Errors of the Pacha—His proper course of Action—Mismanagement of Ibrahim
Pacha in Syria—Gain or Loss of Turkey by the Acquisition of
Syria—Conduct of the Turks in Lebanon—Quarrels of the
Mountaineers—Ill treatment of the Prince—Consequent hatred of
Turkish rule—Conclusion.
The first error Mehemet Ali committed was not immediately ordering
Ibrahim to march on Scutari after the battle of Nizib. At that time the
Allies had not come to a final arrangement, and the British and French
fleets were not collected in Besika Bay. Had he done that at once,
Russia would certainly have come down to Constantinople with a fleet and
army; France would have got alarmed, and probably ordered her fleet up
the Dardanelles; Great Britain would have done the same. Russia would
have urged the Porte to prevent it, which she would have been obliged to
have complied with, and the probability is that Europe would have been
set by the ears, and in the struggle Mehemet Ali would most likely have
retained the government of Syria; indeed, both France and England would
have been obliged to have made use of Mehemet Ali against Russia, and
the Porte, who must have joined with Russia in preventing the fleets
from forcing the Dardanelles. His second error was, in not concentrating
his army the moment he resolved on resisting the decision of the Allies.
At the time we landed in D’Jounie Bay, the Egyptian army in Syria could
not have consisted of less than 80,000 men of all arms. They were
distributed, it is true, in various parts of the country. Ibrahim Pacha
ought to have divined our plan of operations the moment we landed; he
ought also to have ascertained from his spies, (which we could not
prevent,) the number of our troops, and the works we were throwing up,
which of themselves showed our weakness. He must have also known how
slow the mountaineers were in coming in in the first instance for arms.
Seeing all this, had he acted with vigour, and set his troops in motion
from Tripoli, he would first have saved D’Jebail, then occupied Gazir,
and prevented the Emir Abdallah from joining our standard. Had Osman
Pacha advanced at the same time from Balbeck, and occupied Antura and
the strong ground in front of our advanced posts, while Souliman Pacha,
strengthening himself at Beyrout with a couple of thousand men from
Sidon, might have marched with his army from Beyrout, and occupied the
convents and high grounds above the Nahr-el-Kelb, and threatened an
advance at the same time at the mouth of the river, he would, in the
first place, have prevented a single mountaineer from joining our
standard, and the overwhelming force which he would have mustered almost
within shot of us, would have been quite sufficient, without firing a
gun, to have made us pack up our traps and carry the Turkish troops to
Cyprus. By some strange fatality he remained inactive; we gained
confidence; were successful in all our enterprises; desertion began in
Ibrahim’s army, which was just as likely to have begun in our’s; and
when at last Ibrahim made an effort, and advanced to Beckfaya and
Boharsof, instead of collecting the whole of his forces, and driving us
from Ornagacuan, he did not bring half his troops, and allowed himself
to be attacked on both flanks, front and rear, and was defeated. Still
the game was not up with him; withdrawing his troops from Tripoli,
Aleppo, Adana, and concentrating the whole at Zachle, Malaka, and
Damascus, and seeing we hesitated in following up our successes, he
ought to have taken advantage of the absence of the squadron at Acre,
and the weakening of the garrison at Beyrout, and pushed on the latter
place, which he would have taken with ease, and found abundance of
provisions. He should then have marched on Sidon, which probably would
have shared the same fate.
These movements being communicated to the Governor of Acre, would have
encouraged him to hold out; and if he was forced to withdraw, he could
have joined Ibrahim, and again marched on Acre, where they would have
found a practicable breach; and most certainly, at that season of the
year, the British squadron would not have remained in so open an
anchorage.
Such vigorous measures would have had a great effect on France, and
there is no knowing what might have happened. This was not done; and
Ibrahim, without making one effort to draw our attention from Acre, or
to profit by our absence, remained inactive, and to his astonishment,
heard of the surrender of that renowned fortress, which he had not in
the least calculated upon. Still his cause was not lost; our troops were
divided in Beyrout, Sidon, Tyre, and Acre, and, I believe, we had also
some at Tripoli.
The gale of the 29th of November alarmed the Admiral for the safety of
the squadron. The coast was abandoned, except by a steamer or two, and
there was nothing whatever to have prevented Ibrahim from again
advancing, and recovering all his losses, and which he would have been
perfectly justified in doing when the Convention was rejected. Why he
did not, to every military man acquainted with the country, and with our
weakness, must be a matter of surprise.
Had any of these operations I have described been put in force, Mehemet
Ali would have been now in Syria, and a war among the European Powers in
all probability would have been raging.
We will now examine what Turkey has gained by the recovery of the Syrian
provinces. She has got back her fleet, which will never be of the least
use to her, and is an expensive floating ornament to the Seraglio.
Situated as the Turkish empire is, with a rapid stream cutting her in
two, it is evident her only proper defence is a fleet of steamboats;
with these, and the Bosphorus and Hellespont properly fortified, she may
defy attacks either from the north or the south, and have a rapid means
of communicating with her islands and possessions on the Syrian coasts,
and of suddenly transporting troops to any part of her extensive empire.
The Turks are not sailors, and never will be, and are therefore much
better adapted to serve in vessels moved by steam than in line-of-battle
ships, where seamanship cannot be dispensed with.
The Porte has regained Syria, and with it a most extensive kingdom and
discontented population, and instead of keeping her army at home to
defend her against Russia, her natural enemy, she is obliged to maintain
a large force in Syria to keep down her justly irritated subjects, whom
she has neither the talent nor inclination to govern either with
prudence or decency. Syria is divided, as before, into pachalics, and
influential Turks are appointed, as usual, to govern them. There is
neither law nor justice. The Turk sits all day smoking his pipe, and the
people are plundered by their underlings as usual; and they now feel
they were better off under the government of Mehemet Ali than they are
now under their former masters. They pay the taxes they formerly did
under the Porte; they pay Mehemet Ali’s taxes in addition, and are
plundered into the bargain by their old rulers. Property of every
description is less protected than it was, trade destroyed, and the
roads insecure throughout the country. As for Mount Lebanon, whose
population was the first to come forward and join our bands, and whose
position the Allies and the Turks themselves promised to alleviate—how
have they been treated? As yet they have received little or no
remuneration for the burning of their villages and destruction of their
property by Ibrahim Pacha, in revenge for their having joined the
standard of the Sultan. They have been badly paid for the losses we
ourselves caused them at D’Jounie, at Beyrout, Acre, and Sidon. The old
feuds between the Maronites and Druses, which had nearly subsided, have
been fomented by their rulers, and I fear Mehemet Ali himself, as might
have been foreseen, has not been altogether blameless in assisting to
set them by the ears.
In the course of my work it has been shown that the Maronites were the
first to take up arms in the cause of the Sultan. The Druses being more
under the influence of the old Emir Bechir, came forward at a later
period, and when the war was nearly finished, they became jealous of the
Maronites; and the Turks, instead of by prudent management discouraging
these feelings, rather fomented them, with the view of weakening both.
The mountaineers had been armed during the insurrection, and they are
looked upon more as enemies, than friends who had assisted in bringing
them back to power.
