Review of the Turco-Egyptian Question—Mehemet Ali not the
Aggressor—Hostile Preparations of the Porte—Representations of the
Allied Powers—What Interests affected by the Independence of Mehemet
Ali—Views of France—Designs of Russia.
The Syrian and Egyptian question being now brought to a close, by the
total evacuation of the former country, and Mehemet Ali’s establishment
in the hereditary pachalic of Egypt almost on his own terms, it is time
to inquire what has been gained by measures that had well nigh plunged
Europe into a war, the end of which no man could have foreseen.
I think every impartial man who has read the correspondence must allow
that Mehemet Ali was not the aggressor. It is quite true he was anxious
to be independent, and no wonder that a man who had acquired such
extensive possessions by the sword should be desirous of emancipating
himself from a weak master. I am not going to justify Mehemet Ali’s
first invasion of Syria: that would have been the time for the Allies to
have discouraged him, and a naval force sent off Acre would have been
quite sufficient to have put an end to his ambitious designs; but
nothing of the sort was done. Mehemet Ali was allowed to follow up one
victory after another, till his road to Constantinople was open, and the
Turks, having been refused assistance by their friends, called in the
Russians to protect them; and the Treaty of Kutayah settled for that
time the Eastern question.
The Allied Powers, on learning that preparations were making for war at
Constantinople, instructed their Ambassadors to urge the Porte to
preserve peace. At the same time Russia took the initiative, and
instructed her Consul to desire Mehemet Ali to recall Ibrahim, and to
withdraw the Egyptian army to Damascus. What right had Russia, after
consenting to the Treaty of Kutayah, to make such a proposal? Would it
not have been safer and wiser, had the Allied Powers preserved the
_status quo_, or even persuaded the Porte to acknowledge Mehemet Ali at
once, and confer on him the government of the countries he had
conquered, stipulating at the same time that he should establish a
milder government in his extensive possessions? It had been proved that
Turkey, weak as she was, was entirely incapable of governing her distant
provinces; and would it not have been better to have given her a
powerful ally who would have been interested in protecting her against
her natural enemy, Russia, than curtailing his power, by restoring
provinces which she had not been able to govern, and at best giving her
a discontented vassal? It may be argued that such a proceeding would
have been dismembering the Turkish empire: I answer, that was already
done by the Treaty of Kutayah, and it would have been much safer to have
let things alone.
Candia, which was entirely separate both from Egypt and Syria, might
have been restored to the Porte; this would have given her more real
strength than she is ever likely to receive from her very imperfect
possession of Syria.
Let us now examine whose interests would have been affected by giving
Mehemet Ali independence. No power in Europe is so much interested in
keeping well with Mehemet Ali as Great Britain, and no power is more
aware of that than France; for in the very first conversation Count Molé
had with Lord Granville[132] he alluded to the subject, and the French
Government have never let slip an opportunity of doing acts of kindness
to Mehemet Ali, so as to keep him as much out of our hands as possible,
and I fear they have too well succeeded. France had opened a
considerable trade with Egypt, and she entertained great fears that
English enterprise would supplant her; no wonder, then, that she should
have befriended the Pacha in every possible way. France is as well aware
as we are, that steam navigation having got to such perfection, Egypt
has become almost necessary to England as the half-way house to India,
and indeed ought to be an English colony. Now if we wished to weaken
Mehemet Ali, with a view, in the event of the breakup of the Turkish
empire, which is not far distant, to have seized Egypt as our share of
the spoil, we were perfectly right in our policy; or even, had we not
looked so far ahead, it might, perhaps, have been politic to have
confined Mehemet Ali to Egypt, so that in the event of his stopping the
road to India by Suez, we might have the road of the Euphrates open, one
remaining in the possession of the Ottoman empire, and the other in that
of the Pacha of Egypt. It is not, however, usual for a Government to
quarrel with their own interests, and it is so decidedly the advantage
of the Pacha of Egypt to facilitate, by every possible means, the
passage across the Isthmus of Suez, that on the whole I believe the
soundest policy of Great Britain would have been to have supported
Mehemet Ali, and I have not the smallest doubt that when France saw we
were committed against him, she seized that opportunity of quitting the
alliance in order to make the Pacha her firm friend.
France, however, though she had all the desire to protect the Pacha,
even at the risk of war, with match lighted ready to put to the gun,
hesitated, and, fortunately for Europe at large, Louis Philippe had
either not nerve to begin the strife, or being desirous of preserving
peace, refused to adopt M. Thiers’ plan of sending the French fleet to
Alexandria. The Ministers resigned, and Europe was saved from a general
conflagration.
