Conduct of Mr. Wood—His Letter to the Seraskier examined—His Advice
disregarded by the British Officers—Mission of Colonel Alderson to
Gaza—Colonel Rose’s Account of the State of Ibrahim’s Army—Colonel
Alderson’s Character of Ibrahim Pacha—Death of General Michell.
I do not think blame can be attached to General Jochmus for having done
all he could to cripple Ibrahim, if he was acting under proper
authority; but whether his orders were from the English Ambassador or
the Sultan is not clear: both General Michell and Captain Stewart speak
of the Ambassador’s orders[53]. If so, I do not think he was justified
in obeying them; on the other hand, if his orders were from the Sultan’s
minister, or from the the Seraskier, he was quite right. I think,
however, he put too much reliance in the reports that were made to him
of numerous loss inflicted on the Egyptian army, which he speaks of with
much complacency, and which I hope and believe was very much
exaggerated.
As to Mr. Wood, he was quite in a different capacity, and what right he
had, as a British subject, to put the interpretation he did on Sir
Robert Stopford’s orders, I do not know.
In the first paragraph of his letter[54], he says the women and sick
were to be embarked, and that Ibrahim Pacha must provide other means of
withdrawing his army; now the despatches say, women, sick, and others of
the Egyptian army, which meant any portion that Ibrahim thought proper;
but even if the term was not clear, as Syria was to be evacuated without
delay, why was Mr. Wood to take upon himself to point out the way in
which it ought to be done?
In the second paragraph he says that it is “understood that Ibrahim must
re-enter Egypt by the Desert, or by El Arish, which is the direct road,
and the easiest; and by leaving the road free, we act in conformity with
the desire of Mazloum Bey and of the Commodore, to offer every facility
for his retreat without compromising our military position.”
Mazloum Bey, in his letter to the Seraskier, read before the council,
according to Mr. Wood, says the impression at Constantinople was that
the Egyptian army was disorganized; but that Commodore Napier undeceived
him, and pretended that it was in a situation to resist the Imperial
army, and that he did not venture to insist on Mehemet Ali giving up the
Syrian conscripts, and his arms, guns, and military stores, agreeably to
the orders of the Porte; but as they were on the spot, they must be the
best judges whether or no they ought to insist on these two conditions.
I do Mazloum Bey the justice of saying that he was much wiser than the
Divan, for had he proposed those terms, Mehemet Ali would not have given
up one ship.
Mr. Wood then goes on to advise, that in consequence of the complete
disorganization of the Egyptian army, the want of provisions, and the
small number of men capable of resistance, the destruction of Maan, the
passage over the Desert of Souliman, and the retrograde movement of
Ibrahim Pacha with a handful of men without artillery, and as there was
now nothing to fear from their antagonist, he should be obliged to ask
permission to come to Gaza, which should only be granted on condition of
giving up the Syrian troops, his guns, stores, and arms.
According to Mr. Wood’s reasoning, this would be, affording him “the
facilities required by Mazloum Bey and Commodore Napier;” and “if he
persisted in coming to Gaza without those conditions, he would be the
aggressor, and must trust to the consequences.”
He finishes by saying, this is his humble opinion, founded on mature
reflection; and he cannot conceal from himself the danger of Ibrahim
coming to Gaza, where he might recruit his army, and allow his father to
negotiate more advantageously. “Even now,” he adds, “his General at Gaza
has instructions not to attack us, but to deliver up Gaza only with his
life. From such facts, your Excellency may judge of the bad faith of the
vassal who refuses to surrender his arms on the demand of his Sovereign,
which renders his submission incomplete, and even doubtful.” Really, Mr.
Wood is a true disciple of the Ambassador’s school; he does not perceive
that not the Egyptians, but the Turks, were guilty of bad faith from
beginning to end; and that, if the officer at Gaza had delivered it up,
Ibrahim’s army would have been compromised.
Fortunately for the honour of the Porte there were wiser men on the spot
who decided to follow neither the advice of the General nor that of the
Diplomatist, and I should like to have seen the faces of these latter
when they heard of the arrival of Ibrahim’s cavalry, and the near
approach of the infantry.