In the beginning of November, 1841, about the period when the taxes for
the support of the local government were to be raised, the chiefs of the
Druses requested the Grand Prince to attend at Deir-el-Kamar, the seat
of government, to consider how the taxes were to be distributed; this
being acceded to, they sent orders to the different tribes to come armed
to the meeting, which was certainly not a very peaceable way of settling
who was to bear the burden of taxation. These tribes concealed
themselves in the houses of the Scheiks of the family of Abu Bekr, in
Deir-el-Kamar, and, without provocation, sallied out of their houses,
set fire to the town in several places, and plundered and murdered
several of the peaceable inhabitants. The Maronites, taken entirely by
surprise, suffered very considerably at first, but being rallied by
their leaders took up arms, and a regular battle ensued, which lasted
with occasional intermission for several days. The Prince defended
himself in his palace, but seeing the Druses were the strongest,
repeatedly sent to Selim Pacha, who commanded the Ottoman troops at
Beyrout, for assistance; none, however, arrived. This was exactly what
the Turks wanted—the more men killed on each side, and the more
exasperated they became against each other, the better they were
satisfied. “Divide and Govern,” was their motto.
When the news of this unfortunate rencontre came to the knowledge of our
gallant Consul-General, Colonel Rose, he immediately set out for the
mountains, and at imminent hazard to himself, succeeded in putting an
end, for a time, to the broil. Unfortunately, however, the Maronite
Christians hearing of the danger of their countrymen at Deir-el-Kamar,
sent a strong force to relieve them; this, as might be expected, again
brought the Druses into the field, and again the Grand Prince sent to
Selim Pacha, but his appeal to him was in vain, and the Druses being the
strongest, he was besieged in his palace for twenty-four days.
Instead of Turkish troops being sent to put down the insurrection and
relieve the Prince, he received orders to repair to Beyrout; and his
provision and ammunition being expended, he was obliged to capitulate
with the Druse Scheiks, who guaranteed his safety and that of his
retinue and their property; and though the negotiations were carried on
through the medium of the messenger sent by Selim Pacha, no sooner had
the Prince quitted his residence, than the Druses rushed upon them,
seized their arms, horses, and clothes, and even stripped them to their
shirts. The Prince himself did not escape this indignity. On his arrival
at Beyrout he made strong and repeated representations to Selim Pacha,
and entreated him to assist in putting down the civil war, but in vain.
The fact is, Selim Pacha was acting under the orders of the Porte, who
only wanted a good excuse to put an end to the government of the ruling
Prince.
Shortly after this the Porte threw off the mask; the Grand Prince was
arrested and sent to Constantinople, and Omar Pacha, a German who had
entered into the Turkish service, and served under my orders in Syria,
was appointed by the Porte Governor of Lebanon. He may be a good man
enough; but certainly, a Christian having changed his religion was not a
fit man to govern the Christians of Lebanon. The poor Prince has lost
the whole of his property, and his family is brought to ruin. This is
the gratitude of the Porte; this is the reward he has obtained for his
eminent services; and this is the way the Ottoman Government have
treated their allies.
We are informed by Sir Robert Peel that our Ambassador at Constantinople
has protested against these acts, and also against the Porte sending
Albanian troops (who are little better than barbarians) into Syria, and
that they have promised to remove Omar Pacha, and restrict the services
of the Albanians to garrison duty only. How far the Porte will keep
their promise we shall see; but, I confess, with such a man as Izzet
Pacha at the head of the Turkish Government, and who is only putting
into execution what he planned when in Syria, and for which he was
recalled, I confess I have no reliance upon him, or indeed upon any
Turkish Pacha. They are all alike, and quite incapable of preventing the
fate of the Ottoman empire, which is tottering to its base, and the
sooner it goes the better; it is unworthy of preserving.
Had my advice been followed, and the seaports of Lebanon, the Bekaa, and
Anti-Lebanon, been put under the jurisdiction of the Grand Prince,
assisted by a council of the powerful Emirs, and the Turkish troops
removed entirely from his territory, causing him to pay a reasonable
tribute to the Porte, the whole Mountain would have been bound by
gratitude to the Sultan, and would have assisted him to keep the rest of
Syria in order. As it is now, there is nothing but the most inveterate
hatred existing against the Turkish Government; and I most sincerely
hope the different sects will unite, and make a noble effort to drive
their miserable and tyrannical rulers out of their fine country.
Cultivation and commerce would then revive; a field would be opened to
British enterprise, and we might recover the influence we had in the
mountains, and which has been lost, in consequence of the inhabitants
believing that we have not made use of our power to obtain from the
Porte all that was so liberally promised them when we were in want of
their assistance.
* * * * *
I cannot close this work without returning my best thanks to all the
officers and men who served in the squadron that Sir Robert Stopford did
me the honour of putting under my command. The very laborious services
they performed in D’Jounie Bay is above all praise; this was no question
of sending a Lieutenant and a working party on shore; the whole of the
ships’ companies were constantly employed, headed by their Captains.
Captain Reynolds was my second in the landing at D’Jounie, and continued
his unremitted exertions till he was sent off Alexandria. Captain
Berkeley was my second on the attack at Sidon, and both of us regretted
that I could not employ him in the assault on shore; but it was
absolutely necessary that he should remain on board the Thunderer to
regulate the firing as we advanced, and to cover our retreat if
necessary. Nor am I less obliged to Captain Maunsell, of the Rodney, who
was my ambassador to Mehemet Ali, and who with great decision landed at
once at the Palace and opened the negotiations. Indeed, all the
officers, both of the Navy and Marines, as well as Selim Pacha, General
Jochmus, Omar Bey, and the whole of the Turkish officers, did their duty
to my entire satisfaction, and I should be but too proud to command such
a force on another occasion. The merits of Admiral Walker are too well
known to make it necessary for me to say one word in his praise.
I must also take this opportunity of thanking the Commander-in-Chief for
having placed the Allied force under my direction when the ill health of
Sir Charles Smith obliged him to proceed to Constantinople.
APPENDIX.
--------------
No. I.
INSTRUCTIONS given by the SULTAN to HAFIZ PACHA, found at the Turkish
Head-Quarters after the battle of Nizib[135].
_Plan of march of the Army of the Sultan against
Egypt, in nine Articles._
Seeing that the Egyptian Government will never submit to its Sovereign,
it is very probable that in the approaching summer it may declare and
obtain its independence. As all my efforts and all my calculations have
been useless, there is nothing but war which will render me master of
that province, and which will unite it to the empire of the Osmanlis,
and for its execution and success good dispositions must be taken.
ART. I.—For the success of this enterprise, rigorous laws must be
established; in the public orders the grade of Seraskier shall be
promised to all the Ferik Pachas, if they do not betray their trust or
intrigue; but if they fail in their duties, they shall be immediately
turned out of the service.
ART. II.—According to this plan, the army ought to consist of from
60,000 to 70,000 men, with 120 pieces of cannon, as follows: 40,000
infantry, 15,000 cavalry, 5,000 artillery and engineers, and the
remaining 10,000 irregular troops.
ART. III.—Wherever the enemy shall be met, he should be attacked by the
artillery; it is necessary that the Commander-in-Chief should exercise
the artillery daily in line of battle.
