port of Mex with their plant, the storehouses of Boulac and Damietta,
and the right to half the proceeds of any of the lands on the maritime
canal, which the company might offer for disposal. These rights the
Egyptian Government recovered in 1869 on the payment of 1,200,000_l._,
represented by the coupons up to 1894, on the 176,600 shares which it
had acquired as an ordinary subscriber. The Egyptians have certainly
not reaped the financial advantages from the canal which they ought
to have done. They parted to England with their 176,600 shares (less
the coupons to 1894) for something under four millions sterling. The
value of these shares, deducting the detached coupons, is now close on
ten millions. Again, in 1880 they sacrificed their royalties, which
amounted to 15 per cent. on the net receipts of the company, to a
French syndicate to cover a debt of 700,000_l._ In the seven following
years, the syndicate received 1,212,025_l._ from this source, and it
has been calculated that if the annual receipts of the canal never
exceeded those of that period, the canal company would have paid in
1968 no less than fourteen millions sterling in respect of the advance
of 700,000_l._! Evidently the Egyptians did not know the value of the
canal when they made this disastrous bargain, although the navigation
receipts had increased from 228,750_l._ in 1870 to 1,599,700_l._ in
1880.[147]
For a number of years after it was fairly started the canal had to
struggle with financial difficulties. The English had subscribed very
little towards its completion, and the French appeared to have some
doubts as to its ultimate success. M. de Lesseps then, as since, was
full of enthusiasm as to the future of the enterprise, and predicted
that it was to be an assured and notable success. Not so, however, his
friends and allies. On the contrary, Prince Napoleon, in presiding at
a banquet given to M. de Lesseps on the 11th February, 1864, declared
that in his opinion “the canal would not be finished, the works
would go to ruin, and nothing would be done.” And then followed this
remarkable prediction: “In fifteen or twenty years, when the Viceroy
shall have shown his powerlessness, there will be some one all ready
who will constitute a new company and make the canal. Do you know who
it will be? It will be the influence, the capital, and the workmen of
the English.” Napoleon was partly right. Egypt found the greater part
of the money required, but it is the shipowners of England who pay the
dividends that enrich the owners of the canal, and enable M. de Lesseps
and his friends to regard their triumph with so much complacency.
The Act of Concession for the construction of the Suez Canal was
granted by the Viceroy, Said Pacha, to M. de Lesseps on the 30th of
November 1854, and was followed, on the 5th of January 1856, by a
second Act, to which were annexed the Articles of Association of a
company for working the concession. The charter thus granted to the
Suez Canal Company gave it a ninety-nine years’ lease (counting from
the date of opening), to dig and work—
1. A maritime canal from sea to sea, with a northern port on
the Mediterranean, and an inland port at Lake Timsah.
2. A fresh-water canal from Cairo to Lake Timsah, with
branches north and south supplying the two canal seaports.
For the carrying out of this undertaking the Government of Egypt
granted the company:—
1. The lands necessary for the company’s buildings, offices,
and works on the canal, gratuitously, and free from taxation.
2. The lands, not private property, brought under
cultivation by the construction of the fresh-water canal,
gratuitously, and free from taxation for ten years.
3. The right to charge landowners for the use of the water
of the fresh-water canal, which, on the other hand, it was
bound to supply.
4. All mines found on the company’s lands, and the right to
extract from all State mines and quarries, free of cost,
royalty, or tax, the stone, plaster, or other materials
required for the construction of the canal and ports.
5. Freedom from duties on its imports.
It was provided that the canal and works were to be finished, save for
unavoidable delays, within six years. Native labour was to be employed
to the extent of four-fifths of the whole, a special convention
settling the terms on which the Government supplied or authorised such
labour. The tolls were fixed at 10 frs. per “ton of capacity” (an
expression which gave rise to difficulties subsequently), and 10 frs.
for each passenger.
A contract was made with M. Hardon for the execution of the works,
under which the company were to receive 60 per cent. of the prices
fixed by the original estimates of the International Commission. The
drawing up of the plans, the general superintendence, and the supply
of the machinery and stores, were, however, to be left in the hands of
the company. This agreement was subsequently cancelled, and the company
took the works under its own control, making contracts with four
different firms, who undertook to complete the principal undertakings
for a total sum of 4,588,800_l._[148] With these arrangements, the canal
was fairly launched. From 1861 till 1869 the whole line of the canal
was the busiest centre of industrial activity in Europe. The total
amount of excavation required was 107 millions of cubic metres. This
is a larger amount of digging than has been accomplished in the case
of any other work on record.[149] The operations were required to be
carried on at the same time with the fresh-water canal from Nefiche to
Suez, and with the maritime canal from Suez to Port Said, so that two
distinct undertakings were concurrently being constructed. Some details
as to the annual progress of the works may here be suitably introduced.
In 1861, the works were chiefly confined to digging wells along the
line of the maritime canal, to erecting sheds for 10,000 labourers, and
providing dock basins, water condensers, forges and workshops, steam
saw-mills, and opening a water supply by a canal which should join the
Nile to Lake Timsah.
In 1862, the eastern mole at Port Said was begun, together with a
landing stage 70 yards by 22, in 16 feet of water, and an arsenal dock
160 yards by 135 and 5 feet depth. Seven Arab villages were built, and
north of Lake Timsah, a sea-water cutting was continued from Kantara
to El Ferdane. A large dredging plant ordered from various makers in
England and France was delivered.
In 1863, four dredgers and cranes were got to work at Port Said, and
south of Lake Timsah twenty-one dredgers were at work, and three others
were nearly ready. Provision was made for adding twenty more dredgers,
each estimated to be capable of raising 1,050,000 cubic feet per month.
The fresh-water canal from Nefiche to Suez was begun, and 24 miles
were finished. This canal was 64 feet at the water-line, 26 feet at
the bottom, and had 6 feet draught of water. The excavations required
were about 50 millions of cubic feet. On the north of Lake Timsah,
18,000 men were at work, digging a trench 50 feet by 4 to 6 feet
deep, connecting the Mediterranean and Lake Timsah, and 153,600,000
cubic feet of excavation was done at 0·68 fr. per cubic metre, being
within the original estimate, despite the heavy labour of carrying the
earth up an incline of 70 feet. From Lake Timsah to Toussoum Plateau
on the south, the canal was made 190 feet wide and 6 feet below the
Mediterranean level, involving 21,200,000 cubic feet of excavation.
In 1864, 20 new dredgers, with barges and accessories, were fitted
up, 43,000,000 cubic feet of excavation was done, from Port Said to
El Ferdane, and 7,600,000 cubic feet between Timsah and Serapeum, as
well as 4,500,000 cubic feet of gypsous stone along Lake Ballah. A
large area of land was also reclaimed, in order to provide for new
works, quays were extended, and the canal Cheikh Carponti, connecting
Port Said with the lake and Damietta, was completed. The fresh-water
canal was also completed to the sea, over 55 miles, having occupied
thirteen months, and involved 118,000,000 cubic feet of excavation.
Corvées, or native forced labour, were abolished, and 7954 European
labourers, with 10,806 others, were set to work.
In 1865 the general works of the Maritime Canal were extended.
In 1866 Messrs. Borel and Levalley got 32 trough dredgers at work along
35 miles of the canal, and the canal from Port Said to Timsah was
widened to 325 feet, thus allowing of the formation of strands for the
protection of banks from passing vessels, and economising the stone
embankments. The Viceroy set 80,000 men to work at the canal from
Cairo to Wady, so as to allow of the passage of the Nile waters at all
seasons.
In 1867, 353,000,000 cubic feet of dredging was accomplished, and long
trough dredgers were applied to the work between Port Said and Timsah,
which was filled to sea level. The large lake to Chalouf, and the small
lake to Suez, were excavated by hand labour. Of the contract of M.
Couvreux to excavate 146,000,000 cubic feet, 122,500,000 cubic feet had
been completed on 1st June.
In 1868 excellent progress was made. Messrs. Borel and Levalley had
dredged at Port Said 123,000,000 out of their total quantity of
165,000,000 cubic feet. On the 15th April 1,200,000,000 cubic feet
still remained to be excavated in the Maritime Canal. Between Port
Said and Timsah, 5¼ miles had been done with 156,000,000 cubic feet of
excavation, and at El Ferdane, 3¾ miles had been done with 34,000,000,
Couvreux thereby finishing six months in advance of the contract time.
The monthly work at this time was 74,500,000 cubic feet, accomplished
with 8 elevator dredgers, 30 dredgers with barges, 22 long trough
dredgers, 22 inclined planes, and 7500 labourers.
Besides the ordinary work of canalisation along the line of route,
very extensive harbour operations had to be undertaken at Port Said
and Suez. In the former case, two moles were erected, the western 2700
yards long, and the eastern 1950 yards, and requiring 250,000 blocks of
artificial stone, each of 350 cubic feet and weighing 20 tons. A dock
basin, 76 acres in extent had to be provided, and another basin, called
the Basin de Commerce, of 10 acres extent and 37 feet deep. At Suez,
the roadstead had to be dredged, and dykes and embankments constructed,
the latter involving the submergence of 2,300,000 cubic feet of stone.
The Suez breakwater, when finished, had over 1600 yards of stonework.
In 1869, early in the year, the moles at Port Said were completed, and
the maritime canal, from Port Said to the Bitter Lakes Canal, was fully
open. In March the flooding of the Bitter Lakes was commenced, and they
were excavated to the Red Sea, for a distance of 22 miles, by hand, and
for three miles by dredgers. Later on, the canal was fully opened.
The total length of quays at Port Said is over 3 miles. The inner port
has an area of 130 acres, and the outer port an area of over 4000
acres. There are, besides, 120 acres of docks, and 10 acres of channel.
Port Said has now a permanent population of over 17,000, and Suez one
of 11,000, whereas the total population of the Isthmus in 1859 was only
150 inhabitants.