Next day the accounts came in of the arrival of the Egyptians, and
Captain Stewart most wisely sent Colonel Alderson, at the desire of
General Michell, with instructions[56], very properly saying nothing
about the advance by columns of 3000 men. The mode in which Colonel
Alderson acquitted himself of his delicate mission may be best told in
his own words[55]:—
“Being selected for this duty, I left Jaffa on the afternoon of the
22nd, with my instructions, and arrived the following day at Gaza. I
immediately waited on the commanding officer, Achmet Menekli Pacha, the
General of Cavalry, who had arrived two days previous, with eight
regiments of cavalry, after much fatigue and suffering, and annoyance
also from the attacks of the Arabs in the interest of the Turkish
authorities.
“On my first interview with the Egyptian General, I urged the necessity
of their immediately commencing their retreat, so as not to assemble a
large force in Gaza. At first this was stated to be impossible till the
arrival of Ibrahim, or orders from him to that effect, but the following
morning, on going to see the General at the camp, he agreed to commence
the retreat on the 26th, if Ibrahim did not in the mean time arrive, and
that a brigade of cavalry, (two regiments) should march daily.
“On the 25th, five regiments of infantry arrived, and on the day
following, five more, each consisting of four battalions; they were
evidently much fatigued and reduced in numbers, and stated that they had
not had rations for the last seven, nor water for the last three days.
“This day Captain Houston Stewart arrived in the Hecate, with Colonel
Rose, who came to go in search of Ibrahim, Rechid Pacha, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Napier. We all went to the General Achmet Menekli
Pacha’s quarters, to urge the propriety of not obliging the Syrians to
return to Egypt, but, as he said he had no powers to interfere, it was
determined on sending off a letter to Commodore Napier[57], for an order
from Mehemet Ali to this effect, as well as to order Ibrahim to retire
in columns of 3000 men, and not assemble a large force at Gaza.
“On the 28th a council was held, at which Captain Stewart and myself
attended.
“We requested that a pledge should be given that Ibrahim would, on his
arrival, carry into execution the orders of his father, Mehemet Ali, for
the evacuation of Syria. This was at once done without the slightest
hesitation. Indeed Hourschid Pacha, a fine old man, with a magnificent
white beard, who commanded the irregular force, stated he had been forty
years in Mehemet Ali’s service, and during the whole of that period had
never once known Ibrahim to refuse to obey his father’s orders.
“On receiving this guarantee we, in the name of the united forces of
Great Britain, pledged ourselves that no molestation or obstacle should
be put in the way of such evacuation, nor any advance of the Turkish
troops at Medjdel take place, until I had reported the evacuation
complete.
“This pledge was approved and confirmed by the Seraskier at Jaffa[58],
and the evacuation went on afterwards with confidence.
“This measure had become absolutely necessary from the Egyptians’
evident want of confidence in the Turks; they feared that as soon as
they had so far weakened their force at Gaza as to be incapable of
resistance, the Turks might attack them.
“Colonel Rose having been also sent in search of Ibrahim, with a copy of
the Convention, and a letter from General Michell and Captain Stewart,
after much disappointment, arising from the determination on the part of
the Arabs not to conduct any one to Ibrahim, if indeed they knew where
to find him, fell in with him on the 31st (January), in the Desert,
about four hours from Gaza, which town he entered with him between 4 and
5 P.M. the same afternoon.
“The General-in-Chief appeared much fatigued, and very unwell, and had
no doubt suffered much on the journey round the east and south sides of
the Dead Sea. He brought with him about 5000 troops.”
Colonel Rose, soon after this, went to Constantinople, and upon his
arrival at Therapia, made a report to Lord Ponsonby on the state of
Ibrahim’s army, which differs a good deal from that of the other
officers. I give a short extract from the document[59].
“When I came up with Ibrahim Pacha’s column, there were two lines of
videttes flanking it towards the Syrian side,—mounted and dismounted
cavalry—to prevent desertion. I rode for several miles along the column,
which was in great disorder—in fact it was quite broken up; groups of
men in twos and threes, some armed, some not, others hardly able to
walk. I saw two standards, one without any escort, the other with a
guard of two men: they must have belonged to battalions which had been
broken up on account of their casualties. Ibrahim Pacha’s own horses had
had no barley that day; the troops had been three days without water,
and had subsisted chiefly on mule and donkey flesh, which sold at a high
price: 200 determined cavalry might have swept away all that part of the
column which I saw (I entered it at about two-thirds of its length,)
with great ease.