ART. IV.—To prevent the Egyptians from making a sudden attack upon
Marash, it is necessary that this town be fortified and guarded by a
strong body of troops. After having taken these measures, the
Commander-in-Chief will march upon Aleppo, and from thence to Damascus,
and then to Acre, to take possession of that fortress, and not to lose
time in obtaining possession of all the said towns. After the capture of
Acre, he must leave a strong body of troops in that place, and march
direct upon Egypt. The taking of Acre shall be considered the first
conquest of this war; this enterprise may, perhaps, be accomplished
within four or five months; and if the Egyptian Government does not
return under the dominion of the empire, let the Commander-in-Chief know
that the war will be indefinite, and he must take measures in
consequence; for the conquest of Egypt being the second achievement,
four or five months will be necessary for the success of this second
enterprise. According to this calculation, the important possession of
Syria and Egypt will require eleven months or a year to accomplish.
ART. V.—According to the information we have, Solyman Pacha is not
content with his position. A man of so much importance should be got rid
of. An officer should be sent to him to endeavour by all means to gain
him over to our side. Solyman Pacha being a European, one of our French
officers must be sent to him to endeavour to gain him over to us.
ART. VI.—Mehemet Ali, up to the present time, has given no higher grade
to Arabs than that of Captain, whilst to Christians he gives the rank of
Colonel, General, and Pacha; in our camp, there are Arabs who have the
rank of Pacha. Such being the case, he who deserts to us with thirty
soldiers, shall receive the rank of Lieutenant; and he who deserts with
from thirty to one hundred soldiers, the rank of Captain; and if a
Commandant deserts with his battalion, the rank of Colonel; and those
who intrigue in the Egyptian army to make the soldiers revolt, whether
he be an officer or Colonel, shall obtain high grades with us. In order
to put this project into execution, it is necessary to write
proclamations and to scatter them in the Egyptian camp by means of
spies.
ART. VII.—The Druses, the Mutualis, who are in the Egyptian army, the
chiefs of tribes, and the people who are under the dominion of Mehemet
Ali, should be encouraged by promises to embrace our party. Accordingly
their intentions should be seconded, and they should be granted all they
desire; and the better to succeed in this enterprise, it is necessary
that Hafiz Pacha should have with him 7000 or 8000 purses, to distribute
money where he judges it convenient and useful.
ART. VIII.—In the army of Mehemet Ali Pacha, there are a great many
European _employés_, by means of whom all his plans and projects may be
known. It is necessary, in order to be well informed, to send spies
among them, in order that the success of the war, which is about to open
in the approaching summer, may be ensured.
ART. IX.—In order to disembark 10,000 or 12,000 men at Tripoli, the
squadron must be put in movement, and as soon as the _corps d’armée_
shall march from Marash, it is necessary to enter into communication
with the Druses, the Mutualis, and other Cabaïles. For the success of
this enterprise, thirty or forty pieces of field artillery, from 10,000
to 15,000 muskets, with ammunition and _materiél_, must be prepared to
be sent by sea on the first demand. The persons charged with this
enterprise should employ all their diligence in order that these affairs
may terminate as soon as possible.
No. II. See Vol. I., page 18.
TRANSLATION of a PETITION (in Copy) from the NATIONS and INHABITANTS of
MOUNT LEBANON and SYRIA, to Sultan ABDUL MEDJID of Constantinople.
A PETITION.
We humbly supplicate, at the threshold of the Divan of the Mighty
Sovereign, the Benevolent and Just, the Venerated Authority and Daring
Lion, the Lord of the Sword and of the Pen—(viz. of Death and Mercy)—the
Shadow of God over the Earth, our Honoured Sultan, Abdul Medjid Khan,
may God perpetuate the days of his flourishing reign for ever and ever,
Amen.
That the frightful tyranny and the horrible oppression and cruelty under
which Mehemet Ali Pacha has belaboured us—(he who pretends to be as one
of your Majesty’s slaves, but who, in fact, has dared to be treacherous
to your most illustrious and venerated defunct Father, of blessed
memory, and whose abode now may be Paradise)—have compelled us to throw
ourselves at the feet of your Imperial Throne, which is adorned with the
rays of justice and mercy,—spreading our supplicating arms towards your
Majesty’s paternal and sublime clemency, that you may be pleased to turn
your eye towards our protection and safety,—knowing as we do how vast
and extensive the equity of your Majesty’s Government, which is so
renowned throughout the world.—and how immense and unlimited your
Majesty’s mercy and clemency; wherefore our hearts burn with the fire of
the desire of attaining that happiness also, which is enjoyed by all
those fortunate beings who are your subjects. What crime have we
committed to cause your Majesty’s resplendent face to be turned away
from us, and thereby we should be left to be thrashed under the edges of
an unbearable tyranny and of an insupportable iniquity and oppression,
while our fathers and forefathers, ever since a period of four hundred
years, have continually enjoyed the happiness and comfort of the
protection of your Majesty’s Imperial Standard? We are their sons, and
prepared to follow their steps, that we may inherit the same happiness
which they enjoyed for so many centuries, to the great glory of your
Majesty’s Imperial Dynasty.
We therefore pray and supplicate your paternal benignity and clemency
not to abandon us, and to let it be said that a vast and numerous
population has been left to be immolated as a sacrifice to the selfish
ambition and sordid avarice of a single man, a tyrant, totally void of
feeling and humanity, who not only proved himself ungrateful to, and
forgetful of, your Majesty’s great bounty to him, but dared, most
perfidiously, to turn his sword towards your sacred person. Seeing
ourselves thus placed in this most wretched and miserable condition,
bordering on the last degree of our total ruin and annihilation, we have
got up and raised your Majesty’s mighty Standard in defence of the
legitimate and lawful rights of your Imperial Sovereignty over us, for
which we shall continue to fight to the last breath of our existence;
and therefore we trust to the Divine aid of the Almighty, and in your
Majesty’s assistance, to overpower that common enemy of yours and ours,
and to drive him away from your dominions.
Hence, we again supplicate and implore the Throne of your Majesty’s
universal mercy and clemency, to turn your royal face towards us with
your mighty aid and assistance,—especially, our said enemy having
stopped all the roads against us by land and also by sea, and thereby
prevents us receiving any supply of the necessary warlike stores we are
in need of; and as we have no fleet to oppose his, we most earnestly
entreat your Majesty to afford us the needful recourse for the opening
of the roads, &c.; otherwise, we shall be, God forbid, unavoidably
placed in a most distressing state, and in imminent ruin. But no, never
will your Majesty’s imperial and paternal mercy and benevolence allow
such a disastrous calamity to befall us! And we pray the Almighty God to
preserve your sacred person, and to perpetuate the days of your glorious
reign with happiness and victory.
Signed and Sealed by your Majesty’s Slaves.
(No Date) THE NATION OF MUTUALI.
THE NATION OF DRUSE.
THE CHRISTIAN NATION.
FARIS HONEISH, &c., &c.
LETTER addressed by the INHABITANTS of MOUNT LEBANON to his Excellency
the BRITISH AMBASSADOR.
After the usual Compliments, (Translation.)