The Suez Canal can boast of having achieved many triumphs. It has
abridged time and space in a way and to an extent that no other
enterprise has ever before done in the history of the world. It has
brought India and Australasia almost within half their former distance
of Europe. It has revolutionised the shipping trade of the world. It
has brought about remarkable changes in the values of Eastern produce.
It has greatly reduced the cost of transport, and it has placed at the
disposal of England, France, and Egypt a source of revenue which in
its steady upward growth may properly be described as an El Dorado.
But, after all, there is one of the phases of this remarkable work
which is entitled to quite as much attention as any of these, although
the world in general hears less about it. The canal gave an enormous
impetus to engineering invention, skill, and enterprise, the effects of
which have since then been felt in a hundred different works undertaken
and carried out for the good of mankind. The appliances with which
the canal was eventually completed were, for the most part, designed
specially for the purpose. Until then, no such machinery was available.
But the opportunity once found, the men were found who could utilise
it. A description of the numerous different descriptions of elevators,
dredgers, inclined planes, engines, and other appliances employed at
Suez would fill a large volume. Compare some of these mighty machines,
with their weight of 500 or 600 tons,[150] and extracting at the rate
of a million and a half cubic feet of earth per month, with the
_Couffins_, or rude Arab baskets, used by the native fellaheen, by whom
the work was begun in 1860![151] The contrast represents the void that
divides barbarism from civilisation.
The effect of the opening of the Suez Canal has been to reduce the
distance between England and the Australian and Indian possessions
of the British Crown by distances varying from 545 to 4393 nautical
miles, the greatest saving having occurred in the case of the voyage
to Bombay. The voyage to India, China, and Australia has been so
much shortened that some of the most important of the ports of those
possessions are now reached in little more than one half the time that
was formerly taken up by the voyage round the Cape.[152]
The total cost of the Suez Canal at the end of 1870 was placed on the
company’s balance-sheet for that year at 16,613,000_l._[153] At the end
of 1886 this amount had swollen, with various items of expenditure
incurred in the interval, to 19,782,000_l._ Of the former amount only
11,653,000_l._ were expended in the work of construction proper.
The financial success of the Suez Canal has exceeded the wildest dreams
of its promoters. The increase of tonnage that has passed through it
has been extraordinary. So, also, has been the income and the net
receipts of the company. The net tonnage that used the canal in 1870
was only 436,609 tons. Ten years later the tonnage had increased to
3,057,421 tons. In 1885 the tonnage had further increased to 6,335,752
tons, which was the greatest that had passed through in a single year
up to that time. In the last-named year the shipping that used the
canal was more than thirteen times as much as it had been fifteen years
before.
The income and working expenses of the Suez Canal have varied as
follows, compared with the annual income:—
───────────┬──────────────┬───────────────┬─────────────────────
│ │ │Percentage of Working
Year. │ Income. │ Working │ Expenses on
│ │ Expenses. │ Income.
───────────┼──────────────┼───────────────┼─────────────────────
│ £ │ £ │ ..
1870 │ 754,532 │ 754,532 │ ..
1875 │ 1,233,785 │ 717,860 │ ..
1880 │ 1,672,836 │ 682,457 │ ..
1883 │ 2,740,933 │ 758,861 │ ..
1886 │ .. │ 754,567 │ ..
───────────┴──────────────┴───────────────┴─────────────────────
The heaviest items on the expenditure side are the interest and charges
on capital, the administrative charges, transit, navigation, and
telegraph charges, and maintenance of plant and warehouses. The two
latter items, with water supply, make up the working expenses, less
administration, and they amount unitedly to less than 180,000_l._ a
year, or about 7 per cent. on the total gross annual receipts.
There is a not uncommon impression that the trade for the East is now
carried on almost exclusively with steamships _viâ_ the Suez Canal.
Those who are actually engaged in the shipping trade, of course, know
differently, but it is not unimportant that the general public should
also know the facts, and we have, therefore, taken some pains to
ascertain them.
──────────────────┬─────────────┬──────────────┬──────────────
│ Total. │ Steam Ships. │Sailing Ships.
├─────────────┼──────────────┼──────────────
│ tons. │ tons. │ tons.
Vessels entered │ 1,957,000 │ 1,112,000 │ 845,000
Do. cleared │ 3,099,000 │ 1,921,000 │ 1,178,000
├─────────────┼──────────────┼──────────────
Totals │ 5,056,000 │ 3,033,000 │ 2,023,000
──────────────────┴─────────────┴──────────────┴──────────────
From the annual statement of the navigation and shipping of the United
Kingdom, we have extracted the foregoing particulars of the tonnage of
vessels that entered and cleared from the United Kingdom in 1884, in
the Indian and Australian trades distinguishing steamers and sailing
ships.
As sailing ships cannot make use of the canal, it is quite evident
that there must be a use of sailing tonnage to the extent of over two
millions of tons a year in the trade between the United Kingdom and
her Indian and Australasian possessions. Such a fact is not a little
remarkable when we remember that the opening of the canal has shortened
the distance to Bombay by 41 per cent.; to Madras, by 35 per cent.;
and to Calcutta by 32 per cent.[154] In some cases, the sailing tonnage
employed was fully one-half of the whole. The following figures show
how the proportions compare for the different provinces of India, as
regards entrances into British ports:—
──────────────┬──────────────┬──────────────┬────────────────
│ Total. │ Steamers. │ Sailing Ships.
├──────────────┼──────────────┼────────────────
│ tons. │ tons. │ tons.
Bombay │ 336,377 │ 327,039 │ 9,338
Madras │ 74,371 │ 32,251 │ 42,120
Bengal, &c. │ 810,946 │ 426,524 │ 384,222
Ceylon │ 18,373 │ 5,483 │ 12,890
├──────────────┼──────────────┼────────────────
Total │ 1,239,867 │ 791,297 │ 448,570
──────────────┴──────────────┴──────────────┴────────────────
The clearances followed much the same course in the same period. Even
with India, therefore, about 37 per cent. of all our trade passes by
sailing ships round the Cape of Good Hope, instead of going through the
canal, thus proving that the shortening of distance and of time is not
the only consideration that determines the adoption of one route in
preference to another.
One remarkable phase of the Suez Canal traffic is the great increase
that has taken place in the size of the ships passing between the two
seas. When the canal was first put forward by M. de Lesseps, it was
seriously argued that all that was wanted was a canal from the Damietta
branch of the Nile to Suez, which, “with a very little piling and
dredging at either end,” would be accessible to vessels of 300 or 400
tons burthen. Such a canal, it was maintained, “would suffice for all
the wants of Egypt, and for all the local traffic of the two seas.”[155]
It was also maintained, that as the tendency was to increase the
size of the ships employed on the Indian service, the canal would be
compelled to refuse the only traffic ever likely to be offered to
it.[156] The average size of the vessels using the canal in 1870 was only
898 net tons. From this point a gradual increase of size has taken
place, until in 1888 the average size had increased to 1883 tons.
The intervening period of eighteen years had therefore witnessed an
increase of 109 per cent.
[Illustration: M. DE LESSEPS.]
[Illustration: MAP OF THE =SUEZ CANAL= AND PART OF LOWER EGYPT.]
[Illustration: SECTION OF THE SUEZ CANAL.]
Singularly enough, it has been contended that the opening of the
Suez Canal has injured both English and Egyptian interests—English
interests, because it has economised tonnage, saved time, or in other
words, minimised interest on capital, injured our entrepôt trade, and
brought about our occupation of Egypt, with all the heavy expenditure,
loss of life, and international complications which that fact has
involved; Egyptian interests, because the Government of that country
has had to pay large indemnities to the Suez Canal Company, and has
really profited by the success of the enterprise to a much less extent
than it ought to have done, had it not very improvidently sacrificed
the royalties to which it was entitled under the original agreement.
It is, no doubt, unfortunate that our occupation of Egypt, and the
inglorious campaigns in the Soudan, should have been entailed upon
us by our interest in keeping open the canal, but the statistics of
our trade with the East conclusively prove that the canal has had
an important share in the enormous development that has occurred
since it was opened. The movement has, however, been aided by other
influences, and more especially by the opening of telegraph lines,
the improvements that have been effected in steamships and marine
engines, the smaller commissions accepted by merchants or agents, the
lower rates of freight, the reduced charges for insurance, and many
collateral changes, that have all tended, in a greater or less degree,
to facilitate commerce and navigation.
Whether or no M. de Lesseps and his allies have conferred any
substantial advantages on England by their completion of the Suez
Canal, it is quite beyond controversy that the English people have not
rendered much aid in the promotion of that great waterway. The part
which England took when the preliminary arrangements were being made in
1856 is one of which many Englishmen are now a little ashamed. England
was invited to co-operate in the project at an early stage. Not only
did we refuse co-operation, but we refused it with that species of
incivility of which we are occasionally guilty when we have our insular
prejudices offended. The canal was first of all, opposed by the British
Government, as such. Lord Palmerston was then Prime Minister. On the
8th of July, 1857, he declared the opposition to be—(1) that the
construction of the canal would tend to the more easy separation of
Egypt from Turkey, and would, therefore, be in direct violation of a
policy “supported by war and the Treaty of Paris”; and (2) that there
were “remote speculations with regard to easier access to our Indian
possessions, only requiring to be indistinctly shadowed forth to be
fully appreciated,” which rendered the canal undesirable. How much
better it would have been for the memory of genial “old Pam,” if, in
announcing his judgment, he had recollected the rule that “you should
never give your reasons.” History is rapidly made in the nineteenth
century. It is not in the least discreditable to Palmerston that he
should have failed to realise how completely his anticipations would
be falsified by events. No one at that time could have foreseen that,
in less than thirty years from that date, the Suez Canal would not
only have become an accomplished fact, but would have become perhaps
the most successful industrial enterprise of modern times; that it
would have revolutionised our shipping and transit trades; and that
our Indian and Australian possessions would have participated in its
advantages to an enormous degree. Prescience of this kind is given to
few men. But while the lack of this ability to discern the “coming
events” which “throw their shadows before” is not common, so neither
is the example of the representative of a great nation describing as
a “bubble,” and denouncing with all the eloquence and power at his
command, an enterprise which has conferred upon his country, as the
first maritime power in the world, advantages which generally transcend
those that are enjoyed by any other country.