What aid France actually promised to the Pacha, or whether she ever
decidedly promised him any, we do not know, but it is not to be supposed
he would have resisted the wishes of the Allied Powers without some hope
of assistance at the last moment. The fall of Acre opened the Pacha’s
eyes; he turned his back on France, and listened to English counsels,
which guided him for a while. But the hostile conduct of our Ambassador
at Constantinople so disgusted him, that he again turned to France, who
received him with open arms, and thus completely destroyed the English
influence in Egypt.
I think I have shown that England had no immediate reason to clip the
Pacha’s wings, and that France supported him because England was against
him. To Prussia it must have been quite indifferent whether Mehemet Ali
kept possession of Syria or not; nor do I see what interest Austria
could possibly have in displacing him—quite the contrary. Russia cannot
be a pleasant neighbour to Austria; and the Porte is a feeble ally. By
raising Mehemet Ali the Porte would have been strengthened; and indeed,
the Pacha, in possession of Syria and Egypt, would have been as much
interested in controlling the power of Russia as the Sultan himself. Who
then was to gain by reducing the power of Mehemet Ali? Russia! and
Russia alone.
The Emperor of that great and powerful state saw clearly that the
duration of the Ottoman empire was drawing to a close; and that, sooner
or later, Russia would be the greatest gainer by its dissolution. It is
not then to be wondered at that she should be content to wait her time,
and accept the legacy that would fall in to her at its demise; and all
she had to do was to prevent a skilful practitioner coming to her
assistance. That practitioner was Mehemet Ali; and had he been supported
by France, England, Austria, and Prussia, his independence, granted by
the Porte and guaranteed by those Powers, would have been a far greater
blow on Russia than she has received for many years; and which blow, I
have no doubt, she would have used every effort to avert. We, however,
fell into her views; the Treaty of the 15th of July was signed; Mehemet
Ali has been sent back to Egypt; the Syrian provinces restored to the
Porte, and she has become weaker than ever.
Various reasons have been given for Mehemet Ali’s obstinate refusal to
listen to the advice of the Allies. At one time it was supposed he was
backed by Russia, who wished for an excuse to come to Constantinople for
the second time; and, indeed, after the battle of Nizib, and the
defection of the Turkish fleet, that was my opinion. To check Russia, I
always thought that the combined fleets should have proceeded at once to
Constantinople, which was the thing, of all others, the Emperor wished
to avoid; and Count Nesselrode distinctly stated to Count Medem, that if
a French fleet appeared in the sea of Marmora, he would withdraw the
Ambassador, and then take such measures as he saw necessary to
re-establish the independence of the Porte[133].
When France began to take a different view of the question from the
other Powers, and support Mehemet Ali, Russia at once came forward, and
despatched Baron Brunnow to England with a letter from the Emperor to
the Queen. Part of the proposal of Russia was that the French and
English should appear off Alexandria, while the Russian fleet should
anchor in the Bosphorus. This France most properly and most decidedly
objected to. Lord Palmerston took the same view; and though he expressed
himself perfectly satisfied with the good intentions of Russia, he was
of opinion that if it was necessary for a Russian force to appear in the
Bosphorus, a British force should be there also. To this, as might be
expected, Baron Brunnow objected, and lamented that the British
Government had not more reliance on the good faith of Russia. After
various discussions, unnecessary to enter upon here, Russia gave up the
point of being the sole protector of Constantinople, and consented to a
small English force being sent there in the event of the Russian fleet
appearing in the Bosphorus[134]. France in consequence withdrew from the
alliance, and the Four Powers decided so far to fall into the views of
Russia as to put down Mehemet Ali, who was the best supporter the
Ottoman empire could have had, and give back Syria to the Porte, and
thereby accelerate her fall.
The defection of France brought the other Powers closer together; and
the insurrection breaking out in Lebanon hastened the signing of the
Treaty of the 15th of July. We have seen that the movement was put down
by the energy of the Pacha; and that he refused the conditions that were
offered to him, and determined to defend himself; and, under all
circumstances, I think he was right. He had good intelligence from
Constantinople; he knew the Turkish Government could only spare a very
small force; he knew we had only 1500 marines in the fleet; he was quite
certain that Prussia would send no troops to Syria; and he did not think
that Austria would; and he was sensible that Great Britain, Austria, and
Prussia, would be very unwilling to call in the military assistance of
Russia, which would also be disagreeable to the Porte. Besides this, he
had a very large army in Syria, which had always been victorious, and
was well commanded, and the season of the year was far advanced, and not
a safe harbour or anchorage (with the exception of Scanderoun, which was
too far distant) on the coast where our ships could take shelter in the
winter. In addition to all this, he was backed by France, and was
determined to put every thing to the hazard of a die; and had his views
been properly followed up, he must have succeeded.
Footnote 132:
See _Levant Papers_, Part I., p. 1.
Footnote 133:
See _Levant Papers_, Part I., p. 307.
Footnote 134:
See _Levant Papers_, Part I., p. 553.