The humanity which so eminently distinguishes all the acts of the
British Government,—the readiness with which it steps forward to the
assistance of the oppressed,—the anxiety that it displays to make
the people of the East share in the benefits enjoyed by that portion
of their fellow-creatures that are blessed with happier
Governments,—embolden the Syrians to appeal to England for her
mediation to rescue them from the destruction with which Mehemet Ali
threatens them now.
Since the invasion of Syria by Mehemet Ali, he has trampled us under
foot by an oppression which knows no bounds, and by a tyranny the most
atrocious and cruel.
For the last eight years, we have acceded to all his demands, and
because he has left us nothing more to give him, he menaces us with
extermination; nor will his unbounded rapacity be satisfied until he
drinks the very blood of our children, and satiates the licentiousness
of his soldiers with the honour of our families. Driven to despair, we
have taken up arms for the defence of our lives, and to guard our
dwellings from fire and ourselves from the sword with which he threatens
to erase us from among nations.
Abandoned by the world, we implore the protection of Great Britain. In
the humanity of her Government, and in the generosity of one of the
greatest and most powerful nations, rest all our hopes in this cruel
crisis. All that we demand is, to be allowed to return to our legitimate
Sovereign Abdul Medjid,—a natural desire coming from loyal subjects. Why
should two millions and a-half of His Highness’ subjects be sacrificed
to the personal ambition of one man, who himself, forgetful of the
benefits conferred upon him, has turned his sword against the bosom of
his own Sovereign?
We have but one prayer,—we seek but to be allowed to enjoy, in common
with the rest of His Highness’ subjects, the rights and privileges
secured to them by the Hatti-Sheriff; and it is in this hope that we
submit our petition to your Excellency, praying that you will be pleased
to lay it before the “Divan” of Great Britain, the Ally of our august
Master Abdul Medjid, with a request that we may be honoured with a
speedy glad tidings, before we are utterly destroyed by the Governor of
Egypt.
May the Almighty prolong the days of your Excellency with happiness to
the end of time.
(Signed) (L.S.) PRINCE FARIS SHEHAB.
(L.S.) EMIR HAIDAR.
(L.S.) SHEIK FARIS HABEISH, &c.
THE MARONITE NATION.
THE DRUSE NATION.
THE MUTUALIS.
LETTER addressed by the INHABITANTS of MOUNT LEBANON to his Excellency
the FRENCH AMBASSADOR.
(Literal Translation from the Arabic.)
After the usual Compliments,
The painful news that have reached us by the newspapers, have struck a
terrible blow to Syria,—they have torn the hearts of men, women, and
children, now menaced to be exterminated by Mehemet Ali, to whom France
has deigned to grant her powerful protection. Can she be possibly
ignorant of the evils this man has made us suffer since fortune has made
him master of Syria? They are innumerable. Suffice it to say, that the
most distressing vexations, and the most cruel oppression, have driven
us to despair, and have renewed in us the ardent desire of returning to
the paternal government of our august Sovereign, Abdul Medjid. Is not
this a legitimate desire from a loyal people? France, a nation so great,
so magnanimous, that has extended liberty everywhere, that has for ages
spilt so much blood to establish it in her own Government, refuses us
to-day her powerful influence to obtain the enjoyment of the same good!
The French press says, “that France will not admit of any arrangement
that has for basis the restitution of Syria to its legitimate
Sovereign.” Can it be so? the Syrians cannot believe it! The French
nation, so generous, so civilized, cannot desire to see us crushed by a
systematic oppression which alone distinguishes the Egyptian Government
from others.
We wish but to be allowed to return to the protection of our legitimate
Sovereign, whom we have not ceased to obey for the last four hundred
years. We demand but to participate in the privileges and rights of the
Hatti-Sheriff which our gracious Sovereign has granted to all his
faithful subjects, without exception, without distinction. We appeal to
the French Government—we supplicate the French nation at large, to
assist us to obtain our demand. The most atrocious tyranny has compelled
us to take up arms for the defence of our lives and the honour of our
families, from the brutality of the Egyptian soldiery, or to bury
ourselves in the ruins of our country. Our cause is a just one; and as
such, we sincerely trust that the French Government will not abandon us
in a moment so dangerous.
It is with this hope we submit to your Excellency this, our prayer,
begging that you will be pleased to lay it at the feet of the throne of
your august Master, the Ally of our gracious Sovereign, Abdul Medjid.
(Signed) (L.S.) PRINCE FARIS SHEHAB.
(L.S.) PRINCE YOUSUF SHEHAB.
(L.S.) EMIR HAIDAR, &c., &c.
THE MARONITE }
THE DRUSE } NATIONS.
THE MUTUALI }
No. III.
LETTER from Commodore NAPIER to Lieut.-Col.
HODGES.
H.M.S. Powerful, Beyrout,
July 15, 1840.
My dear Hodges,
I received your letter and postscript of the 10th and 13th of July, and
I think you are as cautious a diplomatist as if you had been at it for
the last twenty years; you do not make a single remark upon what my
opinions were relative to this expedition of Mehemet Ali. I do not feel
that there is any responsibility on me whatever; I am positively forbid
to meddle with anything that Mehemet Ali may do, as long as he lets
alone British persons and property; and however I disapprove of this, I
can only obey.
The Pacha’s troops marched out yesterday morning, and although they met
with no resistance, they set the whole country in a blaze, convents and
all. I wrote a very strong letter to the Egyptian Admiral, which I
begged him to communicate to Abbas Pacha, a copy of which accompanies
this. Mr. Wood was sent here by Lord Ponsonby, and he came off a few
days ago, bringing petitions from the poor Mountaineers to the Sultan
and the French and English Ambassadors; he landed again early this
morning, and brings off news that the insurgents are divided amongst
themselves, have been abandoned by many of their chiefs, are badly
armed, and, by all I can collect, unless they are succoured with arms
and ammunition, the insurrection will be put down very shortly, and thus
will finish all hope of Syria being released from the power of Mehemet
Ali, by the efforts of the inhabitants themselves, and the question will
become more complicated than ever; all of which might have been avoided,
had the Admiral had instructions how to act, or had he taken upon
himself, which I feel assured would have been approved of by our
Government at home. I am surprised the mission of Mr. Wood has not been
notified to you, as he certainly was sent here by Lord Ponsonby, and I
have the Admiral’s order to facilitate him, and even to send the Cyclops
back when he has any particular communication to make.
Should Mehemet Ali come this way, the shortest way of putting an end to
all doubts would be to seize him. I do not say I am prepared for so bold
a step, but if I see much cruelty and devastation going on, I don’t know
whether I should not be very much disposed to do it, unless he came
accompanied by such a force as would render the success doubtful; but I
have no idea that he will come, because I believe all will be settled
without him, and you will find that the strength of the insurgents has
been very much magnified. You seem to think that Mehemet Ali is on his
last legs, but I think this will strengthen him very much; he is
evidently backed up by the French, that is clear by the language held by
all the French officers, and we have Thiers’ speech, which is plain
enough. You say, if we act with vigour and determination, we shall carry
through Lord Palmerston’s policy without the aid of any foreign power;
but, my good friend, the opportunity is lost, his troops are landed and
his squadron by this time is in Alexandria, and I do not see now where
our vigour and determination can be applied.