But Lord Palmerston is very far from being a monopolist of this
discredit. Robert Stephenson was at this time one of the leading
English engineers. As the great son of a great father, he enjoyed vast
influence, honourably and justly acquired, and employed, with one
exception, discriminatingly and in a manner worthy of its possessor.
That exception was the position which he took up in reference to the
Suez Canal. Appointed to represent England on a commission of experts
instructed to report on the question of isthmian transit, Stephenson
satisfied himself that the idea of a canal was impracticable, and
reported against it. So far, Stephenson was quite alone. His two
colleagues on the commission—M. Talabot, representing France, and M.
Negrelli, representing Austria—were both in favour of the canal in
preference to the railroad which Stephenson recommended.[157] His brother
engineers in England appear to have stood loyally by Stephenson. They
gave very little countenance to M. de Lesseps or his scheme. Both were,
indeed, denounced from platform and press in the most unsparing manner.
The leading daily journals, which write in haste, and the sober,
scholarly quarterlies, which are supposed to write at leisure and after
much reflection, were alike opposed to it. The _Edinburgh Review_
spoke of it as “utterly impracticable,” and urged that, “the available
population or resources of Egypt could not execute such a work in a
hundred years;” that “an army of foreign navvies would be required to
keep in repair such a work, with its locks, viaducts, steam engines,
and a floating capital hardly inferior to the original outlay”; that
“a vessel in Aden harbour would rather take 3_l._ per ton for England,
if allowed to go _viâ_ the Cape, than she would take 5_l._ if forced
to go through the canal”; that if the principles on which the _Great
Eastern_, was then being built, were sound,[158] there was “an end,
not only of the canal, but the Red Sea may again be restored to its
pristine solitude, undisturbed even by the weekly visit of the passing
steamers”; and, finally, that until different experiences were at
command, “the Suez Canal may fairly be relegated among the _questions
diseuses_ which may interest and amuse, but can hardly ever benefit
mankind.”[159]
So also the ‘Quarterly Review,’ which believed the scheme to be
“commercially unsound,” and set forth a number of objections to it in
categorical form. The great expense of building the masonry harbours
at the two outlets of the canal, the difficulties and dangers of the
navigation of the Red Sea, the cost of the embankments and the expense
of maintenance, the “probability of steamers like the _Great Eastern_
being built to perform the voyage round the Cape to the island of
Ceylon in less time than would be occupied in performing that through
the Suez Canal,”[160] and the impossibility of ensuring the maintenance
of the canal and necessary locks in proper working condition, were
marshalled in battle array as a phalanx of obstacles that could not be
overcome. But the opponents of the canal went further, and declared
that, as a vessel using the canal would take about three days to
get through,[161] would require one day to coal, and another to sail
from Pelusium to the meridian of Alexandria, the saving on goods, as
compared with the railway, would only be one to two days, while on
passengers and mails there would be a loss of four to five days.
The British shipping interest have had some reason to complain of the
way in which they have been treated from first to last by the Suez
Canal Company. It is perfectly true that England did not contribute
anything to the building of the canal, but English shipping has
provided the shareholders with much the larger part of their revenue.
France, which practically owns the canal, only contributes from 6
to 9 per cent. of its income, as against from 75 to 80 per cent. of
the whole contributed by Great Britain. The shipowners of the latter
country not unnaturally thought, some years ago, that they should
have a larger share in the management of the canal, and threatened
the construction of a rival waterway if the existing canal were not
deepened, and other arrangements made for facilitating the shipping
that used it. After a good deal of negotiation between the canal
company and the shipowners, a commission was appointed in 1884 to
determine what new measures, in respect of works and navigation, should
be undertaken to enable the ship canal to meet fully the exigencies of
a traffic exceeding 10,000,000 tons per annum. Its report was presented
in February 1885. The commission considered three methods of increasing
the carrying capacity of the canal, namely:—(1) widening the existing
canal; (2) construction of a second canal; and (3) doubling the
capacity of the canal by a combination of the first two methods.
When the canal was first designed, in 1856, it was supposed that two
vessels, being towed, could easily pass where the bottom width was 144
feet, or double the normal width adopted. At the present day, however,
when vessels of nearly 200 feet in width propel themselves through the
canal, a bottom width of 230 feet has been proposed for the 81 miles
from Port Said to the southern end of the Bitter Lakes, where the tidal
currents do not exceed one knot an hour, and 262 feet for the rest of
the distance to Suez, where the currents often exceed two knots, in
order that the vessels may pass each other freely. The cost of this
widening was estimated at 8,240,000_l._, supposing the depth of the
canal remained as at present, 26¼ feet below low-water of ordinary
spring tides, but it would be increased by 975,200_l._ if the depth was
augmented to 29½ feet, unless the proposed width could be reduced to 18
feet.
The construction of a second canal, within the limits of the company’s
lands, having, like the existing canal, a bottom width of 72 feet,
widened out to 131 feet through the small Bitter Lakes, was estimated
at from 8,200,000_l._ to 8,920,000_l._, with an additional cost of
698,800_l._ if made 29½ feet deep.
The third plan took into consideration the different velocities of
the tidal currents north and south of the Bitter Lakes. Assuming that
the greater velocity might lead to collisions between vessels passing
on a single enlarged canal, it would be advisable to restrict the
enlargement to the northern portion, and to form a second canal between
the Bitter Lakes and Suez. For reasons which are fully set forth in
their Report, the Commission decided in favour of the enlargement of
the existing canal. The estimated cost of the works, which are now in
progress, is rather over 8,000,000_l._
It has been suggested, with some show of reason, that it would be to
the advantage of the commerce of the world that the maritime Powers
should make arrangements to acquire the Suez Canal, and throw it open,
free of any charge or impost whatsoever, to the navigation of all
nations, in the same way that the Scheldt and the Sound have been. The
canal has hitherto been employed almost entirely for the transport
of passengers, mails, and such traffic as will bear a high rate of
freight, the charge of 7_s._ to 10_s._ per ton being prohibitory in
respect to much of the commerce that passes from the East to the West.
The proposal is one that is entitled to every consideration. There
is, however, a high probability, amounting almost to a certainty,
that the proprietors would demand a very large sum in excess of their
original expenditure. The canal has cost from first to last, including
financing, some 20,000,000_l._ At their recent prices, the canal
shares may be considered as worth about four times that amount. If the
property were to be purchased on such a basis, it would require an
expenditure of at least 80,000,000_l._, which sum, although by no means
impossible, is yet little likely to be realised for such a purpose. If
the canal had been taken over in 1880 it could have been purchased for
one-half the sum that would now be required to buy it.[162]
At the same time that the Suez canal route was being advocated with all
his wonted energy and enthusiasm by M. de Lesseps, other two routes to
India were being seriously discussed. As one at least of these is still
on the carpet we may fitly say something of it here.
Up to the sixteenth century the best known and the most frequented
route to India was that by the valleys of the Euphrates and the Tigris.
These two great rivers of Mesopotamia are among the most celebrated
in the world’s history. The Euphrates has its source in the northern
highlands of Armenia; the Tigris in the southern slopes of the same
mountainous region, being fed by many rivers that traverse the boundary
line between Persia and Turkey. Almost at the dawn of recorded history,
we find that the Assyrians and the Babylonians connected these two
rivers by a series of canals. Two of these, constructed parallel to the
rivers Euphrates and Tigris, were large enough to be navigated, but the
system was constructed mainly with a view to irrigating the surrounding
plains, which, for nearly six months, were liable to be burnt up by the
scorching sun. As the Arabs and Turcomans gained greater ascendancy in
this region, the arts of husbandry were less practised, and the canals
and water-courses were allowed to fall into desuetude and decay. Their
embankments still, however, remain to attest the remarkable skill,
labour, and industry with which, at this early date, the fertility
of the soil was stimulated and increased, until the extraordinary
productiveness of Assyria and Babylonia became a favourite theme of
Herodotus and other historians.
Through this region, until the trade of the East was drawn into the
newer channel _viâ_ the Cape of Good Hope, European merchants sought
an outlet for their trade with the East. Bagdad and Bussora were
then great entrepôts of commerce. Mosul and Aleppo were the ancient
counterparts of Suez and Port Said. The route was, however, never
a safe or a satisfactory one. The Syrian desert, close at hand,
claimed many victims. The wild Arab tribes committed depredations on
travellers. The “unspeakable” Turk was exacting and intolerant. The
journey to India and back lasted for a lengthened period—often two
or three years—where it now scarcely extends over so many months.
But in spite of all this, the indomitable spirit and energy of the
English race led it to establish a secure footing on such ungenial
soil, and amid such inhospitable surroundings. An English factory long
flourished at Aleppo. A fleet of boats was, in the reign of Elizabeth,
maintained on the Euphrates for the use of British traders. When the
Levant Company was founded in 1582, it was deemed a veritable Eldorado
to have the exclusive privilege of trading with this part of the globe.
All this has long ceased to be, but the proposal to have the Euphrates
and the Tigris utilised as a trade route to India has been again and
again revived. In 1834, the British Government determined to fit out
an expedition to test the capabilities of the Euphrates for steam
navigation. The expedition was placed under the charge of Colonel
Chesney, upon whose recommendation it was adopted by Parliament. It
was found that the Euphrates was in some places a broad and deep
stream, and in others navigation was impeded by shallows, sandbanks,
rapids, and stone dams of large size, built for irrigation purposes.
One of the two vessels fitted out for the use of the expedition
foundered in a storm, and many lives were lost. The Government,
deeming the result unsatisfactory, declined to take any further part
in exploring the Euphrates. In 1840, however, the East India Company
commissioned Lieutenant Campbell to attempt the ascent of the river.
This expedition sailed up the Tigris to within a few miles of Mosul.