“Ibrahim Pacha did not appear pleased when I gave him Mehemet Ali’s
letter. He was agitated, and it took him five minutes to read it,
although it only consisted of four lines. Whilst he was thus employed,
his camel-rider and chief groom were also endeavouring to read it over
his shoulder. I rode with him for about four hours, and accompanied him
to Gaza; he spoke with considerable bitterness of the Turks. He said,
‘Why have you turned out the Seraskier[60]?’ I said that the Turkish
Government had, I believed, recalled him, because they were not
satisfied with his conduct. He answered, ‘Oh! they are all alike; they
smoke all day, and have people to wash their hands.’ I said, ‘The
present Seraskier is a very good man and soldier.’ ‘Oh yes,’ he replied,
‘as long as he is in the saddle; as soon as he sits down he will rob
like the rest’—on which he laughed very much. ‘I am the only man,’ he
said, ‘to manage the Arabs and Bedouins, who never had any master before
me. I could and did cut off their heads, which the Turks never will do.
Lord Palmerston from London, and Lord Ponsonby from Constantinople, will
have to come here to manage Syria.’ I said, that certainly they had done
so much without coming to the country, that there was no knowing what
they might effect, were they actually to do so. He did not look pleased.
It appeared to me that he was either affecting high spirits, or that he
had been drinking too much. He drank frequently from a bottle which hung
in front of his saddle, and I was informed by an Egyptian Colonel of
Artillery that it was filled with claret. He talked and laughed
constantly with his servants. He is now suffering under a very bad
attack of the jaundice, his eyes and head being quite yellow.
“His reception at Gaza was remarkable: the people flocked from curiosity
to see him, but his entry formed a singular contrast to that of the
Turkish troops into the different towns and villages which they had
occupied for the first time. In the latter case, the reception was
enthusiastic, the men lining the roads and saluting us with all the
varieties of an Eastern welcome, and the women crowding the house-tops
and making with their tongues that extraordinary noise which is meant to
denote extreme pleasure; but with Ibrahim Pacha there was a look of
deep-rooted dislike on the faces of the people, which even their dread
of him could not conceal. He, contrary to the Eastern fashion, saluted
no one,—not one saluted him; certainly, as an inhabitant afterwards said
to me, ‘Not a tongue nor a heart blessed him.’”
Colonel Alderson had necessarily some intercourse with Ibrahim Pacha,
and his character of that renowned personage is well worth quoting.
“From the frequent opportunities I had of seeing and conversing with
Ibrahim Pacha, (if asking questions through an interpreter deserve that
name,) it may be expected of me to give some description of this
extraordinary man. His appearance fully corresponds with his known
character, a voluptuous despot; one who, to all the vices of the East,
adds that of great indulgence in the table.
“He is considerably past his prime, being I believe fifty-six or
fifty-seven years old, and very fat, with a large full projecting eye, a
handsome nose, (like all natives of the East,) a broad forehead
projecting over the eyes, then suddenly retiring very much,
strongly-marked eyebrows, and a thin gray moustache.
“He is evidently a man of considerable talent, and when called for, of
great energy, and appeared to have the most unbounded control over those
by whom he was surrounded, partly from fear, partly from the known
energy and cruelty of his character, and the confidence they had in his
succeeding in what he undertakes.
“His smile was anything but agreeable, and would, I think, have sat on
his features, whether ordering an execution or welcoming a guest.
“When amongst his generals, if in a good humour, he showed it by
practical jokes, pulling the beard of one, hitting another with his
fist, or pushing them about; they seemed to bear it as you would the
fondling of a tamed lion or tiger whelp which his master assured you was
quite safe, but which you felt might end in something less agreeable if
you resented any of his rough jokes.
“He has, however, the character of possessing considerable personal
courage, and is counted a good soldier, though many think he owes much
of his success to the talents of Souliman Pacha.
“I did not pay him many gossiping visits, because he was deficient in
the usual forms of Eastern courtesy, seldom offering coffee, never
pipes; besides, having been so lately in arms against him, I felt I had
no right to intrude myself excepting when required to do so in the
execution of my duty. This he remarked, and sent his German physician to
me to complain of my avoiding him, with some flattering compliments
about me as a soldier, and the regard he had for the profession.
“I consequently waited on him next day with Lieutenant Loring, R.N.; he
received us with loud expressions of joy, made us sit down, ordered
coffee, and, asking if we liked music, sent for an Arab band, consisting
of a violin, like a tenor, but with five strings, a dulcimer, and
guitar, with two men who sang; the music itself was bearable, but when
the men commenced singing at the top of their voices it was anything but
harmonious. His Highness certainly has no very refined taste in music.