_July 20._—It was only yesterday I could get anything positive about the
Egyptians. Our Consul knows nothing, and he will believe nothing against
the Syrians, but a Frenchman has read me a letter from Souliman Pacha,
saying the insurrection was put down; and another from his secretary,
detailing the whole of their operations. It appears they marched as far
as Hammana, about eight hours from here, and met less than a couple of
hundred of the insurgents, whom the Albanians disposed of, and the Emir
Bechir sent to desire them to submit, and give up their arms, which many
of them have done. I was not satisfied with this, and last night I went
down in the Cyclops, and sent on shore at Zouk and Jebel, when they
informed me that the son of Emir Bechir had been there and told them. It
is a pity you had not a vessel to have sent earlier information, but
even that would have made no difference, as nothing would have been
done; it serves them right for their behaviour to me, and I hope you
will tell Lord Palmerston so. I shall keep this open till the last
moment.
_July 21._—The Indian mail is just arrived; I have no more news. I wish
you could come this way, for I fear there is no chance of my going to
Alexandria; I shall, however write to the Admiral by the Austrian
steamer, which I expect hourly.
Believe me, &c.,
CHARLES NAPIER.
No. IV. See Vol. I., page 52.
EXTRACT of LETTER from COMMODORE NAPIER to ADMIRAL the Honourable Sir
ROBERT STOPFORD, G.C.B.
D’Journie, Head-Quarters of the Army
of Lebanon, September 16, 1840.
In execution of your order of the 9th instant, I removed the whole of
the Turkish troops from the transports and the marines of the squadron
into the steamers. The Dido and Wasp took up an anchorage well up to
Beyrout Point, in order to draw Souliman Pacha’s attention from the
position I intended to disembark at. Soon after daylight, the squadron
and steamers you had put under my orders weighed; the Turkish squadron,
under Admiral Walker, weighed also; and the whole, with the exception of
Zebra, who flanked the Egyptian camp, worked up to Beyrout Point, where
a considerable force of the enemy was in position.
When the breeze freshened, the whole bore up for D’Journie. Castor and
Hydra anchored close to Dog River, landed the Turkish troops, and
completely blocked up the pass leading to D’Journie.
The Powerful and Pique, Gorgon, Cyclops and Phœnix, followed by the
Turkish squadron, ran into the bay of D’Journie, and landed the troops
in an incredibly short time, owing to the excellent arrangement of
Captain Reynolds, who took charge of the landing. Admiral Walker put his
troops on shore at the same moment with great celerity and order; a
position was then taken up, and the artillery landed, the few Albanians
stationed here retiring without firing a shot. The Carysfort and Dido
went off D’Jebel, about three leagues to the northward, to act against a
strong tower, garrisoned by Albanian troops.
D’Journie is a good-sized bay, with a promontory projecting considerably
into the sea. A road from Beyrout lies along the shore, and is
practicable for infantry, artillery, and cavalry: this road the Revenge
covered. The road from Tripoli leads also along shore, and the Wasp and
Phœnix covered a gorge, over which it would be necessary to pass. Two
roads lead from Baalbec by Antura, where an excellent position was taken
up by two battalions of Turks, supported by five companies of marines.
The left of this is protected by an impassable gorge, the right rests on
the sea, Dog River separating it from high ground in front.
The first day the inhabitants who had been driven into the mountains,
came in slowly for arms, but these few took them with great avidity, and
hastened to the mountains to drive away the Emir Bechir’s troops, and
open the mountain passes,—this done, the mountaineers have flocked in in
great numbers, with the Sheiks, who have crowded to the standard of the
Sultan.
I beg to inclose Captain Martin’s reports of the occupation of D’Jebel
and Batroun, in which he speaks highly of Captain Austen, of the
Cyclops, and of the officers employed[136].
I regret the loss he met with; it was not to be avoided. The inhabitants
of this city are most warlike and determined, and many Albanians have
suffered by their severity.
Ibrahim Pacha reconnoitred our positions the day before yesterday.
I have sent a battalion of Turks in advance of Gazir to open the
country, and give due notice, should he endeavour to turn our left by
that road, which he will have some difficulty in doing, as the country
is covered by the broadsides of the ships.
I have much reason to be satisfied with the zeal of the whole of the
officers and seamen employed: their exertions in completing our lines,
under Mr. Aldrich, of the Engineers, is beyond all praise.
Permit me, sir, to congratulate you on the first success of the army of
Lebanon. You, yesterday, were witness of the arrival of his Highness the
Emir Abdallah, the Governor of the district of Kesrouan, and of the
enthusiasm of the mountaineers; and if this continues, I have every
reason to think that the Egyptian army will be obliged to retire from
the sea-coast, and the mountains of Lebanon.
I have, &c.
CHARLES NAPIER, _Commodore_.
No. V. See Vol. II., page 17.
INSTRUCTIONS for CAPTAIN FANSHAWE, on his MISSION to ALEXANDRIA.
By the Honourable Sir ROBERT STOPFORD, &c.
Having received instructions from the Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty to send a competent officer to Alexandria, in order to make a
communication to Mehemet Ali, the substance of which is stated in a
letter from Viscount Palmerston to their Lordships of the 14th of
November, of which you will receive a copy,—it is my direction you
proceed forthwith in H.M. steam vessel Megæra to Alexandria, taking with
you the Dragoman named in the margin[137], and on your arrival, after
communicating with the senior officer, who will give you every support,
you will demand to have an interview with Mehemet Ali, in the presence
of Boghos Bey, in order to make to Mehemet Ali a communication from Her
Majesty’s Government. When admitted you will be guided in all respects
by the directions contained in the said letter; and further, should the
written document which Mehemet Ali may deliver to you, for the purpose
of being transmitted to Constantinople, contain an expression of a
desire, on the part of Mehemet Ali, to obtain hereditary tenure of the
Pachalic of Egypt, you will not decline to receive and convey the
document on that account, provided it shall also contain the engagements
mentioned in the aforesaid letter. You will also state that if Mehemet
Ali, as a proof of his desire for conciliation, expresses his readiness
to restore the fleet immediately, you will offer in my name every
assistance in conducting it to Marmorice, where it will be placed at the
Sultan’s disposal; and making the senior officer acquainted with the
result, you will return in the Megæra, and join me at Marmorice.
Should the senior officer be at any distance from the port, you will not
go out of your way, but communicate with him on your return from
Alexandria.
Given on board the Princess Charlotte, off Cyprus, 6th Dec. 1840.
(Signed) ROBERT STOPFORD, _Admiral_.
By command of the Commander-in-Chief,
(Signed) JOHN LOUDON, _Secretary_.
Captain Fanshawe, H.M.S. Princess Charlotte.
No. VI. See Vol. II., page 36.
PROTOCOL of the Conference held at the house of the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Sublime Porte, the 20th of December, 1840, between
the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on one part, and the
Representatives of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, on
the other.