They found a canal uniting the Euphrates and Tigris near Bagdad,
which, however, has long been closed. They also navigated the great
canal which is said to have been constructed by the Emperor Valerian
during his captivity, nearly as far as Shushtir, and several rivers
in Persia. One of the vessels employed on this expedition was for
many years afterwards accustomed to make occasional voyages between
Bagdad and Bussora, mainly in order that our privilege to navigate
the river should be maintained, and our influence in Western Asia
preserved.
The proposal put forward by the promoters of the Euphrates Valley route
in 1856, was to navigate the rivers Euphrates and Tigris from about the
latitude of Aleppo to the sea, to construct a harbour at Suedia, and a
railway thence to Kalah Jaber. From this point it was proposed that
steamers should convey mails, passengers, and merchandise to Bussora,
whence sea-going vessels should run to India.[163] The route to India
would thus be reduced to 4715 miles, and the time necessary for the
journey to less than sixteen days, giving a saving of thirteen days out
and nine days home upon the Suez voyage.
The cost involved in this undertaking, not to speak of its mechanical
and physical difficulties, led to its abandonment, although it is by
no means certain that the engineering problems to be dealt with are
more considerable than those which have had to be solved at Panama. One
serious difficulty, which has been deemed all but insuperable, is the
fact that the waters of the Jordan are just sufficient to balance the
evaporation from the surface of the Dead Sea, so that if that sea were
increased to five or six times its superficial area, as proposed, it
would require a much larger volume of water than the Jordan can furnish
to meet the deficiency. The project also labours under the defects of
climate, a thin population, and an absence of food and water supplies.
In the last century the Marquis of Wellesley endeavoured to utilise
the Euphrates Valley route; and the House of Commons has been asked
to grant sums of money for various purposes in connection with it at
different times. In 1871 the House of Commons ordered an official
inquiry, with a view to place upon record all the useful information
available, including the evidence of Colonel Chesney and others, as to
this route.
It has not been supposed by the promoters of a railway to India that
such a railway would be in any way antagonistic to the Suez Canal,
which would, in all probability, monopolise the heavy traffic, and
still exist as the chief means of communication with Southern India.
But, on the other hand, the Euphrates line would benefit the north-west
provinces, and, as far as passengers and mails are concerned, would
effect a saving in time of at least a fortnight, taking the voyage
out and home. The saving in distance would be about 1000 miles in a
straight line, and, as vessels proceeding by way of the Red Sea are
compelled to deviate from their courses to the extent of 500 or 600
miles during the monsoon months, the saving that might accrue, taking
an average of voyages, would be somewhere about one thousand miles each
voyage. On the other hand, the railway would always suffer from the
fact that two trans-shipments would have to be effected in every case,
and this, where the goods are bulky, is a serious consideration. Prior
to the opening of the Suez Canal only goods of small bulk were sent to
India by way of the Isthmus Railway, although the voyage by the Cape
occupied eight days, and it is regarded as probable that the canal
would still retain heavy traffic.
Besides the Euphrates Valley, two other routes to India have been
proposed. One of these aimed at the substitution of the Black Sea for
the Mediterranean, and making the terminus of the line at Trebizonde.
By the champions of this scheme it is contended that the long and
dangerous voyage necessitated by a Mediterranean terminus would be
avoided, by making use of the Danube and the short passage across the
Black Sea. On the European side, however, there is the liability to
having the Danube, or, indeed, the Black Sea, closed, the effect of
which would be that the railway would be simply useless, as long as the
restrictions remained in force; and on the Asiatic side there would be
serious practical obstacles in the mountain ranges near Trebizonde.
The Tigris Valley route has also been recommended on the ground that
it would open out a better country, and one peopled by more peaceful
tribes. Of the respective advantages of the two routes in regard to
facilities of construction, it is enough to say that the Valley of the
Euphrates is practically flat, and that nothing better could be desired
in the matter of level, while it is not easy to say what difficulties
the Tigris Valley may or may not present. Mr. Eastwick has visited
various parts of the Euphrates route, and he states that the facilities
there for making a good road are great, and that in certain districts
the local traffic would, in all probability, be very considerable.
Another plan was proposed some thirty-five years ago, for forming a
water communication between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean.
This proposal, made by Captain W. Allen, of H.M.’s navy, was based on
the knowledge we now possess that the level of the Dead Sea is at least
1300 feet below that of the Mediterranean or Red Seas, and that the Sea
of Galilee is, in like manner, depressed to the extent of about 650
feet; so that the mean level of the valley of the Jordan, with its two
lakes, may be taken at 1000 feet below the neighbouring seas, and its
extent as covering about 2000 square miles. This vast area Captain
Allen proposed to convert into a great inland sea by cutting a canal
from Acre across the plain of Esdraëlon to the Jordan, a distance of
about 40 miles on the map, and another from Akabah, on the Red Sea, to
the southern limit of the Dead Sea, a distance of about 120 miles.
The summit level of the plain of Esdraëlon may be as low as 100 feet
above the sea level, or as high as 200 feet, and from the appearance of
the banks of the brook Kishon, near its junction with the sea, and the
hills that bound the plain on both sides, the ground is rocky nearly
throughout its whole extent at a small distance below the surface. The
proposal, therefore, as described in the ‘Edinburgh Review,’ was to dig
a canal through a rocky country for 30 or 35 miles in length, and with
a mean depth of 80 to 100 feet.
A plan has quite recently been put forward for the construction of
a parallel canal to that across the Isthmus of Suez, by way of the
Euphrates Valley, the Persian Gulf, and Syria. The proposal is to
create a navigable highway from Sonëidich to the Persian Gulf, by
making the Euphrates flow to the Mediterranean and Antioch. The river
from Beles to Felondjah (near ancient Babylon) would be deepened, and
the waterway would be carried from the Euphrates to the Tigris by the
canal of Saklavijah. Thence the route would be by the Tigris from
Bagdad to Kornah, Bassora, and Fao on the Gulf. The author of this
proposal[164] estimates that the canal would shorten the route to Bombay
by six days, and it would irrigate and restore fertility to a great
part of the country through which it would pass. The estimated capital
required would be 1,500,000,000 francs (60,000,000_l._ sterling).
FOOTNOTES:
[138] The immediate cause of this occurrence does not appear, but
it is obvious that there would not be much employment for a canal
at this early date. The first ship would no doubt be constructed
anterior to this period, but the vessels of that day were rude and
small.
[139] The Red Sea is 1500 miles in length, and, besides being
narrowed in its middle channel, is so deep that there is hardly any
place where a vessel can anchor. Sailing vessels have to contend with
currents that are blowing steadily to the northward for a great part
of the year, while for some months there is little or no wind.
[140] Herodotus, book ii., secs. 159 and 160, Cary’s translation.
[141] Washington Irving’s ‘Successors of Mahomet.’
[142] Rubino’s “Statistical Story of the Suez Canal,” in the
‘Journal’ of the Royal Statistical Society for 1887.
[143] ‘Mémoire sur le Canal des deux Mers.’
[144] ‘Quarterly Review,’ January 1856, p. 257.
[145] Since then, of course, this difficulty has been conquered by
the use of steam dredgers.
[146] This letter is reproduced from an excellent article on the
subject of the Suez Canal in _Engineering_ of December 7, 1883, p. 52.
[147] In 1886 the transit and navigation receipts were over
2,500,000_l._
[148] The following are the details of the contracts for works on
Suez Canal:—
──────────────────────┬───────────────────
Dussaud frères, │ Aiton, Glasgow.
Marseilles. │
──────────────────────┼───────────────────
_20th October, 1863._ │ _13th January, 1864._
250,000 blocks of │ 21,700,000 cubic
artificial stone of │ metres of
1 cubic metre │ excavations
each (35⅓ cubic │ at 1·35 fr.
feet), and weighing │ The plant ceded
20 tons, at │ to the contractor
40 frs. each. │ by the company
10,000,000 frs. │ brings the price
400,000_l._ │ up to 1·60 fr.
│ 34,720,000 frs.
│ 1,388,800_l._
│ Contract
│ afterwards
│ cancelled, and
│ transferred
│ to Borel and
│ Levalley.
──────────────────────┼───────────────────
Couvreux, Paris. │ Borel and Levalley,
│ Paris.
──────────────────────┼───────────────────
_1st October, 1863._ │ _1st April, 1864._
9,000,000 cubic │ 24,500,000 cubic
metres of │ metres of
excavations at │ excavations at
1·60 frs. │ 2·28 frs.
14,000,000 frs. │ 56,000,000 frs.
560,000_l._ │ 2,240,000_l._
Enlargement and │ Continuation and
deepening of the │ completion of 53
great El Guisr │ miles of cutting
trench, over 8 │ from Lake Timsah
miles long. │ to Red Sea.
│
│ _Second contract._
│ Transfer of Aiton’s
│ contract.
──────────────────────┴───────────────────
[149] We do not, of course, include the Panama Canal, which is not,
and may never be, completed.
[150] One long trough dredger, set to work in June 1885, weighed 760
tons.
[151] It is stated that the number of these baskets used at the
trench of El Guisr alone would, if extended in line, reach three
times round the world. Of course when the fellaheen were withdrawn in
1864 these baskets were less largely used.
[152] The following table shows the principal distances and the
saving by the canal:—
───────────────┬───────────┬───────────┬───────────────────────
│ │ │ Saving by Canal.
│ │ ├───────────┬──────────
Ports. │ By Cape. │ By Canal. │ │ Per Cent.
│ │ │ Amount. │ of Voyage
│ │ │ │ (Cape.)