“He was, when we entered, surrounded by his generals playing vingt-un
for handfuls of gazees (dollars); he showed his character here too,
always ready to back his own play, and was loud in his expressions of
delight when successful. He apologized for being found so employed, but
said, they had nothing else to do there, but that when at Cairo they had
their farms to attend to and plenty of business to occupy their time.”
The second day after the departure of Colonel Alderson, that good and
gallant officer General Michell fell a sacrifice to the climate and the
fatigue he suffered on the Gaza expedition, and Colonel Bridgeman
succeeded to the command.
Colonel Alderson remarks, “The cold caught by General Michell, that
wretched night of incessant rain, that followed the affair of Medjdel,
under single canvass, acting on a delicate frame, arising from repeated
wounds received in an hundred fights, together with, I firmly believe,
the mortification he felt at the result of the movement on Gaza, brought
on a fever, under which poor Michell sank in a few days. He died at
Jaffa on the 24th of January, at noon.
“It falls to the lot of few soldiers to earn so high a reputation in the
profession as Brigadier-General Michell had done; fewer still, who to
these high military acquirements have united a mind so highly
cultivated. He was too well known in the military world to enable me to
add anything to his well-earned reputation. I may, however, be
permitted, as a friend, to say that, having been his constant companion
since we left Spain together, I deeply felt and deplored his loss; and
that a life so valuable to his country should have been _thus_ so
prematurely cut off.
“His remains were deposited in a vault hastily constructed by the
British sappers, in what is called the English, or South-Eastern
Bastion, at Jaffa, for which a marble slab is now preparing at Malta, as
a slight memorial of the great respect and esteem in which he was held
by his brother officers.”
Footnote 53:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., pp. 203, 268.
Footnote 54:
Letter to the Seraskier and Hussein Pacha, dated January 21, 1841.
_Levant Papers_, Part III., pp. 275, 276.
Footnote 55:
_Memorandum for Colonel Alderson’s guidance._
Jaffa, January 22, 1841.
Accounts having been received by the Seraskier that a considerable
number of Egyptian troops have advanced towards Gaza, his Excellency
has requested that an English officer of rank and discretion should
proceed to the quarters of the Egyptian officer commanding the troops
in that neighbourhood, to act as Conservator of the Peace. In all
probability the Egyptian Commandant will not feel himself authorized
to order any of these troops to retire until he shall receive
directions from Ibrahim Pacha; but you will point out to him the
evident necessity that exists for the avoidance of any the smallest
act of hostility or plunder, if he would not break the Convention and
renew the war. So long as you are satisfied that he is acting in good
faith, and doing everything possible to maintain order and peace
towards the Turkish troops and inhabitants of the neighbourhood, you
will remain with him, taking occasion at all times to point out and to
urge upon him the propriety of hastening, by any means in his power,
the evacuation of Syria, in the terms of Mehemet Ali Pacha’s order to
his son Ibrahim Pacha. Should you have reason to object to any of his
proceedings, you will at once remonstrate and protest: should he
persist, you will formally take your leave, and immediately return to
the British head-quarters, giving notice that you have done so to the
officer commanding the nearest post of the Ottoman troops, and putting
him on his guard. You will communicate with head-quarters as
frequently as possible, and notify as exactly as you can the number
and state of the Egyptian troops in that district.
You will have with you copies of the letters which have been forwarded
to Ibrahim Pacha, and of Commodore Sir Charles Napier’s letters from
Alexandria to General Michell and to Captain Stewart. The Seraskier
Pacha has declared that he has no design to deprive the Egyptians of
their arms, baggage, or guns; and that he wishes, by every fair and
safe means, to facilitate the retirement from Syria of the Egyptian
forces. Copies of the instructions given to the officers sent to
Ibrahim Pacha, and to accompany General Jochmus, will also be
furnished to you: and you will observe that the immediate evacuation
of Syria is the principal object to which all others are to be
considered as secondary.
By desire of GENERAL MICHELL,
(Signed) HOUSTON STEWART.
Footnote 56:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 307.
Footnote 57:
See page 89.
Footnote 58:
See these documents in pages 176-178.
Footnote 59:
See _Levant Papers_, Part III., p. 329.
Footnote 60:
“Izzet Pacha.”