_Minister for Foreign Affairs._ You are aware, gentlemen, that a letter
was addressed by Mehemet Ali to the Sublime Porte, and you are
acquainted with its contents. The Sublime Porte yesterday received
likewise the Memorandum of the Conference of London of the 14th of
November. The Sublime Porte directs me to ask you, gentlemen, if Mehemet
Ali by this letter has complied with the spirit of the Memorandum, and
if his submission ought to be considered as real?
_Ambassador of England._ I think that it belongs to the Sultan alone to
decide this point.
_Minister for Foreign Affairs._ Up to this time there have only been
words on the part of Mehemet Ali; if he executes the promises made in
the letter, then his submission may be considered as real.
_Ambassador of England._ I leave to my Colleagues to decide upon that
point. As for me, I see nothing before me at present which can authorize
me in explaining myself, or in giving an opinion.
_Internuncio of Austria._ With the view of relieving myself from all
responsibility, and of making the views of my Government in so important
a matter clearly manifest, I have deemed it fitting to give my vote in
writing. I will now read it to the Conference:—
“I have read over and over again with the most scrupulous attention the
letter which Mehemet Ali has just addressed to the Grand Vizier, and on
which I am called upon to pronounce my opinion. I have found nothing in
it which is not correct. The tone which pervades it has appeared to me
to be altogether proper. It might have been desirable that no allusion
had been made to the Convention of Commodore Napier; but we are all
agreed that it would have been much more so that the Convention in
question had never been concluded; and Mehemet Ali, by referring to it,
has only made use of an advantage which has been gratuitously offered to
him. Besides, it was Captain Fanshawe alone who should have represented
to him that an act which the Allied commanders had declared null and of
no effect, ought not to be mentioned in the letter to the Grand Vizier.
But I will not dwell on this point, which, after all, is now only of
secondary interest. I return to Mehemet Ali’s letter. In this letter the
Pacha declares himself ready to do all that is required of him, and in
this respect his submission appears to me entire.
“I should then be of opinion that this submission should be accepted;
that an officer of his Highness should be sent to Alexandria; that
Mehemet Ali should be enjoined to deliver up to him the Ottoman fleet;
that, according to the terms of the Separate Act of the Convention of
the 15th of July, the Allied commanders should be invited to assist at
such delivery; that the Pacha should be summoned to evacuate the
provinces or cities of the Ottoman empire still occupied by the Egyptian
troops, and situated beyond the limits of Egypt; finally, that the Grand
Vizier, in replying to his letter, should announce to him that when once
these conditions should be entirely fulfilled, his Highness, from
deference to his Allies, would be pleased to reinstate him in his
functions as Pacha of Egypt. This advice is what the Conference of
London wished that we should give to the Sublime Porte, in case Mehemet
Ali should yield to the summons about to be made to him. As for the
tribute, the land and sea forces, and the laws which must govern Egypt,
those points have been settled beforehand by the Convention of the 15th
of July, and it will be sufficient to execute in this respect the
stipulations contained in the IIIrd, Vth, and VIth Articles of the
Separate Act annexed to the Convention.
“I should consider as in every respect to be regretted any hesitation on
the part of the Porte to comply with the advice of its Allies. The most
brilliant successes have crowned their efforts in Syria; those successes
have surpassed our calculations, our anticipations, our expectations.
Syria has returned to the rule of his Highness, and thus the principal
object of the alliance is accomplished. To proceed further does not
enter into the views of the Allied Powers; the Conference of London has
pronounced with sufficient distinctness in this respect. The Sublime
Porte may doubtless have good reasons to desire the destruction of
Mehemet Ali; but as it has not the means of effecting it itself, the
task of doing so would devolve upon its Allies. Now would it desire, in
return for the services which they have rendered to it, to involve them
in an undertaking which would endanger the general peace, so ardently
desired by all people, and so happily maintained up to the present time?
“It is especially towards France that the attention of our Governments
is at present directed; that Power is entitled to their respect and
their consideration; and if the menacing and warlike attitude of the
Thiers Ministry could not stay them in their course towards the end
which they proposed to themselves, and which they have attained, they
appear henceforth to be desirous to dedicate all their care to keep well
with the Ministry which succeeds it, and whose language announces a
prudent, moderate, and conciliatory policy. They must consequently enter
into its position, make allowances for the difficulties by which it is
surrounded, and not expose it to be hurried along against its will in a
false course. In the present state of sentiments in France an
unlooked-for event might subvert everything; and is it not for the
interest of all and for that of justice, that they should frankly unite
themselves with those who govern France, to prevent a like calamity?”
The Internuncio thereupon reads the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth
paragraphs of the Separate Act of the 15th of July.
_Envoy of Prussia._ I partake of the opinion of the Internuncio. Mehemet
Ali’s proceeding appears to me in fact to be in conformity with the
spirit of the Memorandum. I think besides, that Mehemet Ali having
solicited his pardon of the Sultan, the Sublime Porte ought not to act
with too great severity against him; that, on the contrary, it ought to
lend itself to explanations, and to evince consideration and moderation,
not only for the interest of the Porte itself, but also for the general
interest of Europe.
_Chargé d’Affaires of Russia._ In all that relates to the general
question the views of my Government cannot differ from those of the
three other Courts, its Allies; my instructions are founded on that
principle. In the special question which forms the object of this
Conference, the existing documents ought to point out to us the course
and the rules to be observed; now this course and these rules appear to
me to be already laid down by the Memorandum of the Conference of London
on the 14th of November, and by Lord Palmerston’s despatch of the 15th
of October. The Memorandum had not yet reached me from my Government; it
is the Internuncio who has had the goodness to communicate it to me; I
have only received Lord Palmerston’s despatch, which is mentioned, and I
conceive that I shall conform to the meaning of these documents, by
joining, under existing circumstances, in the vote pronounced by the
Internuncio.
_Ambassador of England._ The question, I repeat, appears to me to depend
upon the fact of the submission of Mehemet Ali, and the Sultan appears
to me to be the sole judge in such a question: he alone has the right to
decide. If the Sublime Porte informs us that the Sultan has accepted
Mehemet Ali’s submission, that he is satisfied with it, the orders of my
Government enjoin me, in such a case, to advise the Porte to grant to
Mehemet Ali the hereditary government of Egypt. Until that time, until
the Porte communicates to us the decision of the Sultan, I must abstain
from giving any advice, any opinion.
_Minister for Foreign Affairs._ There are different kinds of submission.
Mehemet Ali might, for example, have come himself, according to our
usages, or have sent some one to implore his pardon; but that is not
what we mean. The Memorandum requires that Mehemet Ali should restore
the fleet, that he should evacuate certain countries. He writes that he
will do all this; if he accomplishes these promises, the Sublime Porte
will be able to credit his submission, but the letter cannot of itself
alone be considered as a real submission.
_Internuncio of Austria._ The letter is a commencement of submission. If
the Sublime Porte demands the delivery of the fleet, if Mehemet Ali
restores it, and if he evacuates the countries specified in the
Memorandum, his submission will certainly be then complete.
_Chargé d’Affaires of Russia._ It is certain that we shall not be able
to consider the submission of Mehemet Ali as completed until he shall
have restored the fleet, and evacuated the Holy Cities, as well as the
other places specified in the Memorandum; but for the present we should
abide by the text of the Memorandum and of the instruction addressed by
the Admiralty to Admiral Stopford, wherein mention is made of a letter
to be delivered by Mehemet Ali to the officer commissioned to notify to
him the decision of the Conference of London.