───────────────┼───────────┼───────────┼───────────┼──────────
│ nautical │ nautical │ nautical │
│ miles. │ miles. │ miles. │
│ │ │ │
Bombay │ 10,667 │ 6,274 │ 4,393 │ 41·2
Madras │ 11,280 │ 7,313 │ 3,967 │ 35·2
Calcutta │ 11,900 │ 8,083 │ 3,817 │ 32·1
Singapore │ │ │ │
(_viâ_ Straits│ │ │ │
of Sunda) │ 11,740 │ 8,362 │ 3,378 │ 28·8
Hong Kong │ 13,180 │ 9,799 │ 3,381 │ 25·6
Shanghai │ 14,050 │ 10,669 │ 3,381 │ 24·1
Adelaide │ 11,780 │ 11,100 │ 680 │ 5·8
Melbourne │ 12,140 │ 11,585 │ 555 │ 4·6
Sydney │ 12,690 │ 12,145 │ 545 │ 4·3
Wellington, │ │ │ │
New Zealand │ 13,610 │ 13,055 │ 555 │ 4·1
───────────────┴───────────┴───────────┴───────────┴──────────
[153] This amount was made up as follows:—
£
Construction of canal 11,653,218
Transit, estate, and other services 533,552
Management charges (11 years) 567,296
Interest on shares (11 years) 2,673,864
Interest and repayment of debentures 585,118
Banking charges, stamps, loss in bonds, &c. 618,905
───────────
£16,631,953
═══════════
[154] “The Statistical Story of the Suez Canal,” in the ‘Journal’ of
the Royal Statistical Society for 1887.
[155] ‘Edinburgh Review,’ January 1856, p. 245.
[156] It was assumed that the canal could not take vessels like the
_Himalaya_ and the _Persia_, or indeed any vessel over 350 feet in
length.
[157] The preference of Stephenson for a railway is not difficult to
understand. He had “won his spurs” in railroad construction, and was
familiar with every phase of their working and capabilities, but he
had had comparatively little knowledge experimentally of canals. He
was, indeed, the apostle of the new era—the railway against the canal.
[158] It was expected that the _Great Eastern_ steamship would attain
a speed of 25 knots an hour, and the proposition that a vessel’s
speed is almost in the direct ratio to her length having once been
granted, that a class of vessels would come to be built that would be
too large to make use of the canal.
[159] ‘Edinburgh Review,’ vol. ciii. (January 1856).
[160] This seems an extraordinary assumption when we consider that
the canal saves in the journey to Bombay 41 per cent. of the voyage
by the Cape, and on the journey to Madras and Calcutta 32 to 35 per
cent.
[161] In 1887 the average duration of the passage through the canal
for the whole 3137 ships that made use of it was 34 hours 3 minutes.
Between 1870 and 1873 the passage was frequently effected in 12 to 15
hours.
[162] The shares rose from a middle price of 306 francs in 1867 to
664 in 1877, 1021 in 1880, 2710 in 1882, and fell to 1989 in 1884,
rising again to 2095 in 1886.
[163] The distance from Suedia to Kalah Jabar, a small Arab
settlement on the Euphrates, was put down at 100 to 150 miles, and
the river journey from Kalah Jabar to Bussora at 715 miles. From
Bussora to Kurrachee the distance is 1000 miles. The average time
occupied in descending the Tigris was taken at seven days, and that
of the ascent at twelve.
[164] M. Emile Ende, in a communication to the French Academy of
Sciences in 1886.
CHAPTER XXI.
THE PANAMA CANAL.
“A little model the master wrought
Which should be to the larger plan,
What the child is to the man.”
—_Longfellow._
If the question were asked, “What is the greatest constructive work
that has yet been undertaken by man?” there would, without question, be
a great many different replies. There can, however, be only one reply
as to the most costly. Perhaps, also, there can be but one answer as
to the most disastrous to human life. The Panama canal would almost
certainly secure pre-eminence in these attributes. It might or might
not rank equally high as a work of engineering genius and possible
public utility.
There has probably never been a project that has so challenged the
admiration and the approval of the world as that of finding a waterway
between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, at or near to the narrow
neck of land that separates Limon from the Gulf of Panama in Central
America. This enterprise has a long and a very eventful history. Many
explorers, geographers, statesmen, engineers, and economists have
either written on the merits and demerits of the undertaking, or have
otherwise become associated with it. Some of the more notable episodes
in the records of the isthmus may therefore be referred to, before
proceeding to describe the various projects now either in progress
or in contemplation, for opening it up for the purposes of trade,
commerce, and navigation.
One of the earliest direct references to the importance of a waterway
between the two oceans is that made by Cortez in his letters to Charles
V. The great conqueror, however, does not seem to have contemplated the
construction of such a waterway. He diligently searched for a natural
waterway or strait between the two oceans, and declared that to be “the
one thing above all others in the world I am most desirous of meeting
with,” on account of its immense utility. Some sixty or seventy years
later, there was a project put forward by the Spaniards for uniting the
two oceans by a waterway, but it does not appear to have been carried
any length. The Spaniards, indeed, were hardly the people to achieve
such a distinction. Unlike the ancient Romans, the Italians, and the
Chinese, their skill was not very marked in hydraulics. They were,
besides, much too superstitious to venture on interference with what
many of them believed to be an ordinance having all the fixity of a law
of nature.[165]
The American Isthmus next claims attention as associated with the
ill-starred fortunes of William Paterson and the Darien scheme.[166]
The earliest, and in some respects the best, information yet available,
relative to the topography of the country adjacent to the Panama Canal,
is that furnished by Dampier,[167] who spent some time on the isthmus and
noted all its chief physical characteristics. Dampier’s observations,
however, were chiefly made in and about the Gulf of St. Michael, which
he describes as lying “nearly thirty leagues from Panama, towards the
south-east,” and as “a place where a great many rivers, having finished
their course, are swallowed up in the sea.” Dampier found the isthmus
very low and swampy, “the rivers being so oosy that the stinking mud
infects the air.”
Lionel Wafer[168] has also made an early and valuable report on the
character of the country bordering on the route of the present Panama
Canal, describing it “as almost everywhere of an unequal surface,
distinguished with hills and valleys of great variety for height,
depth, and extent.” He described the river Chagre, or Chagres, as one
which “rises from some hills near the South Sea, and runs along in an
oblique north-westerly course till it finds itself a passage into the
North Sea, though the chain of hills, if I mistake not, is extended
much further to the west, even to the Lake of Nicaragua.”
De Ulloas[169] and some friends in 1735 made an ascent of the river
Chagres on their journey from Cruces to Panama. This voyage is
interesting as being one of the first that is recorded over the
river that has since played so prominent a part in the history of
the canalisation of the isthmus. They found the banks of the Chagres
impassable, for the most part, from the density of the vegetation and
the velocity of the current. The vessels that were then more or less
accustomed to navigate the Chagres were described by De Ulloas as
_chatas_ and _bongos_—the first carrying 600 or 700 quintals, and the
latter 400 or 500. The river was found to be so full of shallows that
even vessels of this small size had to be lightened every now and again
until they had passed over them.
No one has taken a greater interest in the subject of a ship canal than
Humboldt, who regarded Kelley’s Atrato route with approval, and who,
replying to the objections brought against the proposal in his time,
declared that “there is nothing more likely to obstruct the extension
of commerce and the freedom of international relations than to create
a distaste for farther investigation by discouraging, as some are too
positive in doing, all hope of an oceanic channel.”[170]
A survey was made of the isthmus in 1827 by Captain Lloyd and Captain
Falmark, the former an officer of engineers in the Colombian service,
and the latter a Swedish gentleman acting in that capacity for the time
being. Beginning at Panama, they followed the old line of road from
that city to Porto Bello, a distance of 22¾ miles, where they found
the surface of the water in the river to be 152½ feet above high-water
mark at Panama. At Cruces they found a fall in the river of 114½ feet,
leaving only about 38 feet as the height above the Pacific. It was
found that at Panama there was a rise and fall of the tide in the
Pacific of 27·4 feet, being 13·5 feet above the high-water mark of
the Atlantic at Chagres. These and other observations led them to
conclude[171] that “in every twelve hours, commencing with high tides,
the level of the Pacific is first several feet higher than that of the
Atlantic; it becomes then of the same height, and at low tide it is
several feet lower; again, as the tide rises, the two seas are of one
height, and, finally, at high tide the Pacific is again the same number
of feet above the Atlantic as at first.”[172]
In 1840 Mr. Wheelwright was commissioned by the directors of the
Pacific Steam Navigation Company to examine the capabilities of the
river Chagres, and the best means of communication with the South
Sea. He made a lengthy report on the subject, in the course of which
he confirmed many of Captain Lloyd’s observations, giving the depth
of high water on the bar of the Chagres at 15 feet. In 1843, again,
M. Napoleon Garella received from M. Guizot, as Minister of Foreign
Affairs, an order to make a survey of the isthmus, and he proposed a
summit-canal of more than three miles long, the level being reached by
thirty-six locks and three large aqueducts.[173]
In 1853, Mr. Squier explored that section of the mountain chain which
crosses the American isthmus to which Berghaus has given the name of
the Honduras-Nicaraguan group. This range commences at the Col de
Guajoca and extends to the valley of the Rio San Juan. Running at first
close to the shore of the Pacific, it gradually approaches the centre
of the isthmus. The eastern slope, broken by mountain offshoots and
watered by rivers of the first order, terminates on the north-east in
the point Gracias a Dios. The western slope forms a long, low, and,
comparatively speaking, level valley, crossed by an irregular and
independent series of volcanic peaks. This accessory line of volcanoes,
which presents the most distinctive feature of the physical geography
of Central America, is nowhere so distinct from the main line of rocky
axis as in the Honduras-Nicaraguan district. Mr. Squier proposed to
commence a railway at Puerto Caballos, in the Bay of Honduras, and
proceed due south to Fonseca Bay, on the Pacific, a distance of some
160 miles. The harbours on this route are said to be very superior to
those on the Tehuantepec route. The summit-level, however, is 2308
feet above the level of the sea. At such a height a canal would be
practically impossible, and the project was never carried any further
than a survey.
Among the many alternative routes suggested for a canal across the
American isthmus, one that has found some favour in the United States
was that _viâ_ the isthmus of Tehuantepec. This locality has been
repeatedly surveyed. Cortez had his attention called to it in the
sixteenth century. Don Augustus Cramer went over at least part of the
route in 1744. Again, in 1842-3, it was surveyed by Señor Moro, as
will be found in a book called ‘Survey of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec,
executed in the years 1842 and 1843, under the superintendence of a
scientific commission appointed by the projector, Don José de Garay.
London, 1844.’ In 1852 it was surveyed by Mr. J. J. Williams, on behalf
of the Tehuantepec Railroad Company of New Orleans. The project was
to ascend, from the Atlantic coast, the river Coatzacoalcos to its
junction with the Malalengo, from which spot a canal was to be carried
to the summit-level on the Mesa de Tarifa, through a series of locks,
rising 525 feet in all, and descending 656 feet into the lagoons on the
shores east of Tehuantepec. The canal would have a length of about 50
miles, and would require 19 additional miles of trench to convey water.
The length of this line was stated by Mr. Kelly, of New York,[174] at
“about 210 miles,” and by M. Voisin, a director of the Suez Canal,[175]
at 240 kilometres, or about 149 miles.
M. Moro estimated that 150 locks would be required on this route, and
twelve days would be required for vessels to pass through the canal.
The coast of Tehuantepec is, moreover, subject to fearful hurricanes
and to subterranean movements of volcanic origin, while, finally, the
supply of water at so high a level was believed to be doubtful.[176]
At the first session of the Congress of Geographical Science, held
at Antwerp in 1871, the question of constructing a canal across the
American isthmus was presented for consideration. General Hame, of
the United States, was present, and took part in the congress. He
described the proposals of the two French explorers, MM. de Gogorza
and de Lacharme, who proposed to cut the Isthmus of Darien between
the navigable channels of the Tuyra, the Atrato, and the Caquiri. The
congress recommended the project of these gentlemen to the attention of
the great maritime Powers, and of the scientific societies throughout
the world. There the matter rested for a time.
At the second congress of the same body, held at Paris in 1875, the
question of the construction of a canal across the Isthmus of Darien
was again considered. M. de Lesseps, who was present on that occasion,
declared that all the authors of the various projects brought forward
for piercing the isthmus up to that time had made a grave mistake in
committing themselves to a canal with locks and sweet water. He urged
that, in order to meet the wants of commerce, all maritime canals
should be carried between the two oceans at the same level, in the
same way as the Suez Canal had been. Again a resolution was adopted,
urging on the various governments concerned that the utmost facilities
should be given for the construction of a ship canal in this part of
the world. The congress went a step further. In order to inquire into
the subject of the possibility of constructing such a canal, and the
conditions necessary for its accomplishment, a committee was appointed
under the presidency of Admiral Noury, and including among its members
MM. Daubrée, Levasseur, and Delesse, members of the Institute of
France. A syndicate was at the same time formed for the purpose of
exploring Central America, with a view to the adoption of the most
suitable route.
The results of the exploration thus undertaken were made known in
due time, and in 1879 an international congress was held at Paris
under the Presidency of M. de Lesseps, to consider proposals for an
interoceanic canal, when it was affirmed (1) that the construction
of an interoceanic canal, at sea level throughout, so desirable in
the interests of commerce and of navigation, was possible; and (2)
that such a canal should be constructed between the Gulf of Limon and
the Bay of Panama.[177] These resolutions were adopted by no less than
seventy-eight votes against eight, there being, however, twelve who
abstained from voting.
Five different projects were submitted for the consideration of the
conference. It is, however, a remarkable fact that none of them, except
the Panama Canal Scheme, proposed to provide for a canal without a
tunnel and without locks. As the Panama scheme was that recommended by
M. de Lesseps, the conference requested him to undertake the direction
of the work. The veteran replied that his best friends had endeavoured
to persuade him that after the accomplishment of his great work at Suez
he should seek repose; but, he added, “if a general who has won a first
battle is asked to engage in a second, he cannot refuse.” Directly
afterwards M. de Lesseps received from Victor Hugo a letter approving
his course, and adding, “Astonish the universe by great doings which
are not of wars. Is it necessary to conquer the world? No; it is yours.
It belongs to civilisation; it awaits it. Go; do it; proceed.” The
press of Paris were jubilant over the new enterprise, declaring that
France was continuing its great mission. In the Chamber of Deputies
Mgr. Freppel declared that with the piercing of the Isthmus of Panama,
a complete change will be effected in the relations of the entire world.
Thus encouraged on every side, M. de Lesseps sought the means for
his second great enterprise. He did not find it difficult to raise
a considerable sum. He pointed out to his countrymen that on the
250,000,000 of francs that they had contributed towards the actual
expenditure incurred on the works of the Suez Canal, they had benefited
to the extent of 1,220,000,000 of francs. The congress had made it
appear that the Panama Canal would cost twice that of the Suez, but
then it was expected to produce three times as good a result.
M. de Lesseps consented to occupy the position he did on the express
condition that all the complex problems connected with the undertaking
were fully and satisfactorily resolved by commissions of experts.
Five such commissions were appointed—of statistics, of economics, of
navigation, of construction or technique, and of ways and means. The
Technical Commission having considered the various proposals submitted,
drew up the following summary of their several merits.
────────────┬───────┬───────────┬─────────┬─────────┬──────────────
│ │ │Estimated│ │ Length of
Proposed │Length.│ Obstacles.│Duration │ Expense.│ Time occupied
Canal. │ │ │of Work. │ │ in going
│ │ │ │ │through Canal.
────────────┼───────┼───────────┼─────────┼─────────┼──────────────
│ kms. │ │ years. │ millions│ days.
│ │ │ │ of fr. │
Tehuantepec │ 240 │ 120 locks │ .. │ .. │ 12
Nicaragua │ 292 │ 17 ” │ 8 │ 900 │ 4½
Panama │ 73 │ none │ 12 │ 1·200 │ 1½
San Blas │ 53 │ tunnel │ 12 │ 1·400 │ 1
│ │ 14 kilom.│ │ │
Atrato │ 290 │ tunnel │ 10 │ 1·130 │ 3
│ │ 4 kilom.│ │ │
────────────┴───────┴───────────┴─────────┴─────────┴──────────────
The cost of the maintenance and working of each of the several schemes
was estimated at the same sum—130 million of francs, or 5 per cent.
of the anticipated receipts. No doubt appears to have been entertained
that the enterprise would prove highly remunerative. M. Voisin Bey,
Inspector-General of Ways and Bridges, calculated that the company
would be able to obtain an average of 15 francs on at least four
million tons of shipping expected to make use of the canal; and the
Statistical Commission committed themselves to the view that the two
canals of Suez and Panama would present the following comparison:—
───────────┬──────────┬──────────┬────────────────
│ Cost. │ Tonnage. │Annual Receipts.
├──────────┼──────────┼────────────────
│ millions │ millions │ millions
│of francs.│ of tons. │ of francs.
Suez │ 500 │ 3 │ 30
Panama │ 1,070 │ 6 │ 9
───────────┴──────────┴──────────┴────────────────
On the faith of these and similar statements, many of them, as we
now know, largely illusory, the _Compagnie Universelle du Canal
Interocéanique de Panama_ was founded in 1879 with a capital of 600
millions of francs, or about one half the sum estimated as necessary,
but with authority to increase or reduce the capital as might be deemed
desirable.
At the outset of the undertaking, M. de Lesseps, following the
example that he had set with the Suez Canal, and in order to mark
the international character of the enterprise, offered to American
capitalists the opportunity of providing one half of the amount
required, and announced that whether the Americans subscribed towards
the enterprise or not it would be begun with the 300 millions of francs
which it was proposed to raise in Europe. Subscriptions towards this
moiety were invited in Europe in December 1880, and 102,230 subscribers
offered more than double the amount asked for, or 1,266,609 shares
in all, of which 994,508 shares were subscribed in France alone. The
financial outlook of the enterprise being thus encouraging, M. de
Lesseps lost no time in proceeding to Panama, in order that he might
study for himself, on the spot, the character of the work he had
undertaken to perform. He was accompanied by an engineering commission
of eight well-known experts, including MM. Dircks, the chief engineer
of the waterways of Holland, Danzats, chief resident engineer at Suez,
two Colombian engineers, and others. The opinion unanimously arrived
at by this commission was that the canal could be completed for 843
millions of francs, or about 34 millions sterling,[178] in about eight
years.
Meanwhile a grand superior consultative commission, which had been
convened at Paris, for the purpose of inquiring into the technical
details of the scheme, and determining a programme for their execution,
recommended that no time should be lost, and thereupon MM. Couvreux
and Hersent, well-known contractors, were entrusted with the execution
of the work to the extent of 500 millions of francs (20,000,000_l._),
for which sum they declared that the canal could be constructed. The
work of levelling and dredging was prosecuted with vigour. There was,
however, a vast amount of preliminary work to be done. Twenty-three
different workshops and docks had to be provided along the line of
the canal, with workmen’s dwellings, hospitals, and other requisite
equipments. The Culebra, a mountain in the middle of the isthmus, was
selected for the erection of several considerable installations adapted
to the study of the problems to be solved. Through this mountain the
canal had to be cut to a depth of over 100 metres. It was calculated
that the organisation of the works, the providing of the necessary
materials of construction, the acquisition of the ground along the line
of route, and the commencement of operations generally, represented
something like one-third of the total work to be done. The Colombian
Government, through whose territory the canal was to be constructed,
did all they could to advance the project, offering to the company
500,000 hectares of land, with the minerals underlying the same, in
such localities as the company might select. This concession was deemed
at the time to be equal to about one-third of the cost of the canal.
[Illustration: THE WORKS ON THE CULEBRA COL, PANAMA CANAL, IN
1888.]
[Illustration: PLAN OF COLON, ATLANTIC END OF THE PANAMA
CANAL.]