_Internuncio._ What more could Mehemet Ali do? He must begin by saying
that he submitted, and he could not, at the same instant, carry into
effect all the conditions of his submission.
_Minister for Foreign Affairs_, alluding to what the Ambassador for
England had said, observes, that up to the present time there had been
no question of hereditary succession.
_Internuncio._ I am not at this moment called upon to discuss that
point, on which I have no precise instruction; but, the case occurring,
I shall conform myself altogether on that matter to what the Ambassador
of England shall do.
_Ambassador of England._ For my part, I have precise orders to advise
the Porte to grant hereditary succession to Mehemet Ali, so soon as it
shall apprize us that the Sultan is satisfied with the submission of
Mehemet Ali; but such advice can only be conditional; I have not the
right to judge of the reality of the submission, and I must wait, before
giving it, for the Sultan to pronounce himself on the fact of the
submission.
_Internuncio._ As for me, I must repeat it, I look upon the letter of
Mehemet Ali, as a first step towards his submission.
_Ambassador of England._ It will not be in my power to act in the sense
of the instructions of my Government, until the Sublime Porte shall have
declared that it considers the submission of Mehemet Ali as complete.
But I cannot demand of the Sultan any declaration whatever on that
matter, for I should think that I trenched upon his rights. It is for
his Majesty to decide.
_Envoy of Prussia._ I think, as I have already said, that the Sublime
Porte ought not, in the present case, to act with too great severity,
and I must always exhort it to act with moderation.
_Minister for Foreign Affairs._ The Porte has never wished to act with
severity; facts have already proved it. It does not wish to do so even
now. It wishes, on the contrary, to act in concert with its Allies; and
although it is doubtless for the Sultan to decide on the submission of
Mehemet Ali, nevertheless, as his Allies have declared their intentions
in the Memorandum, I have thought it right to consult their
Representatives to know whether Mehemet Ali’s proceeding is in
conformity with the spirit of the Memorandum: but, since their opinions
are at variance, they might refer to the decision of the Conference of
London.
_Internuncio._ But there is no variance between us; we all think that
Mehemet Ali’s submission, in order that it should be complete, must be
followed by the execution of the conditions which are imposed upon him.
I think, moreover, that to refer the question to the decision of the
Conference of London would be to appeal from the Conference to the
Conference, and lose time in useless adjournments.
_Minister for Foreign Affairs._ I think that Mehemet Ali must first
execute the conditions imposed upon him; as for the hereditary
succession, that is another question upon which I am not prepared to
explain myself.
_Internuncio_ once more declares, that when the time arrives, he will
concur in the steps of the Ambassador of England on that point, and the
_Envoy of Prussia_ makes the same declaration.
_Minister for Foreign Affairs._ You are aware, gentlemen, that on his
accession to the throne the Sultan had granted to Mehemet Ali the
hereditary administration of Egypt; he rejected that favour. Still
later, with the view of sparing the shedding of blood, the Treaty of
July 15 granted it to him; Mehemet Ali equally rejected it. It was
necessary to have recourse to measures of coercion, and the Sultan
withdrew this favour from him. At present it appears to me that there
can no longer be a question of a right in favour of Mehemet Ali, and the
Sultan is free to take his decision on this point.
_Representatives_ unanimously admitted that the Sultan possesses his
entire freedom of action in this respect, and that Mehemet Ali could not
appeal to any right.
_Envoy of Prussia_ added, that any concession in favour of Mehemet Ali
could only be considered as an effect of the Sultan’s generosity; for
the independence of his Highness is the object of the Convention of July
15; but the more advantageous the Sultan’s position is at the present
time, the more will it perhaps allow him to be generous.
_Minister for Foreign Affairs._ Since Mehemet Ali has rejected the
Treaty of July 15, that Treaty no longer exists for him, and other
conditions might be imposed on Mehemet Ali.
_Internuncio._ But the Treaty continues to exist for us.
_Ambassador of England._ I declare that, in my opinion, Mehemet Ali has
now no right; that the Sultan is master to take the course which he
shall consider fitting, and that we can only afford him our advice.
_Minister for Foreign Affairs_, addressing himself to the Internuncio,
says to him: Your Excellency began by saying, that if the Sultan is
satisfied with the letter of Mehemet Ali, his submission ought to be
accepted. But Mehemet Ali has already written a thousand letters of the
same kind. Can any faith be placed in his letters? It is evident besides
that there is some trick even in this last letter. For example, he
speaks of Commodore Napier’s Convention, which is a void act, in order
to come to the subject of hereditary succession.
_Internuncio._ That is true; but this letter, given in consequence of a
summons made to him by the English Admiral in the name of the Four
Powers, cannot be compared to all those which he has addressed of his
own accord to the Sublime Porte, and specifically to Hosrew Pacha.
_Minister for Foreign Affairs._ You understand, gentlemen, that in any
case it is necessary that the Porte should have time to reflect upon
this matter.
_Internuncio._ Assuredly, an affair of this kind cannot be concluded in
a day; it is, doubtless, necessary that your Excellency should be able
to concert with your colleagues, and take the orders of the Sultan.
_Minister for Foreign Affairs_ observes, that having to submit to the
Council and to the Sultan his report on the Conference of this day, he
is desirous of knowing, definitely, what is the conclusion which he
should communicate to them.
_Representatives_ reply that their opinion being recorded in the present
Protocol, they refer themselves to it.
_Ambassador of England._ I repeat that I must wait for the decision of
the Sultan to give the advice which is enjoined to me by the orders of
my Government.
_Internuncio_ observes once again how much it would be to be regretted
if the Porte should not conform with promptitude to the wish expressed
by the Allied Courts in the Memorandum of the 14th of November.
No. VII.
LETTER from Lieutenant-Colonel NAPIER to Sir CHARLES NAPIER.
My dear Father, Cairo, February 16, 1841.
I have just returned from a visit to Souliman Pacha, who is a fine
hearty old soldier, and begs to be remembered to you, saying it will be
some time ere he forgets the _cannonnade_ you gave him. I told him how
much you were annoyed at his house having been plundered at Beyrout,
assuring him that the English had nothing to do with it; to which he
replied that he was aware that he was under an obligation on that
account to the Austrians; but he said that some things of his which you
had ordered to be sent to him, had been seized by the _douane_ at
Beyrout, and amongst others some arms from Persia, which he valued much
as curiosities. When his house was plundered all his papers was
destroyed; amongst others some military works of his in manuscript,
which had cost him the labour of years.
Ibrahim Pacha was present at Beckfaya, and mentioned your having taken
off your hat. He was also in person at the crossing of the Jordan, when
we returned in such a hurry to Jerusalem. He says it was merely a
demonstration, which answered the purpose for which it was intended, and
which caused him to gain three marches on us. We had altogether a most
interesting conversation, which lasted upwards of an hour, and during
which he was civil in the extreme, shaking me repeatedly by the hand,
and ended by desiring to be most particularly remembered to you.
_Feb. 17._—Souliman Pacha has just called on me; he is a fine old
fellow. I gave him a bottle of porter; he drank your health, and told me
to let you know he had done so heartily.