The first important step towards the prosecution of the Panama Canal
works was the selection of a site for landing the necessary plant. The
space in front of the town of Colon, at the north-eastern extremity of
the Bay of Limon, was occupied by wharves devoted to the existing trade
brought by steamers to the Panama Railway, and, therefore, another spot
had to be found. The village of Gatun was first chosen, being on the
river Chagres, and close to the railway and the proposed line of the
canal. It was supposed that this site would be healthier than the low
island of Manzanillo, on which Colon is situated, and the river Chagres
afforded communication with the sea, having a minimum depth of 13 feet
over its bar, which might be increased by dredging. Owing, however, to
the want of proper shelter, fever attacked the workmen at Gatun; and,
finally, the creek separating Manzanillo island from the mainland was
selected as a harbour for the works.
[Illustration: SECTION OF THE PANAMA CANAL, SHOWING ITS
INTERSECTION WITH THE RIVER CHAGRES.]
The outlet of the canal was to be situated in this creek; and in order
to protect the mouth of the canal and provide a good harbour for the
works an embankment was formed on the south-west corner of Manzanillo
island, and was carried about 650 feet into the Bay of Limon to afford
shelter, being protected along its exposed portion by rubble stone.
This embankment contains 458,000 cubic yards of earthwork, obtained by
the aid of excavators from some hillocks about three-quarters of a mile
distant, adjoining the railway; it covers an area of about 74 acres,
which was formerly partly marsh land, and partly covered by the sea.
The projecting mole was estimated to shelter nearly 3000 lineal feet
of wharfage.[179] The position of the works will be understood from the
annexed drawing.
Up to February 1883 the work undertaken at the canal had been almost
entirely preliminary. In that month M. de Lesseps, acting upon
recommendations contained in a report made by M. Dingler, chief
engineer of roads and bridges, proposed to the shareholders of the
company that the definite programme of the work to be done should
embrace a canal of a depth of nine metres below sea level, and a width
of 22 metres throughout its course; the construction of large ports at
Colon and at Panama; a great basin, five kilometres in extent, near
Tavernilla, about the centre of the canal, in order to allow vessels
to pass each other; a great dam at Gamboa, for the regulation of the
course of the Chagres river; and a tidal port at Panama, in order to
ensure access to and from the Pacific at all hours. In submitting this
programme, M. de Lesseps calculated that the excavation necessary to
the completion of such a canal would be about 110 millions of cubic
metres, and that the work of regulating the Chagres river would be
equal to a further 10 millions of cubic metres. This work, M. de
Lesseps estimated, could be completed in 1888—the excavations of land
in three years, and the dredging operations in two, so that “the canal
could, with mathematical certainty, be opened on the 1st January 1888.”
In confirmation of this calculation, he appealed to the experience at
Suez, where, with a total of 75 millions of cubic metres of excavation,
50 millions were done during the two last years of the work.
The state of affairs at the canal in the autumn of 1884 is described by
the American Admiral Cooper, who reported that although comparatively
little had been done in the actual work of excavation, in relation to
the vast work to be accomplished, yet all the preliminary plans had
been prepared, the soundings had been made, the line of route had been
cleared of its tropical vegetation, large supplies of materials of
all kinds were at command, dwellings and barracks for the employés
had been erected in elevated and salubrious localities, hospitals
had been established, and every arrangement requisite for meeting
possible eventualities had been carried out so completely that he was
confirmed in the belief that the canal would be finished in due time,
although he doubted its completion in 1888. At this time no less than
twenty different contractors, of eight different nationalities, were
engaged upon the work of construction. These contractors had undertaken
collectively to raise 62,691,000 cubic metres of excavation for a sum
total of 219,295,000 francs (8,772,000_l._ sterling), being at the rate
of rather less than 3_s._ per cubic metre. As the total quantity of
excavation required was estimated at 120 millions of cubic metres, the
opinion was held that the mere work of clearing the course of the canal
could be accomplished for about 440 millions of francs, or rather less
than 18 millions sterling.
Up to the end of 1884, the Canal Company had received a total sum of
471¼ millions of francs (about 19,000,000_l._), and had expended 368¼
millions of francs[180] (about 14¾ millions sterling), leaving only about
4¼ millions sterling in hand. Even at this date it was confidently
stated by M. de Lesseps and his colleagues, that the canal could still
be constructed for the sum of 1070 millions of francs, or about 43
millions sterling. In other words, it was held that for 25 millions
sterling additional, the work could be completed as originally planned.
The work proceeded, with occasional interruptions, due either to the
difficulty of obtaining sufficient capable labour, to the delay in
delivering the necessary dredging and other appliances, and to other
causes. The result of an appeal made through the ‘Bulletin du Canal
Interocéanique’[181] in the latter part of 1884, was to place a further
capital of 136½ millions of francs (about 5½ millions sterling) at the
disposal of the company.[182] With this and the balance remaining of the
previous issues, the company were enabled to carry on the work until
1886, when they had to make a further appeal for assistance. This time
they made a larger demand than they had done on the last occasion, and
they succeeded in raising a sum of 206½ millions of francs (8¼ millions
sterling), making the total amount subscribed to the end of 1886 not
less than 886 millions of francs, or about 35½ millions sterling. The
company was by this time getting into deep water. The public did not
take to the bonds offered so readily as they had formerly done, and
the deep distrust that was beginning to be felt in the success of the
enterprise was shown by the very low price at which the shares had to
be offered.[183]
Meanwhile the prospects and progress of the company had been seriously
hampered by several exceptional sources of trouble. Political strife
on the isthmus disturbed the progress of the works, and led to a large
migration of the workmen employed. An act of incendiarism at Colon
destroyed a number of the principal buildings erected for the purposes
of the canal, and led immediately to the transfer of the headquarters
of the company from Colon to a new town created by them, and called
by the name of Christopher Columbus. At Culebra, again, where the
great work of cleaving a mountain was being proceeded with, there were
several unfortunate incidents which caused the _employés_ to desert the
place almost in a body. These events were the origin of some sinister
rumours most unfavourable to the company. It was stated in the United
States that the political troubles had been expressly “got up” by the
_personnel_ on the canal, with a view to giving France a pretext for
seizing the Isthmus of Panama. In Europe, on the other hand, it was
reported, and largely believed, that the United States proposed to take
advantage of the opportunity afforded by the disturbance at Colon to
seize the State of Colombia, through which the canal is carried. It
is no doubt true that the United States at that time intervened,
with a view to the re-establishment of order on the isthmus, but in
despatching Admiral Jouett with an expedition for that purpose, they
distinctly declared that their only object was to protect the lives and
property of American citizens, and that they would religiously fulfil
their engagements to maintain the neutrality and freedom of transit
between Colon and Panama.
Another difficulty with which M. de Lesseps and his colleagues have
had to contend from the beginning has been the unhealthy character of
the climate. In this respect Panama has always had a most unenviable
notoriety. The danger was therefore not unknown. Dampier, nearly 200
years ago, spoke of the “malignity of the waters draining off the land,
through thick woods, and savannas of low grass and swampy grounds;” and
Wafer reported about the same time that “the country all about here
is woody, low, and very unhealthy, the rivers being so oozy that the
stinking mud infects the air.” Walton, again, expressly declared that
the unhealthiness of the isthmus was one of the greatest obstacles to
the opening of a canal between the two oceans. “Disease,” he said,
“is a barrier against settling on the isthmus to improve it,” and
he found that “persons who have withstood every other climate there
became languid.” Humboldt appears to have made the climate of Panama
a special subject of inquiry, and reports that “for fifty years back
the _vomito_ (black vomit of the yellow fever) has never appeared on
any point of the coast of the South Sea, with the exception of the
town of Panama.” This is explained by the fact that “the tide, when it
falls, leaves exposed for a great way into the bay a large extent of
ground covered with _Fucus ulvæ_ and _Medusæ_, the air is infected by
the decomposition of so many organic substances, and miasmata, of very
little influence on the organs of the natives, have a powerful effect
on Europeans.”
Accounts of the extraordinary mortality at the works of the canal
have from time to time been circulated in Europe, which read like the
description of a pestilence, or of a devastating war. To Europeans
especially the climate has been highly fatal. M. de Lesseps and his
friends have tried, not unnaturally, to reassure the public, both
European and American, on this score. Even he, however, has been
compelled to admit a serious mortality. In his report on the progress
of the works in 1885, he stated that during the previous twelve months
more than 1100 deaths had occurred, of which some 320 were
Europeans.[184] In some of the rainy months the mortality was frightful.
In October and November it rose to nearly fifty per week. The Canal
Executive declared that this large number was swollen considerably by
the mortality of sailors arriving at Panama, but, however this may be,
the climate is without doubt one of the most malarious and deadly to
European constitutions that exists in the world.
These things being so, two results not unnaturally follow—the first,
that it was difficult to get the highest class of labour to undertake
the work; and the second, that the rate of wages paid, and the cost
of the work generally, were exceptionally high. During the years
1884-85-86, the _personnel_ on the canal ranged between 12,000 and
25,000; and although M. de Lesseps announced in 1885 that the Company
had undertaken to provide barrack accommodation for 30,000, it is
doubtful whether that number was ever employed on the works at any one
time. We have already seen that the first contracts made with a number
of different contractors provided for the cost of excavation being
brought under 3_s._ per cubic metre. Señor Armero, however, in a report
made on the progress of the work in the latter part of 1887, stated
that every cubic foot had cost at least 2 dollars, or 8_s._ 4_d._ for
excavation, being nearly three times the amount at which M. de Lesseps
stated the first contracts to have been placed, for something like
one-half of the entire work.
With calculations so entirely falsified by results, the Panama Canal
Company found it necessary in 1887 to procure fresh capital. They
thereupon offered half a million shares, of the nominal value of 500
million francs at 440 francs on 1000 francs, and succeeded in raising
a further sum of about 114 million francs, making the total amount
of cash received to that date rather over 1001 million francs, or,
in other words, within 200 millions of the total amount for which
the canal was to have been completed. How far the canal still was
from completion at this time we may learn from the report made to
the Colombian Government in November 1887 by Señor Armero, who says
that the total amount excavated up to August of that year was about
34 millions of cubic metres, out of a total of 161 millions; that the
upper and easier part of the work had been accomplished, and that
greater difficulties would be encountered in working as the tide-level
was approached; that the cost of controlling the water of the Chagres
alone would amount to 471 million francs, or, roughly, one-third of the
whole estimated cost of the enterprise; that the sum still required to
complete the canal would be 3012½ millions of francs, or 120 millions
sterling, being nearly three times as much as the whole original
estimated cost; and that the amount to be paid on capital loaned during
the next six or seven years would add perhaps 40 millions sterling to
this amount.
This unfavourable report had naturally a depressing effect upon the
scheme when it was made public. And yet the reporter was not entirely
unfavourable to the enterprise. On the contrary, he prefaced his report
by the following remarks:—
“As up to date the sum expended is 818,023,900 francs,
it is evident that the cost per metre of work has been
exorbitant. Were we to base our calculations on these
figures, the total cost of the canal would become fabulous,
and it would probably never be finished. But this is
not the way to calculate. We have to look at the costly
preliminary works, the purchase of the railroad, the
immense amounts of materials which had to be collected, and
the purchase and erection of buildings, all of which were
expenses which had to be met in order that a work should
progress which is perhaps the most important and colossal
of modern or any times. Thus the expense of work per metre
has diminished as the work has progressed, and only when it
shall have been completed shall we be able to determine the
cost of all the excavations.”
About the close of 1887, the canal was _in extremis_. The funds in hand
had sunk to a low point, and there appeared to be but little prospect
of raising more. M. de Lesseps, however, again proved himself equal
to the occasion. Instead of abandoning himself to despair, as the
vast difficulties, past, present, and to come, would have warranted,
he announced to his fellow-countrymen in a letter to the Premier that
he would proceed with the work piecemeal, providing in the meantime a
sufficient passage through the canal for the 7½ million tons of annual
traffic then anticipated,[185] and looking forward to the completion of
the canal, as originally designed, by means of small levies on the
annual profits, as in the case of the Suez Canal. The Consultative
Commission had, he added, declared the practicability both of
constructing on the central mass an upper cutting which would allow
of the continuance of the level works by dredging, and of opening the
maritime transport between the two oceans as soon as these plans were
completed. M. de Lesseps went on to say:—
“This approval leaves for extraction only 40,000,000
cubic metres, 10,000,000 being hard soil, and 30,000,000
dredgable soil. The carrying out of these reduced
extractions being materially ensured, we entrusted the task
of submitting to us a contract for the execution of the
works to M. Eiffel, whose reputation has been established
by engineering skill equally exact and bold, and by his
great metallurgic works; imposing on him the obligation of
applying exclusively to French industry for the supply of
materials, and for all other co-operation.
“This morning (November 15) M. Eiffel has engaged to
execute these works at his own risk within the period and
on the conditions desired by the company. It now rests
with the Government of the Republic, inasmuch as French
law obliges me to apply to it, to insure definitively the
execution of our programme, by authorising the Universal
Inter-oceanic Company to issue lottery obligations.”
On the 1st of January, 1888, the amount of money at the disposal of
the company was stated by M. de Lesseps to be 110 millions of francs
(4½ millions sterling), and it was calculated that 300 million francs
(12,000,000_l._) would be required by the end of the year. M. de
Lesseps, in asking permission to raise this sum by a lottery, placed at
the disposal of the French Government all the contracts and documents
in the hands of the company, “whereby the execution of the programme
drawn up is guaranteed.”
During the first half of 1888, several discussions of a more or
less stormy character took place in the French Parliament on the
proposal to authorise on behalf of the Panama Canal Company an issue
of lottery bonds. In the result M. de Lesseps got his own way, the
Senate sanctioning a loan with 4 per cent. interest, and a deposit of
rentes as a guarantee. Subscriptions were opened on the 23rd of June.
The French people, backed by the most influential newspapers in the
country, looked favourably on the lottery. There were a large number
of prizes to be drawn, the chief being one of half a million francs
(20,000_l._), and there were to be six drawings a year. At the outset,
with inducements that appealed so strongly to the French imagination,
the loan seemed likely to be covered several times over. All at once,
however, the flow of subscriptions stopped. It was then ascertained
that the opponents of the canal had set afloat some sinister rumours
with the object of frustrating the lottery scheme. One of these was the
rumour that Lesseps was dead. The veteran projector, however, was never
more entirely alive. Threatened with failure, he made almost heroic
efforts to avert it. He arranged for attending and speaking at meetings
in all the principal towns of France, beginning at Paris. The labours
now undertaken by the octogenarian canal-builder are thus referred to
by the _Times_ correspondent at Paris:—
“I do not know what will be the fate of the millions of
lottery bonds which still remain to be placed, but what is
certain is that two men never gave themselves to a more
laborious work of propagandism than M. de Lesseps and M.
Charles de Lesseps, his son, have undertaken. If ever the
Panama Canal is finished, if it ever yields the results
promised—as to which I can make no assertion—it would not
be too much to raise statues to these men, who have spared
themselves no toil, but have made almost superhuman efforts
to bring the work to a successful close. For a month M.
de Lesseps and his son have been visiting the industrial
and commercial centres, delivering addresses, taking part
in banquets, organising committees, and endeavouring to
create a national movement favourable to the realisation
of this gigantic scheme. In all places where they have
been speaking they have had crowded audiences, which have
eagerly listened to them, and have shown sympathy with
their efforts to make the completion of the Panama Canal a
national question. Frenchmen feel that success in this work
must avert a rebuff for the constructor of the Suez Canal,
who will continue to be styled ‘Le Grand Français’ so long
as the Panama Canal Scheme has not collapsed.”
On the 14th December, 1888, the Panama Canal Company suspended payment.
Announcement was made in Paris that in consequence of the subscription
not having extended to 400,000 obligations, the payment of all coupons
and drawn bonds would be temporarily suspended. The intimation caused
a severe shock in Paris, although it was not entirely unexpected. The
French Cabinet deemed the matter one of such importance that they held
a meeting to consider what should be done. It was decided to propose
a suspension for three months only. This was proposed for a double
reason—to gain time, and to prevent speculation on the Bourse. It was
stated by M. Peytral, the Minister of Finance, that the Government
wished to enable the old company, without going through the process of
bankruptcy, to hand over the canal to a new concern.
There have been few warmer discussions, even in the French Chamber,
than that which followed the proposal to interpose to this extent on
behalf of the canal company. It was argued by the opponents of the
Government that the canal should not be treated exceptionally; that the
bankruptcy law should be allowed its ordinary course; that the
Government had kept secret the report of its own engineer on the
condition of the company when it was known to be in danger; that the
Army Bill should not be delayed for the sake of a private company; and
that if the company did come to grief, nearly a million bondholders
would be ruined and a milliard of money would be lost.
On the 15th December the Chamber of Deputies, acting upon the Report
of the Committee appointed to consider the Bill, resolved by 256
votes against 81 to throw out the Bill. This decision created intense
excitement, not only in Paris, but throughout France—aye, and
throughout Europe. The shareholders in the company, 870,000 in number,
were threatened with disaster, many of them with ruin. The newspapers
contained reports of the condition of panic that prevailed in the
capital, which recalled the similar episodes of the South Sea Bubble
and Law’s Mississippi Scheme. The canal company’s offices in Paris were
besieged by eager and demonstrative crowds. They did not, however, vent
their anger and disappointment on M. de Lesseps. It was the Government
that was condemned. Lesseps was still the favourite of the people.
“Vive Lesseps” and “Vive Boulanger” were the cries of the hour. There
were not a few who regarded the occasion as one that justified the
country in getting rid of so pusillanimous a Chamber. The opportunity
of the Boulangists appeared to be at hand.[186] The greatest but one of
European Powers seemed likely to be drawn into the vortex of revolution
by the obscure problem of the cost of constructing a waterway in a
territory over which it had no control, at thousands of leagues from
its shores. The mutability of human affairs had surely never a more
striking illustration!
According to a statement which appeared in the _Standard_ of the 17th
December, 1888, a _Figaro_ reporter called on M. de Lesseps, and was
received by him in a drawing-room, where seven of his younger children
were having a romp with their mother. The following is a description of
the scene that took place:—
“You know the vote of the Chamber?”
“No,” he replied very calmly, stretching out his hand.
“The Government Bill is rejected; your application is
defeated; the majority against you is nearly a hundred.”
M. de Lesseps suddenly became very pale, but remained
silent. His hand, quite cold, let mine go. He carried his
handkerchief to his lips, as if to stifle a cry. Then,
resuming all his calmness, and drawing himself up to his
full height, he murmured, “It is impossible.”
“It is infamous,” exclaimed Madame de Lesseps.
“I could not have believed,” he proceeded, in a sad
tone, “that a French Chamber would thus sacrifice all
the best interests of the country. Have they then all
forgotten that one milliard and a half of French savings
(60,000,000_l._) are jeopardised by this vote, and they
could have saved everything by a reprieve? However, in this
appalling crisis I have nothing to reproach myself with. I
have done all that was humanly possible to safeguard the
interests of each and all, because I know that the final
collapse of the Panama Canal would be not only the ruin of
the shareholders, but also a calamity for the country, and
a disaster for the national flag. What consoles me is the
frankness with which our new provisional administrators
have hastened to acknowledge that in our operations
everything has been clear, honest, and straightforward.
They told me so this very day, only an hour ago, and I
have no evidence to contradict that. I am also encouraged
by the thousands of letters I receive from my subscribers
and shareholders, those unknown friends who trust me as
they ever did, and who support me with valiant hearts in
this last battle. Their name is legion, and to save their
earnings I am prepared to make every sacrifice. Nay, even
monarchs have sent me telegrams to express their anguish
and sympathy. See, I have just opened this letter from
Queen Isabella. It is written in Spanish, but I will
translate it for you:—
MY DEAR FRIEND, COUNT DE LESSEPS,—At the
time when difficulties are accumulating around you
I feel impelled to tell you how firmly I believe in
your great work, which is an object of envy to the
whole world, and how much I admire your energy.
(Signed) ISABELLE DE BOURBON.”