He brought back with him 8000 troops of artillery, who were much
harassed by the Arabs from Akaba. He says he put to death every one of
them whom he caught. I did not like to ask him if he had many Syrians
amongst his troops; but I am sorry to inform you that there are a great
many here, who have arrived with the troops from Gaza.
About eight regiments of infantry are now encamped near this, the last
of which arrived yesterday from Gaza, which they left on the 4th
instant; and from what I can learn from the men, they were forced to
accompany the Egyptians. Besides the infantry, a couple of regiments of
lancers have come, some irregular Mogrebins (from the Deserts of Libya),
and some irregular _Turkish_ cavalry _from Anatolia_; I believe about
200. The horses, particularly those of the lancers, are in good
condition, and it is lucky for me that I could not get my mountain
horsemen to approach them[138], as they would have eaten us without
salt. I dine with Souliman the day after to-morrow, and manage to spend
my time pleasantly enough; but I am anxious to hear from our
head-quarters, and have as yet been able to learn nothing positive about
the Emirs, but have sent to Thebes to obtain information.
* * * * * *
The disturbances have already begun in the Hedjaz since the Egyptian
troops have been withdrawn; and a Prophet, calling himself King of the
Land and Sea, has already set up the standard of a religious warfare. _*
* * *_
Your affectionate son,
E. NAPIER.
--------------
No. VIII.
LETTER from BOGHOS BEY to Sir CHARLES
NAPIER.
Commodore, Alexandria, June 19, 1841.
I hasten to acknowledge the receipt of the letter, dated May 27, with
which you have honoured me. Having placed it before His Highness the
Viceroy, I am desired to express his grateful acknowledgements for the
friendly expressions it contains.
On the two points, “of the return of some Syrian soldiers who are still
here, and of the regulation of the monopoly,” which form the principal
object of your letter, I believe that I cannot do better than
transcribe, Commodore, the words which His Highness proffered in reply,
as I have obtained authority to transmit them to you.
“I cannot see the motive why my friend Napier should be in any
difficulty; he who has talked with me, who has seen all, and doubtless,
with his penetration, understood all. No one is ignorant that since the
signing of the Convention with him the difficulty of the question could
not have been made smoother; the affair having been submitted to
different conditions, has been prolonged by negotiations with the Envoy
of the Sublime Porte; and whilst the conditions were under
consideration, they could not be executed, neither could they consider
my conduct strange, still less suppose that I was thereby breaking my
word. Thank God, it is now arranged to the satisfaction of the parties;
the Firman has arrived, and has been solemnly read in public with the
usual ceremonies. I am now only under the necessity of submitting to the
clemency of my Sovereign as to the quota of the tribute. I have already
conferred on this subject with his Envoy here, who is on the point of
setting out, and the matter is almost arranged. Now that the moment has
arrived to put successively into execution the conditions contained in
the above-mentioned Firman, my friend Napier will very soon learn that
what I talked to him about, that what I said to him concerning the
monopoly, will be effected in a manner to promote the interests of the
country; and I hope that his friendship for me will be more than ever
strengthened.”
In sending you, Commodore, on the part of His Highness, the preceding
communication, I am desired also to present his friendly salutations,
and I avail myself of this opportunity in my own person to reiterate the
assurances of the high consideration with which I have the honour to be,
Commodore,
Your very humble and very obedient servant,
BOGHOS JOUSSOUFF.
THE END.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
LONDON:
HARRISON AND CO., PRINTERS,
ST. MARTIN’S LANE.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BY THE SAME AUTHOR.
---
_In Two Volumes, Post Octavo, with Plans, price 21s._,
AN ACCOUNT
OF
THE WAR IN PORTUGAL
BETWEEN DON PEDRO AND DON MIGUEL.
--------------
OPINIONS OF THE PRESS.
“The personal character of the Author is not only impressed upon almost
every page, but the book contains a narrative of one, and to all
appearance the most important of the leaves out of a hero’s life,
written by himself. It is Cæsar’s Commentaries in the first person,
wanting the classical eloquence of the Roman, but equally devoid of his
concealed vanity, and his suspected partiality. Grander battles have
been fought, more gallant never. It is rare to have a description of
such a fight from its hero, even in a gazette; but it is still rarer to
have an account of his feelings.”—_Spectator._
“The gallant Commodore’s description of the battle off Cape St. Vincent
is one of the most stirring nautical sketches that has fallen under our
observation.”—_United Service Gazette._
“An excellent and spirit-stirring book—plain, honest, and straight
forward—the very stuff of which the web of history alone should be
composed. This is, indeed, an honest, fair and impartial
history.”—_Morning Chronicle._
“In spirit and in keeping, from beginning to end, Admiral Napier’s War
in Portugal is the happiest picture we could conceive of the hero of the
battle off Cape St. Vincent, its especial excellence consisting in a
regardless bluntness of manner and language, that is quite admirable and
delightful.”—_Monthly Review._
“If Commodore Napier be not distinguished by the commonplace facilities
of authorship, he possesses the higher qualities of truth, discretion,
end clear-sightedness, in no small degree.”—_Atlas._
“In speaking of himself and his deeds, he has hit the just and difficult
medium—showing his real feelings, yet steering clear of affected modesty
on the one hand, and over-weening egotism on the other hand.”—_Tait’s
Magazine._
“This is a very graphic account of the affairs in which the gallant
author figured so nobly, and added fresh lustre to the name of
Napier.”—_News._
------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Footnotes:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transcriber’s Note
Hyphenation has been retained as printed. Where a word is hyphenated on
a line break, the hyphen is retained or removed depending on instances
elsewhere in the text.
The printer provided a short list of errata for this volume. The changes
indicated there have been incorporated into this text.
In the Table of Contents, the page indicated for Appendix I (p. 301)
should be p. 299, and has been corrected.
The title of Appendix No. VI (Protocol) was misprinted as No. V.
The first footnote, on p. 33, has no anchor in the text. This has been
added at an appropriate point.
Errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been corrected, and
are noted here. The following issues should be noted, along with the
resolutions. The references are to the page and line in the original.
40.4 is disposed to acce[e]pt the submission Removed.
41.3 the 17th Chewal, (the [22nd of November/11th Per Errata.
of December,)
90.21 the quickest _possible co[u/n]veyance_ Inverted.
114.6 after which you[ you] would attack Redundant.
148.6 “[‘]Having arrived at Naplouse, I was to order Removed.
185.17 who was [an-eye witness/an eye-witness] Misplaced.
199.4 [Opposed/Approved] by the other Allied Per Errata.
Ministers
222.5 for their consi[ed/de]ration Transposed.
224.11 it was possible for Mehe[n/m]et Ali Replaced.
242.7 by incurring responsibi[li]ty Inserted,
242.22 I do not intend to[ ]enter into the political Inserted.
merits
262.6 showed no symptoms of fulfil[l]ing Inserted.
262.11 back to their country[,/.] Replaced.
303.26 that you may[ be] pleased to turn your eye Inserted.
318.1 No. V[I]. See Vol. II., page 36 Added.
332.6 with which you have honoured me[.] Added.